{ "version": 1, "source_catalog": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "scope": { "from": "2016-01-01", "geography": "US nationwide" }, "updated": "2026-09-25T14:10:00-07:00", "categories": [ { "id": "cat-1", "title": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "focus": "Shaping public opinion, misinformation, and demoralization to control narratives and suppress opposition.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Linguistic Deception", "children": [ { "name": "Exploit public ignorance and ambiguity in terminology. Examples", "children": [ { "name": "Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Deception", "children": [], "detail": "Citizens are directed to demand \"hand-marked paper ballots\" as a perceived solution for verifiable elections. The term is exploited because it only requires voters to mark paper ballots by hand, which are then fed into electronic tabulation machines for counting. Once implemented, officials claim compliance (\"You already have hand-marked paper ballots\"), while the actual counting remains opaque and machine-dependent. This channels public energy into an ineffective reform that fails to deliver hand-counted results, creating frustration and demoralization without achieving meaningful transparency." }, { "name": "Air-Gapped Systems Deception", "children": [], "detail": "Election officials and the public are told that electronic voting systems are \"air-gapped\" (completely isolated from networks), implying they are secure from external interference or remote manipulation. The term is misused because many systems are not truly isolated in practice-due to memory cards, USB transfers, wired/wireless/modem connections, or administrative access-yet officials, lacking deep technical understanding, accept the claim and project false confidence. This discourages scrutiny from citizen experts, reinforces institutional dismissal of concerns, and maintains the illusion of security while vulnerabilities persist undetected." }, { "name": "Encryption Deception", "children": [], "detail": "Voting system vendors and officials promote \"encryption\" as a key security feature that protects election data. In reality, encryption serves primarily as a form of obfuscation that conceals potential manipulation from public view. What should be prioritized instead is verifiable data integrity through full transparency, where all processes and data remain visible and auditable at every step. Transparency and verifiable integrity supersede hidden mechanisms; that which cannot be seen cannot be independently verified. This semantic framing creates a false sense of protection while enabling undetectable alterations." } ] } ] }, { "name": "Psychological Operations", "children": [ { "name": "Misinforming the public with information dominance", "children": [ { "name": "will not understand the battlefield", "children": [] }, { "name": "will fight each other", "children": [] }, { "name": "will not listen to each other", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Distracting the public", "children": [ { "name": "will waste their resources", "children": [] }, { "name": "will drain them emotionally", "children": [] }, { "name": "will dilute their efforts", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Demoralizing citizens", "children": [ { "name": "causes loss of hope", "children": [] }, { "name": "causes loss of courage", "children": [] }, { "name": "causes loss of confidence", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Influence Operations", "children": [ { "name": "Create another media system, 'social media'", "children": [] }, { "name": "Incentivize people to become influencers", "children": [] }, { "name": "Use influences to manipulate public opinion", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Media", "children": [ { "name": "Push the narrative of 'security' and 'accuracy' until people start believing it.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Discredit any entity that questions security or accuracy of election, so the people ignore or discount the presented facts.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "children": [ { "name": "Suppressing visible support (flags, signs, stickers) makes it seem as though there's less backing for one side than actually exists.", "children": [] }, { "name": "This alters perceptions so that when results are falsified to favor another candidate, those manipul...", "children": [], "detail": "This alters perceptions so that when results are falsified to favor another candidate, those manipulated believe the stolen victory was more plausible because they were misled about how popular their preferred candidate truly was." }, { "name": "The tactic leverages fear and self-censorship to create a false reality where fraud is harder to detect.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Examples", "children": [ { "name": "Targeted Removal", "children": [], "detail": "Removing candidate signs or flags from lawns through vandalism, theft, or staged incidents makes it seem as though support isn't widespread." }, { "name": "Public Shaming/Intimidation", "children": [], "detail": "Attacks on individuals wearing pro-Trump gear create a climate where others self-censor to avoid harassment." }, { "name": "Media Pressure", "children": [], "detail": "News coverage exaggerating the lack of visible support for one side further distorts perceptions before an election." } ] } ] }, { "name": "Forced Opposition Projection", "children": [ { "name": "Manufactured rallies and similar orchestrated protests function as a display of opposition designed to distort perceptions about public sentiment.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Artificial Crowd Generation", "children": [], "detail": "organizers bus in supporters from outside local areas instead of relying on organic turnout. This creates the illusion that there's wider support for a particular agenda than actually exists, making it seem more mainstream and legitimizing attacks against certain supporters." }, { "name": "How It Works", "children": [ { "name": "Bus-In Tactics", "children": [], "detail": "Protesters are brought in from cities or regions where political opposition is already concentrated, ensuring a larger-than-realistic crowd presence. This bypasses the need for local grassroots support." }, { "name": "Media Amplification", "children": [], "detail": "Media coverage focuses on the size of the \"organic\" protest rather than questioning its artificial nature, creating the perception that there's overwhelming public demand against a movement." }, { "name": "Suppression Reinforcement", "children": [], "detail": "The illusion of widespread opposition normalizes hostility towards those who support a particular movement, further suppressing visible allegiance through fear and self-censorship. If a rally looks large and popular, others will be less likely to openly oppose it for risk of backlash or social ostracization. The tactic is effective because many people base their opinions on surface appearances (e.g., how \"big\" something appears in media) rather than deeper engagement with issues. It works best when combined with other suppression strategies like attacking certain supporters, making the fake rally look more credible by association." } ] } ] }, { "name": "Fear/Discredit Tactics", "children": [ { "name": "Compromise some people by getting them to commit election crimes", "children": [] }, { "name": "Target/attack/discredit everyone that reports or discusses election crimes to make them an example and scare others from reporting election crimes", "children": [] }, { "name": "Target/attack/discredit any attorneys/election officials/legislators/judges/etc to dissuade them and any others from getting involved", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Intimidation", "children": [ { "name": "Inorganic intimidation / hate spam", "children": [], "detail": "It generally starts with hate spam - messages delivered to you in some fashion, whether by phone, email, over social media or some other form of communication. People you don't know, who don't know anyone who knows you, and who don't appear to have any particular connection to anything you are involved in, suddenly decide they hate you in particular and they want you to know it, repeatedly, in volume. It is phony, contrived and organized. It is called inorganic intimidation because it is not natural." }, { "name": "The main characteristic of inorganic intimidation and interference operations is that the point is t...", "children": [], "detail": "The main characteristic of inorganic intimidation and interference operations is that the point is to stop you from doing whatever you were doing - the attacks sustain over time rather than waning. You were successful at something they didn't like, therefore they will shut you down." }, { "name": "Mailing list stuffing attacks", "children": [], "detail": "To bring this home, almost every Republican campaign and organization gets hit by mailing list stuffing attacks, the purpose of which is to load you up with spam flags so that your emails no longer reach inboxes, effectively silencing you in that medium. This was discussed at length in a pair of Virginia Project newsletters last year (Losing the War in Cyberspace | Alice in Cyberspace). These are swarm-intimidation events." }, { "name": "The ranks of conservatives and Republicans who have been targeted by this means are already consider...", "children": [], "detail": "The ranks of conservatives and Republicans who have been targeted by this means are already considerable - they include, among others, the current Virginia Lieutenant Governor - as is the material damage done to GOP electioneering operations. It will only increase over time - unless we put our foot down and end the proliferation of these unlawful practices with robust application of the law." }, { "name": "We know how to handle brute-force intimidation through multiple communication vectors", "children": [], "detail": "do not react fearfully; never respond; do not read threatening communications, just record everything; and when the evidence you collect crosses the threshold of probable cause, bring in law enforcement and/or call in a lawyer to collect damages from perpetrators. This intimidation is unlawful interference against our campaigns and activism." }, { "name": "We know that Virginia Democrats will, in fact, conspire amongst themselves to raise money to hire criminal hackers to attack your online assets. This likely happens across the country.", "children": [] }, { "name": "To combat the above", "children": [], "detail": "Re-code websites from the ground up with an integrated software firewall with enhanced traffic analysis and reporting capabilities, and a component what I suppose marketing agencies might these days call a \"network application security AI.\" Develop an entire security layer of an application that can execute in less than 50 milliseconds, distinguishing real \"customers\" from both the ongoing hostile background noise of the Internet as well as targeted and sustained cyberattacks from abroad." }, { "name": "Social media companies are avenues by these gangs to hijack their content moderation processes", "children": [], "detail": "Social media companies are avenues by these gangs to hijack their content moderation processes. Never rely on a social media platform alone, but if it happens exchange with that company's litigation team to expose unfair tactics against GOPers and candidates." }, { "name": "As a Republican, you need this system to protect yourself from the illegal things that Democrats, as...", "children": [], "detail": "As a Republican, you need this system to protect yourself from the illegal things that Democrats, as well as other enemies of the American people, will do to your communications. So say goodbye to \"my county GOP committee doesn't have a website\" and all the votes left on the table." }, { "name": "The Virginia Project believes they have gotten the mission of helping Twitter fix its account exploitation bugs", "children": [], "detail": "The Virginia Project believes they have gotten the mission of helping Twitter fix its account exploitation bugs. If you have been the victim of an unexplained account lock out on that platform, please email a description of your experience and the username of the account." }, { "name": "The Biden Administration is using, among other things yet to be explained, the EU 'Digital Services Act' to censor domestic opposition on social media.", "children": [] } ], "detail": "reference is The Virginia Project Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush" }, { "name": "Fake polling results", "children": [] }, { "name": "Manipulated betting markets", "children": [] } ] }, { "id": "cat-2", "title": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "focus": "Inserting agents or co-opting organizations and officials to monitor, disrupt, or redirect efforts from within.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Fake Groups", "children": [ { "name": "Claim to be on our side", "children": [] }, { "name": "Suck up money", "children": [] }, { "name": "Suck up attention", "children": [] }, { "name": "Redirect the citizens away from real solutions", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Infiltrators", "children": [ { "name": "These will inject themselves into existing groups", "children": [] }, { "name": "They will make themselves sound great", "children": [] }, { "name": "They may even provide some help to gain people's confidence", "children": [] }, { "name": "Then they start playing people against each other", "children": [] }, { "name": "They cause disruptions", "children": [] }, { "name": "They cause distractions", "children": [] }, { "name": "They may get the group to do something that can then be used to discredit the group", "children": [] }, { "name": "Sometimes they do this work through another unsuspecting person in the group so nobody expects it.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Infiltration of Grass Root Orgs", "children": [ { "name": "Cabal may co-op the Leader of grassroots election org and pass / receive info thus monitoring and controlling efforts. The leader/org may have no idea they are being used.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Cabal may bait honest citizens into frivolous lawsuit to discredit and demoralize group.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Infiltration of Offices", "children": [ { "name": "We have seen many of the following individuals be put into positions over a period of time, operating in lock-step inhibiting transparency and verifiability in elections:", "children": [ { "name": "Governor", "children": [] }, { "name": "Secretaries of State", "children": [] }, { "name": "County Attorneys", "children": [] }, { "name": "County Sheriffs", "children": [] }, { "name": "County IT Staff", "children": [] }, { "name": "County Judges", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Usurpation of Election Officials", "children": [ { "name": "The systems are too complex and vulnerable for election officials to understand", "children": [] }, { "name": "Election officials must completely rely on assigned 'cybersecurity' experts who are in effect actually controlling our elections", "children": [] }, { "name": "They have election security/information dominance, controlling exactly what our representative officials know", "children": [] }, { "name": "Election Officials that resign prior to the end of their term could be replaced by an 'appointed' individual not beholden to the citizens", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "County Clerks Association", "children": [ { "name": "NGO paid by counties and unaccountable to county's electors", "children": [] }, { "name": "Instruct clerks they serve as \"Agents of the Secretary of State\"", "children": [] }, { "name": "Instruct clerks to trust machines and vendors", "children": [] }, { "name": "Convince clerks that electors are dangerous and to be feared", "children": [] }, { "name": "Instruct clerks to \"forget\" to notify (Republican) party chairmen to appoint Canvass Board members, so clerks can appoint them on behalf of party", "children": [] }, { "name": "Intimidate Canvass Board members who don't certify elections", "children": [] }, { "name": "Work closely with Secretary of State to pass rules, statutes, and laws centralizing elections under government control", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Law Enforcement", "children": [ { "name": "Sheriffs are being sequestered into the service of the county (corporation) and state through interlocal agreements and county policies.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Training for sheriffs is provided by the county attorney's office. This is an usurpation of the People's protection against government officials acting unlawfully.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Push out good officers to make room for bad officers that will not uphold the constitution.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Media attack on law enforcement", "children": [] }, { "name": "Turn citizens against police, police against citizens", "children": [] }, { "name": "Force retirement of law enforcement by making it miserable to be a good officer", "children": [] }, { "name": "Lack of education of Sheriff's rights/duties", "children": [] }, { "name": "Compromised and blackmailed judges/prosecutors", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Political Parties", "children": [ { "name": "Fuel further division rather than unity on fair elections.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Make non-partisan positions, partisan.", "children": [ { "name": "AZ Clerk and Recorder", "children": [] }, { "name": "DASS - Democratic Secretaries of State", "children": [] }, { "name": "etc.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Do not adhere to (or don't know) their duties to provide Election Judges, Poll Watchers, and Audit and Canvass Board members", "children": [] }, { "name": "Don't exert their authority over election operations as representatives of the electors, which is greater than that of the clerks and SOS who are \"elected\"", "children": [] }, { "name": "Don't hold the election officials accountable for providing honest elections", "children": [] }, { "name": "Fail their constituents by not demanding honest elections", "children": [] }, { "name": "Are likely gaining power or monetary benefits by their complicity in election manipulation", "children": [] }, { "name": "There are no teeth (consequences) in many of the laws, therefore nothing to prohibit people breaking the laws, paving the way for abuse under false sense of security.", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "id": "cat-3", "title": "3. Financial / Campaign / Candidate Manipulation", "focus": "Controlling resources, candidates, and primaries to limit viable options and waste opposition efforts.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Cost to run", "children": [ { "name": "Increase cost to run for office/positions, so only someone with big money behind them can afford run, disenfranchising ordinary American Citizens.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Campaign Consultants - There is a group of consultants coordinating to covertly subvert the candidates they represent", "children": [ { "name": "Suck money", "children": [] }, { "name": "Subtly sabotage campaigns", "children": [] }, { "name": "Share information with cabal", "children": [] }, { "name": "Control information flow", "children": [] }, { "name": "Block opportunities", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Campaigns", "children": [ { "name": "Many campaign managers are controlled opposition and attempt to control and spy on citizen candidates", "children": [] }, { "name": "Campaign financial manager may waste funds or violate laws in order to compromise the candidate they pretend to support", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Candidate Engineering", "children": [ { "name": "Candidates changing parties to give themselves a competitive advantage while deceiving the citizens.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Sleeper Candidates - They have their people already embedded in opposite party, positioned to be placed in a race to split votes.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bad Candidates - They purposely support candidates on our side that", "children": [ { "name": "Are controllable through compromise", "children": [] }, { "name": "Don't have what it takes to pull through, sucking up donor dollars and wasting resources.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Will cause chaos", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "They find a candidate B with a similar name to run against candidate A to confuse the voters to bleed votes", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Districting/Gerrymandering", "children": [] }, { "name": "Primaries - Cheat every way possible to control the endorsed candidates", "children": [ { "name": "Bribe others to run to split the vote", "children": [] }, { "name": "Hire people to Bad-mouth opponents", "children": [] }, { "name": "Open-Primaries - These can be used to cheat! They allow the opposing party to control who is on the ticket. Open-Primaries are a trojan horse.