{"id": "ei-2026-09-017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-58", "uid": "C20260925-155410-58", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-58", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-017"], "seq": "C00058", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballots are removed from election officials' custody by other authorities, breaking the chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-55", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-09-24", "state": "CA", "description": "In Cervantes v. Bianco, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that Riverside County Sheriff Chad Bianco unlawfully seized about 650,000 ballots from the county registrar during a probe tied to the November 2025 special election on Proposition 50, ordered return of the ballots, and barred further sheriff handling of them. Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero stressed that voted ballots must remain with election officials even with a search warrant. Coverage through Sept. 25 indicates Bianco plans to comply; Gov. Newsom, AG Bonta, and SOS Weber welcomed the ruling. Traditional-outlet corroboration on Sept. 25 includes KTVU and The Virginian-Pilot recirculating the return order (EMon confidence→high). County Executive Officer Jeff Van Wagenen said the ballots and related materials were returned to the Registrar of Voters on about Sept. 29. On Oct. 12, 2026, The Riverside Record reported that the California Department of Justice had completed its review of the sheriff's investigation and had no objection to disposition under state law, and that the Secretary of State's Office confirmed the ballots must be destroyed under the California Elections Code; the county said the Registrar would proceed with destruction under established procedures while preparing for the Nov. 3 general election. Bianco's campaign criticized the planned destruction. On Oct. 13, county spokesperson Brooke Federico told the Press-Enterprise that the more than 650,000 Proposition 50 ballots \"have been sent for destruction pursuant to Election Code and are no longer in the county's possession,\" citing Elections Code section 17302(c), which requires destruction of state and local ballots after six months (that deadline passed in May; the ballots had been held while the Supreme Court case was pending). Sheriff Bianco called it \"destruction of evidence,\" and the Riverside Election Integrity Team asked the sheriff and District Attorney Mike Hestrin to halt it. Registrar Art Tinoco has said the actual ballot discrepancy was 103, not the roughly 45,000 the group alleged. Status Upheld (court order against the seizure; return completed; ballots sent for destruction Oct. 13). Catalog note: with these ballots now sent for destruction, no independent recount or hand review of the Prop 50 ballots will be possible, which is why voted paper must stay in documented custody and be hand-verifiable before any retention period ends. Also maps to Ballots / Mail ballots leaves for physical custody of voted ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "CalMatters — Sheriff broke law by seizing ballots, CA Supreme Court rules", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/09/supreme-court-ruling-sheriff-ballot-seizure/"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Sheriff's ballot seizure was unlawful", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-09-24/california-supreme-court-ruling-ballot-seizure"}, {"title": "CBS Los Angeles — Court orders return of seized ballots", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/california-supreme-court-riverside-county-chad-bianco-ballot-seizure-case/"}, {"title": "KTVU — CA Supreme Court orders Bianco to give up 650,000 ballots", "url": "https://x.com/KTVU/status/2103514906376982868"}, {"title": "Judicial Branch of California — Cervantes v. Bianco, S295866 published opinion (Sept. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://courts.ca.gov/opinion/published/2026-09-24/s295866"}, {"title": "The Riverside Record — Riverside County Prop 50 ballots to be destroyed after CA DOJ/SOS review (Oct. 12, 2026; curl 406 bot-block 2026-10-13, URL retained)", "url": "https://riversiderecord.org/riverside-county-prop-50-ballots-to-be-destroyed/"}, {"title": "CBS Los Angeles — Riverside County sheriff returns seized ballots after state legal case (video, Oct. 13, 2026; curl 406 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/video/riverside-county-sheriff-returns-seized-ballots-after-state-legal-case/"}, {"title": "Press-Enterprise — Riverside County is destroying 650,000-plus ballots; Sheriff Bianco calls it destruction of evidence (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.pressenterprise.com/2026/10/13/riverside-county-is-destroying-650000-plus-ballots-sheriff-chad-bianco-calls-it-destruction-of-evidence/"}, {"title": "KESQ News Channel 3 — Riverside County Prop 50 ballots sent for destruction (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://kesq.com/news/2026/10/13/riverside-ballots/"}, {"title": "NBC Palm Springs — Riverside County to destroy 650,000 ballots, ending Sheriff Bianco's election investigation (Oct. 13, 2026; curl 429 rate-limit 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.nbcpalmsprings.com/ca-us-and-world/2026/10/13/riverside-county-to-destroy-650000-ballots-ending-sheriff-biancos-election-investigation"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Riverside ballots (ei-2026-09-017)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-017 refresh 2026-10-14 AM: ballots sent for destruction Oct. 13 under Elections Code 17302(c) (Press-Enterprise/KESQ/NBC Palm Springs); Bianco and the Riverside Election Integrity Team objected. Refresh 2026-10-13 (EMon status resolved): ballots returned ~Sept. 29; CA DOJ/SOS cleared destruction (Riverside Record Oct. 12); published opinion link added (courts.ca.gov). Earlier: 2026-09-25 confidence→high via KTVU + Virginian-Pilot. Chain-of-custody leaf: unlawful removal of ballots from election official custody. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Chain of Custody sleight of hand' to 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand' to the new leaf 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand > Ballots are removed from election officials' custody by other authorities, breaking the chain of custody.'."}
{"id": "de-fenwick-island-llc-trust-voting-superior-court-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-22", "uid": "C20260925-185839-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-22", "old_ids": ["de-fenwick-island-llc-trust-voting-superior-court-2026"], "seq": "C00173", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Artificial entities act as \"phantom,\" non-human voters that dilute the weight of real resident votes (for example, Delaware allows LLCs, trusts, and companies to vote in elections)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-48", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-05-29", "state": "DE", "description": "Delaware Superior Court Judge Craig Karsnitz ruled in May 2026 that Fenwick Island may allow artificial entities—family trusts, LLCs, corporations, and similar property-owning entities—to vote in municipal elections under the town's General Assembly-amended charter (2008), denying the ACLU of Delaware's challenge that such voting unlawfully dilutes human residents' votes. Spotlight Delaware reported nearly a quarter of 2024 municipal votes (109) were cast by entity owners, and that Henlopen Acres, Dagsboro, Bethel, and Dewey Beach have similar rules. Status Upheld for the Superior Court decision sustaining LLC/trust/company municipal voting (Delaware Supreme Court appeal argued Sept. 23, 2026; decision pending).", "sources": [{"title": "Spotlight Delaware — Judge: Trusts, LLCs are 'people' in Fenwick elections", "url": "https://spotlightdelaware.org/2026/05/29/judge-trusts-llcs-are-people-in-fenwick-elections/"}, {"title": "Justia — ACLU of Delaware v. Town of Fenwick Island (Superior Court 2026)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/delaware/superior-court/2026/s25c-12-003-cak.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 10. Catalog example matches Fenwick/Delaware entity voting."}
{"id": "tn-stephens-tndp-bona-fide-democrat-blocked-primary-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-04", "uid": "C20260926-013447-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-04", "old_ids": ["tn-stephens-tndp-bona-fide-democrat-blocked-primary-2026"], "seq": "C00863", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Sleeper candidates: operatives already embedded in the opposing party are placed in a race to split the vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-05-22", "state": "TN", "description": "Tennessee Democratic Party determined on March 12, 2026 that Elizabeth Stephens was not a 'bona fide Democrat' for the U.S. House District 5 August primary; the State Executive Committee unanimously upheld that disqualification on March 22 under party bylaws defining bona fide status by public service, writings, and statements faithful to the party's interests. Stephens sued seeking an injunction to force certification onto the primary ballot; on May 22, 2026 Davidson County Chancellor Patricia Head Moskal denied the injunction, holding that determining party membership and nominees is a political matter for the TNDP—not the courts—and that candidates lack a protected property interest in a primary ballot slot. Status Upheld for the party/court outcome removing a primary candidate over affiliation/bona-fides—peer sleeper/infiltration-control pattern to Ohio's Ronan GOP-primary removal; opposite party direction.", "sources": [{"title": "WZTV/FOX17 — Court blocks woman from Tennessee Democratic Party's August primary ballot", "url": "https://fox17.com/news/local/davidson-county-woman-blocked-from-tennessee-democratic-partys-august-primary-ballot-by-court"}, {"title": "NewsChannel9 — Court blocks Stephens from TNDP August primary ballot", "url": "https://newschannel9.com/news/local/davidson-county-woman-blocked-from-tennessee-democratic-partys-august-primary-ballot-by-court", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tn-stephens-tndp-bona-fide-democrat-blocked-primary-2026__newschannel9-court-blocks-stephens-from-tndp-august-pri.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to oh-ronan-democrat-infiltrate-gop-primary-removed-2026 (sleeper/affiliation control)."}
{"id": "oh-ronan-democrat-infiltrate-gop-primary-removed-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-18", "uid": "C20260925-194013-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-18", "old_ids": ["oh-ronan-democrat-infiltrate-gop-primary-removed-2026"], "seq": "C00202", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Sleeper candidates: operatives already embedded in the opposing party are placed in a race to split the vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-04", "state": "OH", "description": "Samuel Ronan, a former Democratic National Committee chair candidate, filed as a Republican for Ohio's 15th Congressional District 2026 primary while posting that 'Leftists need to infiltrate Republican spaces and primary them' and referencing his DNC-chair argument that Democrats should primary Republicans in deep-red districts. After a voter protest, Secretary Frank LaRose broke a Franklin County board tie to remove him for bad-faith party declaration under Ohio Rev. Code §3513.07. The Sixth Circuit upheld the disqualification (Ronan v. LaRose); SCOTUS denied emergency relief. Status Upheld for court-affirmed removal of an admitted opposing-party infiltrator/sleeper primary candidacy.", "sources": [{"title": "Reason / Volokh — Sixth Circuit OKs disqualifying Democrat infiltrating GOP primary (Ronan)", "url": "https://reason.com/volokh/2026/04/08/sixth-circuit-oks-disqualifying-republican-primary-candidate-who-admits-hes-a-democrat-infiltrating-the-party/"}, {"title": "Courthouse News — Supreme Court keeps former DNC candidate off Ohio GOP primary ballot", "url": "https://courthousenews.com/supreme-court-keeps-former-dnc-candidate-off-ohio-gop-primary-ballot/"}, {"title": "NBC4 Columbus — Ohioan’s primary candidacy revoked over 'infiltrating' GOP comments", "url": "https://www.nbc4i.com/news/your-local-election-hq/ohioans-primary-candidacy-revoked-over-comments-about-infiltrating-gop/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 8. Sleeper/infiltrator removal Upheld."}
{"id": "pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-09", "uid": "C20260925-214102-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-09", "old_ids": ["pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games"], "seq": "C00332", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Play word games and feign confusion over information requests (deliberately playing dumb)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-31", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-04-28", "state": "PA", "description": "In Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services (Pa. 2026), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that randomized cast vote records are public election reports under Election Code §308 (25 P.S. §2648), not exempt 'contents of ballot boxes and voting machines.' For years counties and OOR pathways had treated CVR requests through RTKL/election-secrecy word games — arguing CVRs were machine/ballot-box contents or otherwise non-disclosable — until the Court rejected that characterization. Status Upheld for the Court's rejection of the ballot-box-contents framing; Confirmed historically that agencies played definitional shell games to block CVR inspection.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs. (Pa. 2026)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2026/79-map-2024.html"}, {"title": "PA Courts — Supreme Court opinion PDF (J-45-2025)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Supreme/out/J-45-2025mo%20-%20106765691356512270.pdf?cb=1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games__pa-courts-supreme-court-opinion-pdf-j-45-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "RTKL Decisions summary — CVRs not ballot-box contents", "url": "https://rtkldecisions.com/honey-lycoming-cvr-election-code-308-2026/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games__rtkl-decisions-summary-cvrs-not-ballot-box-contents.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 5. Word games = calling CVRs 'ballot box contents' to deny inspection.", "related": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"]}
{"id": "eastman-ca-supreme-court-2026-disbarment-overturn-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-04", "uid": "C20260926-023334-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-04", "old_ids": ["eastman-ca-supreme-court-2026-disbarment-overturn-2020"], "seq": "C01064", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Attack citizen attorneys (personal attacks, lawsuits, attempts to revoke their licenses, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-29", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2026-04-15", "state": "CA", "description": "On April 15, 2026 the California Supreme Court denied review of the State Bar Court recommendation and ordered John Eastman disbarred—striking his name from the California roll and requiring Client Security Fund payment—after findings of culpability on multiple ethics counts tied to post-2020 election litigation and related advice. Reuters and San Francisco Chronicle contemporaneous reporting confirm the final California disbarment; Eastman signaled U.S. Supreme Court review. Status Upheld California Supreme Court attorney-discipline disposition; peer to the State Bar Court recommendation and Michigan Powell/Wood discipline cards already on this leaf—final CA disbarment order, not those remounted. PEP framing: license/lawfare pressure on election-integrity counsel raises the personal cost of challenging opaque machine systems.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Trump ally John Eastman is disbarred over bid to overturn 2020 election (Apr. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/trump-ally-john-eastman-is-disbarred-over-bid-overturn-2020-election-2026-04-15/"}, {"title": "California Courts Appellate Case Information — Eastman State Bar matter S292011 docket", "url": "https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/search/case/dockets.cfm?dist=0&doc_id=3136409&doc_no=S292011&request_token=NiIwLSEnPkw7WyBZSCJNVEhIIEA0UDxTKiI%2BRztTICAgCg%3D%3D"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on lawfare-against-citizen-attorneys leaf."}
{"id": "ms-peoples-assisted-living-ballot-harvesting-2025", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-04", "uid": "C20260925-185839-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-04", "old_ids": ["ms-peoples-assisted-living-ballot-harvesting-2025"], "seq": "C00155", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Retirement communities"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-23", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2025-12", "state": "MS", "description": "Bobbie Peoples of Greenwood, Mississippi, was convicted of unlawfully transmitting another person's mailed absentee ballot after visiting assisted-living / senior residents; she was sentenced to six months suspended incarceration and a fine of about $2,718.75 and announced an appeal. Status Upheld for the trial conviction on ballot-transmission / harvesting involving senior assisted-living voters (pending appeal does not erase the conviction disposition).", "sources": [{"title": "Mississippi Free Press — Woman convicted of ballot harvesting will appeal", "url": "https://www.mississippifreepress.org/mississippi-woman-convicted-of-ballot-harvesting-for-submitting-seniors-vote-will-appeal/"}, {"title": "WLBT — Mississippi woman sentenced in ballot harvesting case", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2025/12/08/mississippi-woman-sentenced-ballot-harvesting-case/"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 2. Assisted-living / senior community setting."}
{"id": "coomer-v-lindell-2025-jury-verdict-defamation-2-3m", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-01", "uid": "C20260926-023825-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-01", "old_ids": ["coomer-v-lindell-2025-jury-verdict-defamation-2-3m"], "seq": "C01076", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit anyone who reports or discusses election crimes, making examples of them to deter others from reporting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-30", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2025-06-16", "state": "CO / Federal", "description": "In Coomer v. Lindell (D. Colo. 1:22-cv-01129), a federal jury on June 16, 2025 found Mike Lindell liable for defaming former Dominion Voting Systems executive Eric Coomer over repeated 2020 election-rigging claims and awarded roughly $2.3 million combined against Lindell and FrankSpeech (MyPillow cleared on the tried statements)—CPR and Denver Gazette contemporaneous coverage confirm the verdict entered that week. Status Upheld jury merits finding of defamation for speech that labeled an individual election-system participant a criminal/fraud actor; peer to the Dominion v. Giuliani/Powell suit-filing card and the GCC/SCC media-frame card already on this leaf—Coomer individual-executive verdict, not those remounted. PEP framing: high-dollar defamation exposure against people who publicly allege election-crime narratives chills reporting of machine/centralization failures without adding hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "CPR — Jury finds MyPillow CEO Mike Lindell defamed former Dominion executive Eric Coomer (~$2.3M) (June 16, 2025)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2025/06/16/mypillow-ceo-mike-lindell-defamation-lawsuitverdict/"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Coomer v. Lindell, 1:22-cv-01129 (D. Colo.) docket / courtroom minutes", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/63296393/coomer-v-lindell/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coomer-v-lindell-2025-jury-verdict-defamation-2-3m__courtlistener-coomer-v-lindell-1-22-cv-01129-d-colo-docket-courtroom-minutes.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Fear/Discredit target-election-crime-reporters leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "harris-county-tx-2024-180th-judicial-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-10", "uid": "C20260925-181533-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-10", "old_ids": ["harris-county-tx-2024-180th-judicial-overturn"], "seq": "C00082", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-67", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024", "state": "TX", "description": "A Texas state judge overturned the Harris County 180th District Court judicial election after concluding that over 1,400 illegal votes had been counted in a race decided by only 449 votes (more than one million ballots cast). The court found clear and convincing evidence that hundreds of votes were cast by individuals who did not actually reside in Harris County, did not correctly list residence, or listed non-residential addresses (Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding: False Registration / Fraudulent Use of Absentee Ballots). Status Upheld (court overturn). Also maps to Registration; Voter Rolls and Mail ballots leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB — Harris County 180th District Court Judicial Election 2024 (PDF)", "url": "http://static.heritage.org/Election%20Fraud%20Database/2024/50th%20batch/Harris%20County%20180th%20District%20Court%20Judicial%20Election.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/harris-county-tx-2024-180th-judicial-overturn__heritage-vfdb-harris-county-180th-district-court-judicial-el.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Harris County 180th 2024", "url": "https://herit.ag/3Y4e2VV", "local": "/archives/2026/09/harris-county-tx-2024-180th-judicial-overturn__heritage-vfdb-shortlink-harris-county-180th-2024.pdf"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding. Upheld for court overturn over illegal votes / false registration findings."}
{"id": "pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-03", "uid": "C20261020-161446-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-03", "old_ids": ["pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension"], "seq": "C01462", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-10-29 to 2024-11-01", "state": "PA", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2024, Pennsylvania's deadline to apply for a mail ballot, Bucks County cut off the lines of voters waiting at its three election offices (Doylestown, Quakertown and the Lower Bucks Government Services Center in Levittown/Bristol Township) to apply for, receive and cast mail ballots \"on demand,\" in some places as early as 2:40 p.m., because staff could not process everyone by 5 p.m. Voters still in line, some after hours of waiting, were handed mail-ballot applications on clipboards and told they could have the ballot mailed or pick it up later. The Trump campaign, the RNC and the McCormick campaign sued. On Oct. 30, Bucks County Court of Common Pleas Judge Jeffrey G. Trauger held that the county had violated state election law by turning away people who were in line before the deadline, contrary to Department of State guidance, and ordered the county to let voters apply for, receive and return mail ballots in person through 5 p.m. Friday, Nov. 1. The county complied. On the extended final day, lines were longest at the Levittown office: voters reported waits of three to six hours, and those in line by closing waited until about 8 p.m. Bucks County Republican Committee chair Pat Poprik attributed the Levittown backlog to limited space and a single state-supplied ballot printer that prints one ballot at a time (Doylestown had two); she said she did not think it was nefarious. Each on-demand voter took up to 15 minutes to verify and print. Two MJTruth Rumble shorts show the Levittown lines: \"Levittown, Pennsylvania - Voters Turned away before Deadline\" (Oct. 31, 2024; captioned \"Voter rights denied in Levittown, PA\" and \"Turned away before deadline / lines cut,\" with an official handing out applications) and \"Levittown, PA, there were no lights, & people were forced to vote by cell phone light\" (posted 9:48 PM ET Nov. 1, 2024; voters waiting after dark in lawn chairs). The no-lights / phone-light claim is not confirmed by official or local news reporting; the footage shows an outdoor waiting area after dark. Status Upheld: a court found the Oct. 29 turn-aways violated the Election Code and ordered relief. Nothing established shows the backlog was deliberate; the established cause is too little processing capacity (staff, space, printers) for the turnout.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Judge extends Bucks County's in-person mail voting deadline until Friday, after Trump campaign lawsuit (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/trump-bucks-county-lawsuit-early-voting-20241030.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__inquirer.html"}, {"title": "Bucks County Court of Common Pleas — Order of Judge Jeffrey G. Trauger extending on-demand mail-ballot application to Nov. 1, 2024 (Democracy Docket copy)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Docket-18872928-0-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__trauger-order.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Judge extends early voting option in a suburban Philadelphia county after Trump's campaign sued (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/pennsylvania-early-voting-problems-bucks-lehigh-county-2916b3bf337d39635d63f642435aa1f9"}, {"title": "LevittownNow — Judge Orders Extension Of Mail-In Ballot Deadline To Friday Following GOP Lawsuit (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://levittownnow.com/2024/10/30/judge-orders-extension-of-mail-in-ballot-deadline-to-friday-following-gop-lawsuit/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__levittownnow-order.html"}, {"title": "LevittownNow — Long Lines & Confusion Over On-Demand Ballot Process Mark Final Day (Nov. 2, 2024)", "url": "https://levittownnow.com/2024/11/02/long-lines-confusion-over-on-demand-ballot-process-mark-final-day/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__levittownnow-final-day.html"}, {"title": "6abc Philadelphia — Long lines, some confusion on final day for 'on-demand' voting in Bucks County (Nov. 2, 2024; one ballot printer at Levittown)", "url": "https://6abc.com/post/long-lines-confusion-final-day-demand-voting-bucks-county/15497281/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__6abc.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Levittown, Pennsylvania - Voters Turned away before Deadline\" (short, uploaded Oct. 31, 2024 9:42 PM ET; 41 s)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l1md7"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Levittown, PA, there were no lights, & people were forced to vote by cell phone light.\" (short, uploaded Nov. 1, 2024 9:48 PM ET; 25 s)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5laigi"}], "notes": "MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20): two shorts on one card. v5l1md7 (41.2 s; watermark aroundtheworld888; audio is an elections official telling voters to fill out the application and have the ballot mailed or pick it up later, consistent with the Oct. 29 cutoff). v5laigi (26 s; after dark; a man in a red cap says he has been there since 6:30-7 a.m. and that there are other options but he wants them to vote today; consistent with the Nov. 1 extended day). Leaf: Election 'Day' > Deprive voting centers of enough ballots/ballot paper (peers: Harris County 2022, Luzerne 2022, Maricopa 2022 printers) because the established cause is printing/processing capacity. Court order archived (PDF, Democracy Docket copy). AP linked only (403). 2024 event; no EMon ping. MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (41 s): voters outside the Bucks County Levittown (Bristol Township) office on Oct. 29, 2024, captioned 'Voter rights denied in Levittown, PA' and 'Turned away before deadline / lines cut'; an official hands out mail-ballot applications"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-2-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-2-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (25 s): after dark on the court-extended final day (Nov. 1, 2024), voters wait in lawn chairs outside the Levittown county office; a man in a red cap tells them he has been there since 6:30-7 a.m. and wants them to be able to vote"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l1md7", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 41.239, "bytes": 10667552, "sha256": "b7da44c100d387682eb0566f229e98b74d3b25555caa3e9b2bb15714e32c3d35", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video.json"}, {"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5laigi", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-2.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-2-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 25.967, "bytes": 6731041, "sha256": "3fbce5155eb7cb69bcf22f91ce0ca30ce8e24baa6451256315430fc6b77322e7", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-on-demand-mail-ballot-lines-cut-before-deadline-court-extension__rumble-video-2.json"}]}
{"id": "xenia-oh-boddy-mic-seized-sixth-circuit-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-14", "uid": "C20261001-094909-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-14", "old_ids": ["xenia-oh-boddy-mic-seized-sixth-circuit-2024"], "seq": "C01308", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Microphones are shut off"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-18", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-10-14", "state": "OH", "description": "At the Oct. 14, 2024 Xenia Community Schools Board of Education meeting, Board President Mary Grech threatened to cut Darbi Boddy's microphone during calm prepared public comment criticizing the board and superintendent, then walked to the podium and seized the mic amid audience booing and recessed the meeting—denying Boddy her allotted five minutes with no makeup time afterward. On June 10, 2026 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Boddy v. Grech, No. 25-3490) reversed denial of a preliminary injunction, finding likely First Amendment viewpoint discrimination and an unconstitutional heckler's veto for silencing the speaker rather than the disruptive audience; subsequent local reporting cites a proposed settlement including damages/fees. Status Upheld for the Sixth Circuit PI ruling that seizing the microphone violated protected public-comment speech. Peer to Cleveland Martin and Las Vegas Rolle cards—Xenia/Boddy instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: confiscating a citizen mic under 'decorum' pretext chills witnesses monitoring election-adjacent school-governance records.", "sources": [{"title": "Sixth Circuit opinion — Boddy v. Grech, No. 25-3490 (June 10, 2026 PDF)", "url": "https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/26a0164p-06.pdf"}, {"title": "Dayton Daily News — Court rules against Xenia Schools for stopping public comment", "url": "https://www.daytondailynews.com/local/court-rules-against-xenia-schools-for-stopping-public-comment/article_3a9046af-bf2b-5ac8-b06e-a353c57a9a4f.html"}, {"title": "Reason / Volokh — No Heckler's Veto Allowed at School Board Meetings", "url": "https://reason.com/volokh/2026/06/11/no-hecklers-veto-allowed-at-school-board-meetings/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct Sixth Circuit seize-mic uphold; not Cleveland remount."}
{"id": "orten-utah-grama-cvr-ballot-images-denied-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-04", "uid": "C20261002-123208-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-04", "old_ids": ["orten-utah-grama-cvr-ballot-images-denied-2024"], "seq": "C01320", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-04", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-09-19", "state": "UT", "description": "In Orten v. Utah County, 2024 UT App 132 (filed Sept. 19, 2024), the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of GRAMA requests by Jennifer Orten and Sophie Anderson seeking cast vote records (CVRs), project backup databases, ballot images, and tabulator tapes from Utah, Juab, and Millard counties (Dec. 2021–Jan. 2022 requests). The court held Utah’s Election Code restricts access to ‘ballots’ and ‘election returns’ (including storage/destruction without examination under Utah Code §20A-4-202), so those materials are not public under GRAMA’s presumption of openness (Utah Code §63G-2-201). Status Upheld appellate affirmance that Election Code overrides GRAMA for these election electronic records—peer to AZ AUDIT-USA / PA Stroehmann public-records barriers on this leaf; Utah Orten, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Orten v. Utah County (Utah Ct. App. 2024 UT App 132)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/court-of-appeals-published/2024/20220782-ca.html"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Orten v. Utah County opinion PDF", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2024/09/19/orten_v._utah_county.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Upheld GRAMA denial via Election Code; distinct from Hudson CVR remount skip."}
{"id": "kalshi-ex-v-cftc-2024-congressional-control-contracts-allowed", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-01", "uid": "C20260926-023334-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-01", "old_ids": ["kalshi-ex-v-cftc-2024-congressional-control-contracts-allowed"], "seq": "C01061", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Manipulated Betting Markets"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-07", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-09-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "In KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2024), Judge Jia M. Cobb granted Kalshi summary judgment and vacated the CFTC's Sept. 22, 2023 order that had prohibited Kalshi's self-certified congressional-control event contracts as \"gaming\" / unlawful activity under CEA §5c(c)(5)(C)—holding elections are neither gaming nor unlawful activity and that the Commission exceeded its special-rule authority. Reuters contemporaneous coverage confirms the ruling reopened regulated U.S. election-contract trading on a designated contract market. Status Upheld APA merits holding; peer to CFTC Polymarket $1.4M settlement and wash-trading allegations already on this leaf—Kalshi DCM congressional contracts litigation, not Polymarket remounted. PEP framing: liquid election-outcome markets amplify perception feedback loops around machine-reported totals without adding hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — KalshiEX LLC v. CFTC, No. 1:23-cv-03257 (D.D.C.) Memorandum Opinion (Sept. 12, 2024 PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.261465/gov.uscourts.dcd.261465.51.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/kalshi-ex-v-cftc-2024-congressional-control-contracts-allowed__courtlistener-recap-kalshiex-llc-v-cftc-no-1-23-cv-03257-d-d-c-memorandum-opinion-sept-12-2024-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Reuters — U.S. judge allows election betting, dealing blow to markets regulator (Sept. 12, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/us-judge-allows-election-betting-dealing-blow-markets-regulator-2024-09-12/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on Manipulated betting markets leaf."}
{"id": "austin-monitor-2024-judge-public-comment-limits-violate-open-meetings-charter", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-13", "uid": "C20260926-023825-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-13", "old_ids": ["austin-monitor-2024-judge-public-comment-limits-violate-open-meetings-charter"], "seq": "C01088", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "People are assigned to run out the clock and eliminate or reduce our time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-93", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-05", "state": "TX", "description": "Austin Monitor reported a May 2024 state-court ruling that Austin’s truncated public-comment rules (including reducing speakers to as little as two minutes total across items) violated Texas open-meetings law and the city charter—after 2023 council proposals further constrained sign-up/time-donation practices that coordinated speakers use to fill agendas. Status Upheld trial-court finding against the city’s clock-cutting regime; peer to Pima County Call-to-Audience hour-cap and Jersey City Airbnb-filibuster comment cuts already on this leaf—Austin judicial ruling, not those remounted. PEP framing: shrinking citizen time lets machine-status-quo majorities run out the clock on hand-count / decentralization testimony.", "sources": [{"title": "Austin Monitor — Judge rules that city is violating open meetings law and the city charter (May 2024)", "url": "https://austinmonitor.com/stories/2024/05/judge-rules-that-city-is-violating-open-meetings-law-and-the-city-charter/"}, {"title": "Austin Monitor — Proposal to change Council meeting rules draws opposition (June 2023 context)", "url": "https://austinmonitor.com/stories/2023/06/proposal-to-change-council-meeting-rules-draws-opposition/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Public Meetings run-out-the-clock leaf."}
{"id": "eastman-ca-state-bar-disbarment-recommendation-2024-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-25", "uid": "C20260925-205354-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-25", "old_ids": ["eastman-ca-state-bar-disbarment-recommendation-2024-2026"], "seq": "C00240", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Attack citizen attorneys (personal attacks, lawsuits, attempts to revoke their licenses, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-29", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-03", "state": "CA / Federal", "description": "California State Bar Court hearing judge recommended John Eastman's disbarment (March 2024) after finding culpability on multiple ethics counts arising from 2020 election-related legal work; the Review Department later affirmed the disbarment recommendation (2025), and California Supreme Court process culminated in striking him from the roll. Status Upheld for the disciplinary outcome against an attorney who pursued election challenges — documenting license-attack consequences (card does not re-litigate underlying election claims).", "sources": [{"title": "State Bar of California — Hearing judge recommends Eastman disbarment", "url": "https://www.calbar.ca.gov/news/state-bar-court-hearing-judge-recommends-john-eastmans-disbarment", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eastman-ca-state-bar-disbarment-recommendation-2024-2026__state-bar-of-california-hearing-judge-recommends-eastman-dis.png"}, {"title": "State Bar of California — Review decision: disbarment recommendation remains", "url": "https://www.calbar.ca.gov/news/john-eastman-state-bar-court-review-decision-disbarment-recommendation-remains", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eastman-ca-state-bar-disbarment-recommendation-2024-2026__state-bar-of-california-review-decision-disbarment-recommend.png"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Former Chapman dean disbarred for Trump 2020 election role", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-04-15/former-chapman-university-dean-disbarred-for-trump-2020-election-role"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 13. License discipline Upheld."}
{"id": "morales-v-rust-2024-indiana-supreme-court-upholds-affiliation-statute-sleeper-bar", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-12", "uid": "C20260926-024539-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-12", "old_ids": ["morales-v-rust-2024-indiana-supreme-court-upholds-affiliation-statute-sleeper-bar"], "seq": "C01102", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Sleeper candidates: operatives already embedded in the opposing party are placed in a race to split the vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-03-06", "state": "IN", "description": "In Morales v. Rust (Ind. Mar. 6, 2024), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the state's primary Affiliation Statute requiring major-party primary candidates either to have voted in that party's two most recent primaries or to obtain county-chair certification—explicitly crediting state interests in guarding against party raiding, ballot overcrowding, and frivolous/sleeper candidacies that split or confuse party electorates. Status Upheld state high-court validation of anti-sleeper/anti-raid primary ballot gates; peer to Ohio Ronan Democrat-infiltrate-GOP-primary removal and Tennessee Stephens bona-fide-Democrat block cards already on this leaf—Indiana Affiliation Statute merits holding, not those remounted. PEP framing: party-embedding races that dilute primary signals without public hand-count clarity.", "sources": [{"title": "Indiana Courts CaseClips — Morales v. Rust, No. 23S-PL-371 (Ind. Mar. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://caseclips.courts.in.gov/2024/03/11/morales-v-rust-no-23s-pl-371-__-n-e-3d-__-ind-march-6-2024/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/morales-v-rust-2024-indiana-supreme-court-upholds-affiliation-statute-sleeper-bar__indiana-courts-morales-v-rust-no-23s-pl-371.png"}, {"title": "Federalist Society / SCDW — Indiana Supreme Court upholds law restricting primary ballot access (summary)", "url": "https://fedsoc.org/scdw/indiana-supreme-court-upholds-law-restricting-which-candidates-for-office-can-appear-in-partisan-primaries", "local": "/archives/2026/09/morales-v-rust-2024-indiana-supreme-court-upholds-affiliation-statute-sleeper-bar__federalist-society-indiana-primary-ballot-access-morales-v-rust.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Sleeper Candidates leaf."}
{"id": "fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-2024-judgment-defendants-no-vra-11b", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-02", "uid": "C20260926-023334-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-02", "old_ids": ["fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-2024-judgment-defendants-no-vra-11b"], "seq": "C01062", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing", "They claim that citizen canvassing efforts constitute voter intimidation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-69", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2024-01-02", "state": "GA", "description": "After a multi-week bench trial, U.S. District Judge Steve C. Jones entered judgment for True the Vote / Catherine Engelbrecht et al. on Jan. 2, 2024 in Fair Fight, Inc. v. True the Vote (N.D. Ga.), holding plaintiffs failed to prove Voting Rights Act §11(b) intimidation from mass eligibility challenges tied to the 2021 Georgia Senate runoff—despite criticizing TTV's challenge process as unreliable. AJC and Fair Fight contemporaneous statements confirm the defense judgment; Fair Fight appealed (11th Cir. No. 24-10372). Status Upheld district-court merits judgment rejecting the intimidation label for citizen challenge/canvass activity; peer to the filed suit and DOJ intervention cards already on this leaf—judgment outcome, not those remounted. PEP framing: labeling ordinary roll challenges as intimidation raises the cost of citizen observation without curing machine-count opacity.", "sources": [{"title": "DocumentCloud — Fair Fight v. True the Vote Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law / Judgment (Jan. 2, 2024 PDF)", "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24251969/1-2-24-true-the-vote-order.pdf"}, {"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — True the Vote wins intimidation case over Georgia voter challenges (Jan. 2, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/true-the-vote-wins-voter-intimidation-case-over-georgia-voter-challenges/JINOOXMKOJGX7CEDT2TVUGR2TM/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on citizen-canvassing-as-intimidation leaf."}
{"id": "bridgeport-ct-2023-absentee-primary-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-07", "uid": "C20260925-181533-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-07", "old_ids": ["bridgeport-ct-2023-absentee-primary-overturn"], "seq": "C00079", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2023-09", "state": "CT", "description": "Superior Court Judge William Clark overturned the Sept. 12, 2023 Bridgeport, Connecticut Democratic mayoral primary (Joseph Ganim vs. John Gomes; margin 251 votes) due to absentee ballot fraud, ordering a new primary. Heritage Election Fraud Database (Judicial Finding) summarizes that an unusually large number of counted absentee ballots showed irregularities in how they were obtained and handled. Status Upheld (court-ordered new primary / overturn of the tainted primary result). Also maps to Mail ballots chain-of-custody and Election Contest leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB — Bridgeport Municipal Mayoral Democratic Primary 2023 (Judicial Finding PDF)", "url": "http://thf-legal.s3.amazonaws.com/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/47th%20batch/Part%20IV/Bridgeport%20Municipal%20Mayoral%20Democratic%20Primary%202023%20Election.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Bridgeport 2023", "url": "https://herit.ag/3TBYUNy"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding. Upheld for court overturn of primary over absentee fraud. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Ballot Harvesting > Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk.'."}
{"id": "mi-williams-guardian-incapacitated-absentee-applications-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-07", "uid": "C20260925-185839-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-07", "old_ids": ["mi-williams-guardian-incapacitated-absentee-applications-2023"], "seq": "C00158", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "Hospitals"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-25", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2023-07", "state": "MI", "description": "Oak Park, Michigan guardian Nancy Juanita Williams pleaded guilty in Wayne County to election-fraud counts after Michigan AG investigators alleged she submitted absentee-ballot and voter-registration applications for dozens of legally incapacitated persons under her care (AG materials described ~26 persons) and directed ballots to her business address without consent. She received probation and a fine. Status Upheld for guilty plea on harvesting applications tied to incapacitated wards' medical/care records (population overlapping hospital/long-term-care pathways). Not a brick-and-mortar acute-care hospital employee case.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit News — Oak Park guardian pleads guilty to voter fraud (2020 election)", "url": "https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/wayne-county/2023/07/03/oak-park-guardian-pleads-guilty-to-voter-fraud-in-2020-election/70380130007/"}, {"title": "Michigan AG — Update on election fraud cases including Nancy Williams", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2021/10/11/ag-nessel-sos-benson-provide-update-on-new-election-fraud-cases", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-williams-guardian-incapacitated-absentee-applications-2023__michigan-ag-update-on-election-fraud-cases-including-nancy-w.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 3. Incapacitated-ward record harvesting via medical/care guardianship."}
{"id": "tx-ostrewich-v-nelson-political-apparel-polls-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-13", "uid": "C20260926-012939-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-13", "old_ids": ["tx-ostrewich-v-nelson-political-apparel-polls-2023"], "seq": "C00852", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["At the Polls", "They prohibit political attire at the polls to protect the election illusion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2023-06-28", "state": "TX / Federal", "description": "After Mansky struck Minnesota's vague 'political' apparel ban, Texas litigants challenged Texas Election Code provisions regulating apparel/electioneering near polls. In Ostrewich v. Nelson (5th Cir. 2023), the Fifth Circuit upheld Texas Election Code §§61.010, 61.003, and 85.036, concluding Texas's more specific bans on apparel relating to ballot candidates/measures/parties/election conduct and on electioneering within 100 feet are constitutional. Status Upheld for the Fifth Circuit judgment sustaining Texas's polling-place political-apparel/electioneering restrictions—peer statute/litigation to Minnesota's struck ban.", "sources": [{"title": "Fifth Circuit — Ostrewich v. Nelson, No. 21-20577 (June 28, 2023) opinion PDF", "url": "https://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/21/21-20577-CV0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-ostrewich-v-nelson-political-apparel-polls-2023__fifth-circuit-ostrewich-v-nelson-no-21-20577-june-28-20.pdf"}, {"title": "SCOTUS — Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (context for post-Mansky apparel bans)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/16-1435_2co3.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-ostrewich-v-nelson-political-apparel-polls-2023__scotus-minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky-context-for-p.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to mansky on Polls/political attire leaf. Upheld = 5th Cir judgment."}
{"id": "moore-v-harper-2023-elections-clause-isl-theory-rejected", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-02", "uid": "C20260926-022920-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-02", "old_ids": ["moore-v-harper-2023-elections-clause-isl-theory-rejected"], "seq": "C01047", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Redistricting and Gerrymandering"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-16", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2023-06-27", "state": "Federal", "description": "In Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. 1 (June 27, 2023), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the maximalist independent state legislature theory under the Elections Clause: state legislatures prescribing federal election rules (including congressional redistricting) remain subject to state constitutions and ordinary state judicial review. The 6–3 decision arose from North Carolina partisan-gerrymandering litigation over post-2020 maps. Status Upheld SCOTUS merits holding on Elections Clause constraints; peer to Rucho (partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable in federal court) and Allen v. Milligan (VRA §2 map) already on this leaf—Moore addresses ISL/judicial review of districting, not those remounted. PEP framing: map-drawing remains a high-leverage structural control point even when courts retain review.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court — Moore v. Harper, No. 21-1271 (slip opinion, June 27, 2023)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1271_3f14.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/moore-v-harper-2023-elections-clause-isl-theory-rejected__u-s-supreme-court-moore-v-harper-no-21-1271-slip-opinion-june-27-2023.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Moore v. Harper, 600 U.S. ___ (2023)", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/600/21-1271/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Districting/Gerrymandering leaf."}
{"id": "king-v-whitmer-2023-sixth-circuit-partially-affirms-attorney-fee-sanctions", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-10", "uid": "C20260926-024539-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-10", "old_ids": ["king-v-whitmer-2023-sixth-circuit-partially-affirms-attorney-fee-sanctions"], "seq": "C01100", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Harass and countersue plaintiffs, and file motions to reconsider, to drain our finances."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-36", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2023-06-23", "state": "MI / Federal", "description": "On June 23, 2023 the Sixth Circuit in King v. Whitmer largely upheld Rule 11 / §1927 attorney-fee sanctions against counsel who filed the Michigan 2020 election challenge, reducing but affirming fee awards of about $132,810.62 to Detroit and $19,639.75 to state defendants for sanctionable Dominion/fraud allegations while reversing as to two lightly involved attorneys—published opinion 23a0134p.06. Status Upheld appellate merits ruling that fee sanctions draining plaintiff-side counsel for election-contest pleadings remain enforceable; peer to Lake v. Hobbs fee/reconsideration cards already on this leaf—Sixth Circuit King affirmance (distinct from the Out-lawyer chill card on another Lawfare leaf). PEP framing: fee exposure that deters citizens from challenging machine totals without creating hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Sixth Circuit — King v. Whitmer, Nos. 21-1785 et al. (June 23, 2023) published opinion PDF", "url": "https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/23a0134p-06.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-2023-sixth-circuit-partially-affirms-attorney-fee-sanctions__sixth-circuit-king-v-whitmer-opinion-23a0134p-06-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — King v. Whitmer, No. 21-1786 (6th Cir. 2023) case page", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/21-1786/21-1786-2023-06-23.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Lawfare Harassing/countersuing plaintiffs leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "alameda-2022-rcv-suspend-mode-config-error-wrong-winner-certified-oakland-ousd-d4", "permanent_id": "C20261007-123654-05", "uid": "C20261007-123654-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-123654-05", "old_ids": ["alameda-2022-rcv-suspend-mode-config-error-wrong-winner-certified-oakland-ousd-d4"], "seq": "C01333", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Allows covert election manipulation hidden in the complexity of the calculations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-12", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2022-11", "state": "CA", "description": "For the November 8, 2022 election, the Alameda County Registrar of Voters' ranked-choice tally software was configured to 'suspend' instead of 'advance' ballots whose first-choice column was left blank, contrary to the Oakland City Charter. Because of that setting, 235 ballots in the Oakland Unified School District Director, District 4 race were left out of the first round. The registrar certified Nick Resnick as the winner on December 8, 2022, and the Oakland City Council declared the results. On December 28 the registrar disclosed the configuration error and said a corrected tally made Mike Hutchinson the winner. Because the result was already certified, only a court could change it. On March 6, 2023, Alameda County Superior Court Judge Brad Seligman found an error in the vote-counting program sufficient to change the outcome and declared Hutchinson the winner. Status Upheld (court judgment). It is an administrative software setting, not proven intent, but it shows how a single hidden setting in RCV software changed a certified outcome without anyone noticing at the time. Simple, observable hand tabulation (PEP) does not depend on hidden software settings.", "sources": [{"title": "Alameda County Superior Court — Judgment in Hutchinson election contest (Mar. 2023; hosted by The Oaklandside)", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/35593729_03_07_2023_Judgment_v2.pdf"}, {"title": "Alameda County Registrar of Voters — Ranked-Choice Voting tally presentation to Board of Supervisors", "url": "https://www.acgov.org/board/bos_calendar/documents/RankedChoiceVotingTallyPresentation.pdf"}, {"title": "The Oaklandside — Judge declares Mike Hutchinson winner of OUSD school board race (Mar. 7, 2023)", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/2023/03/07/judge-declares-mike-hutchinson-winner-of-ousd-school-board-race/"}, {"title": "Oakland City Attorney — Jan. 8, 2023 memorandum on certified results pending court order", "url": "https://www.oaklandcityattorney.org/wp-content/oca-reports/public-legal-opinions-and-public-reports/2023-01-08-January-8,-2023-Statement-and-Memorandum-from-City-Attorney-re-City-Clerk_s-Ministeral-duty-to-administer-oath-of-Off.PDF"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-07. Upheld (court judgment). Framed as a configuration error, not proven intent. Distinct from Alameda CVR locked-PDF Records cards."}
{"id": "wi-teigen-2022-absentee-drop-boxes-held-unlawful", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-10", "uid": "C20260926-014044-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-10", "old_ids": ["wi-teigen-2022-absentee-drop-boxes-held-unlawful"], "seq": "C00885", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "There is no control over what is deposited or by whom."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-43", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2022-07-08", "state": "WI", "description": "In Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2022 WI 64 (July 8, 2022), the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a circuit judgment holding that WEC staff memos authorizing unstaffed absentee-ballot drop boxes were invalid because Wis. Stat. §6.87(4)(b)1. required return by mail or personal delivery to the municipal clerk (office or designated alternate site)—i.e., drop boxes as described in the memos were not permitted under then-controlling statute. (Later Priorities USA v. WEC, 2024 WI 32, reinterpreted §6.87 to permit clerk-designated secure drop boxes; Teigen remains the 2022 Upheld holding that unstaffed drop-box guidance lacked statutory authority.) Status Upheld for the Teigen court outcome restraining unauthorized drop-box practice—peer major drop-box policy fight alongside California's 2020 unauthorized partisan drop-box removals and Texas Abbott one-dropbox-per-county order.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Supreme Court — Teigen v. WEC, 2022 WI 64 (PDF opinion)", "url": "https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=542617", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-teigen-2022-absentee-drop-boxes-held-unlawful__wisconsin-supreme-court-teigen-v-wec-2022-wi-64-pdf-opi.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 2022 WI 64", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2022/2022ap000091.html"}, {"title": "Justia — Priorities USA v. WEC, 2024 WI 32 (later reinterpretation note)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2024/2024ap000164.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Drop-Boxes root leaf (Teigen 2022 Upheld; note 2024 Priorities USA). Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Drop-Boxes' to 'Drop Boxes > No control of what gets put in or by who'."}
{"id": "mi-rainey-father-murray-nursing-home-absentee-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-01", "uid": "C20260925-185839-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-01", "old_ids": ["mi-rainey-father-murray-nursing-home-absentee-2022"], "seq": "C00152", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Nursing homes"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-24", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2022-02-23", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel announced that Trenae Myesha Rainey, an employee at Father Murray Nursing Home (Center Line / Macomb County), pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of making a false statement in an absentee ballot application after forging residents' signatures on absentee applications for the 2020 general election. The Center Line clerk flagged roughly two dozen applications whose signatures did not match the Qualified Voter File; investigators found applications were for residents who had not indicated they wished to vote. Judge Michael Chupa sentenced Rainey to two years' probation with the first 45 days in Macomb County Jail. Status Upheld (guilty plea + sentence) for nursing-home absentee-application forgery / harvesting pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan AG — Macomb nursing home employee pleads guilty (Feb 24, 2022)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2022/02/24/macomb-county-nursing-home-employee-pleads-guilty-in-attempted-election-fraud-case", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-rainey-father-murray-nursing-home-absentee-2022__michigan-ag-macomb-nursing-home-employee-pleads-guilty-feb-2.png"}, {"title": "AP — Michigan nursing home worker gets jail time for voter fraud", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/business-elections-voting-michigan-detroit-23d97e198ad3de3e5a677ce041260e15"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 1. Primary: MI AG press release."}
{"id": "king-v-whitmer-2021-ed-mich-dismissed-laches-post-certification-delay", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-15", "uid": "C20260926-023334-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-15", "old_ids": ["king-v-whitmer-2021-ed-mich-dismissed-laches-post-certification-delay"], "seq": "C01075", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Use delay tactics to stall until no time is left to fix anything."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-35", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2021-08-25", "state": "MI", "description": "In King v. Whitmer (E.D. Mich.), the district court dismissed the post-2020 presidential-election challenge as barred by laches (among mootness and other defects), emphasizing plaintiffs waited until Nov. 25—after the Nov. 3 election and Nov. 23 state certification—to sue, prejudicing election administration and making requested relief unavailable (556 F. Supp. 3d 680; Healthy Elections / FJC case summaries). Status Upheld district-court laches dismissal for post-certification delay; peer to Trump v. WEC 7th Cir. laches and PA Metcalfe timing-barrier cards already on this leaf—King v Whitmer MI judgment, not WEC remounted. PEP framing: delay-then-laches closes the window to remedy opaque machine-count defects before certification hardens results.", "sources": [{"title": "Leagle — King v. Whitmer, 556 F. Supp. 3d 680 (E.D. Mich. 2021)", "url": "https://www.leagle.com/decision/infdco20210826f67", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-2021-ed-mich-dismissed-laches-post-certification-delay__leagle-king-v-whitmer-556-f-supp-3d-680-e-d-mich-2021.png"}, {"title": "Federal Judicial Center — Emergency Election Cases: Attorneys Sanctioned… King v. Whitmer summary PDF", "url": "https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/10/EE-MIE-2-20-cv-13134-King.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-2021-ed-mich-dismissed-laches-post-certification-delay__federal-judicial-center-emergency-election-cases-attorneys-sanctioned-king-v-whitmer-summary-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on lawfare delay/laches leaf."}
{"id": "compton-ca-2021-council-residence-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-08", "uid": "C20261001-094909-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-08", "old_ids": ["compton-ca-2021-council-residence-overturn"], "seq": "C01301", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-67", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2021-06 / ruling 2022", "state": "CA", "description": "Superior Court Judge Michelle Williams Court overturned the June 2021 Compton, California City Council run-off (incumbent Isaac Galvan declared winner over Andre Spicer by one vote) after finding four counted votes were cast by registered voters who did not live in the district. The judge threw out those four votes and declared Spicer the winner. Five people including Galvan were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit election fraud; Heritage notes the charged individuals pleaded guilty or no contest. Status Upheld (court overturn / winner declared). Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding (Election Overturned). Also maps to Registration; Voter Rolls (out-of-district registration/voting).", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — June 2021 Compton City Council Race (Judicial Finding)", "url": "https://herit.ag/3Np798W"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Compton 2021 source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3OK0uqL"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Compton 2021 source 3", "url": "https://herit.ag/3QU6ora"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding (id 200951). Upheld for court overturn over out-of-district votes."}
{"id": "nc-hoke-blue-shaw-nursing-home-absentee-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-03", "uid": "C20260925-185839-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-03", "old_ids": ["nc-hoke-blue-shaw-nursing-home-absentee-2021"], "seq": "C00154", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Nursing homes"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-24", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2021-04", "state": "NC", "description": "Hoke County, North Carolina activists Wanda Blue and Julia Shaw, who had been indicted for harvesting a combined 21 absentee ballots from nursing-home patients, each resolved the case with a reduced obstructing-justice count (Shaw guilty plea; Blue Alford plea), receiving fines, community service, and probation. Coverage notes the original indictments involved possessing nursing-home patient absentee ballots and that a Stage-Four Alzheimer patient's ballot was among those at issue. Status Upheld for guilty/Alford pleas arising from nursing-home absentee ballot harvesting charges (reduced counts).", "sources": [{"title": "Voter Integrity Project NC — Blue/Shaw nursing-home harvesting pleas", "url": "https://voterintegrityproject.com/two-democrats-convicted-of-ballot-harvesting-in-nursing-homes/"}, {"title": "Just the News — Four plead guilty in North Carolina ballot fraud cases (related era)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/four-plead-guilty-north-carolina-ballot-ballot-harvesting-case-16-and-18", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-hoke-blue-shaw-nursing-home-absentee-2021__just-the-news-four-plead-guilty-in-north-carolina-ballot-fra.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 1. Reduced pleas; court-accepted dispositions on nursing-home absentee handling."}
{"id": "tx-brunner-mexia-sslc-incapacitated-residents-registration-mail-ballot-plea-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-09", "uid": "C20260926-015040-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-09", "old_ids": ["tx-brunner-mexia-sslc-incapacitated-residents-registration-mail-ballot-plea-2022"], "seq": "C00897", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "Mental health institutions"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-26", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton's Election Fraud Unit announced Nov. 6, 2020 that Kelly Reagan Brunner, a social worker at Mexia State Supported Living Center (SSLC serving people with intellectual/developmental disabilities), was charged with 134 felony counts for submitting voter-registration applications for 67 residents without their signature or effective consent while purporting to act as agent; the AG release states a number of those residents had been declared totally mentally incapacitated by a court (ineligible to vote under Texas law). Brunner later pleaded guilty (2022) to multiple counts of purporting to act as a voter agent and election-fraud offenses, receiving deferred adjudication / community supervision (remaining counts dismissed); reporting noted no improper resident votes were cast. Status Upheld for a guilty-plea case targeting incapacitated / SSLC-resident registration and mail-ballot access—peer to NC Cherry Hospital disability-rights absentee assist and MN Crow Wing incapacitated-wards cases on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas AG — Limestone County social worker charged with 134 felony counts (Mexia SSLC)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/limestone-county-social-worker-charged-134-felony-counts-involving-election-fraud", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-brunner-mexia-sslc-incapacitated-residents-registration-mail-ballot-plea-2022__texas-ag-limestone-county-social-worker-charged-with-13.png"}, {"title": "KWTX — Local social worker charged with 134 counts in election fraud investigation", "url": "https://www.kwtx.com/2020/11/06/local-social-worker-changed-with-134-counts-in-election-fraud-investigation/"}, {"title": "Houston Chronicle — Feds cite Texas Mexia case in nursing-home voter fraud advisory (plea/deferred adjudication)", "url": "https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/investigations/article/cms-warns-voter-fraud-nursing-home-mexia-case-22357598.php"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Mental health institutions / incapacitated-resident harvest leaf."}
{"id": "sayreville-nj-rittenhouse-dropbox-opra-spoliation-2020", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-01", "uid": "C20261002-123208-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-01", "old_ids": ["sayreville-nj-rittenhouse-dropbox-opra-spoliation-2020"], "seq": "C01317", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-11-30", "state": "NJ", "description": "In Rittenhouse v. Borough of Sayreville (N.J. GRC Complaint No. 2021-33), the complainant’s Nov. 2020 OPRA request sought surveillance video of Middlesex County Board of Elections drop boxes at Sayreville Borough Hall and the Sayreville Water Department for the Nov. 3, 2020 general election. The Government Records Council’s May 30, 2023 Interim Order found a deemed denial for failure to respond in writing within seven business days and held that the Custodian’s failure to safeguard the Water Department camera site video—overwritten on Nov. 30, 2020 after the pending OPRA request—resulted in spoliation of responsive records, referring the matter to OAL for possible civil penalty under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11. The June 25, 2024 Final Decision accepted an ALJ-approved settlement. Status Upheld for GRC findings of deemed denial and spoliation of drop-box surveillance footage under OPRA; does not adjudicate election-outcome fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "N.J. GRC — Rittenhouse v. Sayreville, Complaint No. 2021-33 (Final Decision / Interim Order PDF)", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/grc/decisions/pdf/2021-33.pdf"}, {"title": "N.J. Guide to Ballot Drop Box (Sept. 25, 2020) — video retention as election record (cited in GRC record)", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/election-security/ballot-drop-box-guidance.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Upheld GRC spoliation finding; peer Erie/Luzerne overwrite pattern—Sayreville OPRA, not those remounted."}
{"id": "las-vegas-nv-rolle-mic-cut-oml-2020", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-13", "uid": "C20261001-094909-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-13", "old_ids": ["las-vegas-nv-rolle-mic-cut-oml-2020"], "seq": "C01307", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Microphones are shut off"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-18", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-11-18", "state": "NV", "description": "At the Nov. 18, 2020 Las Vegas City Council meeting, Mayor Carolyn Goodman cut activist Dan Rolle's public-comment microphone mid-remarks after Rolle criticized Mayor Pro Tem Stavros Anthony; video shows the mic stopped about halfway through his allotted minute while positive commenters on other occasions were allowed to finish. Nevada Attorney General findings (OAG File 13897-381, Apr. 14, 2021) held the Council violated the Open Meeting Law by restricting Rolle's critical comments while allowing positive comments in full—viewpoint-differential silencing even if intent was framed as 'courtesy.' Status Upheld for the AG OML finding that cutting the mic violated state open-meeting law. Peer to Cleveland Chris Martin mic-cut card already on this leaf—Las Vegas Rolle/AG instance, not that remounted. PEP framing: shutting off citizen mics during public comment blocks oversight of election-adjacent city decisions without creating a usable public record.", "sources": [{"title": "Review-Journal — AG: Las Vegas Council violated state law by cutting off activist", "url": "https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/las-vegas/ag-las-vegas-council-violated-state-law-by-cutting-off-activist-2340167/"}, {"title": "Nevada AG OAG File 13897-381 — Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (PDF)", "url": "https://ag.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/agnvgov/Content/About/Governmental_Affairs/13897_381.pdf"}, {"title": "KTNV — AG finds Las Vegas City Council violated Open Meeting Law", "url": "https://www.ktnv.com/news/nevada-attorney-general-finds-las-vegas-city-council-violated-states-open-meeting-law"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct from Cleveland Martin leaf peer; AG OML uphold."}