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Cheat using the voting system", "children": [ { "name": "Allow 'delegate' votes, then control the delegates", "children": [] }, { "name": "Add 'anonymous' votes during voting process (see CA GOP)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Pre-make slides to show pre-determined outcomes, and show those instead of the real-time votes (citizens don't know the difference)", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Ranked-choice voting", "children": [ { "name": "There are many reasons this is a bad idea. One of them is that it is so complicated that it REQUIRES a computer tabulate and LOCKS us into using computerized tabulation. That ALONE is reason to boot it.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Allows covert election manipulation hidden in the complexity of the calculations", "children": [] }, { "name": "RCV information", "children": [] }, { "name": "Behind RCV", "children": [ { "name": "Behind RCV: Open Society / FairVote", "children": [], "detail": "Open Society - 'Fair Vote'" }, { "name": "Behind RCV: Tides Foundation / Unite America", "children": [], "detail": "Tides Foundation - 'Unite America'" }, { "name": "Behind RCV: GEHL / Action Now", "children": [], "detail": "GEHL - 'Action Now'" } ] }, { "name": "Beware of RCV implemented under a different name.", "children": [] } ], "detail": "Ranked-choice voting (See @Ranked Choice Voting (RCV))" } ] }, { "id": "cat-4", "title": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "focus": "Using laws, bills, and legal tactics to enable manipulation, restrict access, and delay accountability.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Legislation", "children": [ { "name": "They inundate legislators with so many lengthy bills, nobody has a chance to read them.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They get naïve legislators to carry 'election integrity' bills as a good 'compromise' (e.g., 2026 HB95 in AL)", "children": [] }, { "name": "They disguise bills building in trojan horses", "children": [] }, { "name": "They create legislation, then later change the definition of the terms used in the previous legislation. Bait and switch.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They create a sacrificial bill to put on the ballot that gets a certain group riled up in order to increase biased voter participation.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They sneak legislation changes into the state budget (including legislation that moves representation away from the governed)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Passing bills to eliminate hand counted ballots (e.g., AB969 in CA).", "children": [] }, { "name": "Laws are created to give people the sense of security, which turns false because they then don't follow the laws.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Laws are created to restrict access by the citizens, blocking us from being able to see or verify our own election system", "children": [], "detail": "Laws are created to restrict access by the citizens, blocking us from being able to see or verify our own election system. This is done SUBTLY, and/or hidden in other legislation. They SNEAK THESE LAWS IN! (e.g., 2026 HB67 in AL)" }, { "name": "There is no reasonable penalty attached to breaking election laws.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Requiring municipalities to use county election systems in order to centralize and control downstream elections.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Lawfare", "children": [ { "name": "Out-lawyer the citizens so they cannot afford representation to fight with equal force", "children": [] }, { "name": "Attack the citizen attorneys (personal attacks, lawsuits, go after their license, etc.)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Refuse to hear case and evidence due to 'lack of standing'", "children": [] }, { "name": "Blocking evidence", "children": [ { "name": "Play word games and feign confusion with the information requests (they play stupid on purpose)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Push citizens to the point of lawsuit, then claim they cannot release the records due to lawsuit", "children": [] }, { "name": "Delay information release until suddenly the information is gone for some reason (hard drive crash, backup failure, etc.)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Cases are moved to jury trials to induce additional costs to pursue.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Delay tactics are frequently used to kick the can down, then leave no time to get anything fixed.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Harassing and countersuing the plaintiffs and asking judges for motions to reconsider to drain our finances and harass plaintiffs", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Delay Tactics in fixing election issues", "children": [ { "name": "Policy analyses", "children": [] }, { "name": "Feasibility studies", "children": [] }, { "name": "Impact assessments", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Public Information Requests", "children": [ { "name": "Election Database Backups - Vendors and some Counties use a myriad of excuses to deny access to these databases as well as charge exorbitant fees:", "children": [ { "name": "Intellectual property - They claim that there is IP in the database backups", "children": [], "detail": "Intellectual property - They claim that there is IP in the database backups. There shouldn't be any, of course. If there is, then the company is incompetent in putting their intellectual property inside a file meant to serve as an archive of election data. There is no need to put any IP in that, so if they are doing so on purpose, they are doing so in order to use this as an excuse to block citizens from accessing it." }, { "name": "Critical Infrastructure - They claim there is information in the database backups that would comprom...", "children": [], "detail": "Critical Infrastructure - They claim there is information in the database backups that would compromise the security of their 'critical infrastructure' election systems. Then I suppose their 'critical infrastructure' election systems are for some reason storing information that could compromise the security of their systems in files that should never have this kind of information. This would violate critical infrastructure best practices. So, which is it? Are they critical infrastructure and they incompetently or maliciously violated those best practices, or are they not and they're just using this lie to restrict access to information?" } ] } ] } ] }, { "id": "cat-5", "title": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "focus": "Inflating voter rolls with phantom or low-propensity entries to create opportunities for ballot injection.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Population", "children": [ { "name": "Population numbers are increased by every available means, in order to have headroom to increase registered voters.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Prior to 2010, the Census Form had a citizenship question on it", "children": [], "detail": "Prior to 2010, the Census Form had a citizenship question on it. In 2010, the form was replaced with a different form that had no citizenship question on it. California even sued to keep the citizenship question OFF the census form." }, { "name": "Open-borders substantiate higher population numbers that include illegal aliens with no way to verify them.", "children": [] }, { "name": "There are cases of census 'miscounting' the population as well.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Illegal Immigration", "children": [ { "name": "Mass immigration combined with a census that now counts them allows justification for higher population, and creates more headroom of justifiable registered voters and enables gerrymandering.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Allows creation of voter registration records that don't actually need to be tied to a real citizen", "children": [] }, { "name": "The voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated.", "children": [] }, { "name": "There are not adequate protections in place to protect elections from this (by design, most-likely)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Demographic manipulation", "children": [ { "name": "Move people into cities to run for offices in order to start shifting political demographics at county/state levels", "children": [] }, { "name": "Artificial entities act as a form of \"phantom\" or non-human voters that dilute the weight of actual resident human votes. (For instance, Delaware allowing LLCs, Trusts, and Companies to vote in elections.)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Colleges", "children": [ { "name": "They bring groups in from other states to harvest voters from young populations", "children": [] }, { "name": "Our kids are targeted on campuses to capture their votes", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "children": [ { "name": "Felon Voting Rights - This isn't really for felons to actually vote", "children": [], "detail": "Felon Voting Rights - This isn't really for felons to actually vote. It is to pave the way for the cabal to inject more phantom ballots into the system. It merely provides justification for the value to be there. This creates yet another huge abuse vector." }, { "name": "Minor Voting Rights - This allows children who are easily manipulated and persuaded, who's brains ar...", "children": [], "detail": "Minor Voting Rights - This allows children who are easily manipulated and persuaded, who's brains aren't even fully developed yet and aren't even mature enough to sign a legal contract, serve on a jury, file a lawsuit, open a bank account, buy a stock, rent an apartment, consent to their own medical care, register to give blood, get a tattoo, buy a car, etc, to change laws, choose judges, local/state/federal officials, and even the President of the US." }, { "name": "Felon Voting Rights", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Registration", "children": [ { "name": "Some 'requirements' allow", "children": [ { "name": "no driver's license, ID card, SS card", "children": [] }, { "name": "no physical address, mailing address only", "children": [] }, { "name": "entries for people that are only 15 years old but warn them not to vote because it is illegal", "children": [] }, { "name": "have to be in the state for at least 22 days (this would allow state-hopping) to cover staggered elections.)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Increase numbers of independent registrations", "children": [ { "name": "Independent are more universal manipulation purposes", "children": [] }, { "name": "Inflating independent voter rolls gives fake results a plausible cover - more 'wiggle room' to explain whatever outcome is needed", "children": [] }, { "name": "Illegal or 'gray-area' voter registration drives", "children": [] }, { "name": "NGO's going performing voter registration", "children": [ { "name": "They target vulnerable parts of our communities", "children": [] }, { "name": "It gives them direct access to people's information (violation of privacy)", "children": [] }, { "name": "In at least Maricopa County, the county provided registration NGO's URL/API access directly to their county voter registration system (to be confirmed with @Shelby Busch)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "If the elected county officials are not in full control of all registrations, it leaves a huge attack surface open", "children": [] }, { "name": "Youth Pre-registration - In some states, children are allowed to be 'pre-registered' to vote.", "children": [ { "name": "Allows plausible excuses for procedural 'mistakes' that allow indirect manipulation of elections", "children": [ { "name": "Send out ballots to the youth. If caught, just claim it was a mistake. If not, free uninformed voters!", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "As soon as those pre-registrations hit the 18 yr old mark, they are automatically changed to active status which allows them to be used an excuse for injection of phantom ballots.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "They are changing people from their designated party to PND status (party not designated) in order to vote for use their record to inject votes.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Voter registration records will be changed to inactive without the voter knowing, causing the not to be able to vote", "children": [], "detail": "Voter registration records will be changed to inactive without the voter knowing, causing the not to be able to vote. In many states, this can happen even on election day prior to voting. If you vote by mail, you won't know until it is too late. If you vote in person, you'll find out right then and you can make them fix it right then." }, { "name": "No responsible party / accountability for keeping the voter rolls accurate", "children": [] }, { "name": "Voter registration databases do not mandate or even include the SOURCE of the registration record (the individual that caused the registration, and the full path it took to arrive in the database in the first place)", "children": [] }, { "name": "People go to graveyards and find names off of tombstones", "children": [] }, { "name": "Traveling Voter Operations", "children": [ { "name": "Recruit individuals willing to travel (college students, transient workers, activists, or paid operatives).", "children": [] }, { "name": "Pre-register them in multiple early-voting states using forwarding addresses, sympathetic roommates, or vacant properties (a practice already documented in some voter-roll studies).", "children": [] }, { "name": "Starting with the earliest-opening states (e.g., Minnesota and South Dakota open ~46 days out; New Jersey, New York, Virginia ~45 days), the travelers vote in person during the early period.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Move immediately to the next cluster of states whose early voting has opened but whose rolls have no...", "children": [], "detail": "Move immediately to the next cluster of states whose early voting has opened but whose rolls have not yet received updated \"voted\" flags from the previous states-flaws amplified by ERIC's batch processing and spotty detection." }, { "name": "Repeat across the country, hitting battleground states in waves (Midwest → Southeast → Southwest → West Coast) over the 2-6 week early-voting calendar.", "children": [] }, { "name": "In states with same-day registration, simply show up, register, and vote-no pre-planning needed.", "children": [] } ] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Voter Rolls", "children": [ { "name": "Their goal is to increase the registered voters by as much as possible, especially with low-to-no-propensity voters, because they need those database entries to attach votes to.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Motor-Voter system is a gateway for illegitimate voter registrations. They utilize weaknesses in obtaining driver's licenses in order to create a voter registration record.", "children": [ { "name": "Voter Reg Entries are also being created for those too young to vote, but old enough to drive.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Loose or no ID requirement to register to vote in many cases", "children": [] }, { "name": "Proof of residence not being required or confirmed", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mass change of party affiliation to unaffiliated in order to manipulate - Look for affiliation changes before and after primaries.", "children": [] }, { "name": "'Private' or 'Protected' status meant to protect some records is abused and used to covertly inject phantom registrations.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Change of party affiliation prior to becoming poll-workers in order to pose as different party.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's instruction?)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Injection of bad records", "children": [] }, { "name": "Loose security in access controls", "children": [] }, { "name": "Loose access logging", "children": [] }, { "name": "No change-tracking", "children": [] }, { "name": "Duplicate entries of individuals with name changes (maiden/married names)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Addresses modified (street names) to send ballots to know bad addresses", "children": [] }, { "name": "Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls to entities that fail to maintain them properly (through incompetence or maliciousness), also allowing the rolls to be indirectly manipulated by a fourth-party.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Adjustments to voter rolls are made in real-time, even during the election", "children": [] }, { "name": "No data consistency", "children": [] }, { "name": "No change-tracking", "children": [] }, { "name": "No referential integrity", "children": [] }, { "name": "Same-day voter registration paves the way for last-second ballot injections.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Registration; Voter Rolls", "children": [ { "name": "NGO registration / API access", "children": [] }, { "name": "Motor-Voter", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "id": "cat-6", "title": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "focus": "Sabotaging meetings, events, and oversight to limit participation and awareness.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Public Meetings", "children": [ { "name": "They get rescheduled to cause conflicts", "children": [] }, { "name": "People are assigned to run out the clock to eliminate or reduce our time", "children": [] }, { "name": "Public speaking time is continually reduced", "children": [] }, { "name": "Microphones are shut off", "children": [] }, { "name": "Livestreams/recordings sometimes have audio 'issues' that result in the public not being able to hear", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Date/Time games", "children": [ { "name": "They advertise incorrect dates/times for events in order to cause people to miss events (one example", "children": [], "detail": "publishing LAT at 9a, but starting at 8a so poll watchers miss the first hour)." } ] }, { "name": "Electronic Date/Time Manipulation", "children": [ { "name": "There are many instances of date/time not being accurate on various parts of the voting systems.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Polling Places", "children": [ { "name": "Enact laws that make it prohibitive to qualify many locations as polling places to force the centralization of polling centers.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Implement \"County-Wide Voting\"", "children": [ { "name": "Sold as conveniences", "children": [] }, { "name": "Centralizes control", "children": [] }, { "name": "Centralizes manipulation", "children": [] }, { "name": "Allows undetectable laundering of votes", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Nothing wrong with reasonable ADA requirements for our disabled citizens, but we do need to take these into account: 2016-06 US DOJ Civil Rights ACA Checklist for Polling Places (votingchecklist).pdf", "children": [] }, { "name": "County-Wide Voting", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Polls", "children": [ { "name": "They prohibit anyone wearing political attire at the polls to protect the Election Illusion.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Election Workers", "children": [ { "name": "They make it seem like anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes election workers. The election workers are their people.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Poll Watchers", "children": [ { "name": "They make it seem like anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes poll watchers. The poll watchers are their people.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They mis-train poll watchers so they don't know what to look for.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They keep watchers and observers from access to polls, testing so that they can't view anything that matters", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "id": "cat-7", "title": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "focus": "Exploiting extended voting periods and mail systems for data collection and ballot insertion.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Early Voting", "children": [ { "name": "They collect data and build a model of the election results prior to tabulation", "children": [ { "name": "Mail-in Ballot-Tracking - They tell the citizens that the ballot tracking is so citizens can track their ballots", "children": [], "detail": "Mail-in Ballot-Tracking - They tell the citizens that the ballot tracking is so citizens can track their ballots. However, the ballot tracking allows the cabal to know who has voted. Combined with databases of party affiliation and other online profiling, the vote of each returned ballot can be estimated without even needing to look at the ballot." }, { "name": "Electronic Poll Books - When someone checks in to vote, this data is put into a central database", "children": [], "detail": "Electronic Poll Books - When someone checks in to vote, this data is put into a central database. Combined with databases of party affiliation and other online profiling, the vote of each returned ballot can be estimated without even needing to look at the ballot." } ] }, { "name": "They can calculate how much of an adjustment to the votes needs to be made, then take advantage of v...", "children": [], "detail": "They can calculate how much of an adjustment to the votes needs to be made, then take advantage of voter registration database manipulation to utilize phantom records or records of low-propensity voters to inject ballots into the system to shift the results organically before anything goes to tabulation." }, { "name": "Early voting makes it more challenging and costly to perform exit polling.", "children": [] }, { "name": "GOP's \"Bank Your Vote\" https://bankyourvote.com/", "children": [] }, { "name": "Some states claim they do not tabulate during early voting, however, feeding ballots through a machi...", "children": [], "detail": "Some states claim they do not tabulate during early voting, however, feeding ballots through a machine that can scan and/or tabulate that ballot is tabulated and certain people would have access to the results in real-time." } ] }, { "name": "Election 'Day'", "children": [ { "name": "Allowing voting before Election Day allows bad actors to gain necessary information to more accurately estimate the results to manipulate the results by injecting ballots.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Allowing voting after Election Day allows bad actors to make final adjustments to the results by injecting ballots.", "children": [] }, { "name": "All of this turns the election into a feedback control system that bad actors can use the control the results of elections with high precision.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Deprive voting centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to service the voters. (eg Harris County TX)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "In-Person Voting converted to Mail-in", "children": [ { "name": "Colorado and other states force citizens to convert their in-person votes to mail/drop-box in order to launder them all into one voting type.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Ballot Harvesting - Harvest signatures from elderly citizens", "children": [ { "name": "Retirement communities", "children": [] }, { "name": "Nursing homes", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting - Records that have a low propensity to vote are used to attach ballots to.", "children": [ { "name": "Hospitals", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mental health institutions", "children": [] }, { "name": "College dorms/fraternities", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Mail ballots - Injection of ballots with broken chain of custody", "children": [ { "name": "Declare an emergency to force the use and relax/ignore other election laws", "children": [] }, { "name": "Real-time tracking systems allow bad actors to track ballots to gain realtime information to abuse.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Postal carriers instructed to NOT deliver ballots to the address in which no residents with that nam...", "children": [], "detail": "Postal carriers instructed to NOT deliver ballots to the address in which no residents with that name reside so that the ballot can be routed elsewhere, thus avoiding alerting of multiple ballots registered to that address." }, { "name": "Addresses copied from one locality to another, but changing the street name, generating returned ballots", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They claim drop-boxes have 100% surveillance, when they do not!", "children": [] }, { "name": "Many states have permanent mail in ballot registration causing a perpetual flood of ballots in the mail.", "children": [] }, { "name": "No poll watchers at the post offices, where millions of ballots are flowing through.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Missing Postmarks", "children": [] }, { "name": "Fake Postmarks (postmarks can be dated whatever the person operating the machine wants to date them)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Different colors or holes/windows in outbound and/or return envelopes that allow a bad actor to know what type of ballot may be inside in order to 'lose' or swap out", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mail-in ballots severely cripples the ability to perform exit polling (This is KEY for those that would want to manipulate elections, because it destroys this additional verification component)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Signature Verification", "children": [ { "name": "The Gatekeeper of fraudulent ballots entering the system", "children": [] }, { "name": "Initiate \"updated\" signature drives for all registered \"voters\" and inject fake \"updated\" signatures.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Designed to be defective in order to manipulate", "children": [ { "name": "Many citizens are not trained at all", "children": [] }, { "name": "Citizens that are trained are not properly trained", "children": [] }, { "name": "Proper training takes 2 years of certified document examiner schooling", "children": [] }, { "name": "There is not testing prior to allowing a citizen to verify signatures", "children": [] }, { "name": "Citizens are fired if they reject too many signatures", "children": [] } ] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Drop-Boxes - Injection of ballots with broken chain of custody, avoiding any tracking by USPS.", "children": [ { "name": "Public/Private money funding setting these up all over", "children": [] }, { "name": "Many boxes that require surveillance cameras don't have them", "children": [] }, { "name": "Public has limited/no access to surveillance footage", "children": [] }, { "name": "No control of what gets put in or by who", "children": [] }, { "name": "Provides an open path to easily inject ballots into the system without even USPS tracking of mail-in ballots.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "USPS", "children": [ { "name": "When the USPS classifies a ballot as 'undeliverable', they gather them in one or more facilities.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Several USPS workers have told @Mark Cook that those stacks of undeliverable ballots mysteriously decrease toward the election.", "children": [] }, { "name": "The USPS is billing the counties for undelivered ballots (typically by weighing them instead of counting them - total loss of chain of custody).", "children": [] }, { "name": "The USPS then delivers far less undelivered ballots to the county, and the county typically reflects that amount in their reports.", "children": [] }, { "name": "The people in the county don't notice, seem to know why, or care that they received less undelivered ballots than they were billed for.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mail ballots are BIG BUSINESS for the USPS (yet another private organization", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "UOCAVA - Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act", "children": [ { "name": "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Nobody seems to be asking the question \"How could a bad guy manipulate this?\" in every new part of UOCAVA that is brought forward.", "children": [] }, { "name": "For example, look what this organization is doing", "children": [], "detail": "VoteFromAbroad.org" }, { "name": "More vulnerabilities listed at www.verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/ .", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Chain of Custody sleight of hand allows opportunities to distract or avoid detection while manipulating ballots/records.", "children": [ { "name": "Water main breaks", "children": [] }, { "name": "Power outages", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bomb threats", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Early Voting; Election 'Day'", "children": [] }, { "name": "UOCAVA", "children": [ { "name": "VoteFromAbroad.org", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Ballot Harvesting", "children": [] }, { "name": "Drop-Boxes", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mail ballots", "children": [] }, { "name": "Chain of Custody sleight of hand", "children": [] } ] }, { "id": "cat-8", "title": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "focus": "Manipulating physical ballots through design flaws, errors, or handling to enable fraud.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Ballots", "children": [ { "name": "Ballots in multiple languages adds to complexity (increasing numbers of different ballot styles) forcing the use of computers to tabulate", "children": [] }, { "name": "Consolidate many smaller elections into less frequent larger elections makes ballots more complex and hand count more difficult", "children": [] }, { "name": "Textual 'Mistakes' on ballots (names spelled wrong, names missing, geographical differences)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Wrong ballot styles being given to people to affect who they can vote for. Then they claim 'mistakes'.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Light printing / toner adhesion", "children": [], "detail": "Markers are used so they don't leave kinematic artifacts (indentations) that could be used to discern a copied ballot vs a real ballot (a photocopied ballot may look like a pen filled it out, but it won't have indentations in the paper). Pen indentations are a critical secondary artifact against fraud." }, { "name": "Paper thickness / scanner routing", "children": [], "detail": "Mix any questionable ballots in with the rest to make it impossible to find them again should they be ruled ineligible, making any argument moot." }, { "name": "Misalignment between front and rear of ballot will cause misread resulting in easy redirection to adjudication for manipulation", "children": [] }, { "name": "Ballot image shrink / misalignment", "children": [], "detail": "Shrink or enlarge the ballot image slightly to skew the alignment marks will cause misread resulting in easy redirection to adjudication for manipulation" } ] } ] }, { "id": "cat-9", "title": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "focus": "Backdoors and weaknesses in digital systems for undetected alterations.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Fake Testing / Certification", "children": [ { "name": "Vendors pay the 'testing' labs.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Labs approve systems.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Systems are certified.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Everyone downstream 'trusts' because they were 'tested' and 'certified'.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Technology / Cyber-Security", "children": [ { "name": "Instead of handling security locally, many counties and states are outsourcing those services, which puts that at risk and displaces the responsibility", "children": [] }, { "name": "Creates a much more attractive attack surface", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bad actors can then exploit to cause a much larger blast radius", "children": [] }, { "name": "Decentralization is defeated when certain components are centralized", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "children": [ { "name": "Install wireless cards, modems, additional connectivity (even covert) so the citizens and election officials aren't aware", "children": [], "detail": "Install wireless cards, modems, additional connectivity (even covert) so the citizens and election officials aren't aware. Take advantage of the fact that election officials are not cyber-security experts and they don't know what they don't know, in order to manipulate the system right under their noses." }, { "name": "Start with the systems in a disconnected state, tell the citizens they are all isolated and 'air-gap...", "children": [], "detail": "Start with the systems in a disconnected state, tell the citizens they are all isolated and 'air-gapped', then once they are used to that, start mandating that parts of them become connected, until after several years/cycles, they are all interconnected via a network." } ] }, { "name": "Data Breaches", "children": [ { "name": "Beyond the original breach are usually hidden higher-order breaches as a results that can be leveraged by bad-actors.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Software", "children": [ { "name": "Lack of downstream verification", "children": [ { "name": "Officials that are conducting elections using black-box systems that", "children": [ { "name": "They blindly trust (voluntarily and involuntarily)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Don't look 'under the hood' to ensure their security", "children": [] }, { "name": "They aren't allowed to look 'under the hood' to ensure", "children": [ { "name": "The software that is running on their systems is what was originally tested", "children": [] }, { "name": "Doesn't have any malicious programming embedded in it", "children": [] } ] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Update Scam", "children": [ { "name": "Vulnerabilities are found or 'found' in order to spur states and counties to buy NEW equipment/software to 'fix' the problems", "children": [], "detail": "Vulnerabilities are found or 'found' in order to spur states and counties to buy NEW equipment/software to 'fix' the problems. The new stuff can have even more sophisticated methods to manipulate elections built in to them. Then vulnerabilities are 'found' on those, and counties are pressured to buy NEW equipment again. Continual income for the vendors, and manipulation becomes continually more sophisticated. This applies to the entire ecosystem from voter reg, 'sig-ver', poll books, tabulation, and reporting." } ] } ] }, { "name": "Electronic Poll Books", "children": [ { "name": "These are typically connected to each other over insecure wireless connections, then all connected t...", "children": [], "detail": "These are typically connected to each other over insecure wireless connections, then all connected to a central database outside of the polling location, and sometimes outside of the state they are operating in. Unknown parties have control of these databases, therefore can view/add/change/delete records at their will, without the knowledge of the poll workers, county officials, or state officials." }, { "name": "These can be abused wirelessly from the parking lot, wired from within the polling location, on the cellular network or internet anywhere in the world", "children": [], "detail": "These can be abused wirelessly from the parking lot, wired from within the polling location, on the cellular network or internet anywhere in the world. The counties and states do not have control of these regardless of what they claim." }, { "name": "Data from poll books can be read by others and used to know how to manipulate the election by adding phantom ballots, then injecting phantom electronic check-ins.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Electronic Poll Books usually consist of common Android tablets or Windows laptops (all easily abused by people that know how), hidden in a custom frame.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Electronic Voting Machines", "children": [ { "name": "For D.R.E. (Direct-Recording Equipment - touch-screen voting)", "children": [ { "name": "Change the touch-screen calibration so when someone selects their candidate, the other candidate is selected. Many won't notice.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Program the system to select whichever candidate you like regardless of which candidate name is touched", "children": [], "detail": "Program the system to select whichever candidate you like regardless of which candidate name is touched. Set up a counter in the software so after X number of tries, the correct candidate is selected. This can be easily explained away as 'calibration error'. Most will fall for this explanation. It's been going on for over a decade." } ] }, { "name": "Show one thing on the screen and the printout, but record the votes any way you like in the database.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Record the votes properly in the database initially, then change them later.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Show one thing on the printout, but put different results in the QR-code, then encrypt the QR-code so humans can't see what's been done.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Put the software you want them to see in escrow. They won't know that it isn't the same as on the voting machines.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Use QR-codes to covertly make adjustments to the votes/feed algorithms. Then put them in the mail or drop-boxes. The election staff will be delivering the payload themselves without having a clue.", "children": [] }, { "name": "If they figure out the QR code con, then use what appears as random dots on the page, but watch for them in the programming and make adjustments with those instructions.", "children": [] }, { "name": "If they figure out the 'random' dot approach, then use very light color like yellow that the scanner can pick up, but the human eye will not without a magnifying glass.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Mobile Voting and \"shiny new object\" technology", "children": [ { "name": "Since machines and mail-in voting will be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce/implement \"mobile voting\"", "children": [ { "name": "Will use the \"proven track record\" with UOCAVA as evidence that it is \"safe and secure\"", "children": [] }, { "name": "Will appeal to Trump's love of crypto and the public's growing acceptance of block chain.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Use NASS to push", "children": [] }, { "name": "https://www.mobilevoting.org/about", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Election Code", "children": [ { "name": "Actions that facilitate indirect manipulation of our election system have been put into code.", "children": [ { "name": "For example, Texas", "children": [], "detail": "Sec. 85.072. BRANCH DAILY REGISTER. (a) Each day early voting is conducted at a branch polling place, an election officer in charge of the branch shall prepare a register listing the voters who cast ballots at the branch that day. (g) The Previous early voting clerk shall compile the registers and electronically submit to the secretary of state a record of each voter participating in a primary, a runoff primary, a general election, or any special election ordered by the governor not later than the day the voter votes in person or the early voting clerk receives a ballot voted by mail." } ] } ] }, { "name": "Fake Testing and Certification", "children": [] }, { "name": "Data Breaches; Software", "children": [] } ] }, { "id": "cat-10", "title": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "focus": "Comprehensive methodologies tying together injection, flipping, and verification evasion across the election lifecycle.", "tactics": [ { "name": "Overall Manipulation Methodology", "children": [ { "name": "Injection of phantom voters and corresponding votes (votes not correlated to real citizens)", "children": [ { "name": "Combat at voter registration and validation legs", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Injection of votes for existing voters (stealing their identity)", "children": [ { "name": "Combat at validation leg", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Vote-flipping", "children": [ { "name": "Combat at validation, tabulation, and reporting legs", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Result-shifting/flipping", "children": [ { "name": "Combat at result leg. Set up parallel reporting at precinct levels (or county level if precinct not available)", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, precincts to keep below margin of error", "children": [] }, { "name": "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, precincts to keep below margin of recounts", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Feedback Loop", "children": [ { "name": "Inject phantom voter registrations", "children": [ { "name": "Use plausible deniability in duplicating existing records (make sure every duplicate can be explained away as a mistake)", "children": [ { "name": "Change spellings of names slightly. Examples", "children": [ { "name": "Bob Smith", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bob Smyth", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bobby Smith", "children": [] }, { "name": "Bobby Smth", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Slightly change addresses. Examples", "children": [ { "name": "123 Jones St", "children": [] }, { "name": "123 Jones", "children": [] }, { "name": "123 Jones Street", "children": [] }, { "name": "123 Jones Ave", "children": [] }, { "name": "213 Jones St", "children": [] }, { "name": "123 Jons St", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Duplicate records will have their own voter ID number, allowing a vote to be associated with it. If someone catches the 'duplicate', it can be explained as a typo.", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Encourage everyone to register to vote to put in as many registrations possible", "children": [] }, { "name": "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "children": [ { "name": "Mail in ballots - Design a mail-in-ballot tracking system to give the public a warm fuzzy false sense of security for using mail in ballots", "children": [], "detail": "Mail in ballots - Design a mail-in-ballot tracking system to give the public a warm fuzzy false sense of security for using mail in ballots. Tell them that they can 'track their ballot'. The tracking isn't really for the citizens, it's used to know when each one of them votes (and to track which ballot belongs to which individual so they can be 'handled appropriately)" }, { "name": "In person - Design digital poll book system to track who comes in in person to vote", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Knowing who has voted, use their party affiliation and voting history fortified with social media profiles to determine how they will vote", "children": [] }, { "name": "Build a model of the election results (without even needing to look at a single ballot)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Determine how many votes are needed to shift the results", "children": [] }, { "name": "Choose which voter reg records to associate with phantom votes", "children": [ { "name": "Use the existing voter registration metrics combined with the real-time tracking from mail-in-ballot tracking system and electronic poll books", "children": [] }, { "name": "Record preference priority", "children": [ { "name": "Phantom records - these are best to use first because nobody will ever show up to vote and be told they already voted", "children": [] }, { "name": "Low-propensity voters - these are more risky because these voters may actually show up", "children": [] }, { "name": "High-propensity voters - these are very risky and should only be used as a last resort as they are likely to result in voters catching their use", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Record distribution", "children": [ { "name": "Don't choose records in the same precinct. Use a distribution of records in different precincts where you think there is room. Remember, STAY UNDER 100% VOTER PARTICIPATION so the injections don't stick out.", "children": [] } ] } ] }, { "name": "Inject ballots into the system", "children": [ { "name": "Mail them in", "children": [] }, { "name": "Scatter them in drop-boxes", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "If done properly, manipulating the system using the feedback loop will be hidden from the county officials.