{"id": "tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-63", "uid": "C20260925-155410-63", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-63", "old_ids": ["tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020"], "seq": "C00063", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Change the number or location of ballot return sites abruptly, shortly before the election."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-45", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-10-01", "state": "TX", "description": "On October 1, 2020, Gov. Greg Abbott issued a disaster-act proclamation amending his July expansion of in-person delivery of marked mail ballots so that, before Election Day, each county could designate only a single early-voting clerk office location for hand-delivery (poll watchers required). Plaintiffs challenged the sudden restriction; the Texas Supreme Court on October 27, 2020, in Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League dissolved the temporary injunction and upheld the proclamation as within gubernatorial disaster authority and not a severe voting burden relative to the Election Code baseline. Status Upheld.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of the Texas Governor — Proclamation enhancing ballot security (Oct 1, 2020)", "url": "https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-proclamation-enhancing-ballot-security"}, {"title": "Supreme Court of Texas — Abbott v. ADL, No. 20-0846 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1449966/200846.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020__supreme-court-of-texas-abbott-v-adl-no-20-0846-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Dallas Morning News — Texas Supreme Court upholds one mail-ballot drop site order", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2020/10/27/texas-supreme-court-upholds-gov-abbotts-order-limiting-counties-to-one-mail-ballot-drop-site/"}], "notes": "Strengthens Drop-Boxes leaf; also relevant to sudden early-voting delivery rule changes. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Drop-Boxes' to 'Drop Boxes'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Drop Boxes' to the new leaf 'Drop Boxes > Change the number or location of ballot return sites abruptly, shortly before the election.'."}
{"id": "nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-05", "uid": "C20261020-161446-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-05", "old_ids": ["nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea"], "seq": "C01464", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-09-28 to 2020-10-02", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Sept. 28, Oct. 1 and Oct. 2, 2020, Nicholas Beauchene, 26, a U.S. Postal Service letter carrier from Kearny, New Jersey, threw 1,875 pieces of mail he was assigned to deliver in West Orange and Orange into dumpsters in North Arlington and West Orange. The mail included 99 general-election ballots from the Essex County Board of Elections addressed to West Orange residents and 276 campaign flyers from local candidates for West Orange Town Council and Board of Education, plus 627 first-class pieces. Law enforcement recovered the mail on Oct. 2 and Oct. 5, 2020 and put it back into the mail stream. Beauchene pleaded guilty in Newark federal court to one count of desertion of mails (announced May 27, 2021 by Acting U.S. Attorney Rachael A. Honig; investigated by USPS-OIG). Status Upheld: guilty plea. Catalog point: the ballots were recovered only because the dumped mail was found; a voter whose ballot never arrives may not know why.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, District of New Jersey — Postal Employee Admits Dumping Mail, Including Election Ballots Sent to West Orange Residents", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/postal-employee-admits-dumping-mail-including-election-ballots-sent-west-orange-residents"}, {"title": "Oversight.gov (USPS OIG) — Postal Employee Admits Dumping Mail, Including Election Ballots Sent to West Orange Residents", "url": "https://www.oversight.gov/postal-employee-admits-dumping-mail-including-election-ballots-sent-west-orange-residents", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea__oversight-gov.html"}, {"title": "NJ.com — N.J. mail carrier admits dumping bundles of mail, including nearly 100 election ballots (May 2021)", "url": "https://www.nj.com/news/2021/05/nj-mail-carrier-admits-dumping-bundles-of-mail-including-nearly-100-election-ballots.html"}], "notes": "Added with the MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20) as a second, adjudicated card on the new 'postal workers dump election mail' leaf (named in the New Jersey Globe Kean coverage). USAO-NJ page returned a stub to curl; the Oversight.gov (CIGIE) copy of the same release is archived. NJ.com linked only (403). Sentence not checked. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"]}
{"id": "fl-amendment4-sb7066-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-62", "uid": "C20260925-155410-62", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-62", "old_ids": ["fl-amendment4-sb7066-2020"], "seq": "C00062", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-09-11", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida voters passed Amendment 4 (2018) restoring voting rights to many felons upon 'completion of all terms of sentence.' SB 7066 (2019) and Fla. Stat. § 98.0751 defined completion to include fines, fees, costs, and restitution; the Florida Supreme Court advisory opinion agreed (Jan 2020). After a district court enjoined pay-to-vote aspects for indigents, the Eleventh Circuit en banc in Jones v. Governor of Florida (Sept 11, 2020) reversed and upheld the financial-completion requirement. Status Upheld for the court-sustained implementation; catalog leaf concerns accessibility sleight-of-hand—label carefully as Confirmed statutory practice upheld against constitutional challenge, not as adjudicated 'fraud.'", "sources": [{"title": "11th Cir. en banc — Kelvin Leon Jones v. Governor of Florida (CourtListener PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/pdf/2020/09/11/kelvin_leon_jones_v._governor_of_florida.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-amendment4-sb7066-2020__11th-cir-en-banc-kelvin-leon-jones-v-governor-of-florida-cou.pdf"}, {"title": "Fla. Supreme Court — Advisory Opinion re Implementation of Amendment 4", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/florida/supreme-court/2020/sc19-1341.html"}, {"title": "Campaign Legal Center — Jones v. DeSantis en banc opinion page", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/document/jones-v-desantis-us-court-appeals-eleventh-circuit-en-banc-opinion"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Felon Voting Rights. Document statute + court outcomes carefully."}
{"id": "flint-twp-mi-2020-clerk-funk-broke-ballot-container-seal-block-recount", "permanent_id": "C20261007-123654-01", "uid": "C20261007-123654-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-123654-01", "old_ids": ["flint-twp-mi-2020-clerk-funk-broke-ballot-container-seal-block-recount"], "seq": "C01329", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Broken physical seals that destroy the chain of custody of paper ballots"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-43", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-08", "state": "MI", "description": "After the August 4, 2020 primary, Flint Township (Genesee County, Michigan) Clerk Kathy Funk, who was on the ballot herself and led her challenger by 79 votes in the unofficial count, reported to township police that someone had broken into the election office and broken the seal on a ballot container. Under Michigan law, ballots in a container whose seal does not match the recorded seal number cannot be recounted, so the original totals for that precinct would stand. A Michigan State Police investigation found Funk had broken the seal herself, and the Attorney General charged her with ballot tampering and misconduct in office (March 2022). In January 2023 she pleaded no contest to felony misconduct in office (the tampering count was dismissed), and in April 2023 she was sentenced to two years' probation, six months of house arrest on an electronic tether, a $1,000 fine and $1,000 in court costs, and a written apology to township voters. Status Upheld (court disposition). The case shows how a single broken seal can quietly take paper ballots out of reach of a recount, which is why seal logs and observed custody of the paper matter so much to a PEP-style hand count.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Attorney General — Former Flint Township Clerk pleads on misconduct charge (Jan. 25, 2023)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2023/01/25/former-flint-township-clerk-pleads-on-misconduct-charge"}, {"title": "Michigan Attorney General — Former Flint Twp. Clerk Funk sentenced for misconduct in office (Apr. 25, 2023)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2023/04/25/former-flint-twp-clerk-funk-sentenced-for-misconduct-in-office"}, {"title": "ABC12 — AG Nessel charges Genesee County election official with ballot tampering (Mar. 11, 2022)", "url": "https://www.abc12.com/news/top-stories/ag-nessel-charges-genesee-county-election-official-with-ballot-tampering/article_2f92c590-a18f-11ec-a956-2326486513a7.html"}, {"title": "AP News — Michigan official gets house arrest for 2020 ballot sabotage", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/michigan-clerk-election-sabotage-5cf11dba7a7e9405b1fa27540240bd25"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-07. Upheld (no-contest plea + sentence). Thickens seals leaf beyond the Fulton State Farm Arena card (Fulton seal remounts remain a standing skip)."}
{"id": "aberdeen-ms-2020-alderman-absentee-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-07", "uid": "C20261001-094909-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-07", "old_ids": ["aberdeen-ms-2020-alderman-absentee-overturn"], "seq": "C01300", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-06 / ruling 2021", "state": "MS", "description": "Judge Jeff Weill overturned the June 2020 Aberdeen, Mississippi First Ward Alderman Democratic primary (Nicholas Holliday over Robert Devaull by 37 votes) due to absentee ballot fraud and ordered a new election. The Monroe County district court found that 66 of 84 absentee ballots should not have been counted; notary Dallas Jones was arrested for notarizing ballots without watching voters sign or checking identification. The court also found evidence of intimidation at the polls by various public officials. Status Upheld (court overturn / new election ordered). Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding. Also maps to Ballot Harvesting and Fear/Discredit intimidation leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Aberdeen First Ward Alderman Primary 2020 (Judicial Finding)", "url": "https://herit.ag/3idftfH"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Aberdeen 2020 source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3BPBXeb"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Aberdeen 2020 source 3", "url": "https://herit.ag/3iM4ubO"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding (id 200950). Upheld for court overturn over absentee fraud. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Mail ballots' to 'Mail Ballots > Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy...'."}
{"id": "paterson-nj-2020-mail-ballot-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-08", "uid": "C20260925-181533-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-08", "old_ids": ["paterson-nj-2020-mail-ballot-overturn"], "seq": "C00080", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-19", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2020-05", "state": "NJ", "description": "Superior Court Judge Ernest M. Caposela overturned the May 2020 Paterson, New Jersey Third Ward City Council election for what he called mail-in vote procedural violations. The Passaic County Board of Elections flagged improperly cast/handled absentee ballots; about 24.29% of all ballots cast were rejected, including for signature mismatches and incomplete designations when someone other than the voter handled the ballot. Status Upheld (court overturn). Maps to Mail ballots / Signature Verification and broader chain-of-custody exposure in all-mail / high-mail local races.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB — May 2020 Third Ward Paterson City Council Election (PDF)", "url": "http://static.heritage.org/2020/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/Add/May%202020%20Third%20Ward%20Paterson%20City%20Council%20Election%202020%20NJ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/paterson-nj-2020-mail-ballot-overturn__heritage-vfdb-may-2020-third-ward-paterson-city-council-elec.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Paterson 2020 Source 2 (PDF)", "url": "http://static.heritage.org/2020/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/Add/May%202020%20Third%20Ward%20Paterson%20City%20Council%20Election%202020%20NJ%20Source%202.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/paterson-nj-2020-mail-ballot-overturn__heritage-vfdb-paterson-2020-source-2-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding. Upheld for court overturn over mail-ballot procedural violations."}
{"id": "commerce-v-ny-citizenship-question-scotus-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-03", "uid": "C20260925-184601-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-03", "old_ids": ["commerce-v-ny-citizenship-question-scotus-2019"], "seq": "C00121", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Before 2010, the census form included a citizenship question."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-40", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2019-06-27", "state": "Federal", "description": "In Department of Commerce v. New York (June 27, 2019), the Supreme Court held that the Secretary's stated Voting Rights Act rationale for reinstating a citizenship question on the 2020 Census appeared pretextual under the APA, and left the injunction against adding the question in place. The administration subsequently abandoned the 2020 short-form citizenship question. Status Upheld for the judicial barrier to reinstatement; Confirmed historically that the question remained off the 2020 short form.", "sources": [{"title": "Supreme Court — Department of Commerce v. New York (slip op.)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-966_bq7c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-citizenship-moved-to-acs-2010__supreme-court-department-of-commerce-v-new-york-18-966-slip.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Department of Commerce v. New York", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/18-966/"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 1. 2018–2019 citizenship-question fight outcome."}
{"id": "kosmider-ny-ballot-images-foil-election-law-denied-2019", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-05", "uid": "C20261002-123208-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-05", "old_ids": ["kosmider-ny-ballot-images-foil-election-law-denied-2019"], "seq": "C01321", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-04", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2019-06-13", "state": "NY", "description": "In Matter of Kosmider v. Whitney, 34 N.Y.3d 48 (2019) (NY Slip Op 04757, June 13, 2019), the New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division and denied Bethany Kosmider’s FOIL request for electronic ballot images from Essex County’s November 2015 election. The Court held Election Law §3-222(2) bars examination of ‘voted ballots’—including electronic copies—during the first two years after an election absent a court order or legislative-committee direction, rejecting the theory that requesting a copy rather than the original evades the statute. Status Upheld NY high-court barrier to FOIL release of electronic ballot images; peer Stroehmann/Orten/AUDIT-USA on Public Information Requests leaf—Kosmider NY, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "NY Courts — Matter of Kosmider v Whitney (2019 NY Slip Op 04757)", "url": "https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2019/2019_04757.htm"}, {"title": "Justia — Kosmider v. Whitney (N.Y. 2019)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/court-of-appeals/2019/41.html"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Upheld FOIL denial of ballot images under Elec. Law §3-222."}
{"id": "ncsbe-2019-order-new-election-cd9-dowless-absentee-scheme", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-01", "uid": "C20260926-022920-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-01", "old_ids": ["ncsbe-2019-order-new-election-cd9-dowless-absentee-scheme"], "seq": "C01046", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Compromise people by inducing them to commit election crimes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-29", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2019-02-21", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections (bipartisan 5–0) unanimously ordered a new election in CD-9 and two Bladen County contests after an evidentiary hearing found a \"coordinated, unlawful and substantially resourced absentee ballot scheme\" centered on operative Leslie McCrae Dowless, with workers collecting ballots, forging signatures, and filling votes—felony-risk conduct that compromised paid collectors into election crimes. Formal Order (Mar. 13, 2019) and Feb. 25, 2019 NCSBE press release document the Board's findings and new-election schedule. Status Upheld administrative adjudication ordering a do-over; peer to worker guilty pleas already on this leaf—Board order as institutional consequence of the compromise scheme, not those remounted. PEP framing: machine/mail complexity enabled the harvest pathway; hand-count transparency does not erase criminal compromise of workers.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — State Board unanimously orders new election in 9th Congressional District (Feb. 25, 2019)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2019/02/25/state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-9th-congressional-district", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsbe-2019-order-new-election-cd9-dowless-absentee-scheme__ncsbe-state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-in-9th-congressional-district-feb-25-2019.png"}, {"title": "NCSBE — Order (Congressional District 9 Portal, Mar. 13, 2019 PDF)", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Congressional_District_9_Portal/Order_03132019.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsbe-2019-order-new-election-cd9-dowless-absentee-scheme__ncsbe-order-congressional-district-9-portal-mar-13-2019-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Compromise-into-election-crimes leaf."}
{"id": "kaufman-tx-2018-vote-harvester-mail-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-09", "uid": "C20261001-094909-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-09", "old_ids": ["kaufman-tx-2018-vote-harvester-mail-overturn"], "seq": "C01303", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2018", "state": "TX", "description": "In a Republican primary for a Kaufman County, Texas court seat, Dennis Jones appeared to beat Tracy Gray by one vote. Gray challenged, alleging a \"vote harvester\" had submitted illegal mail-in ballots and that numerous eligible provisional ballots were uncounted. A district judge agreed, invalidating the election results and ordering a new election; in the July 21 special election Gray prevailed by 404 votes. Status Upheld (court invalidation + new election). Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding (Election Overturned).", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Kaufman County TX 2018 (Judicial Finding)", "url": "https://herit.ag/378DJJa"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Kaufman County source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3f3wjeH"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding (id 200968). Upheld for court overturn over illegal harvested mail ballots. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Ballot Harvesting > Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk.'."}
{"id": "kleberg-tx-2018-jp-out-of-precinct-overturn", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-11", "uid": "C20261001-094909-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-11", "old_ids": ["kleberg-tx-2018-jp-out-of-precinct-overturn"], "seq": "C01305", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-67", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2018", "state": "TX", "description": "Visiting District Court Judge Joel Johnson overturned a closely contested Kleberg County, Texas Justice of the Peace Precinct 4 run-off after a two-day hearing. Challenger Ofelia \"Ofie\" Gutierrez contested the result against longtime seat-holder Esequiel \"Cheque\" De La Paz; after a recount narrowed the margin to six votes (312–318), Judge Johnson threw out seven of sixteen contested ballots because they were cast by De La Paz relatives who lived outside Precinct 4 boundaries, and ordered a new election before the end of August. Status Upheld (court overturn / new election ordered). Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding (Election Overturned). Also maps to Registration; Voter Rolls (out-of-precinct voting).", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Kleberg County TX JP 2018 (Judicial Finding)", "url": "https://herit.ag/3iTTEkf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Kleberg County source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3BQhSVo"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding (id 201008). Upheld for court overturn over out-of-precinct relative votes. Unused JUD from Sep-25 VFDB corpus (post–midday 200950/951/968/201007 ingest)."}
{"id": "minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky-political-apparel-ban-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-11", "uid": "C20260925-211320-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-11", "old_ids": ["minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky-political-apparel-ban-2018"], "seq": "C00256", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["At the Polls", "They prohibit political attire at the polls to protect the election illusion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2018-06-14", "state": "MN / Federal", "description": "Minnesota statute banned political apparel inside polling places. In Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held 7–2 that Minnesota's ban violated the First Amendment because 'political' was not capable of reasoned application — confirming that such broad political-attire prohibitions at the polls have been enacted and litigated. Status Upheld for the SCOTUS judgment striking MN's ban; Confirmed historically that the prohibition existed as state law.", "sources": [{"title": "SCOTUS / Justia — Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/585/16-1435/"}, {"title": "Oyez — Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky", "url": "https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-1435", "local": "/archives/2026/09/minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky-political-apparel-ban-2018__oyez-minnesota-voters-alliance-v-mansky.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 6. Upheld = SCOTUS judgment on the ban's unconstitutionality; ban itself was real statute."}
{"id": "scotus-husted-v-apri-2018-ohio-inactive-nvra-confirmation-process", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-04", "uid": "C20260925-212129-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-04", "old_ids": ["scotus-husted-v-apri-2018-ohio-inactive-nvra-confirmation-process"], "seq": "C00301", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2018-06-11", "state": "OH / Federal", "description": "In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Ohio's Supplemental Process: after a period of nonvoting, the state sends an NVRA confirmation notice and marks non-responders inactive, then may remove them after additional nonvoting across two federal general elections. Many registrants learn of the status change only when they next try to vote. Status Upheld for the federal legality of inactive-marking + eventual removal after notice/nonresponse (Ohio inactive voters generally retain regular-ballot rights until removal; catalog's 'unable to vote' applies most clearly post-removal / provisional friction).", "sources": [{"title": "SCOTUS opinion PDF — Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute (16-980)", "url": "https://law.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/A.PhilipRandolph-SCOTUSopinion061118.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scotus-husted-v-apri-2018-ohio-inactive-nvra-confirmation-process__scotus-opinion-pdf-husted-v-a-philip-randolph-institute-16-9.pdf"}, {"title": "Oyez / case materials — Husted v. APRI", "url": "https://www.oyez.org/cases/2017/16-980", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scotus-husted-v-apri-2018-ohio-inactive-nvra-confirmation-process__oyez-case-materials-husted-v-apri.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 2. Upheld process; do not overclaim that Ohio 'inactive' alone always blocks a regular ballot."}
{"id": "va-spieles-jmu-harrisonburgvotes-false-registrations-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-11", "uid": "C20260925-194013-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-11", "old_ids": ["va-spieles-jmu-harrisonburgvotes-false-registrations-2017"], "seq": "C00195", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "College dorms and fraternities"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-21", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2017", "state": "VA", "description": "James Madison University student / HarrisonburgVOTES paid registrant Andrew J. Spieles pleaded guilty in federal court to transferring 18 false Virginia voter-registration forms (including deceased persons and fabricated DOBs/SSNs) submitted to the Harrisonburg registrar ahead of the 2016 election, and was sentenced to 100 days' incarceration. DOJ Western District of Virginia press materials state no indication fraudulent ballots were cast from the false registrations. Status Upheld for false college-town registration-form convictions creating low-propensity roll records; not a fraternity ballot-harvesting conviction.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ WDVA — Harrisonburg man sentenced for fraudulent voter registration forms", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/harrisonburg-man-sentenced-submitting-fraudulent-voter-registration-forms"}, {"title": "Washington Post — Probe into dead Virginians registered in Harrisonburg", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/probe-looks-at-how-dead-virginians-came-to-be-registered-to-vote-in-harrisonburg/2016/10/05/8d07662e-872b-11e6-ac72-a29979381495_story.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 4. College-town false registrations Upheld; dorm/frat address not the charged mechanism."}
{"id": "tx-davis-waxahachie-nursing-home-mail-ballot-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-02", "uid": "C20260925-185839-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-02", "old_ids": ["tx-davis-waxahachie-nursing-home-mail-ballot-2017"], "seq": "C00153", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Nursing homes"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-24", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2017-06", "state": "TX", "description": "In Ellis County, Texas, a jury convicted Constable Tyron Davis of six misdemeanor voter-fraud counts for illegally harvesting mail-ballot applications at a Waxahachie nursing home while a candidate in the May 2016 Democratic primary runoff. Contemporaneous reporting states Davis filled out mail applications for as many as 18 seniors (including at least one with Alzheimer's) without signing as an assistant as required by Texas Election Code; elections officials flagged similar handwriting and missing assistant signatures. Davis accepted an arrangement avoiding jail by resigning, forfeiting his peace-officer license, and paying fines. Status Upheld for nursing-home mail-ballot harvesting convictions.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Scorecard — Constable convicted of voter fraud (Ellis County nursing home)", "url": "https://texasscorecard.com/local/democrat-constable-convicted-voter-fraud-ellis-county/"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — Voter Fraud Database", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-davis-waxahachie-nursing-home-mail-ballot-2017__heritage-foundation-voter-fraud-database.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 1. Jury conviction on nursing-home mail applications."}
{"id": "idaho-democrats-v-rich-2016-inadequate-notice-relocated-polls-hours-extended", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-14", "uid": "C20260926-023334-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-14", "old_ids": ["idaho-democrats-v-rich-2016-inadequate-notice-relocated-polls-hours-extended"], "seq": "C01074", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2016-11-08", "state": "ID", "description": "In Idaho State Democratic Party v. Rich (D. Idaho 1:16-cv-00491), voters were directed to relocated polling places after inadequate/late notice on Election Day 2016; the federal court issued emergency relief extending voting by one hour at five affected original locations and requiring notices directing voters to the new sites (Federal Judicial Center emergency-election case summary; Clearinghouse case record). Status Upheld Election Day judicial remedy for notice/location timing failures that caused voters to miss correct poll windows; peer to the Union County NC and Virginia wrong-polling-place cards on this leaf. PEP framing: wrong time/location advertising suppresses observed in-person voting and pushes voters toward less observable channels.", "sources": [{"title": "Federal Judicial Center — Emergency Election Cases: Keeping Polls Open Because They Were Moved with Inadequate Notice (Idaho Democrats v. Rich summary PDF)", "url": "https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/52/EE-ID-1-16-cv-491-Idaho-Democrats.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/idaho-democrats-v-rich-2016-inadequate-notice-relocated-polls-hours-extended__federal-judicial-center-emergency-election-cases-keeping-polls-open-because-they-were-moved-with-inadequate-notice-idaho-democrats-v-rich-summary-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse — Idaho State Democratic Party v. Rich 1:16-cv-00491", "url": "https://clearinghouse.net/case/44934/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on Date/Time games incorrect-advertising leaf. Moved 2026-10-26 (Mark pt445u) from 6 > Event Date and Time Misdirection > \"They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events…\"; its source concerns inadequate notice of relocated polling places, so voters went to the wrong locations to 6 > Polling Places > \"Incorrect or altered polling-location data\"."}
{"id": "brandon-dean-brighton-al-2016-absentee-vacate", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-12", "uid": "C20261001-094909-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-12", "old_ids": ["brandon-dean-brighton-al-2016-absentee-vacate"], "seq": "C01306", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2016 / ruling 2017", "state": "AL", "description": "Brandon Dean, elected mayor of Brighton, Alabama in 2016, was ordered to vacate the office after a judge determined that 46 fraudulent absentee votes had been cast for him. Of those ballots, 21 were not signed by the voter, 22 had been sent to Dean's address instead of the voters' homes, 2 were submitted by voters who were actually present at city hall on Election Day, and one voter did not live in Brighton city limits. Deducting the fraudulent votes dropped Dean below the threshold needed to avoid a mandatory runoff, which the city was required to hold. Status Upheld (court-ordered vacate / runoff). Heritage VFDB Judicial Finding (Fraudulent Use of Absentee Ballots). Also maps to Ballot Harvesting and Election Contest.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Brandon Dean Brighton AL (Judicial Finding)", "url": "https://herit.ag/2WlR6DL"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Brandon Dean source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3x2hFL2"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Judicial Finding (id 200355). Upheld for court vacate over fraudulent absentees. Unused JUD from Sep-25 VFDB corpus. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Mail ballots' to 'Mail Ballots > Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy...'."}
{"id": "scotus-2013-arizona-v-itca-federal-form-attestation-no-documentary-citizenship-proof", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-15", "uid": "C20260926-025634-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-15", "old_ids": ["scotus-2013-arizona-v-itca-federal-form-attestation-no-documentary-citizenship-proof"], "seq": "C01120", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2013-06-17", "state": "Federal / AZ", "description": "In Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc., 570 U.S. 1 (2013), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the NVRA requires states to 'accept and use' the federal mail voter-registration form for federal elections and that Arizona may not demand documentary proof of citizenship beyond the Federal Form's attestation/checkbox regime—cementing attestation-without-documents as the controlling federal registration pathway for residence/citizenship declarations on the national form. Status Upheld SCOTUS holding; peer to NCSL attestation survey and EAC Federal Form checkbox cards already on this leaf—ITCA binding precedent, not those remounted. PEP framing: attestation-only federal registration expands unverifiable roll entries versus documentary confirmation before hand-count eligibility.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court — Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc. (570 U.S. 1) opinion PDF (June 17, 2013)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/12-71_83i6.pdf"}, {"title": "DOJ CRT — National Voter Registration Act of 1993 overview (Federal Form accept-and-use)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Voter Rolls Proof of residence not required leaf."}
{"id": "or-swenson-clackamas-2013-ballot-tampering-undervote-conviction", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-09", "uid": "C20260926-014044-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-09", "old_ids": ["or-swenson-clackamas-2013-ballot-tampering-undervote-conviction"], "seq": "C00884", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation", "undervotes on ballots can easily be filled in to manipulate those races"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-28", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2013-04-25", "state": "OR", "description": "Former Clackamas County, Oregon temporary elections employee Deanna Swenson was indicted after a co-worker reported seeing her alter a ballot on Oct. 31, 2012; she pleaded guilty to official misconduct and unlawfully altering a cast ballot for marking ballots left partially blank by voters (reporting contemporaneously described filling previously undervoted races). On April 25, 2013 she was sentenced to 90 days in jail; Oregon SOS Kate Brown and AG Ellen Rosenblum stated the conduct did not change any race outcomes. Status Upheld for a prosecuted conviction for filling blank/undervote races on already-cast ballots—peer distinct from Oklahoma Glass v. State (1961) counter-filled blank races; illustrates the tabulation-stage undervote-manipulation vulnerability on paper ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Oregon SOS — Ballot Tampering Conviction (Swenson plea; 90-day sentence)", "url": "https://apps.oregon.gov/oregon-newsroom/OR/SOS/Posts/Post/ballot-tampering-conviction-2228", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-swenson-clackamas-2013-ballot-tampering-undervote-conviction__oregon-sos-ballot-tampering-conviction-swenson-plea-90.png"}, {"title": "OregonLive — Former Clackamas County elections employee Deanna Swenson indicted on ballot tampering charges", "url": "https://www.oregonlive.com/oregon-city/2012/11/former_clackamas_county_electi.html"}, {"title": "KOMO News — Ore. election worker says she did not intentionally alter ballots", "url": "https://komonews.com/news/local/ore-election-worker-says-she-did-not-intentionally-alter-ballots"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Tabulation > fill in undervotes leaf (distinct from OK Glass)."}
{"id": "coleman-franken-2008-mn-senate-election-contest", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-01", "uid": "C20260926-022424-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-01", "old_ids": ["coleman-franken-2008-mn-senate-election-contest"], "seq": "C01031", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-67", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2008-2009", "state": "MN", "description": "After the November 4, 2008 Minnesota U.S. Senate race, a statewide hand recount and State Canvassing Board certification put Al Franken ahead of Norm Coleman by 225 votes; Coleman then filed a statutory election contest under Minn. Stat. §209.021. A three-judge panel after trial found Franken ahead by 312 legally cast votes (April 13, 2009), and the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously affirmed on June 30, 2009 (In re Contest of General Election / Sheehan v. Franken, A09-697), entitling Franken to the certificate of election. Status Upheld contested-election adjudication after recount; peer to Arizona Lake v. Hobbs contest and Harris County 180th judicial overturn cards—Minnesota 2008 Senate contest, not those remounted. PEP framing: hand recount and public adjudication still depend on intact paper and lawful ballots; machine opacity is not cured by contest litigation alone.", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota Supreme Court — In re Contest of General Election / Sheehan v. Franken (A09-697, June 30, 2009)", "url": "https://mn.gov/web/prod/static/lawlib/live/archive/supct/0906/OPA090697-0630.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coleman-franken-2008-mn-senate-election-contest__minnesota-supreme-court-in-re-contest-of-general-election-sheehan-v-franken-a09-697-june-30-2009.pdf"}, {"title": "FindLaw — In re Contest of General Election Held on November 4, 2008 (Minn. 2009)", "url": "https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/mn-supreme-court/1431369.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Election Contest leaf."}
{"id": "wi-howard-eau-claire-college-dual-vote-2004", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-10", "uid": "C20260925-194013-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-10", "old_ids": ["wi-howard-eau-claire-college-dual-vote-2004"], "seq": "C00194", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "College dorms and fraternities"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-21", "status": "Upheld", "date": "2005-01", "state": "WI", "description": "University of Wisconsin–Eau Claire student Michael R. Howard voted absentee in Appleton then registered and voted again in Eau Claire in the same 2004 primary; he pleaded to a misdemeanor false statement on a voter registration form and received probation and community service (felony dual-voting charge reduced). Contemporaneous AP coverage and Brennan Center case summaries document the college-student dual registration/voting disposition. Status Upheld for guilty plea arising from dual college-community voting.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Election Day Registration report (Howard Eau Claire dual-vote plea summary)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/edr_fraud.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-howard-eau-claire-college-dual-vote-2004__brennan-center-election-day-registration-report-howard-eau-claire-dual-vote-plea-summary.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 4. College dual-vote plea Upheld."}
{"id": "ok-glass-v-state-1961-25-ballots-pen-x-on-blank-races-scheme", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-24", "uid": "C20260925-214102-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-24", "old_ids": ["ok-glass-v-state-1961-25-ballots-pen-x-on-blank-races-scheme"], "seq": "C00347", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation", "undervotes on ballots can easily be filled in to manipulate those races"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-28", "status": "Upheld", "date": "1961-03-15", "state": "OK", "description": "Companion detail from the same affirmed record: investigators found ~25 ballots with rubber-stamp votes in some races and pen-ink 'X' marks added in races the voter left blank; only counters had post-box access during sorting/calling, and expert testimony matched Glass's pen to the added marks. Status Upheld for the multi-ballot undervote-fill scheme pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "OSCN full opinion — Glass v. State (facts on 25 ballots)", "url": "https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=51806"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "ok-glass-v-state-1961-counter-filled-blank-undervote-races-conviction", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-23", "uid": "C20260925-214102-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-23", "old_ids": ["ok-glass-v-state-1961-counter-filled-blank-undervote-races-conviction"], "seq": "C00346", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation", "undervotes on ballots can easily be filled in to manipulate those races"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-28", "status": "Upheld", "date": "1961-03-15", "state": "OK", "description": "In Glass v. State, 361 P.2d 230 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961), election counter Russell Glass was convicted (affirmed on appeal) of changing primary ballots while counting: on ballots where voters left races blank (undervotes), he marked pen 'X' selections for preferred candidates (court clerk / related charges; ~25 ballots similarly marked). Handwriting/ink experts tied marks to his pen; he received a one-year sentence. Status Upheld for the proven fill-in-undervotes tactic by a trusted counter with ballot access.", "sources": [{"title": "OSCN — Glass v. State, 1961 OK CR 34, 361 P.2d 230", "url": "https://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=51806"}, {"title": "OpenJurist — Glass v. State, 361 P.2d 230", "url": "https://openjurist.org/361/p2d/230/glass-v-state-1295361", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ok-glass-v-state-1961-counter-filled-blank-undervote-races-conviction__openjurist-glass-v-state-361-p-2d-230.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 12. Classic Upheld undervote-fill conviction. Overvote-cancel sibling left for later unless stronger modern case found."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-09", "uid": "C20261028-132233-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-09", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party"], "seq": "C01604", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "current statute (checked 2026-10-28)", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona law requires the officer in charge of elections to \"Ensure that the ballot return envelopes are of a type that does not reveal the voter's selections or political party affiliation and that is tamper evident when properly sealed.\" (A.R.S. § 16-545(B)(2)) [1] Status Confirmed: statutory text.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Revised Statutes § 16-545 — Ballot envelope; tamper evident (azleg.gov; checked Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00545.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/10/az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party__azleg-ars-16-545.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. The year the envelope clause was added was not verified; the id carries no year.", "related": ["co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party", "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations"]}
{"id": "co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-09", "uid": "C20261026-180010-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-09", "old_ids": ["co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc"], "seq": "C01574", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "current rule (8 CCR 1505-1, Rule 17.1.2)", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado's Election Rule 17.1.2 provides for the case in which a voter service and polling center \"loses connectivity to SCORE,\" the statewide voter registration system. [1] The election judge \"must attempt to verify the elector's eligibility\" by \"reviewing or receiving information produced from the statewide voter registration system either in real-time or within the preceding 24 hours.\" [1] (If a court extends voting past 7 p.m. on Election Day, the information may be no earlier than the day before.) If eligibility can be determined, the judge issues a mail ballot or replacement mail ballot; if it cannot, the judge must issue a provisional ballot. [1] Beginning the Friday before Election Day, the county clerk must keep \"a paper or electronic backup of the county's voter registration list produced from the preceding day\" for this purpose. [1] The rule's acceptance code ALC marks a provisional ballot cast because the center \"lost connectivity and the voter's eligibility could not be otherwise determined.\" [1] Status Confirmed that Colorado's rule expressly anticipates the live link to the registration database failing, and allows eligibility to be decided from a copy up to 24 hours old, with a provisional ballot as the fallback. This is a documented fallback design, not a reported incident.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Secretary of State, Election Rules, 8 CCR 1505-1, Rule 17 Provisional Voting", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule17.pdf"}], "notes": "", "related": ["co-2014-general-intermittent-loss-of-connectivity-vspcs-to-score-387-of-981-provisional-ballots", "colorado-vote-centers-require-centralized-statewide-voter-registration-access", "ncsl-same-day-registration-realtime-epollbook-statewide-database-updates", "eac-2023-electronic-poll-book-report-realtime-statewide-voter-record-updates"]}
{"id": "pa-dos-ovr-web-api-third-party-posting-organizations-direct-sure-submission", "permanent_id": "C20261019-125714-04", "uid": "C20261019-125714-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-125714-04", "old_ids": ["pa-dos-ovr-web-api-third-party-posting-organizations-direct-sure-submission"], "seq": "C01453", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "In at least Maricopa County, the county gave registration NGOs direct URL and application programming interface (API) access to its voter registration system."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "Program in place by 2019; API specification updated May 2024 (v1.9)", "state": "PA", "description": "The Pennsylvania Department of State runs the PA Online Voter Registration and Vote by Mail Web API (PA-OVR-WebAPI). It lets approved third-party 'posting organizations' build their own registration apps, including tablet apps used in voter registration drives, that submit voter registration applications, record updates and standalone mail-ballot requests by program directly into the Department's online registration system, which feeds the SURE statewide registry. DOS describes the API as available in interactive and batch modes, and its May 2024 specification adds the standalone vote-by-mail request function. The Terms of Use let a posting organization share its application with 'Affiliates' identified only by a partner ID, and the specification says organizations 'can collect voter contact information for the use of their organization.' A 2019 Philadelphia election-security panel slide lists 'WebAPI (Agency and 3rd Party Partners)' as one of four ways voters enter SURE, with driver's license and SSN4 checked against PennDOT and SSA. Status Confirmed (Department of State's own program pages, specification and terms). This card documents the access channel. It is not a finding that any approved organization misused it. Catalog note: this is the API-access half of the leaf title. Outside organizations' software sits directly in front of the state's registration and mail-ballot request intake, and those organizations keep the contact data they collect.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State — PA Online Voter Registration Web API (PA-OVR-WebAPI) program page: registration, access keys, interactive and batch modes", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/resources/voting-and-elections-resources/pa-online-voter-registration-web-api-rfc"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State — Voter Registration and Vote by Mail API Specification v1.9 (updated May 2024)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/web-api/PAOVERWebAPISpecifications.1.9.pdf"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State — PA OVR Web API Terms of Use (posting organizations, Affiliates, partner IDs)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/web-api/PAOVRWebAPITermsOfUse.pdf"}, {"title": "City of Philadelphia — Election Security Panel slides (2019; 'WebAPI (Agency and 3rd Party Partners)' path into SURE)", "url": "https://www.phila.gov/media/20190724193349/Day-1-Session-3_Election-Security-Panel-Marks.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-19 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed (program documentation). Direct state peer to seed-maricopa-ngo-api (AZ Unique URL program). Distinct from rock-the-vote-api-partner-access-registrant-personal-information (vendor-side partner data). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots (standalone VBM request via API). Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > NGO registration / API access' to 'Registration > Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations > Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration > In at least Maricopa County, the county provided registration NGO's URL/API a...'."}
{"id": "ga-wabe-2026-july-deadline-feasibility-puzzle-postpone-election-system-change", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-08", "uid": "C20260925-220029-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-08", "old_ids": ["ga-wabe-2026-july-deadline-feasibility-puzzle-postpone-election-system-change"], "seq": "C00361", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Feasibility studies"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026", "state": "GA", "description": "Contemporaneous reporting (WABE / Peach State Press) documented lawmakers citing acquisition, testing, training, accessibility, cybersecurity, cost, and line-length impacts as reasons a rapid voting-system replacement before the next cycle was infeasible—explicitly framing the pause as a feasibility/impact problem rather than an immediate statutory fix. Status Confirmed that feasibility/impact framing was the public justification for postponement.", "sources": [{"title": "WABE — Lawmakers puzzle over Georgia election system with deadline looming", "url": "https://www.wabe.org/with-july-1-deadline-looming-lawmakers-puzzle-over-what-to-do-about-georgias-election-system/"}, {"title": "Peach State Press — Special session postpones mandated election-system changes", "url": "https://peachstatepress.com/special-session-ends-lawmakers-postpone-georgia-election-changes/"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "usps-kit600-2026-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-return-fee", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-02", "uid": "C20260926-013447-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-02", "old_ids": ["usps-kit600-2026-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-return-fee"], "seq": "C00861", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS bills counties for undelivered ballots, typically by weighing rather than counting them, a total loss of chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Kit 600 (2026–2027 Official Election Mail) STID guidance states that when outbound Ballot Mail is sent as USPS Marketing Mail and UAA pieces must be returned, 'USPS Marketing Mail is charged an additional weighted fee for mail that must be returned' under Address Service Requested options, and under Return Service Requested Option 2 Marketing Mail 'is returned at either the single-piece First-Class Mail or Priority Mail price, depending on the weight of the piece.' First-Class Ballot Mail return is at no charge. Status Confirmed for current Election Mail documentation that undeliverable Marketing Mail ballot returns are billed by weight-based postage—not a piece-count invoice that preserves per-ballot CoC accounting. Complements Pub 632; PEP precinct hand count of voter-marked paper does not depend on USPS UAA billing integrity.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Kit 600 — How to Determine the Right STID (weighted fee / weight-based return prices)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600/kit600_v04-2026_023.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-2026-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-return-fee__usps-kit-600-how-to-determine-the-right-stid-weighted-f.png"}, {"title": "USPS — Kit 600: 2026-2027 Official Election Mail (PDF)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-2026-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-return-fee__usps-kit-600-2026-2027-official-election-mail-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS Publication 632 — State and Local Election Mail User's Guide", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-2026-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-return-fee__usps-publication-632-state-and-local-election-mail-user.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight."}
{"id": "usps-kit600-ballot-mail-forward-or-return-stid-acs-endorsements", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-05", "uid": "C20260926-015536-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-05", "old_ids": ["usps-kit600-ballot-mail-forward-or-return-stid-acs-endorsements"], "seq": "C00908", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Postal carriers are instructed not to deliver ballots addressed to people who do not live there, so the ballots can be rerouted without revealing multiple registrations at the address."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026", "state": "National", "description": "USPS Kit 600 (2026–2027 Official Election Mail) instructs election mailers to choose Ballot Mail STIDs that tell the Postal Service whether Undeliverable-as-Addressed (UAA) Ballot Mail should be **forwarded** (Address Service Requested options) or **returned** to the election office (Return Service Requested)—with ACS electronic/manual notices of the new address or reason for non-delivery. The kit does not authorize leaving a mismatched-name ballot for a different household occupant; UAA Ballot Mail is handled under forward-or-return ancillary endorsements. Status Confirmed for official USPS Election Mail STID/ACS architecture implementing forward-or-return for UAA ballots—peer to Pub 632 Ballot Mail rules and Federal Register ancillary-endorsement constraints.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Kit 600 — How to Determine the Right STID (forward vs return UAA Ballot Mail)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600/kit600_v04-2026_023.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-ballot-mail-forward-or-return-stid-acs-endorsements__usps-kit-600-how-to-determine-the-right-stid-forward-vs.png"}, {"title": "USPS Pub 632 — Whether You Want Free Forwarding and Return (Ballot Mail)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632/pub632_008.htm"}, {"title": "USPS Kit 600 — 2026-2027 Official Election Mail hub", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600/kit600_v04-2026_001.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-ballot-mail-forward-or-return-stid-acs-endorsements__usps-kit-600-2026-2027-official-election-mail-hub.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on postal carriers must not deliver wrong-addressee ballots leaf."}
{"id": "az-pima-2026-11-12-recorder-finds-17-early-ballots-after-final-results-two-late-batches", "permanent_id": "C20261116-181245-02", "uid": "C20261116-181245-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-181245-02", "old_ids": ["az-pima-2026-11-12-recorder-finds-17-early-ballots-after-final-results-two-late-batches"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-10 (counting reported complete); 2026-11-12 to 2026-11-13 (17 ballots found and counted)", "state": "AZ", "description": "Pima County's official Early Ballots Processed report for the Nov. 3, 2026 general election lists two batches added after the county finished counting on Nov. 10: batch Y-1, 13 ballots (memo dated Nov. 12, received at Elections and counted Nov. 13), and batch Z-1, 4 ballots (memo dated and counted Nov. 13). On the Nov. 16 Winn Tucson radio program, Joel Strabala, a member of the Pima County Election Integrity Commission and Republican LD17 chair, said the Recorder's office found 13 early ballots still in their affidavit envelopes on Thursday afternoon (Nov. 12) and four more on Friday (Nov. 13), after the final batch had been tabulated and the post-election logic and accuracy test had passed; he said the Elections Department tabulated each batch with party observers present and reposted its final results after each. Strabala said he checked the closest races and found it 'extremely unlikely' that any race was materially affected by the 17 ballots, but said ballots are controlled items that should not go missing and turn up later. Pima County Republican Chair Kathleen Winn said the party is not accusing anyone and called it a broken process. The 17 late batches are documented in the county's own report; how the ballots were missed has not been explained publicly in the sources reviewed, and no statement from the Recorder's office was found. The county canvass is scheduled for Nov. 18, per Strabala. Missing evidence: an official explanation from the Recorder's office of where the ballots were and why they were missed. Status Confirmed: the two late batches (Y-1, 13 ballots; Z-1, 4 ballots, both counted Nov. 13) appear in Pima County's own Early Ballots Processed report, after KVOA reported counting complete on Nov. 10; the circumstances are described by Election Integrity Commission member Joel Strabala on Winn Tucson. No outcome change is reported, and no Recorder's office explanation was found. Catalog point: early ballots still sealed in affidavit envelopes surfaced after the county had declared its count finished and passed its post-election logic and accuracy test; chain of custody over mailed ballots did not account for them until they turned up.", "sources": [{"title": "Pima County Elections Department (2026 General Election - Early Ballots Processed, PDF linked from pima.gov/election-results) — Pima County 17 late-found early ballots (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://content.civicplus.com/api/assets/az-pimacounty/d15685d3-b434-4640-8549-fc1a9995fdb7"}, {"title": "Winn Tucson (radio program episode summary) — Pima County 17 late-found early ballots (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.winntucson.com/episodes/smith-strabala-letts"}, {"title": "KVOA — Pima County 17 late-found early ballots (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://www.kvoa.com/news/decision2026/the-pima-county-elections-department-finishes-counting-all-ballots-for-the-general-election/article_11076fe4-5d61-4b47-984d-7fc84721061a.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pima Co. AZ 17 early ballots found after final results (ei-2026-10-440)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-440 (added 2026-11-16 6:12 PM ET, 2026-11-16 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. No vendor named. Recheck Nov. 18 canvass and any Recorder statement. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "az-2026-11-09-sos-ballot-progress-page-statewide-uncounted-total-sums-only-reporting-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261110-121330-03", "uid": "C20261110-121330-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261110-121330-03", "old_ids": ["az-2026-11-09-sos-ballot-progress-page-statewide-uncounted-total-sums-only-reporting-counties"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-08 to 2026-11-09", "state": "AZ", "description": "Two independent analyses of the Arizona Secretary of State's official Ballot Progress page, which A.R.S. § 16-551(D) requires to keep the public updated on ballots still being processed, report that its \"estimated total number of uncounted ballots\" is not reported consistently. In a Nov. 8, 2026 Substack post, Kelly Meixler wrote that the English note defines the total as early plus provisional ballots left to process, while the Spanish note also adds ballots ready for tabulation and cites the 2019 rather than the 2025 Elections Procedures Manual. Using Nov. 7 data, she wrote that Pima's 7,075 includes ready ballots; that Maricopa and Yuma left the total blank despite listing 4,200 and 2,978 ballots ready for tabulation (Maricopa's total would be 13,250 or 17,450 depending on the definition); that Cochise, Mohave, Pinal and Santa Cruz reported zero uncounted while listing 348, 1,233, 2,300 and 256 ballots left to process; and that Navajo's listed 2,307 does not match its components (574 or 585). She also asked Navajo County to explain how its 5,209 late-early ballots compare with the 1,852 early ballots it reported as dropped off at voting locations on election night, while noting that the difference may include lawful mail or drop-box ballots. On Nov. 9, X account @_Patriot1776Q_ posted a graphic, attributed to the Ballot Progress page as of 11:39 a.m. PT, saying the statewide figure of 9,382 reflects only Pima (7,075) and Navajo (2,307) while the counties' own columns total 33,642 (42,172 with 8,530 ready to scan), and noted a Maricopa state House race separated by 318 votes. Neither source alleges fraud, and Meixler says nothing shows any ballot was mishandled. These figures come from the two analysts' readings of the page and have not been independently checked against the live page. No response from the Secretary of State or the counties has been reported. Missing evidence: an archived copy of the page, an official explanation of the definitions and the blank or zero entries, and Navajo County's late-early breakdown and custody records. Nov. 9 evening update: Brian Skellenger (@brianskellenger) posted his own reading of the page's Nov. 9 update (statewide total uncounted 9,382 against 21,309 early plus 10,435 provisional left, or 31,744 under the English definition), agreeing that the statewide figure only adds the counties that filled in the total field and that this is a reporting failure, not evidence that ballots were removed. He also noted that Maricopa Legislative District 27 shows Lisa Fink at 33,541 and Tony Rivero at 33,223, a 318-vote gap (0.476%) inside Arizona's 0.5% automatic-recount threshold under A.R.S. § 16-661 if it holds at canvass. EMon then read the live page directly at about 7:40 p.m. ET Nov. 9 (header \"Last Updated Monday, November 9, 2026 at 7:29:52 PM\", time zone not stated). The page's English note defines the total as rows 2 and 3. It showed 13,279 early and 7,479 provisional ballots left to process statewide (20,758 combined) and 9,860 ready for tabulation, but an estimated total uncounted of 4,743, which equals exactly the only two counties that filled in that field: Pima (2,436) and Navajo (2,307). Maricopa still listed 10,750 early and 2,500 provisional ballots left, last updated Nov. 7, with no total entered, and Navajo's 2,307 still does not match its own 38 early plus 536 provisional. That direct read confirms the page's internal inconsistency. No fraud is alleged by any source, and no explanation from the Secretary of State or the counties has been reported. Still missing: an official explanation, a full archived capture of the page (including the Spanish note, which EMon's text read did not show), and Navajo County's reconciliation. Status Confirmed by a direct read of the Arizona Secretary of State's official Ballot Progress page on Nov. 9 (statewide uncounted total equals only the two counties that filled in the field), matching independent readings by named analysts Kelly Meixler and Brian Skellenger; no source alleges fraud, and no Secretary of State or county explanation has been reported. Catalog point: the state's own public dashboard reported a statewide count of uncounted ballots that was a fraction of its own row figures, so the public had no reliable official number for what remained to be counted.", "sources": [{"title": "Substack (Kelly Meixler) — AZ Ballot Progress page uncounted-ballot totals inconsistent (unconfirmed) (2026-11-08)", "url": "https://ncelections.substack.com/p/whats-left-to-count-arizonas-ballot"}, {"title": "X: @_Patriot1776Q_ — AZ Ballot Progress page uncounted-ballot totals inconsistent (unconfirmed) (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2119889231036494330"}, {"title": "Arizona Secretary of State, Ballot Progress page (read by EMon ~7:40 p.m. ET Nov. 9) — AZ Ballot Progress page uncounted-ballot totals inconsistent (unconfirmed) (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://app.enhancedvoting.com/results/public/Arizona/elections/110326GeneralElection/stats"}, {"title": "X post by @brianskellenger (2026-11-10T00:33:57Z)", "url": "https://x.com/brianskellenger/status/2119951659384377467"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — AZ Ballot Progress page uncounted-ballot totals inconsistent (unconfirmed) (ei-2026-10-386)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-386 (added 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET, 2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-09-az-sos-ballot-progress-page-uncounted-ballot-totals-inconsistent-meixler. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount", "permanent_id": "C20261109-123201-01", "uid": "C20261109-123201-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-123201-01", "old_ids": ["fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Seat an election official with a conflict of interest on the canvassing or recount board."], "leaf_id": "L20261109-123201-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261109-123201-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-06 (suit); 2026-11-09 (hearing/denial; recount began)", "state": "FL", "description": "On Nov. 6, 2026, Democratic U.S. House candidate Eliott Rodriguez filed a federal lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida seeking to bar Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections Alina Garcia from serving as a voting member of the county canvassing board for the automatic machine recount in Florida's 27th Congressional District, where Republican Rep. María Elvira Salazar led by 1,090 votes (50.22% to 49.78%), inside Florida's 0.5-point automatic-recount margin (Democracy Docket; NBC News; CBS News Miami; Florida Politics via EMon). The complaint alleged an objective risk of bias because, according to a Miami Herald election-night interview cited across the coverage, Garcia said Salazar \"is the winner, with or without a recount,\" and because Garcia's son-in-law, elections lawyer Robert Fernandez, represents Salazar in the recount; Salazar's filing did not dispute the family relationship (Democracy Docket; Miami Herald reporting as summarized by WSVN and the Herald's Nov. 9 ruling story). The Rodriguez campaign had demanded recusal; Garcia refused, saying, \"I will not recuse myself. There is no conflict\" (Miami Herald ruling coverage). U.S. District Judge David S. Leibowitz held an emergency hearing at 9 a.m. on Nov. 9, an hour before the recount was to start in Doral, and denied the preliminary injunction. He found the election-night comments and the family connection to Salazar's lawyer insufficient to remove Garcia from the three-member canvassing board, called the \"with or without a recount\" portion \"ham-fisted\" and \"a really dumb statement to make,\" noted that she had also said a reversal was \"possible but not probable,\" and pointed to safeguards including two county court judges on the board, public proceedings, and campaign observers (Miami Herald; NBC 6; WSVN). Garcia remained on the board as the recount began shortly after 10 a.m. The bias claims remain contested allegations; the court's denial is not a finding that there was no conflict, only that the showing did not justify removing her. Status Confirmed for the documented family relationship to the candidate's recount counsel, Garcia's refusal to recuse, her continued service on the canvassing board after the Nov. 9 denial, and the suit itself; the Miami Herald interview is the source of the election-night quotation (secondhand to outlets that quote the Herald). Catalog point: an elections official with an undisputed family tie to a candidate's recount lawyer stayed a voting member of the canvassing board that oversees the recount. Update (Nov. 10, 2026): Supervisor Alina Garcia announced the CD-27 machine recount was complete, with Salazar at 124,519 (50.22%) and Rodriguez at 123,433 (49.78%), a 1,086-vote margin, and posted the County Canvassing Board's official certificate. No counting error was reported.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — Florida Democrat sues to block county election chief from recount, alleging bias (Brentin Mock, Nov. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/florida-democrat-sues-to-block-county-election-chief-from-recount-in-house-race-alleging-bias/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__demdocket.html"}, {"title": "NBC News — South Florida candidate sues election official, alleging bias in razor-thin race (Nov. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/south-florida-miami-rodriguez-sues-supervisor-elections-garcia-salazar-rcna607841", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__nbcnews.html"}, {"title": "CBS News Miami — Rodriguez lawsuit seeks Garcia recusal from District 27 recount (Nov. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/rodriguez-lawsuit-garcia-recusal-district-27-recount-salazar/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__cbs.html"}, {"title": "Key Biscayne Independent — Judge orders emergency hearing in recount lawsuit against Miami elections chief (Nov. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://kbindependent.org/2026/11/08/judge-orders-emergency-hearing-in-recount-lawsuit-against-miami-elections-chief/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__kbi.html"}, {"title": "NBC 6 South Florida — Federal judge denies motion to remove supervisor of elections in District 27 recount (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcmiami.com/elections/federal-judge-orders-emergency-hearing-an-hour-before-recount-in-fls-district-27-race/3885535/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__nbc6.html"}, {"title": "Miami Herald — Federal judge lets Miami-Dade supervisor oversee recount (Nov. 9, 2026); election-night interview source of the quotation", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election-results/article317994770.html"}, {"title": "WSVN — Judge denies Eliott Rodriguez campaign’s motion to remove Miami-Dade elections supervisor from District 27 recount (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://wsvn.com/news/politics/salazar-rodriguez-fl-27-recount/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/fl-miami-dade-2026-11-06-cd27-rodriguez-sues-garcia-conflict-canvassing-board-recount__wsvn.html"}, {"title": "Florida Politics — Eliott Rodriguez sues to block Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections from CD 27 recount (Nov. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://floridapolitics.com/archives/830153-eliott-rodriguez-sues-to-block-miami-dade-supervisor-of-elections-from-cd-27-recount/"}, {"title": "Miami-Dade Elections — CD-27 machine recount complete (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.miamidade.gov/global/release.page?Mduid_release=rel1794352779560131"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Miami-Dade FL CD-27 recount: suit seeks supervisor's recusal (ei-2026-10-380)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-380 held at 2026-11-09 midday ingest for MISSING_LEAF; added 2026-11-09 12:32 PM ET after Mark approved a new conflict-of-interest canvassing/recount-board leaf (t617u). Leaf L20261109-123201-01 under Certification. Quote attributed to Miami Herald election-night interview (Herald is the primary interview source; other outlets quote the Herald). Family relationship undisputed in Salazar filing per EMon/coverage. Judge denied removal Nov. 9; bias remains contested. Research-queue cross-check at add time: no queue item matches this Miami-Dade CD-27 Garcia conflict/recusal suit. Keyword scan for Garcia/Rodriguez/CD-27/conflict-of-interest/recusal/canvassing-board-conflict returned none; Miami-Dade+recount/canvass also none. Scanned 93 queue items. This card does not corroborate any waiting queue lead. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Archives: Democracy Docket, NBC News, CBS Miami, Key Biscayne Independent, NBC 6, WSVN; Miami Herald and Florida Politics blocked or timed out for local capture. Refreshed 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-380 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "ms-2026-11-05-hyde-smith-nrsc-demand-82-counties-preserve-affidavit-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-08", "uid": "C20261106-121456-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-08", "old_ids": ["ms-2026-11-05-hyde-smith-nrsc-demand-82-counties-preserve-affidavit-ballots"], "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-05", "state": "MS", "description": "On Nov. 5, 2026, counsel for Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith and her campaign (via a letter also reported as an NRSC demand) wrote all 82 Mississippi county election commissioners and circuit clerks demanding immediate separation, secure custody, and preservation of all affidavit ballots from the Nov. 3 general election, kept apart from regular and absentee ballots through canvass and certification. Affidavit ballots are Mississippi's provisional ballots. The letter demands documentation of each ballot's acceptance, rejection, or unresolved status and retention of associated materials (envelopes, receipt books, pollbooks, SEMS entries, tabulator media, and custody records), citing Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-573 and § 23-15-911 and the federal 22-month record-retention rule (52 U.S.C. § 20701). It says implementation must not delay lawful tabulation or compromise ballot secrecy, and asks for confirmation by 5 p.m. Central on Nov. 5. Just the News and The Center Square reported the request as the race remained too close to call, with Democrat Scott Colom leading by roughly 2,000 votes at about 96% counted; Secretary of State Michael Watson said counties have until Nov. 13 to submit certified results and that about 3,600 outstanding mail ballots postmarked by Election Day could still arrive within five days. WLBT reported Colom's campaign called the demand a \"desperate stunt,\" and quoted Hyde-Smith's team saying thousands of votes remained to be counted. The Center Square noted Mississippi is among states without a recount mechanism for congressional races and that candidates can still challenge whether certain ballots may be included; no court order or statewide compliance decision was reported in the sources read. Nov. 5–6 update: Democracy Docket reported that Colom's counsel (Elias Law Group, also counsel to the DSCC) wrote election officials that the Republican separation demands \"have no basis in Mississippi law\" and would require officials to \"violate Mississippi voters' rights,\" and that officials should continue ordinary lawful procedures. The same report put outstanding ballots at approximately 17,000 affidavit (provisional) ballots and about 3,000 remaining mail ballots, many concentrated in Hinds County, and cited a Mississippi Free Press analysis that Lafayette County affidavit ballots favored Colom 69% to 29%. No court order changing county canvass procedures was reported as of this update. Status Confirmed by the Nov. 5 Lex Politica / NRSC demand letter to all 82 counties and multi-outlet coverage (Just the News, The Center Square, WLBT, Democracy Docket). Colom counsel (Elias Law Group) wrote that the separation demands have no basis in Mississippi law. No court order changing canvass procedures was reported. Catalog point: after a close U.S. Senate race, campaign counsel demanded statewide segregation and preservation of every affidavit (provisional) ballot through certification. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): Secretary of State Michael Watson said 14,239 affidavit ballots had been processed statewide with about 77% accepted, and 2,732 mailed absentee ballots remained outstanding (Mississippi Today). Hinds County Board of Supervisors attorney Tony Gaylor said the county expected to finish counting most affidavit ballots by the end of Nov. 9 but would not upload results until Nov. 11, after the county Resolution Board reviews accepted affidavits. The ID cure deadline is 5 p.m. Nov. 10 and counties must certify by Nov. 13; WAPT reported both campaigns had monitors at the Hinds count. Update (Nov. 10 to 11, 2026): WLBT reported that 76% of affidavit ballots were accepted and 24% rejected statewide; in Hinds County, 212 ballots cast by Jackson State University students were rejected (188 not registered, 18 wrong precinct, six registered in another county). On Nov. 11, CNN reporter Annie Grayer and WAPT reporter Ross Adams posted that the Hinds County Election Commission announced 817 affidavit ballots accepted and 1,609 rejected of 2,426; reasons for the Hinds rejections were not given in those posts, and an official breakdown was not yet published. Update (Nov. 11, 2026, morning): At the Hinds County press conference, District 1 Election Commissioner Kidada Brown said she was surprised by the number of rejections, that many voters had voted in the wrong precinct (which Mississippi does not count or allow to be cured), and that some affidavit voters, particularly at Jackson State University and Tougaloo College, were found not to be registered, possibly after attending registration drives; the 817 accepted ballots had not yet been counted, and counties must upload certified results by Friday, Nov. 13 (Democracy Docket). The final Hinds count was not yet reported at this sweep. Update (Nov. 11, 2026, final Hinds count): Mississippi Today and the Mississippi Free Press reported that Hinds County finished processing affidavit ballots on Nov. 11: of 2,426 cast, 817 were accepted and 1,609 rejected (about 66%), and 67 outstanding mail ballots were also counted. A Hinds County election commissioner told the Mississippi Free Press she believed many District 5 rejections (including Jackson State University) involved registration-drive applications not submitted to the circuit clerk by the deadline. The county's final tally gave Scott Colom 63,302 votes to Cindy Hyde-Smith's 14,925; the Associated Press called the Senate race for Colom hours later on unofficial results, and Hinds commissioners planned to certify Nov. 12 (counties must certify by Nov. 13). No source reports that the affidavit ballots at issue were mishandled. Update (Nov. 13, 2026, final): Secretary of State Michael Watson announced that official results from all 82 counties are in; 21,344 affidavit ballots were processed statewide and about 73% were accepted. Results that night showed Scott Colom with 479,404 votes (49.3%) and Cindy Hyde-Smith with 471,817 (48.6%), a 7,587-vote margin (WLBT). No court challenge to the affidavit-ballot decisions had been reported.", "sources": [{"title": "NRSC / Lex Politica (Hyde-Smith counsel) — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.nrsc.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/261105-Demand-re-Preservation-of-Affidavit-Ballots.pdf"}, {"title": "Just the News — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/national-republican-senatorial-committee-asks-mississippi-preserve"}, {"title": "The Center Square via Just the News — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/nation/states/center-square/mississippi-senate-race-could-head-court"}, {"title": "WLBT — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2026/11/05/representatives-hyde-smiths-campaign-send-letter-counties-demanding-preservation-all-affidavit-ballots/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/colom-campaign-says-gop-seeks-to-violate-mississippi-voters-rights-as-legal-battle-ignites/"}, {"title": "NRSC press release — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.nrsc.org/press-releases/nrsc-demands-mississippi-affidavit-ballots-are-separated-and-preserved-2026-11-05/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Today — Hinds County affidavit count in Colom/Hyde-Smith Senate race (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://mississippitoday.org/2026/11/09/hinds-county-mississippi-senate-colom-hyde-smith/"}, {"title": "WLBT — 24% of affidavit ballots rejected statewide, including some in Hinds County (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2026/11/11/24-affidavit-ballots-were-rejected-statewide-including-some-hinds-county/"}, {"title": "X post by @AnnieGrayerCNN — Hinds County affidavit numbers (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/AnnieGrayerCNN/status/2120544439831789568"}, {"title": "X post by @radamsWAPT — Hinds County rejected 1,609, accepted 817 (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/radamsWAPT/status/2120546069457322377"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Mississippi's key Democratic stronghold rejected most affidavit ballots (Jacob Knutson, Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/mississippis-key-democratic-stronghold-rejected-most-affidavit-ballots/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/democracydocket-hinds-rejected-most-affidavits-2026-11-11.html"}, {"title": "Mississippi Today — Colom lead increases as Hinds County finalizes count (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://mississippitoday.org/2026/11/11/colom-lead-increases-in-mississippi-senate-race-as-hinds-county-finalizes-count/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Free Press — Hinds County accepts 817 affidavit ballots, rejects 1,609 (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.mississippifreepress.org/hinds-county-accepts-817-affidavit-ballots-rejects-1609/"}, {"title": "WLBT — Mississippi Secretary of State releases final election numbers (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2026/11/14/ms-secretary-state-releases-final-election-numbers/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (ei-2026-10-324)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-324 update). EMon ei-2026-10-324 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET (2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-324 Nov. 9 update; zero X API. Refreshed 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-324 update; zero X API. Refreshed 12:30 PM ET 2026-11-11 (open-web fortify sweep); zero X API. Refreshed 2026-11-12 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-12 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-324 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "or-lane-2026-11-04-ballot-sorter-inkjet-clog-paused-processing-hours", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-05", "uid": "C20261106-121456-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-05", "old_ids": ["or-lane-2026-11-04-ballot-sorter-inkjet-clog-paused-processing-hours"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-04", "state": "OR", "description": "Lane County Elections said ballot-sorting equipment at the Elections Office stopped working on Nov. 4, 2026, because of a clog in an inkjet line that prints the date and time a ballot is sorted onto return envelopes, pausing processing for several hours and delaying the next results drop. County Clerk Tommy Gong said the older sorting equipment may have contributed and that counting machines were unaffected. To resume, the office suspended printed time/date stamps and relied on each envelope's unique barcode, which the sorter still logs electronically. Processing resumed Nov. 5 with updated results expected by 5 p.m.; official certification remains Nov. 25. Covered by the county's own press releases, Lookout Eugene-Springfield, and KEZI. Status Confirmed by Lane County Elections press releases and County Clerk Tommy Gong, reported by Lookout Eugene-Springfield; counting machines were unaffected and processing resumed Nov. 5 using envelope barcodes. Catalog point: a clogged inkjet line on the ballot sorter paused central processing for hours even though the ballots themselves were intact.", "sources": [{"title": "Lane County (official) — Lane County OR ballot-sorter inkjet clog delays count (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.lanecountyor.gov/news/what_s_new/PR_110526_ResultsDelayUpdate"}, {"title": "Lane County (official) — Lane County OR ballot-sorter inkjet clog delays count (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.lanecountyor.gov/news/what_s_new/PR_110426_ResultsDelayed"}, {"title": "Lookout Eugene-Springfield — Lane County OR ballot-sorter inkjet clog delays count (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://lookouteugene-springfield.com/story/government-politics/2026/11/05/lane-county-resumes-ballot-processing-after-equipment-breakdown/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lane County OR ballot-sorter inkjet clog delays count (ei-2026-10-321)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-321 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-delaware-2026-11-04-chester-voting-machine-warehouse-white-powder-breath-mint", "permanent_id": "C20261105-181625-03", "uid": "C20261105-181625-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-181625-03", "old_ids": ["pa-delaware-2026-11-04-chester-voting-machine-warehouse-white-powder-breath-mint"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-04", "state": "PA", "description": "On Wednesday morning, Nov. 4, 2026, Delaware County election staff found a packet containing a white granulated substance on the floor of the county Voting Machine Warehouse at 403 E. 24th Street in Chester, which stores voting machines, according to the Delaware County Daily Times. Staff bagged the packet and called 911. Chester Fire Department responded with breathing apparatus and two chemical analysis kits, which came back negative for hazardous chemicals; further investigation identified the material as a crushed breath mint. Delaware County Communications Director Mike Connolly said the incident was resolved quickly and the substance was confirmed non-dangerous. The Times noted election officials had been warned about possible chemical disruption attempts, and that the Chester County government center had a separate powder incident the prior week. Distinct from the mid-October nationwide powder letters to secretary-of-state offices and from the Nov. 2 Jefferson County, CO, ballot-envelope substance. No source reported damage to voting machines, ballots or staff, or any delay in vote counting. Status Confirmed by Delaware County Communications Director Mike Connolly and the Chester Fire Department hazmat response, reported by the Delaware County Daily Times; the substance was identified as a crushed breath mint. Catalog point: a white-powder packet found on the floor of the county voting-machine warehouse triggered a hazmat response and was identified as non-dangerous with no reported damage to machines, ballots or staff.", "sources": [{"title": "Delaware County Daily Times — Delco warehouse powder was breath mint (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.delcotimes.com/2026/11/05/white-powdery-substance-draws-attention-of-delaware-county-election-officials/"}, {"title": "X (@hoopes_leah) — Delco warehouse powder was breath mint (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://x.com/hoopes_leah/status/2118472732182474808"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Delco warehouse powder was breath mint (ei-2026-10-315)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-315 (added 2026-11-05 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wa-pacific-2026-11-04-clearballot-uncertified-design-server-emergency-la-test", "permanent_id": "C20261105-181625-01", "uid": "C20261105-181625-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-181625-01", "old_ids": ["wa-pacific-2026-11-04-clearballot-uncertified-design-server-emergency-la-test"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-04", "state": "WA", "description": "On Nov. 4, 2026, Pacific County Auditor Nicole Deskins issued a Public Notice stating that late in October the county's state-certified count system \"met its life expectancy and was no longer functioning,\" and that vendor ClearBallot restored it \"through a different design server.\" Because that server \"was not tested and certified by the state,\" the county scheduled an emergency Logic & Accuracy Test with the Washington Secretary of State's Office for Thursday, Nov. 5, 2026, at 11 A.M. in the Election Room at 300 Memorial Drive, South Bend. Deskins wrote that \"this lapse in procedure was caught by the Secretary of State's Office,\" which had been present in the auditor's office for the prior three days. She said election-night results posted at 8 P.M. on Tuesday, Nov. 3, \"are valid and will remain a part of the official election results upon certification,\" and that updated results would be released by Friday, Nov. 6, at 5 P.M. if the test passed. A matching Party Chair notice invited observers to the emergency test. The county elections page links both PDFs. The county's Enhanced Voting results page for the Nov. 3 general election still showed a last update of Wednesday, Nov. 4, at 7:27 P.M., with the next update expected Friday, Nov. 6, which matches the notice's results-delay timeline. As of filing, no public source found has reported the outcome of the Nov. 5 11 A.M. emergency L&A test. The X post that circulated the notice (@ForTheGood / EricaPNW) asked whether any ballots had already been processed before the emergency testing and compared the SOS response with \"when King Co did it a few years ago\"; those questions are the poster's commentary and are not confirmed by the county notice. The King County comparison appears to refer to 2023 allegations that King County replaced a tabulation server mid-primary (widely reported by WA GOP and others); that earlier case is not independently re-investigated here and is not treated as proven equivalence. Status Confirmed by Pacific County Auditor Nicole Deskins's Public Notice and Party Chair notice, linked from the county elections page; the Washington Secretary of State's Office flagged the uncertified restore and was present for the emergency Logic & Accuracy Test. Catalog point: after the certified count system failed, the vendor restored it on a different design server that the state had not tested or certified, and election-night results stayed posted while an emergency L&A was run afterward. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): the county passed the emergency Logic and Accuracy Test on Nov. 5 with observers present and received state certification, then decided to rescan every ballot scanned before that test, including more than 9,900 ballots in the first Election Day results, on Nov. 9 with observers invited (Chinook Observer, Nov. 8).", "sources": [{"title": "Pacific County Auditor's Office (Public Notice PDF) — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://co.pacific.wa.us/auditor/11-4-2026-Public-Notice-Election-Results-Emergency-LA-Test.pdf"}, {"title": "Pacific County Elections (Party Chair notice PDF) — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://co.pacific.wa.us/auditor/11-4-2026-Party-Chair-Notice-Emergency-LA-Test-Notice.pdf"}, {"title": "Pacific County Auditor — Election Information — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://co.pacific.wa.us/auditor/elections.htm"}, {"title": "Pacific County Enhanced Voting results (Nov. 3, 2026 General) — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://app.enhancedvoting.com/results/public/pacific-county-wa/elections/20261103"}, {"title": "@ForTheGood / EricaPNW (X), post with Public Notice image — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://x.com/ForTheGood/status/2118200215782203548"}, {"title": "Chinook Observer — Election struggles continue for auditor's office (Nov. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://chinookobserver.com/2026/11/08/election-struggles-continue-for-auditors-office/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pacific County WA ClearBallot uncertified server / emergency L&A (ei-2026-10-312)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-312 (added 2026-11-05 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET (2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon updates; zero X API.", "vendor": ["Clear Ballot"]}
{"id": "al-madison-2026-11-03-tva-substation-outage-four-voting-locations-battery-backup", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-11", "uid": "C20261104-121522-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-11", "old_ids": ["al-madison-2026-11-03-tva-substation-outage-four-voting-locations-battery-backup"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "AL", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a Huntsville Utilities outage that left about 13,000 customers without power in northwest Madison County, Alabama, affected four voting locations, according to AL.com. Huntsville Utilities said the loss of power came from the Tennessee Valley Authority feed at the Charity Lane Substation. Probate Judge Frank Barger said voting machines kept running on battery backup and there was no pause in voting, although the buildings had no lights or other power. Power was later restored to all customers, and Barger said no voter went without being processed and casting a ballot during the outage. Status Confirmed by Probate Judge Frank Barger and Huntsville Utilities, reported by AL.com. Catalog point: a utility outage affecting about 13,000 customers reached four voting sites, which kept voting on battery backup.", "sources": [{"title": "AL.com — Madison Co. AL voting sites power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.al.com/news/2026/11/13000-without-power-in-madison-county-voting-machines-running-on-battery-backup.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Madison Co. AL voting sites power outage (ei-2026-10-287)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-287 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "al-mobile-2026-11-03-st-pius-precinct-47-polling-place-power-outage-battery-generator", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-02", "uid": "C20261109-180918-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-02", "old_ids": ["al-mobile-2026-11-03-st-pius-precinct-47-polling-place-power-outage-battery-generator"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "AL", "description": "On Election Day morning, Nov. 3, 2026, Mobile County reported a power outage on Sage Avenue that affected the St. Pius Catholic Church Family Life Center, where Precinct 47 votes. A Mobile County news release said the outage should not impact voting because the machines have backup batteries and a generator was en route, and that Alabama Power estimated restoration by 11 a.m. WKRG reported the same county release and said a generator was being used. Probate Judge Mark Erwin said on the Mobile Mornings radio show that the poll opened at 7 a.m. on battery power, that the county was deploying generator backup, and that voting was not interrupted. 1819 News separately reported the Sage Avenue / St. Pius outage and the planned generator. Status Confirmed by a Mobile County news release and Probate Judge Mark Erwin, reported by WKRG and 1819 News; officials say voting was not interrupted. Catalog point: the polling place opened on battery power and waited for a generator while utility power was out.", "sources": [{"title": "Mobile County (via EIN Presswire) — Mobile Co. AL St. Pius polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.einpresswire.com/article/954219462/power-outage-on-sage-ave-not-anticipated-to-impact-today-s-voting-at-st-pius"}, {"title": "WKRG (via Yahoo News) — Mobile Co. AL St. Pius polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/power-mobile-county-polling-place-141917767.html"}, {"title": "1819 News — Mobile Co. AL St. Pius polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://1819news.com/news/item/baldwin-mobile-county-voting-precincts-welcome-voters-with-few-issues"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Mobile Co. AL St. Pius polling place outage (ei-2026-10-382)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-382 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-11-03-chandler-gilbert-cc-printer-fuse-49-minute-waits", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-15", "uid": "C20261106-121456-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-15", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-11-03-chandler-gilbert-cc-printer-fuse-49-minute-waits"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Nov. 3, 2026, Election Day voters at the Chandler-Gilbert Community College vote center in Maricopa County faced long lines amid technical issues. About 10:30 a.m., the Maricopa County Elections Department reported high volume there and advised voters to use Tumbleweed Recreation Center in Chandler or an LDS church on Catalina Street in Gilbert. An on-site election worker told KTAR a fuse went out on a printer and needed replacement; some voters also reported ink shortages and ballots not reading properly. As of noon, the county's interactive vote center map showed a 49-minute wait and more than 130 voters in line. Assistant County Manager Zach Shira said voters could still be served and drop off ballots, with triage teams ready. Distinct from ei-2026-10-041 (Oct. 16 overnight opened paper trays at the same site). Status Confirmed by Maricopa County Elections' public redirect advisories and an on-site election worker's report to KTAR of a printer fuse outage; the county map showed about a 49-minute wait with more than 130 voters in line around noon. Catalog point: a ballot-printer fuse outage at a high-volume vote center was enough to create nearly hour-long waits and force redirects to other sites.", "sources": [{"title": "KTAR News — Maricopa Chandler-Gilbert Election Day printer delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://ktar.com/arizona-politics-news/election/voters-delays-east-valley-electiond-day"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa Chandler-Gilbert Election Day printer delays (ei-2026-10-331)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-331 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-11-03-laveen-elementary-district-office-vote-center-pre-dawn-power-outage", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-01", "uid": "C20261109-180918-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-01", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-11-03-laveen-elementary-district-office-vote-center-pre-dawn-power-outage"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Maricopa County Elections posted at 5:52 a.m. Arizona time that the vote center at the Laveen Elementary School District Office was temporarily closed because of a power outage and directed voters to Locations.Maricopa.Vote. At 6:00 a.m. Arizona time the county posted that the Laveen vote center was open and ready to serve voters. A later county reply said the vote center successfully opened at 6 a.m., and another county post said all 254 Maricopa County vote centers opened on time. Arizona's Family likewise reported that power was restored in time for the 6 a.m. opening and that all 254 centers opened on time. Maricopa County Elections spokesperson Adrian Borunda told AFP that claims the outage was election fraud were false and that vote centers opened on time. No official report says voters were turned away after polls opened. Status Confirmed by Maricopa County Elections' own posts and spokesperson Adrian Borunda (to AFP), with Arizona's Family reporting the same; the county says the site opened on time. Catalog point: a vote center lost power minutes before opening and the county announced it closed; power came back in time, but every outage is another moment when equipment and custody depend on conditions outside anyone's control.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County Elections (X) — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117600851745263809"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Elections (X) — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117602917670637717"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Elections (X) — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117618480942100779"}, {"title": "Arizona's Family (AZFamily) — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/11/03/its-election-day-heres-what-arizona-voters-should-know-polls-open/"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.D6FT6KE"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Laveen AZ vote center pre-dawn outage (ei-2026-10-381)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-381 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-shasta-2026-11-03-election-night-delays-overflowing-drop-boxes-staffing-mislabeled-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-03", "uid": "C20261106-121456-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-03", "old_ids": ["ca-shasta-2026-11-03-election-night-delays-overflowing-drop-boxes-staffing-mislabeled-ballots"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "CA", "description": "Local and statewide outlets reported that Shasta County was California's outlier on Election Night Nov. 3–4, 2026, with delayed results and overnight precinct counting. Shasta Scout reported overflowing drop boxes (especially Redding City Hall, emptied as often as every half hour), Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis leaving the Market Street elections office to collect drop-box ballots instead of prepping tabulation, a missed computer hard-drive backup before vote releases, ballots mislabeled in the computer system that forced restarts and relabeling, and poll-closer sorting that left many precinct ballots unready for processing. First results did not appear until about 10 p.m.; precinct processing began after midnight and finished around 7:30–8 a.m. Nov. 4. KRCR reported seven employees out sick and a batch of about 50 ballots placed in the wrong category. CalMatters summarized overflowing boxes, staffing shortages, wrong bins, computer hiccups and relocated polling-place signs. Curtis told Shasta Scout he did not see where he could have done better and, asked what he would say to concerned voters, replied \"Who cares? It's my last election anyway.\" Joanna Francescut is scheduled to take over in January. Distinct from the Oct. 2026 Millville wrong-ballot-style mapping error. Status Confirmed by Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis and multi-outlet reporting from Shasta Scout, KRCR and CalMatters; Shasta was California's Election Night outlier with delayed results and overnight precinct counting. Catalog point: overflowing drop boxes, short staffing, a missed backup and mislabeled ballots combined to push first results to about 10 p.m. and finish precinct processing near dawn.", "sources": [{"title": "Shasta Scout — Shasta CA Election Night count delays (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://shastascout.org/who-cares-its-my-last-election-anyway-shasta-rov-responds-to-election-mistakes/"}, {"title": "Shasta Scout — Shasta CA Election Night count delays (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://shastascout.org/shasta-is-the-only-california-county-still-struggling-to-finish-counting-precinct-ballots/"}, {"title": "CalMatters — Shasta CA Election Night count delays (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/11/shasta-county-election-problems/"}, {"title": "KRCR — Shasta CA Election Night count delays (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://krcrtv.com/news/local/clint-curtis-reflects-on-a-long-election-night-in-shasta-county"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Shasta CA Election Night count delays (ei-2026-10-318)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-318 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-shasta-2026-11-03-redding-city-clerk-race-left-off-november-ballot-special-election", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-29", "uid": "C20261106-121456-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-29", "old_ids": ["ca-shasta-2026-11-03-redding-city-clerk-race-left-off-november-ballot-special-election"], "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "CA", "description": "Shasta County Elections Office left the uncontested Redding City Clerk race (incumbent Sharlene Tipton) off the Nov. 3, 2026 general election ballot. Redding City Council approved a special election for March 2, 2027 so voters can fill the seat; city attorneys cited California Elections Code requiring the race to appear even when uncontested. Mayor Mike Littau said the city contracts with the county to run municipal elections and did not receive a draft ballot to review before the omission. Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis (leaving office in January after losing to Joanna Francescut) disputed fault and called a special election a costly \"vanity\" race; Record Searchlight reported Nov. 5 that Curtis said he is seriously considering running against Tipton in March. Cost responsibility for the special election (estimated $100,000-plus) remains unresolved between city and county. Distinct from Shasta Election Night count delays and the Oct. Millville wrong-ballot mapping error. Status Confirmed by Redding City Council action and multi-outlet reporting (KRCR, Record Searchlight); Shasta County Elections left the uncontested Redding City Clerk race off the Nov. 3 ballot, forcing a March 2, 2027 special election. Mayor Mike Littau said the city never received a draft ballot to review. Catalog point: omitting even an uncontested municipal race from the ballot forces a costly special election and shows how ballot-content errors escape pre-election review.", "sources": [{"title": "KRCR News Channel 7 — Redding CA city clerk race left off Nov ballot (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://krcrtv.com/news/local/redding-city-council-approves-special-election-to-fill-city-clerk-seat-left-off-ballot"}, {"title": "KRCR News Channel 7 — Redding CA city clerk race left off Nov ballot (2026-10-26)", "url": "https://krcrtv.com/news/local/redding-may-need-costly-special-election-after-city-clerk-race-left-off-ballot"}, {"title": "KRCR News Channel 7 — Redding CA city clerk race left off Nov ballot (2026-10-27)", "url": "https://krcrtv.com/news/local/redding-mayor-says-shasta-county-weighing-special-election-after-clerk-race-omitted"}, {"title": "Redding Record Searchlight — Redding CA city clerk race left off Nov ballot (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.redding.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/05/clint-curtis-may-run-for-redding-clerk-in-special-election/92629061007/"}, {"title": "X post by @KRCR7 (2026-10-27T21:19:08Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KRCR7/status/2115191592088662193"}, {"title": "X post by @KRCR7 (2026-10-29T18:40:14Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KRCR7/status/2115876377396142366"}, {"title": "X post by @RS_JSkropanic (2026-11-05T23:39:06Z)", "url": "https://x.com/RS_JSkropanic/status/2118488306451349891"}, {"title": "X post by @j3669 (2026-11-06T11:58:16Z)", "url": "https://x.com/j3669/status/2118674324156543453"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Redding CA city clerk race left off Nov ballot (ei-2026-10-346)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-346 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ct-mansfield-2026-11-03-same-day-registration-ballot-shortage-absentee-ballots-hand-count", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-04", "uid": "C20261109-121807-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-04", "old_ids": ["ct-mansfield-2026-11-03-same-day-registration-ballot-shortage-absentee-ballots-hand-count"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "CT", "description": "Connecticut Assistant Director of Elections Anna Posniak said after polls closed on Nov. 3, 2026, that several communities ran low on same-day registration (SDR) ballots, particularly Mansfield, home of the University of Connecticut. According to Posniak, Mansfield used its absentee ballots in place of SDR ballots, and those ballots must be hand-counted because the tabulators cannot read them. Secretary of the State Stephanie Thomas described the election overall as \"very smooth.\" The number of SDR voters affected and the hand-count result have not been reported. Reported by CT Examiner (Dave Altimari, Nov. 3). A Nov. 7 social-media roundup also listed Mansfield/UConn same-day registration pressure among Connecticut irregularities. Status Confirmed by Connecticut Assistant Director of Elections Anna Posniak as reported by CT Examiner (Nov. 3). The number of affected same-day-registration voters and the hand-count result have not been reported. Catalog point: same-day-registration ballots ran short in the UConn college town, and absentee ballots were substituted that the tabulators cannot read, so those ballots had to be hand-counted.", "sources": [{"title": "CT Examiner — Mansfield CT same-day registration ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://ctexaminer.com/2026/11/03/two-voters-try-to-vote-twice-ballots-run-low-in-wallingford-mansfield/"}, {"title": "X post by @1exposethemedia (2026-11-07)", "url": "https://x.com/1exposethemedia/status/2119030086292611160"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Mansfield CT same-day registration ballot shortage (ei-2026-10-355)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-355 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ct-wallingford-2026-11-03-ballot-shortage-100-contingency-ballots-tabulator-fed-recount", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-25", "uid": "C20261106-121456-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-25", "old_ids": ["ct-wallingford-2026-11-03-ballot-shortage-100-contingency-ballots-tabulator-fed-recount"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "CT", "description": "Wallingford Registrar of Voters Joan Ives-Parisi said that on Nov. 3, 2026, all but one of the town's polling locations ran out of preprinted Election Day ballots after higher-than-expected gubernatorial turnout. Poll workers switched to printed contingency ballots that the Connecticut Secretary of the State's office advised must be segregated and hand-counted (leftover early-voting ballots could not be scanned this year because each ballot type was uniquely coded). At one polling location, about 100 of those contingency ballots were mistakenly fed into a tabulator. Secretary of the State Stephanie Thomas's office directed a discrepancy recount under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-311. Wallingford town notice (Nov. 5, 2026): discretionary audit and recount of the 34th Senatorial District set for Friday, Nov. 6, 2026, at 9 a.m. in the Robert F. Parisi Council Chambers, Town Hall, 45 S Main Street; observers welcome. NBC Connecticut (Nov. 6): the recount got underway Friday morning and is expected to run into at least the afternoon; the tabulator manufacturer told the town the ~100 contingency ballots were most likely counted, and officials are verifying. No final Wallingford recount results were reported as of about 12:05 p.m. ET Nov. 6. FOX61: the 34th State Senate race is razor-thin, with Democrat Brandi Mandato ahead of Republican incumbent Paul Cicarella by 25 votes on a preliminary count of nearly 39,000 District 34 ballots; Wallingford's Friday recount is part of a broader District 34 recount also covering North Haven and parts of East Haven, North Branford, and Durham, with a Tuesday deadline. Both candidates told FOX61 they trust the hand-count process and will accept the result. Status Confirmed by Wallingford Registrar Joan Ives-Parisi, Secretary of the State Stephanie Thomas's discrepancy-recount directive under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-311, and multi-outlet coverage (Connecticut Public, NBC Connecticut, FOX61, WFSB). About 100 contingency ballots that should have been hand-counted were mistakenly fed into a tabulator; a Friday Nov. 6 recount covering SD-34 was underway with no final tallies as of midday. Catalog point: after a ballot shortage forced contingency stock, feeding those ballots into a tabulator against SOS guidance triggered a state-ordered discrepancy recount.", "sources": [{"title": "Connecticut Public — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.ctpublic.org/news/2026-11-04/wallingford-to-conduct-discrepancy-recount-after-running-out-of-ballots"}, {"title": "NBC Connecticut — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/wallingford-to-recount-ballots-after-election-day-error/3792605/"}, {"title": "Connecticut Secretary of the State — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://portal.ct.gov/sots/press-releases/2026-press-releases/statement-from-secretary-of-the-state-thomas-about-the-need-for-a-discrepancy-recount-in-wallingford"}, {"title": "FOX61 — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.fox61.com/article/news/politics/elections/wallingford-connecticut-recount-every-election-day-ballot-voting-issues-2026/520-52f7e577-054e-4922-b326-5e1f317674c3"}, {"title": "Town of Wallingford — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.wallingfordct.gov/news/2027-election-discretionary-audit-recount-of-34th-senatorial-district/"}, {"title": "NBC Connecticut — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/ballot-recount-underway-in-wallingford-after-election-day-error/3793243/"}, {"title": "FOX61 — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.fox61.com/article/news/politics/elections/ct-state-senate-candidates-have-complete-trust-in-district-34-recount-as-tuesday-deadline-looms/520-0cf464be-2210-4f41-bc14-c85f6449a358"}, {"title": "WFSB — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.wfsb.com/2026/11/06/wallingford-recount-ballots-friday-after-running-out/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Wallingford CT ballot shortage and discrepancy recount (ei-2026-10-341)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-341 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-broward-2026-11-03-ballot-check-in-barcode-glitch-delays-voting-some-voters-left", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-07", "uid": "C20261103-121512-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-07", "old_ids": ["fl-broward-2026-11-03-ballot-check-in-barcode-glitch-delays-voting-some-voters-left"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "FL", "description": "When polls opened at 7 a.m. on Nov. 3, 2026, a new Broward County feature that scans a barcode on the ballot to make sure voters in precincts split by redistricting receive the correct ballot incorrectly flagged some ballots as wrong, preventing voters from checking in. Supervisor of Elections Joe Scott said at a morning news briefing that delays lasted about 20 minutes countywide (WSVN reported 10 to 15 minutes), that the issue was fixed by about 7:20 a.m., and that \"Nobody voted on the wrong ballot.\" Scott said some voters could not wait and left without voting, that it is not clear how many, and urged them to return to their assigned polling place before 7 p.m. NBC News reported that an unknown number of voters were turned away during the glitch. WPLG Local 10 reported technical problems right after 7 a.m. at Sunset Lakes Community Center in Miramar, Coconut Palm Elementary and South Plantation High School, where a voter said poll workers could not log into the system or look up who was registered; Local 10 was told all issues were resolved. Status Confirmed by Broward Supervisor of Elections Joe Scott at a morning briefing, reported by the Miami Herald, WSVN and NBC News. Catalog point: a new check-in feature added for split precincts wrongly flagged correct ballots and stopped check-ins countywide when polls opened; some voters left without voting, and the number is not known.", "sources": [{"title": "Miami Herald — Broward check-in glitch (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article317901350.html"}, {"title": "WSVN 7News — Broward check-in glitch (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wsvn.com/news/politics/south-florida-polls-open-tuesday/"}, {"title": "NBC News live blog — Broward check-in glitch (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/live-blog/midterm-election-results-2026-news-trump-live-updates-rcna605763"}, {"title": "X post by @MJTruthUltra reposting WPLG Local 10 segment (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MJTruthUltra/status/2117648894750539844"}, {"title": "X post by @MJTruthUltra (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MJTruthUltra/status/2117654262234702010"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Broward check-in glitch (ei-2026-10-241)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-03 PM ingest: added WPLG Local 10 named-precinct report from EMon update. EMon ei-2026-10-241 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-broward-2026-11-03-cd26-locklin-vote-total-briefly-jumped-ap-data-entry-error", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-10", "uid": "C20261109-121807-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-10", "old_ids": ["fl-broward-2026-11-03-cd26-locklin-vote-total-briefly-jumped-ap-data-entry-error"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "FL", "description": "In Florida's 26th Congressional District, Democratic candidate Nicole Locklin said a vote total of about 3,000 reported around 11:16 p.m. on election night (Nov. 3, 2026) was later removed without explanation, after some media outlets briefly showed her ahead of Republican Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart; she raised the question with Broward County Supervisor of Elections Joe Scott on Nov. 4, CBS News Miami reported. The Associated Press said \"a data entry error caused an incorrect vote total to briefly appear\" for Locklin and that it quickly identified and corrected the total. Scott said he welcomed the scrutiny and believed his office did everything correctly. On Nov. 6 the Broward canvassing board reviewed about 300 questioned ballots, with problems ranging from signature issues to ballots from voters who died, and accepted about 100; Diaz-Balart led by about 1,700 votes. Locklin said that if officials cannot explain where the 3,000 votes went, \"they owe me a recount,\" and her campaign has consulted an attorney. Officials in Broward and Miami-Dade said too few ballots remain to change the outcome or trigger a recount. The reported error was in the Associated Press's results feed, not in the county's count; no evidence of a counting error by election officials has been reported. Status Confirmed by the Associated Press's statement that a data-entry error caused an incorrect vote total to briefly appear, reported by CBS News Miami. Catalog point: a roughly 3,000-vote total appeared on Election Night and then vanished; the public learned the cause only after a candidate asked publicly, which shows how little anyone outside can verify about the totals displayed. Update (Nov. 12–14, 2026): WLRN reported that Locklin filed a civil suit on Nov. 12 under Florida's public records law against Miami-Dade Supervisor of Elections Alina García, seeking timestamped results, vote-counting logs and records of data the county sent to the state, with an immediate hearing. The AP called the race for Díaz-Balart on Nov. 9; Division of Elections figures cited by WLRN show 114,578 (49.86%) to 112,874 (49.12%), a 1,704-vote margin outside Florida's 0.5% automatic recount threshold. The suit seeks records and does not establish a counting error; no ruling has been reported.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News Miami — Broward FL CD-26 brief vote-total jump (AP data-entry error) (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/florida-district-26-wrong-vote-total-nicole-locklin/"}, {"title": "CBS News Miami — Broward FL CD-26 brief vote-total jump (AP data-entry error) (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/diaz-balart-locklin-district-26-broward-canvassing-board-ballots-data-entry-error/"}, {"title": "WLRN — Locklin files suit against Miami-Dade elections chief seeking Nov. 3 vote records (2026-11-14)", "url": "https://www.wlrn.org/government-politics/2026-11-14/democrat-nicole-locklin-files-suit-against-miami-dade-elections-chief-seeks-nov-3-vote-records"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Broward FL CD-26 brief vote-total jump (AP data-entry error) (ei-2026-10-377)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-377 update). EMon ei-2026-10-377 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-duval-2026-11-03-regency-square-library-eleven22-arlington-pre-opening-power-outage-generators", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-03", "uid": "C20261109-180918-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-03", "old_ids": ["fl-duval-2026-11-03-regency-square-library-eleven22-arlington-pre-opening-power-outage-generators"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "FL", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Duval County Supervisor of Elections Jerry Holland told Action News Jax that the Regency Square Branch Library and The Church of Eleven22 Arlington campus lost power before polls opened because of a wider outage in Jacksonville's Regency area that affected more than 5,000 customers. First Coast News reported the outage affected as many as 5,437 customers and that both precincts remained open on generator power until electricity was restored. Holland said both locations opened on time without any issues and that power was later restored. Status Confirmed by Duval County Supervisor of Elections Jerry Holland, reported by Action News Jax and First Coast News; both sites opened on time. Catalog point: two polling places lost power before opening in a neighborhood outage affecting more than 5,000 customers and ran on generators.", "sources": [{"title": "Action News Jax — Duval FL Regency-area polling place outages (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/duval-supervisor-elections-speaks-election-day-issues-polling-locations/WJZUVOQZL5FBLER4C4KW77YSNQ/"}, {"title": "First Coast News — Duval FL Regency-area polling place outages (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/local/duval-county-voting-locations-open-generator-power/77-aab8d7fa-b991-4b77-b1f9-be2a49cbdc13"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Duval FL Regency-area polling place outages (ei-2026-10-383)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-383 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-dougherty-2026-11-03-albany-sherwood-elementary-ballot-scanner-down-emergency-bin", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-20", "uid": "C20261106-121456-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-20", "old_ids": ["ga-dougherty-2026-11-03-albany-sherwood-elementary-ballot-scanner-down-emergency-bin"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "Dougherty County elections supervisor Ginger Nickerson told WALB that a ballot scanner at the Sherwood Elementary School voting location in Albany malfunctioned sometime the morning of Nov. 3, 2026. Poll workers directed voters to place ballots in an emergency backup bin so voting could continue without interruption. The precinct manager notified county election officials; the Georgia Secretary of State's Office was also notified, and an election technician repaired the equipment. Nickerson encouraged voters who used the emergency bin to return at 7 p.m. to watch those ballots be scanned. Status Confirmed by Dougherty County elections supervisor Ginger Nickerson to WALB; the Sherwood Elementary scanner went down Tuesday morning, voters used the emergency bin, the Secretary of State's Office was notified, and a technician repaired the equipment. Catalog point: when the scanner failed, the emergency bin kept voting open and those ballots were scanned later under observation.", "sources": [{"title": "WALB — Dougherty County GA Albany Sherwood Elementary scanner down (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.walb.com/2026/11/03/ballot-scanner-down-an-albany-voting-location/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dougherty County GA Albany Sherwood Elementary scanner down (ei-2026-10-336)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-336 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2026-11-03-false-polling-place-change-text-messages", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-15", "uid": "C20261104-121522-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-15", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2026-11-03-false-polling-place-change-text-messages"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, some Fulton County, Georgia, voters reported receiving text messages saying their polling place had changed. Fulton County said in a post on X that it did not send the messages and directed voters to verify their polling place on the Georgia My Voter Page or by calling 404-612-7020. Nextgov/FCW, USA Today and the Associated Press reported the texts. It is not known who sent the messages, how many voters received them, or whether any voter went to the wrong location as a result. A Nov. 3 X post by @_Patriot1776Q_ with a 40-state \"Election Day Issues\" map also lists fake texts to voters in Georgia, Tennessee, Nebraska and New Jersey; the Tennessee, Nebraska and New Jersey items in that post are unconfirmed, and the post cites no sources. Status Confirmed by Fulton County, which said it did not send the texts, as reported by Nextgov/FCW, USA Today and the Associated Press. The sender and the number of recipients are unknown. Catalog point: false polling-place information sent on Election Day can send voters to the wrong location.", "sources": [{"title": "Nextgov/FCW — Fulton County GA: false polling-place-change texts (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2026/11/election-security-center-reports-limited-threats-voting-glitches-fuel-fraud-claims/417013/"}, {"title": "USA Today — Fulton County GA: false polling-place-change texts (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-few-problems-dirty-tricks-or-federal-interventions/92459782007/"}, {"title": "PBS News (AP) — Fulton County GA: false polling-place-change texts (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/false-accusations-and-unverified-claims-quickly-spread-about-election-day-voting"}, {"title": "@_Patriot1776Q_ (X), 40-state roundup map (unsourced) — Fulton County GA: false polling-place-change texts (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2117838767738532147"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fulton County GA: false polling-place-change texts (ei-2026-10-293)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-293 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2026-11-03-two-advance-voting-scanners-failed-1069-ballots-modified-count", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-05", "uid": "C20261103-121512-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-05", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2026-11-03-two-advance-voting-scanners-failed-1069-ballots-modified-count"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "In a Nov. 3, 2026 memo to Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and state voting-systems staff, Fulton County Registration and Elections Director Nadine Williams said two ICP scanners failed during advance voting, so the way their ballots are tabulated must change. At the Hugh C. Conley Recreation Center, a scanner kept showing a paper jam error on Oct. 26 even though no jam was found; it was shut down after 708 ballots had been cast on it. State staff advised moving its memory cards to another ICP scanner on Election Night to close it out; if that fails, the paper ballots will be scanned on a central-count (ICC) scanner. At Mechanicsville Library, on Oct. 21 a voter in a wheelchair accidentally rolled over the scanner's power cable, which shut it down; after restarting it showed an error and would no longer work. 361 ballots had been cast on it. State staff advised that its memory cards should not be uploaded because the data may be corrupted, so all 361 paper ballots will be rescanned on an ICC scanner. Williams is asking the county Board of Registration and Elections to approve the modified process at its 6:30 PM Election Night meeting; work would start about 7 to 7:30 PM after polls close, in view of the public and poll watchers. CBS News Atlanta reported the memo. The memo describes the causes as equipment failure and a voter accident; it does not call them an official error. The board vote had not happened as of this card. Status Confirmed by the Fulton County Registration and Elections Director's Nov. 3 memo to the Secretary of State, reported by CBS News Atlanta. Catalog point: one scanner showed a false paper-jam error and another may hold corrupted data after a power-cable mishap, so 1,069 ballots need a non-standard tabulation path on Election Night. This shows there is no way to guarantee error-free machine operation; the paper ballots are the record that makes a recount possible.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News Atlanta (live updates) — Fulton scanner failures, 1,069 ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/atlanta/live-updates/georgia-midterm-elections-2026/"}, {"title": "@ginamilan_ (X), post with image of the Fulton County memo — Fulton scanner failures, 1,069 ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/ginamilan_/status/2117595646475595793"}, {"title": "Fulton County (BRE meeting calendar) — Fulton scanner failures, 1,069 ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fultoncountyga.gov/Calendar/2026/11/03/BRE-Special-Meeting-and-Election-Night-November-3-2026"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fulton scanner failures, 1,069 ballots (ei-2026-10-238)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-238 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-seminole-2026-11-03-missed-election-day-memory-card-388-ballots-uploaded-late-hd154", "permanent_id": "C20261106-181036-02", "uid": "C20261106-181036-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-181036-02", "old_ids": ["ga-seminole-2026-11-03-missed-election-day-memory-card-388-ballots-uploaded-late-hd154"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "On Nov. 6, 2026, the Georgia Secretary of State's office said a post-election check found approximately 388 more voters recorded as having checked in at Seminole County polling places on Election Day (Nov. 3) than the number of ballots the county had reported as cast. After the SOS notified the Seminole County Board of Elections, county officials discovered a memory card that had not been uploaded to the election management system. Once those votes were uploaded, Republican state Rep. Gerald Greene went from trailing Democrat Harry James by 58 votes to leading by 262 in State House District 154, according to WCTV, CBS News Atlanta, and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution citing the SOS. Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger said his office identified the discrepancy, alerted county officials, and uncovered a failure to properly upload election results, and that the oversight changed who was leading the race; he said the office is investigating how the memory card was overlooked, whether required procedures were followed, and what corrective measures are needed. The county has until Monday to certify results. Update (Nov. 17, 2026): the Georgia Recorder reported that, at the elections superintendent's request, Seminole County completed an additional audit consisting of a hand count of all ballots in the HD-154 race, and elections supervisor Ronald D. Foskey said the hand-counted results matched the numbers the county certified on Nov. 6; six sworn citizens counted, with observers from both campaigns, the Carter Center, the county GOP and the Donalsonville News present. Harry James said he was not conceding yet, citing the Secretary of State's ongoing inquiry. WTXL reported the Secretary of State's office said investigators still had to interview county officials and review records before reporting to the State Election Board, which differs from the Nov. 9 FOX 5 account that the investigation had concluded. Status Confirmed by the Georgia Secretary of State's office and multi-outlet reporting (WCTV, CBS News Atlanta, Atlanta Journal-Constitution); a post-election check found about 388 more Election Day check-ins than ballots previously reported as cast, county officials then found a memory card that had not been uploaded, and once uploaded Republican state Rep. Gerald Greene went from trailing Democrat Harry James by 58 votes to leading by 262 in HD-154 (unofficial pending Monday certification). Secretary Raffensperger said the office is investigating how the card was overlooked. Catalog point: an overlooked memory card kept hundreds of Election Day ballots out of the reported totals until a post-election discrepancy check forced the upload — and flipped who was leading a state House race. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): Seminole County Elections Supervisor Ron Foskey disputed the 'missing memory card' framing, saying all cards were accounted for and the election management system had not completed its final validate-and-publish step for the last precinct's card; he said ballots, scanner tape and card data agreed on 2,911 ballots, and the 'Final and Complete' report added the 388 (The Donalsonville News, Nov. 7). Either way, 388 Election Day ballots were missing from the reported totals until the state flagged the gap. The Secretary of State's investigation remains open. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): FOX 5 Atlanta reported that the Secretary of State's office confirmed its investigation had concluded, finding the memory card holding the roughly 388 votes was overlooked, not missing, and that Seminole County certified its results after the correction, with Republican Gerald Greene ahead of Democrat Harry James in House District 154.", "sources": [{"title": "WCTV — Seminole GA missed Election Day memory card (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.wctv.tv/2026/11/06/memory-card-with-uncounted-ballots-found-seminole-county-georgia-sos-launches-investigation/"}, {"title": "CBS News Atlanta — Seminole GA missed Election Day memory card (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/atlanta/news/georgia-secretary-of-state-investigating-countys-late-upload-of-votes-that-could-flip-house-seat/"}, {"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Seminole GA missed Election Day memory card (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/11/georgia-elections-missing-memory-card/"}, {"title": "X post by @MarkDavisGOP (2026-11-06T22:40:59Z)", "url": "https://x.com/MarkDavisGOP/status/2118836068225032277"}, {"title": "The Donalsonville News — Seminole County election news update (Nov. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.donalsonvillenews.com/2026/11/07/seminole-county-election-news-update/"}, {"title": "The Georgia Sun (Capitol Beat) — Missing memory card changes apparent outcome in state House race (Nov. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://thegeorgiasun.com/government/your-vote/missing-memory-card-changes-apparent-outcome-in-state-house-race/"}, {"title": "FOX 5 Atlanta — How a 388-vote discrepancy changed who won a Georgia House seat (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/how-388-vote-discrepancy-changed-who-won-georgia-house-seat"}, {"title": "Georgia Recorder — Seminole HD-154 hand count and SOS investigation status (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://georgiarecorder.com/2026/11/17/hand-count-in-southwest-georgia-legislative-race-confirms-republican-incumbents-win/"}, {"title": "WTXL — Seminole HD-154 hand count and SOS investigation status (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.wtxl.com/news/local-news/seminole-county-certifies-house-district-154-results-but-georgias-investigation-into-the-reporting-issue-stays-open"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Seminole GA missed Election Day memory card (ei-2026-10-350)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-18 12:10 PM ET (2026-11-18 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-350 update). EMon ei-2026-10-350 (added 2026-11-06 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status investigating). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET (2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon updates; zero X API. Refreshed 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET (2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-350 Nov. 9 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "id-bannock-2026-11-03-ess-tabulator-roller-jams-folded-absentee-delay-to-8am", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-12", "uid": "C20261106-121456-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-12", "old_ids": ["id-bannock-2026-11-03-ess-tabulator-roller-jams-folded-absentee-delay-to-8am"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "ID", "description": "Bannock County, Idaho, Elections Director Julie Hancock told EastIdahoNews.com that Election Night counting after the Nov. 3, 2026, midterms ran until about 8 a.m. Wednesday because of what she called a \"perfect storm\": record-high early/absentee volume statewide, a two-page ballot that roughly doubled sheets to process (about 20,000 Election Day voters counted as about 40,000 ballot sheets in the county), and technical problems feeding ballots into ES&S tabulators. Hancock said tabulator rollers were set too tight and jammed, requiring IT staff to call Election Systems & Software for a fix, and that folded two-page absentee ballots in envelopes did not feed cleanly. Ballots that would not scan went to a bipartisan resolution table in \"stacks and stacks,\" which slowed the night. Hancock emphasized the problem was physical feeding, not how the machines tabulated votes once ballots were accepted, and said staff stayed until the count was finished. The Idaho State Journal also reported machine trouble slowing the Bannock County count for hours amid about 69% turnout. Status Confirmed by Bannock County Elections Director Julie Hancock to EastIdahoNews.com and the Idaho State Journal; ES&S tabulator rollers set too tight jammed, folded two-page absentees would not feed, and counting ran until about 8 a.m. Catalog point: physical feed settings and a two-page folded absentee design stalled tabulation overnight even though accepted ballots tabulated correctly once fed.", "sources": [{"title": "EastIdahoNews.com — Bannock County ID tabulator jams delay Election Night count (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.eastidahonews.com/2026/11/why-did-vote-counting-take-so-long-officials-point-to-a-perfect-storm/"}, {"title": "Idaho State Journal — Bannock County ID tabulator jams delay Election Night count (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/machine-trouble-slows-bannock-county-count-for-hours-as-69-percent-of-voters-turn-out/article_fa1569f5-97cf-4d05-a54a-31f9f6aa73d1.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bannock County ID tabulator jams delay Election Night count (ei-2026-10-328)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-328 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "il-chicago-2026-11-03-uptown-pilsen-holstein-park-polling-places-run-out-of-paper-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-04", "uid": "C20261104-121522-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-04", "old_ids": ["il-chicago-2026-11-03-uptown-pilsen-holstein-park-polling-places-run-out-of-paper-ballots"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "IL", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Block Club Chicago reported that polling places in Uptown, Pilsen, Logan Square, Albany Park and the Near West Side ran out of paper ballots, some more than once, forcing voters to wait for the few electronic voting machines available. Goudy Elementary School in Uptown (48th Ward) ran out for some voters by 8:15 a.m. after receiving 50 paper ballots, according to election judge Adam Honaker. Manuel Perez Jr. Elementary in Pilsen ran out before 10 a.m. and again in the afternoon (Block Club, Borderless Magazine). Holstein Park ran out around 10 a.m. and had at least a two-hour wait at 5 p.m., according to 32nd Ward committeeman Mike Nellis. ABC7 Chicago reported a Noble Square site with no paper ballots since 9:45 a.m. Chicago Board of Elections interim spokesperson Julie Metea said the board confirmed a shortage in Ward 1, Precinct 4, was checking reports in Ward 1, Precinct 5 and Wards 25 and 32, was printing extra ballots on demand, and was investigating split precincts that can have as many as seven ballot styles. She apologized, directed voters to universal vote centers, and said anyone in line by 7 p.m. could vote. Some voters said they could not wait or return. Official error: yes, by the board's account of the shortages. Update: on Nov. 4 the Chicago Board of Elections told the Sun-Times that a coding error left some split precincts short of one ballot style and oversupplied another although total ballot counts were correct; officials printed and shipped extra ballots, sent more electronic machines, kept some precincts open past 7 p.m. and apologized, but did not say how many precincts ran out. Status Confirmed by the Chicago Board of Elections for Ward 1, Precinct 4 and by named election judge Adam Honaker and committeeman Mike Nellis, reported by Block Club Chicago, Borderless Magazine, WTTW and ABC7 Chicago. Catalog point: several neighborhoods ran out of paper ballots, some more than once, leaving voters waiting hours for the few electronic machines.", "sources": [{"title": "Block Club Chicago — Chicago polling places run out of paper ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://blockclubchicago.org/2026/11/03/chicago-voters-spend-hours-in-line-as-polling-places-run-out-of-ballots-across-city/"}, {"title": "WTTW News — Chicago polling places run out of paper ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://news.wttw.com/2026/11/03/federal-monitors-present-some-chicago-polling-locations-election-day-crowds-cast-their"}, {"title": "ABC7 Chicago — Chicago polling places run out of paper ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://abc7chicago.com/post/election-day-illinois-2026-voters-head-polls-chicago-area/20011258/"}, {"title": "Borderless Magazine — Chicago polling places run out of paper ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://borderlessmag.org/2026/11/03/heres-what-brought-some-immigrant-voters-to-the-polls-and-the-challenges-they-faced-on-election-day/"}, {"title": "X post by @qaggnews (2026-11-04T01:05:47Z)", "url": "https://x.com/qaggnews/status/2117785346641420551"}, {"title": "X post by @newsoverlooked (2026-11-04T00:52:06Z)", "url": "https://x.com/newsoverlooked/status/2117781903520456928"}, {"title": "Chicago Sun-Times — Election coding error caused ballot shortage (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://chicago.suntimes.com/elections/2026/11/04/election-coding-error-ballot-shortage"}, {"title": "Block Club Chicago — Ballot shortages caused by coding error, elections board says (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://blockclubchicago.org/2026/11/04/ballot-shortages-long-waits-to-vote-were-caused-by-coding-error-elections-board-says/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Chicago polling places run out of paper ballots (ei-2026-10-276)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-05 midday ingest: added board's coding-error explanation (EMon ei-2026-10-276 update). EMon ei-2026-10-276 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "in-marion-2026-11-03-election-board-urgent-call-ballot-counters-staffing", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-07", "uid": "C20261106-121456-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-07", "old_ids": ["in-marion-2026-11-03-election-board-urgent-call-ballot-counters-staffing"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "IN", "description": "On Election Night Nov. 3, 2026, the Marion County Election Board posted that it urgently needed additional workers to help count ballots, warning that without enough counters the board might not have results by the end of the night. WRTV reported officials said at then-current staffing levels votes would not be counted until after midnight. Workers were offered $15/hour and had to be registered Indiana voters; volunteers were directed to the election operations center at 51 Koweba Lane in Indianapolis. WNDU/IndyStar noted more than 100,000 Election Day ballots were being processed in the state's most populous county. This is a staffing/operations delay, not a machine failure or fraud allegation. Status Confirmed by the Marion County Election Board's public call for counters and reporting by WRTV and WNDU; officials warned results might not be ready by midnight without more staff for more than 100,000 Election Day ballots. Catalog point: central counting depends on enough people as much as on machines, and a staffing shortfall delayed Election Night totals in the state's largest county.", "sources": [{"title": "WRTV — Marion County IN Election Night ballot-counter shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wrtv.com/news/elections/marion-county-calls-for-more-poll-workers-to-count-votes"}, {"title": "WNDU — Marion County IN Election Night ballot-counter shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wndu.com/2026/11/04/could-some-indiana-election-results-be-delayed-marion-county-facing-urgent-shortage-ballot-counters/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Marion County IN Election Night ballot-counter shortage (ei-2026-10-323)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-323 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ks-leavenworth-2026-11-03-linwood-house-district-38-ballot-shortage-voters-waited", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-07", "uid": "C20261103-181235-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-07", "old_ids": ["ks-leavenworth-2026-11-03-linwood-house-district-38-ballot-shortage-voters-waited"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "KS", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Linwood Community Building polling place in Linwood, Leavenworth County, Kansas, ran short of House District 38 ballots around 8 a.m. The precinct needs two state representative ballot styles (House Districts 38 and 42), and the Leavenworth County Election Office confirmed it had not ordered enough H-38 ballots. Voters waited more than an hour while the office printed 200 more ballots and drove them about 45 minutes to the site, then printed roughly 800 more; voters used ExpressVote machines in the meantime, and a caller told KMBC some people were turned away at the door. By 11:25 a.m. the clerk said the site had more than three times the ballots needed, voting had resumed normally, and more than 320 people had voted. County officials apologized and asked anyone who could not vote to return to the site or contact the county clerk before polls close at 7 p.m. Posts on X and one outlet attribute to the Kansas Secretary of State's Office a figure of 100 ballots ordered instead of 100,000 (other posts say 10,000 or 10 percent of need); that figure is not stated in the local TV reports and is unverified. In a 71-second briefing clip posted on X by @nicksortor, a state official, apparently from the Kansas Secretary of State's Office, says the county delivered about 100 paper ballots when about 1,000 should have been delivered because of a county clerical error, that the site ran out at about 8 a.m., and that voting was unavailable for about 1.5 hours; these counts are not in a written official statement. Status Confirmed by the Leavenworth County Election Office, which said it had not ordered enough House District 38 ballots, as reported by KSHB, KCTV5 and KMBC. Catalog point: a precinct with two ballot styles was short of one of them, voters waited more than an hour, and some were reported turned away at the door while the county printed and drove ballots to the site.", "sources": [{"title": "KSHB 41 — Linwood KS ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/polling-location-in-linwood-ks-runs-out-of-ballots-clerk-says-more-on-the-way"}, {"title": "KCTV5 — Linwood KS ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kctv5.com/2026/11/03/ballot-shortage-causes-hour-long-delays-linwood-polling-site-leavenworth-county/"}, {"title": "KMBC 9 — Linwood KS ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kmbc.com/article/leavenworth-county-kansas-ballot-shortage-election-day/74323481"}, {"title": "Real Truth Media — Linwood KS ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://realtruth.media/kansas-ballot-shortage-exposes-clerk-error-in-gop-leaning-county/"}, {"title": "@Polymarket (X) — Linwood KS ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/Polymarket/status/2117710732993192201"}, {"title": "X post by @KimKatieUSA (2026-11-03T20:16:33Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KimKatieUSA/status/2117712557922517079"}, {"title": "X post by @KCStar (2026-11-03T22:30:14Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KCStar/status/2117746200245883295"}, {"title": "X post by @nicksortor, state official briefing clip (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/nicksortor/status/2117707481220792383"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Linwood KS ballot shortage (ei-2026-10-267)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-04 midday ingest: added state official briefing figures (EMon ei-2026-10-267 update). EMon ei-2026-10-267 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "ks-rice-2026-11-03-ballot-scanner-failures-forced-hand-count-portion", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-06", "uid": "C20261106-121456-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-06", "old_ids": ["ks-rice-2026-11-03-ballot-scanner-failures-forced-hand-count-portion"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "KS", "description": "Rice County was among the last Kansas counties to submit Election Night returns. Clerk Rachael Manley told KWCH that unexpected technical difficulties with ballot scanners on Tuesday night (Nov. 3, 2026) prevented automated tabulation, so workers counted a portion of ballots by hand under a bipartisan team with chain-of-custody controls and a secondary accuracy check. County officials said delays can raise questions but that election-night results should not be a race against the clock. Numbers remain unofficial until the Nov. 16 canvass. No source named how many ballots were hand-counted. Status Confirmed by Rice County Clerk Rachael Manley to KWCH; workers counted a portion of ballots by hand under a bipartisan team with chain-of-custody controls after scanners failed on Election Night. Catalog point: when scanners failed, a bipartisan hand count finished the work — hand counting remained the reliable backstop.", "sources": [{"title": "KWCH — Rice County KS ballot scanners force hand count (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.kwch.com/2026/11/05/rice-county-details-ballot-scanner-issues-that-delayed-election-night-results/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Rice County KS ballot scanners force hand count (ei-2026-10-322)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-322 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ks-sedgwick-2026-11-03-humidity-warped-oversized-ballots-ds2-tabulator-jams", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-13", "uid": "C20261106-121456-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-13", "old_ids": ["ks-sedgwick-2026-11-03-humidity-warped-oversized-ballots-ds2-tabulator-jams"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "KS", "description": "Sedgwick County Election Commissioner Laura Rainwater told KWCH that on Nov. 3, 2026, high humidity caused a DS2 tabulator to jam twice Tuesday morning after moisture warped oversized paper ballots. Rainwater said technicians cleared the jams and bipartisan teams re-fed affected ballots from emergency bins. She said it was the first time she recalled using ballots that large and that humidity warps them so they jam if pinned at an angle. KWCH also reported wait times of 30 to 45 minutes at high-volume sites including Reliance Church and Magdalen Church, and nearly an hour at Central Christian Church, where an election worker said the location was short-staffed and short several voting machines. Status Confirmed by Sedgwick County Election Commissioner Laura Rainwater to KWCH; a DS2 tabulator jammed twice Tuesday morning after humidity warped oversized ballots, and bipartisan teams re-fed ballots from emergency bins. Catalog point: oversized ballots plus humidity were enough to jam a central tabulator and divert ballots into emergency bins for later feeding.", "sources": [{"title": "KWCH — Sedgwick County KS DS2 tabulator humidity jams (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kwch.com/2026/11/03/line-by-7-pm-you-can-still-vote-heres-where-turnout-stands-across-sedgwick-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Sedgwick County KS DS2 tabulator humidity jams (ei-2026-10-329)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-329 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ky-fayette-2026-11-03-lexington-results-hours-late-on-state-website-clerk-says-not-county", "permanent_id": "C20261105-120646-01", "uid": "C20261105-120646-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-120646-01", "old_ids": ["ky-fayette-2026-11-03-lexington-results-hours-late-on-state-website-clerk-says-not-county"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Election officials do not know what happens to their totals once the totals leave their office."