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Voting on DRE or BMD", "children": [ { "name": "Touchscreen voting machines-whether Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems or Ballot Marking Devi...", "children": [ { "name": "Security researchers have replicated far more advanced manipulation", "children": [], "detail": "Security researchers have replicated far more advanced manipulation. At DEF CON Voting Village, participants with ordinary tools gained full control of multiple DRE and BMD models in minutes, enabling arbitrary vote alteration. Princeton and University of Michigan teams demonstrated malware for Diebold and ES&S systems that alters recorded votes or printed ballots only under specific conditions, remaining dormant during testing." }, { "name": "Such code is trivial to embed by an inside bad-actor or once an attacker obtains physical or supply-chain access to the firmware", "children": [], "detail": "Such code is trivial to embed by an inside bad-actor or once an attacker obtains physical or supply-chain access to the firmware. The sophistication lies in its deniability: every affected voter experiences what appears to be isolated human or hardware error. Without comprehensive paper ballots, independent audits, and risk-limiting audits, the mechanism remains undetectable at scale." } ], "detail": "Touchscreen voting machines-whether Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) systems or Ballot Marking Devices (BMDs)-rely on software that translates voter taps into selections. Programming such devices to intermittently ignore a tap or register the opposite choice can create arbitrary vote alteration , and requires only a few conditional lines of code: for example, a counter that activates the anomaly after a random number of interactions, or a timer that triggers misregistration within a narrow window, presenting the behavior as ordinary user error (mis-tap, calibration drift, or capacitive-sensor noise). Because the logic executes silently and only a small percentage of the time, it evades routine logic-and-accuracy testing while cumulatively shifting vote totals in targeted precincts. When combined with other low-visibility tactics, this can materially alter outcomes without triggering detectable anomalies or paper-trail discrepancies in unaudited DRE deployments." } ] }, { "name": "Tabulation", "children": [ { "name": "Change definitions of 'tabulation' to legally allow early machine tabulation so long as it isn't 'human readable'; this still fuels their feedback loop", "children": [] }, { "name": "Logic and accuracy testing", "children": [], "detail": "tabulator test ballots are only vendor supplied with TEST in red ink which is not displayed on the digital ballot image during adjudication testing. This is a great way for the software to branch to a test-only code path (operate differently) during L&A testing vs normal tabulation during an election." }, { "name": "Pre-load votes during early voting in order to establish a 50/50 ratio from the start to be able to...", "children": [], "detail": "Pre-load votes during early voting in order to establish a 50/50 ratio from the start to be able to stay under the radar as adjustments are made to counter real votes coming in from that point forward. (Colorado, Washington, etc.)" }, { "name": "Use different thickness ballot paper for different areas/voters", "children": [ { "name": "Use the thickness as excuse to determine which tabulators are used (Sacramento CA does this - they c...", "children": [], "detail": "Use the thickness as excuse to determine which tabulators are used (Sacramento CA does this - they claim the 'thin' paper gets jammed in the Hi-Pro scanners, so they scan all the 'thin' ballots through the smaller desktop scanners - Mark Cook was told this first-hand)" }, { "name": "Paper that is too thick used in BMD (Ballot Marking Devices) and tabulators may jam, allowing another path to segregate those ballots. This may have happened in AZ", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Print the ballot image slightly shrunk so citizens don't notice it, but the tabulators would be unable to scan, causing them to be segregated and an excuse to 're-create' them. (This happened in AZ)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Print the ballot image lighter than normal so citizens don't notice it, but the tabulators would be unable to scan, causing them to be segregated and an excuse to 're-create' them. (This happened in AZ)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Randomize the order of the ballots inside the batches, destroying the time-series recording of the o...", "children": [], "detail": "Randomize the order of the ballots inside the batches, destroying the time-series recording of the order of ballots as they were scanned (manipulating evidence), making it impossible to determine patterns of manipulation. They also then increase the batch size to launder more ballots per batch. (Montgomery County TX)" }, { "name": "Someone could easily fill in undervotes in ballots to manipulate those races.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Someone could easily fill in an overvote to cancel a vote (overvotes invalidate the entire race).", "children": [] }, { "name": "Induce error into the system to obfuscate manipulation (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, mis-spellings, etc. - these aren't all accidents)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Change database outside of voting system software", "children": [] }, { "name": "Incomplete tracking", "children": [] }, { "name": "Incomplete logging", "children": [] }, { "name": "Self-deleting logs", "children": [] }, { "name": "Back doors", "children": [] }, { "name": "Ability to be connected to alternate networks (including the internet)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Wireless devices installed in hardware", "children": [] }, { "name": "No visibility to the public", "children": [] }, { "name": "Secret source code", "children": [] }, { "name": "Incomplete verifiability", "children": [] }, { "name": "No way to guarantee they will always operate without error/abuse", "children": [] }, { "name": "Block all access to ballot images and paper ballots", "children": [] }, { "name": "Wipe hard drives to ensure no evidence of manipulation is left", "children": [] }, { "name": "No supply-chain control or controllable chain of custody", "children": [] }, { "name": "Manipulate programming on thumb/flash drives", "children": [] }, { "name": "Pre-load votes on thumb/flash drives", "children": [] }, { "name": "Manipulate votes on thumb/flash drives", "children": [] }, { "name": "Disable and/or manipulate ballot images on thumb/flash drives", "children": [] }, { "name": "Broken physical seals destroying chain of custody of the physical ballots", "children": [] }, { "name": "Mix up thumb/flash drives to cause confusion to inhibit proper audit", "children": [] }, { "name": "Thumb/flash drives can be easily modified by bad actors in-transit", "children": [ { "name": "For instance, encryption keys for Dominion are stored in cleartext inside the database, and the same...", "children": [], "detail": "For instance, encryption keys for Dominion are stored in cleartext inside the database, and the same keys can be used across different counties, states, or all over the world. The keys can also be stored in accessible folders in the filesystem, and obtainable through side-channel vectors." } ] }, { "name": "Disable digital images of ballots to be able to thwart their use that evidence in an audit", "children": [] }, { "name": "Manipulate digital images of the ballots in cases where digital images are made", "children": [] }, { "name": "THERE IS NO WAY TO SECURE THESE SYSTEMS IN ANY WAY", "children": [] }, { "name": "Dominion claimed that the existing systems cannot handle a future sized ballot and therefore, the county needed to 'upgrade' (Rio Grande County, CO)", "children": [] }, { "name": "Early tabulation / 50-50 preload claims", "children": [] }, { "name": "Batch randomization", "children": [] }, { "name": "Different thickness ballot paper routing", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Reporting", "children": [ { "name": "Election officials don't even know what really happens to their totals when they leave", "children": [] }, { "name": "Totals can be changed and hidden inside aggregation without the public able to detect", "children": [] }, { "name": "No guarantee to the public that the shown state/fed totals are actually accurate", "children": [] }, { "name": "No public place that all totals are transparently and additionally posted", "children": [] }, { "name": "Centralization of results makes it difficult if not impossible to detect fraud. For insurance, Michigan no longer denotes the difference between", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Records", "children": [ { "name": "Purposely misinterpret the 22-month minimum federal retention period to restrict access to election records for 22 months", "children": [], "detail": "Purposely misinterpret the 22-month minimum federal retention period to restrict access to election records for 22 months. That is not the purpose of the minimum retention period. The purpose of the retention period is to make sure the data is RETAINED for the time period so that people can look at it. I believe there is a legal case in some stage regarding setting the record straight on that." }, { "name": "Blocked, or complicated, access to cast vote records (CVRs) which can be used to identify many patterns of manipulation", "children": [ { "name": "They put CVR out as JSON format to make it too complex for the average person to examine the data.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They print out the CVR as a PDF to create an additional barrier to easily examine the data.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Push citizens to the point they have to file lawsuit to get access to records, then claim they can't provide access to records due to pending lawsuit.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Even some republican states (e.g., South Dakota, South Carolina) have not provided CVRs.", "children": [] }, { "name": "They randomize CVR data claiming that they must do so in order to protect voter privacy", "children": [], "detail": "They randomize CVR data claiming that they must do so in order to protect voter privacy. The randomization destroys the time-series aspect of the CVR and therefore cripples their effectiveness at detecting manipulation. Not to mention, this is TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE at the best, and DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE and ELECTION RECORDS at the worst." }, { "name": "No access to security logs, has testing, penetration testing, ballot review files", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Certification", "children": [ { "name": "Forcing certification to be procedurally automatic instead of only happening if evidence supports doing so. This is how they SEAL THE FRAUD!", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Auditing", "children": [ { "name": "'Risk Limiting Audits' or 'Partial Manual Counts' are used to justify auditing only a small portion to convince the public the rest of the tabulation is accurate.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Engineered to avoid catching the fraud (easy to do when fraud is algorithmic).", "children": [] }, { "name": "Some recount procedures cause the ballot order within batches to be broken", "children": [], "detail": "Some recount procedures cause the ballot order within batches to be broken. This can unintentionally negatively affect the effectiveness of other audits that rely on order being preserved (to compare with other counts or temporal examinations)" }, { "name": "Some states redefine what their 'audit' is to cripple and make it worthless.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Canvassing", "children": [ { "name": "They attempt to claim that citizen canvassing efforts cause voter intimidation", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Recalls", "children": [ { "name": "Fake recall booths are set up, then sigs are thrown out.", "children": [] }, { "name": "Fake recall groups/orgs are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Election Contest", "children": [ { "name": "Implement a ridiculously short period of time to file a contest, to guarantee that there is not adequate time to investigate the data.", "children": [] } ] }, { "name": "Reporting; Records", "children": [] } ] } ], "instances": [ { "id": "ca-ab969-2023", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Legislation" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10-04", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 969 (Pellerin), signed into law Oct. 4, 2023 as Chapter 300 and effective immediately as an urgency statute, prohibits elections officials from conducting a manual (hand) vote count in most contests above specified registration thresholds (more than 1,000 registered voters on an established election date; more than 5,000 otherwise) unless under a Secretary of State–approved plan or emergency. It also requires use of certified voting systems for accessibility and tabulation, and makes termination of a certified-system contract provisional until a transition plan and new certified contract are in place. Catalog seed: \"Passing bills to eliminate hand counted ballots (e.g., AB969 in CA).\" Status Confirmed for the statute text and enactment; causal/motive claims in advocacy commentary are not adjudicated here.", "sources": [ { "title": "CA Legislature — Bill Text AB-969 (Chapter 300)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB969" }, { "title": "ABC News — Bill limiting ballot hand counting becomes law", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/bill-limiting-ballot-hand-counting-california-law-county/story?id=103741610" } ], "notes": "Primary: statute. Contemporaneous reporting notes Shasta County context." }, { "id": "al-hb95-2026", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Legislation" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB95 (2026 Regular Session), the Alabama Post-Election Audit Act, was passed by the Legislature and signed by Gov. Kay Ivey (April 2026). It requires county judges of probate to order a post-election audit after every countywide and statewide general election for at least one randomly selected precinct and race, with public reporting of findings. Catalog seed characterized HB95 as an example of naïve legislators carrying an 'election integrity' compromise bill; that framing is advocacy opinion. Status Confirmed for enactment and statutory audit requirements only—not for any trojan-horse motive claim.", "sources": [ { "title": "Governor Ivey — Signs Audit Law (HB95)", "url": "https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2026/04/governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-to-uphold-alabamas-nation-leading-free-and-secure-elections/" }, { "title": "Ballotpedia — Alabama HB95", "url": "https://legislation.ballotpedia.org/elections/bill/21991" } ], "notes": "Within scope (enacted 2016–present). Motive/compromise framing remains unverified." }, { "id": "al-hb67-2026", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Legislation" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB67 (2026 Regular Session) was enacted; it limits the cost of reproducing voter registration lists (electronic list fee capped at $1,000), designates certain voter data as confidential, and makes unlawful the sale/publication of portions of voter lists or use of voter data for commercial purposes (with electioneering/campaign exceptions), effective June 1, 2026. Catalog seed cited HB67 as an example of laws that restrict citizen access 'sneaked in.' Status Confirmed for the enacted text regarding access/cost/confidentiality rules; whether the bill was a covert access-restriction scheme is not established by primary sources reviewed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Ballotpedia — Alabama HB67", "url": "https://legislation.ballotpedia.org/elections/bill/21818" }, { "title": "Bama Politics — HB67 Signed", "url": "https://www.bamapolitics.com/alabama/bills/2026-regular-session/2026-house-bills/" } ], "notes": "Enacted; effective date June 1, 2026 per bill summaries." }, { "id": "harris-county-tx-ballot-paper-2022", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Early Voting; Election 'Day'" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "TX", "description": "Harris County, TX, experienced ballot-paper shortages at multiple Election Day 2022 polling locations. A Texas Rangers investigation and DA Kim Ogg's office announced that shortages stemmed from an employee's misallocation of paper (alleged second-job neglect), with prosecutors stating there was no evidence of intentional suppression or intent to sway the election; an employee faced theft/tampering charges. Judge David Peeples upheld 2022 results while criticizing the county's paper-allocation law compliance. Catalog seed: \"Deprive voting centers of enough ballots or ballot paper (eg Harris County TX).