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "KY", "description": "On election night, Nov. 3, 2026, Fayette County results took hours to appear on Kentucky's state election results website while thousands of people refreshed it, WKYT reported. Fayette County Clerk Susan Lamb said her office began transmitting votes to Frankfort at 7:14 p.m., uploaded nearly all precincts just after 8:07 p.m., and made a final upload from two library sites at 9:13 p.m. Lamb said, \"I can tell you it wasn't on our end, but I don't know what the issue was,\" and that she was told after calling Frankfort that the public site was working. She said state law bars her from releasing results before they are shown on the state website, so newsrooms and campaigns could not get updates from her office. Neighboring Madison County posted its own results on Facebook. WKYT said the Secretary of State's office and the State Board of Elections had not responded about what caused the state website to stall. Results are unofficial; county boards certify Friday. The cause of the state-level delay has not been officially explained. Status Confirmed for the delay by Fayette County Clerk Susan Lamb, reported by WKYT; the cause at the state level has not been explained, and the Secretary of State's office and State Board of Elections had not responded. Catalog point: the county sent its totals on time, the public state website stalled for hours, and the clerk said she did not know what happened to the totals after they left her office.", "sources": [{"title": "WKYT — Fayette County KY results stalled on state website (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wkyt.com/2026/11/05/fayette-county-clerk-says-election-night-results-delay-was-not-countys-end/"}, {"title": "WKYT — Fayette County KY results stalled on state website (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wkyt.com/2026/11/04/fayette-county-clerks-office-addresses-wait-election-results/"}, {"title": "X post by @KyHorses8888 (2026-11-05T13:00:22Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KyHorses8888/status/2118327565693919247"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fayette County KY results stalled on state website (ei-2026-10-308)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-308 (added 2026-11-05 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status investigating). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ky-todd-2026-11-03-guthrie-precinct-e101-paper-ballot-shortage-ada-wrong-paper", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-26", "uid": "C20261106-121456-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-26", "old_ids": ["ky-todd-2026-11-03-guthrie-precinct-e101-paper-ballot-shortage-ada-wrong-paper"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "KY", "description": "Todd County Clerk Cindy O’Bryan told WEKT News Edge that on Nov. 3, 2026, Guthrie precinct E-101 ran out of paper ballots and the site’s ADA-accessible voting machine was loaded with incorrect paper. O’Bryan said the situation had grown heated by the time she arrived, with several upset voters voicing frustration. She said she was not aware of any voters who missed their opportunity to vote; some anonymous Guthrie residents told WEKT that 25–30 voters were turned away (unverified; clerk did not confirm). Separately, O’Bryan acknowledged in an email to a concerned resident that the standard pre-election verification process between the county and Guthrie city hall was omitted this cycle due to personal circumstances, amid questions about whether county residents with Guthrie mailing addresses outside city limits could receive city ballots. Residents who raised the concerns told WEKT they plan to challenge the city’s election results through official legal channels. OVERLOOKED noted the story remained fully overlooked by major U.S. outlets as of Nov. 4, 2026. Status Confirmed by Todd County Clerk Cindy O'Bryan to WEKT News Edge; Guthrie precinct E-101 ran out of paper ballots, the ADA machine had incorrect paper, and the clerk acknowledged the usual pre-election address verification with Guthrie city hall was omitted this cycle. Anonymous claims that 25–30 voters were turned away were not confirmed by the clerk. Catalog point: a precinct without enough paper ballots and with wrong ADA paper left voters waiting while a related address-check step had been skipped before Election Day.", "sources": [{"title": "WEKT News Edge (Ham Broadcasting) — Todd County KY Guthrie precinct E-101 ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wektradio.com/2026/11/03/missed-audit-and-election-day-mishap-raise-questions-over-guthrie-election-results/"}, {"title": "OVERLOOKED — Todd County KY Guthrie precinct E-101 ballot shortage (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://theoverlooked.news/story/kentucky-todd-county-guthrie-precinct-ran-out-of-ballots-missed-address-audit"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Todd County KY Guthrie precinct E-101 ballot shortage (ei-2026-10-343)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-343 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status developing). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ma-boston-2026-11-03-north-end-ward3-pct1-tabulator-power-loss-hand-count", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-17", "uid": "C20261106-121456-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-17", "old_ids": ["ma-boston-2026-11-03-north-end-ward3-pct1-tabulator-power-loss-hand-count"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MA", "description": "On Nov. 3, 2026, a ballot tabulator at Boston's North End polling place at 145 Commercial Street (Ward 3, Precinct 1) briefly lost power and was reset around 4 p.m., according to Boston election officials, City Councilor Gabriela Coletta Zapata, and Secretary of the Commonwealth spokesperson Debra O'Malley (NBC Boston / Mass Daily News / CBS Boston). Officials said the machine worked without incident after the reset; voting continued with ballots placed in the hand-count compartment during the outage. Out of an abundance of caution, poll workers hand-counted ballots cast before and during the power failure in a public, observable process at the polling place. Galvin's office said it understands a power failure caused the reset. No official ballot count for the hand-counted set was published in the cited coverage. Status Confirmed by Boston election officials, City Councilor Gabriela Coletta Zapata and Secretary of the Commonwealth spokesperson Debra O'Malley (NBC Boston, Mass Daily News); the Ward 3 Precinct 1 tabulator briefly lost power around 4 p.m., and pre-reset ballots were hand-counted in public. Catalog point: a brief power loss forced a visible hand count of the affected ballots, which is what kept the count moving when the machine reset.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC Boston — Boston North End tabulator power loss hand count (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/massachusetts-voting-poll-monitors-midterm-elections/4043524/"}, {"title": "Mass Daily News — Boston North End tabulator power loss hand count (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.massdailynews.com/2026/11/03/north-end-voting-machine-reset-forces-hand-count-hours"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Boston North End tabulator power loss hand count (ei-2026-10-333)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-333 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ma-lynn-2026-11-03-vendor-programming-error-result-tape-lancaster-not-jones", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-18", "uid": "C20261106-121456-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-18", "old_ids": ["ma-lynn-2026-11-03-vendor-programming-error-result-tape-lancaster-not-jones"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MA", "description": "Lynn, Massachusetts, city officials said a programming error by their ballot-tabulator vendor caused Election Day result tapes to print Democrat Mariah Lancaster's name in place of Republican Micah Jones, according to NBC Boston (Nov. 4, 2026) citing Secretary of the Commonwealth Bill Galvin's office. The ballots voters marked had the correct candidate names; the vendor confirmed the tape labeling error and said it had no effect on the actual results. Poll workers manually corrected the tapes so printed totals matched Jones. Status Confirmed via Secretary of the Commonwealth Bill Galvin's office to NBC Boston; a vendor programming error mislabeled tabulator result tapes with Democrat Mariah Lancaster's name in place of Republican Micah Jones, while voter-marked ballots had the correct names and totals were manually corrected on the tapes. Catalog point: a vendor programming error changed only the printed tape labels, not the ballots, and poll workers had to correct the tapes by hand.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC Boston — Lynn MA tabulator result-tape mislabel (Lancaster/Jones) (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.nbcboston.com/news/local/massachusetts-voting-poll-monitors-midterm-elections/4043524/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lynn MA tabulator result-tape mislabel (Lancaster/Jones) (ei-2026-10-334)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-334 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ma-new-bedford-2026-11-03-tabulator-wire-ballot-port-four-precincts-hand-count", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-11", "uid": "C20261103-181235-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-11", "old_ids": ["ma-new-bedford-2026-11-03-tabulator-wire-ballot-port-four-precincts-hand-count"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MA", "description": "On Election Day morning, Nov. 3, 2026, ballot tabulators had problems at four New Bedford, Massachusetts precincts, according to city spokesperson Jack Thuon (WBSM). At Precincts 3D (Taber Mill Community Center), 3F (Bayberry Apartments) and 6F (New Life Southcoast Church), Thuon said \"an internal wire in the machines at these locations was found to be physically interfering with the port on the machine where ballots are fed,\" and that the 17-inch ballot, longer than the more typical 14 inches, may have contributed. Election officials adjusted the wires and the machines returned to normal operation. At Precinct 5F (Buttonwood Park Warming House), a tray problem left the machine unavailable for about 40 to 45 minutes; voting continued, with ballots placed in the machine's secure bottom compartment to be hand counted at the precinct after polls close. WBSM reported that voting continued without further disruption. WBSM also noted earlier ballot jams in New Bedford in 2022, 2024 and 2025. Just the News also reported the problems. Status Confirmed by New Bedford city spokesperson Jack Thuon, reported by WBSM and Just the News. Catalog point: an internal wire blocked the ballot port on three tabulators, with the longer 17-inch ballot as a possible factor, and a fourth machine was down for about 40 minutes. Ballots from the down machine went into its secure compartment to be hand counted at the precinct, which shows hand counting is the working backstop.", "sources": [{"title": "WBSM — New Bedford MA tabulator glitches, 4 precincts (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wbsm.com/new-bedford-election-machine-issues-2026/"}, {"title": "Just the News — New Bedford MA tabulator glitches, 4 precincts (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/several-states-report-technical-issues-polls-election-day"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — New Bedford MA tabulator glitches, 4 precincts (ei-2026-10-271)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-271 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-brandywine-elementary-no-usable-paper-ballots-at-open", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-06", "uid": "C20261103-181235-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-06", "old_ids": ["md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-brandywine-elementary-no-usable-paper-ballots-at-open"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MD", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the polling place at Brandywine Elementary School in Brandywine, Prince George's County, Maryland, had no usable paper ballots when polls opened at 7 a.m., leaving only two electronic voting machines and causing a backup of voters. WJLA (7News) reported that officials at the site confirmed it had run out of paper ballots and that a truck was unloading additional ballots when its crew arrived. One voter told WJLA the problem stemmed from incomplete ballots, with one page complete and the next page blank, and said election workers had called the elections office around 6:30 a.m. True the Vote posted the report on X at 1:44 PM ET, stating that more ballots were brought in. The cause and the number of voters affected have not been stated by the Prince George's County Board of Elections or the Maryland State Board of Elections; WJLA said it had asked the state board for details. The same site ran out of ballots in the 2018 general election. Status Confirmed by officials at the site, as reported by WJLA (7News); True the Vote also posted it. The county and state boards have not stated the cause or the number of voters affected. Catalog point: the site opened with incomplete ballots (one page printed, the next blank), leaving only two electronic machines and a backup of voters. Prince George's County had a similar ballot shortage in 2018.", "sources": [{"title": "WJLA 7News — Brandywine MD paper ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wjla.com/news/local/brandywine-elections-election-day-2026-paper-ballot-shortage-polling-place-delays-issues-voter-lines-voting-machines-prince-georges-county-maryland-problems-midterm"}, {"title": "@TrueTheVote (X) — Brandywine MD paper ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/TrueTheVote/status/2117689315585331694"}, {"title": "NBC4 Washington (2018 background) — Brandywine MD paper ballot shortage (2018-11-06)", "url": "https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/prince-georges-county-voters-wait-for-hours-after-ballots-run-out-in-several-precincts/168463/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Brandywine MD paper ballot shortage (ei-2026-10-265)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-265 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-laurel-beltsville-senior-center-wrong-precinct-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-10", "uid": "C20261106-121456-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-10", "old_ids": ["md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-laurel-beltsville-senior-center-wrong-precinct-ballots"], "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MD", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, ballots intended for other precincts were delivered to the Laurel-Beltsville Senior Activity Center in Laurel, Prince George's County, Maryland, causing voting machines to reject them, according to Chief Election Judge Alta Cannaday as reported by The Laurel Independent. Replacement ballots had to be brought from the Prince George's County Board of Elections headquarters in Largo, with rush-hour traffic adding to the delay. Long lines stretched outside the center that evening; some voters reported waits of more than two hours. Distinct from DiPietro Community Center delays and from the Brandywine Elementary paper-ballot shortage. Status Confirmed by Chief Election Judge Alta Cannaday as reported by The Laurel Independent; wrong-precinct ballots were delivered to the Laurel-Beltsville Senior Activity Center, scanners rejected them, and replacements had to come from Largo through rush-hour traffic. Catalog point: delivering the wrong precinct's ballots to a polling place stops the scanners and forces voters to wait for a corrected style.", "sources": [{"title": "The Laurel Independent — Laurel MD Senior Activity Center wrong-precinct ballots (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://laurelindependent.com/3842/news/long-lines-ballot-problems-mark-election-day-in-laurel/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Laurel MD Senior Activity Center wrong-precinct ballots (ei-2026-10-326)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-326 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-laurel-dipietro-late-ballots-scanner-jams-multi-hour-waits", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-09", "uid": "C20261106-121456-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-09", "old_ids": ["md-prince-georges-2026-11-03-laurel-dipietro-late-ballots-scanner-jams-multi-hour-waits"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MD", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Robert J. DiPietro Community Center polling place in Laurel, Prince George's County, Maryland, had late-arriving ballots, malfunctioning voting equipment and waits of up to about three hours, according to Maryland Matters, The Banner and The Laurel Independent. Voters said paper-ballot shortages and repeated scanner jams contributed; the county Board of Elections told voters an additional ballot scanner was being expedited. Kristina Toliver told The Banner she returned three times, then waited nearly two hours to feed a printed ballot after voting electronically; the scanner jammed three times (one jam about 30 minutes), and poll workers eventually told voters to fold ballots and place them in a drawer at the scanner base for later reconciliation against the check-in list. One woman reportedly fainted. The League of Women Voters of Maryland and the NAACP filed an emergency court action seeking to keep the site open until midnight, saying problems effectively closed the polling place for about four hours; Circuit Court Judge Tiffany H. Anderson denied the request, citing late filing and that anyone in line by 8 p.m. could still vote. A county Board of Elections spokesperson did not respond to The Banner's questions about Toliver's experience. Distinct from the Brandywine Elementary paper-ballot shortage and from wrong-precinct ballots at the Laurel-Beltsville Senior Activity Center. Status Confirmed by multi-outlet reporting (Maryland Matters, The Banner, The Laurel Independent); Circuit Court Judge Tiffany H. Anderson denied an LWV/NAACP request to keep the site open until midnight. Named voter Kristina Toliver described repeated scanner jams and ballots placed in a drawer for later reconciliation. Catalog point: late ballots and jammed scanners produced multi-hour waits, and rejected ballots were held aside for later counting against the check-in list.", "sources": [{"title": "Maryland Matters — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://marylandmatters.org/2026/11/03/heavy-election-day-turnout-follows-heavy-early-voting-no-major-problems-reported/"}, {"title": "The Banner — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.thebanner.com/community/local-news/prince-georges-voting-delays-6735CYQXMZFGDDAJJ2IRFC2BT4/"}, {"title": "The Laurel Independent — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://laurelindependent.com/3842/news/long-lines-ballot-problems-mark-election-day-in-laurel/"}, {"title": "Baltimore County Herald — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://baltimorecountyherald.com/article/one-voter-waited-three-hours-and-three-trips-to-cast-a-ballot-in-laurel/"}, {"title": "The Banner — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.thebanner.com/politics-power/local-government/prince-georges-county-ballot-issues-XNDWIYLJRNGFVFPHCNCTQNBN2U/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Laurel MD DiPietro ballot delays and scanner jams (ei-2026-10-325)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-325 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-2026-11-03-dearborn-flint-state-flags-doj-monitors-questioning-poll-workers", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-01", "uid": "C20261104-121522-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-01", "old_ids": ["mi-2026-11-03-dearborn-flint-state-flags-doj-monitors-questioning-poll-workers"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Michigan Department of State and Attorney General Dana Nessel's office said they received reports that U.S. Justice Department election monitors in Dearborn asked poll workers for copies of their training materials, and that monitors in Flint asked poll workers how they were trained. State officials said Michigan law limits monitors to observing and bars them from questioning poll workers about training or handling election materials. They said the DOJ's Michigan monitor coordinator confirmed the conduct was inconsistent with the monitors' training and said the department would remind monitors of what they may and may not do. A DOJ spokesperson told The Verge the questions were standard ones on monitor forms, that the department had not confirmed monitors requested training materials, and that it would remind monitors they need not request them. Officials said reports of monitors speaking with voters outside a Lansing polling place were permissible. The DOJ sent 71 monitors to seven or eight Michigan cities, according to the reports. Status Confirmed by the Michigan Department of State and Attorney General Dana Nessel's office, reported by the Michigan Advance, Detroit Free Press, WDIV and The Verge; the DOJ disputes part of the account. Catalog point: state officials publicly restricted what federal election monitors could ask poll workers on Election Day, which limits outside observation of how poll workers are trained and how materials are handled.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Advance — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://michiganadvance.com/2026/11/03/michigan-officials-flag-improper-interactions-between-doj-election-monitors-and-poll-workers/"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/michigan-election-day-problems-tabulators-doj-monitors/92589763007/"}, {"title": "WDIV Local 4 (ClickOnDetroit) — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2026/11/03/not-permitted-election-monitors-in-dearborn-requested-copies-of-poll-worker-training-materials/"}, {"title": "The Verge — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.theverge.com/policy/1025627/michigan-officials-contacted-doj-about-reports-of-election-monitors-speaking-with-poll-workers"}, {"title": "Just the News — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/michigan-officials-say-doj-election-monitors-overstepped-dearborn-flint"}, {"title": "X post by @tftTarot4today (2026-11-03T23:33:39Z)", "url": "https://x.com/tftTarot4today/status/2117762160420139146"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — MI DOJ monitors overstep in Dearborn, Flint (ei-2026-10-273)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-273 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-2026-11-03-redford-shelby-madison-heights-escanaba-tabulator-malfunctions", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-14", "uid": "C20261104-121522-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-14", "old_ids": ["mi-2026-11-03-redford-shelby-madison-heights-escanaba-tabulator-malfunctions"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, malfunctioning ballot tabulators delayed some voting at several Michigan polling places, according to the Detroit Free Press. The Michigan Department of State confirmed tabulator problems at Thurston High School in Redford Township (Wayne County) and Eisenhower High School in Shelby Township (Macomb County); a voter reported a broken tabulator at Wilkinson Middle School in Madison Heights (Oakland County), which the Michigan ACLU confirmed. Voters could wait for repairs or place ballots in a secure auxiliary bin to be tabulated later with a Republican and a Democratic poll worker present. Separately, the Escanaba Daily Press reported that the tabulator at the Bark River Senior Center in Bark River Township (Delta County) stopped working in the late morning; ballots were placed in a lockbox to be fed later, and the county clerk delivered a replacement unit by about 1:20 p.m. Department of State spokesperson Angela Benander said the problems were not out of the ordinary for a high-turnout general election and that she had heard no reports of voters being turned away. Status Confirmed by the Michigan Department of State for Redford and Shelby and by the Michigan ACLU for Madison Heights, reported by the Detroit Free Press, The National News Desk and the Escanaba Daily Press. Catalog point: tabulators failed at several sites, and voters either waited for repairs or put their ballots in auxiliary bins for later bipartisan tabulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press — Michigan tabulator malfunctions (Redford, Shelby, Madison Heights) (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/michigan-election-day-problems-tabulators-doj-monitors/92589763007/"}, {"title": "The National News Desk (WSET) — Michigan tabulator malfunctions (Redford, Shelby, Madison Heights) (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/nation-world/voting-delayed-in-different-michigan-counties-due-to-malfunctioning-tabulators-doj-scott-presler"}, {"title": "Daily Press (Escanaba) — Michigan tabulator malfunctions (Redford, Shelby, Madison Heights) (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.dailypress.net/news/local-news/2026/11/tabulator-replaced/"}, {"title": "X post by @_Patriot1776Q_ (2026-11-04T04:40:33Z)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2117839392148685053"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Michigan tabulator malfunctions (Redford, Shelby, Madison Heights) (ei-2026-10-290)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-290 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-gratiot-2026-11-03-st-louis-city-hall-polling-place-disturbance-arrest-voters-left", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-13", "uid": "C20261104-121522-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-13", "old_ids": ["mi-gratiot-2026-11-03-st-louis-city-hall-polling-place-disturbance-arrest-voters-left"], "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a 47-year-old St. Louis, Michigan, man was arrested after causing a disturbance at the polling location inside St. Louis City Hall in Gratiot County, according to a statement from St. Louis Police Chief Richard Ramereiz Jr. reported by ABC12 and the Lansing State Journal. Police said the man left after an officer tried to de-escalate, then returned minutes later and resumed the disruptive behavior; witnesses said they felt alarmed and some voters left the polling location as a result. He was arrested for disorderly conduct and disturbing the peace, taken to a hospital for evaluation after reporting injuries, and then held at the Gratiot County Jail. Police said no threats were made against the polling place, election personnel or the public, and there was no indication of a weapon or threat to the security of the voting process. The man was not named, and the charges are accusations only. Status Confirmed by St. Louis Police Chief Richard Ramereiz Jr.'s statement, reported by ABC12 and the Lansing State Journal. Catalog point: a disruptive man returned to the polling place after being asked to leave, and some voters left without voting before police arrested him.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC12 (WJRT) — St. Louis MI polling place disturbance arrest (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.abc12.com/news/crime/man-arrested-for-polling-site-distubance-in-gratiot-county/article_966b4271-5c7c-413a-b6cb-28a38b56e43b.html"}, {"title": "Lansing State Journal — St. Louis MI polling place disturbance arrest (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.lansingstatejournal.com/story/news/local/2026/11/03/st-louis-man-arrested-for-disruptive-behavior-at-voting-site/92599560007/"}, {"title": "X post by @_Patriot1776Q_ (2026-11-04T04:40:33Z)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2117839392148685053"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — St. Louis MI polling place disturbance arrest (ei-2026-10-289)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-289 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-ingham-2026-11-03-alaiedon-township-tabulator-stopped-reading-ballots-sealed-box", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-12", "uid": "C20261104-121522-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-12", "old_ids": ["mi-ingham-2026-11-03-alaiedon-township-tabulator-stopped-reading-ballots-sealed-box"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the ballot tabulator at the Alaiedon Township polling place in Ingham County, Michigan, stopped reading ballots for a period of time. Ingham County Clerk Barb Byrum confirmed the issue to WILX and WLNS and said voters were asked to place their ballots in a sealed box behind the tabulator, to be counted by Democratic and Republican election inspectors after polls closed, which is standard procedure. Alaiedon Township Clerk Kimberly Hafley told WKAR that the county elections office sent someone to repair the tabulator, counting resumed, and only about 10 to 12 ballots were affected. Byrum called it an isolated occurrence and said tabulator jams happen at a poll or two in nearly every election. The cause was not specified. Status Confirmed by Ingham County Clerk Barb Byrum and Alaiedon Township Clerk Kimberly Hafley, reported by WKAR, WILX and WLNS. Catalog point: when the tabulator stopped reading, ballots went into a sealed box to be counted by bipartisan inspectors; the paper ballot is what made that possible.", "sources": [{"title": "WKAR Public Media — Alaiedon Twp MI tabulator outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wkar.org/election-2026/2026-11-03/tabulator-issue-causes-brief-pause-in-ballot-counting-in-alaiedon-township"}, {"title": "WILX News 10 — Alaiedon Twp MI tabulator outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wilx.com/2026/11/03/ingham-county-clerk-confirms-tabulator-issue-alaiedon-township-polling-place-votes-be-counted-later/"}, {"title": "WLNS 6 News — Alaiedon Twp MI tabulator outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wlns.com/your-local-election-hq/alaiedon-township-polling-place-experiencing-tabulator-issues/"}, {"title": "X post by @_Patriot1776Q_ (2026-11-04T04:40:33Z)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2117839392148685053"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Alaiedon Twp MI tabulator outage (ei-2026-10-288)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-288 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-macomb-2026-11-03-eastpointe-saint-thomas-lutheran-polling-place-fight-five-cited", "permanent_id": "C20261106-181036-01", "uid": "C20261106-181036-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-181036-01", "old_ids": ["mi-macomb-2026-11-03-eastpointe-saint-thomas-lutheran-polling-place-fight-five-cited"], "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, five people were issued citations after a fight at the polling location at Saint Thomas Lutheran Church, 23801 Kelly Road, in Eastpointe, Macomb County, Michigan, according to Eastpointe Police Department spokesperson Alex Holish as reported by the Detroit Free Press (Jalen Williams, USA TODAY Network) on Nov. 5. Police said the five individuals disagreed over political views, leading to a fight, and were cited for disorderly conduct among other things. A video posted to Facebook by the Scanner of Warren appears to show five women in a scuffle, with one hitting two others with a purse. Police confirmed on Thursday, Nov. 5, that the fight occurred and that the investigation remains ongoing. Citations are accusations only. A separate Election Day polling-place disturbance arrest in St. Louis, Gratiot County, is already listed as ei-2026-10-289. Status Confirmed by Eastpointe Police Department spokesperson Alex Holish as reported by the Detroit Free Press (USA TODAY Network) on Nov. 5; police said five people were cited for disorderly conduct and related offenses after a political disagreement led to a fight at the Saint Thomas Lutheran Church polling place, and that the investigation remains ongoing. Citations are accusations only. The Free Press/police report does not state whether voting was interrupted. Catalog point: a polling-place fight on Election Day shows how quickly political conflict at the precinct can become a security incident that police have to clear while voters are still checking in.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press (USA TODAY Network) — Eastpointe MI polling place fight citations (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/macomb/2026/11/05/fight-eastpointe-voting-site-election-day-citations/92613136007/"}, {"title": "X post by @i (2026-11-06T18:37:00Z)", "url": "https://x.com/i/status/2118774653766549978"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Eastpointe MI polling place fight citations (ei-2026-10-349)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-349 (added 2026-11-06 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-newaygo-2026-11-03-six-townships-run-out-of-ballots-clerk-fetches-more", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-05", "uid": "C20261104-121522-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-05", "old_ids": ["mi-newaygo-2026-11-03-six-townships-run-out-of-ballots-clerk-fetches-more"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a spokesperson for the Newaygo County Clerk's Office confirmed to WZZM 13 just before 7 p.m. ET that \"a handful\" of jurisdictions had run out of ballots and that the clerk was in Grand Rapids getting more. The office said the shortage might cause delays but that everyone in line would be able to vote, that ballots are typically printed to match 50% of registered voters for elections like this, and that the county had not run out before. FOX 17 reported the clerk's office said it ordered what it usually does for major elections and did not account for such turnout. WCMU reported that U.S. Rep. John Moolenaar wrote on Facebook that six townships ran out earlier in the day, that the issue was resolved, and that voters who could not vote should return to their polling place by 8 p.m. The specific townships and how long each was without ballots have not been published. Official error: yes, by the clerk's office's account of the ballot order. Status Confirmed by the Newaygo County Clerk's Office to WZZM 13 and FOX 17, with U.S. Rep. John Moolenaar reporting six townships ran out (WCMU). Catalog point: the county printed ballots for about half of registered voters, and several townships ran out while the clerk drove to Grand Rapids for more.", "sources": [{"title": "WZZM 13 — Newaygo County, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wzzm13.com/article/news/politics/elections/voter-turnout-is-so-high-in-newaygo-county-a-handful-of-jurisdictions-are-out-of-ballots/69-d902d8f1-c933-4934-9479-3335763174fd"}, {"title": "FOX 17 West Michigan — Newaygo County, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fox17online.com/news/local-news/multiple-jurisdictions-run-out-of-ballots-in-newaygo-county-on-election-day"}, {"title": "WCMU Public Media (live updates) — Newaygo County, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wcmu.org/live-updates/michigan-midterm-elections-live-updates"}, {"title": "X post by @brianskellenger (2026-11-04T01:50:22Z)", "url": "https://x.com/brianskellenger/status/2117796563141497215"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Newaygo County, MI precincts run out of ballots (ei-2026-10-278)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-278 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-wayne-2026-11-03-canton-township-polling-place-power-outage-battery-backup", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-02", "uid": "C20261104-121522-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-02", "old_ids": ["mi-wayne-2026-11-03-canton-township-polling-place-power-outage-battery-backup"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Votebeat reporter Hayley Harding reported that voting was continuing at a Canton Township, Michigan, polling place despite a power outage, thanks to a FEMA-funded battery and $566 in safety lights bought from Home Depot. The update was posted to Votebeat's Election Day live blog. The RNC's election-integrity account separately posted that it was in contact with DTE Energy about a power outage in Canton Township and urged voters to stay in line. Neither source names the specific polling place or says how long power was out, and no voter is reported to have been unable to vote. Status Confirmed by Votebeat reporter Hayley Harding on Votebeat's live blog, with the RNC separately reporting contact with DTE Energy about the outage. Catalog point: the polling place stayed open on a FEMA-funded battery and store-bought lights; each outage shows how much in-person voting depends on electricity.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat (Election Day live blog) — Canton Twp MI polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/national/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-live-blog-midterms-trump/"}, {"title": "@Hayley__Harding (X), Votebeat reporter — Canton Twp MI polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/Hayley__Harding/status/2117749786816475523"}, {"title": "@RNCVoteProtect (X), RNC Election Integrity — Canton Twp MI polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/RNCVoteProtect/status/2117767790342087140"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Canton Twp MI polling place power outage (ei-2026-10-274)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-274 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-wayne-2026-11-03-dearborn-precincts-temporarily-run-out-of-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-06", "uid": "C20261104-121522-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-06", "old_ids": ["mi-wayne-2026-11-03-dearborn-precincts-temporarily-run-out-of-ballots"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, at 6:50 p.m. ET, Dearborn Mayor Abdullah Hammoud posted on X: \"We're receiving reports that some precincts have temporarily run out of ballots and that lines are longer than usual. PLEASE STAY IN LINE. DO NOT LEAVE.\" He asked voters to give the City Clerk's team time to restock ballots and said anyone in line before polls closed at 8 p.m. had the legal right to vote. The Detroit Free Press and FOX 2 Detroit reported the shortages, and WCMU noted polling places downstate were also running short amid record turnout. The precincts affected, how long they were without ballots, and whether any voters left without voting have not been reported. Status Confirmed by Dearborn Mayor Abdullah Hammoud's public statement, reported by the Detroit Free Press and FOX 2 Detroit. Catalog point: precincts ran out of ballots in the last hours of voting, and voters were urged to stay in line while the clerk restocked.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press — Dearborn, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/dearborn-mayor-some-precincts-ran-out-of-ballots-stay-in-line-voters/92596848007/"}, {"title": "FOX 2 Detroit (live blog) — Dearborn, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fox2detroit.com/live-blog/news/michigan-election-day-2026-historic-midterm-voting-updates-campaigns-near-finish-line"}, {"title": "WCMU Public Media (live updates) — Dearborn, MI precincts run out of ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wcmu.org/live-updates/michigan-midterm-elections-live-updates"}, {"title": "X post by @AHammoudMI (2026-11-03T23:50:44Z)", "url": "https://x.com/AHammoudMI/status/2117766457274609928"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dearborn, MI precincts run out of ballots (ei-2026-10-279)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-279 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-wayne-2026-11-03-gibraltar-carlson-high-school-polling-place-bomb-threat", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-10", "uid": "C20261103-181235-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-10", "old_ids": ["mi-wayne-2026-11-03-gibraltar-carlson-high-school-polling-place-bomb-threat"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a bomb threat was called in to Carlson High School in Gibraltar, Michigan, the polling place for Brownstown Township Precincts 8 and 11. The building was evacuated while Brownstown Township police, Gibraltar police and the Wayne County Sheriff's Office swept it out of an abundance of caution. Local 4 (WDIV) reported that voting was not fully interrupted because voters were moved to the school's parking lot to keep casting ballots. Police said they take all threats seriously; as of the first reports no device had been reported found and no further details had been released. Status Confirmed by police, as reported by CBS Detroit, WDIV and WXYZ. No device had been reported found. Catalog point: two precincts were evacuated for a sweep, and voters were moved to the school parking lot to keep voting.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Detroit — Gibraltar MI polling place bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/police-investigate-reported-bomb-threat-gibraltar-polling-location/"}, {"title": "WDIV Local 4 (ClickOnDetroit) — Gibraltar MI polling place bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2026/11/03/election-day-bomb-threat-forces-evacuation-at-high-school-polling-location-in-gibraltar/"}, {"title": "WXYZ Detroit — Gibraltar MI polling place bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wxyz.com/news/bomb-threat-called-into-polling-location-in-gibraltar-police-conducting-sweep"}, {"title": "X post by @brianskellenger (2026-11-03T22:30:56Z)", "url": "https://x.com/brianskellenger/status/2117746376348225882"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Gibraltar MI polling place bomb threat (ei-2026-10-270)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-270 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-wexford-2026-11-03-slagle-30-not-300-ballots-five-precincts-cleared-memory-cards", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-19", "uid": "C20261106-121456-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-19", "old_ids": ["mi-wexford-2026-11-03-slagle-30-not-300-ballots-five-precincts-cleared-memory-cards"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "Wexford County Clerk Alaina Nyman told the Cadillac News that on Nov. 3, 2026, Slagle Township reported it did not have enough ballots after the ballot vendor dropped a zero from the order, supplying 30 ballots instead of 300. Additional ballots were printed and driven from Tecumseh; while waiting, voters used the touchscreen Voter Assist Terminal or blank test/photocopied ballots placed in the auxiliary bin and later transferred onto official ballots. Separately after polls closed, Nyman said four precincts (three in the Mesick Consolidated Schools District) cleared tabulator memory cards after printing results reports; officials retrieved results from those printed reports. A fifth cleared card at Selma Township was missed overnight because absentee results arrived on a separate card, briefly showing a false 25% turnout until 638 Election Day votes were added Wednesday afternoon (actual turnout 62%). Nyman said she will train inspectors not to zero memory cards on election night and that results remained secure because paper ballots and printed reports were available. Status Confirmed by Wexford County Clerk Alaina Nyman to the Cadillac News; the ballot vendor dropped a zero (30 ballots instead of 300) at Slagle Township, and separately four precincts plus Selma cleared tabulator memory cards after printing results, with Selma's Election Day votes restored Wednesday afternoon from paper reports. Catalog point: a vendor order error left a precinct nearly without ballots, and clearing memory cards after printing results briefly hid Election Day totals until paper reports restored them.", "sources": [{"title": "Cadillac News — Wexford MI Slagle ballot shortage and cleared memory cards (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.cadillacnews.com/news/what-happened-during-election-night-in-wexford-county/article_52ff3d5f-651b-4022-9df7-7623f23eb047.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Wexford MI Slagle ballot shortage and cleared memory cards (ei-2026-10-335)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-335 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mo-kansas-city-2026-11-03-blue-ridge-church-polling-place-power-outage-battery-backup", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-02", "uid": "C20261103-121512-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-02", "old_ids": ["mo-kansas-city-2026-11-03-blue-ridge-church-polling-place-power-outage-battery-backup"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MO", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Kansas City Election Board learned at about 5 a.m. that power was out at the Blue Ridge Church of Christ polling place, 9603 Blue Ridge Boulevard, in south Kansas City, Missouri, after an Evergy outage in the area. KMBC reported that Evergy listed about 650 customers without power at 7 a.m., and its meteorologist attributed the outages to wind gusts of about 45 miles per hour. Election Board officials said generators could not be connected to the church's main power, so battery backups were placed on the check-in computers and ballot readers by 7:30 a.m.; the batteries were expected to last two to three hours and did not power the building's lights. In a KMBC 9 News segment reposted on X, reporter Martin Augustine says voting continued at the site, with some voters using smartphone lights or standing near windows to read their ballots. Because Kansas City uses centralized polling, voters could also vote at any of its 80 locations, and officials directed them to nearby sites; the outlets name Hillcrest Community Center, Lane Avenue Baptist Church and Grace Baptist (Grace) Church. Election Board Republican Director Shawn Kieffer said power was restored at 9:50 a.m., and Democratic Director Lauri Ealom said the outage was an Evergy issue. No voters are reported to have been unable to vote. Status Confirmed for the outage, the battery backup on check-in computers and ballot readers, and the 9:50 a.m. restoration, all stated by Kansas City Election Board officials and reported by the Kansas City Star, KMBC, KSHB and KCTV. Catalog point: a power outage forces voting equipment onto short-lived battery backup and sends voters elsewhere; here officials say no voters were unable to vote, but the equipment ran outside normal conditions for several hours.", "sources": [{"title": "Kansas City Star (live updates) — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/election/article317886916.html"}, {"title": "KMBC — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kmbc.com/article/kansas-city-polling-place-power-outage-election-day/74321693"}, {"title": "KSHB 41 — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kshb.com/news/local-news/power-outage-impacting-polling-location-on-blue-ridge-boulevard"}, {"title": "KCTV5 — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kctv5.com/2026/11/03/power-outage-hits-south-kc-polling-site-election-day-voters-directed-nearby-locations/"}, {"title": "@iAnonPatriot (X), post with video — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/iAnonPatriot/status/2117635753005998534"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — KC Blue Ridge polling place outage (ei-2026-10-245)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-245 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ms-2026-11-03-voters-marked-inactive-machine-failures-affidavit-ballots-desoto-court-challenge", "permanent_id": "C20261104-180406-02", "uid": "C20261104-180406-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-180406-02", "old_ids": ["ms-2026-11-03-voters-marked-inactive-machine-failures-affidavit-ballots-desoto-court-challenge"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "MS", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Mississippi voters reported long lines, voting machines that were down, closed or moved precincts, and poll books that listed long-time voters as inactive. Secretary of State Michael Watson's office said its hotline received a high volume of calls, including reports of a late-opening precinct, voting machines temporarily out of service and voters checking their registration status; Watson said voters marked inactive after county election commissioners verified state-shared data should cast affidavit ballots, which reactivate their status. Mississippi Today reported a Madison voter who had voted regularly at the same precinct, most recently in 2025, was marked inactive for not answering a confirmation letter sent to an old address, and said the affidavit room there was very busy. Mississippi Votes Action Fund reported machine malfunctions in Lamar, Lincoln, Hinds and Jackson counties; the Jackson County Election Commission attributed equipment problems at multiple polling places to its new voting machines, and its chairman said elderly poll workers were confused by the new electronic poll books and scanners. The Mississippi Black Women's Roundtable said that at some precincts only one machine was working and voters were steered to affidavit ballots, and that some Hinds County voters found their usual polling places closed without notice. After polls closed, the state Democratic Party filed a court challenge saying several DeSoto County precincts opened late (two by an hour), had extraordinary waits and ran short of regular and affidavit ballots, and sought an extra hour of voting; no immediate ruling was reported. On Nov. 4, journalist A.J. Perez wrote on X that up to 15,000 affidavit ballots remain to be counted, citing voters improperly deemed inactive and broken machines among the reasons; that figure is from his post and has not been confirmed by election officials. Mississippi Today reported on Nov. 2 that inactivations surged after the Secretary of State adopted Experian data for roll maintenance. Update (Nov. 19–20, 2026): the Associated Press reported that the number of Mississippi voters listed as inactive rose by nearly 60,000 since the 2024 presidential election, apparently because Experian data was integrated into roll maintenance. The Mississippi Legislative Black Caucus called for an investigation and a public hearing before the 2027 session into voters it says were wrongly marked inactive and what happened to their affidavit ballots. Holmes County organizer Kameisha Smith told WLBT that her affidavit ballot was rejected because an inaccurate San Antonio, Texas, address on her Experian report, since disputed and removed, appeared in her records. Secretary of State Watson's office said it welcomes an investigation, has continuously followed the law, and that voter rolls are maintained by local election officials. The number of wrongly inactivated voters and rejected affidavit ballots has not been officially reported. Status Confirmed by the Secretary of State's office and the Jackson County Election Commission, reported by Mississippi Today, the Mississippi Free Press and WXXV. The figure of up to 15,000 uncounted affidavit ballots is from a journalist's X post and is not confirmed by officials. Catalog point: long-time voters found themselves marked inactive after the state used outside commercial data for roll maintenance, and broken machines pushed many more onto affidavit ballots that are counted later. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): Secretary of State Michael Watson said on SuperTalk Mississippi that the Experian-supplemented roll-maintenance program is working as designed and that county election commissioners are legally responsible for verifying flagged address changes; Rankin County Election Commissioner Tonya Rivers told Democracy Docket she strongly disagrees, saying some Experian data sent to her county was wildly inaccurate (including suggested new addresses in states voters had never visited) and that commissioners were not consulted and learned of the Experian data only later. These are the two officials' competing accounts as reported by Democracy Docket; neither has been independently verified.", "sources": [{"title": "Mississippi Today — Mississippi inactive voters and machine failures (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://mississippitoday.org/2026/11/03/mississippi-voters-report-problems-amid-heavy-midterm-turnout/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Free Press — Mississippi inactive voters and machine failures (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.mississippifreepress.org/mississippi-voters-report-delays-faulty-machines-and-closed-precincts/"}, {"title": "WXXV News 25 — Mississippi inactive voters and machine failures (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wxxv25.com/mississippi-secretary-of-state-reports-election-day-issues-high-hotline-volume/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Today — Mississippi inactive voters and machine failures (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://mississippitoday.org/2026/11/02/red-flag-voter-inactivations-surge-in-midterms-since-secretary-of-state-adopted-unverified-experian-data-to-clean-voter-rolls/"}, {"title": "X post by @byajperez (2026-11-04T19:36:16Z)", "url": "https://x.com/byajperez/status/2118064807366508978"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Mississippi election chief blames local officials for voter purge chaos; they're pushing back (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/mississippi-election-chief-blames-local-officials-for-voter-purge-chaos-amid-razor-thin-senate-race-theyre-pushing-back/"}, {"title": "DeSoto County News — DeSoto County voting lawsuit dropped (Nov. 4, 2026)", "url": "https://desotocountynews.com/mississippi-news/desoto-county-voting-lawsuit-dropped/"}, {"title": "Associated Press — inactive-voter surge and caucus call for investigation (2026-11-20)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/mississippi-voters-ballots-democrats-experian-7a9282987612197b43c73cf05f7e7d31"}, {"title": "WLBT — inactive-voter surge and caucus call for investigation (2026-11-20)", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2026/11/20/mississippi-legislative-black-caucus-calls-investigation-into-inactive-voter-rolls/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Mississippi inactive voters and machine failures (ei-2026-10-305)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-20 12:16 PM ET (2026-11-20 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-305 update: AP ~60,000 inactive increase, Black Caucus investigation call). Label unchanged. EMon ei-2026-10-305 (added 2026-11-04 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET (2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-305 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "nc-2026-11-03-hertford-gates-lenoir-wilson-polling-places-delayed-opening-technical-issues", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-04", "uid": "C20261103-181235-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-04", "old_ids": ["nc-2026-11-03-hertford-gates-lenoir-wilson-polling-places-delayed-opening-technical-issues"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "NC", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, North Carolina State Board of Elections Executive Director Sam Hayes said at a news conference that some polling places in Hertford, Gates, Lenoir and Wilson counties had \"minor delays\" opening \"due to various technical issues,\" described as glitches such as a printer jam or pollbook confusion. WITN reported that one of 12 precincts in Hertford County had a 30-minute delay, and WRAL reported delays at Vinson-Bynum Elementary School in Wilson. The issues were resolved, and the State Board scheduled a 2 p.m. meeting to decide whether to extend voting past 7:30 p.m. at the affected sites. State law allows extensions only where voting was interrupted for at least 15 minutes, and only for as long as the disruption lasted. WRAL said statewide results could be delayed about an hour if extensions are granted. The State Board's emergency meeting notice for 2 p.m. listed specific sites for possible extensions: South Williams (Tabor City Courthouse) in Columbus County, North Sunbury Sub Station 2 in Gates County, K8 Holloway Recreation Center in Lenoir County, Boone 2 (Appalachian State Plemmons Student Union) in Watauga County, 102 Boomer Fire Department in Wilkes County, Wells School and Vinson-Bynum Elementary School in Wilson County, and multiple precincts in Hertford County. WECT reported that the computer system at the Tabor City Courthouse precinct went down for a time, workers used the emergency backup system, and no one was turned away. Under state rules, any ballot cast after 7:30 p.m. is provisional. At the 2 p.m. meeting, the State Board voted unanimously to extend voting until 8 p.m. at Lenoir County's K8 precinct at the Holloway Recreation Center in Kinston, where printer problems delayed voting for about 45 minutes; Lenoir County Elections Director Kristie Smith said one voter left to go to work and planned to return (Neuse News). Voters arriving after 7:30 p.m. at that precinct will cast provisional ballots. The Raleigh News & Observer and WFAE later reported the full State Board decision: voting was extended at five polling places. In Columbus County, the South Williams-Tabor City Courthouse site was extended 45 minutes to 8:15 p.m.; in Lenoir County, K8 Holloway Recreation Center in Kinston was extended to 8 p.m.; in Wilson County, the Recreation Park Center precincts were extended 15 minutes to 7:45 p.m.; and in Hertford County, the Como Fire and Rescue Building was extended 25 minutes to 7:55 p.m. and the Murfree Center in Murfreesboro 30 minutes to 8 p.m. The board declined extensions for the Gates, Watauga and Wilkes county sites. Officials said workers used backup systems in most cases and all technical problems were resolved. Statewide results will not be released until at least 8:15 p.m., when the last extended site closes; voters in line at 7:30 p.m. elsewhere may still vote. Status Confirmed by NC State Board of Elections Executive Director Sam Hayes at a news conference and the board's emergency meeting notice, reported by the News & Observer, WRAL, WITN, WECT and others. Catalog point: printer jams and poll-book confusion delayed openings in four counties and forced an emergency state board meeting about extending hours. Each technology layer added to the polling place is another point where voting can stop.", "sources": [{"title": "Raleigh News & Observer — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article317902579.html"}, {"title": "WECT — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wect.com/2026/11/03/nc-board-elections-consider-extending-poll-hours-some-counties/"}, {"title": "WITN — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.witn.com/2026/11/03/boe-election-day-issues-enc-county-congressional-monitors-placed-district-one/"}, {"title": "ABC11 (live updates) — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://abc11.com/live-updates/nc-midterm-elections-2026-hot-us-senate-house-races-road-balance-power-runs-north-carolina/20009167/entry/20012048/"}, {"title": "WRAL — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wral.com/news/nccapitol/nc-voting-election-polls-races-ballot-north-carolina-midterm-updates-results-november-2026/"}, {"title": "NC State Board of Elections (emergency meeting notice) — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2026/11/03/state-board-emergency-meeting-nov-3-2026"}, {"title": "The NC Beat (live updates) — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://thencbeat.com/north-carolina-election-night-live-updates-2026/"}, {"title": "Neuse News — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.neusenews.com/index/2026/11/3/voting-extended-until-8-pm-at-holloway-recreation-center-after-printer-problems"}, {"title": "The NC Beat — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://thencbeat.com/nc-election-results-delay-voting-hours-extension/"}, {"title": "WFAE 90.7 — NC four-county Election Day delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wfae.org/politics/2026-11-03/nc-extends-voting-hours-at-five-polling-places-after-technical-issues-results-will-be-delayed"}, {"title": "X post by @ReceiptsMatter (2026-11-03T18:13:37Z)", "url": "https://x.com/ReceiptsMatter/status/2117681618089337205"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NC four-county Election Day delays (ei-2026-10-253)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-253 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nh-belknap-2026-11-03-laconia-ward-5-turning-point-volunteer-slapped-man-charged", "permanent_id": "C20261104-180406-03", "uid": "C20261104-180406-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-180406-03", "old_ids": ["nh-belknap-2026-11-03-laconia-ward-5-turning-point-volunteer-slapped-man-charged"], "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "NH", "description": "Just before 3 p.m. on Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Laconia police were called to Woodland Heights Elementary School, the Ward 5 polling location, for a reported assault. Police said an 18-year-old volunteer staffing a Turning Point Action informational booth outside the polls was approached by a man who had just voted and wanted to read him a poem about rich people; the two argued, the man became agitated, and he allegedly struck the volunteer across the face with the back of his hand before walking away. Video of the confrontation spread widely on social media. Police located video evidence and several witnesses, obtained a warrant, and arrested Stephen Redic, 70, of Laconia, just before 8 a.m. on Nov. 4 (the Union Leader reported he turned himself in). He is charged with misdemeanor simple assault and violation-level disorderly conduct and is scheduled for arraignment in Laconia on Dec. 10. Police Chief Matt Canfield called the incident unprovoked; Redic told WMUR the video tells only part of the story but that his actions were inexcusable and he apologizes. The Belknap County Republican and Democratic committees both condemned the attack. Charges are accusations only. Status Confirmed by the Laconia Police Department and Chief Matt Canfield, reported by WMUR, the New Hampshire Union Leader and Boston 25 News. The charges are accusations only. Catalog point: a political volunteer outside a polling place was struck on Election Day, and the confrontation was filmed and spread widely.", "sources": [{"title": "WMUR — Laconia polling-place assault (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wmur.com/article/man-assault-turning-point-arrest/74333117"}, {"title": "New Hampshire Union Leader — Laconia polling-place assault (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.unionleader.com/news/local-news/laconia-man-arrested-wednesday-accused-of-striking-another-at-the-polls-on-tuesday-afternoon-ed417d27/"}, {"title": "Boston 25 News — Laconia polling-place assault (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.boston25news.com/news/local/man-accused-assaulting-worker-turning-point-usa-booth-polling-location-new-hampshire/TY4SY5ASOBAAPISKDZYQXRMVCA/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Laconia polling-place assault (ei-2026-10-306)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-306 (added 2026-11-04 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nj-salem-2026-11-03-board-of-elections-scanner-broke-1800-ballots-unprocessed-overnight", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-27", "uid": "C20261106-121456-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-27", "old_ids": ["nj-salem-2026-11-03-board-of-elections-scanner-broke-1800-ballots-unprocessed-overnight"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Election Night Nov. 3, 2026, a ballot-scanning machine at the Salem County Board of Elections broke down, leaving approximately 1,800 ballots uncounted and forcing officials to suspend tabulation for the night, New Jersey Globe reported. At the halt, Republican incumbents Ed Ramsay and Paul Collier led Democrats Charles Hassler and John “Buddy” Ayars in the two commissioner races. The News of Salem County reported 19,254 ballots counted as of 12:07 a.m. Wednesday (38.1% of 50,497 registered). When counting resumed, both Democratic candidates moved ahead; by Nov. 5 New Jersey Globe reported Hassler defeating Ramsay by 1,053 votes and Ayars unseating Collier by 274, cutting the GOP board majority to 3–2 (unofficial; ~207 provisionals remaining). Status Confirmed by New Jersey Globe and The News of Salem County; a Board of Elections ballot scanner broke on Election Night with about 1,800 ballots left, counting stopped overnight, and after the count resumed both Democratic commissioner candidates moved ahead of the Republican incumbents (unofficial). Catalog point: a single central-count scanner failure halted overnight tabulation and shifted the remaining ballots — and the unofficial commissioner outcomes — to the next day.", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey Globe — Salem County NJ Board of Elections scanner breakdown (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/local/republicans-narrowly-win-in-salem-county/"}, {"title": "The News of Salem County — Salem County NJ Board of Elections scanner breakdown (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://thenewsofsalemcounty.com/too-close-to-call-salem-county-nj-election-results-2026/"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — Salem County NJ Board of Elections scanner breakdown (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/local/democrats-flip-two-salem-county-commissioner-seats/"}, {"title": "OVERLOOKED — Salem County NJ Board of Elections scanner breakdown (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://theoverlooked.news/story/new-jersey-salem-county-scanner-breakdown-1800-ballots-commissioner-races"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Salem County NJ Board of Elections scanner breakdown (ei-2026-10-344)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-344 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status developing). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nv-clark-2026-11-03-election-day-hourslong-lines-brinley-open-near-midnight", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-11", "uid": "C20261106-121456-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-11", "old_ids": ["nv-clark-2026-11-03-election-day-hourslong-lines-brinley-open-near-midnight"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "NV", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, some Clark County, Nevada, vote centers had hourslong lines. FOX5 reported waits of up to three hours and said the Nevada Secretary of State's office reported the last voter in the state cast a ballot at 11:57 p.m. at J. Harold Brinley Middle School in Las Vegas; results were released after that close. Clark County Registrar of Voters Lorena Portillo told FOX5 and News 3 that \"the lines at some of our locations this year were unfortunate,\" while saying sites had been resourced from past turnout and that popularity at sites such as Brinley shifted. Portillo also cited Clark County's two-card ballot (142 contests / 254 candidates) as adding time at the booth and said about 146,000 people voted in person in Clark County on Election Day. News 3 quoted Secretary of State Cisco Aguilar saying voters \"overcame serious challenges on Election Day\" and that \"no voter should have to wait in line for five hours.