\" Shortage and administrative failure are Confirmed; intentional partisan fraud is Disputed/denied by the official investigation—hence Partially confirmed.", "sources": [ { "title": "NYT — Inquiry Finds No Politics Behind Ballot Paper Shortages", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/us/harris-county-elections-ballots-investigation-charges.html" }, { "title": "Houston Chronicle — Rangers find no evidence of fraud", "url": "https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/houston/article/ogg-corruption-election-texas-harris-no-fraud-19653715.php" }, { "title": "Votebeat — Judge criticizes 2022 ballot paper shortage", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2023/11/16/harris-county-election-changes-teneshia-hudspeth/" } ], "notes": "Operational failure Confirmed; intentional fraud claim not established." }, { "id": "maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Ballot image shrink / misalignment" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's independent investigation (former AZ Supreme Court Chief Justice Ruth McGregor, report released April 2023) documented that some Election Day 2022 ballots were printed \"fit to page,\" shrinking/relocating timing marks so tabulators could not read them; testing reproduced sporadic fit-to-page prints on four printers without determining a definitive cause. Separately, faint/flaking toner from Oki B432 fusers on thicker/longer paper caused tabulator rejects. Misread ballots were duplicated or centrally tabulated. Catalog seed: shrink ballot image to force adjudication/'re-create.' Physical printing anomalies Confirmed by the official report; intentional manipulation not established—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments (McGregor investigation)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments" }, { "title": "AP — Paper changes caused printer failure", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maricopa-county-ballot-printers-mcgregor-kari-lake-9edeef525b8afacb767a4960bf951ea1" }, { "title": "Votebeat — Investigation of Maricopa ballot problems", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/4/10/23678055/maricopa-county-election-day-investigation-oki-printers/" } ], "notes": "Also maps to light-printing leaf." }, { "id": "maricopa-az-2022-faint-toner", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Light printing / toner adhesion" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Same McGregor investigation found Oki B432 fusers failed to maintain heat needed to fuse toner onto 20-inch, 100-pound ballots, leaving timing marks too faint; print could flake onto tabulators. County attributed issues to equipment/paper combination, not malice. Catalog seed: print ballot image lighter so tabulators cannot scan. Equipment/paper failure Confirmed; intentional light-printing scheme not established.", "sources": [ { "title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments" }, { "title": "CNN — Investigation finds equipment failure at fault", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/11/politics/maricopa-county-printer-investigation-2022-election" } ], "notes": "Companion to fit-to-page instance." }, { "id": "co-early-mail-processing-statute", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Tabulation", "Early tabulation / 50-50 preload claims" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado law (C.R.S. § 1-7.5-107.5) authorizes processing/counting of mail ballots beginning up to 15 days before Election Day (with larger counties required to start earlier), while prohibiting release of count information until 7 p.m. Election Day. Catalog seed claims Colorado/Washington \"pre-load votes during early voting\" to establish a 50/50 ratio as a manipulation technique. Early legal processing/counting authority is Confirmed; the specific \"50/50 preload\" manipulation claim lacks a verified primary finding in this pass—Partially confirmed (statute/process Confirmed; fraud mechanism Alleged/unverified).", "sources": [ { "title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. § 1-7.5-107.5", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7.5-107.5" }, { "title": "Ballotpedia — Absentee/mail-in ballot processing timelines", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Timelines_related_to_absentee/mail-in_ballot_processing_and_counting" } ], "notes": "Treat carefully per brief: do not treat advocacy 50/50 charts as Confirmed fraud." }, { "id": "wa-early-processing-wac", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Tabulation", "Early tabulation / 50-50 preload claims" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington administrative rules (e.g., WAC 434-250-110) permit early ballot processing/scanning while prohibiting tabulation release before 8 p.m. Election Day. Catalog seed groups Washington with Colorado on 50/50 preload claims. Early processing authority Confirmed; intentional preload-to-50/50 manipulation not established by primary sources reviewed—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [ { "title": "WAC 434-250-110", "url": "https://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=434-250-110&pdf=true" }, { "title": "Ballotpedia — Absentee/mail-in ballot processing timelines", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Timelines_related_to_absentee/mail-in_ballot_processing_and_counting" } ], "notes": "Advocacy batch-ratio charts (e.g., WhoCountsTheVotes) are partisan analyses, not official findings." }, { "id": "virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation", "category": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "tactic_path": [ "Intimidation", "Inorganic intimidation / hate spam" ], "status": "Alleged", "date": "2023", "state": "VA", "description": "The Virginia Project newsletter \"Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush\" (David Gordon) describes \"inorganic intimidation\"—sustained hate spam and related swarm tactics—and mailing-list stuffing attacks intended to flag campaign emails as spam, citing targeting of Republican campaigns including Virginia's Lieutenant Governor. Source is partisan advocacy describing claimed patterns; no court adjudication reviewed in this pass—Alleged.", "sources": [ { "title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072" } ], "notes": "Partisan advocacy primary narrative; catalog quotes this piece extensively." }, { "id": "fairvote-open-society-funding", "category": "3. Financial / Campaign / Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Ranked-choice voting", "Behind RCV", "Behind RCV: Open Society / FairVote" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "FairVote is a leading national RCV advocacy organization. InfluenceWatch and Capital Research Center (right-of-center research outlets) list Open Society Foundations and related Soros-affiliated foundations among FairVote funders, alongside Arnold, Hewlett, Democracy Fund, and Tides. Catalog seed: \"Behind RCV: Open Society – 'Fair Vote'.\" Funding relationship is documented by secondary research aggregators; exact grant amounts/years were not fully verified from OSF or FairVote primary 990 line-items in this pass. Status Partially confirmed for funder listing claims; does not establish that RCV systems enable covert tabulation fraud.", "sources": [ { "title": "InfluenceWatch — FairVote (funder list incl. Open Society Foundations)", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/fairvote/" }, { "title": "Capital Research Center — Ranked-Choice Voting: Biggest Advocates", "url": "https://capitalresearch.org/article/ranked-choice-voting-part-4/" }, { "title": "FairVote — Financials", "url": "https://fairvote.org/who-we-are/financials/" } ], "notes": "InfluenceWatch/CRC are advocacy-adjacent research; cross-check IRS 990s in future sweeps." }, { "id": "princeton-diebold-2006", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Voting Machines" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-09-13", "state": "Federal", "description": "Princeton CITP researchers Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten published a peer-reviewed security analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS DRE, demonstrating that brief physical access (or memory-card access) could install vote-stealing malware that modifies records/logs/counters, and that a self-propagating voting-machine virus could spread via memory cards used in normal election procedures. Catalog seed cites Princeton research under electronic voting machines / DEF CON discussion.", "sources": [ { "title": "Princeton CITP — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS", "url": "https://citp.princeton.edu/our-work/publications/security-analysis-diebold-accuvote-ts-voting-machine" }, { "title": "USENIX EVT'07 paper (Feldman, Halderman, Felten)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/evt-07/security-analysis-diebold-accuvote-ts-voting-machine" }, { "title": "PDF — jhalderm.com ts-evt07", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ts-evt07.pdf" } ], "notes": "Peer-reviewed / academic primary research. Pre-2016 work retained as foundational tech evidence referenced by catalog." }, { "id": "umich-ess-everest-2008", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Voting Machines" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008", "state": "OH", "description": "As part of Ohio's Project EVEREST, researchers (including University of Pennsylvania/related teams publishing at USENIX EVT'08) evaluated ES&S DRE and optical-scan systems and election management software, finding numerous exploitable vulnerabilities enabling alteration of precinct results, corrupt firmware, erased audit records, and potential viral propagation between machines and backend systems. Catalog seed: Princeton and University of Michigan teams demonstrated malware for Diebold and ES&S systems.", "sources": [ { "title": "USENIX EVT'08 — Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and EMS", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/aviv/aviv_html/" }, { "title": "PDF mirror — ES&S evaluation (evt08)", "url": "https://cernyp.github.io/publications/evt08/evt08.pdf" } ], "notes": "Academic/state-commissioned security review. Confirmed for demonstrated technical vulnerabilities, not for any specific election outcome fraud." }, { "id": "defcon-voting-village-2017", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Voting Machines" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Machine Hacking Village (Las Vegas, July 2017) convened security researchers and published a September 2017 report documenting cyber vulnerabilities across U.S. election equipment, databases, and infrastructure examined at the village; organizers included Matt Blaze, Jake Braun, Harri Hursti, Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Margaret MacAlpine, and Jeff Moss. Catalog seed: DEF CON Voting Village participants gained control of multiple DRE/BMD models with ordinary tools.", "sources": [ { "title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF)", "url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf" }, { "title": "Verified Voting summary of Voting Village report", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/defcon-voting-village-report-highlights-election-system-vulnerabilities-and-solutions/" } ], "notes": "Confirmed laboratory/conference findings on equipment vulnerabilities." }, { "id": "uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "UOCAVA" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA/AAAS risk-management guidance on electronic ballot delivery, marking, and return classifies internet ballot return as high risk relative to paper return, documenting confidentiality, integrity, and availability concerns for electronic UOCAVA channels. Catalog seed warns UOCAVA expansions increase manipulation surface and points to VoteFromAbroad.org and VerityVote overseas-voting vulnerability materials.", "sources": [ { "title": "CISA/AAAS — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/CISA%20Risk%20Management%20Electronic%20Ballot.pdf" }, { "title": "VerityVote — Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities (advocacy compilation)", "url": "https://verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/" } ], "notes": "CISA risk classification Confirmed; VerityVote is advocacy—use for catalog mapping, not as sole proof of fraud." }, { "id": "votefromabroad-org-seed", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "UOCAVA", "VoteFromAbroad.org" ], "status": "Alleged", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Catalog and VerityVote advocacy materials criticize VoteFromAbroad.org (Democrats Abroad–associated overseas voting assistance) as expanding electronic/overseas ballot pathways with inadequate adversarial analysis. No court finding or CISA designation of VoteFromAbroad.org as a confirmed exploit was located in this pass—Alleged vulnerability discussion.", "sources": [ { "title": "VerityVote — UOCAVA Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities report PDF", "url": "https://verityvote.us/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/UOCAVA_overseas-voting-vulnerabilies-report_VerityVote.pdf" }, { "title": "VoteFromAbroad.org (organization site)", "url": "https://www.votefromabroad.org/" } ], "notes": "Advocacy critique; primary org site for context." }, { "id": "air-gapped-linguistic-seed", "category": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "tactic_path": [ "Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public ignorance and ambiguity in terminology. Examples", "Air-Gapped Systems Deception" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2006-2026", "state": "Multi-state / Federal", "description": "Catalog asserts officials misuse \"air-gapped\" to imply total isolation despite memory cards, USB, modem/wireless, or administrative transfers. Peer-reviewed Princeton Diebold analysis (2006/EVT'07) demonstrated a self-propagating voting-machine virus via memory cards used in normal procedures even without network connectivity. CISA election-system best practices separately emphasize network segmentation, limiting internet connectivity for election hosts, and treating elections VLANs as high-sensitivity—implicitly acknowledging that \"disconnected\" systems still require layered controls around removable media and connected components. Status Partially confirmed for the technical premise that network isolation alone does not equal full isolation; specific jurisdiction marketing claims paired 1:1 with contradictory connectivity still vary.", "sources": [ { "title": "Princeton / USENIX EVT'07 — Diebold AccuVote-TS security analysis (PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ts-evt07.pdf" }, { "title": "CISA — Best Practices for Securing Election Systems", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/best-practices-securing-election-systems" }, { "title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (catalog definition)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics" } ], "notes": "Technical attack-surface Confirmed in literature; linguistic misuse as a deliberate tactic remains framing analysis." }, { "id": "encryption-linguistic-seed", "category": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "tactic_path": [ "Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public ignorance and ambiguity in terminology. Examples", "Encryption Deception" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-2026", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Catalog asserts vendors/officials promote \"encryption\" as security while opaque crypto can impede public auditability. Foundational NIST/Rivest discourse on software independence argues election outcomes must be detectable as incorrect without relying solely on correct software—prioritizing evidence (e.g., voter-verifiable paper + audits) over trust in software/crypto alone. MIT Voatz analysis (USENIX Security 2020) further showed that encrypted mobile-ballot submission packets could still leak vote choices via packet-length metadata (CVE-2020-8989), illustrating that \"encrypted\" is not synonymous with private or auditable. Status Partially confirmed for the academic/engineering tension between encryption marketing and audit/privacy properties; not a finding that any named vendor intentionally deceived a specific jurisdiction in this entry.", "sources": [ { "title": "NIST — On the notion of software independence in voting systems (Rivest/Wack)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf" }, { "title": "USENIX Security 2020 — Specter et al. Voatz analysis", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/specter" }, { "title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (catalog definition)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics" } ], "notes": "Software-independence literature + Voatz metadata leak Confirmed; catalog motive framing not adjudicated." }, { "id": "seed-maricopa-ngo-api", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Registration; Voter Rolls", "NGO registration / API access" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Secretary of State operates an Online Voter Registration Unique URL Program under which approved political parties and nonprofit voter-outreach groups receive trackable URLs that send applicants into ServiceArizona (MVD-backed online registration) for eligibility checks. AZCIR (Oct. 2024) and SOS statements confirm the program's existence and that registrations process through ServiceArizona subject to state/federal rules; SOS materials describe tracking of referral volume, not NGO write access into county voter databases. Catalog seed claiming Maricopa gave NGOs direct API/write access to the county registration system remains unverified and is disputed by SOS/AZCIR framing. Status Partially confirmed for Unique URL NGO/party referral program; Alleged portion (two-way API write access) not established.", "sources": [ { "title": "AZCIR / Gigafact — Unique URL Program fact brief", "url": "https://azcir.org/news/2024/10/11/fact-brief-does-arizona-secretary-of-state-unique-url-program-allow-noncitizens-register-to-vote-no/" }, { "title": "EIN Presswire / AZ SOS — Unique URL Program applications (2022)", "url": "https://www.einpresswire.com/article/561686453/applications-available-for-the-online-voter-registration-unique-url-program" }, { "title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics" } ], "notes": "Catalog API-write claim still unverified; Unique URL program Confirmed as public SOS program." }, { "id": "seed-montgomery-tx-batch-randomization", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Tabulation", "Batch randomization" ], "status": "Alleged", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "TX", "description": "No verified instance yet (seed from catalog). Catalog asserts Montgomery County, TX, randomized ballot order inside batches (destroying time-series) and increased batch size. No primary county procedure, CVR order policy, or official audit finding confirming intentional evidence-destroying randomization was located in this pass.", "sources": [ { "title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics" } ], "notes": "Seed placeholder." }, { "id": "seed-sacramento-thin-thick-paper", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Tabulation", "Different thickness ballot paper routing" ], "status": "Alleged", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "CA", "description": "No verified instance yet (seed from catalog). Catalog claims Sacramento County routes \"thin\" ballots to smaller desktop scanners (not Hi-Pro) based on jam excuses, attributed to first-hand statement to Mark Cook. No official Sacramento procedure or contemporaneous news confirmation located in this pass.", "sources": [ { "title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics" } ], "notes": "Anecdotal seed; needs FOIA/official procedure." }, { "id": "ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021", "category": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "tactic_path": [ "Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public ignorance and ambiguity in terminology. Examples", "Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Deception" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-07", "state": "GA", "description": "In Curling v. Raffensperger litigation, expert J. Alex Halderman's July 2021 report argued Georgia's near-universal in-person Ballot Marking Device (BMD) model produces barcode-bearing printouts that scanners tabulate, while voters rarely verify printed text; malware could in principle alter barcodes without matching human-readable contests. Catalog linguistic leaf criticizes marketing BMDs/printouts as equivalent to hand-marked paper ballots. Status Partially confirmed for documented expert/security critique of BMD-as-hand-marked equivalence and barcode/auditability concerns in the federal record; does not establish statewide outcome fraud.", "sources": [ { "title": "Expert Report of J. Alex Halderman (Curling litigation PDF mirror)", "url": "http://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/153377.pdf" }, { "title": "Princeton CITP — Security Analysis of the Dominion ImageCast X", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2023/06/14/security-analysis-of-the-dominion-imagecast-x/" } ], "notes": "Court expert report + academic follow-on; advocacy reuse of findings is secondary." }, { "id": "nc-bladen-ballot-harvesting-2018", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Ballot Harvesting" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11 to 2019-02", "state": "NC", "description": "After the Nov. 2018 U.S. House District 9 race, the North Carolina State Board of Elections conducted an evidentiary hearing on absentee-ballot irregularities centered on Bladen County operative Leslie McCrae Dowless Jr. Testimony described paid collectors gathering completed/incomplete absentee ballots (illegal under NC law for non-family handlers). On Feb. 21–25, 2019 the Board unanimously ordered a new election. Multiple associates later pleaded guilty to misdemeanor conspiracy to possess absentee ballots (2022); Dowless died in 2022 before state trial on related felonies (he had a separate federal Social Security fraud conviction). Status Confirmed for Board findings, new-election order, and guilty pleas by associates—not a finding that every third-party ballot-return jurisdiction is fraudulent.", "sources": [ { "title": "NCSBE — State Board