\" Portillo said the department will review equipment, staffing, and its online wait-time tool. Status Confirmed by Clark County Registrar of Voters Lorena Portillo and Secretary of State Cisco Aguilar, reported by FOX5, News 3 and KTNV; the last statewide voter cast at 11:57 p.m. at Brinley Middle School, and Aguilar said no voter should wait five hours. Catalog point: vote-center resource allocation and a two-card ballot left some Election Day sites with hourslong lines despite advance planning.", "sources": [{"title": "News 3 / KSNV — Clark County NV Election Day hourslong lines (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://news3lv.com/news/local/clark-county-voters-faced-hourslong-election-day-lines-former-official-weighs-fixes"}, {"title": "FOX5 Las Vegas — Clark County NV Election Day hourslong lines (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.fox5vegas.com/2026/11/04/clark-county-registrar-addresses-long-lines-some-voting-sites/"}, {"title": "KTNV — Clark County NV Election Day hourslong lines (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.ktnv.com/news/political/elections-local/clark-county-processing-thousands-of-mail-ballots-as-officials-address-long-election-day-lines"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Clark County NV Election Day hourslong lines (ei-2026-10-327)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-327 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ny-westchester-2026-11-03-scanners-countywide-reject-ballots-paper-issue-emergency-bags", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-06", "uid": "C20261103-121512-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-06", "old_ids": ["ny-westchester-2026-11-03-scanners-countywide-reject-ballots-paper-issue-emergency-bags"], "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "NY", "description": "On the morning of Nov. 3, 2026 (Election Day), ballot scanners at polling places throughout Westchester County, NY, began refusing to accept ballots. The Westchester County Board of Elections first said in a statement that the problem was \"an issue involving the thickness of paper ballots\"; a later corrected version of the statement says only \"an issue involving paper ballots.\" The board told voters to stay in line and fill out their paper ballots, which poll workers place in orange emergency ballot bags that it says will stay secure and be counted under election procedures. ABC7 reported that county officials said those ballots will be hand-counted after polls close and that technicians were sent to affected sites; results in the NY-17 race may be delayed. The board apologized for the disruption. Just the News reported that U.S. Rep. Mike Lawler (R-NY) said on X that the exact cause, whether the ballots or the machines, was not yet known, that the Board of Elections is working with its vendors to fix the problem, and that voters should stay in line and vote because their ballots will be counted. Rasmussen Reports (@Rasmussen_Poll) posted that the ballots \"aren't 'too thick'\" and that machine settings \"most likely have been adjusted to reject them\"; no source supports that claim, and it is the poster's speculation. No cause beyond the paper issue had been confirmed as of this card. Official error: the board's statement attributes it to the paper ballots and apologizes, but does not use the word error. Status Confirmed for the countywide scanner rejections and the emergency-bag procedure, stated by the Westchester County Board of Elections and reported by ABC7, FOX 5 New York and others. The cause beyond \"an issue involving paper ballots\" is not established; the claim that machine settings were adjusted is the poster's speculation and is unsupported. Update: the Westchester County Board of Elections reported it had scanned 15,467 emergency ballots on Nov. 4 and 11,462 more as of 1:30 p.m. on Nov. 5 for a preliminary total of 26,929, with daily scanning continuing (Yonkers Times, Patch). MyRye.com, citing an unnamed county official, estimated about 160,000 Election Day ballots might need counting. News 12 reported County Executive Ken Jenkins said a bipartisan committee is being formed to investigate. The Board continues to attribute the scanner problem to an election-programming update not installed on all machines. Catalog point: the board first blamed paper thickness and then removed that wording. Ballots that scanners will not read are set aside and counted later, by hand according to county officials, which shows that hand counting remains the reliable backstop when machines fail. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): The New York State Board of Elections said scanning of all of Westchester's roughly 181,000 Election Day emergency ballots finished at about 8:45 p.m. on Nov. 6, after it sent 20 staff and, with the Suffolk County Board of Elections and Clear Ballot, added nine scanning stations to the county's three. The State Board said results remain subject to reconciliation, canvass and certification, and that after Westchester certifies it will conduct a full bipartisan review of what caused the Election Day failure and share its findings publicly.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC7 New York — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://abc7ny.com/post/election-day-scanner-problem-affects-westchester-polling-sites/20011651/"}, {"title": "MyRye.com (Westchester BOE statement) — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://myrye.com/2026/11/westchester-boe-voting-machine-failure/"}, {"title": "Yonkers Times (corrected BOE statement) — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://yonkerstimes.com/we-wont-know-for-days-who-won-ny-17-because-the-wrong-paper-was-used-for-our-high-tech-ballot-machines/"}, {"title": "FOX 5 New York — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fox5ny.com/news/westchester-county-ballot-scanner-problems"}, {"title": "Rasmussen Reports (X), post with photo — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/Rasmussen_Poll/status/2117616108954161405"}, {"title": "@Bogs4NY (X), quoted post with image — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/Bogs4NY/status/2117608363303305502"}, {"title": "Just the News — Westchester scanners reject ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/ballot-machines-westchester-county-new-york-wont-accept-paper-ballots"}, {"title": "Yonkers Times — Westchester BOE update on emergency ballot processing (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://yonkerstimes.com/westchester-county-board-of-elections-provides-update-on-emergency-ballot-processing-following-election-day/"}, {"title": "Patch (White Plains) — Westchester election results hold as ballots set aside (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://patch.com/new-york/whiteplains/westchester-election-results-hold-ballots-set-aside-voting-machine-collapse"}, {"title": "MyRye.com — Only 17 percent of Election Day ballots counted estimate (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://myrye.com/2026/11/only-17-percent-election-ballots-counted/"}, {"title": "News 12 — Vote counting continues in Westchester after widespread machine problems (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://connecticut.news12.com/2026/11/06/vote-counting-continues-in-westchester-after-widespread-machine-problems-no-estimate-on-completion/4eHdWvwXNx2MCXn7tKUjzj"}, {"title": "ABC7 New York — Vote counting resumes in Westchester (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://abc7ny.com/post/midterm-results-vote-counting-resumes-westchester-county-election-day-ballot-glitch/20015392/"}, {"title": "New York State Board of Elections — Westchester County update press release (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://elections.ny.gov/system/files/documents/2026/11/westchester-county-update-press-release-11092026-final.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Westchester scanners reject ballots (ei-2026-10-239)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-06 midday ingest: added Nov. 4–5 emergency-ballot scanning progress (EMon ei-2026-10-239 update); stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-239 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET (2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-239 Nov. 9 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "oh-hancock-2026-11-03-mccomb-voting-machines-said-already-voted-reused-voter-access-cards-not-set-up", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-03", "uid": "C20261111-120609-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-03", "old_ids": ["oh-hancock-2026-11-03-mccomb-voting-machines-said-already-voted-reused-voter-access-cards-not-set-up"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "OH", "description": "WTVG 13abc reported on Nov. 10, 2026 that several Hancock County, Ohio voters had trouble with voting machines on Election Day at the McComb Church of Christ polling place. Voter Rick Hohenbrink said he and friends, first in line, tried about six machines after check-in and got messages saying they had already voted; he was eventually able to submit a ballot after poll workers fixed the machines. Voter Brett Montague said several machines would not accept his card until the process was restarted. Randy Wanamaker, an IT assistant with the county board of elections, said there was a misstep in setting up the check-in machine and the voting cards were not created correctly; the cards are reused from election to election and can retain old data if not properly cleared. Hohenbrink later asked the board to confirm his ballot was counted once, but officials said ballots cannot be traced to individual voters. Wanamaker said the board verified that the number of check-ins matched the number of ballots cast at the location, 304. No voter was reported to have been unable to vote. Status Confirmed by Hancock County Board of Elections IT assistant Randy Wanamaker, who acknowledged the check-in setup misstep and incorrectly created cards, reported by WTVG 13abc with named voters Rick Hohenbrink and Brett Montague. Catalog point: reused voter-access cards carried old data and told voters they had already voted; afterward the board could not confirm that a voter's ballot was counted only once because ballots cannot be traced to individuals.", "sources": [{"title": "WTVG 13abc — Hancock Co. OH \"already voted\" card errors (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://www.13abc.com/2026/11/10/hancock-county-voters-report-election-day-machine-issues/"}, {"title": "X post by @j3669 (2026-11-11T11:43:18Z)", "url": "https://x.com/j3669/status/2120482495619891474"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hancock Co. OH \"already voted\" card errors (ei-2026-10-401)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-401 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "oh-lucas-2026-11-03-toledo-beverly-elementary-polling-place-bomb-threat-evacuated", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-02", "uid": "C20261103-181235-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-02", "old_ids": ["oh-lucas-2026-11-03-toledo-beverly-elementary-polling-place-bomb-threat-evacuated"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "OH", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, at about 10:27 a.m., Toledo police responded to a reported bomb threat at Beverly Elementary School, a Lucas County polling place, WTOL reported. Voters and staff were evacuated while officers searched the building; the Northwest Ohio Bomb Squad was notified and bomb-detection dogs were requested. An election protection monitor told WTOL that roughly 40 people stood outside during the sweep and that monitors collected names and numbers of people who were turned away. Lucas County Board of Elections Director LaVera Scott initially said additional voting machines were being brought so voters could vote outside (13 ABC). Police cleared the site at about 12:15 p.m. and voting resumed inside. Other area schools also received threats that morning, including Monac Elementary in Toledo, Conneaut and Kenwood elementaries in Bowling Green, and Lake Local Schools; all were swept and found safe. It is not known whether the threats are connected. Update: police deemed the threat non-credible and found no explosives. Shortly before the 7:30 p.m. close, Lucas County Common Pleas Judge Ken Walz, on a suit by the Ohio Democratic Party, let people who joined the Beverly line from 7:30 to 9:15 p.m. cast provisional ballots, to be kept sealed and uncounted unless the court orders otherwise; Secretary of State Frank LaRose told WTOL he \"very much disagree[d]\" and expected the ballots to be challenged. Status Confirmed for the threat, the evacuation and the reopening, reported by WTOL, 13 ABC and Ideastream with Toledo police and the Lucas County Board of Elections director. No suspect is reported. Catalog point: voters stood outside for almost two hours while police searched the building, and election protection monitors recorded people who were turned away. Several other area schools received threats the same morning.", "sources": [{"title": "WTOL 11 — Toledo OH Beverly Elementary bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wtol.com/article/news/local/vote/police-investigate-school-threat-in-lake-township-sweep-tps-polling-location/512-97755e13-a45e-4b5b-9d45-4fc9e015776e"}, {"title": "13 ABC (WTVG) — Toledo OH Beverly Elementary bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.13abc.com/2026/11/03/polling-location-beverly-elementary-evacuated-due-bomb-treat/"}, {"title": "Ideastream Public Media (live updates) — Toledo OH Beverly Elementary bomb threat (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.ideastream.org/live-updates/live-coverage-northeast-ohioans-cast-their-ballots-in-the-2026-november-midterm-election"}, {"title": "X post by @WheelerMan (2026-11-03T18:34:26Z)", "url": "https://x.com/WheelerMan/status/2117686858738176320"}, {"title": "WTOL 11 — LaRose on Beverly Elementary extended-hours provisional ballots (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wtol.com/article/news/politics/elections/frank-larose-beverly-elementary-toledo-extended-voting-hours-provisional-ballots/512-65c356cb-4c28-4e9f-b1ae-14e1ce2459f6"}, {"title": "WTOL 11 — What affected voters need to know after Beverly Elementary disruption (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wtol.com/article/news/politics/elections/what-affected-voters-need-to-know-after-election-day-disruption-at-beverly-elementary/512-fb816c99-b861-4933-9dc3-1769779dde94"}, {"title": "13 ABC (WTVG) — Attorneys plan lawsuit to extend voting hours at Beverly Elementary (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.13abc.com/2026/11/03/attorneys-plan-lawsuit-extend-voting-hours-beverly-elementary-polling-location-after-bomb-threat-blade-reports/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Toledo OH Beverly Elementary bomb threat (ei-2026-10-251)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-05 midday ingest: added court-ordered extended provisional voting and LaRose response (EMon ei-2026-10-251 update). EMon ei-2026-10-251 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ok-oklahoma-county-2026-11-03-ballot-readers-jam-multiple-polling-places-emergency-bins", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-08", "uid": "C20261104-121522-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-08", "old_ids": ["ok-oklahoma-county-2026-11-03-ballot-readers-jam-multiple-polling-places-emergency-bins"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "OK", "description": "On the morning of Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Oklahoma County Election Board reported voting-machine (ballot reader) problems at multiple polling places, causing delays for some voters. Election Board Secretary Doug Sanderson said such malfunctions are not unusual, particularly with long ballots that can jam, that technicians were sent to the sites, and that affected ballots were placed in locked emergency bins to be counted at the end of the day. KOCO 5 reported brief machine issues at polling places in northwest Oklahoma City and Edmond and a report of a machine down in Harrah, and county officials said those were fixed with technicians standing by. The State Election Board's spokesperson described minor voting device issues that were quickly resolved. Status Confirmed by Oklahoma County Election Board Secretary Doug Sanderson, reported by News 9, KOCO 5 and The Oklahoman. Catalog point: ballot readers jammed at multiple sites, especially on long ballots, and the affected paper ballots were held in locked emergency bins to be counted later.", "sources": [{"title": "News 9 (KWTV) — Oklahoma County OK voting machine problems (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.news9.com/oklahoma-elections/oklahoma-county-election-board-polling-machine-issues"}, {"title": "KOCO 5 — Oklahoma County OK voting machine problems (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.koco.com/article/oklahoma-voting-machine-issues-polling-place-2026-election/74324721"}, {"title": "The Oklahoman (live updates) — Oklahoma County OK voting machine problems (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/oklahoma-midterm-election-2026-live-updates-results-and-winners--live/92567387007/"}, {"title": "X post by @brianskellenger (2026-11-03T15:33:27Z)", "url": "https://x.com/brianskellenger/status/2117641311759077883"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Oklahoma County OK voting machine problems (ei-2026-10-282)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-282 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "or-marion-2026-11-03-envelope-sorter-down-six-hours-election-night-count-slowed", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-03", "uid": "C20261109-121807-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-03", "old_ids": ["or-marion-2026-11-03-envelope-sorter-down-six-hours-election-night-count-slowed"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "OR", "description": "According to Salem Reporter (Madeleine Moore, Nov. 6, 2026), the envelope-sorting machine in the Marion County, Oregon, clerk's office was unusable for about six hours on Election Night (roughly 4–10:30 p.m. Nov. 3, 2026), leaving election workers unable to use automated sorting for nearly every ballot. County Clerk Bill Burgess said the outage \"slowed down the process quite a bit,\" though staff kept working with ballots already in house and later resumed after repairs. The Statesman Journal similarly reported that Marion County still had about one-third of ballots left to count after the machine broke. This is a post-polling count delay, not a report that voters were turned away. Status Confirmed by Marion County Clerk Bill Burgess as reported by the Salem Reporter and the Statesman Journal (Nov. 6). This is a post-polling count delay, not a report that voters were turned away. Catalog point: one machine failure took automated envelope sorting offline for about six hours on Election Night and left about a third of the county's ballots still to be counted days later.", "sources": [{"title": "Salem Reporter — Marion County OR Election Night sorter outage (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.salemreporter.com/2026/11/06/marion-county-ballot-count-slowed-by-broken-machine-on-election-night/"}, {"title": "Statesman Journal — Marion County OR Election Night sorter outage (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.statesmanjournal.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/06/marion-county-has-many-ballots-to-count-election-machine-breaks/92647704007/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Marion County OR Election Night sorter outage (ei-2026-10-354)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-354 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-2026-11-03-beaver-centre-scanner-jams-ballots-held-emergency-slot", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-20", "uid": "C20261104-121522-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-20", "old_ids": ["pa-2026-11-03-beaver-centre-scanner-jams-ballots-held-emergency-slot"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On the morning of Nov. 3, 2026, activist Scott Presler (@ScottPresler) posted messages he says came from voters. One says that in Beaver County \"the machine to scan ballots isn't working and the ballots have to go in a box\" to be scanned after polls close. Another says the scanner was jammed at the Lions Club building in Pine Grove Mills (Ferguson East precinct, Centre County), so ballots were being inserted in the bottom slot for workers to scan later. A reply from another user says Butler Township in Luzerne County \"has no scanner box\" and ballots are going into a holding box. These reports have not been confirmed by a news outlet or county election office; replies on X note that Beaver County had not confirmed an outage. Pennsylvania's Department of State directive says that if all precinct scanners in a precinct are inoperable, voters drop completed ballots in a secure container to be tabulated after polls close, so the emergency bin is the prescribed backup. A separate Presler post shares a screenshot of a Facebook post by Rob O'Donnell quoting a voter: \"7:45 am Butler Township Luzerne County District 8. The scanner box for my district was not available, so they put my ballot in a holding box in the other scanning machine,\" and saying a scanner was present but \"not attached to a box that the ballots would fall into.\" The county's election proclamation lists Butler Township Districts 1 through 5, so \"District 8\" may refer to the 8th Congressional District. At 12:29 p.m. ET, The Citizens' Voice reported that the heads of the Luzerne County Democratic and Republican parties said there had been no issues at the polls so far. UPDATE (Nov. 4): County and state officials have now confirmed scanner problems. CNHI News reported that ballot scanners malfunctioned in \"a handful of precincts\" in Beaver, Centre, Franklin and Luzerne counties and that the problems were resolved within a few hours or less. Beaver County elections director Colin Sisk said a scanner jammed at Precinct 1 in Economy Borough and that, once a new scanner was running about 90 minutes later, the ballots were scanned one by one under the watch of the judge of election, county election board members and observers. Centre County spokesperson Kirsten Smith said paper jams occurred at the Ferguson East precinct in Pine Grove Mills and \"a small number\" of other precincts, and that bipartisan teams scanned the ballots from the emergency slot after polls closed. Secretary of the Commonwealth Al Schmidt's office said some counties had isolated scanner issues, that ballots were held securely until they could be scanned, and that the jams did not prevent anyone from voting. The Butler Township (Luzerne County) report has not been confirmed separately. Status Confirmed by Beaver County elections director Colin Sisk, Centre County spokesperson Kirsten Smith and the Secretary of the Commonwealth's office (CNHI News); the Butler Township (Luzerne) report is not separately confirmed. Catalog point: scanners jammed in several counties, and ballots from the emergency slot were scanned later under bipartisan watch.", "sources": [{"title": "@ScottPresler (X), voter message, Beaver County — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/ScottPresler/status/2117629512619864273"}, {"title": "@ScottPresler (X), voter message, Centre County — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/ScottPresler/status/2117635517151887542"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State directive (2026) — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/directives-and-guidance/2026/2026-directive2_use-of-elec-voting-systems.pdf"}, {"title": "@ScottPresler (X), screenshot of Rob O'Donnell Facebook post, Luzerne County — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/ScottPresler/status/2117630630733455414"}, {"title": "The Citizens' Voice (live updates) — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-polls-are-open-in-luzerne-county/"}, {"title": "Luzerne County Election Proclamation — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026)", "url": "https://www.luzernecounty.org/1539/Election-Proclamation"}, {"title": "CNHI News — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.cnhinews.com/cnhi/article_3150dae3-06d5-4d94-a5b2-aefb80859502.html"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State — PA scanner jams in four counties (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/agencies/dos/newsroom/safe-and-secure-election-day-2026"}, {"title": "X post by @subyrn (2026-11-03T15:21:22Z)", "url": "https://x.com/subyrn/status/2117638272319119843"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — PA scanner jams in four counties (ei-2026-10-243)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-243 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-03-pa-beaver-centre-luzerne-scanners-jammed-down-ballots-in-emergency-bins. Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-butler-2026-11-03-adams-township-precinct-3-ballot-scanner-jam-fixed", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-16", "uid": "C20261106-121456-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-16", "old_ids": ["pa-butler-2026-11-03-adams-township-precinct-3-ballot-scanner-jam-fixed"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "Butler County Bureau of Elections director Chantell McCurdy told the Butler Eagle that a ballot scanner at Adams Township Precinct 3 jammed on Nov. 3, 2026, and was down in the early afternoon before being fixed shortly after 1 p.m. Voters could wait for the fix or place completed ballots in a sealed emergency compartment for later counting under bipartisan observation once the judge of elections broke the seal. McCurdy said her office believes a small piece of paper stuck in the scanner caused the jam and described such incidents as uncommon but not abnormal. Status Confirmed by Butler County Bureau of Elections director Chantell McCurdy to the Butler Eagle; the Adams Township Precinct 3 scanner jammed in the early afternoon and was fixed shortly after 1 p.m., with an emergency compartment available for sealed later counting. Catalog point: a small paper jam took a precinct scanner offline until repaired, and ballots could wait in a sealed emergency compartment under bipartisan observation.", "sources": [{"title": "Butler Eagle — Butler County PA Adams Twp Precinct 3 scanner jam (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.butlereagle.com/20261103/ballot-scanner-in-adams-township-jammed-fixed-around-1-p-m/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Butler County PA Adams Twp Precinct 3 scanner jam (ei-2026-10-332)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-332 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-cambria-2026-11-03-johnstown-precinct-incomplete-poll-book-names-missing", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-08", "uid": "C20261103-181235-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-08", "old_ids": ["pa-cambria-2026-11-03-johnstown-precinct-incomplete-poll-book-names-missing"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, shortly after polls opened, activist Scott Presler posted on X that a polling place in Johnstown, Cambria County, Pennsylvania, was turning voters away because their names were missing. Votebeat reporter Carter Walker, writing in Spotlight PA's live coverage, asked the county, which said in a statement that one precinct did not receive a complete poll book and that a replacement was printed and sent to the polling place. The county said the issue did not prevent any voter from casting a ballot; provisional ballots are the standard contingency in such cases. The precinct name and how long the poll book was incomplete were not reported. Cambria County had a separate, larger tabulator problem in the 2024 general election. Status Confirmed by Cambria County's statement to Votebeat, published in Spotlight PA's live coverage. The county says no voter was prevented from casting a ballot; the precinct and the poll book format were not reported. Catalog point: a precinct received a poll book that was missing voters, so registered voters were initially told their names were not there until a replacement was printed and sent.", "sources": [{"title": "Spotlight PA / Votebeat (live updates) — Cambria PA incomplete poll book (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2026/11/pennsylvania-election-day-live-updates-results/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Cambria PA incomplete poll book (ei-2026-10-268)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-268 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-chester-2026-11-03-machine-setup-delayed-openings-three-precincts-hours-extended", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-01", "uid": "C20261103-181235-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-01", "old_ids": ["pa-chester-2026-11-03-machine-setup-delayed-openings-three-precincts-hours-extended"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, Chester County, Pennsylvania, said the Court of Common Pleas granted a petition for a 30-minute extension of voting hours at three precincts \"due to machine set-up issues that briefly delayed the opening of those polling locations this morning.\" Precinct 201 (Easttown 3, Easttown Township Library, Berwyn), Precinct 210 (Easttown 6, St. John's Presbyterian Church, Devon) and Precinct 244 (East Goshen, Goshen Baptist Church, West Chester) will stay open until 8:30 p.m.; votes cast after 8 p.m. will use provisional ballots. The county said the ballot drop box at the Easttown Library and Information Center closes at 8 p.m. and all other precincts close at 8 p.m. as scheduled. The Pennsylvania Department of State reposted the notice, and Patch reported it the same day. The county has not said how long the openings were delayed or how many voters were affected. Status Confirmed by Chester County's own notice and the Court of Common Pleas order, reposted by the Pennsylvania Department of State and reported by Patch. Catalog point: machine set-up problems at the start of the day delayed three polling places enough that a court had to extend voting, and the extra half hour is on provisional ballots. Equipment that must be configured correctly every morning can fail without warning.", "sources": [{"title": "Chester County (Alert Center) — Chester County PA extended hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.chesco.org/AlertCenter.aspx?AID=Chester-County-General-Election-98"}, {"title": "Chester County Voter Services (X), notice image — Chester County PA extended hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/ChescoVoterSvcs/status/2117655528444715261"}, {"title": "Patch (West Chester) — Chester County PA extended hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://patch.com/pennsylvania/westchester/polling-hours-extended-multiple-locations-around-chester-county"}, {"title": "X post by @PAStateDept (2026-11-03T16:43:55Z)", "url": "https://x.com/PAStateDept/status/2117659047520268589"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Chester County PA extended hours (ei-2026-10-249)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-249 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-luzerne-2026-11-03-hazleton-voter-handed-slip-for-closed-polling-place", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-18", "uid": "C20261104-121522-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-18", "old_ids": ["pa-luzerne-2026-11-03-hazleton-voter-handed-slip-for-closed-polling-place"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a voter who went to Hazleton City Hall was told he was in the wrong place and was handed a printout listing his Ward 9 polling place as Our Lady of Grace R.C. Church, 750 N. Vine St., The Standard-Speaker reported. That church closed on Aug. 2, and a sign there directed voters to the new polling place about a block away at St. John the Baptist Polish National Catholic Church, 748 N. Church St. The judge of election for the eighth ward said poll workers spotted the error, and a Democratic poll watcher helped the voter. County Manager Romilda Crocamo said she did not know why a voter would be handed a slip for a closed polling place and that the county had received no other complaints like it. The county Election Bureau's website lists the correct location for Wards 9 and 11. The newspaper reported that later in the afternoon people were still walking up to the closed church and leaving after seeing the sign. Status Confirmed by County Manager Romilda Crocamo and the local judge of election, reported by The Standard-Speaker; the county says it received no other complaints like it. Catalog point: a voter was handed official printout data pointing to a church that had closed in August.", "sources": [{"title": "The Standard-Speaker — Hazleton PA closed-polling-place slip (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.standardspeaker.com/2026/11/03/polling-site-change-causes-some-confusion-in-hazleton/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hazleton PA closed-polling-place slip (ei-2026-10-298)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-298 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-philadelphia-2026-11-03-germantown-happy-hollow-polling-place-electrical-fire-machines-down-hour", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-04", "uid": "C20261109-180918-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-04", "old_ids": ["pa-philadelphia-2026-11-03-germantown-happy-hollow-polling-place-electrical-fire-machines-down-hour"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, an electrical fire caused a power outage at the Happy Hollow Playground and Recreation Center polling place in Germantown, Philadelphia, temporarily disrupting in-person voting, KYW Newsradio reported. Poll workers said voters smelled something burning before the power went out; firefighters determined an electrical fire had knocked out power. Voting machines were not operational for just over an hour. Many voters left, though poll workers encouraged them to stay and fill out provisional ballots. Power was restored after 1 p.m. and voting machines were fully operational again. KYW said it had reached out to the Office of the City Commissioners and had not yet received a response at the time of publication. Status Confirmed by KYW Newsradio's on-scene reporting of poll workers and firefighters' determination; the Office of the City Commissioners had not responded at publication. Catalog point: an electrical fire took the voting machines down for just over an hour, many voters left, and those who stayed were steered to provisional ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "KYW Newsradio — Germantown PA Happy Hollow electrical fire (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.audacy.com/kywnewsradio/news/local/fire-germantown-polling-place"}, {"title": "KYW Newsradio (live report) — Germantown PA Happy Hollow electrical fire (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.audacy.com/podcasts/d81566608e783ef09f28df4e28074880/episodes/electrical_fire_disrupts_votin-8935560"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Germantown PA Happy Hollow electrical fire (ei-2026-10-384)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-384 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "sc-dorchester-2026-11-03-early-voting-usb-failure-5500-plus-hand-count-rescan", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-28", "uid": "C20261106-121456-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-28", "old_ids": ["sc-dorchester-2026-11-03-early-voting-usb-failure-5500-plus-hand-count-rescan"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "SC", "description": "On Election Night Nov. 3, 2026, Dorchester County Board of Voter Registration and Elections Executive Director Kizzie Scott told ABC News 4 (WCIV) and The Post and Courier that faulty USB sticks from early-voting ballot scanners failed to upload results, forcing workers to hand-count and rescan more than 5,500 early-voting ballots. The Post and Courier reported the drives came from two early-voting sites — Miles Road Baptist Church and Wescott Park — and that the votes spanned multiple early-voting days, so staff had to pull the correct batches before rescanning. Scott said nothing was wrong with the ballots themselves; the USB may have hit storage capacity and crashed. Hand counts matched the rescanned totals, and the county completed its statewide hand-count audit Nov. 4. The delay affected reporting in South Carolina's closely watched 1st Congressional District (Democrat Nancy Lacore later led Republican Jenny Costa Honeycutt unofficially). Provisional-ballot review was scheduled for Friday Nov. 6; results remained unofficial pending certification. Status Confirmed by Dorchester County Board of Voter Registration and Elections Executive Director Kizzie Scott to ABC News 4 (WCIV) and The Post and Courier; faulty USB sticks from two early-voting sites failed to upload, forcing a hand count and rescan of more than 5,500 early-voting ballots. Hand counts matched the rescans. Catalog point: when USB media failed, the paper ballots were still there to hand-count and rescan — the paper record is what made the recovery possible.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC News 4 (WCIV) — Dorchester SC early-voting USB failure forces 5,500+ rescan (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://abcnews4.com/news/local/dorchester-county-officials-explain-delay-in-counting-more-than-5500-ballots"}, {"title": "The Post and Courier — Dorchester SC early-voting USB failure forces 5,500+ rescan (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/elections/dorchester-county-hand-count-election-ballots/article_b14f2120-dc6d-4f9b-a5ac-306fd31e9f4f.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dorchester SC early-voting USB failure forces 5,500+ rescan (ei-2026-10-345)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-345 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "sd-codington-2026-11-03-sheridan-township-three-more-ballots-than-poll-book-random-drawdown", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-12", "uid": "C20261109-121807-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-12", "old_ids": ["sd-codington-2026-11-03-sheridan-township-three-more-ballots-than-poll-book-random-drawdown"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "More ballots are scanned than voters checked in at a poll site, and the board offers a scanner-counter explanation instead of reconciling."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "SD", "description": "At the Codington County (Watertown, SD) canvass on Nov. 5, 2026, County Auditor Brenda Hanten explained that on election night the Sheridan Township ballot box held three more ballots than the number of voters recorded in the precinct poll book, Northeast Radio SD reported. Election workers followed the state rule for excess ballots (ARSD 5:02:16:09): three ballots were drawn at random, marked as not read and kept separately, so the ballot count matched the poll book before tabulation. Hanten said such discrepancies are unintentional and can happen when pre-packaged bundles of blank ballots do not contain the assumed 50 ballots and workers do not count every blank ballot before polls open. The precinct is in Legislative District 5, where the state Senate race was uncontested and the House race was not close. The commission approved the canvass unanimously and encouraged counting every ballot package before future elections. The source does not report any investigation into who cast the extra ballots. Status Confirmed by Codington County Auditor Brenda Hanten at the Nov. 5 canvass, reported by Northeast Radio SD. Catalog point: the ballot box held three more ballots than voters in the poll book, and the rule-book fix was to draw three ballots at random and set them aside — which reconciles the count but cannot tell which ballots were the extra ones.", "sources": [{"title": "Northeast Radio SD — Codington SD: 3 more ballots than poll book in Sheridan Twp (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.northeastradiosd.com/post/codington-county-approves-2026-election-canvass-sheridan-township-ballot-discrepancy-explained"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Codington SD: 3 more ballots than poll book in Sheridan Twp (ei-2026-10-379)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-379 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-dallas-2026-11-03-duncanville-library-vote-center-power-outage-ballot-printer-down", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-09", "uid": "C20261104-121522-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-09", "old_ids": ["tx-dallas-2026-11-03-duncanville-library-vote-center-power-outage-ballot-printer-down"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "TX", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Duncanville Public Library vote center in Dallas County, Texas, lost power at about 8:20 a.m., and service was restored at 9:10 a.m., according to Dallas County Elections Department spokesman Nic Solorzano, as reported by The Dallas Morning News. Voting machines kept running on battery power, but the printer used to issue ballots needed electricity, so poll workers could not issue new ballots during the outage. An election judge estimated fewer than 50 voters were turned away and directed to a nearby vote center. The cause of the outage was not clear as of 5 p.m. Status Confirmed by Dallas County Elections Department spokesman Nic Solorzano, reported by The Dallas Morning News. Catalog point: the voting machines ran on battery, but the ballot printer needed wall power, so no ballots could be issued for about 50 minutes and fewer than 50 voters were sent elsewhere.", "sources": [{"title": "The Dallas Morning News — Duncanville TX polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/elections/article/election-day-disruptions-dallas-texas-voters-22509462.php"}, {"title": "X News summary (Texas polling glitches) — Duncanville TX polling place power outage (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://x.com/i/trending/2117816771692372399"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Duncanville TX polling place power outage (ei-2026-10-283)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-283 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-lubbock-2026-11-03-early-voting-machine-malfunction-5681-ballots-rescanned", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-04", "uid": "C20261106-121456-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-04", "old_ids": ["tx-lubbock-2026-11-03-early-voting-machine-malfunction-5681-ballots-rescanned"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "TX", "description": "Lubbock County Elections Administrator Troy Havard told KCBD that Election Night results were delayed by a machine malfunction at one early-voting location, required ballot rescans, and a poll-worker shortage. Workers spotted an error on Oct. 22, replaced the machine, then saw the problem again at the same site. Because Texas law limits handling of early-voting drives until after 7 p.m. on Election Day, the office rescanned every ballot from that location — 5,681 ballots — and, at the direction of the Secretary of State's Legal Division, also rescanned all 1,700 limited ballots cast during early voting (each a two-page form requiring adjudication). Havard said the audit process found and fixed the issue so every vote would be counted accurately. Some polling places stayed open until about 9 p.m. for voters still in line after the 7 p.m. close amid tight staffing. Status Confirmed by Lubbock County Elections Administrator Troy Havard to KCBD; workers rescanned 5,681 ballots from one early-voting site plus 1,700 limited ballots at the Secretary of State's direction. Catalog point: a machine error that recurred after a replacement forced a full rescan of every ballot from that site before Election Night totals could be released.", "sources": [{"title": "KCBD — Lubbock TX early-voting machine rescans delay results (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.kcbd.com/2026/11/05/lubbock-county-election-results-late-after-machine-error-ballot-rescans/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lubbock TX early-voting machine rescans delay results (ei-2026-10-320)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-320 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-tarrant-2026-11-03-arlington-st-stephens-polling-place-power-outage-voters-turned-away", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-03", "uid": "C20261104-121522-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-03", "old_ids": ["tx-tarrant-2026-11-03-arlington-st-stephens-polling-place-power-outage-voters-turned-away"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "TX", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Fort Worth Star-Telegram reported that power went out in the neighborhood around St. Stephen's Methodist Church in Arlington shortly before 11:30 a.m. Election officials there said they ran on battery-powered generators for a time, then stopped all operations until power was restored, with the outage lasting 60 to 90 minutes by their account, and that they had to turn other voters away during the outage. About 400 voters had voted at the site by about 3:20 p.m. The same Star-Telegram live updates report slow machine start-ups at the Betsy Price Community Center (running at 7:35 a.m.) and too few power cords at Highland Middle School (running at 7:25 a.m.), with no voters turned away at those sites. The Dallas Morning News separately reported that a power outage and equipment problems disrupted some North Texas polls. It is not reported whether turned-away voters returned. Status Confirmed by election officials at the site, reported by the Fort Worth Star-Telegram, with The Dallas Morning News reporting North Texas outages and equipment problems. Catalog point: after the batteries ran down, the site stopped all operations for 60 to 90 minutes and turned voters away; it is not reported how many came back.", "sources": [{"title": "Fort Worth Star-Telegram (live updates) — Arlington TX polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/election/article317796228.html"}, {"title": "@dallasnews (X), The Dallas Morning News — Arlington TX polling place power outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/dallasnews/status/2117780641341145178"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Arlington TX polling place power outage (ei-2026-10-275)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-275 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-travis-2026-11-03-ut-austin-texas-union-polling-place-fire-alarm-pulled-twice", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-09", "uid": "C20261103-181235-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-09", "old_ids": ["tx-travis-2026-11-03-ut-austin-texas-union-polling-place-fire-alarm-pulled-twice"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "TX", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, a fire alarm was activated twice at the Texas Union on the University of Texas at Austin campus, which was serving as a polling place. The building was evacuated and voting was paused for about 10 minutes before resuming normally, with voting continuing until 7 p.m. The Travis County Clerk's Office confirmed the alarm was triggered twice and said voters who left could vote at any of the county's 201 polling places. UT Austin Police are investigating the incidents as a criminal offense and released an image of a person of interest believed to be unaffiliated with the university; no one had been identified or charged at the time of reporting. Status Confirmed by the Travis County Clerk's Office, with UT Austin Police investigating it as a criminal offense, reported by KXAN, CBS Austin, The Daily Texan and FOX 7. No one had been identified or charged at the time of reporting. Catalog point: a false fire alarm, like a bomb threat, empties a polling place and pauses voting, and it was pulled twice at the same site.", "sources": [{"title": "KXAN Austin — UT Austin polling place fire alarms (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kxan.com/news/your-local-election-hq/voting-resumes-quickly-after-fire-alarm-pulled-at-ut-austin/amp/"}, {"title": "CBS Austin — UT Austin polling place fire alarms (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/ut-austin-police-seek-person-of-interest-after-fire-alarms-disrupt-election-day-voting"}, {"title": "The Daily Texan — UT Austin polling place fire alarms (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://thedailytexan.com/2026/11/03/voting-continues-at-texas-union-utpd-investigates-fire-alarm-incidents/"}, {"title": "FOX 7 Austin — UT Austin polling place fire alarms (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fox7austin.com/news/ut-election-polling-location-voting-briefly-paused-due-fire-alarm"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — UT Austin polling place fire alarms (ei-2026-10-269)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-269 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ut-co-az-2026-11-03-southwest-flooding-emergency-electronic-ballot-return-vote-center-moved", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-08", "uid": "C20261103-121512-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-08", "old_ids": ["ut-co-az-2026-11-03-southwest-flooding-emergency-electronic-ballot-return-vote-center-moved"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Declare an emergency to force mail-ballot use and relax or ignore other election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "UT", "description": "Weekend flooding in the Southwest affected Election Day voting on Nov. 3, 2026. Newsweek reported that Colorado officials moved the Archuleta County vote center to the Archuleta County Courthouse and closed the Pagosa Springs drop box; that Utah's lieutenant governor declared an emergency accommodation letting San Juan County voters who cannot reasonably reach a polling place or drop box request electronic ballot return; and that Arizona warned flooded roads could affect access. In Yavapai County, AZ, the Daily Courier reported that all vote centers would operate as planned despite the flooding, and the Verde Independent reported that the Board of Supervisors had declared a state of emergency for the Verde Valley. Separately, an X user (@MerissaCaldwell) posted that she \"got a report that there are 500 voters in Paulden area who are trapped in their neighborhood\" by washes about 3 feet high; that claim is secondhand and has not been confirmed by a news outlet or election official. Status Confirmed for the Utah emergency accommodation allowing electronic ballot return in San Juan County, the Archuleta County, Colorado vote center move and drop box closure, and the Yavapai County emergency declaration, as reported by Newsweek, the Daily Courier and the Verde Independent. The report of 500 trapped voters in Paulden is secondhand and unconfirmed. Catalog point: an emergency accommodation was used to open electronic ballot return to voters in one county, which is the pattern this leaf describes: an emergency relaxes the normal ballot-return rules.", "sources": [{"title": "Newsweek — Southwest flooding and voting access (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/election-day-flooding-forces-polling-changes-where-voters-are-affected-12653462"}, {"title": "The Daily Courier (Prescott) — Southwest flooding and voting access (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.dcourier.com/news/general-election-to-continue-as-planned/article_fc780fe6-b749-42b4-babf-7ea95c8bfc4b.html"}, {"title": "Verde Independent — Southwest flooding and voting access (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.verdenews.com/news/getting-the-vote-out-secretary-of-state-fontes-expected-in-cottonwood/article_03618540-3663-47a1-b5b4-0eaca3293db0.html"}, {"title": "@MerissaCaldwell (X), unconfirmed claim — Southwest flooding and voting access (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/MerissaCaldwell/status/2117655264006640120"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Southwest flooding and voting access (ei-2026-10-242)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-242 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-campbell-2026-11-03-early-voting-ballot-unique-id-collision-scanners-reject", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-14", "uid": "C20261106-121456-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-14", "old_ids": ["va-campbell-2026-11-03-early-voting-ballot-unique-id-collision-scanners-reject"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Campbell County Registrar Kelly Martin told WSET that some precincts ran low on ballots on Nov. 3, 2026, and that remaining early-voting ballots sent from the registrar's office were initially rejected by voting scanners. Martin and a vendor representative determined the first batch of early-voting and absentee ballots had the same unique identifiers as the Election Day ballots, so scanners flagged the identifiers as invalid. Each ballot's unique identifier is intended to prevent duplication and repeat scanning. Martin said the Electoral Board and registrar's office worked to address the issue and that all ballots placed in secure emergency voting slots were counted on election night. WSET also reported scanner issues at multiple precincts including Timberlake Baptist Church. Status Confirmed by Campbell County Registrar Kelly Martin to WSET; early-voting and Election Day stock shared the same unique identifiers, so scanners flagged them as invalid until emergency-slot ballots were counted that night. Catalog point: a printing/identifier collision between early-voting and Election Day stock made valid ballots unscannable until they were recovered from emergency slots.", "sources": [{"title": "WSET — Campbell County VA ballot ID collision rejects scanners (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/local/campbell-county-general-registrar-gives-explanation-for-election-day-scanner-disruption-november-2026"}, {"title": "WSET — Campbell County VA ballot ID collision rejects scanners (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/local/ballot-machine-issues-reported-at-multiple-campbell-county-precincts-november-2026"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Campbell County VA ballot ID collision rejects scanners (ei-2026-10-330)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-330 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-carroll-2026-11-03-vendor-short-edge-ballot-print-scanners-unreadable-emergency-bin", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-22", "uid": "C20261106-121456-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-22", "old_ids": ["va-carroll-2026-11-03-vendor-short-edge-ballot-print-scanners-unreadable-emergency-bin"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Carroll County Director of Elections and General Registrar Stacey Reavis issued an Election Day notice stating a vendor printing error affected optical scanners' ability to read some ballots: ballots were printed on the short edge when they should have been printed on the long edge. Reavis said all ballots cast would be counted. Unreadable ballots went into a locked emergency ballot bin attached to the scanner; after 7 p.m., one Democrat and one Republican officer of election would retry them through the scanner and hand-count any that still would not tabulate. Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski told reporters Carroll County was among localities with ballot printing/readability problems and that newly printed replacement ballots were delivered; already-cast unscannable ballots were secured for later counting. Status Confirmed by Carroll County Director of Elections Stacey Reavis's Election Day notice and by Commissioner Koski; ballots printed on the short edge instead of the long edge could not be read by optical scanners and went to a locked emergency bin for later retry and hand count. Catalog point: a vendor print-orientation error made some ballots unscannable, and the emergency-bin plus hand-count backup is what guaranteed every ballot was counted.", "sources": [{"title": "The Carroll News — Carroll County VA vendor short-edge ballot printing error (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.thecarrollnews.com/election-notice--scanning-devises-cannot-read-some-ballots-but-all-votes-will-be-counted/article_9af0cff5-b857-4e65-acb6-93096096e347.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Mercury — Carroll County VA vendor short-edge ballot printing error (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-live-updates/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Carroll County VA vendor short-edge ballot printing error (ei-2026-10-338)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-338 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-harrisonburg-2026-11-03-lucy-simms-vendor-ballots-unreadable-87-hand-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-21", "uid": "C20261106-121456-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-21", "old_ids": ["va-harrisonburg-2026-11-03-lucy-simms-vendor-ballots-unreadable-87-hand-counted"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Harrisonburg Registrar Mark Finks told WMRA/WHRO that on the morning of Nov. 3, 2026, paper ballot scanners at the Lucy Simms polling place would not read some ballots. A backup scanner was brought in; Finks said the problem was not with the scanners/tabulators but with ballots from the North Carolina vendor (Printelect). Newly printed ballot-on-demand ballots from City Hall tested successfully through the Simms scanners. Of 876 ballots cast at the precinct, 87 were affected; those ballots were collected in the scanner's emergency slot and hand-counted on election night. Finks said machines had been tested with vendor paper ballots but the exact Election Day stock arrived after that test, and he plans to work with Printelect to determine the cause. Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski separately told reporters that Harrisonburg was among localities with ballot printing/readability problems and that ballot-on-demand printing allowed voting to continue. Status Confirmed by Harrisonburg Registrar Mark Finks to WMRA/WHRO and by Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski; scanners rejected some Printelect vendor-printed ballots at Lucy Simms, ballot-on-demand reprints worked, and 87 of 876 precinct ballots were hand-counted from the emergency slot. Catalog point: vendor ballot stock that failed L&A timing still reached Election Day, and hand counting from the emergency slot recovered the 87 affected ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "WHRO / WMRA — Harrisonburg VA Lucy Simms ballot print/scanner snag (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.whro.org/2026-11-04/harrisonburg-election-officials-handle-snag-counting-87-ballots"}, {"title": "WMRA — Harrisonburg VA Lucy Simms ballot print/scanner snag (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.wmra.org/2026-11-04/harrisonburg-election-officials-handle-snag-counting-87-ballots"}, {"title": "Virginia Mercury — Harrisonburg VA Lucy Simms ballot print/scanner snag (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-live-updates/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Harrisonburg VA Lucy Simms ballot print/scanner snag (ei-2026-10-337)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-337 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Printelect"]}
{"id": "va-nottoway-2026-11-03-two-precincts-temporary-ballot-shortage-hours-extension-denied", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-24", "uid": "C20261106-121456-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-24", "old_ids": ["va-nottoway-2026-11-03-two-precincts-temporary-ballot-shortage-hours-extension-denied"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski said on Nov. 3, 2026, that two precincts in Nottoway County temporarily ran out of ballots, triggering delays of up to two hours for some voters. The Nottoway circuit court denied a petition to extend voting hours at those precincts. Koski said some voters may not have stayed to wait and he could not say whether they returned later. Status Confirmed by Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski; two Nottoway precincts temporarily ran out of ballots with delays up to two hours, and the circuit court denied a petition to extend voting hours. Koski said some voters may not have stayed. Catalog point: a temporary ballot shortage created multi-hour delays, and the court would not extend hours to make up the lost time.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Mercury — Nottoway County VA temporary ballot shortage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-live-updates/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Nottoway County VA temporary ballot shortage (ei-2026-10-340)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-340 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-suffolk-2026-11-03-mack-benn-precinct-riddick-and-write-in-totals-swapped", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-11", "uid": "C20261109-121807-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-11", "old_ids": ["va-suffolk-2026-11-03-mack-benn-precinct-riddick-and-write-in-totals-swapped"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Suffolk, Virginia election officials said an election-night reporting error listed the wrong number of votes for candidate Tyron Riddick at the Mack Benn Jr. precinct: his total and the write-in total were switched, so the write-in total was entered as 117 votes and Riddick's as one, according to Virginia Commissioner of Elections Steve Koski and the state's change log (WTKR). The numbers were later corrected. Koski said the error happened when results were entered, not in the votes themselves; during the canvass, the local Electoral Board compares the numbers entered on election night with the precinct's statement of results and printed results tape. General Registrar Cameron Butler said the office acted immediately once it found the discrepancy, and officials said they are reviewing Election Day tapes from all precincts to make sure results were reported accurately. The city's Electoral Board expects to certify results by Nov. 14. Status Confirmed by Virginia Commissioner of Elections Steve Koski and the state's results change log, and by Suffolk General Registrar Cameron Butler, reported by WTKR and The Tidewater News. Catalog point: a candidate's 117 votes were posted as write-ins and he was shown with one vote until the canvass compared the entered numbers with the precinct tape — the posted totals were wrong even though the ballots were not.", "sources": [{"title": "WTKR — Suffolk VA precinct totals swapped with write-ins (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.wtkr.com/news/in-the-community/suffolk/suffolk-election-officials-correct-reporting-error-involving-mack-benn-jr-precinct-results"}, {"title": "The Tidewater News — Suffolk VA precinct totals swapped with write-ins (2026-11-07)", "url": "https://www.tidewaternews.com/news/suffolk-election-results-precinct-reporting-correction-2026/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Suffolk VA precinct totals swapped with write-ins (ei-2026-10-378)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-378 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-waynesboro-2026-11-03-ballot-printing-readability-problem-bod-kept-voting-moving", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-23", "uid": "C20261106-121456-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-23", "old_ids": ["va-waynesboro-2026-11-03-ballot-printing-readability-problem-bod-kept-voting-moving"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski told reporters on Nov. 3, 2026, that Waynesboro was among localities that experienced ballot printing problems in which some ballots could not be scanned by voting machines even though the printed content was correct. Koski said Waynesboro (like Harrisonburg) used ballot-on-demand printers, allowing voting to continue without disruption, and that already-cast unscannable ballots would be counted. Local outlet detail beyond the commissioner's briefing was not located in this pass. Status Confirmed by Virginia Elections Commissioner Steve Koski's Election Day briefing reported by Virginia Mercury; Waynesboro had ballot printing/readability problems, used ballot-on-demand printers to keep voting moving, and secured already-cast unscannable ballots for later counting. Catalog point: when preprinted stock would not scan, ballot-on-demand printing kept the polls open while unscannable ballots waited for a later count.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Mercury — Waynesboro VA ballot printing/scanner readability problem (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2026/11/03/election-day-2026-live-updates/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Waynesboro VA ballot printing/scanner readability problem (ei-2026-10-339)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-339 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-milwaukee-2026-11-03-hampton-silver-spring-power-outages-central-count-tabulators", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-10", "uid": "C20261104-121522-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-10", "old_ids": ["wi-milwaukee-2026-11-03-hampton-silver-spring-power-outages-central-count-tabulators"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "WI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the Milwaukee Election Commission said two polling places, Hampton School and Silver Spring Neighborhood Center, lost power in the afternoon; both stayed open, voting continued, and power was restored by about 4:45 p.m. CT, according to WISN and WTMJ. The commission also said two ballot tabulators at Central Count, where the city's absentee ballots are counted, had problems around 3 p.m. CT and were repaired by technicians. WISN reported a separate machine problem at Fire House #38 that was resolved shortly before 11 a.m. CT with all ballots counted, and Election Commissioner Patricia Ruiz-Cantú said machine problems at several sites were resolved by turning the machines off and on. The commission said it is investigating whether the problems were related. Official error: no for the power outages; equipment malfunctions per the commission. Update: CBS 58 reported that more than 240 absentee ballots tabulated at Central Count were missing required voter numbers because election officials failed to include them. Executive Director Paulina Gutiérrez called it a clerical error, said a pod captain audited the ballots and they were processed as ballots from eligible voters, and said the ballots can be tracked if needed. In a 9 p.m. CT update she said all earlier issues had been resolved, with about 7,000 absentee ballots left to count and official results expected after midnight. Official error: yes for the absentee labeling. Status Confirmed by the Milwaukee Election Commission and Commissioner Patricia Ruiz-Cantú, reported by WISN, WTMJ, CBS 58 and WUWM. Catalog point: two polling places lost power, and two tabulators at Central Count, where the city's absentee ballots are counted, had to be repaired during the count.", "sources": [{"title": "WISN 12 (live updates) — Milwaukee power outages and tabulators (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wisn.com/article/live-updates-election-day-wisconsin-2026-midterm/74321529"}, {"title": "WTMJ — Milwaukee power outages and tabulators (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wtmj.com/news/decision-wisconsin/2026/11/03/milwaukee-election-commission-power-outages-and-tabulation-issues-on-election-day/"}, {"title": "CBS 58 — Milwaukee power outages and tabulators (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.cbs58.com/news/polling-location-experiences-early-morning-technical-problems-currently-resolved"}, {"title": "WUWM 89.7 FM — Milwaukee power outages and tabulators (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wuwm.com/government-politics/2026-11-03/2026-election-updates-wisconsin"}, {"title": "X post by @TrueTheVote (2026-11-03T23:42:53Z)", "url": "https://x.com/TrueTheVote/status/2117764480696516672"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Milwaukee power outages and tabulators (ei-2026-10-286)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-286 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-milwaukee-2026-11-03-saveland-park-tabulator-100-ballots-locked-box", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-05", "uid": "C20261103-181235-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-05", "old_ids": ["wi-milwaukee-2026-11-03-saveland-park-tabulator-100-ballots-locked-box"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "WI", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the City of Milwaukee Election Commission confirmed a machine problem at the Saveland Park Pavilion polling place. WISN reported that about 100 ballots could not be read into the tabulator and were placed into a locked box until the problem was fixed, and that its reporters then watched the ballots being fed through and counted. Election Commission Executive Director Paulina Gutiérrez said at a late-morning briefing that all affected ballots had been tabulated and that all reported issues had been resolved. WISN also reported that other locations had machine issues resolved by restarting the machines, and WTMJ reported a clerical error at Central Count in which some absentee ballots were missing voter numbers; officials said those ballots were legitimate and were processed after review. Status Confirmed by the City of Milwaukee Election Commission and Executive Director Paulina Gutiérrez, reported by WISN, WTMJ and FOX6. WISN reporters watched the held ballots being fed through afterward. Catalog point: about 100 ballots could not be read and sat in a locked box until the tabulator was fixed, and other sites needed machine restarts. The paper ballots are what allowed these votes to be counted after the machine failed.", "sources": [{"title": "WISN 12 (live updates) — Milwaukee Saveland Park tabulator (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.wisn.com/article/live-updates-election-day-wisconsin-2026-midterm/74321529"}, {"title": "WTMJ — Milwaukee Saveland Park tabulator (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wtmj.com/news/2026/11/03/mec-voting-running-smoothly-despite-minor-election-day-issues/"}, {"title": "FOX6 Milwaukee (video) — Milwaukee Saveland Park tabulator (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.fox6now.com/video/fmc-axtfzvc9knypz1k0"}, {"title": "X post by @libsoftiktok (2026-11-03T18:49:01Z)", "url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/2117690530377195726"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Milwaukee Saveland Park tabulator (ei-2026-10-257)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-257 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-ozaukee-2026-11-03-cedarburg-absentee-submitted-without-voter-signature-sheriff", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-02", "uid": "C20261106-121456-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-02", "old_ids": ["wi-ozaukee-2026-11-03-cedarburg-absentee-submitted-without-voter-signature-sheriff"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "WI", "description": "FOX6 Milwaukee reported on Nov. 4, 2026, that the Ozaukee County Sheriff's Office is investigating a \"potential voter irregularity\" at a Cedarburg polling location on Election Day. Just after 4:30 p.m. on Nov. 3, a Town of Cedarburg resident arrived at the Ozaukee Pavilion to vote in person and learned an absentee ballot had already been submitted in his name. The polling location chief told FOX6 that the signature on the absentee ballot was not the man's, so poll workers rejected the absentee ballot and allowed him to cast an in-person vote; she said it was the first such issue she had seen in a 20-year career. FOX6 reported it is not clear who submitted the absentee ballot. No charges have been announced. Charges, if any later, would be accusations only. Status Confirmed by the Ozaukee County Sheriff's Office investigation and the polling-location chief's statement to FOX6 Milwaukee; the unsigned or mismatched-signature absentee was rejected and the named voter cast an in-person ballot. No charges have been announced. Catalog point: an absentee ballot attributed to a real voter who did not sign it was caught at the polls because the voter showed up in person.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX6 Milwaukee — Cedarburg WI absentee signature irregularity investigation (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.fox6now.com/news/cedarburg-voter-ballot-irregularity-investigation"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Cedarburg WI absentee signature irregularity investigation (ei-2026-10-317)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-317 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "or-lincoln-2026-11-03-state-results-site-identical-13184-totals-two-commission-races-clerk-mistyped", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-02", "uid": "C20261111-120609-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-02", "old_ids": ["or-lincoln-2026-11-03-state-results-site-identical-13184-totals-two-commission-races-clerk-mistyped"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 to 2026-11-10", "state": "OR", "description": "The Boiler Bay Beacon reported on Nov. 10, 2026 that the Oregon Secretary of State's results website listed two Lincoln County commission candidates in different races with the same vote total from the Nov. 3 election: Position 1 challenger Cathie Rigby at 13,184 votes against incumbent Casey Miller at 9,665, and Position 2 candidate Cristen Don also at 13,184 against Joe Steere at 8,830, with 128 write-ins listed in each race. A voter noticed the match and contacted the paper. A Secretary of State spokesman said the state site is not official and posts results submitted by county clerks. Lincoln County Clerk Amy Southwell said she corrected the figures after the state elections division flagged them, and blamed her own data-entry error: the county had to enter every race by hand, and she mistyped it. She said the results on the county's own website have been accurate since election night. The corrected totals were not stated in the excerpt read. No ballot count was reported to have changed. Status Confirmed by Lincoln County Clerk Amy Southwell's own account of a hand-entry error and by a Secretary of State spokesman, reported by the Boiler Bay Beacon; the clerk says the county's own website was accurate. Catalog point: county results were hand-keyed into the state results site, and a wrong total stayed public for a week until a voter noticed two different races showing the same number.", "sources": [{"title": "Boiler Bay Beacon — Lincoln Co. OR results entry error (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://boilerbaybeacon.com/secretary-of-state-had-commission-candidates-in-tie/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lincoln Co. OR results entry error (ei-2026-10-398)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-398 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nd-burleigh-2026-11-03-liberty-elementary-134-district-7-voters-given-district-8-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261117-120714-02", "uid": "C20261117-120714-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261117-120714-02", "old_ids": ["nd-burleigh-2026-11-03-liberty-elementary-134-district-7-voters-given-district-8-ballots"], "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (general election); 2026-11-16 (county canvassing board report)", "state": "ND", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, election judges at the Liberty Elementary School polling location on Bismarck's north side, which serves Legislative Districts 7 and 8, handed District 8 ballots to some District 7 voters. District 8 had no legislative contests this year, so those voters could not vote in the District 7 state Senate and state House races; statewide races and the two ballot measures appeared on both ballot styles. KFYR reported on Nov. 3 that the Secretary of State's office attributed the error to \"reading receipts,\" that voters who noticed before casting received the correct ballot, and that Burleigh County Auditor Mark Splonskowski went to the site and had the judge correct his process; KFYR said the county addressed the issue by 9:45 a.m. According to the North Dakota Monitor, Burleigh County election coordinator Thomas Larson told the county canvassing board on Nov. 16 that 134 District 7 voters received District 8 ballots, that ballots already inserted into tabulators could not be changed, that no other polling location had the issue, and that the county plans more immersive election judge training before 2028. Officials said the certified District 7 margins (Sen. Michelle Axtman 4,402 to 1,914 over Kevin Horneman; House winners Greg Vetter 4,147 and Steve Sauter 4,029 versus 1,866 and 1,786) were large enough that the 134 ballots could not have changed the outcomes. Status Confirmed: Burleigh County election coordinator Thomas Larson reported the 134 affected voters to the county canvassing board (North Dakota Monitor), and the Secretary of State's office and County Auditor Mark Splonskowski acknowledged the error on Election Day (KFYR). Officials say the outcomes could not have changed. Catalog point: 134 voters lost their chance to vote in their own state Senate and House races, ballots already in the tabulator could not be corrected, and the error is attributed to an election judge 'reading receipts.'", "sources": [{"title": "North Dakota Monitor — Burleigh County wrong ballot style (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://northdakotamonitor.com/2026/11/16/burleigh-county-ballot-mistake-would-not-have-changed-results-election-official-says/"}, {"title": "KFYR-TV (Your News Leader) — Burleigh County wrong ballot style (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kfyrtv.com/2026/11/03/possible-ballot-mix-up-bismarcks-district-7-has-candidate-frustrated/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Burleigh Co. ND 134 District 7 voters given wrong ballots (ei-2026-10-442)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-442 (added 2026-11-17 12:07 PM ET, 2026-11-17 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon resolved/high, official_error yes). Description taken from the EMon summary. A Fargo rewrite citing inspector Aaron Birst estimated about 120 voted before correction; the county's later 134 figure is used. No vendor named. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ct-2026-11-16-ct-insider-unofficial-results-vote-voter-mismatches-six-towns-hand-entered-totals", "permanent_id": "C20261116-181245-01", "uid": "C20261116-181245-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-181245-01", "old_ids": ["ct-2026-11-16-ct-insider-unofficial-results-vote-voter-mismatches-six-towns-hand-entered-totals"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (general election); 2026-11-13 (state website reviewed); 2026-11-16 (published)", "state": "CT", "description": "A CT Insider review published Nov. 16, 2026 (Alex Putterman; also in the CT Post and New Haven Register) found that, as of Friday, Nov. 13, unofficial results for the Nov. 3 general election on the Secretary of the State's website showed more votes cast in top races than voters recorded in three towns, and far fewer votes than voters in three other towns or cities; the article does not name all six. Hartford's unofficial statistics showed votes recorded in '25 of 24' precincts. Stonington had reported more votes than voters until CT Insider flagged it; registrar Peggy Roberts attributed it to 'a couple of typos' when transferring tabulator-tape results to state forms, and the correction added 82 votes to Gov. Ned Lamont and 30 to Republican Ryan Fazio there. In Greenwich, registrar Fred DeCaro said the town submitted incorrect turnout statistics but correct race results; the turnout figures were amended Nov. 13. Earlier, Mansfield's governor results were briefly listed as strongly favoring Fazio before being corrected, and Hartford initially reported 44,000 votes for probate judge, more than twice its turnout, before correcting it. Officials say results are tabulated by machine but early, absentee and Election Day totals, and cross-endorsed candidates' ballot lines, are combined and entered by hand; the Secretary of the State's office, which said in October that the new tabulators had 'eliminated the possibility' of data errors, said the tabulators cannot yet combine cross-endorsed totals automatically and that it is working with its vendor. Spokesperson Matthew Clyburn said the office is 'a filing cabinet for the official results that each town reports.' CT Insider reports the errors are typically too small to affect outcomes and shows no evidence that they favor one party. Results can be corrected until certification in late November. Sen. Rob Sampson (R-Wolcott), who earlier found a certified 1,000-vote data-entry error in his 2022 race in Prospect, plans legislation to reduce such errors. Status Confirmed: the mismatches and corrections are acknowledged on the record by the Stonington and Greenwich registrars and by the Secretary of the State's office, as reported by CT Insider (also carried by the CT Post and New Haven Register). No outcome change is reported. Catalog point: machine totals from early, absentee and Election Day tapes, and cross-endorsed lines, are combined and keyed in by hand, and the state calls itself 'a filing cabinet' for whatever towns report, so the totals the public sees carry no guarantee until someone outside the system checks them. A public precinct hand count, posted at the precinct on election night, leaves no transcription layer in which such errors can hide.", "sources": [{"title": "CT Insider — Connecticut results data-entry errors (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.ctinsider.com/election/article/connecticut-voting-data-errors-22525763.php"}, {"title": "New Haven Register (same CT Insider report) — Connecticut results data-entry errors (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.nhregister.com/election/article/connecticut-voting-data-errors-22525763.php"}, {"title": "Connecticut Post (same CT Insider report) — Connecticut results data-entry errors (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.ctpost.com/election/article/connecticut-voting-data-errors-22525763.php"}, {"title": "Connecticut Post (Sampson 2022 Prospect error background) — Connecticut results data-entry errors (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.ctpost.com/election/article/rob-sampson-stephanie-thomas-prospect-election-22494584.php"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — CT results data-entry errors persist (vote/voter mismatches) (ei-2026-10-439)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-439 (added 2026-11-16 6:12 PM ET, 2026-11-16 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high, official_error yes). Description taken from the EMon summary. Tabulator vendor not named in the sources, so no vendor tag. Related card ct-mansfield-2026-11-03-same-day-registration-ballot-shortage-absentee-ballots-hand-count (different issue). Recheck certification (late November) and Sampson legislation. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nv-washoe-2026-11-13-canvass-duplicate-scans-misplaced-tray-scanned-checkin-ballot-mismatch-certified-3-2", "permanent_id": "C20261116-120630-02", "uid": "C20261116-120630-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-120630-02", "old_ids": ["nv-washoe-2026-11-13-canvass-duplicate-scans-misplaced-tray-scanned-checkin-ballot-mismatch-certified-3-2"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (general election); 2026-11-13 (canvass and certification)", "state": "NV", "description": "At the Nov. 13, 2026 canvass of the Nov. 3 general election, Washoe County Registrar of Voters Andrew (Drew) McDonald disclosed several ballot-handling problems. KRNV News 4 quoted him saying, 'A small tray of ballots got placed on the wrong shelf and a human took those and actually extracted them and scanned them in'; he said those ballots did not change the outcome of any race. This Is Reno reported 'a memory card issue and some ballots being scanned twice,' both of which were rectified, and said McDonald reported that all logic and accuracy tests passed. The Nevada Record meeting summary says the registrar's report listed duplicate scans from the Sparks Library site, 44 more check-ins than ballots, and 28 mail ballots tabulated in error, totaling 58 unexplained ballots, and that only the Palomino Valley General Improvement District contest had a margin close enough to matter, with two of those ballots related to it; that summary has not yet been checked against the meeting video or the registrar's written report. The Board of County Commissioners approved the canvass 3-2. Commissioner Jeanne Herman voted no, saying she was representing constituents, although she called the election fair; Commissioner Mike Clark voted no, citing what he called 'three major flaws in the ballot' related to candidates not running under their legal names. In addition, 317 mail ballots were postmarked too late to be counted. Under Nevada law, recount requests for non-statewide races are due by Nov. 18, 2026. The county says no race outcome changed. Status Confirmed: the duplicate scans, the misplaced tray scanned in error and the memory-card issue were disclosed by Registrar Andrew McDonald at the canvass and reported by KRNV, This Is Reno and KTVN. The 58-ballot breakdown (duplicate Sparks Library scans, 44 more check-ins than ballots, 28 mail ballots tabulated in error) comes only from the Nevada Record meeting summary and has not been checked against the meeting video or the registrar's written report. No outcome change has been reported. Catalog point: even with every logic-and-accuracy test passing, ballots were scanned twice and a tray was run through the machines by mistake, and the check-in and ballot counts still did not match when the board certified. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere; a public precinct hand count reconciled to the poll book on election night leaves no such gap to explain.", "sources": [{"title": "KRNV News 4 (mynews4.com) — Washoe County canvass disclosures (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://mynews4.com/news/local/washoe-county-canvasses-election-outlines-changes-for-2028"}, {"title": "This Is Reno — Washoe County canvass disclosures (2026-11-14)", "url": "https://thisisreno.com/2026/11/washoe-county-election-canvass/"}, {"title": "KTVN 2 News — Washoe County canvass disclosures (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.2news.com/news/local/washoe-county-commissioners-vote-to-certify-election-results/article_4cdab51b-571a-4bf7-8317-4958af953ccc.html"}, {"title": "Nevada Record (meeting summary) — Washoe County canvass disclosures (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://nevadarecord.org/washoecounty/meetings/2026-11-13-board-of-county-commissioners-november-13-2026-2c5c52ab-88de-45bf-9ef7-b004ece64680"}, {"title": "Washoe County Board of County Commissioners meeting video, Nov. 13, 2026 (YouTube) — Washoe County canvass disclosures (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Do_EKcCzhX4"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Washoe Co. NV canvass discloses ballot discrepancies; 3-2 certification (ei-2026-10-438)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-438 (added 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high, official_error yes). Description taken from the EMon summary. No vendor named in the sources. Recheck recount requests due Nov. 18 (Palomino Valley GID). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-05-2026-11-19-recount-guilford-tabulator-failures-watauga-jammed-ballot-missed-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20261120-121619-01", "uid": "C20261120-121619-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261120-121619-01", "old_ids": ["nc-05-2026-11-19-recount-guilford-tabulator-failures-watauga-jammed-ballot-missed-election-day"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election; Watauga ballot jam); 2026-11-19 (recount findings)", "state": "NC", "description": "The district-wide machine recount of North Carolina's 5th Congressional District, requested on Nov. 17, 2026 by Republican Rep. Virginia Foxx after county canvasses left Democrat Chuck Hubbard ahead by 331 votes, began this week across the district's counties. In Guilford County, which FOX8 WGHP says accounts for about 35% of the district vote, elections staff began recounting about 200,000 ballots on Thursday, Nov. 19. Guilford Elections Director Charlie Collicutt told FOX8 that one tabulator had mechanical problems with its belts, another had a paper jam and a third had a hardware failure; he said all three were fully operational again and that he did not know whether the problems would cause delays, with the recount expected to continue through Friday. In Watauga County, the Watauga Democrat reported that the completed recount gave Foxx two additional votes. Elections Director Matt Snyder said one came from a documented ballot jam on Election Day at the Blue Ridge precinct, after which the recount found one more ballot than the Election Day count, and the other came from an overvoted ballot that the four county board members unanimously judged to show an intent to vote for Foxx; Snyder said the jam was the only error among the county's 24,167 ballots. Other counties, including Caldwell (starting Nov. 19) and Surry (starting Nov. 20), posted their own recount schedules. The State Board of Elections says recounts must finish by Nov. 23, and the state canvass is set for Nov. 24. No source alleges misconduct; the reported problems are equipment malfunctions and a single uncounted jammed ballot, and Hubbard remains ahead unless the recount totals change. Nov. 20 update: ABC45 and WXII reported that as of the evening of Nov. 19, nine of the district's 10 counties had begun recounting, with Surry County set to start on Nov. 20, and that the Watauga result narrowed Hubbard's lead from 331 to 329 votes. Collicutt told WXII that a recount does not mean something went wrong and that recounts typically confirm the original results or produce only minor differences; Guilford officials expected district-wide results by late Friday, Nov. 20, or early the following week. ABC45 reported that the State Board of Elections is scheduled to meet at 11 a.m. on Nov. 24 to certify results and that a candidate may then request a hand count of a sample of ballots. Status Confirmed: the tabulator failures and the jammed ballot are stated by the counties' own elections directors (Guilford's Charlie Collicutt to FOX8 and WXII; Watauga's Matt Snyder to the Watauga Democrat). The Watauga Democrat also reports that the same jammed ballot added one vote to Republican Eric Eller in the N.C. District Court Judge District 35 Seat 1 recount, that eight votes changed across the two recounted races in Watauga, and Snyder's comment: \"That's usually where the changes come in recounts, is once a human being inspects the ballot.\" No misconduct is alleged, and the changes are too small to alter either outcome on the reported figures. Catalog point: in a congressional race decided by about 330 votes, one county's machine count missed a ballot lost in a documented Election Day jam and voided a ballot whose intent four board members found easy to read, while three tabulators in the largest county failed during the recount itself; it was people inspecting the paper ballots that found and corrected the errors, which is what a hand count does for every ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX8 WGHP (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://myfox8.com/news/politics/nc/recount-underway-for-ncs-5th-congressional-district-race/"}, {"title": "Watauga Democrat (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://www.wataugademocrat.com/news/local/foxx-picks-up-two-votes-after-watauga-county-recount-results/article_68978123-127d-4b42-a792-6f38f5e76163.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/watauga-democrat-foxx-two-votes-recount-2026-11-19.html"}, {"title": "North Carolina State Board of Elections (Foxx recount request letter) (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/Legal/2026%20General%20Election/Recount%20Requests/5th%20Congressional%20District_Foxx_Recount%20Request.pdf"}, {"title": "Caldwell County Board of Elections (notice of recount) (2026-11)", "url": "https://www.caldwellcountync.org/DocumentCenter/View/3262/Notice-of-Recount?bidId="}, {"title": "Mount Airy News (2026-11)", "url": "https://www.mtairynews.com/news/surry-county-prepares-for-recount-following-foxx-s-official-request/article_593f8181-d2c2-4bf3-8a1c-763192e9a3ad.html"}, {"title": "ABC45 (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://abc45.com/news/local/recount-underway-in-tight-nc-district-5-election-race-officials-await-final-vote-totals"}, {"title": "WXII 12 (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://www.wxii12.com/article/guilford-county-begins-recounting-ballots-in-two-races-mechanical-issues-briefly-delay-process/74481617"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NC-05 recount: Guilford tabulator problems, Watauga jam ballot (ei-2026-10-454)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-454 (added 2026-11-20 12:16 PM ET, 2026-11-20 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon active, medium confidence; Nov. 20 update included). Watauga Democrat article read directly via WebFetch and archived by curl (HTTP 200). Queue cross-check: rq-2026-11-10-nc-05-da21-anson-inactive-voter-accepted-ballots-stay-vigilant-nc-claim (NC-05 inactive-voter accepted ballots) is not addressed by the recount, and rq-2026-11-03-pa-beaver-centre-luzerne-scanners-jammed-down-ballots-in-emergency-bins (PA scanners jammed, different state and election) is a separate event; neither is corroborated or resolved. No vendor named in sources. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "id-latah-2026-11-03-2342-early-vote-ballots-left-out-of-unofficial-results-memory-stick-full-recount", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-05", "uid": "C20261109-180918-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-05", "old_ids": ["id-latah-2026-11-03-2342-early-vote-ballots-left-out-of-unofficial-results-memory-stick-full-recount"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election); 2026-11-09 (recount ordered)", "state": "ID", "description": "Idaho Secretary of State Phil McGrane announced on Nov. 9, 2026 that Latah County will conduct a full recount of all ballots cast in the Nov. 3 general election after a post-election review found that results from 2,342 ballots were not included in the unofficial totals reported on VoteIdaho.gov. According to the Secretary of State's release, the Latah County Clerk's Office found the discrepancy during its routine review ahead of the county canvass; the ballots were counted by the county's tabulation machines, but results from a portion of early voting were not fully transferred to the election-night reporting system. McGrane called it \"a significant discrepancy in results\" and said the issue appears to be a procedural reporting error and that an initial review indicates no outcomes changed. County Commissioner Tom Lamar told Boise State Public Radio that the clerk's office discovered on Friday a memory stick containing the 2,342 uncounted votes, and that county certification is delayed until Thursday. Lamar said the votes could affect several close contests, including the three state legislative seats, both county commission seats, a Moscow school levy that unofficially passed with 62% against a 60% threshold, and the race of County Clerk Julie Fry, who leads her opponent by 1,289 votes and did not take part in counting the votes. Democratic county commission candidate Laura Heinse filed a formal complaint asking the state to force a recount, and the Idaho Democratic Party chair called the omission an \"unacceptable failure.\" A Secretary of State team will oversee the recount at the Latah County Courthouse in Moscow starting at 9:30 a.m. Pacific on Tuesday, Nov. 10, open to observers. Still pending: the recount results, the precincts the omitted ballots came from, and the state's findings on what went wrong. Status Confirmed by Idaho Secretary of State Phil McGrane's release and County Commissioner Tom Lamar (memory stick found), reported by KREM 2, KXLY, Boise State Public Radio and Idaho News 6; the recount results are pending. Catalog point: tabulators counted 2,342 early-vote ballots, but their results never reached the election-night reporting system and were found on a memory stick only during the pre-canvass review, in a county with several close contests. Update (Nov. 10, 2026): Secretary of State McGrane told KTVB that results from one machine used for in-person early voting had not been uploaded, so VoteIdaho did not include all votes cast; KXLY quoted Clerk Julie Fry that more than 18,000 people voted while the online results listed about 15,000 ballots, from a batch of early voting at the fairgrounds. The Moscow-Pullman Daily News reported after the public Nov. 10 recount that election outcomes were unchanged; full recount totals were not available in the sources read. Update (Nov. 10 to 11, 2026): The Secretary of State's release after the recount put the omitted in-person early-voting ballots at 2,343 (one more than first announced), bringing Latah County to 18,104 ballots cast (CBS2/Idaho News); McGrane said 'For the recount, we went back to the source, which is the paper ballots.' All outcomes were unchanged; the closest measure, the Moscow School District plant facilities levy, passed with 60.34% against a 60% threshold (KHQ).", "sources": [{"title": "KREM 2 News — Latah Co. ID 2,342 ballots left out; full recount (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://www.krem.com/article/news/politics/elections/latah-county-recount-ballots-general-election/293-91c84e86-d0ba-454c-a695-cc0e73a2deda"}, {"title": "KXLY — Latah Co. ID 2,342 ballots left out; full recount (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://www.kxly.com/news/latah-county-will-conduct-full-recount-due-to-counting-discrepancy/article_2269f747-e521-48cb-8e36-8e0d1072e6f8.html"}, {"title": "Boise State Public Radio — Latah Co. ID 2,342 ballots left out; full recount (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://www.boisestatepublicradio.org/politics-government/2026-11-09/latah-county-recount-lost-votes"}, {"title": "Idaho News 6 / CBS2 — Latah Co. ID 2,342 ballots left out; full recount (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://idahonews.com/news/local/full-recount-set-nov-10-at-latah-county-courthouse-in-moscow-after-ballot-discrepancy"}, {"title": "X post by @KREM2 (2026-11-09T21:44:03Z)", "url": "https://x.com/KREM2/status/2119908906038067438"}, {"title": "X post by @BennettIdaho (2026-11-09T21:44:42Z)", "url": "https://x.com/BennettIdaho/status/2119909067397505373"}, {"title": "Moscow-Pullman Daily News — Election outcomes unchanged by recount (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.dnews.com/local-news/election-outcomes-unchanged-by-recount-73fda6a0"}, {"title": "KXLY — Latah County recounts ballots after 2,000-plus votes left out of final totals (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kxly.com/news/latah-county-recounts-ballots-after-2-000-plus-votes-left-out-of-final-election-totals/article_8d6202ee-2113-451b-963c-6af2f8ef5eb1.html"}, {"title": "KTVB — Idaho election recounts: what prompted them and how state officials are responding (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/politics/elections/idaho-election-recounts-prompted-them-how-state-officials-responding/277-25a970ba-d428-443d-916e-f1905f7e8097"}, {"title": "KHQ — Latah County recounts ballots, adding 2,343 previously omitted votes (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.khq.com/news/latah-county-recounts-ballots-adding-2-343-previously-omitted-votes/article_5a84bccb-7ef8-45f9-9534-c495d30530e1.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/khq-latah-recount-2343-2026-11-11.html"}, {"title": "CBS2 / Idaho News — Latah County recount confirms omitted early-vote totals did not change election outcomes (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://idahonews.com/news/local/latah-county-recount-confirms-omitted-early-vote-totals-did-not-change-election-outcomes"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Latah Co. ID 2,342 ballots left out; full recount (ei-2026-10-388)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-388 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-388 update; zero X API. Refreshed 12:30 PM ET 2026-11-11 (open-web fortify sweep); zero X API."}
{"id": "oh-lucas-2026-11-06-board-of-elections-level-3-oversight-unreadable-ink-unscanned-ballots-testing", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-01", "uid": "C20261109-121807-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-01", "old_ids": ["oh-lucas-2026-11-06-board-of-elections-level-3-oversight-unreadable-ink-unscanned-ballots-testing"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election); 2026-11-06 (oversight order)", "state": "OH", "description": "On Nov. 6, 2026, Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose's office placed the Lucas County (Toledo) Board of Elections under Level 3 Administrative Oversight, the state's highest level of remediation, after Election Day (Nov. 3) problems that left the county among the last in Ohio to report results, with full results available only around 3 a.m. Nov. 4, according to WTOL and 13 ABC (WTVG). A letter from state Director of Elections Chris Burnett listed five problems: absentee ballots that scanners could not read because cheap or off-brand ink was used to print them; un-scanned ballots discovered on Election Night after the board had promised results within an hour; inadequate ballot testing before Election Day; staff unaware of required Election Night reporting procedures, including reporting absentee votes before precinct votes and including all memory drives; and local leaders making excuses rather than admitting mistakes. Board members had earlier cited about 900 absentee ballots arriving at 7:30 p.m., ballot reprinting and inadequate staffing. Under the oversight order the state will hold weekly meetings, conduct site visits, help write new procedures, require a corrective-action plan, and require staff performance evaluations by Dec. 11. Board director LaVera Scott said the oversight document contains several inaccurate statements. Social-media posts asking how many votes the omitted drives added have not been answered by an official source; no outcome change has been reported. Status Confirmed by the Ohio Secretary of State's office: State Director of Elections Chris Burnett's letter placing the Lucas County Board of Elections under Level 3 Administrative Oversight lists the failures, as reported by WTOL and 13 ABC (WTVG). Catalog point: the state itself found inadequate pre-election ballot testing, absentee ballots printed with ink the scanners could not read, and un-scanned ballots discovered on Election Night — failures that proper testing and reconciliation are supposed to catch before results are reported.", "sources": [{"title": "WTOL — Lucas County OH placed under Level 3 state oversight (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.wtol.com/article/news/local/lucas-county-board-of-elections-placed-on-highest-level-of-state-oversight/512-5518f4d0-d91c-47b9-ac95-6af9f8040118"}, {"title": "13 ABC (WTVG) — Lucas County OH placed under Level 3 state oversight (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.13abc.com/2026/11/06/state-election-officials-alert-lucas-county-board-elections-oversight-actions-following-delayed-reporting/"}, {"title": "13 ABC (WTVG) — Lucas County OH placed under Level 3 state oversight (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.13abc.com/2026/11/04/why-is-lucas-county-so-late-report-election-results/"}, {"title": "X post by @_Patriot1776Q_ (2026-11-07T06:28:41Z)", "url": "https://x.com/_Patriot1776Q_/status/2118953768532242584"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lucas County OH placed under Level 3 state oversight (ei-2026-10-352)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-352 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ia-johnson-2026-11-05-about-2017-absentee-ballots-omitted-from-unofficial-results-sos-audit", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-05", "uid": "C20261109-121807-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-05", "old_ids": ["ia-johnson-2026-11-05-about-2017-absentee-ballots-omitted-from-unofficial-results-sos-audit"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election); 2026-11-05 (discovered)", "state": "IA", "description": "On Thursday, Nov. 5, 2026, an official in the Johnson County Auditor's Office identified about 2,017 absentee ballots that were not included in unofficial results from Tuesday, Nov. 3, 2026 local, state, and federal elections, according to a Friday afternoon joint statement from Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate and Johnson County Auditor Julie Persons. Iowa Capital Dispatch (Brooklyn Draisey; published 2026-11-06T23:09:53Z, 5:09 p.m. CST) reported that statement. CBS2 Iowa (Janelle Brisbine; published 2026-11-06T14:59:15-06:00, 2:59 p.m. CST) reported the same figure: approximately 2,017 absentee ballots were not included in the unofficial results reported on Election Night, and the official who identified them Thursday contacted the Iowa Secretary of State's Office. Iowa Capital Dispatch reported that the audit was set to begin \"immediately\" on Friday, Nov. 6, and wrap up by Nov. 9, and that it focuses on the county's Absentee and Special Voters Precinct. CBS2 Iowa reported the audit of all ballots in that precinct is underway and expected to be completed by Monday, Nov. 9. Nov. 9 is the expected completion date, not the start date. An X post by @pepesgrandma at 2026-11-06T23:55:25Z (5:55 p.m. CST) called the audit \"set for Nov 9,\" which does not match the joint-statement reporting. The joint statement said that, based on current unofficial results, race outcomes are not expected to change. Iowa Capital Dispatch reported that no unofficial statewide result was within 2,017 votes and that the Associated Press had called Iowa's 1st Congressional District for Democrat Christina Bohannan over Republican incumbent Mariannette Miller-Meeks by nearly 32,000 votes (54%). It also reported that the only contested legislative race within that margin was House District 91, where Republican Judd Lawler led Democrat Mark Divitt by 940 votes in Johnson County, and that in House District 92, split between Johnson and Washington counties, incumbent Republican Rep. Heather Hora led Democrat Brittany Erickson by 2,020 votes. Neither article reports evidence that the omission was intentional. The joint statement said each county's Absentee and Special Voters Precinct is still counting ballots cast through address-confidentiality programs and by overseas Americans, and that results are not official until county and statewide canvasses are completed. Update (Nov. 8, 2026): KCRG (KCRG Staff; published Nov. 8, 2026 at 7:11 p.m. CST) reported that Auditor Julie Persons announced Sunday that counting of all 36,138 absentee ballots cast in the general election is complete, including the roughly 2,000 ballots found unopened and still boxed in a secure ballot storage room on Thursday, Nov. 5, during routine post-election duties. Tabulation of those ballots began Friday, Nov. 6, and concluded Sunday, Nov. 8, and the results were uploaded to the Secretary of State's website. KCRG reported that counting them did not change any outcome for state, federal, county or township races, the state amendment or any ballot measure. Persons is quoted saying her office identified how the ballots were overlooked, that \"at no time was the chain of custody broken on these ballots,\" and that absentee counting procedures are being updated; the report does not state the specific cause. The absentee board reconvenes Monday, Nov. 9, for UOCAVA ballots and cured provisional ballots, and the county canvass is set for 1 p.m. Tuesday, Nov. 10. The chain-of-custody statement is the auditor's own account and has not been independently verified. Status Confirmed by a joint statement from Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate and Johnson County Auditor Julie Persons, reported by Iowa Capital Dispatch, CBS2 Iowa and KCRG; the state launched an audit. Catalog point: about 2,017 absentee ballots were left out of the Election Night unofficial results and were found only two days later by an auditor's office official. Update (Nov. 10, 2026): Auditor Julie Persons told KCRG the ballots were cast Nov. 2, alphabetized on Election Day and carried upstairs to the absentee board's room, where the boxes were set on a shelf instead of left on a cart, and were found Thursday during cleanup before the canvass; she said they stayed under lock and key. Under a Secretary of State directive more than 26,000 absentee ballots were recounted, and the Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the canvass Nov. 10 with no outcomes changed. Former Auditor Travis Weipert said reconciliation checks should have flagged the shortfall and called for Persons to resign.", "sources": [{"title": "Iowa Capital Dispatch — Johnson IA ~2,017 absentee ballots omitted (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://iowacapitaldispatch.com/2026/11/06/secretary-of-state-launches-audit-into-uncounted-johnson-county-absentee-ballots/"}, {"title": "CBS2 Iowa — Johnson IA ~2,017 absentee ballots omitted (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://cbs2iowa.com/news/local/more-than-2000-absentee-ballots-not-included-in-johnson-county-election-results-voting-mail-in-unofficial"}, {"title": "KCRG — Johnson IA ~2,017 absentee ballots omitted (2026-11-08)", "url": "https://www.kcrg.com/2026/11/09/johnson-county-finishes-counting-2000-missed-absentee-ballots-finds-no-effect-final-results/"}, {"title": "X post by @pepesgrandma (2026-11-06T23:55:25Z)", "url": "https://x.com/pepesgrandma/status/2118854800141877696"}, {"title": "KCRG — Johnson County auditor explains how 2,017 ballots were overlooked; predecessor calls for resignation (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kcrg.com/2026/11/10/johnson-county-auditor-explains-how-2017-ballots-were-overlooked-predecessor-calls-resignation/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Johnson IA ~2,017 absentee ballots omitted (ei-2026-10-356)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-356 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-356 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "id-bannock-2026-11-03-pocatello-2-precinct-333-election-day-ballots-not-counted-election-night", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-01", "uid": "C20261111-120609-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-01", "old_ids": ["id-bannock-2026-11-03-pocatello-2-precinct-333-election-day-ballots-not-counted-election-night"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election night); 2026-11-10 (found and added)", "state": "ID", "description": "The Idaho Secretary of State's Office announced on Nov. 10, 2026, that the Bannock County Clerk's Office notified it earlier that day that 333 ballots cast in the Nov. 3 general election in the Pocatello 2 precinct had not been counted on election night. The ballots were identified during the post-election review (reconciliation) process. After the ballots were tabulated, no outcomes changed; the closest contest involving the precinct, the county coroner's race, was separated by 4,857 votes. Secretary of State Phil McGrane said his office will work to determine why the ballots were not processed on election night, and Clerk Jason Dixon said 'this should not have happened.' The ballots were to be added to VoteIdaho.gov totals on Nov. 10; the county Board of Canvassers will recanvass on Thursday, Nov. 12, at 9 a.m., and the State Board of Canvassers meets Friday, Nov. 13, to begin statewide post-election audits. This is separate from the county's election-night tabulator jams. The cause of the omission has not yet been reported. Update (KTVB, Nov. 10): the Secretary of State's Office said the 333 ballots had been tabulated as of Tuesday evening, Nov. 10, and no outcomes changed. Update (Nov. 18–19, 2026): the Idaho State Journal reported that the Secretary of State's post-election hand count of the Attorney General race in Bannock County matched the county's reported results, and the Secretary of State's Office said it agrees with the clerks' findings. Clerk Jason Dixon said all ballots were accounted for; one precinct initially came up one ballot off, but a recount showed the auditors had miscounted. Five write-in ballots sent to the resolution table on election night had been filed by precinct instead of with their counted batch, which the county will change; Dixon said those ballots were counted correctly. The Secretary of State's full audit report is due when the State Board of Canvassers meets on Nov. 24. The Pocatello 2 precinct itself was not among the precincts selected for audit. Status Confirmed by the Idaho Secretary of State's Nov. 10 release and Bannock County Clerk Jason Dixon (\"this should not have happened\"), reported by the Gem State Chronicle and KTVB; no outcome changed, and the state's root-cause findings are pending. Catalog point: a whole precinct's Election Day ballots were left out of the election-night count and surfaced only in post-election reconciliation, a week after Latah County's 2,342 omitted early-vote ballots in the same state. Update (Nov. 10 to 11, 2026): The Idaho State Journal reported the cause: while searching for a missing tote of Election Day supplies, staff found the sealed Pocatello 2 ballot box in a poll worker's pickup truck, where it had slid from the tailgate toward the cab and stayed for a week. Clerk Jason Dixon said that on election night, with absentee ballots jamming the machines, about three-quarters of precinct boxes waited to be checked in; the experienced check-in staffer had been moved to the bipartisan resolution table, a newer employee worked check-in alone, and Elections Director Julie Hancock never compared the check-in sheet against the precinct list ('Our failsafes … failed'). The electronic poll book showed exactly 333 Election Day check-ins, the county counted exactly 333 ballots, and the precinct seals were intact and matched; the closest affected race is District 29 House Seat B (Roberts 10,036, Miles 8,012). Dixon said the gap would have surfaced in the canvass because precinct turnout would not match voter history; the county plans to buy headlamps for volunteers unloading boxes.", "sources": [{"title": "Gem State Chronicle (Idaho Secretary of State press release) — Bannock Co. ID 333 uncounted Pocatello 2 ballots (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://gemstatechronicle.com/2026/11/bannock-county-additional-election-day-ballots/"}, {"title": "KTVB — Bannock Co. ID 333 uncounted Pocatello 2 ballots (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://www.ktvb.com/article/news/politics/elections/idaho-election-recounts-prompted-them-how-state-officials-responding/277-25a970ba-d428-443d-916e-f1905f7e8097"}, {"title": "X post by @gemstatechron (2026-11-10T23:28:33Z)", "url": "https://x.com/gemstatechron/status/2120297589237256276"}, {"title": "Idaho State Journal — Bannock County finds 333 uncounted Election Day ballots in pickup truck a week after marathon count (Shelbie Harris, Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/bannock-county-finds-333-uncounted-election-day-ballots-in-pickup-truck-a-week-after-marathon/article_e5d6ab9d-c48a-4f70-a28d-84d991aca4f9.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/isj-bannock-333-ballots-pickup-truck-2026-11-10.html"}, {"title": "KIFI Local News 8 — Bannock hand-count audit matched (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://localnews8.com/news/2026/11/17/bannock-county-under-audit-after-election/"}, {"title": "Idaho State Journal — Bannock hand-count audit matched (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.idahostatejournal.com/news/local/hand-counts-match-reported-results-in-bannock-caribou-oneida-counties-post-election-audits/article_72d6a41c-6be7-4dfa-a05f-96f4c6f95679.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bannock Co. ID 333 uncounted Pocatello 2 ballots (ei-2026-10-393)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-19 12:14 PM ET (2026-11-19 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-393 update: hand-count audit result). EMon ei-2026-10-393 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 12:30 PM ET 2026-11-11 (open-web fortify sweep); zero X API."}
{"id": "oh-wyandot-2026-11-03-oct-28-mock-election-totals-left-in-reporting-system-unofficial-results-overreported", "permanent_id": "C20261110-121330-02", "uid": "C20261110-121330-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261110-121330-02", "old_ids": ["oh-wyandot-2026-11-03-oct-28-mock-election-totals-left-in-reporting-system-unofficial-results-overreported"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election night); 2026-11-09 (county confirmation)", "state": "OH", "description": "The X user @lamps_apple posted on Nov. 8, 2026 three images of what are labeled Wyandot County's Unofficial Canvass, 2026 General Election summary pages, saying the county has 'a math problem.' The first page shows 23 of 23 precincts reporting, 14,414 registered voters, and 8,739 total ballots cast: 4,873 on Election Day, 844 absentee, 0 provisional and 3,022 early vote (60.63% turnout). The Governor page shows 9,855 total votes cast plus 6 overvotes and 128 undervotes, which adds to 9,989, and 6,063 of the votes on Election Day; the U.S. Senate page shows 9,988 votes plus 2 overvotes and 145 undervotes, which adds to 10,135, with 6,190 on Election Day. Treasurer of State and both Supreme Court races show 5,121 to 5,134 Election Day votes. In the pages as posted, absentee and early-vote columns are roughly consistent with ballots cast, but every race's Election Day votes exceed the 4,873 Election Day ballots cast. The arithmetic in the post matches the pages as shown. The post does not establish the cause: it may be an error in the ballots-cast summary line, a mismatch between reports, or a counting error. The pages were not obtained from the county directly, the Wyandot County Board of Elections has not been found responding, and no news outlet has reported the discrepancy. Ohio's official canvass runs Nov. 8 to Nov. 18, with certification due Nov. 24, so the figures are unofficial and may change. Evidence still missing: the county's own report, a board explanation, and the canvass reconciliation. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): Lead Stories reported that Wyandot County Board of Elections Director Darcy Zimmerman confirmed the discrepancy by phone, saying \"those numbers do not math\" and that the office was working with the Secretary of State's office on it. Hours later the board issued a press release, quoted by Lead Stories, saying \"vote totals from an October 28 mock election were inadvertently left in the reporting system for one precinct before Election Night results were entered,\" which \"resulted in overreported unofficial vote totals for several races\" but \"did not change the outcome of any contest\"; it described mock elections as system pretests run weekly in the month before the election. Lead Stories also traced a similar Nov. 8 post by @natebige_ citing the same figures. The excess votes are therefore confirmed as a county reporting error, not additional ballots; no source alleges fraud. On Nov. 10, the Ohio Secretary of State's Verify Ohio account posted that Wyandot County \"identified that test results from a single precinct were inadvertently included in their unofficial results on Election Night,\" acknowledged the mistake, and is correcting it for the official canvass, linking the county's press release. Still pending: the corrected official canvass figures, which precinct was affected, and the full text of the press release, which EMon has not read directly. Update (Nov. 16, 2026): AFP Fact Check (Nov. 12) found the circulating screenshots were genuine copies of the unofficial Nov. 3 documents on the Secretary of State's website, with the excess votes coming from the disclosed mock-election error; NewsForce247 reported the county canvass convened Nov. 16 to correct the error, with certification due by Nov. 24. Corrected official figures had not yet been published in the sources read. Status Confirmed by the Wyandot County Board of Elections (Director Darcy Zimmerman and the board's press release, as reported by Lead Stories) and by the Ohio Secretary of State's Verify Ohio account; the county says no outcome changed, and the corrected official canvass figures are pending. Catalog point: test-election totals were still sitting in the reporting system on election night and were added to the public results; the error was caught only because citizens noticed the votes exceeded the ballots cast.", "sources": [{"title": "X (@lamps_apple) — Wyandot County OH: unofficial results overreported after Oct. 28 mock-election totals were left in for one precinct (2026-11-08)", "url": "https://x.com/lamps_apple/status/2119529487310205199"}, {"title": "Lead Stories — Wyandot County OH: unofficial results overreported after Oct. 28 mock-election totals were left in for one precinct (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/11/fact-check-ohio-ballots-do-not-add-up-wyandot-county-confirms-numbers-are-off-unofficial-totals-released-election-day.html"}, {"title": "Verify Ohio (Ohio Secretary of State) on X — Wyandot County OH: unofficial results overreported after Oct. 28 mock-election totals were left in for one precinct (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://x.com/VerifyOhio/status/2120157759878656249"}, {"title": "X post by @LeadStoriesCom (2026-11-10T12:58:11Z)", "url": "https://x.com/LeadStoriesCom/status/2120138953571394046"}, {"title": "NewsForce247 — Wyandot canvass convenes to correct mock-vote error (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://newsforce247.com/wyandot-county-canvass-convenes-to-correct-mock-vote-error-certification-by-nov-24/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Wyandot County OH: unofficial results overreported after Oct. 28 mock-election totals were left in for one precinct (ei-2026-10-374)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-17 12:07 PM ET (2026-11-17 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-374 update). EMon ei-2026-10-374 (added 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET, 2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-09-oh-wyandot-canvass-election-day-votes-exceed-ballots-cast-lamps-apple. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-11-02-paradise-valley-sunset-canyon-vote-centers-power-closure", "permanent_id": "C20261102-180524-01", "uid": "C20261102-180524-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-180524-01", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-11-02-paradise-valley-sunset-canyon-vote-centers-power-closure"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-02", "state": "AZ", "description": "On the morning of Nov. 2, 2026, the day before the general election, Maricopa County Elections announced that the vote centers at Paradise Valley Community College and Sunset Canyon School were temporarily closed. Its first post, at 8:57 AM Arizona time, attributed the closures to \"storm related issues.\" The county then edited the post to say \"power related issues\" and directed voters to Locations.Maricopa.Vote to find another location. At 11:25 AM Arizona time, the county posted that both vote centers were open again. The county has not reported how many voters were turned away or redirected, and it has not described the cause beyond power-related issues. This is the second power-related vote center closure in Maricopa County in four days, after the Mesa Community College Red Mountain outage on Oct. 30. Status Confirmed for the temporary closures and reopening, which Maricopa County Elections posted; the county first said storm-related and then power-related issues, and has not described the cause further or said how many voters were turned away. Catalog point: an outage that closes a vote center turns voters away during the window it is closed, and the cause is often never publicly established.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County Elections (X) — Maricopa Nov. 2 vote center closures (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117287200891314567"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Elections (X) — Maricopa Nov. 2 vote center closures (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117322101174718879"}, {"title": "Patriots Heart Network — Maricopa Nov. 2 vote center closures (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://patriotsheartnetwork.com/2026/11/02/here-we-go-maricopa-county-claims-power-related-issues-causing-vote-center-closures/"}, {"title": "X post by @MaricopaVote (2026-11-02T15:57:26Z)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117284961262641505"}, {"title": "X post by @MaricopaVote (2026-11-02T16:06:20Z)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117287200891314567"}, {"title": "X post by @MaricopaVote (2026-11-02T18:25:01Z)", "url": "https://x.com/MaricopaVote/status/2117322101174718879"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa Nov. 2 vote center closures (ei-2026-10-233)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-233 (added 2026-11-02 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "co-jefferson-2026-11-02-golden-unknown-substance-ballot-envelope-hazmat-50-ballots-isolated", "permanent_id": "C20261105-120646-02", "uid": "C20261105-120646-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-120646-02", "old_ids": ["co-jefferson-2026-11-02-golden-unknown-substance-ballot-envelope-hazmat-50-ballots-isolated"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-02", "state": "CO", "description": "On Monday evening, Nov. 2, 2026, at about 6:30 p.m., workers at the Jefferson County Elections building (Laramie Building on Illinois Street in Golden) found an unknown substance inside a single ballot envelope, according to a Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder spokeswoman quoted by 9News. The Jefferson County Sheriff's Office Hazmat team responded. The clerk's office said law enforcement ruled out a variety of hazards, that nobody came into direct contact with the substance or showed symptoms, that ballots in the immediate area (about 50, per Telemundo Denver) were isolated but will be counted, and that the building resumed normal operations with no indication of a broader issue. Telemundo Denver reported the substance was sent to the FBI for identification and that testing continued. On Nov. 5, election judge Dawn Liberty (@DawnLiberty2) posted on X that she worked Colorado elections in a particular county, that a \"Caster\" opened an envelope with a white powder substance Monday night, that workers were kept in a hallway about three hours while police, possibly FBI, ambulances, fire and hazmat responded, and that the room was not cleared for return until Election Day morning; she tagged @PatriotMarkCook. Her account matches the JeffCo incident in time and substance; she did not name the county. Distinct from the mid-October nationwide powder letters to secretary-of-state offices; Colorado was not among the election offices WIRED listed in that series. Status Confirmed by the Jefferson County Clerk and Recorder's office, reported by 9News and Telemundo Denver, with a matching first-hand X account from election judge Dawn Liberty. The substance had not been publicly identified. Catalog point: one envelope with an unknown substance stopped work at a central ballot-processing site for hours the night before Election Day and sent about 50 ballots into isolation.", "sources": [{"title": "9News (KUSA) — JeffCo CO ballot envelope unknown substance (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.9news.com/article/news/politics/elections/unknown-substance-found-in-single-ballot-at-jeffco-elections-building/73-3258fac8-7fa2-442c-8d9e-c331734136d6"}, {"title": "Telemundo Denver — JeffCo CO ballot envelope unknown substance (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.telemundodenver.com/noticias/local/aislan-unas-50-boletas-tras-hallar-un-sobre-con-sustancia-desconocida-en-centro-electoral-de-golden/2486850/"}, {"title": "9News video — JeffCo CO ballot envelope unknown substance (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.9news.com/video/news/local/local-politics/jefferson-county-colorado-white-substance-election-ballot/73-a90e9bba-9e6b-4c9a-bef0-66c2302d15c6"}, {"title": "X post by @DawnLiberty2 (2026-11-05T14:47:04Z)", "url": "https://x.com/DawnLiberty2/status/2118354416273379489"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — JeffCo CO ballot envelope unknown substance (ei-2026-10-309)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-309 (added 2026-11-05 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nv-nye-2026-11-02-ems-file-upload-error-30405-ballot-records-shown-received", "permanent_id": "C20261117-120714-01", "uid": "C20261117-120714-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261117-120714-01", "old_ids": ["nv-nye-2026-11-02-ems-file-upload-error-30405-ballot-records-shown-received"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "Mail ballots: design a mail-ballot tracking system that gives the public a false sense of security about voting by mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-02 (county notice); 2026-11-12 (certified abstract)", "state": "NV", "description": "In a notice dated Nov. 2, 2026, Nye County said it identified and corrected a file upload error that caused the election management system to incorrectly show 30,405 ballot records as received. The county said that during ballot processing, the Clerk's Office uploaded a file for outgoing ballots instead of the file documenting returned ballots, and that it worked with the Nevada Secretary of State's Office and its election technology vendor to remove the incorrect entries, upload the correct records, and verify the counts. The Clerk's Office said it takes accurate ballot tracking seriously and would continue processing ballots under applicable laws so results would be timely after the polls closed on Nov. 3. A KPVM TV News 25 Facebook post published about Nov. 14 reported the same notice and said officials say the issue has been corrected. The county's certified abstract of the Nov. 3, 2026 general election, filed Nov. 12, 2026 by Clerk Cori A. Freidhof, shows 21,569 ballots cast of 37,479 active registered voters (57.55 percent turnout), so the incorrect 30,405 figure was well above the number of ballots actually cast. Status Confirmed: the error and its correction are stated in Nye County's own Nov. 2 notice, and the county's certified abstract (21,569 ballots cast) shows the 30,405 'received' figure exceeded the ballots actually cast. No outcome change is reported. Catalog point: the ballot-tracking records the public and campaigns rely on to know whose mail ballot was received were overwritten by an outgoing-ballot file, so for a time the system reported tens of thousands of returns that never happened; the correction depended on the Clerk, the Secretary of State and the election technology vendor, with no outside check of the records.", "sources": [{"title": "Nye County Clerk's Office (official 2026 General Election page) — Nye County ballot-record upload error (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.nyecountynv.gov/1277/General-Election-November-2026"}, {"title": "Nye County Clerk (2026 General Election Results / Abstract of Vote, PDF) — Nye County ballot-record upload error (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://www.nyecountynv.gov/DocumentCenter/View/52169/2026-General-Election-Results-PDF"}, {"title": "KPVM TV News 25 (Facebook post; screenshot supplied by Mark; specific post permalink not located) — Nye County ballot-record upload error (2026-11-14)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/KPVM25/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Nye Co. NV file upload showed 30,405 ballots received in error (ei-2026-10-441)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-441 (added 2026-11-17 12:07 PM ET, 2026-11-17 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon resolved/high, official_error yes). Description taken from the EMon summary. The vendor is not named in the sources, so no vendor tag. KPVM post permalink not located (screenshot supplied by Mark). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ct-madison-2026-11-01-voter-checked-in-twice-early-voting-handed-second-ballot-referred-seec", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-02", "uid": "C20261109-121807-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-02", "old_ids": ["ct-madison-2026-11-01-voter-checked-in-twice-early-voting-handed-second-ballot-referred-seec"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-11-01", "state": "CT", "description": "Connecticut Deputy Secretary of the State Jennifer Barahona said on Election Day (Nov. 3, 2026) that a person in Madison attempted to vote twice during early voting and that the matter was referred to the State Elections Enforcement Commission (SEEC). CT Examiner (Dave Altimari, Nov. 3) reported the referral and Barahona's warning that attempting to \"test the system\" by voting more than once is illegal. Connecticut Public (Isabelle Marceles, Nov. 6) identified the voter as Terri LaChance, 65, a registered Democrat in Madison, and reported that documents show a town registrar contacted the Secretary of the State's Office. LaChance told Connecticut Public she had already voted, returned on Nov. 1, checked in again, had her license scanned, signed twice, and was handed a ballot, then alerted a worker that she had previously voted; she said she was testing whether a second vote was possible after seeing social-media claims about machines. A Secretary of the State communications official said statewide systems are designed to prevent double voting once a ballot is recorded. Connecticut Public also reported a second, separate October early-voting incident in which a woman believed to have short-term memory issues was issued and cast a second ballot after a check-in error; that matter was also referred to SEEC. SEEC said it cannot comment unless it opens an investigation; its next meeting was scheduled for Nov. 18. Charges have not been reported. Same-voter second ballot / check-in fits Cloned Voting under Ineligible Voting (Mark 2026-11-05). Status Confirmed by Connecticut Deputy Secretary of the State Jennifer Barahona (CT Examiner, Nov. 3), with Connecticut Public (Nov. 6) identifying the voter as Terri LaChance, who told the outlet she had already voted, checked in again, had her license scanned, signed twice and was handed a ballot before alerting a worker. The matter was referred to the State Elections Enforcement Commission; a referral is not a finding. Catalog point: a voter who had already voted was checked in a second time and handed a second ballot; by her own account it was she, not the check-in system, who raised the alarm.", "sources": [{"title": "Connecticut Public — Madison CT second-ballot attempt referred to SEEC (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.ctpublic.org/news/investigative/2026-11-06/ct-officials-say-madison-woman-attempted-to-vote-twice-she-says-it-was-a-test"}, {"title": "CT Examiner — Madison CT second-ballot attempt referred to SEEC (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://ctexaminer.com/2026/11/03/voter-caught-trying-to-vote-twice-in-madison/"}, {"title": "CT Examiner — Madison CT second-ballot attempt referred to SEEC (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://ctexaminer.com/2026/11/03/two-voters-try-to-vote-twice-ballots-run-low-in-wallingford-mansfield/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Madison CT second-ballot attempt referred to SEEC (ei-2026-10-353)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-353 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-fresno-2026-10-ballot-printing-error-fowler-unified", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-16", "uid": "C20261102-121503-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-16", "old_ids": ["ca-fresno-2026-10-ballot-printing-error-fowler-unified"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "The Fresno County Elections Office announced on Oct. 31, 2026, that ballots printed by its ballot-marking devices for the Fresno Unified School District Trustee Areas 1, 3 and 4 contests may show the heading \"Fowler Unified School District\" instead of \"Fresno Unified School District.\" The device screen shows the correct contest name. Registrar of Voters James A. Kus said that selections are recorded and counted in the correct Fresno Unified contest and that no other contests are affected. The county called it a minor typographical printing error and apologized. Notices are being posted at the devices, and voters who prefer may request an on-demand paper ballot instead; on-demand and mail ballots are not affected. The county said it will audit additional precincts in the affected trustee areas during the post-election manual tally and will add proofing of device printouts in future elections. The number of voters who used the devices for these contests has not been reported. Status Confirmed: the Fresno County elections office discovered and announced the printing error. Catalog point: printing and programming errors are caught only when someone looks; each one adds to the list of 'mistakes' that make errors seem normal.", "sources": [{"title": "KMPH Fox 26 — Fresno BMD ballot label error (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://kmph.com/news/local/ballot-printing-error-discovered-by-fresno-county-elections-office-midterm-2026"}, {"title": "KSEE24 / CBS47 (YourCentralValley.com) — Fresno BMD ballot label error (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/local-news/error-found-on-some-fresno-county-ballots-elections-office/amp/"}, {"title": "ABC30 Fresno — Fresno BMD ballot label error (2026-11-01)", "url": "https://abc30.com/post/typographical-printing-error-fresno-county-ballots/20003781/"}, {"title": "New York Post — Fresno BMD ballot label error (2026-11-01)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/11/01/us-news/election-officials-spot-error-on-ballots-for-fresno-county-school-district/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fresno BMD ballot label error (ei-2026-10-227)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-227 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-cobb-2026-10-sewell-mill-01-districting-error-wrong-house-race-on-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-01", "uid": "C20261028-121857-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-01", "old_ids": ["ga-cobb-2026-10-sewell-mill-01-districting-error-wrong-house-race-on-ballots"], "seq": "C01583", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10", "state": "GA", "description": "Cobb County Elections and Voter Registration officials said a \"districting error\" made when ballot combinations were loaded for the 2026 election cycle caused voters in the Sewell Mill 01 precinct to receive ballots showing the race for Georgia House District 43 instead of the race for House District 37, the Cobb County Courier reported on Oct. 27, 2026. Officials said the error was found only after in-person advance voting had begun, so the ballot could not be changed. They said a \"limited\" number of voters is affected but gave no number. Votes cast by Sewell Mill 01 voters in the House District 43 race will not be counted; officials said the outcome will not change because both House races are uncontested. They said an audit confirmed that no other precincts or races are involved, and notices are being posted at the precinct and at all advance voting locations. Catalog point: the wrong ballot style reached voters through the county's own programming, was caught only after voting began, and was excused as harmless because the races happened to be uncontested.", "sources": [{"title": "Cobb County Courier — Cobb officials report ballot error in Sewell Mill precinct (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://cobbcountycourier.com/2026/10/cobb-officials-report-ballot-error-in-sewell-mill-precinct/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Cobb County, GA wrong House race on Sewell Mill 01 ballots (ei-2026-10-175)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-175 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). Cobb County Courier curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ma-pelham-2026-vendor-mail-ballot-packets-missing-page-two-questions", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-06", "uid": "C20261019-123505-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-06", "old_ids": ["ma-pelham-2026-vendor-mail-ballot-packets-missing-page-two-questions"], "seq": "C01437", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10", "state": "MA", "description": "Some pre-assembled mail ballot packets sent to voters in Pelham, Massachusetts for the Nov. 3, 2026 state election contained two copies of the first ballot page and no second page, which carries the last two statewide ballot questions. Resident Bob Andres reported that his packet, his wife's and several neighbors' had the problem. Town Clerk Melissa Hibbard said the packets are assembled by a vendor hired by the Secretary of the Commonwealth and sent to about 280 Pelham voters who asked for mail ballots; she said \"It wasn't my mistake\" and that the packets she spot-checked were correct. Debra O'Malley, communications director for the Secretary of the Commonwealth, said: \"We have reached out to our vendor to report the issue, though it does appear to be isolated.\" The clerk has since checked all remaining packets. Affected voters can get a replacement from the clerk, including during early voting from Oct. 17, and the defective ballot will be spoiled. The number of affected voters is not known. Status Confirmed for the defect and the vendor attribution (Daily Hampshire Gazette, with on-record statements from the town clerk and the Secretary's office). No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a voter who did not notice the missing page could not vote on two statewide questions, and the fix depends on each voter catching it. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Ballots handed out at the precinct and checked against the posted sample ballot keep a missing page from going unnoticed.", "sources": [{"title": "Daily Hampshire Gazette — Pelham mail-in ballots missing page two; town clerk offers replacements before Nov. 3 election (Oct. 17, 2026)", "url": "https://gazettenet.com/2026/10/17/pelham-mail-in-ballots-missing-page-two-town-clerk-offers-replacements-before-nov-3-election/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pelham MA ballot packets missing page two (ei-2026-10-045)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-045 (first_seen 2026-10-18; EMon status active, severity low, confidence high; official_error yes). Single outlet, curl 200, with on-record officials. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: Floyd IN missing race, Lake FL omitted candidate). Watch for an affected-voter count or other towns using the same vendor."}