unanimously orders new election in 9th District", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2019/02/25/state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-9th-congressional-district" }, { "title": "AP — New election ordered in disputed North Carolina House race", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/e79854eb724b483a9a2ebbc2672d06d8" }, { "title": "WSOC-TV — Four plead guilty in ballot fraud probe", "url": "https://www.wsoctv.com/news/local/plea-agreements-reached-by-4-nc-congress-ballot-probe/E7BX4FYHXZDEXBN2XAP7VZ367Y/" } ], "notes": "Canonical U.S. illegal ballot-harvesting adjudication post-2016." }, { "id": "ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Ballot Harvesting" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 1921 (2015–2016) amended Elections Code §3017 to allow a vote-by-mail voter to designate any person to return their ballot (removing prior family/household-only limits), while prohibiting per-ballot compensation schemes. Status Confirmed for the statute expanding lawful third-party ballot return (often labeled \"ballot harvesting\" in political debate). Enactment is not itself a finding of fraud.", "sources": [ { "title": "CA Legislature — Bill Text AB-1921", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1921" }, { "title": "CA Legislature — AB-1921 floor analysis", "url": "https://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_1901-1950/ab_1921_cfa_20160429_111838_asm_floor.html" } ], "notes": "Statute Confirmed; fraud claims about post-2016 CA elections are separate." }, { "id": "ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Drop-Boxes" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "CA", "description": "In October 2020, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Secretary of State Alex Padilla issued cease-and-desist actions and related guidance against unofficial California Republican Party ballot collection boxes that officials said could confuse voters into thinking they were official drop boxes. Subsequent reporting documented labeling/monitoring changes, litigation skirmishes, and eventual drop of related AG litigation after ballots were processed. Status Confirmed for official state enforcement against unauthorized/unofficial drop-box branding; does not adjudicate partisan intent claims beyond the stated voter-confusion rationale.", "sources": [ { "title": "CA DOJ — AG Becerra and SOS Padilla cease-and-desist on ballot drop boxes", "url": "https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-and-secretary-state-padilla-send-cease-and-desist" }, { "title": "CA SOS — CCROV memo unauthorized ballot drop boxes (PDF)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2020/october/20240jl.pdf" }, { "title": "AP — California attorney general drops lawsuit against state GOP", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/house-elections-lawsuits-elections-xavier-becerra-alex-padilla-bb5f6f9c406627fa0e081d88c8ed6367" } ], "notes": "Official drop-box authenticity/control controversy." }, { "id": "ga-signature-match-settlement-2020", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Mail ballots - Injection of ballots with broken chain of custody", "Signature Verification" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03", "state": "GA", "description": "In Democratic Party of Georgia v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 1:19-cv-05028), the Democratic Party of Georgia, DSCC, and DCCC entered a Compromise Settlement Agreement with State Election Board defendants requiring that before an absentee ballot is rejected for a missing/mismatched signature, at least two additional registrars/clerks review it and a majority must agree to reject. Post-election, Georgia Republicans sued alleging the process was too lenient (dismissed for standing). SB 202 (2021) later replaced signature-match with ID-number verification for absentee ballots. Status Confirmed for the settlement's multi-reviewer rejection protocol and subsequent statutory overhaul.", "sources": [ { "title": "CourtListener RECAP — Compromise Settlement Agreement (PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.283580/gov.uscourts.gand.283580.5.1.pdf" }, { "title": "Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse — Ga. Republican Party v. Raffensperger", "url": "https://clearinghouse.net/case/44530/" } ], "notes": "Primary settlement document; partisan characterizations noted." }, { "id": "pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020", "category": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "tactic_path": [ "Poll Watchers" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania law (25 P.S. §2687(b)) restricts poll watchers to serving in their county of residence. In 2020 litigation including Trump campaign / Republican challenges, federal and state courts upheld the county-residency requirement against claims it unconstitutionally limited observation amid expanded mail voting. Status Confirmed for the statutory residency limit and judicial upholding; whether the rule is good policy is outside this label.", "sources": [ { "title": "W.D. Pa. Trump v. Boockvar materials (CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736.574.0_2.pdf" }, { "title": "Pa. Supreme Court docket materials — Republican Committee answer (PDF)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210510/224838-file-9888.pdf" } ], "notes": "Confirmed legal barrier to cross-county poll watching." }, { "id": "dominion-v-fox-settlement-2023", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Lawfare" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-18", "state": "Federal / DE", "description": "Dominion Voting Systems' defamation suit against Fox News over 2020 election claims settled for $787.5 million on the eve of trial (April 18, 2023). Court pretrial rulings had found certain Fox statements about Dominion false as a matter of law; Fox acknowledged the court's findings in settlement coverage while not issuing an on-air apology. Status Confirmed for the settlement amount and existence of landmark election-adjacent defamation litigation. Catalog may frame such suits as lawfare chilling speech; that motive characterization is advocacy—label Confirmed only for the case outcome.", "sources": [ { "title": "Reuters — Fox settles Dominion lawsuit for $787.5 million", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/dominions-defamation-case-against-fox-poised-trial-after-delay-2023-04-18/" }, { "title": "CNN Business — Fox News settles with Dominion for $787 million", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/18/media/fox-dominion-settlement" } ], "notes": "Major election-speech litigation; partisan \"lawfare\" framing is interpretive." }, { "id": "az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Public Information Requests" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "AZ", "description": "In AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County, Arizona courts held that Cast Vote Records (electronic data derived from ballots) are protected from public-records disclosure under A.R.S. §16-625, which requires electronic ballot data to be secured at least as protectively as sealed paper ballots. Arizona Court of Appeals Division One published opinion affirmed denial. Later Hudson v. Heap (Court of Appeals, reported 2026) again affirmed Maricopa's denial of 2024-cycle CVR public-records requests on the same statutory basis. Status Confirmed for statutory/public-records denial of CVR access (not a finding that underlying tallies were altered).", "sources": [ { "title": "Justia — AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/court-of-appeals-division-one-published/2023/1-ca-cv-22-0254.html" }, { "title": "A.R.S. §16-625 — Electronic data and digital images; ballots; security", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/title-16/section-16-625/" }, { "title": "Arizona Court of Appeals — Hudson v. Heap opinion PDF (1 CA-CV 25-0730)", "url": "https://apps.azcourts.gov/aacc/appella/1CA/CV/CV250730.PDF" } ], "notes": "Also maps to Reporting; Records / Tabulation transparency debates." }, { "id": "az-hudson-cvr-reporting-2024", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Reporting; Records" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "AZ", "description": "Companion to AZ CVR public-records denials: Hudson v. Heap confirms Cast Vote Records from Maricopa's 2024 election cycle are \"electronic data from ballots\" under A.R.S. §16-625 and may be withheld from public records requesters even after canvass/certification, with protections treated as ongoing rather than election-contest-only. Status Confirmed for the records-access rule affecting independent verification workflows that rely on CVR export.", "sources": [ { "title": "Arizona Court of Appeals — Hudson v. Heap opinion PDF (1 CA-CV 25-0730)", "url": "https://apps.azcourts.gov/aacc/appella/1CA/CV/CV250730.PDF" }, { "title": "A.R.S. §16-625", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/title-16/section-16-625/" } ], "notes": "Operational transparency constraint Confirmed." }, { "id": "ca-motor-voter-ey-audit-2019", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Registration; Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08", "state": "CA", "description": "An August 2019 Ernst & Young audit of California's New Motor Voter program (launched April 2018 under AB 1461 / related DMV-SOS automation) found roughly 83,684 duplicate voter registration records and over 170,000 records with party-preference discrepancies, attributing failures to inadequate software testing, confusing interfaces, and weak cross-agency governance. Officials stated eligibility/outcome integrity was not shown compromised; problems were operational. Status Confirmed for audit-documented Motor-Voter system errors (not intentional fraud).", "sources": [ { "title": "Los Angeles Times — Nearly 84,000 duplicate voter records in Motor Voter audit", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-09/duplicate-voter-records-audit-california-motor-voter-system" }, { "title": "AP — Audit finds problems with California motor voter program", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-42cd6b5eeda94a218caa250b460b8503" } ], "notes": "Operational Motor-Voter failure Confirmed." }, { "id": "rucho-gerrymandering-2019", "category": "3. Financial / Campaign / Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Districting/Gerrymandering" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-27", "state": "Federal / NC / MD", "description": "In Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019), the U.S. Supreme Court held 5–4 that partisan gerrymandering claims present nonjusticiable political questions in federal court, vacating lower-court rulings on North Carolina and Maryland maps. The decision leaves partisan map-drawing disputes primarily to state courts and legislatures. Status Confirmed for the holding; does not itself validate any particular map as fair or fraudulent.", "sources": [ { "title": "U.S. Supreme Court opinion PDF — Rucho v. Common Cause", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf" }, { "title": "Oyez — Rucho v. Common Cause", "url": "https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422" } ], "notes": "Foundational SCOTUS districting control case within scope." }, { "id": "unite-america-tides-rcv-funding-2020", "category": "3. Financial / Campaign / Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Ranked-choice voting", "Behind RCV", "Behind RCV: Tides Foundation / Unite America" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "AK / MA / Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia's compilation of 2020 RCV ballot-measure funding shows Unite America as a top donor (e.g., ~$3.4M toward Alaska Ballot Measure 2's Alaskans for Better Elections; six-figure support for Massachusetts Question 2). InfluenceWatch and advocacy trackers also list Tides Foundation among FairVote/RCV ecosystem funders. Status Partially confirmed for Unite America's large disclosed contributions to 2020 RCV campaigns via Ballotpedia reporting; Tides→FairVote amounts rely more on secondary aggregators pending 990 line-item cross-check. Does not establish that RCV enables covert tabulation fraud.", "sources": [ { "title": "Ballotpedia News — Who funded RCV ballot measures in 2020?", "url": "https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/02/22/who-funded-the-campaigns-for-and-against-ranked-choice-voting-ballot-measures-in-2020/" }, { "title": "Ballotpedia — Alaska Ballot Measure 2 (2020)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Ballot_Measure_2,_Top-Four_Ranked-Choice_Voting_and_Campaign_Finance_Laws_Initiative_(2020)" }, { "title": "InfluenceWatch — Unite America Institute", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/unite-america-institute/" } ], "notes": "Disclose InfluenceWatch as advocacy-adjacent research." }, { "id": "action-now-gehl-rcv-funding-2020", "category": "3. Financial / Campaign / Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Ranked-choice voting", "Behind RCV", "Behind RCV: GEHL / Action Now" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "AK / MA / NV / Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia reporting identifies the Action Now Initiative (Arnold-affiliated) as a leading funder of 2020 RCV campaigns, including ~$2.9M to Alaska's Alaskans for Better Elections and ~$3.66M to Massachusetts Ranked Choice Voting 2020. Katherine Gehl's Final Five / Institute for Political Innovation network is frequently paired with Action Now on open-primary/RCV measures (e.g., Nevada coverage). Status Partially confirmed for Action Now Initiative's disclosed RCV ballot funding; Gehl organizational pairing documented in contemporaneous reporting—exact catalog \"GEHL / Action Now\" structure is advocacy taxonomy.", "sources": [ { "title": "Ballotpedia News — Who funded RCV ballot measures in 2020?", "url": "https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/02/22/who-funded-the-campaigns-for-and-against-ranked-choice-voting-ballot-measures-in-2020/" }, { "title": "Nevada Independent — Open primary/RCV measure fundraising (Action Now)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/open-primary-ranked-choice-ballot-measure-raises-2-2-million-in-2022-first-quarter" }, { "title": "InfluenceWatch — Final Five Fund Inc.", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/political-party/final-five-fund-inc/" } ], "notes": "Campaign-finance reporting Confirmed for Action Now amounts via Ballotpedia." }, { "id": "tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Fake Testing and Certification" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-24", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Deputy Secretary of State José A. Esparza denied state certification of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A on Jan. 24, 2020 after examiner reports concluded the system did not meet Texas Election Code §122.001 standards (accuracy/suitability/security concerns documented in SOS examination PDFs). The denial is an official refusal to certify—not a claim that EAC federal testing was fabricated, but evidence that state examiners rejected a federally reviewed configuration for Texas use. Status Confirmed for Texas non-certification decision and published examiner findings.", "sources": [ { "title": "Texas SOS — Dominion voting system examination status page", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/dominion.shtml" }, { "title": "Texas SOS — Report of Review of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/sysexam/dominion-d-suite-5.5-a.pdf" } ], "notes": "Maps to catalog \"Fake Testing and Certification\" leaf as certification-gate controversy; label carefully—not proof EAC certificates are forged." }, { "id": "co-rla-statute-1-7-515", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Auditing" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-7-515 mandates risk-limiting audits after coordinated elections, with Secretary of State rules (8 CCR 1505-1 Rule 25) specifying comparison vs ballot-polling methods, contest selection, and continuation until the risk limit is met or a full hand count. Colorado SOS publishes RLA FAQs and results. Status Confirmed for the statutory/regulatory RLA requirement—an official audit framework often debated by activists as either integrity safeguard or insufficient substitute for full hand counts.", "sources": [ { "title": "C.R.S. §1-7-515 — Risk-limiting audits", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7-515" }, { "title": "Colorado SOS — Risk-Limiting Audit FAQs", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/RLA/faqs.html" } ], "notes": "Official RLA architecture Confirmed." }, { "id": "va-rla-2024-general", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Auditing" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "VA", "description": "Pursuant to Va. Code §24.2-671.2, Virginia Department of Elections supervised post-November 2024 RLAs: a statewide ballot-polling RLA of the U.S. Senate contest (1,878 ballots across 125 localities) and a batch-comparison RLA of U.S. House District 1 (137,627 ballots across selected batches), both meeting the State Board's 10% risk limit in the first round per ELECT's published summary. Status Confirmed for official RLA conduct and published pass results.", "sources": [ { "title": "Virginia ELECT — Risk-limiting Audits page", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/resultsreports/election-security/rla/" } ], "notes": "Official state RLA documentation." }, { "id": "ga-2020-certification-hand-tally", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Certification" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-20", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and Governor Brian Kemp certified the 2020 presidential results on Nov. 20, 2020 after a statewide risk-limiting audit conducted as a full hand tally of ~5 million ballots (observed/reported by the Carter Center) and subsequent machine recount, both affirming Biden's statewide win (final certified margin later ~11,779). Status Confirmed for certification after audit/recount process. Later Fulton County SEB consent orders documented audit paperwork/data-entry errors attributed to human error—operational quality issues, not adjudicated intentional fraud.", "sources": [ { "title": "Carter Center — Georgia Risk-Limiting Audit/Hand Tally Observation Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.cartercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/georgia-audit-final-report-033121.pdf" }, { "title": "AP — Georgia again certifies election results showing Biden won", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-georgia-elections-4eeea3b24f10de886bcdeab6c26b680a" }, { "title": "AJC — State finds errors in Fulton audit paperwork", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-investigation-finds-errors-in-fulton-audit-of-2020-election/BZ7D5JXOMRBPZIU4PNVYIHQZR4/" } ], "notes": "Certification Confirmed; Fulton paperwork errors are operational." }, { "id": "mit-voatz-mobile-voting-2020", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Mobile Voting and \"shiny new object\" technology" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-02", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "MIT researchers (Specter, Koppel, Weitzner) published a USENIX Security 2020 analysis of Voatz, a blockchain-marketed mobile voting app used in some U.S. elections for UOCAVA/absentee voters, finding multiple serious vulnerabilities including vote alteration/blocking possibilities and a ballot-secrecy leak via encrypted packet lengths (CVE-2020-8989). Status Confirmed for peer-reviewed/conference security findings on a deployed mobile-voting product—not a finding that any specific election outcome was flipped via Voatz.", "sources": [ { "title": "USENIX Security 2020 — The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain (Voatz)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/specter" }, { "title": "MIT Internet Policy — Voatz security analysis PDF", "url": "https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf" }, { "title": "CVE-2020-8989", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-8989" } ], "notes": "Canonical \"shiny new object\" mobile voting security case." }, { "id": "il-ivrs-breach-2016", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Data Breaches; Software" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-07", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois State Board of Elections announced in mid-2016 that attackers used SQL injection against the Illinois Voter Registration System (IVRS), exfiltrating information on roughly 76,000–90,000 voters; officials stated voter records were not altered and voting equipment was not affected. The incident was later cited in U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee materials on 2016 election-infrastructure targeting. Status Confirmed for the official breach acknowledgment (confidentiality impact); integrity of cast ballots not implicated by the Board's statements.", "sources": [ { "title": "Illinois State Board of Elections — Aug. 31, 2016 press release (PDF)", "url": "https://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/AboutTheBoard/PDF/08_31_16PressRelease.pdf" }, { "title": "U.S. Senate Intelligence — Illinois Voter Registration System materials", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-os-ssandvoss-062117-0.pdf" } ], "notes": "Within scope as 2016 statewide VRDB breach." }, { "id": "ny-covid-absentee-expansion-2020", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "In-Person Voting converted to Mail-in" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "NY", "description": "During COVID-19, New York expanded absentee eligibility (including via executive orders and Chapter 139 of the Laws of 2020 treating risk of COVID contraction as \"illness\" for absentee applications) and related postage-paid return measures (e.g., EO 202.26 context). Subsequent legislation extended pandemic-related absentee flexibility. Status Confirmed for official conversion/expansion of mail pathways relative to pre-pandemic norms; not a fraud finding.", "sources": [ { "title": "NY Governor — legislation extending COVID absentee voting through 2022", "url": "https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-legislation-allow-voting-absentee-ballot-due-covid-19-pandemic-through" }, { "title": "NYS courts — Matter of Amedure discussing COVID absentee framework", "url": "http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_06096.htm" } ], "notes": "Pandemic mail expansion Confirmed." }, { "id": "maricopa-paper-weight-routing-2022", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Paper thickness / scanner routing" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's McGregor investigation linked 2022 Election Day printer/tabulator problems in part to 20-inch, 100-pound ballot stock interacting poorly with Oki B432 fusers (insufficient heat/fusion), producing faint timing marks and rejects requiring central duplication/tabulation. Catalog also alleges thickness-based routing to different scanners elsewhere (Sacramento seed). For Maricopa, paper-weight/equipment interaction is Confirmed by the official report; intentional routing-for-fraud scheme not established—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments (McGregor)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments" }, { "title": "Votebeat — Maricopa ballot printer investigation", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/4/10/23678055/maricopa-county-election-day-investigation-oki-printers/" } ], "notes": "Companion to faint-toner instance; distinct leaf for paper thickness." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-006", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "USPS" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-14", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Sept. 14–15, 2026 the U.S. Supreme Court left intact a lower-court injunction blocking USPS final rules that would have required specialized mail-ballot envelope designs (including unique barcodes) and submission of voter mailing data via a USPS portal before the midterms. Status Confirmed for the Court's leave-in-place of the block (CBS/AP contemporaneous reporting); underlying policy dispute remains litigated.", "sources": [ { "title": "CBS News — Supreme Court blocks new Postal Service mail ballot rules", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-blocks-new-postal-service-mail-ballots-trump/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-006. Previously skipped; clear USPS leaf mapping." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-008", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Lawfare" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Sept. 18, 2026 the NAACP and allied organizations filed NAACP et al. v. DHS et al. seeking to restrain federal law-enforcement deployments alleged to intimidate voters around the midterms (Democracy Docket case page). Status Confirmed for the lawsuit filing; court has not finally adjudicated the merits in sources reviewed. Note Democracy Docket affiliation/advocacy framing of the docket.", "sources": [ { "title": "Democracy Docket — Federal election interference at the polls challenge (NAACP)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/federal-election-interference-at-the-polls-challenge-naacp/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-008. Filing Confirmed; maps to Lawfare leaf as election-adjacent federal litigation." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-009", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Mail ballots - Injection of ballots with broken chain of custody", "Signature Verification" ], "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09", "state": "NC", "description": "On Sept. 22, 2026 the North Carolina Alliance for Retired Americans and others sued over State Board of Elections policies announced Sept. 4 that plaintiffs say will invalidate absentee ballots for technical envelope/seal and related issues unrelated to eligibility (Democracy Docket case summary). Status Alleged for plaintiffs' characterization of disqualifying impact; case emerging/unadjudicated as of source date. Included because tags/summary expressly implicate absentee verification mechanics adjacent to signature/envelope curing fights.", "sources": [ { "title": "Democracy Docket — North Carolina absentee ballot voting restrictions challenge", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/north-carolina-absentee-ballot-voting-restrictions-challenge/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-009. Advocacy docket; Alleged pending court findings." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-011", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Poll Books" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-12", "state": "MN", "description": "Around Sept. 12–14, 2026 the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the City of Oak Grove to use paper voter rosters instead of electronic poll books for the 2026 general election, over League of Women Voters warnings about wait times/errors. Status Confirmed for the court authorization of paper check-in as an alternative to e-pollbooks in that locality.", "sources": [ { "title": "Democracy Docket — Minnesota early voting restrictions / Oak Grove paper poll books", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/gop-led-early-voting-restrictions-compound-in-minnesota/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-011. Clear Electronic Poll Books leaf mapping." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-015", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Early Voting; Election 'Day'" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-18", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Per CEIR calendars and contemporaneous reporting, early in-person or equivalent pre-Election Day voting for the Nov. 3, 2026 midterms began as early as Sept. 18 in Virginia, Minnesota (absentee), South Dakota, and Idaho, with Illinois among states opening Sept. 24; most states open mid-October (Kentucky as late as Oct. 29 per CEIR). Status Confirmed for published early-voting calendar facts illustrating multi-week \"Election Day\" expansion.", "sources": [ { "title": "CEIR — Dates for 2026 early in-person and mail voting", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/dates-for-2026-early-in-person-and-mail-voting/" }, { "title": "Washington Examiner — States begin September early voting", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/congressional/4732384/states-september-early-voting-midterm-elections/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-015. Calendar Confirmed." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-001", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Registration; Voter Rolls" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10 to 2026-09", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas DPS acknowledged a system error that left tens of thousands of online driver's-license portal voter registration applications/updates untransmitted to county registrars for as long as about a year (records dating to Oct. 2025). After state delivery of unsent records beginning Sept. 22–23, 2026, refreshed county counts included Dallas 68,104+ (Dallas Morning News / NBC 5), Collin 40,000+, Bexar more than 45,000, Travis more than 35,000 (NBC News), and Lubbock more than 7,500. SOS/DPS say the system issue was resolved; counties extended hours aiming to finish before early voting Oct. 19; registration deadline Oct. 5; affected voters may cast provisional ballots if they registered via DPS by the deadline. Gov. Abbott addressed the backlog at a Sept. 24 news conference. Status Confirmed for the operational transmission failure (official acknowledgment via contemporaneous reporting); not labeled as intentional fraud. Also maps to Motor-Voter / illegitimate-registration leaf as DPS portal motor-voter channel failure.", "sources": [ { "title": "Votebeat / Texas Tribune — DPS error backlogged voter registration applications", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/09/23/dps-error-backlogged-voter-registration-applications-county-election-officials/" }, { "title": "EMon live monitor — TX DPS registration backlog (refreshed county counts)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-001 refresh 2026-09-25: Dallas 68,104+; Bexar/Travis/Collin/Lubbock counts. Operational failure Confirmed. Cross-leaf: Motor-Voter." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-016", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Poll Books" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-24", "state": "IL", "description": "On the first day of Illinois early voting (Sept. 24, 2026), DuPage County paused early voting after roughly the first hour due to a technical issue, with the clerk's office saying voting would resume during regular hours Friday, Sept. 25 (Audacy/WBBM; NCTV17; Center Square / county statement via local coverage). Sites cited by witnesses included the DuPage fairgrounds and Naperville Municipal Center. As of the morning of Sept. 25, clean-reopen confirmation was still pending (status remains active on EMon). Root cause (pollbooks vs network vs vendor) not yet detailed in sources reviewed. Status Confirmed for the countywide early-voting pause/outage as an administration failure; intentional sabotage not alleged by primary local TV report. Also maps to Technology / Cyber-Security and Early Voting; Election 'Day' leaves.", "sources": [ { "title": "NCTV17 — DuPage County paused early voting (technical issue)", "url": "https://x.com/NCTV17/status/2103176843910365618" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-016 refresh 2026-09-25: still active pending clean-reopen confirm after Fri resume notes." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-002", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "USPS" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Brookings analysis of 2026 primaries in California, North Carolina, and Washington finds USPS Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO)—one daily truck instead of two for many rural post offices >50 miles from plants—roughly doubled late-arrival mail-ballot rejection rates in exposed counties. Estimates 43,000–55,000 additional late rejections possible nationally if the pattern holds in November. USPS also confirmed (Dec. 2025) a postmark may no longer show the day mail was sent. Status Partially confirmed: rigorous observational analysis with difference-in-differences design; causal attribution and November projection remain estimates, not adjudicated findings of intentional disenfranchisement.", "sources": [ { "title": "Brookings — Postal network redesign and mail ballot rejections in the 2026 primaries", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/postal-network-redesign-and-mail-ballot-rejections-in-the-2026-primaries/" }, { "title": "Brookings — New post office policy could lead to tens of thousands of additional rejections", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/new-post-office-policy-could-lead-to-the-rejection-of-tens-of-thousands-of-mail-in-ballots-in-november/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-002." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-003", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Mail ballots" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington rejected 20,267 ballots for late postmarks in the August 2026 primary, up from 16,131 in 2024 (~32% increase), even as more voters used drop boxes. Rural/central counties saw sharp jumps. Sen. Maria Cantwell and county auditors linked trends to USPS processing/postmark timing changes. Status Confirmed for the official rejection counts and increase; intentional fraud not claimed.", "sources": [ { "title": "Spokesman-Review — 4,000 additional WA ballots rejected due to late postmarks", "url": "https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2026/sep/04/4000-additional-ballots-in-washington-rejected-due/" }, { "title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks surged in WA and OR", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-003." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-004", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Mail ballots" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon Secretary of State Tobias Read reported 7,314 ballots arriving during the state's weeklong grace period after the May 2026 primary were not counted because they were postmarked after Election Day—a 13% rejection rate among those late-arriving mailed ballots, up from 9.5% two years earlier. Status Confirmed for SOS-reported figures.", "sources": [ { "title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks surged in WA and OR", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-004." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-012", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Mail ballots" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "CA", "description": "Associated Press reporting (via PBS NewsHour) states that during California's June 2026 primary about 93,500 voters had ballots rejected because they were postmarked or arrived too late. California is also in the Brookings RTO late-rejection study. Status Confirmed for the reported aggregate late-rejection figure pending county-table re-verification.", "sources": [ { "title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks (includes CA ~93,500)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes" }, { "title": "Brookings — RTO and 2026 primary rejections (CA rate +86%)", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/postal-network-redesign-and-mail-ballot-rejections-in-the-2026-primaries/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-012. Medium confidence in EMon pending SOS tables." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-005", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "USPS" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Office of Inspector General audit (Sept. 4, 2026; reported by ProPublica Sept. 9) found election-mail training gaps at many delivery units, managers unaware of correct ballot postmarking at ~12% of reviewed facilities, inaccurate hand-postmark dates at some processing facilities (including 56 wrong-date postmarks in Pennsylvania on primary day), and incomplete daily election-mail dispatch checks—while noting most facilities generally complied and nearly 99% of trackable ballots were processed on time. Status Confirmed for OIG audit findings of operational gaps.", "sources": [ { "title": "ProPublica — Postal Service audit on primary election ballots", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/postal-service-audit-primary-election-ballots" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-005." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-007", "category": "1. Psychological / Perception / Influence Operations", "tactic_path": [ "Intimidation" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "Federal", "description": "Democratic campaign committees (DSCC, DCCC, DGA) and congressional leaders including Sens./Reps. Schumer and Jeffries sued DHS, ICE, FBI and leaders in D.C. federal court seeking to bar armed federal officers near open polling places, drop boxes, curbside voting, and vote-counting/certification sites through ballot curing, citing Civil War-era statutes and VRA §11(b). Court had not ruled as of sources' dates; EMon still lists the matter active, with light X corroboration of the filing and early-voting timing. Status Confirmed for the lawsuit filing and claims asserted; does not adjudicate whether deployments would constitute unlawful intimidation. Note: Democracy Docket affiliation with counsel for plaintiffs.", "sources": [ { "title": "Democracy Docket — Democrats sue to keep armed agents from polls", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/democrats-sue-trump-admin-to-keep-armed-agents-from-polls-during-midterms/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-007 refresh 2026-09-25: still active; light X corroboration. Maps to Fear/Discredit/Intimidation and Polling Places climate." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-010", "category": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "tactic_path": [ "Polling Places" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "AR", "description": "Poinsett County Election Commission voted unanimously to temporarily close the Tyronza Senior Citizens Center polling place for the Nov. 3, 2026 general election due to too few local residents completing required poll-worker certification before the training window closed. Voters may use other county vote centers; county does not provide transportation. Status Confirmed for the closure decision and stated staffing cause.", "sources": [ { "title": "KAIT 8 — Worker shortage temporarily closes Tyronza polling site", "url": "https://www.kait8.com/2026/09/23/worker-shortage-temporarily-closes-tyronza-polling-site-ahead-november-election/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-010." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-013", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Wrong ballot styles being given to people to affect who they can vote for. Then they claim 'mistakes'." ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08", "state": "TN", "description": "During August 2026 early voting ahead of Tennessee's primary, one Shelby County machine at Christian Life Church in Bartlett was missing four state judicial races, affecting 307 voters. Officials attributed the issue to human error amid a headquarters move and redistricting; ~700 absentee ballots earlier lacked the same races. Affected in-person voters could not revote under state law. Status Confirmed for the ballot-definition omission and official human-error explanation; intentional fraud not alleged by officials.", "sources": [ { "title": "Action News 5 / WMC — Shelby County early voting machine missing races", "url": "https://www.actionnews5.com/2026/08/03/liveshelby-county-election-officials-speak-early-voting-turnout/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-013. Remapped under wrong ballot style / missing races leaf. Also relevant to Electronic Voting Machines." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-014", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cyber Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Electronic Poll Books" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-26", "state": "TX", "description": "During the May 26, 2026 Texas primary runoff, Fort Bend County experienced a countywide electronic pollbook outage from shortly after 3 p.m. until about 6 p.m., preventing normal check-in for more than two hours. Officials later said an incorrectly uploaded election data file caused the disruption; ballot-marking/tabulation devices were not affected. Voters could use provisional ballots; hours were not extended. Status Confirmed for the outage and official root-cause statement (bad data upload).", "sources": [ { "title": "Houston Public Media — Fort Bend voting issue investigation", "url": "https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/fort-bend/2026/05/28/553083/voting-issue-fort-bend-county-elections-investigation/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-014." }, { "id": "ei-2026-09-017", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Chain of Custody sleight of hand" ], "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-09-24", "state": "CA", "description": "In Cervantes v. Bianco, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco unlawfully seized about 650,000 ballots from the county registrar during a probe tied to the November 2025 special election on Proposition 50, ordered return of the ballots, and barred further sheriff handling of them. Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero stressed that voted ballots must remain with election officials even with a search warrant. Coverage through Sept. 25 indicates Bianco plans to comply; Gov. Newsom, AG Bonta, and SOS Weber welcomed the ruling. Status Upheld (court order against the seizure). Also maps to Ballots / Mail ballots leaves for physical custody of voted ballots.", "sources": [ { "title": "CalMatters — Sheriff broke law by seizing ballots, CA Supreme Court rules", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/09/supreme-court-ruling-sheriff-ballot-seizure/" }, { "title": "Los Angeles Times — Sheriff's ballot seizure was unlawful", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-09-24/california-supreme-court-ruling-ballot-seizure" }, { "title": "CBS Los Angeles — Court orders return of seized ballots", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/california-supreme-court-riverside-county-chad-bianco-ballot-seizure-case/" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-017 refresh 2026-09-25: still active; compliance noted in summaries. Chain-of-custody leaf: unlawful removal of ballots from election official custody." }, { "id": "maricopa-az-2016-ppe-vote-centers", "category": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "tactic_path": [ "Polling Places", "County-Wide Voting" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-03-22", "state": "AZ", "description": "For the March 22, 2016 Arizona presidential preference election, Maricopa County shifted to a countywide vote-center model and cut Election Day locations from more than 200 (2012) to 60, citing cost and rising mail voting. Voters waited hours; county recorder records later showed votes still being cast past 10 p.m. at 20 of 60 sites and past midnight at five Phoenix-area sites, with one final ballot near 1 a.m. County officials later acknowledged the 60-site plan was a mistake. Status Confirmed for the consolidation, countywide access model, and documented wait times; intentional disenfranchisement motive not established.", "sources": [ { "title": "AP — Records reveal scope of wait times in Arizona primary", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-47da6cbdb2c74ca88584f42059358e40" }, { "title": "Arizona Republic — Lack of polling sites caused Maricopa election chaos", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/23/maricopa-county-presidential-primary-election-chaos-arizona/82174876/" }, { "title": "Arizona Republic — Long lines, too few polls frustrate metro Phoenix voters", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/22/arizona-primary-voter-turnout-long-lines/82125816/" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: County-Wide Voting. Strong official/records documentation." }, { "id": "wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage", "category": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "tactic_path": [ "Election Workers" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04-07", "state": "WI", "description": "Ahead of Wisconsin's April 7, 2020 spring election/presidential primary, COVID-era poll-worker shortfalls forced massive site consolidations. Governor Evers' Executive Order #74 recited WEC estimates of thousands of missing workers and documented Milwaukee cutting polling places from 182 to five (~97% reduction), Green Bay from 31 to two, and Waukesha from 15 to one. Brennan Center analysis later estimated Milwaukee consolidation reduced turnout ~8.6 percentage points (larger for Black voters) despite a surge in absentee voting. Status Confirmed for worker shortages and consolidations; pandemic context noted, intentional partisan suppression not established by these sources.", "sources": [ { "title": "Wisconsin EO #74 (poll-worker shortage / consolidation findings)", "url": "https://urbanmilwaukee.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingAndSpecialSession.pdf" }, { "title": "Brennan Center — Did consolidating polling places in Milwaukee depress turnout?", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/did-consolidating-polling-places-milwaukee-depress-turnout" }, { "title": "PMC — Voting in a Pandemic: COVID-19 and Primary Turnout in Milwaukee", "url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8689108/" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Election Workers (beyond Poinsett AR ei-2026-09-010)." }, { "id": "wi-april-2020-election-calendar-fight", "category": "6. Process & Procedural Interference", "tactic_path": [ "Date/Time games" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "WI", "description": "In the days before Wisconsin's April 7, 2020 election, calendar and deadline rules flipped repeatedly: Gov. Evers sought postponement and issued EO #74 attempting to move the election; the Wisconsin Supreme Court blocked that order; a federal district court extended absentee receipt deadlines; and on April 6 the U.S. Supreme Court in RNC v. DNC stayed the injunction insofar as it allowed ballots postmarked after Election Day, requiring postmark by April 7 and receipt by April 13. Status Confirmed for the succession of sudden deadline/calendar changes via executive, state-court, and SCOTUS action; disputes over which side benefited are political, not needed for the leaf.", "sources": [ { "title": "SCOTUS — Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (PDF)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/589us2r23_m6io.pdf" }, { "title": "Cornell LII — RNC v. DNC text", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/19A1016" }, { "title": "Wisconsin EO #74 (attempted suspension / special session framing)", "url": "https://urbanmilwaukee.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingAndSpecialSession.pdf" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Date/Time games." }, { "id": "fl-amendment4-sb7066-2020", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon Voting Rights" ], "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-09-11", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida voters passed Amendment 4 (2018) restoring voting rights to many felons upon 'completion of all terms of sentence.' SB 7066 (2019) and Fla. Stat. § 98.0751 defined completion to include fines, fees, costs, and restitution; the Florida Supreme Court advisory opinion agreed (Jan 2020). After a district court enjoined pay-to-vote aspects for indigents, the Eleventh Circuit en banc in Jones v. Governor of Florida (Sept 11, 2020) reversed and upheld the financial-completion requirement. Status Upheld for the court-sustained implementation; catalog leaf concerns accessibility sleight-of-hand—label carefully as Confirmed statutory practice upheld against constitutional challenge, not as adjudicated 'fraud.'", "sources": [ { "title": "11th Cir. en banc — Kelvin Leon Jones v. Governor of Florida (CourtListener PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/09/11/kelvin_leon_jones_v._governor_of_florida.pdf" }, { "title": "Fla. Supreme Court — Advisory Opinion re Implementation of Amendment 4", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2020/sc19-1341.html" }, { "title": "Campaign Legal Center — Jones v. DeSantis en banc opinion page", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/document/jones-v-desantis-us-court-appeals-eleventh-circuit-en-banc-opinion" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Felon Voting Rights. Document statute + court outcomes carefully." }, { "id": "tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020", "category": "7. Voting Methods & Early / Mail / In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": [ "Drop-Boxes" ], "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-10-01", "state": "TX", "description": "On October 1, 2020, Gov. Greg Abbott issued a disaster-act proclamation amending his July expansion of in-person delivery of marked mail ballots so that, before Election Day, each county could designate only a single early-voting clerk office location for hand-delivery (poll watchers required). Plaintiffs challenged the sudden restriction; the Texas Supreme Court on October 27, 2020, in Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League dissolved the temporary injunction and upheld the proclamation as within gubernatorial disaster authority and not a severe voting burden relative to the Election Code baseline. Status Upheld.", "sources": [ { "title": "Office of the Texas Governor — Proclamation enhancing ballot security (Oct 1, 2020)", "url": "https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-proclamation-enhancing-ballot-security" }, { "title": "Supreme Court of Texas — Abbott v. ADL, No. 20-0846 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1449966/200846.pdf" }, { "title": "Dallas Morning News — Texas Supreme Court upholds one mail-ballot drop site order", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2020/10/27/texas-supreme-court-upholds-gov-abbotts-order-limiting-counties-to-one-mail-ballot-drop-site/" } ], "notes": "Strengthens Drop-Boxes leaf; also relevant to sudden early-voting delivery rule changes." }, { "id": "az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Canvassing" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "Cochise County Supervisors Tom Crosby and Peggy Judd twice refused to canvass/certify the county's 2022 general-election results by Arizona's statutory deadline, citing machine-certification claims county/state elections lawyers advised were not a lawful basis to withhold a ministerial canvass. After the Secretary of State sued, a judge ordered the board to canvass; the board then certified (Crosby absent). In November 2023 a state grand jury indicted Crosby and Judd on felony conspiracy and interference-with-an-election-officer charges for allegedly conspiring to delay the canvass. Status Confirmed for the refused/delayed canvass, court-ordered certification, and indictment; ultimate criminal adjudication may evolve.", "sources": [ { "title": "Votebeat — Two Cochise County supervisors indicted for refusing to certify", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/11/29/arizona-cochise-county-supervisors-indicted-refusing-certify-2022-election/" }, { "title": "Democracy Docket — Court orders Cochise County to canvass", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/court-orders-cochise-county-arizona-to-canvass-election-results/" }, { "title": "AP — Arizona county certifies election after judge's order", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-phoenix-government-and-politics-938a920c848d28ca23435a6d2cb61f98" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Canvassing." }, { "id": "az-lake-v-hobbs-contest-2022", "category": "10. Overall Systems & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": [ "Election Contest" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-24", "state": "AZ", "description": "After the 2022 Arizona gubernatorial race, Kari Lake filed a statutory election contest under A.R.S. § 16-672 alleging intentional misconduct tied to Maricopa ballot-on-demand printer/tabulator failures and chain-of-custody issues. On December 24, 2022, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Peter Thompson ruled after evidentiary hearing that Lake failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence intentional outcome-changing misconduct on either remaining count and confirmed Katie Hobbs as governor-elect. Later appellate/signature-verification proceedings continued separately; fraud claims remain Alleged and were rejected on the tried counts. Status Confirmed for the contest process and adverse merits ruling on printer/custody claims.", "sources": [ { "title": "Maricopa Superior Court — Lake v. Hobbs under-advisement ruling (Democracy Docket PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/UA-Ruling-Lake-vs.-Hobbs.pdf" }, { "title": "AP — Lake loses suit over Arizona governor's race", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-katie-hobbs-2a1ef57c4902c8460eaee8ec0bc394d6" }, { "title": "Arizona Court of Appeals Div. 1 opinion materials (2023)", "url": "https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2023/1%20CA-CV%2022-0779%20and%201%20CA-SA%2022-0237.pdf" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Election Contest. Process Confirmed; underlying fraud claims Alleged/rejected on tried counts." }, { "id": "nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": [ "Colleges" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-02", "state": "NC", "description": "For the 2026 North Carolina primary, county/state election boards did not include on-campus early-voting sites at Western Carolina University, NC A&T, and UNC-Greensboro in approved plans (WCU had hosted sites consistently since 2016; A&T/UNCG had hosted in some presidential cycles). College Democrats and students sued seeking an injunction. On ~Feb 8–9, 2026, U.S. District Judge William Osteen denied relief, finding the burden not severe enough under Purcell-timing constraints and logistics/cost justifications; early voting began Feb 12 without those campus sites. Status Confirmed for the denials and court ruling; whether exclusion was discriminatory remains litigated/contested framing, not adjudicated as discrimination here.", "sources": [ { "title": "Carolina Public Press — Judge denies campus early-voting sites for three NC universities", "url": "https://carolinapublicpress.org/74415/judge-denies-demands-for-early-voting-sites-on-three-nc-university-campuses/" }, { "title": "AP — Efforts at early voting sites at North Carolina universities denied by judge", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/north-carolina-early-voting-universities-judge-452615513f497ab51ca3c19783703073" }, { "title": "Complaint PDF — College Democrats / students v. NCSBE (CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ncmd.103938/gov.uscourts.ncmd.103938.1.0.pdf" } ], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-018 (published to live monitor 2026-09-25). Priority Colleges / Early Voting leaf. Confirmed for denial ruling; Purcell timing cited." }, { "id": "pa-expressvote-xl-remedy-delay-2023", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": [ "Delay Tactics in fixing election issues" ], "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-08", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania certified ES&S ExpressVote XL in 2018; advocates petitioned for re-examination in 2019 citing code/security/privacy flaws, and Northampton County suffered severe XL problems in Nov 2019. A Commonwealth Court suit filed Dec 2019 survived a 2021 motion to dismiss. Only in August 2023 did plaintiffs settle with Secretary Al Schmidt: counties must upgrade to latest certified software (fixing some sued issues) by March 1, 2024, implement certification 'conditions for use,' and the Commonwealth must collect/publish statewide malfunction reports. Status Partially confirmed for multi-year gap between documented defects/litigation and mandated remediation; settlement improves transparency rather than proving intentional stalling.", "sources": [ { "title": "Free Speech For People — PA ExpressVote XL settlement with Secretary Schmidt", "url": "https://freespeechforpeople.org/advocates-win-security-transparency-improvements-in-pennsylvania-elections-settlement-reached-with-secretary-of-state-schmidt-in-voting-machine-lawsuit/" }, { "title": "Votebeat — Voting machine malfunctions in Pennsylvania will be tracked", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2023/8/18/23837562/voting-machine-malfunction-reports-public-database-election-lawsuit/" }, { "title": "WHYY — Judge delays voting machine case against Pa. state department", "url": "https://whyy.org/articles/federal-judge-delays-voting-machine-case-against-pa-department-of-state/" } ], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Delay Tactics in fixing election issues." }, { "id": "montgomery-pa-2020-wrong-party-mail-ballots", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Wrong ballot styles being given to people to affect who they can vote for. Then they claim 'mistakes'." ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05", "state": "PA", "description": "Montgomery County, PA, mistakenly mailed about 1,984 June 2020 primary mail ballots with the wrong party (Democrats receiving Republican ballots and vice versa) after a ballot-printer data mix-up. County officials voided the bad ballots and reissued correct ones with USPS coordination. Status Confirmed for the wrong-ballot mailing and official remediation; intentional fraud not alleged by officials.", "sources": [ { "title": "The Philadelphia Inquirer — Montgomery County sent voters wrong ballots for 2020 primary", "url": "https://inquirer.com/politics/election/montgomery-county-pa-wrong-primary-ballots-20200526.html" } ], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources." }, { "id": "carter-tn-2024-wrong-johnson-city-ballots", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Wrong ballot styles being given to people to affect who they can vote for. Then they claim 'mistakes'." ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "TN", "description": "Carter County, TN, election officials acknowledged that Heather Lane voters (outside Johnson City limits) were given Johnson City municipal ballots in the Nov. 5, 2024 election — documents cited up to 44 affected voters. The error mattered because a city commission seat was decided by a 38-vote margin; results were certified. Status Confirmed for the wrong ballot-style issuance acknowledged by officials; intentional fraud not established by cited reporting.", "sources": [ { "title": "WCYB — Carter County voters given wrong ballot", "url": "https://wcyb.com/news/local/carter-county-voters-given-wrong-ballot-potentially-impacting-tight-johnson-city-race" }, { "title": "WJHL — Tight JC election results certified despite glitch", "url": "https://www.wjhl.com/news/your-local-election-hq/tight-jc-election-results-certified-despite-glitch/" } ], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources." }, { "id": "will-il-2024-wrong-ballot-style", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Wrong ballot styles being given to people to affect who they can vote for. Then they claim 'mistakes'." ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03", "state": "IL", "description": "In the March 19, 2024 Illinois primary, a Will County Crete Township Precinct 8 voter was given the wrong state House ballot style; election judges reportedly did not know the precinct had two styles. Will County Clerk’s office acknowledged wrong-style handoffs can occur and noted separate faulty VBM ballots omitting a Senate race. Status Confirmed for the acknowledged wrong-style incident; intentional fraud not alleged.", "sources": [ { "title": "The Center Square — Election confidence rattled after voter receives wrong ballot", "url": "https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/article_267cbbde-034c-11ef-9301-0f2196d74422.html" } ], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources." }, { "id": "mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Textual 'Mistakes' on ballots (names spelled wrong, names missing, geographical differences)" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "WV", "description": "During early voting Oct. 23–28, 2024, Mingo County, WV, issued ballots to about 678 early voters that incorrectly listed Randy Fowler (instead of Jeff Disibbio) as the Democratic candidate for West Virginia Senate District 6. The printing vendor found the error; corrected ballots followed Oct. 28. ACLU-WV sought mandamus for a new election; cast ballots could not be individually corrected because voting is anonymous. Status Confirmed for the wrong-name ballot printing affecting hundreds of early voters; intentional fraud not established by cited sources.", "sources": [ { "title": "ACLU of West Virginia — Mingo County ballot debacle legal action", "url": "https://www.acluwv.org/press-releases/aclu-wv-files-legal-action-mingo-countys-latest-ballot-debacle/" }, { "title": "Democracy Docket — West Virginia Mingo County Incorrect Ballot Challenge", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/west-virginia-mingo-county-incorrect-ballot-challenge/" }, { "title": "Petition for writ of mandamus (Nov. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/2024-11-05-Petition-for-writ-of-mandamus.pdf" } ], "notes": "Catalog leaf: textual mistakes on ballots. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources." }, { "id": "craighead-ar-2022-bequette-misspelling", "category": "8. Ballots & Physical / Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": [ "Ballots", "Textual 'Mistakes' on ballots (names spelled wrong, names missing, geographical differences)" ], "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-05", "state": "AR", "description": "Craighead County (and Phillips County) Arkansas primary ballots misspelled U.S. Senate candidate Jake Bequette’s first name as “Jack.” Counties corrected after the error surfaced during early voting; Bequette sued state/county election officials. Officials attributed it to a county-level proofreading error in ballot preparation. Status Confirmed for the misspelling and correction; intentional fraud not alleged.", "sources": [ { "title": "Arkansas Democrat-Gazette — Craighead County corrects candidate's misspelled name on ballot", "url": "https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2022/may/12/craighead-county-corrects-candidates-misspelled-name-on-ballot/" } ], "notes": "Catalog leaf: textual mistakes on ballots. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources." } ], "emon_ingested": [ "ei-2026-09-001", "ei-2026-09-016", "ei-2026-09-002", "ei-2026-09-003", "ei-2026-09-004", "ei-2026-09-012", "ei-2026-09-005", "ei-2026-09-007", "ei-2026-09-010", "ei-2026-09-013", "ei-2026-09-014", "ei-2026-09-017", "ei-2026-09-006", "ei-2026-09-008", "ei-2026-09-009", "ei-2026-09-011", "ei-2026-09-015", "ei-2026-09-018" ], "emon_skipped": [] }