{"id": "mn-kittson-kennedy-2026-10-vote-for-one-two-council-seats-replacement-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-05", "uid": "C20261028-121857-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-05", "old_ids": ["mn-kittson-kennedy-2026-10-vote-for-one-two-council-seats-replacement-ballots"], "seq": "C01587", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10", "state": "MN", "description": "Mail ballots sent to registered voters in the city of Kennedy, in Kittson County, Minnesota, told voters to \"Vote for One\" in the city council race even though two council members are to be elected, the Kittson County Enterprise reported on Oct. 27, 2026. All registered voters in Kennedy will receive a new ballot with a bright label reading \"REPLACEMENT BALLOT\" and directions to discard the old one. Kittson County CFO Shirley Swenson said voters who had already voted received a letter letting them either request that their voted ballot be spoiled and a new one issued, or leave their ballot as is. The paper reported that 133 people are registered to vote in Kennedy, according to the Secretary of State's website. Catalog point: a printed instruction error put two different ballots for the same race in circulation, and voters who already voted must take action themselves to get a correct ballot counted.", "sources": [{"title": "Kittson County Enterprise — Kennedy residents' ballots will be reprinted, reissued after error is found (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kittsonarea.com/2026/10/27/kennedy-residents-ballots-will-be-reprinted-reissued-after-error-is-found/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Kennedy, MN council race misprint; replacement ballots (ei-2026-10-179)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-179 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed, official_error yes). Source curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ms-2026-10-31-sems-polling-place-locator-18-wrong-or-outdated-locations-eight-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-19", "uid": "C20261104-121522-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-19", "old_ids": ["ms-2026-10-31-sems-polling-place-locator-18-wrong-or-outdated-locations-eight-counties"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-31", "state": "MS", "description": "The Mississippi Free Press reported that, as of Oct. 31, 2026, the Statewide Election Management System, which feeds the state's online polling-place locator, still listed incorrect or outdated locations or addresses for 18 polling places in Bolivar, Jackson, Neshoba, Oktibbeha, Perry, Sharkey, Smith and Tunica counties. Neshoba County Circuit Clerk Delana Waddell confirmed that the Southeast Philadelphia precinct, which moved to Faith Tabernacle Apostolic, was still shown at the Philadelphia Country Club, saying the address \"can't be changed until after the election due to machines were already programmed.\" Oktibbeha County confirmed on Oct. 30 that its Maben precinct address was still wrong but said it would try to fix it. Jackson County said it had corrected its Hickory Hills listing, and Tunica County said it had corrected five long-standing errors. The Secretary of State's office said counties are responsible for entering polling-place information and that it would follow up with them. Whether any voters were sent to the wrong site on Election Day had not been reported. Status Confirmed by Neshoba and Oktibbeha county officials and the Secretary of State's office, reported by the Mississippi Free Press. Catalog point: the state's online polling-place locator still showed wrong locations days before the election, and one clerk said the address could not be changed because the machines were already programmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Mississippi Free Press — Mississippi polling-place locator errors (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://www.mississippifreepress.org/lingering-errors-in-mississippis-election-system-risk-sending-voters-to-wrong-polling-place-on-election-day/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Mississippi polling-place locator errors (ei-2026-10-299)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-299 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-10-30-mesa-red-mountain-vote-center-power-outage-closure", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-14", "uid": "C20261102-121503-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-14", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-10-30-mesa-red-mountain-vote-center-power-outage-closure"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-30", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Friday, Oct. 30, 2026, the Maricopa County Recorder's Office posted that the Mesa Community College Red Mountain Vote Center (7110 E. McKellips Road, Mesa) was experiencing \"an unexpected power outage\" and that facility officials said it would \"remain closed for the rest of today\"; the office directed voters to the ASU Polytechnic Academic Center and the Gilbert Public Works North Area Service Center. About 55 minutes later, the office posted that the vote center had reopened and would close at its regular 7:00 PM time. Shortly before the closure notice, journalist Rachel Alexander (Townhall, Arizona Insiders) posted a voter's message saying the polling station was evacuated for a fire alarm and then lost power, and asked why the alarm was pulled at a \"heavily Republican vote center.\" On Oct. 31, Maricopa County Republican Committee Chair Craig Berland told Arizona Insiders in a video interview that \"it appears at this point that it was pulled intentionally,\" that \"there was no fire,\" that whoever did it \"also impacted the electricity,\" and that \"it does appear to be sabotage.\" He also said he had \"not been advised of anything further\" and that he hopes the Department of Justice investigates. His account is a claim and has not been confirmed. As of Nov. 1, no official source, including the Recorder's Office, Maricopa County Elections, Mesa Community College, or local police and fire agencies, has publicly confirmed that a fire alarm was pulled, what caused the evacuation or the power outage, or any sabotage. The Recorder's Office notices cite only a power outage, and they show the site reopened the same afternoon, while Berland said the center was lost \"for the rest of the afternoon.\" How many voters were turned away or delayed was not reported. Status Confirmed for the power outage and temporary closure, which the Recorder's Office posted; the claims of a pulled fire alarm and sabotage remain unconfirmed. Catalog point: an unexplained outage that closes a vote center turns voters away during the window it is closed, and the cause is often never publicly established.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County Recorder's Office (X) — Mesa Red Mountain vote center outage (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2116310172473950475"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Recorder's Office (X) — Mesa Red Mountain vote center outage (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2116323949953077298"}, {"title": "Arizona Insiders (X), interview with Craig Berland — Mesa Red Mountain vote center outage (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://x.com/ArizonaInsiders/status/2116734811104481339"}, {"title": "Transcript of the Arizona Insiders interview (local Whisper large-v3 machine transcription) — Mesa Red Mountain vote center outage (2026-11-01)", "url": "archives/2026/10/ei-2026-10-212__x-video-berland-interview.transcript.txt"}, {"title": "X post by @RecordersOffice (2026-10-30T23:23:58Z)", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2116310172473950475"}, {"title": "X post by @RecordersOffice (2026-10-31T00:18:43Z)", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2116323949953077298"}, {"title": "X post by @Rach_IC (2026-10-30T23:04:52Z)", "url": "https://x.com/Rach_IC/status/2116305364560040034"}, {"title": "X post by @ArizonaInsiders (2026-11-01T03:31:00Z)", "url": "https://x.com/ArizonaInsiders/status/2116734811104481339"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Mesa Red Mountain vote center outage (ei-2026-10-212)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-212 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-2026-10-team-state-display-lags-county-turnout-harris-835k-vs-953k", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-19", "uid": "C20261102-121503-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-19", "old_ids": ["tx-2026-10-team-state-display-lags-county-turnout-harris-835k-vs-953k"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-30", "state": "TX", "description": "Spectrum News reported on Oct. 30, 2026, that early-voting turnout shown by the Texas Secretary of State does not match what counties are posting. In Harris County, the state display showed about 835,000 votes while the county's own site reported 953,000, a gap of roughly 118,000. Christopher McGinn, executive director of the Texas Association of County Election Officials, said that since the new Texas Election Administration Management (TEAM) system went live in July 2025 the state display has not exactly reflected what counties upload, with the largest gap in how the state processes absentee (mail) ballot data; the state sometimes returns error reports requiring more voter-registration verification. The Houston Chronicle reported that the Secretary of State's elections director emailed administrators instructing them to enter mail-voter data into TEAM manually, one record at a time, after counties had been told bulk entry would be possible, and that Bastrop County found TEAM recording mail ballots received in late October as cast on Nov. 3, requiring record-by-record fixes. Secretary of State spokeswoman Alicia Pierce said counties are responsible for uploading data, are supposed to enter it by 10 a.m. the next day, and some have been slower. Rice University professor Mark Jones said the problem affects only the displayed turnout, not ballots or candidate tallies. The gap is trending on X, including partisan claims of cheating that the cited reports do not support. Status Confirmed: county election officials and the Secretary of State's office acknowledge the state display does not match county figures; no effect on ballots or candidate tallies has been shown. Catalog point: the public sees the state's displayed numbers, and when they diverge from county figures by tens of thousands, the public has no way to know which, if either, is accurate.", "sources": [{"title": "Spectrum News Texas — Texas TEAM turnout mismatch (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://spectrumlocalnews.com/tx/san-antonio/news/2026/10/30/texas-early-voting"}, {"title": "Houston Chronicle — Texas TEAM turnout mismatch (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/texas/article/early-voting-totals-22489478.php"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Texas TEAM turnout mismatch (ei-2026-10-232)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-232 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-fayette-2026-10-about-300-approved-mail-ballots-never-mailed", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-09", "uid": "C20261102-121503-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-09", "old_ids": ["pa-fayette-2026-10-about-300-approved-mail-ballots-never-mailed"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-29 (found); 2026-10-30 (announced)", "state": "PA", "description": "Fayette County, Pennsylvania, election officials said on Oct. 30, 2026, that mail ballots for about 300 voters who had been approved for them were never printed or mailed. Elections Director Marybeth Kuznik said staff found the problem on Thursday, Oct. 29, after a week of higher-than-usual calls about missing ballots; WPXI reports 308 voters were missing from the mail-ballot label files generated earlier in the month from the state's SURE voter registration system. The Pennsylvania Department of State said \"human error in Fayette County resulted in approximately 300 approved mail ballots not being mailed\" and that the problem was not caused by the SURE system; Kuznik disputed that the error was the county's and said the cause is under investigation. The county is contacting affected voters by robocall and email. They can get a replacement ballot at the Election Bureau, 2 West Main Street, Uniontown, or vote a provisional ballot at their polling place on Nov. 3. Kuznik said the affected voters appear random, with no visible pattern by party, location or registration date, and that a further review will follow the election. Oct. 31 update: The Herald-Standard reports that the cause is still unknown and is under review by the county and the Pennsylvania Department of State, whose press secretary, Geoff Morrow, called it an \"isolated issue.\" Voters who still have not received a ballot may get a replacement over the counter at the Election Bureau on Monday, Nov. 2, from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., or on Election Day from 7 a.m. to 8 p.m. Voters who cannot travel because of a disability or other limitation are asked to call the bureau at 724-430-1289 to arrange another way to receive a ballot. Mail ballots must reach the county elections office by 8 p.m. on Nov. 3. Status Confirmed: the Pennsylvania Department of State and the county both confirm the ballots were not mailed; they disagree about the cause, which is under review. Catalog point: when a mail-ballot file silently drops voters, they learn of it only if they notice a ballot never arrived; in-person Election Day voting does not depend on a label file reaching the voter.", "sources": [{"title": "WPXI — Fayette County, PA unmailed mail ballots (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.wpxi.com/news/local/election-2026-some-fayette-county-voters-may-not-get-their-mail-in-ballot-how-still-get-one/3JETZAHMKZGQ7GKYEY5UBZP35M/"}, {"title": "WTAE — Fayette County, PA unmailed mail ballots (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.wtae.com/article/fayette-county-ballot-mailing-issue-uniontown/74296570"}, {"title": "Herald-Standard — Fayette County, PA unmailed mail ballots (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://www.heraldstandard.com/news/local_news/2026/oct/31/fayette-elections-officials-notifying-300-voters-who-did-not-receive-mail-in-ballots/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fayette County, PA unmailed mail ballots (ei-2026-10-209)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-209 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "in-allen-2026-10-27-vvpat-jam-showed-previous-voters-selections", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-07", "uid": "C20261028-121857-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-07", "old_ids": ["in-allen-2026-10-27-vvpat-jam-showed-previous-voters-selections"], "seq": "C01589", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-27", "state": "IN", "description": "Allen County, Indiana, Director of Elections Amy Scrogham said a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) printer at the Christ's Community Church satellite early-voting site was \"badly jammed\" and was showing a previous voter's selections on Tuesday, Oct. 27, 2026, after a voter told 21Alive (WPTA) that a machine misrecorded their ballot. \"We determined that the VVPAT had a jam which was showing a previous voter's selections,\" Scrogham said. She said the voting panel recorded the voter's selections as intended, that the paper trail is used for state audits and not to tally votes, and that the jam was fixed once mechanics learned of it. The county said it is working with its vendor to prevent future jams and will have poll workers check that the paper-trail window is clear before each voter. Catalog point: the paper record the voter is shown to verify displayed someone else's choices, so the voter could not confirm their own vote, and the audit record for that machine is in question.", "sources": [{"title": "21Alive (WPTA) — Allen County election board addresses issue with audit tool during early voting (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.21alivenews.com/2026/10/27/allen-county-election-board-addresses-issue-with-audit-tool-during-early-voting/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Allen County, IN VVPAT jam showed prior voter's choices (ei-2026-10-183)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-183 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed, official_error partial). Source curl 200. Vendor not named in the source, so no vendor tag. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nj-hudson-2026-10-27-union-city-early-voting-trailer-left-unlocked-machines-poll-books-inside", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-13", "uid": "C20261109-121807-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-13", "old_ids": ["nj-hudson-2026-10-27-union-city-early-voting-trailer-left-unlocked-machines-poll-books-inside"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-27", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Tuesday, Oct. 27, 2026, at about 9:01 a.m., an hour before early voting opened, a man filmed himself walking into an unlocked, unattended Hudson County early-voting trailer at 10th Street and Summit Avenue in Union City, New Jersey, which held two voting machines and electronic poll books; video posted by Leonard Filipowski (Leroy Truth) and by @MichaelCasey_ went viral. Hudson County Board of Elections Clerk Michael Harper told Hudson County View (Dan Israel, Nov. 2) that an electrician who services the trailer generators each morning \"wrongfully\" left the door unlocked before poll workers arrived at 9:35 a.m., that the trailer was unattended for 30 minutes at most, and that \"It was an oversight, nobody's saying that it wasn't.\" Harper said the Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of Elections ran an immediate diagnostic, that the machines, poll books and Wi-Fi had not been turned on and the vote totals matched the prior night's, so early voting continued; the county added a person whose sole job is to unlock and lock the trailer. The New Jersey Attorney General's Office said it was aware of the video and reviewing it; the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to comment. Status Confirmed by the county elections clerk's on-record account of the unlocked, unattended trailer, reported by Hudson County View; no tampering has been shown, and the no-tampering conclusion rests on the county's own check. Catalog point: voting machines and poll books sat in an unlocked, unstaffed trailer before polls opened, and the public learned of it only because a citizen filmed it.", "sources": [{"title": "Hudson County View — Hudson official confident 2 Union City voting machines 'unmolested' after viral vid (Dan Israel, Nov. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://hudsoncountyview.com/hudson-official-confident-2-union-city-voting-machines-unmolested-after-viral-vid/"}, {"title": "X post by @MichaelCasey_ (video, Nov. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/MichaelCasey_/status/2117133659069182001"}, {"title": "X post by @LeroyTruth (video interview with Michael Harper, Nov. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/LeroyTruth/status/2117252984576917759"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Union City unlocked voting trailer (ei-2026-10-234)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Promoted 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET from research queue item rq-2026-11-02-nj-union-city-early-voting-trailer-unlocked-unattended-video (EMon ei-2026-10-234): Hudson County View article (Nov. 2, 2026; read via WebFetch Nov. 9) carries the county Board of Elections clerk's on-record acknowledgment that the trailer was left unlocked and unattended, meeting Mark's 2026-10-20 corroboration rule (official acknowledgment plus a news report that reached the people involved). Description written from the article. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-tarrant-2026-10-26-forest-hill-green-card-holder-ballot-cancel-request-task-force-referral", "permanent_id": "C20261106-121456-01", "uid": "C20261106-121456-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-121456-01", "old_ids": ["tx-tarrant-2026-10-26-forest-hill-green-card-holder-ballot-cancel-request-task-force-referral"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "TX", "description": "The Dallas Express reported on Nov. 3, 2026, that Tarrant County referred an alleged non-citizen vote to its Election Integrity Task Force after lead clerk Jessica Mang documented a request to cancel a ballot at the Forest Hill Civic & Convention Center during early voting. Mang’s Oct. 28 affidavit says Anishka Adanique Persaud voted without problems at 9:43 a.m. on Oct. 26 with a valid ID and voter registration card, then returned saying she wanted the ballot canceled because she is not a U.S. citizen; she said she had a green card, was seeking citizenship, and had consulted an immigration attorney. Mang’s account says Persaud described registering after a Mount Olive Baptist Church event in Arlington where she told a volunteer she was not a citizen and was directed to a QR-code eligibility check, later receiving a registration card (system entry listed Sept. 28; card validity Oct. 27). Elections Administrator Clint Ludwig told the Dallas Express the county is aware of allegations that a potential non-citizen may have cast a ballot and referred the matter for review, declining further comment as a pending legal matter. The affidavit and Ludwig’s statement do not establish whether the ballot was counted or invalidated, whether a registration error occurred, or whether criminal charges will follow; citizenship status is not independently verified in the reporting. Charges, if any, would be accusations only. Distinct from the separate Oct. 28 federal conviction of Khalwinder Singh Bhengura in Tarrant County for 2024 unlawful voting (covered in other DOJ/non-citizen cards). Status Confirmed by lead clerk Jessica Mang's Oct. 28 affidavit and Elections Administrator Clint Ludwig's statement to The Dallas Express that the county referred the matter to its Election Integrity Task Force. Citizenship status was not independently verified in the reporting, and no charges have been announced. Catalog point: a registration record accepted a self-described green-card holder, issued a ballot, and the cancellation request came only after the ballot was cast.", "sources": [{"title": "The Dallas Express — Tarrant County non-citizen ballot cancellation referral (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://dallasexpress.com/tarrant/tarrant-county-refers-alleged-noncitizen-vote-to-election-integrity-task-force/"}, {"title": "X (@natebige_) — Tarrant County non-citizen ballot cancellation referral (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://x.com/natebige_/status/2118477305756700880"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Tarrant County non-citizen ballot cancellation referral (ei-2026-10-316)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-316 (added 2026-11-06 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wa-clark-2026-10-26-looper-ballots-completed-mail-ballots-returned-to-voters", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-03", "uid": "C20261028-121857-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-03", "old_ids": ["wa-clark-2026-10-26-looper-ballots-completed-mail-ballots-returned-to-voters"], "seq": "C01585", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "WA", "description": "Clark County, Washington, Auditor Greg Kimsey said his office is looking into reports that some voters' completed mail ballots, mailed in the official preprinted return envelope, were returned to the voters by the U.S. Postal Service, KATU, The Columbian and KOIN reported on Oct. 26, 2026. Kimsey told KATU the likely cause is a \"looper ballot\": \"The ballot is sent to the post office, it loops back to the voter, because the machines at the post office distribution center are seeing the voter's address on the backside of that envelope.\" He said he checked with the Postal Service and there is no widespread issue, and he urged voters to check their ballot status at votewa.gov. The number of affected ballots was not reported. Catalog point: a completed ballot's path depends on Postal Service sorting machines the county does not control, and a voter learns of a misroute only if the ballot happens to come back.", "sources": [{"title": "KATU — Clark County reviewing reports of returned ballots (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://katu.com/news/local/clark-county-reviewing-reports-of-returned-ballots"}, {"title": "The Columbian — Clark County Auditor investigates reports of returned ballots using preprinted, addressed envelopes (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.columbian.com/news/2026/oct/26/clark-county-auditor-investigates-reports-of-returned-ballots-using-preprinted-addressed-envelopes/"}, {"title": "KOIN — \"Very unfortunate\": Clark County election officials investigate reports of returned ballots (Oct. 26, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.koin.com/local/clark-county/very-unfortunate-clark-county-election-officials-investigate-reports-of-returned-ballots/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Clark County, WA mailed ballots looping back to voters (ei-2026-10-177)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-177 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). KATU and Columbian curl 200; KOIN 403 (URL retained). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-kenosha-pleasant-prairie-2026-10-26-duplicate-absentee-ballot-packets-employee-gone", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-04", "uid": "C20261028-121857-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-04", "old_ids": ["wi-kenosha-pleasant-prairie-2026-10-26-duplicate-absentee-ballot-packets-employee-gone"], "seq": "C01586", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "WI", "description": "The Village of Pleasant Prairie in Kenosha County, Wisconsin, said an election employee issued duplicate absentee ballot packets to some voters on Monday, Oct. 26, 2026, during absentee processing, WTMJ and the Kenosha County Eye reported on Oct. 27. The village described the number of affected voters as \"limited\" but did not give a figure. It said duplicate ballots will not be counted, that it is reviewing absentee records and ballot issuance procedures, and that the employee responsible \"is no longer employed by the Village.\" Voters who received a duplicate are asked to contact the Village Clerk's Office and not to submit more than one ballot. Catalog point: a second live ballot went to voters by the clerk's own hand; whether only one ballot per voter is counted now depends on the clerk's reconciliation, and the village has not disclosed how many duplicates went out.", "sources": [{"title": "WTMJ — Village of Pleasant Prairie employee accidentally sends out duplicate ballots (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://wtmj.com/news/2026/10/27/village-of-pleasant-prairie-employee-accidentally-sends-out-duplicate-ballots/"}, {"title": "Kenosha County Eye — Pleasant Prairie clerk's office sends duplicate absentee ballots; village does not disclose how many voters affected (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://kenoshacountyeye.com/2026/10/27/pleasant-prairie-clerks-office-sends-duplicate-absentee-ballots-village-does-not-disclose-how-many-voters-affected/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pleasant Prairie, WI duplicate absentee ballots sent (ei-2026-10-178)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-178 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed, official_error yes). Peers: ca-imperial and Tulare duplicate-ballot cards. Both sources curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap", "permanent_id": "C20261025-113703-01", "uid": "C20261025-113703-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261025-113703-01", "old_ids": ["va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap"], "seq": "C01542", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Weak identity check at the point of voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261025-113703-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261025-113703-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-25 (current Virginia law and forms)", "state": "VA", "description": "Impersonation via ID Confirmation Statement (Virginia). Under Va. Code § 24.2-643(B), a voter who does not show one of the listed forms of identification (the list includes non-photo documents such as a utility bill or bank statement) \"shall be allowed to vote after signing a statement, subject to felony penalties for false statements pursuant to § 24.2-1016, that he is the named registered voter he claims to be.\" The statement is form ELECT-643ID-ML1, the ID Confirmation Statement, which is marked \"Place in Envelope #8.\" It asks only for a signature, a printed name and a date; the birth year and the last four digits of the Social Security number are optional. The voter then casts an ordinary ballot, not a provisional one. A willfully false material statement is election fraud, a Class 5 felony under § 24.2-1016. Nothing physically prevents someone else from signing in a registered voter's name. If the real voter then arrives and the pollbook already shows that voter as having voted, § 24.2-651.1 requires the real voter to cast a provisional ballot (Virginia's What-Ifs, Rev. 7/2026, Situation 12 and Situation 16c, Reason Code #5). Once it is scanned, the impostor's ballot cannot be located or pulled. Neither the pollbook record nor the ID Confirmation Statement carries any ballot identifier. Ballot secrecy is protected by Va. Const. Art. II, § 3 (\"Secrecy in casting votes shall be maintained\") and by § 24.2-646, under which the officer places the folded ballot in the container without inspection, apart from checking that it is a single genuine ballot. The counted ballots are sealed and delivered to the circuit court clerk (§ 24.2-668), the clerk keeps them \"without breaking the seal\" except for narrow listed purposes (§ 24.2-669), and wrongful tampering with a ballot container or election records is a Class 5 felony (§ 24.2-1009). The only procedures that remove ballots are the blindfolded random draw under § 24.2-662, used when ballots exceed the names on the pollbook, and undoing a check-in before the ballot is scanned (What-Ifs Situation 13). Section 24.2-663 says that all ballots from a person who votes more than once are void \"and, if possible, not counted,\" but once a ballot is scanned it cannot be identified. The real voter's provisional ballot would most likely not be counted. Under § 24.2-653.01(C), the ballot is not opened or counted if the electoral board \"is unable to determine his right to vote.\" The State Board's General Registrar and Electoral Board Handbook (ch. 13, § 13.4.4, Reason #5) says such a ballot \"should count only if: an officer of election is able to attest to the fact that they marked the wrong voter, AND no evidence exists that either person attempted to actually vote twice,\" and its footnote cites § 24.2-663 (\"ballots from voters who have already cast a vote in that election cannot be counted\"). No source states outright that the real voter's ballot is not counted. Poll-worker materials do not tell officers to document, flag or report a suspected impersonation: neither the What-Ifs (Rev. 7/2026, including Appendix B) nor the Department of Elections' Checking in Voters training contains the word \"impersonation\" or \"fraud.\" No post-election check would catch two ballots cast under one name. The canvass (Handbook ch. 14, 2026) reconciles counts, the risk-limiting audit tests outcomes, and the duplicate reports cover registrations and same-day registrants. The only route is a complaint to the Commonwealth's Attorney under § 24.2-1019. An informal complaint to the Department of Elections and the Attorney General's enforcement authority under § 24.2-104 also exist, but none of these remedies voids or counts a ballot. Former Virginia elections commissioner Edgardo Cortés testified on Feb. 26, 2016, in the photo-ID trial before U.S. District Judge Henry E. Hudson, that he \"was not aware of any case of voter impersonation in Virginia over the past 20 years\" (Richmond Times-Dispatch). No audit of that statement by JLARC, the Attorney General or the State Board of Elections was found. Given the structure above, an impersonation would leave no record that could be checked, so the absence of known cases is not evidence that none occurred.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Luke Rosiak (@lukerosiak): \"At my Virginia polling place, I mentioned that you can vote with no ID… Just had me write my name on this form. Birthday and social can be left blank.\" with a photo of the ID Confirmation Statement (posted 2026-10-24 11:11 AM ET; prompted this card)", "url": "https://x.com/lukerosiak/status/2114011851696619976", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X media — photo attached to the Rosiak post: ID Confirmation Statement ELECT-643ID-ML1 5/2024, four-language version (original size)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVZ6kqnXcAAH_zF.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-643 — Qualified voter permitted to vote; procedures at polling place; voter identification (subsection B: ID or signed statement)", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-643/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-643.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-1016 — False statements; penalties (Class 5 felony)", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter10/section24.2-1016/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-1016.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — ID Confirmation Statement, form ELECT-643ID-ML1 (5/2024) (\"Place in Envelope #8\")", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/election-management/election-day-instructions-and-forms/ELECT-643ID-ML1-ID-Confirmation-Statement-5-2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__elect-643id-ml1-id-confirmation-statement-5-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-651.1 — Voter who is shown as having already voted; provisional ballots", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-651.1/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-651.1.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — Virginia's What-Ifs, Rev. 7/2026 (Situations 1, 12, 13 and 16c; Appendix B, Reason Codes)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/election-management/election-day-instructions-and-forms/What-Ifs-Rev.7.2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__what-ifs-rev-7-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-653 — Provisional voting; procedures in polling place", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-653/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-653.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-653.01 — Provisional ballots; determination (subsection C: \"unable to determine his right to vote\")", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-653.01/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-653.01.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — General Registrar and Electoral Board Handbook, Chapter 13: Provisional Ballots (08/2025; § 13.4.4 Reason #5)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2025-updates/13_Provisional_Ballots_2025_en.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__greb-ch13-provisional-ballots-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-663 — When ballot void", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-663/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-663.html"}, {"title": "Constitution of Virginia, Article II, § 3 — Method of voting (\"Secrecy in casting votes shall be maintained\")", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/constitution/article2/section3/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__va-constitution-art2-sec3.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-646 — Voter folds paper ballot and hands same to officer who deposits it unopened in ballot container", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-646/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-646.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-668 — Pollbooks, statements of results, and ballots to be sealed and delivered to clerk or general registrar", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-668/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__vacode-24.2-668.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-669 — Clerk to keep ballots; inspection; destruction", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-669/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__vacode-24.2-669.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-1009 — Stealing or tampering with ballot containers, voting or registration equipment, software, records or documents", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter10/section24.2-1009/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-1009.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-662 — Procedure when paper ballots exceed names on pollbooks (blindfolded draw)", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-662/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-662.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — Checking in Voters (officer of election training, updated August 2020)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/training/Checking-In-Voters.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__checking-in-voters-training-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — General Registrar and Electoral Board Handbook, Chapter 14: Canvass (10/2026)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2026-updates/14_Canvass_Final_2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__greb-ch14-canvass-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-1019 — Complaints and allegations concerning election law offenses (filed with the attorney for the Commonwealth)", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter10/section24.2-1019/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-1019.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-104 — Requesting assistance for attorney for the Commonwealth; investigative committees (subsection A: Attorney General's enforcement authority)", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter1/section24.2-104/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-104.html"}, {"title": "Richmond Times-Dispatch — State official says he's unaware of any voter impersonation in past 20 years (Frank Green, Feb. 26, 2016)", "url": "https://richmond.com/news/article_b8a007a7-0ca1-59ca-8811-4d8c46892381.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__rtd-2016-02-26-cortes-unaware-impersonation.html"}, {"title": "The Voting News (Verified Voting Foundation) — repost of the Richmond Times-Dispatch article (Feb. 29, 2016)", "url": "https://thevotingnews.com/state-election-official-says-hes-unaware-of-any-voter-impersonation-in-past-20-years-richmond-times-dispatch/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__votingnews-rtd-2016-cortes.html"}], "notes": "New card 2026-10-25 (Mark approval pt425u). Research was read-only from primary sources re-fetched on 2026-10-25 (Code of Virginia and Constitution pages from law.lis.virginia.gov; Department of Elections forms, What-Ifs, training and Handbook chapters; Richmond Times-Dispatch). Every source is archived locally; nothing is redacted. Confirmed on legal structure, not on any incident: each step is quoted from current Virginia law, forms and official guidance as of 2026-10-25. No impersonation case is documented here. Luke Rosiak's X post of Oct. 24, 2026 prompted the card; it is a first-hand account that a poll officer let him vote a regular ballot after he wrote his name on this form, with the birthday and Social Security fields left blank. Mark's summary called the ID 'photo ID'; § 24.2-643(B) also accepts non-photo documents, so the card says 'one of the listed forms of identification.' Mark's summary also cited the electronic pollbook standard for the absence of a ballot identifier. That standard was not re-fetched for this card, and the March 2026 EPB Certification Standard v2.0 allows the EPB to provide a digital code for ballot retrieval on ballot-marking devices, so the card relies only on the pollbook record and the form. The Handbook ch. 13 says Envelope #8 is 'sealed and stored in the clerk's office'; the newer Circuit Court Clerks Guidance (rev. 10-2026) says Envelope 8 is 'Reusable, not sealed' and retained by the general registrar (see the companion card). Cortés source: Richmond Times-Dispatch, Frank Green, published Feb. 26, 2016 at 10:30 PM ET; the testimony was given that day ('Friday', the fifth day of the trial in Lee v. Virginia State Board of Elections). The Voting News repost is archived alongside. Companion card: va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Virginia ID Confirmation Statement (ELECT-643ID-ML1 5/2024), photo attached to Luke Rosiak's Oct. 24, 2026 post"}]}
{"id": "va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8", "permanent_id": "C20261025-113703-02", "uid": "C20261025-113703-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261025-113703-02", "old_ids": ["va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8"], "seq": "C01543", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Weak identity check at the point of voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261025-113703-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261025-113703-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-25 (current Virginia law and forms)", "state": "VA", "description": "Uncounted ID Confirmation Statements (Virginia). Signed ID Confirmation Statements (form ELECT-643ID-ML1) go into Envelope #8. The Department of Elections' Circuit Court Clerks Guidance (rev. 10-2026) lists \"Signed ID Confirmation Statements\" among Envelope 8's contents, alongside completed Affirmation of Eligibility forms, and says: \"Reusable, not sealed.… The envelope and its contents are to be retained by the general registrar.\" Library of Virginia records schedule GS-01, series 000510 (Elections: Election Materials), keeps \"identity confirmation forms\" for 2 years after the election, followed by confidential destruction. No state or local rule requires anyone to count, review or audit the signed statements, and the state publishes no count. The Department of Elections' 2024 and 2025 post-election reports list Reason #7 (\"Voter did not show the required ID nor sign the ID confirmation statement\") but their provisional-ballot charts group the remaining reason codes as \"Other\" (\"Reason Codes 3-6\" in 2024 and \"Reason Codes 3-7\" in 2025), and neither report gives any count of signed ID Confirmation Statements. The Virginia Mercury reported on Aug. 23, 2021: \"State officials don't track how many people vote that way.\" No line for these statements appears on the forms that close out an election: under Va. Code § 24.2-611 the officer certifies the number of qualified registrants who have voted, § 24.2-668 seals the pollbooks, statements of results and ballots, and the Handbook ch. 14 canvass reconciles counts. Section 24.2-643 also requires no pollbook notation for a voter who signed the statement. Fairfax County is the only locality found that reports counts, in its electoral board canvass minutes (Office of Elections staff report): 138 for the March 5, 2024 presidential primaries (114 early/absentee, 24 in precincts); 72 for the June 18, 2024 primaries (30 early/absentee, 42 in precincts); 717 for the Nov. 5, 2024 general election (305 early/absentee, 412 \"in the precincts on primary day\", as the draft minutes say); 477 for the Nov. 4, 2025 general election (167 early/absentee, 310 in precincts); and 352 for the April 21, 2026 special election (173 early/absentee, 179 \"in the precincts on election day\"). Four bills died in the Privileges and Elections committees: HB2402 (2025, left in committee) and its identical successors HB1213 (2026, left in committee) and SB526 (2026, passed by indefinitely 8-6), which would have required additional information on the statement, and SB1070 (2025, passed by indefinitely 8-7), which would have required photo ID.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — Circuit Court Clerks Guidance (rev. 10-2026), Word document (Envelope 8: \"Reusable, not sealed\"; contents retained by the general registrar)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/election-management/canvass-documents/Circuit-Court-Clerks-Guidance-(rev-10-2026).docx", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__circuit-court-clerks-guidance-rev-10-2026.docx"}, {"title": "Library of Virginia — Records Retention and Disposition Schedule GS-01, Voter Registration and Elections (effective 9/14/2023), series 000510 (search-index extract; the PDF did not open from the box)", "url": "https://old.lva.virginia.gov/agencies/records/sched_local/GS-01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__lva-gs01-000510-search-extract.txt"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — General Registrar and Electoral Board Handbook, Chapter 13: Provisional Ballots (08/2025)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2025-updates/13_Provisional_Ballots_2025_en.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__greb-ch13-provisional-ballots-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — General Registrar and Electoral Board Handbook, Chapter 14: Canvass (10/2026)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2026-updates/14_Canvass_Final_2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__greb-ch14-canvass-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-643 — Qualified voter permitted to vote; procedures at polling place; voter identification", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-643/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap__vacode-24.2-643.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-611 — Form and signing of pollbooks; records of persons voting; electronic pollbooks", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-611/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__vacode-24.2-611.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-668 — Pollbooks, statements of results, and ballots to be sealed and delivered to clerk or general registrar", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-668/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__vacode-24.2-668.html"}, {"title": "Va. Code § 24.2-669 — Clerk to keep ballots; inspection; destruction", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-669/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__vacode-24.2-669.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Mercury — Virginians don't have to show ID to vote anymore. Data shows almost everyone still does. (Graham Moomaw, Aug. 23, 2021)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2021/08/23/virginians-dont-have-to-show-id-to-vote-anymore-data-shows-almost-everyone-still-does/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__va-mercury-2021-08-23-id-data.html"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — 2024 Post-Election Report (Provisional Voting chart, p. 20)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/maintenance-reports/2024-Post-Election-Report.FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__elections-2024-post-election-report.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — 2025 Post-Election Report (Provisional Voting chart, p. 15)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/maintenance-reports/2025-Post-Election-Report-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__elections-2025-post-election-report.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — draft minutes, Feb. 29 and March 6–10, 2024 (March 5, 2024 presidential primaries canvass: 138 ID Confirmation Statements)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/electoral-board/minutes/2024/04-18/DRAFTMinutes_229_306.2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__fairfax-eb-minutes-2024-02-29-draft.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — draft minutes, June 19, 2024 (June 18, 2024 primaries canvass: 72)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/electoral-board/minutes/2024/08-15/3.DRAFTMinutes%20-%20061924.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__fairfax-eb-minutes-2024-06-19-draft.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — draft minutes, Nov. 6, 2024 (Nov. 5, 2024 general election canvass: 717)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/Documents/PDF/DRAFTMinutes%20-%20110624.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__fairfax-eb-minutes-2024-11-06-draft.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — minutes, Nov. 5, 2025 canvass (Nov. 4, 2025 general election: 477)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/Documents/PDF/Minutes%20-%20110525(v2)%20-%20Canvass%20-%20EB%20Meeting%20-%20Provisional.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__fairfax-eb-minutes-2025-11-05-canvass.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — minutes, April 22, 2026 canvass (April 21, 2026 special election: 352)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/Documents/PDF/Minutes%20-%20042226%20-%20Canvass%20-%20EB%20Meeting%20-%20Provisional.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__fairfax-eb-minutes-2026-04-22-canvass.pdf"}, {"title": "Richmond Sunlight — HB2402 (2025): Elections; affirmation statement in lieu of identification, additional information required (left in Privileges and Elections, Feb. 5, 2025)", "url": "https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2025/hb2402/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__richmondsunlight-hb2402-2025.html"}, {"title": "Richmond Sunlight — HB1213 (2026): Elections; affirmation statement in lieu of identification, additional information required (left in committee, Feb. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2026/hb1213/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__richmondsunlight-hb1213-2026.html"}, {"title": "Richmond Sunlight — SB526 (2026): Elections; affirmation statement in lieu of identification; additional information required (passed by indefinitely in Privileges and Elections 8-6, Jan. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2026/sb526/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__richmondsunlight-sb526-2026.html"}, {"title": "Richmond Sunlight — SB1070 (2025): Voter identification; identification containing a photograph required (passed by indefinitely in Privileges and Elections 8-7, Jan. 21, 2025)", "url": "https://www.richmondsunlight.com/bill/2025/sb1070/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2026-id-confirmation-statements-uncounted-envelope-8__richmondsunlight-sb1070-2025.html"}], "notes": "New card 2026-10-25 (Mark approval pt425u). Research was read-only from primary sources re-fetched on 2026-10-25; every source is archived locally and nothing is redacted. Confirmed: the handling, retention and absence of any counting requirement are quoted from current Virginia law and official guidance, and the Fairfax figures are quoted from the county's own minutes. All five Fairfax counts were checked against the fetched minutes and match Mark's figures (138, 72, 717, 477, 352). The Nov. 2024 draft minutes say 'in the precincts on primary day' for a general election, which is likely a typo; the Nov. 2025 minutes repeat the same phrase. The Nov. 2025 minutes' heading says 'Tuesday, November 5, 2025', while their provisional-ballot motion gives the election date as November 4, 2025. The 138 figure is in the March 6–10, 2024 portion of the PDF that begins with the Feb. 29, 2024 minutes. The Circuit Court Clerks Guidance is published as a Word document; the PDF address originally supplied returns HTTP 404. The Handbook ch. 13 (08/2025) still says Envelope #8 is 'sealed and stored in the clerk's office', which conflicts with the newer Clerks Guidance. The GS-01 text comes from a search-index extract, because the Library of Virginia PDF returned an HTML page to the box. The earlier, unconfirmed '486' Reason #7 figure is deliberately not used. Mark's summary listed the Ballot Record Report, the Statement of Results and the ELECT-659/668 checklist; those forms were not re-fetched for this card, so the description cites only the statutes and the Handbook. Companion card: va-2026-id-confirmation-statement-impersonation-gap."}
{"id": "nj-essex-2026-10-24-turtle-back-zoo-early-voting-site-bomb-threat-evacuated", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-04", "uid": "C20261026-121625-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-04", "old_ids": ["nj-essex-2026-10-24-turtle-back-zoo-early-voting-site-bomb-threat-evacuated"], "seq": "C01547", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "NJ", "description": "The Essex County Sheriff's Office said it received information about a potential bomb threat at the Essex County Turtle Back Zoo in West Orange, New Jersey, which hosts an early-voting site, at about 10:45 a.m. on Oct. 24, 2026. The zoo was evacuated and voting there stopped. Authorities found no device and said there was no active threat; NJ.com reported that the early-voting site reopened at about 12:20 p.m. while the zoo stayed closed for the day. No arrest has been reported. Status Confirmed by the sheriff's office and news reports.", "sources": [{"title": "News 12 New Jersey — Turtle Back Zoo evacuated after bomb threat; no active danger (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://newjersey.news12.com/essex-county-turtle-back-zoo-evacuated-after-bomb-threat-no-active-danger-reported"}, {"title": "NJ.com — Turtle Back Zoo voting site evacuated after bomb threat (Oct. 24, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.nj.com/essex/2026/10/turtle-back-zoo-voting-site-evacuated-after-bomb-threat.html"}, {"title": "NBC New York — Early voting begins in New York; bomb threat stops votes at New Jersey location (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/early-voting-begins-in-new-york-bomb-threat-stops-votes-at-new-jersey-location/6562922/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Essex NJ Turtle Back Zoo bomb threat (ei-2026-10-154)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-154 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). News 12 curl 200; NJ.com 403."}
{"id": "nj-hudson-2026-10-24-spanish-machine-ballots-two-line-a-no-line-b", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-10", "uid": "C20261026-121625-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-10", "old_ids": ["nj-hudson-2026-10-24-spanish-machine-ballots-two-line-a-no-line-b"], "seq": "C01556", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Printing ballots in multiple languages adds complexity (more ballot styles), which is used to push computerized tabulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Saturday, Oct. 24, 2026, a programming error on in-person early-voting machines at every Hudson County, New Jersey, early-voting location caused Spanish-language ballots to show two columns labeled \"Line A\" and no column labeled \"Line B\" (New Jersey Globe). Republicans hold Line A and Democrats Line B this year; English-language, provisional and sample ballots were not affected. County Executive Craig Guy called the mistake \"egregious\" and \"unacceptable,\" said County Counsel contacted the New Jersey Attorney General's Office, and said supervisors were stationed at polling places to assist voters while affected machines were swapped out. The New Jersey Globe reported that the County Clerk's office, which proofreads ballots, was closed for the weekend. Completion of the fix has not been independently confirmed. Status Confirmed by the county executive.", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey Globe — Glitch on Hudson voting machines leaves Spanish-language ballots without Democratic Line B (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/local/glitch-on-hudson-voting-machines-leaves-spanish-language-ballots-without-democratic-line-b/"}, {"title": "NewsChunks — Hudson County Spanish ballots showed incorrect machine layout Saturday", "url": "https://newschunks.com/state/new-jersey/jersey-city/hudson-county-spanish-ballots-showed-incorrect-machine-layout-saturday/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hudson NJ Spanish ballots two Line A columns (ei-2026-10-160)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-160 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). NJ Globe curl 200. Language-specific ballot style carried an error the English style did not."}
{"id": "nm-santa-fe-2026-10-24-eleven-voted-mail-ballots-in-couples-usps-vacation-hold-mail", "permanent_id": "C20261030-120852-01", "uid": "C20261030-120852-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-120852-01", "old_ids": ["nm-santa-fe-2026-10-24-eleven-voted-mail-ballots-in-couples-usps-vacation-hold-mail"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "NM", "description": "A Santa Fe, New Mexico couple, Keith Bradley and his wife, had asked the U.S. Postal Service to hold their mail while they were away. When they picked up the held mail after returning, it included more than 30 pieces addressed to other people, among them 11 voted mail-in ballots belonging to other Santa Fe County voters, the Santa Fe Reporter, KOB 4 and KOAT reported Oct. 28 and 29, 2026. Bradley posted about it on Nextdoor, and on the night of Saturday, Oct. 24, Santa Fe County Clerk Katharine Clark drove to his home, documented the ballots with photos and video for chain of custody, and took them directly to the county warehouse. \"He showed me all the ballots,\" Clark said. \"None of them had been tampered with.\" The Santa Fe Reporter described the ballots as not yet postmarked by the Postal Service. The county absentee board will confirm the voters have not voted in person before the ballots are counted. The county reported the incident to the Postal Service, which told KOB 4 that local management reviewed it and \"determined to be an isolated, inadvertent error\" and reminded the employee of proper handling. Clark said her office has seen more mail problems this season, including ballots damaged by sorting equipment. Status Confirmed: the county clerk retrieved the ballots herself and the Postal Service acknowledged the error. Catalog point: 11 voted ballots sat for days in a stranger's held mail, and they were recovered only because a private citizen chose to post about them; no postal or election-office control noticed they were missing. Ballots cast in person on Election Day and counted by hand at the precinct never pass through a mail stream.", "sources": [{"title": "Santa Fe Reporter — County clerk comes to rescue of stranded mail-in ballots (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://sfreporter.com/news/county-clerk-comes-to-rescue-of-stranded-mail-in-ballots/"}, {"title": "KOB 4 — 11 ballots found in someone else's mail (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kob.com/new-mexico/11-ballots-found-in-someone-elses-mail/"}, {"title": "KOAT — Santa Fe County clerk retrieves 11 absentee ballots found in couple's hold mail (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.koat.com/article/santa-fe-county-clerk-retrieves-11-absentee-ballots-found-in-couples-hold-mail/74265155"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Santa Fe, NM: 11 voted ballots in wrong mail (ei-2026-10-194)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-194 (added 2026-10-30 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). Santa Fe Reporter, KOB 4 and KOAT curl 200; SF Reporter text-verified (Bradley, Clark quote, 11 ballots). SF Reporter uses both 'unsealed' and 'sealed' for the ballots, so the card does not state seal condition. Peers on this leaf: Millcreek, UT ballots taken from mailboxes; Valley Center, CA unvoted ballots strewn. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ny-erie-2026-10-24-buffalo-ballots-back-printed-upside-down-tabulators-reject", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-03", "uid": "C20261026-121625-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-03", "old_ids": ["ny-erie-2026-10-24-buffalo-ballots-back-printed-upside-down-tabulators-reject"], "seq": "C01546", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Misalignment between the front and back of the ballot causes misreads, easily diverting ballots to adjudication for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "NY", "description": "The Erie County Board of Elections said that during the first few hours of early voting on Oct. 24, 2026, some ballot-on-demand printers at multiple early-voting sites printed one side of the City of Buffalo's two-sided ballot (which carries 11 charter-revision propositions on the back) upside down. Republican Commissioner Ralph Mohr told WIVB that the tabulators are programmed to refuse ballots they do not recognize, so they rejected the misprinted ballots, which went into an emergency bin. Democratic Commissioner Howard Johnson said the problem was fixed within 45 minutes and that those ballots will still be counted. The board reported 13,220 ballots cast countywide that day; the number affected was not reported. Status Confirmed by both commissioners.", "sources": [{"title": "WIVB (via AOL) — Board of Elections: some Buffalo ballots printed upside down on first day of early voting (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.aol.com/articles/boe-early-voting-buffalo-ballot-220713000.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Erie NY Buffalo ballots printed upside down (ei-2026-10-153)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-153 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200. Front/back orientation error diverted ballots out of the scanner path into an emergency bin."}
{"id": "ny-tompkins-2026-10-24-ballot-on-demand-printer-configuration-scanners-reject-emergency-bag", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-02", "uid": "C20261026-121625-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-02", "old_ids": ["ny-tompkins-2026-10-24-ballot-on-demand-printer-configuration-scanners-reject-emergency-bag"], "seq": "C01545", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "NY", "description": "On Oct. 24, 2026, the first day of New York early voting, ballot scanners at both Tompkins County early-voting sites (the Ithaca Airport CFR building in Lansing and the Veterans Services office in Ithaca) would not accept ballots properly on Saturday morning. Elections Commissioner Stephen M. DeWitt told 14850 Today that the cause was a configuration issue with the printer that prints ballots on demand, and that voting proceeded normally from about 10:15 a.m. Voters whose ballots could not be scanned placed them in a secured emergency ballot bag, and DeWitt said those ballots will be hand counted after Election Day. The number of affected ballots was not reported. Status Confirmed by the elections commissioner.", "sources": [{"title": "14850 Today — Early voting machines reject ballots at Tompkins County sites; printer configuration blamed (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.14850.com/102447548-early-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Tompkins NY scanners reject on-demand ballots (ei-2026-10-152)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-152 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200. PEP note: the fallback for the misprinted ballots is a hand count, which shows hand counting is the reliable backstop when the printed ballot and the machine disagree."}
{"id": "or-sos-2026-10-24-election-results-test-site-mock-la-results-exposed-to-search-engines", "permanent_id": "C20261027-121429-03", "uid": "C20261027-121429-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-121429-03", "old_ids": ["or-sos-2026-10-24-election-results-test-site-mock-la-results-exposed-to-search-engines"], "seq": "C01580", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24", "state": "OR", "description": "The Oregon Secretary of State's Office confirmed that a test version of its election-results website was accidentally exposed to the public internet and to search engines. The Oregonian/OregonLive reported on Oct. 24, 2026, that the site showed mock results for many contests, including the governor's race between Gov. Tina Kotek and state Sen. Christine Drazan. Office spokesperson Connor Radnovich said the numbers were \"absolutely not\" real vote tallies, that a system update had misrouted the website outside a firewall, and that the site was meant only for county elections offices checking that systems are ready for Election Day. Former Republican state Rep. Julie Parrish said a candidate she represents found the site that morning through Google. Yamhill County News reported that the site displayed county and contest totals produced by the counties' logic and accuracy testing, including, as of a 1:00 p.m. update, 64,453 test ballots counted statewide and a turnout of 2.24 percent; it alerted Yamhill County Clerk Keri Hinton, who contacted the state. Officials removed the mock tallies and blocked public access by early afternoon on Oct. 24. The East Oregonian reported in May 2024 that simulated results on a state test site had also been publicly reachable for several days before that primary. Status Confirmed: the exposure is acknowledged by the Secretary of State's Office; the data was test data, and no source reports that real tallies were exposed or equipment affected.", "sources": [{"title": "The Oregonian/OregonLive (Jonathan Bach) — Oregon election test data accidentally exposed to public internet, search engines (Oct. 24, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2026/10/oregon-election-test-data-accidentally-exposed-to-public-internet-search-engines.html"}, {"title": "Yamhill County News (Rebecca Wallis) — Oregon SOS staging site publicly displays logic and accuracy test data for Nov. 3 election (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://yamconews.com/2026/10/24/oregon-sos-staging-site-publicly-displays-logic-and-accuracy-test-data-for-nov-3-election/"}, {"title": "East Oregonian — Oregon election test site comes down after simulated numbers raise concerns (May 17, 2024; background)", "url": "https://eastoregonian.com/2024/05/17/oregon-election-test-site-comes-down-after-simulated-numbers-raise-concerns/"}, {"title": "X — @PDXReal1 (PDX Real) post on the test site (Oct. 26, 2026; its figures do not appear in the news reports)", "url": "https://x.com/PDXReal1/status/2114835596044890137"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Oregon test results site exposed (ei-2026-10-170)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-170 (added 2026-10-27 PM ingest). Yamhill County News and East Oregonian curl 200; Oregonian 403. Shows that L&A test totals flow through the same results-publishing system used on election night, reachable from outside the firewall after an update. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-guilford-2026-10-23-craft-rec-center-tabulator-roller-failure-80-ballots-emergency-bin", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-09", "uid": "C20261026-121625-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-09", "old_ids": ["nc-guilford-2026-10-23-craft-rec-center-tabulator-roller-failure-80-ballots-emergency-bin"], "seq": "C01555", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-23", "state": "NC", "description": "On Friday, Oct. 23, 2026, a tabulator at the Craft Recreation Center early-voting site on Yanceyville Road in Greensboro, North Carolina, failed because of a hardware problem with its rollers. Eighty voters placed their ballots in the secure emergency ballot bin and 15 voters said they would come back later. Guilford County Elections Director Charlie Collicutt said appointed poll workers processed the emergency-bin ballots according to protocol. Status Confirmed by the elections director.", "sources": [{"title": "WXII 12 — Guilford County early-voting machine malfunction (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.wxii12.com/article/guilford-county-early-voting-machine-malfunction/74232901"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Guilford NC tabulator roller failure (ei-2026-10-159)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-159 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200. Fifteen voters left without voting, a measurable cost of a machine dependency."}
{"id": "ny-2026-10-fraudulent-registration-fani-willis-name-trump-tower-nyc-boe-canceled", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-06", "uid": "C20261026-121625-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-06", "old_ids": ["ny-2026-10-fraudulent-registration-fani-willis-name-trump-tower-nyc-boe-canceled"], "seq": "C01549", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject phantom voter registrations", "Duplicate existing records with plausible deniability (ensure every duplicate can be explained away as a mistake)", "Each duplicate record has its own voter ID number, so a vote can be associated with it. If someone catches the \"duplicate,\" it can be explained as a typo."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-23", "state": "NY", "description": "Fulton County, Georgia, District Attorney Fani Willis told WSB-TV (reported Oct. 23, 2026) that someone submitted a New York voter-registration application in her name listing her as a Republican living at Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, with the Fulton County Courthouse as the mailing address, a false date of birth and a forged signature. She learned of it when the New York City Board of Elections sent her a notice that the registration was being canceled as suspected fraud. The board said no vote was cast under the registration and that anyone trying to vote with it would have had to show identification or proof of residence. Willis's office is in contact with a New York prosecutor; no one has been identified or charged. Status Confirmed: the board's cancellation notice confirms that the fraudulent registration was filed and accepted into processing.", "sources": [{"title": "WSB-TV — Fani Willis says she was targeted by a fraudulent voter registration in New York (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta/fani-willis-claims-she-was-targeted-by-fraudulent-voter-registration-new-york/H5X3GAHWP5GYNNVQ5GV2P43BGY/"}, {"title": "Yahoo News — Fani Willis claims she was targeted by fraudulent registration", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/fani-willis-claims-she-targeted-214858113.html"}, {"title": "Hoodline — Fani Willis says someone registered to vote as her at Trump Tower in NY (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://hoodline.com/2026/10/fani-willis-says-someone-registered-to-vote-as-her-at-trump-tower-in-ny/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Fraudulent NY registration in Fani Willis's name (ei-2026-10-156)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-156 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). WSB curl 200. A second record for a real person, at a false address and with a false birth date, entered the system; it was caught here because the board mailed the real person."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-10-22-asu-west-glendale-vote-center-power-loss-offline", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-01", "uid": "C20261103-121512-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-01", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-10-22-asu-west-glendale-vote-center-power-loss-offline"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-22", "state": "AZ", "description": "The Maricopa County Recorder's Office reported that its early-voting vote center at Arizona State University's West Valley campus in Glendale went offline on Oct. 22, 2026, because of a loss of power. The office said it was first told that power would not be restored on Oct. 23, so it planned to keep the site closed another day. Power was restored at 9:30 AM Arizona time on Oct. 23, and the office said one of its new rapid-response teams opened the vote center within 30 minutes before regular poll workers took over. The office did not say what caused the power loss or how many voters were affected. It is one of several power-related vote center closures in Maricopa County during the 2026 general election, along with Mesa Red Mountain on Oct. 30 and Paradise Valley Community College and Sunset Canyon School on Nov. 2. Status Confirmed for the outage and reopening, which the Maricopa County Recorder's Office posted; the office did not give the cause or how many voters were affected. Catalog point: this is the third power-related vote center closure in Maricopa County during the 2026 general election (with Mesa Red Mountain on Oct. 30 and Paradise Valley Community College and Sunset Canyon School on Nov. 2). Each outage stops voting at the site, and the cause is not publicly established.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County Recorder's Office (X) — ASU West vote center power loss (2026-10-23)", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2113739274525004067"}, {"title": "ASU Watts College (Sun Devils Vote) — ASU West vote center power loss (2026-10-13)", "url": "https://publicservice.asu.edu/pastor/elections-voting/vote"}, {"title": "X post by @AzPinkLady (2026-11-03T02:04:04Z)", "url": "https://x.com/AzPinkLady/status/2117437624742744307"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — ASU West vote center power loss (ei-2026-10-235)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-235 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-2026-vr-systems-php-flaw-county-voter-lookup-tools-offline-nine-hours", "permanent_id": "C20261022-121034-03", "uid": "C20261022-121034-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-121034-03", "old_ids": ["fl-2026-vr-systems-php-flaw-county-voter-lookup-tools-offline-nine-hours"], "seq": "C01517", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Bad actors can then exploit it for a much larger blast radius."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "FL", "description": "On Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026, during early voting, voters across Florida could not use online tools on county Supervisor of Elections websites to check their registration status, view sample ballots or find voting locations, Suncoast Searchlight reported. VR Systems, the Tallahassee company that hosts the county election websites, took parts of them offline at 10 a.m. after the PHP Foundation, which maintains the widely used PHP web programming language, disclosed critical security flaws that could let attackers take over web servers. The federal Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency urged organizations the same day to patch immediately. VR Systems chief operations officer Ben Martin said, \"It's critical to understand that this does not affect the ability to vote, only the ability to look up information. This does not affect the voter rolls.\" A Sarasota County Supervisor of Elections spokesperson confirmed that some of the office's web tools were taken offline for VR Systems maintenance and directed voters to its call center. Service was restored at about 7 p.m., roughly nine hours later. No breach has been reported. Status Confirmed: the vendor and the Sarasota County office confirmed the shutdown, and the outage was a precaution rather than an attack. Catalog point: because one vendor hosts the public election websites of many Florida counties, a single flaw in shared web software took voter lookup tools offline in county after county at once, during early voting. A county that runs its own records and serves voters at the precinct is not taken offline by a vendor's statewide decision.", "sources": [{"title": "Suncoast Searchlight — Florida voter lookup tools go down after PHP website flaw (Oct. 21, 2026; updated Oct. 22)", "url": "https://suncoastsearchlight.org/florida-voter-lookup-tools-down-php-website/"}, {"title": "WGCU — Voter lookup tools go down across Florida as early voting begins (republishing Suncoast Searchlight, Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wgcu.org/top-story/2026-10-21/voter-lookup-tools-go-down-across-florida-as-early-voting-begins"}, {"title": "CISA — Critical vulnerabilities in PHP require immediate patching (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2026/10/21/critical-vulnerabilities-php-require-immediate-patching"}, {"title": "The PHP Foundation — Today's PHP security release (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://thephp.foundation/blog/2026/10/21/todays-php-security-release-and-how-were-strengthening-php-security/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Florida county voter lookup tools offline (ei-2026-10-132)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-132 (first_seen 2026-10-22; EMon confirmed, official_error no: precautionary). Mapped to 9 Technology / Cyber-Security > larger blast radius (one hosting vendor, many counties). Vendor tag VR Systems per Suncoast Searchlight. Suncoast and CISA text-verified, curl 200. Statewide FL DOS lookup unaffected per EMon. Watch for any VR Systems or DOS statement on exposure.", "vendor": ["VR Systems"], "related": ["tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected"]}
{"id": "nc-wilson-2026-10-21-agricultural-center-early-voting-site-left-unlocked-overnight", "permanent_id": "C20261029-180802-01", "uid": "C20261029-180802-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261029-180802-01", "old_ids": ["nc-wilson-2026-10-21-agricultural-center-early-voting-site-left-unlocked-overnight"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "NC", "description": "On the morning of Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026, the groundskeeper who opens the Wilson County Agricultural Center early-voting site in Wilson, North Carolina, found that the building had been left unlocked overnight, with both the outer doors and the voting enclosure unlocked, Wilson County Board of Elections Director Tasha Bell told the board at its Oct. 27 meeting, The Wilson Times reported on Oct. 28. Bell said that once the groundskeeper confirmed no one was inside, everything was found as election officials had left it, with no evidence that anyone had entered or tampered with voting equipment; staff found the laptops shut down and passcode-protected and checked the ballots to confirm the ballot count was correct. The DS200 tabulator, which holds recorded votes on a thumb drive, stays locked at the site through early voting. There was no footage of the incident to review. Bell said locking up is the responsibility of the afternoon chief judge (\"They said they didn't leave it unlocked. Well, they had to.\"). She also reported a second incident at the same site, in which judges one night left the authorization-to-vote equipment at the Agricultural Center instead of returning it to the board office. Both incidents were reported to the North Carolina State Board of Elections. Board Chairman Pete Hall said, \"I don't think we've lost any integrity, but there was a security breach.\" The board voted unanimously to give Bell authority to do what she needs to secure the facility, and Bell said the chief judges will remain in place through Election Day. Status Confirmed: the elections director reported both lapses to the county board and the State Board of Elections. Catalog point: an early-voting site holding a tabulator, laptops and ballots sat open overnight with no camera footage, and the only assurance that nothing was touched is the officials' own after-the-fact check. Paper ballots kept under bipartisan seal and counted by hand at the precinct do not depend on a door being locked.", "sources": [{"title": "The Wilson Times (Christopher Long) — Elections director reports security breach at polling site / Early voting site left unlocked overnight (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wilsontimes.com/news/elections-director-reports-security-breach-at-polling-site-af205c60"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Wilson County, NC early-voting site left unlocked (ei-2026-10-190)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-190 (added 2026-10-29 PM ingest; EMon confirmed, resolved). Wilson Times URL returns 403 to curl; EMon read the text from a full-page screenshot Mark provided, so the source is linked only. Status Confirmed on the elections director's own report to the board and the SBE. Peers on this leaf: Monroe County, FL Big Pine Key unlocked early-voting door (Oct. 18, 2026) and Maricopa Chandler-Gilbert ballot-on-demand printer trays opened overnight. The same article mentions an Anson County, NC office left unlocked (undated); not carded. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["DS200"]}
{"id": "tx-williamson-2026-10-21-hutto-city-hall-ballot-scanner-jams", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-13", "uid": "C20261026-121625-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-13", "old_ids": ["tx-williamson-2026-10-21-hutto-city-hall-ballot-scanner-jams"], "seq": "C01559", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "TX", "description": "On Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026, voters at Hutto City Hall, the city's only early-voting site, reported that ballot scanners showed jam errors for many voters, with waits of about 30 minutes, and that workers used a tool to push ballots in (KVUE). Williamson County Elections Administrator Bridgette Escobedo said jams can happen with longer ballots or high turnout and that, to protect chain of custody, law enforcement must be present before ballot bins are opened and jams cleared; she said the bins were emptied after lunch. A voter interviewed around 4 p.m. reported a wait of about 10 minutes. Status Confirmed by the elections administrator.", "sources": [{"title": "KVUE — Central Texas ballot-scanner jams during early voting (Oct. 21, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/vote-texas/central-texas-ballot-scanner-jams-early-voting-midterm-election/269-b0ea798f-aa01-43ba-9362-d874714586a6"}, {"title": "Focal News — Ballot-scanner jams slow some early voters in Hutto and Travis County", "url": "https://focalnews.org/austin-tx/politics/ballot-scanner-jams-slow-some-early-voters-in-hutto-and-travis-county"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hutto TX scanner jams (ei-2026-10-163)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-163 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Peer of the Travis County day-one jam card. KVUE 403."}
{"id": "us-ndcal-2026-injunction-dhs-door-to-door-voter-eligibility-interviews-nine-states", "permanent_id": "C20261022-121034-04", "uid": "C20261022-121034-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-121034-04", "old_ids": ["us-ndcal-2026-injunction-dhs-door-to-door-voter-eligibility-interviews-nine-states"], "seq": "C01518", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026, U.S. District Judge Araceli Martínez-Olguín of the Northern District of California issued a preliminary injunction that, until the polls close on Nov. 3, bars the Department of Homeland Security from \"elections-related field operations and field interviews\" in California, Connecticut, Georgia, Missouri, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Washington and Wisconsin that involve or are likely to involve people whom agents \"know, suspect, or should reasonably know or suspect are U.S. citizens\" (Courthouse News). The plaintiffs are the California Nurses Association and National Nurses United, the Voto Latino Foundation, Santa Clara County, and the City and County of San Francisco. CBS News reported the same day that Homeland Security Investigations had posted photos and videos of agents approaching homes in several states as part of the noncitizen-voting operation. The judge found the policy likely violates the Voting Rights Act provision against intimidating, threatening or coercing people who help others vote, and wrote: \"Plaintiffs do not claim, nor does the Court find, that it is unlawful for federal officials to undertake investigations into unlawful voting in federal elections.\" Justice Department attorneys argued that the data sharing and agent deployments are lawful investigative tactics. The judge stayed the injunction until 5 p.m. on Friday, Oct. 23, to allow an appeal. The order also required the plaintiffs to post a nominal $100 bond by 5 p.m. Thursday, Oct. 22, or it would be dissolved; as of the afternoon of Oct. 22, no government appeal had been reported (EMon, citing AP and The Washington Post). A Homeland Security spokesperson told the Los Angeles Times the agency is \"laser focused on identifying, prosecuting, and removing aliens who vote\" and has \"no plans to question or investigate people we believe to be U.S. citizens.\" As of the morning of Oct. 23, no appeal had been reported; the stay ends at 5 p.m. Pacific that day. Status Confirmed for the injunction and the court's preliminary finding; the case is not final, and the order does not bar investigations of noncitizen voting. Catalog point: whatever the purpose of an enforcement operation, agents at the doors of eligible citizens weeks before an election is the kind of pressure that a court has now found likely to intimidate. Clean precinct rolls that citizens can inspect locally, with identification at check-in, address ineligible registrations without either door-to-door federal visits or unchecked rolls.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News — Judge blocks DHS operation targeting suspected noncitizen voters in nine states (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-dhs-noncitizen-voters-ruling/"}, {"title": "Courthouse News Service — Judge curtails DHS crackdown on unlawful voters ahead of midterms (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-curtails-dhs-crackdown-on-unlawful-voters-ahead-of-midterms/"}, {"title": "Bloomberg Law — DHS's voter fraud operation barred in nine states through Nov. 3 (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/dhss-voter-fraud-operation-barred-in-nine-states-through-nov-3"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D. Cal. — Order granting preliminary injunction (Oct. 21, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/87-2026-10-22-Order-granting-preliminary-injunction.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Judge orders Trump administration to halt noncitizen-voting investigations in nine states (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-states-noncitizen-voting-investigation-california-ac8a87b135f7a2ae9fe961bab3b28825"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Judge blocks DHS investigations of noncitizen voting, citing flawed data (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/22/judge-blocks-dhs-investigations-noncitizen-voting-citing-flawed-data/"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Judge limits election-related immigration stops amid broader legal war ahead of midterms (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2026-10-22/judge-limits-election-related-immigration-stops-amid-broader-legal-war-ahead-of-midterms"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DHS voter-eligibility field interviews enjoined (ei-2026-10-133)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: LA Times DHS statement; no appeal as of Oct. 23 morning (curl 200). EMon ei-2026-10-133 (first_seen 2026-10-22; EMon confirmed). Mapped to 1 Fear/Discredit Tactics; Intimidation (peer: ei-2026-09-007 armed agents near polls suit). CBS and Courthouse News text-verified, curl 200. Democracy Docket is affiliated with plaintiff-side counsel in other cases. Watch for a government appeal or Ninth Circuit stay before 5 p.m. PT Oct. 23. Refresh 2026-10-22 PM: added AP (curl 403, bot block) and Washington Post (curl timeout) from EMon verified sources; $100 bond condition; no appeal reported yet."}
{"id": "ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation", "permanent_id": "C20261021-150556-01", "uid": "C20261021-150556-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-150556-01", "old_ids": ["ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation"], "seq": "C01514", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).", "Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-20", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 20, 2026, in United States v. State of California (C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025), Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean Logan opposed the Justice Department's request for a temporary restraining order requiring California to set aside mail ballots from more than 20,000 people on a federal list of likely noncitizens. In a sworn declaration filed with the opposition, Monica Flores, assistant registrar-recorder for the Candidate and Voter Services Bureau, stated (¶ 44): \"The Registrar is not equipped or authorized to verify voter citizenship because it does not independently house citizenship-related information beyond the voter attestation as identified in federal and state law (such as, among other things, immigration records, travel records, naturalization records, etc.) and certainly is not equipped to do so within the election period.\" She added that California has not authorized use of the federal SAVE program for the 2026 General Election, that the registrar has no direct access to federal citizenship data, and that the registrar is not an investigative body. She also stated that the registrar \"has no information beyond the voter's own attestation with which to determine citizenship, and has no lawful means of obtaining such information\" (City News Service via KESQ). First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli posted the ¶ 44 excerpt on X the same afternoon and called it a \"massive concession\"; Gov. Gavin Newsom's press office replied that California follows the 1993 federal law requiring registrants to swear eligibility, including citizenship, under penalty of perjury (Fox News). The same filing challenges the federal list. A declaration by Aman Bhullar of the county's Information Technology Bureau says 7,035 of the listed records bear county addresses and that, in a sample of 200, 42.9% were canceled registrations, 42.4% active and 4.6% inactive; 86 of the sampled people were mailed November ballots; 71.2% had never voted; and 25.8% of the sample (38.9% of records with a meaningful birthplace) record a U.S. birthplace. The county's brief says these figures describe the records, not any individual's citizenship. Status Confirmed for the county's sworn statement of its own procedure (court filing; FOX 11, Fox News, KESQ, Breitbart and Legal Insurrection report the same text). The federal list itself remains unverified and is tracked on its own card (ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county). Catalog point: when eligibility rests on a sworn checkbox and the office that keeps the roll holds no record it can check that oath against, a false attestation is caught only if some other agency looks, as the Operation Protect the Vote charges (ca-cdca-2026-operation-protect-the-vote-two-dozen-lprs-charged-noncitizen-voting) show. Precinct rolls that local citizens can inspect add another check.", "sources": [{"title": "C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025, Doc. 32-1 — Defendant Dean C. Logan's opposition to the ex parte TRO application (Oct. 20, 2026; cites the Flores and Bhullar declarations; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-20-TRO-Opposition.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__la-county-tro-opposition-doc-32-1-2026-10-20.pdf"}, {"title": "KESQ (City News Service) — LACo attorneys: no credible evidence of non-citizen voting (Oct. 20, 2026; Flores declaration quoted)", "url": "https://kesq.com/news/california/2026/10/20/laco-attorneys-no-credible-evidence-of-non-citizen-voting/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__kesq-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "MyNewsLA.com (City News Service) — LACo attorneys: no credible evidence of non-citizen voting (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://mynewsla.com/crime/2026/10/20/laco-attorneys-no-credible-evidence-of-non-citizen-voting/"}, {"title": "Fox News — Newsom spars with Trump-appointed prosecutor over 20,000 suspected noncitizens on voter rolls (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/newsom-spars-trump-appointed-prosecutor-20000-suspected-noncitizens-voter-rolls", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__foxnews-2026-10-21.html"}, {"title": "FOX 11 Los Angeles (Matthew Seedorff) — One of 11 arrested in California voter fraud crackdown speaks out (Oct. 20, 2026, 11:13 PM PT)", "url": "https://www.foxla.com/news/one-11-arrested-california-voter-fraud-crackdown-speaks-out", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__fox11-munoz-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "Breitbart — Federal prosecutor says L.A. County made 'massive concession' on voter citizenship checks (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.breitbart.com/immigration/2026/10/20/federal-prosecutor-l-a-county-massive-concession-voter-citizenship-checks/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__breitbart-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "Legal Insurrection — Los Angeles County officials offer conflicting accounts of voter citizenship checks (Oct. 20, 2026; quotes Flores ¶ 44 and the Bhullar sample)", "url": "https://legalinsurrection.com/2026/10/los-angeles-county-officials-offer-conflicting-accounts-of-voter-citizenship-checks/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__legalinsurrection-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "X — First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli (@USAttyEssayli), \"Massive concession…\" with an excerpt of the Flores declaration, ¶ 44, p. 15 (Oct. 20, 2026, 5:23 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/USAttyEssayli/status/2112655946912792757", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--essayli__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), \"Noncitizen arrested in DOJ California voter fraud raid speaks out…\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 12:48 PM ET; 3:48 video: narration around the FOX 11 report of Oct. 20)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2112949061548417417", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--scif__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Lead: Mark Cook, 2026-10-21 3:02 PM ET, X post by @TheSCIF 2112949061548417417 (posted Oct. 21, 2026, 12:48 PM ET; 3:48 video built on the FOX 11 Los Angeles report of Oct. 20). Mark asked that each issue in the post be handled separately. Issue 3 of the post (\"L.A. officials just admitted in federal court that they are not authorized or have the equipment to verify CA's voter's citizenship\"): carded here. The SCIF's wording matches ¶ 44, but its inference that ineligible people have voted is not stated in the filing. Issue 1 (Omar Muñoz says someone used his identity) is added to ca-cdca-2026-operation-protect-the-vote-two-dozen-lprs-charged-noncitizen-voting; issue 2 (\"they use people's names, and even fake names\"; dirty rolls; refusal to hand rolls to DOJ) is commentary with no new factual claim, and the DOJ voter-list suit is already carded as ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county; the closing questions about elections affected are rhetorical. The separate Flores and Bhullar declarations were not found as standalone files; their text is quoted from Essayli's image (¶ 44), KESQ and Legal Insurrection, and the county brief (Doc. 32-1) cites them by paragraph. Legal Insurrection and Breitbart are partisan outlets and are cited for the quoted text only. Archived: Doc. 32-1 PDF, FOX 11, Fox News, KESQ, Breitbart, Legal Insurrection, X captures (Essayli photo, SCIF video 15.5 MB). No vendor named. Nothing redacted. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).' to its new child leaf 'Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later'.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--essayli__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--essayli__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Excerpt of the Declaration of Monica Flores, ¶ 44, p. 15, as posted by Bill Essayli: \"The Registrar is not equipped or authorized to verify voter citizenship…\""}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2112949061548417417", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--scif__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--scif__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 227.605, "bytes": 15546668, "sha256": "b8e984ec031b37fdd097aa126f8108b495a01a926440a96532b3d3f0f0dc21ca", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--scif__x-video.json"}], "related": ["ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied", "ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-14", "uid": "C20261028-132233-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-14", "old_ids": ["us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation"], "seq": "C01609", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Rush ineligible ballots through envelope separation, then claim it is too late to pull them out (IRREVERSIBLE DILUTION)"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-20 to 2026-10-27", "state": "CA", "description": "In United States v. California (C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025; 9th Cir. No. 26-7070), Los Angeles County told the court that once a mail ballot is separated from its envelope, \"there is no way to associate the voter with that ballot.\" The Justice Department quoted that admission in its Oct. 25, 2026, Ninth Circuit brief and wrote that the county \"has processed roughly 219,000 ballots that can never again be traced to the person who cast them,\" because the count of processed ballots rose from 331,000 on Oct. 20 to 550,000 four days later: \"over 200,000 more ballots have become untraceable in Los Angeles County alone since the United States sought emergency relief.\" [1] On Oct. 26 the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court had not yet ruled. Judge Bumatay, dissenting, wrote: \"No one contests that, once a ballot is separated from its envelope, it's impossible to identify who cast it,\" and \"California admits that there is no way to trace a ballot after it is processed.\" Judge Sanchez, concurring, said the alleged harm \"is tempered by California's established process for ensuring voter eligibility.\" [2][3] At the Oct. 27 hearing, Judge David O. Carter did not rule, said he would likely appoint a special master to weigh the evidence, and warned that \"any threats to state and county elected employees cease immediately\"; a final ruling may not come until after Election Day. [4][5] Status Confirmed for the untraceability and the counts, which come from the county's own filing and are uncontested; whether any of these ballots came from ineligible voters is unverified (see the DOJ list card, Alleged).", "sources": [{"title": "United States' opposition to Los Angeles County's emergency motion to dismiss, 9th Cir. No. 26-7070, DktEntry 56.1 (Oct. 25, 2026; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-25-DOJ-opposition-to-emergency-motion-to-dismiss.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation__doj-9th-cir-opposition-dktentry-56-1-2026-10-25.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit — Order, United States v. State of California, No. 26-7070 (Oct. 26, 2026; per curiam; Bennett and Sanchez concurring; Bumatay dissenting)", "url": "https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/26/26-7070.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation__ca9-26-7070-order-2026-10-26.pdf"}, {"title": "CBS News — Appeals court dismisses DOJ's request to force California to set aside ballots (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/appeals-court-dismisses-doj-trump-california-ballots/"}, {"title": "ABC News — Judge to appoint special master in California voting case in setback to DOJ (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/judge-appoint-special-master-california-voting-case-setback/story?id=137622503"}, {"title": "CalMatters — Federal judge unlikely to rule on Trump noncitizen voting claim until after Election Day (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/10/trump-noncitizen-voting-court/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. 550,000 - 331,000 = 219,000. As of about 1 PM ET Oct. 28 no written Carter ruling was found.", "related": ["ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope", "nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir", "pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots", "ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "wa-grays-harbor-2026-10-levies-left-off-hoquiam-oakville-ballots-outdated-map", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-11", "uid": "C20261026-121625-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-11", "old_ids": ["wa-grays-harbor-2026-10-levies-left-off-hoquiam-oakville-ballots-outdated-map"], "seq": "C01557", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-20 to 2026-10-24", "state": "WA", "description": "Ballots first mailed to voters in Hoquiam and Oakville, Washington, left off two local measures: the Timberland Regional Library levy lid lift in Hoquiam and the Grays Harbor Fire District 1 levy in Oakville (KING 5, Oct. 24, 2026). County Auditor Joseph MacLean said his office had relied on an outdated map to assign ballots and attributed the error to the county mapping department; the maps have been updated. Replacement ballots were mailed Oct. 20. The replacement supersedes the first ballot, but if a voter does not return it, the first ballot will be counted. The League of Women Voters of Grays Harbor County raised concern about voter confusion. Status Confirmed by the county auditor.", "sources": [{"title": "KING 5 — Ballots re-issued to some Grays Harbor County voters after levies left out (Oct. 24, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.king5.com/article/news/local/ballots-re-issued-to-some-grays-harbor-county-voters-after-levies-left-out/281-7ddbe6ef-ad4d-465e-b49c-f60e777259cc"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Grays Harbor WA levies left off ballots (ei-2026-10-161)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-161 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). KING 5 curl 403; content per EMon extract. Outdated district map produced the wrong ballot style for those voters."}
{"id": "ak-2026-10-rural-in-person-absentee-sites-failed-to-open-removed-without-explanation", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-06", "uid": "C20261028-121857-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-06", "old_ids": ["ak-2026-10-rural-in-person-absentee-sites-failed-to-open-removed-without-explanation"], "seq": "C01588", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Suspend early voting at a site, citing an undisclosed technical problem."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "AK", "description": "Polling places in some rural Alaska communities did not fully open after early and in-person absentee voting began on Oct. 19, 2026, Alaska Public Media reported on Oct. 27. State Sen. Bill Wielechowski wrote that voters in 18 communities reported trouble. In a letter to Wielechowski, Division of Elections Director Carol Beecher said three sites had \"declined to open\" and three did not respond to state officials, while 12 of the 18 were open. The division's website listed Ekwok, Goodnews Bay, Kongiganak, Mertarvik and Scammon Bay as temporarily closed, and Chignik Bay, Fort Wainwright and Levelock were removed from the list without explanation. Some villages offered voting only by appointment or opened late, details that were not posted on the division's website. The division said it would investigate an allegation that some local absentee voting officials made errors, and Beecher wrote, \"Absentee in-person ballots are not rejected because of mistakes made by AVOs.\" Catalog point: early-voting sites closed or dropped from the public list with no stated reason, leaving rural voters without the access the state advertised.", "sources": [{"title": "Alaska Public Media — Some rural Alaska absentee voting sites failed to open ahead of midterms (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://alaskapublic.org/news/politics/elections/2026-10-27/some-rural-alaska-absentee-voting-sites-failed-to-open-ahead-of-midterms"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Alaska rural absentee voting sites failed to open (ei-2026-10-182)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-182 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). Leaf fit: sites closed or removed without a stated reason. Source curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-imperial-2026-mailing-error-duplicate-ballots-160-confidential-voters", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-05", "uid": "C20261021-121524-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-05", "old_ids": ["ca-imperial-2026-mailing-error-duplicate-ballots-160-confidential-voters"], "seq": "C01501", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the Imperial County Registrar of Voters announced that, \"due to a mailing error, approximately 160 voters with confidential voter status were sent an additional ballot, even though they had already been included in the original ballot mailing\" for the Nov. 3, 2026 general election. The county said the error occurred while the office was updating its procedures to follow a California law (AB 1392, effective Jan. 1, 2026) that made elected officials and candidates for public office eligible for confidential voter status. Registrar of Voters Linsey Dale said safeguards ensure that only one ballot is accepted and counted for each eligible voter. Affected voters were asked to call the Registrar's Office at 442-265-1060 for guidance on which ballot to vote and to return or destroy the unused ballot. The Los Angeles Times reported the Imperial error on Oct. 20 alongside the larger Tulare County duplicate mailing. Status Confirmed: the county acknowledged the mailing error and the approximate count. Whether any duplicate ballots have been returned has not been reported. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a procedure change put a second live ballot in the hands of about 160 voters, and the county now relies on back-end matching to keep only one from counting. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. A single ballot handed to a voter at the precinct, against a printed poll book, cannot be mailed twice.", "sources": [{"title": "Imperial County Registrar of Voters — Duplicate ballots notice (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://imperialcounty.org/2026/10/rovduplicateballots/"}, {"title": "Imperial County Registrar of Voters — Press release: duplicate ballots (Oct. 19, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://elections.imperialcounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Press-Release-Duplicate-Ballots-Eng.pdf"}, {"title": "The Desert Sun (via Yahoo News) — Why 160 Imperial County voters received duplicate ballots (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/why-160-imperial-county-voters-222811019.html"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Thousands of California voters got duplicate vote-by-mail ballots. Here's what happened (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-10-20/thousands-of-california-voters-got-duplicate-vote-by-mail-ballots"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Imperial County, CA duplicate ballots (ei-2026-10-119)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-119 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed, official_error yes). Mapped to 7 Mail ballots > double-vote reconciliation (peer: Tulare ei-2026-10-049). LA Times Imperial '160' paragraph text-verified; all sources curl 200."}
{"id": "nj-2026-tyndale-simpson-guilty-plea-noncitizen-voting-somerset-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261020-120650-02", "uid": "C20261020-120650-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-120650-02", "old_ids": ["nj-2026-tyndale-simpson-guilty-plea-noncitizen-voting-somerset-2024"], "seq": "C01456", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, U.S. Attorney Robert Frazer of the District of New Jersey announced that Gaye Tyndale-Simpson, 55, of Bridgewater, a citizen of Jamaica whom the Justice Department describes as being in the country illegally, pleaded guilty in federal court in Trenton to one count of voting by an alien in a federal election. According to court documents and statements made in court, she has never been a U.S. citizen, and she voted in Somerset County in the Nov. 5, 2024 general election (New Jersey Globe). The charge carries up to six months in prison and a $100,000 fine, and sentencing is scheduled for Feb. 24, 2027, before U.S. Magistrate Judge Rukhsanah L. Singh. The FBI, Homeland Security Investigations, the State Department's Diplomatic Security Service and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services investigated the case under the office's Election Integrity Task Force. Status Confirmed: she admitted the offense in court, although she has not yet been sentenced. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was never a citizen was accepted, a ballot was issued against it, and that ballot was cast in a presidential election before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give records like this more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Illegal alien admits illegally voting in federal election in New Jersey (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/illegal-alien-admits-illegally-voting-federal-election-new-jersey"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — Bridgewater woman admits illegally voting in 2024 presidential election (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/judiciary/bridgewater-woman-admits-illegally-voting-in-2024-presidential-election/"}, {"title": "Bridgewater Patch — Bridgewater woman admits illegally voting in federal election as noncitizen (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://patch.com/new-jersey/bridgewater/bridgewater-woman-admits-illegally-voting-federal-election-noncitizen"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NJ noncitizen-voting guilty plea, Somerset County (ei-2026-10-060)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-060 (first_seen 2026-10-19; voter_fraud category). Guilty plea, so Confirmed per leaf precedent for pleas. DOJ release text-verified (Tyndale-Simpson, Jamaica, sentencing Feb. 24, 2027); all sources curl 200."}
{"id": "or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261027-082200-03", "uid": "C20261027-082200-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-082200-03", "old_ids": ["or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"], "seq": "C01553", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "OR", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the Deschutes County, Oregon, Clerk's Office announced that roughly 200 voters in recently annexed areas of the City of Bend had been sent incorrect precinct ballots for the Nov. 3, 2026 election, and that all affected voters would receive a corrected ballot by mail that week [1][3]. Voters who had already returned the original ballot were told to complete and return the corrected one, and the office said it \"will ensure that only the valid ballot is counted\" [1]. The office also said that the letter \"H\" had been left out of Deschutes County Commission Position 5 candidate Rob Imhoff's last name in the printed voter pamphlet, and that the online pamphlet had been corrected [1][3]. Central Oregon Daily also reported an earlier problem with a voter pamphlet that was missing 24 pages [3]. The county said it \"regrets the errors\" [1]. Status Confirmed: the county clerk's office acknowledged the errors. No source says they were deliberate, and no vendor is named. It belongs with other 2026 wrong-ballot-style mailings in Volusia County, Florida; Kendall County, Illinois; Pueblo County, Colorado; and Shasta County, California (see the related cards).", "sources": [{"title": "KQAK (Horizon Broadcasting Group) — \"200 Deschutes County Voters Were Sent Incorrect Precinct Ballots\" (Deschutes County Clerk's Office statement; Oct. 19, 2026; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121710/https://www.kqak.com/2026/10/19/200-deschutes-county-voters-were-sent-incorrect-precinct-ballots/)", "url": "https://www.kqak.com/2026/10/19/200-deschutes-county-voters-were-sent-incorrect-precinct-ballots/"}, {"title": "KQAK — Oct. 19, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.kqak.com/2026/10/19/200-deschutes-county-voters-were-sent-incorrect-precinct-ballots/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots__kqak-2026-10-19.html"}, {"title": "Central Oregon Daily — \"Deschutes County mails wrong ballots to 200 voters\" (Oct. 19, 2026, 11:20 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121747/https://www.centraloregondaily.com/news/elections/deschutes-county-wrong-ballots-200-bend-voters-corrected-ballots/article_8071327f-8276-41c8-bf87-285a4c5e2f05.html)", "url": "https://www.centraloregondaily.com/news/elections/deschutes-county-wrong-ballots-200-bend-voters-corrected-ballots/article_8071327f-8276-41c8-bf87-285a4c5e2f05.html"}, {"title": "Central Oregon Daily — Oct. 19, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.centraloregondaily.com/news/elections/deschutes-county-wrong-ballots-200-bend-voters-corrected-ballots/article_8071327f-8276-41c8-bf87-285a4c5e2f05.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots__centraloregondaily-2026-10-19.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Deschutes County, OR, about 200 Bend voters sent wrong precinct ballots (EMon submission, 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon-submitted item, added 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET. Verified by curl against KQAK and Central Oregon Daily (both HTTP 200); local copies and Wayback snapshots kept. Confirmed because the county clerk's office acknowledged the errors. The candidate-name misspelling could also fit 8 > Textual mistakes; the wrong-precinct ballots are the primary issue, so the card stays on the wrong-ballot-style leaf. No vendor tag. 2026 midterm window: yes. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["fl-volusia-2026-10-vendor-mailing-error-350-wrong-vote-by-mail-ballots", "kendall-il-2026-300-wrong-vbm-ballots-ineligible-referendum-two-precincts", "pueblo-co-2026-special-district-property-owner-ballots-mailed-incorrectly-rye-fire", "ca-shasta-2026-millville-gis-error-six-voters-anderson-ballots-school-board-omitted", "ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots"]}
{"id": "tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites", "permanent_id": "C20261020-194308-01", "uid": "C20261020-194308-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-194308-01", "old_ids": ["tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites"], "seq": "C01473", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the first day of early voting in Texas, ballot scanner paper jams disrupted voting at three Travis County early-voting sites. The Travis County Clerk's Office confirmed to the Austin American-Statesman that three polling locations had experienced paper jams and said workers were addressing them. Voters reported problems on Monday afternoon at the Lakeway Activity Center and the Ben Hur Shrine Center, where scanners were not accepting completed ballots. One voter at Ben Hur said some people placed their ballots in a secure compartment while workers waited for assistance. The county did not identify the third site or give a timeline for repairs. The Clerk's Office said voters who cannot wait for a jam to be cleared can place their completed ballots in an emergency compartment at the base of the scanner, and that more substantial jams may require local law enforcement officers to help election workers open the machines and clear them. Under Texas Secretary of State procedures, ballots in the emergency compartment are kept separate from those already scanned and are transported to the central counting station to be scanned and counted there. In a press release reported by KVUE, the Clerk's Office said: \"Operations continue to run normally at all Travis County election sites. Ballot receiving scanners may occasionally experience a paper jam during the course of operations. In those situations, a voter may be asked to either wait until the jam is cleared or place their ballot securely in the ballot box.\" A later Statesman story said scanners at several sites had jammed and that the problems were resolved. Equipment: the Texas Secretary of State's 2026 voting-systems-by-county list (revised Sept. 1, 2026) shows Travis County using ES&S EVS 6.3.0.0, with 2,100 ExpressVote ballot-marking devices and 350 DS200 precinct scanners, and the County Clerk's site names ES&S ExpressVote equipment. The news coverage does not name the scanner model at the affected sites, so the DS200 attribution comes from the state list. Status Confirmed for the jams, on the Clerk's Office's own confirmation. The cause of the jams was not reported, and no count of ballots routed to emergency compartments was released. Catalog point: when a precinct scanner jams, voters' ballots leave the normal scan-at-the-polls path and travel uncounted to a central station, the same separate handling that the Harris County 2022 two-page-ballot jams produced (separate card). A jam that officials describe as routine becomes a ready explanation for any later discrepancy in those ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Austin American-Statesman — Ballot scanner jams disrupt voting at 3 Travis County locations (Dante Motley, Oct. 19, 2026, 6:08 PM ET; later retitled \"What happens if a ballot scanner jams? Here's how your vote is protected.\")", "url": "https://www.statesman.com/news/politics/elections/article/texas-early-voting-travis-county-scanner-jams-22484297.php", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites__statesman-scanner-jams.html"}, {"title": "Austin American-Statesman — Travis County's first-day early voting jumps 61% from last mid-term election (Oct. 2026; jams at several sites resolved, per the Clerk's Office)", "url": "https://www.statesman.com/news/politics/elections/article/travis-county-early-voting-turnout-first-day-22485617.php", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites__statesman-turnout-day-one.html"}, {"title": "KVUE — Travis County reports record turnout for first day of midterm election early voting (Oct. 20, 2026; quotes the Clerk's press release on paper jams)", "url": "https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/vote-texas/travis-county-turnout-first-day-midterm-election-early-voting/269-5f854f5c-f5d4-49dc-b35e-5e0f06adef22"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Voting Systems by County 2026 (revised Sept. 1, 2026; Travis: ES&S EVS 6.3.0.0, ExpressVote x2,100, DS200 x350, DS450, DS850, DS950)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/voting-sys-bycounty.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites__txsos-voting-systems-by-county-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Travis County Clerk — Voters with Disabilities (ES&S ExpressVote voting equipment)", "url": "https://votetravis.gov/voter-information/voters-with-disabilities/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites__votetravis-voters-with-disabilities.html"}, {"title": "Travis County Clerk — Current Election (early voting Oct. 19–30, 2026)", "url": "https://votetravis.gov/current-election-information/current-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-travis-2026-early-voting-day-one-ballot-scanner-paper-jams-three-sites__votetravis-current-election.html"}], "notes": "EMon item ei-2026-10-064, carded 2026-10-20. EMon's hint suggested Hart InterCivic Verity, but the Secretary of State's 2026 list and the Clerk's site show Travis County uses ES&S (ExpressVote BMDs and DS200 precinct scanners), so the card is tagged ES&S. Hays County, next door, uses Hart. Leaf: filed with the Harris County 2022 jam card under Ballots › Paper thickness / scanner routing, because the reported effect is ballots diverted from the precinct scanner into separately handled emergency-compartment ballots. The Tabulation leaf on thick paper causing jams was not used, since no paper or ballot-design cause was reported. Not reported: the third site, the cause, the number of ballots placed in emergency compartments, and how long each scanner was down. KVUE returned 403 to the archiver and is linked only; its quote of the Clerk's release was verified through search. The Clerk's release itself was not found on votetravis.gov. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200 precinct scanner", "ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "ar-union-2026-el-dorado-vote-center-software-glitch-wrong-ballot-on-machines", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-01", "uid": "C20261021-121524-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-01", "old_ids": ["ar-union-2026-el-dorado-vote-center-software-glitch-wrong-ballot-on-machines"], "seq": "C01497", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-20", "state": "AR", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the first day of early voting in Arkansas, a software problem at the Union County vote center in the El Dorado Municipal Auditorium caused voting machines to display a different ballot than the one shown on the voter's printed card, according to the El Dorado News-Times. County Election Coordinator Mike Hayes said the glitch mixed up ballots for about a dozen voters; one El Dorado voter was shown a Strong ballot and another a Smackover ballot. \"Our software wasn't working quite right,\" Hayes said. \"The card that prints out tells us the right ballot, but it's not telling the machine the right ballot.\" He also said, \"The machine had a different ballot than what people expected. The ballots were wrong.\" The county notified the Arkansas Secretary of State's Office and the State Board of Election Commissioners, and with state help poll workers matched each voter's printout to the correct activation card by hand. Lines spilled outside and some voters waited 30 to 45 minutes. The newspaper reported that the county's contractor (named in the article as \"Electronic Systems and Services\") worked on a fix overnight after an earlier fix failed, and on Oct. 20 it reported that the glitch appeared to be resolved. Status Confirmed: the county election coordinator acknowledged that the machines presented the wrong ballots. Whether any voter cast a wrong-style ballot has not been reported. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: the ballot a voter is entitled to and the ballot the machine presented came apart inside the software, and the mismatch was caught only because voters noticed contests that did not belong to them. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Pre-printed precinct ballots handed out against a printed poll book, and counted by hand at the precinct, leave no software layer between the voter and the correct ballot style.", "sources": [{"title": "El Dorado News-Times — Glitch causes issues with ballots, delays on first day of early voting (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.eldoradonews.com/news/2026/oct/19/glitch-causes-issues-with-ballots-delays-on-first/"}, {"title": "El Dorado News-Times — Early voting continues in Union County (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.eldoradonews.com/news/2026/oct/20/early-voting-continues-in-union-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Union County, AR wrong-ballot glitch (ei-2026-10-114)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-114 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed, official_error acknowledged by county coordinator). Mapped to 8 Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peer: Dorchester SC ei-2026-10-059). Vendor not tagged: the article names the contractor only as 'Electronic Systems and Services'. 'about a dozen voters' text-verified; both sources curl 200. Watch for whether any wrong ballots were cast."}
{"id": "sc-dorchester-2026-early-voting-check-in-scanner-failure-wrong-ballot-styles", "permanent_id": "C20261020-120650-01", "uid": "C20261020-120650-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-120650-01", "old_ids": ["sc-dorchester-2026-early-voting-check-in-scanner-failure-wrong-ballot-styles"], "seq": "C01455", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-20", "state": "SC", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the first day of early voting in South Carolina, check-in equipment at Dorchester County early-voting sites had trouble scanning newer driver's licenses. The Dorchester County Republican Party (as reported by WCBD) and the Dorchester County Democratic Party both said the problem caused some voters who checked in before about 10:30 a.m. to receive ballots with the wrong district contests. According to the Democratic Party chair, Alexia Niketas, County Elections Director Kizzie Scott told her the issue involved scanning newer driver's licenses at check-in; poll workers switched to entering voter information by hand at all early-voting sites, and the underlying problem was reported as still unresolved that afternoon. The county elections office told Live 5 News that it \"discovered the ballot cards were not loading the correct ballot style for each voter,\" that the problem was isolated to Dorchester County, and that it did not affect voting statewide. In a statement to ABC News 4, county officials acknowledged technical issues and said the office \"will provide additional direction to early voting polling locations to ensure votes are accurately accounted for.\" Voters at Miles Road Baptist Church in Summerville and other sites reported waits of roughly 45 to 50 minutes, and State House District 97 candidate Robby Robins told ABC News 4 that people reported names missing from their ballots. Both county parties told voters to compare their ballots with their personal sample ballot on scvotes.gov and, if they believe they received the wrong ballot, to return and request a provisional ballot rather than cast a second regular ballot. The Democratic chair asked for an audit of the morning check-in and ballot-assignment records and for direct notice to affected voters. Oct. 20 update (ABC News 4): officials, citing the South Carolina State Election Commission, confirmed that about 150 early voters were given incorrect ballots because of an \"error in the preparation of the electronic poll book file,\" and said the problem was resolved. State and county officials said a ballot already cast, even an incorrect one, cannot be changed. The county elections office said, \"Every voter should receive the ballot containing the contests for which that voter is eligible. We regret the concern this incident has caused.\" Dorchester County Republican Party Chairman CJ Westfall said he is working with Democratic county leaders to demand action for affected voters and that they are willing to take legal action or ask for a re-vote. Status Confirmed: election officials confirmed that about 150 voters received wrong-style ballots and attributed it to an error in the electronic poll book file; those ballots cannot be retrieved or corrected. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a single check-in failure on the first morning of early voting put some voters in front of the wrong contests, and the county learned of it only after voters and party officials noticed. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Paper poll books checked by hand and ballot styles that precinct workers verify against a printed list make this kind of failure visible at the table, before a ballot is handed out.", "sources": [{"title": "WCBD News 2 (via Yahoo News) — Dorchester County voters encounter delays, incorrect ballots reported (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/dorchester-county-voters-encounter-delays-211950927.html"}, {"title": "Holy City Sinner — Dorchester County using manual voter check-in at all early-voting sites (Dorchester County Democratic Party release, Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://holycitysinner.com/politics/dorchester-county-using-manual-voter-check-in-at-all-early-v/"}, {"title": "ABC News 4 (WCIV) — Dorchester County voters face polling issues on first day of early voting (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews4.com/news/local/dorchester-county-voters-face-polling-issues-on-first-day-of-early-voting-wciv-abc-news-4-election"}, {"title": "Live 5 News (WCSC) — Early voting off to a rocky start at some Lowcountry polling locations (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.live5news.com/2026/10/19/early-voting-off-rocky-start-some-lowcountry-polling-locations/"}, {"title": "ABC News 4 (WCIV) — About 150 voters in Dorchester County given wrong ballot, State Election Commission says (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews4.com/news/local/dorchester-county-says-early-voting-ballot-display-problem-is-now-resolved-south-carolina-election-news"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dorchester County, SC check-in and wrong-ballot issue (ei-2026-10-059)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-21 AM EDS/EMon ingest: ABC News 4 Oct. 20, about 150 voters given wrong ballots, electronic poll book file preparation error, per State Election Commission; county 'regret' statement; GOP chair Westfall re-vote/legal action. Upgraded Partially confirmed to Confirmed. Text-verified, curl 200. EMon ei-2026-10-059 (first_seen 2026-10-19; EMon status active, confidence high, official_error partial). Mapped to 8 Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: CO 7A ei-2026-10-011, Shasta Millville, Pelham MA). Cross-leaf: Electronic Poll Books (check-in scanner failure). Live 5 'ballot style' quote and ABC News 4 'accurately accounted for' quote text-verified; all four sources curl 200. Watch for an affected-voter count and an SC State Election Commission statement."}
{"id": "tx-bexar-2026-leon-valley-scanner-jams-missing-measures-registration-card-backlog", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-02", "uid": "C20261021-121524-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-02", "old_ids": ["tx-bexar-2026-leon-valley-scanner-jams-missing-measures-registration-card-backlog"], "seq": "C01498", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-20", "state": "TX", "description": "During the first days of Texas early voting, Bexar County reported several problems, according to KSAT. On Oct. 20, 2026, voters at the Leon Valley Conference Center said they waited up to two hours after a ballot scanner jammed. Elections Administrator Michele Carew confirmed the jams, said the scanner jammed at about 1,200 ballots although it can hold about 2,000, and said that with the county's new scanners, ballots \"are not falling the way we'd like them to.\" Technicians will be stationed at polling locations, and emergency bins are available so ballots can be counted at headquarters. Voters also reported that measures, including Northside and East Central school district measures, were missing from some ballots. Carew said that problem was corrected within an hour after the office learned of it, that it was not limited to school districts, and that a ballot cannot be changed once cast. She also confirmed printing problems and a backlog of voter registration cards: the county can print only 250 a day, a spring mass mailing affected more than 130,000 voters, and about 45,000 cards were ready to mail. Oct. 21 update (KSAT): Bexar County said it had received incorrect data from the state that \"transposed the ballot styles\" in areas where district boundaries split neighborhoods or streets, affecting 150 district splits, so some voters received the wrong ballot. Carew said it was corrected within about an hour and that the county will not know how many voters received an incorrect ballot until ballots are returned and reviewed. Status Confirmed: the elections administrator confirmed the scanner jams, the missing measures and the card backlog. The number of voters who cast ballots missing measures has not been reported, and the scanner vendor is not named in the coverage. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: new scanners that jam well below rated capacity send ballots into emergency bins and to headquarters, away from the polling place where they were cast, and ballots missing measures cannot be fixed once they are in the box. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Precinct hand counts keep every ballot in the room where it was cast, and a missing contest is visible to the counting team at once.", "sources": [{"title": "KSAT — Voters, election officials report scanner issues at early-voting site in Leon Valley (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/20/voters-election-officials-report-scanner-issues-at-early-voting-site-in-leon-valley/"}, {"title": "KSAT — Early voting issues in Bexar County: missing propositions, voter registration cards delayed (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/21/early-voting-issues-in-bexar-county-missing-propositions-voter-registration-cards-delayed/"}, {"title": "KSAT — Bexar County says ballot problem is fixed. What about voters who already voted? (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/21/bexar-county-says-ballot-problem-is-fixed-what-about-voters-who-already-voted/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bexar County, TX early-voting problems (ei-2026-10-115)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), quotes KSAT on missing measures and Carew's \"Once a ballot's been cast\" statement (Oct. 21, 2026, 11:45 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112933307159609699", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--root__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — @j3669, KSAT headline: Early voting issues in Bexar County: missing propositions, voter registration cards delayed (Oct. 21, 2026, 8:44 AM ET; quoted by Gallagher)", "url": "https://x.com/j3669/status/2112887755294330917", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--j3669__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), reply to Mark Cook listing Texas ballot-on-demand failures (Oct. 21, 2026, 1:54 PM ET; no media)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112965849451827224", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--reply__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — @Tmucho3 reply: voted in Bexar County Oct. 21; all candidates and the NISD measures were on the ballot (Oct. 21, 2026, 12:14 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Tmucho3/status/2112940639247868162"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-22 AM EDS/EMon ingest (EMon ei-2026-10-115 change): KSAT Oct. 21, wrong ballot styles from transposed state data across 150 district splits; count of affected voters unknown. Text-verified, curl 200. Cross-leaf: Wrong ballot styles. Refreshed 2026-10-21 2:15 PM ET from Mark's @Lorionafarm lead (issue 5 of her post): added her thread posts and the quoted KSAT headline as sources, plus one Oct. 21 Bexar voter reply reporting a complete ballot. No new facts beyond KSAT; status unchanged. EMon ei-2026-10-115 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed, official_error partial). Mapped to 8 Ballots > Paper thickness / scanner routing (peer: Travis TX ei-2026-10-064). Cross-leaf: Textual 'mistakes' (missing measures). Related Bexar website outage card (ei-2026-10-031). No vendor named in sources. Both KSAT pages curl 200."}
{"id": "fl-monroe-2026-10-18-big-pine-key-early-voting-site-door-unlocked-equipment-replaced", "permanent_id": "C20261024-102612-05", "uid": "C20261024-102612-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261024-102612-05", "old_ids": ["fl-monroe-2026-10-18-big-pine-key-early-voting-site-door-unlocked-equipment-replaced"], "seq": "C01541", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-18 (before early voting opened Oct. 19)", "state": "FL", "description": "Monroe County, Florida Supervisor of Elections Sherri Hodies announced on Oct. 18, 2026 that she had replaced the voting tabulators and the electronic voter identification (check-in) systems at the Big Pine Community Park early-voting site on Big Pine Key, after a citizen told her and a county park employee that a door to the site had been found unlocked, leaving the voting equipment inside accessible and unattended. Early voting had not yet begun. The county employee secured the door; Hodies visited the site, said the machines had not been tampered with, and met with sheriff's deputies, who are investigating, and county staff to request more security. Under Canvassing Board supervision, her staff ran logic and accuracy tests on reserve tabulators at the Key West office, and county staff transported them to Big Pine. Hodies said the swap was made \"to eliminate any question that the unlocked door affected the accuracy of the early-voting results from the Big Pine site\" and that \"the election equipment was not compromised.\" Early voting at the site runs Oct. 19 to Oct. 31. Status Confirmed: the unlocked door and the equipment replacement come from the Supervisor's own press release. Who left the door unlocked, how long it was open, and whether anyone entered have not been reported; the sheriff's investigation is pending. No vendor is named. Catalog point: voting equipment staged at a public building before early voting depends on a door being locked, and the public learned of the lapse only because a citizen noticed. Replacing the machines is the right response, and it shows that once custody is broken the equipment cannot be trusted. Paper ballots kept under bipartisan seal and counted by hand at the precinct do not depend on unattended equipment.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Keys Weekly — Unlocked door at early-voting site prompts voting machine safeguards (Oct. 23, 2026; quotes the Supervisor's Oct. 18 press release)", "url": "https://keysweekly.com/42/unlocked-door-at-early-voting-site-prompts-voting-machine-safeguards/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Monroe County, FL Big Pine Key unlocked early-voting site (ei-2026-10-149)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-149 (2026-10-24 AM). New card. Leaf: 7 > Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand > 'Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization.' Peer: the Maricopa Chandler-Gilbert printer-tray card. Chosen over 10 > Tabulation > 'No supply-chain control or chain of custody' because this is a site-custody lapse at a polling place before voting, not a vendor supply-chain issue. Keys Weekly curl 200. 2026 midterm-window item: EMon priority true. Watch for the sheriff's findings. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-shasta-2026-millville-gis-error-six-voters-anderson-ballots-school-board-omitted", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-07", "uid": "C20261019-123505-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-07", "old_ids": ["ca-shasta-2026-millville-gis-error-six-voters-anderson-ballots-school-board-omitted"], "seq": "C01438", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-16", "state": "CA", "description": "Six voters in Millville, Shasta County, California received general-election ballots for an Anderson precinct that left off the Millville Elementary School Board race, according to Registrar of Voters Clint Curtis. Resident Tracy Verhougstraete noticed the missing race and found that her husband's and neighbors' ballots were also wrong. Curtis said the residents live on the border of an Anderson precinct and have Anderson mailing addresses but have always voted in Millville: \"There was an issue between GIS mapping and Election consolidation that put these folks in the Anderson precinct instead of the Millville precinct.\" He hand-delivered corrected ballots on Oct. 16, said residents who were not home would get theirs by mail, and asked anyone who suspects a wrong ballot to call the elections office. Status Confirmed (registrar's statement via KRCR); resolved for the six known voters. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a mapping error quietly removed a local race from these voters' ballots, and it was caught only because one voter read hers closely. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Precinct boundaries and ballot styles posted publicly and checked by local citizens before ballots go out catch this kind of error early.", "sources": [{"title": "KRCR News Channel 7 — Millville woman says incorrect ballots omitted local school board race (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://krcrtv.com/news/local/millville-woman-says-incorrect-ballots-omitted-local-school-board-race"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Shasta Millville wrong ballot style (ei-2026-10-046)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-046 (first_seen 2026-10-18; EMon status resolved, severity low, confidence high; official_error yes). KRCR curl 200. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles.", "related": ["or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"]}
{"id": "md-anne-arundel-2026-specimen-ballots-missing-last-two-pages-questions", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-08", "uid": "C20261019-123505-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-08", "old_ids": ["md-anne-arundel-2026-specimen-ballots-missing-last-two-pages-questions"], "seq": "C01439", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-16", "state": "MD", "description": "The Maryland State Board of Elections said on Oct. 16, 2026 that specimen (sample) ballots mailed to Anne Arundel County voters were missing the last two pages, which cover state ballot Questions 2 and 3 and Anne Arundel County Questions A, B and C. The board called it a misprint that \"may cause voter confusion or frustration over their ballot.\" Specimen ballots are informational copies; the statement concerned the mailed samples, not the official ballots voters cast. The State Board said it will send corrected sample ballots to all affected voters, and the county board will notify voters directly with a link to a complete online sample ballot. Status Confirmed (State Board statement via CBS News Baltimore). Sample ballots only; the number of voters affected was not given. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: the document voters use to study their ballot left out five ballot questions, so voters preparing at home saw an incomplete ballot. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Sample ballots checked publicly against the certified ballot before mailing would catch a missing page.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News Baltimore — Sample ballots mailed to Anne Arundel County voters missing pages; SBE misprint statement (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/sample-ballots-mailed-to-anne-arundel-county-voters/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Anne Arundel specimen ballot misprint (ei-2026-10-047)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-047 (first_seen 2026-10-18; EMon status active, severity low, confidence high; official_error yes). CBS Baltimore curl 200. Mapped to Ballots > Textual 'Mistakes' (contests missing from the voter-facing sample ballot)."}
{"id": "wi-wec-2026-clerks-cannot-use-modified-save-citizenship-checks", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-03", "uid": "C20261019-123505-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-03", "old_ids": ["wi-wec-2026-clerks-cannot-use-modified-save-citizenship-checks"], "seq": "C01434", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-15", "state": "WI", "description": "At its Oct. 15, 2026 special meeting, the bipartisan Wisconsin Elections Commission approved a clerk memo, \"Clerk Use of Federal SAVE System,\" after the U.S. Supreme Court's Sept. 25, 2026 order lifted the lower-court block on the modified Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) system. The guidance says Wisconsin law \"prohibits election officials disclosing voters' personally identifiable information, which makes it impossible for election officials to use SAVE as it is currently constructed,\" so the state's roughly 1,800 municipal clerks cannot use SAVE to check voter citizenship (WEC meeting packet; Democracy Docket; Wisconsin State Journal). The commission also approved a contingency-planning memo for possible Election Day disruptions. Status Confirmed for the official guidance (WEC memo and meeting packet). Whether state law truly bars any SAVE use is the commission's legal reading, not a court ruling. Catalog point: a federal citizenship check became legally available, and the state's answer is that its own clerks may not use it for the coming election, so eligibility rests on the voter's sworn statement. A gap like this shows how a safeguard can exist on paper and still be kept from the people who maintain the rolls. Local clerks with real verification tools, and rolls the public can check, close that gap.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Oct. 15, 2026 special meeting open-session packet (PDF; Clerk Use of Federal SAVE System memo)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Open%20Session%20Packet%20October%2015%2C%202026.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — 2026 election page with clerk memos (curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/election/2026"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Wisconsin offers new guidance to local officials on emerging election threats (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/wisconsin-offers-new-guidance-to-local-officials-on-emerging-election-threats/"}, {"title": "Wisconsin State Journal — Clerks prohibited from using federal SAVE database (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://madison.com/news/state-regional/government-politics/elections/article_b9ab96d9-1ad0-48f5-8710-28530ef401f6.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — WI clerks barred from modified SAVE (ei-2026-10-042)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-042 (first_seen 2026-10-15; EMon status active, severity low, confidence high; official_error no). Packet PDF, Democracy Docket and madison.com curl 200. Mapped to Illegal Immigration > not adequate protections. Related: SCOTUS SAVE stay card (ei-2026-09-019). Critics' 'honor system' framing on X noted, not quoted (zero X API).", "related": ["ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "va-2026-10-15-election-bulletin-restrict-document-federal-monitors", "permanent_id": "C20261022-121034-05", "uid": "C20261022-121034-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-121034-05", "old_ids": ["va-2026-10-15-election-bulletin-restrict-document-federal-monitors"], "seq": "C01519", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-15 to 2026-10-22", "state": "VA", "description": "On Oct. 15, 2026, the Virginia Department of Elections and Attorney General Jay Jones's office issued a joint \"2026 General Election Bulletin\" to general registrars, local electoral boards, local government attorneys and circuit court clerks on how to respond to federal election monitors, armed agents near polling places, and attempts by federal officials to seize election materials. The Virginia Mercury reported it on Oct. 22 and published the 10-page bulletin; earlier coverage traced only to a post by former Delegate Tim Anderson. The bulletin says that for Justice Department monitors to be present at a polling place, DOJ \"must request consent from local election officials,\" that such requests are treated like those from neutral observers \"who may appear at the discretion of local election officials,\" that monitors need written authorization, and that \"the decision to accept the request to monitor is in the sole discretion of the applicable electoral board and general registrar.\" It also states that no active court order requires any Virginia locality to accept federal Voting Rights Act observers, recognizes congressional observers and court-authorized observers under federal law, and tells officials to contact counsel immediately if presented with a search warrant, without delaying lawful access, and to record any materials seized. DOJ has announced monitors for Fairfax and Prince William counties. Status Confirmed: the bulletin is published by the Virginia Mercury, which interviewed Elections Commissioner Steve Koski. Catalog point: when state officials tell local boards that federal monitors may be admitted or refused at their discretion, whoever controls the polling place decides who gets to watch. Transparent precinct procedures with open observation, including citizen observers, let the public see what happens at the polls and at the count.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Mercury — Elections chief says Virginia is ready for midterms, potential federal interference (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2026/10/22/elections-chief-says-virginia-is-ready-for-midterms-potential-federal-interference/"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections and Office of the Attorney General — 2026 General Election Bulletin (Oct. 15, 2026, PDF published by the Virginia Mercury)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Elections-Bulletin.pdf"}, {"title": "Potomac Local News — Former Del. Tim Anderson says Virginia bulletin tells registrars they may deny DOJ monitors access (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.potomaclocal.com/2026/10/21/virginia-bulletin-tells-registrars-they-may-deny-doj-monitors-access/"}, {"title": "Daily Presser — Virginia issues Election Day guidance limiting access for federal monitors (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://dailypresser.com/virginia-issues-election-day-guidance-limiting-access-for-federal-monitors/"}, {"title": "Headline USA — Controversial Virginia AG prepared for major election showdown with feds (Oct. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://headlineusa.com/controversial-virginia-ag-prepared-for-major-election-showdown-with-feds/"}, {"title": "Liberty One News — Virginia AG tells poll workers to confront federal agents on Election Day (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://libertyonenews.com/virginia-ag-tells-poll-workers-to-confront-federal-agents-on-election-day/"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — Chapter 11 Election Day Manual (Rev. 9/2026), federal observers section (background)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2026-updates/11_Election_Day_Manual_Final_2026.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division — Election Integrity: Virginia (Fairfax and Prince William monitors, Aug. 4, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/election-integrity-virginia"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Virginia bulletin on federal monitors (ei-2026-10-092)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Promoted from the research queue 2026-10-22 (EDS/EMon ingest, ~12:30 PM ET): the Virginia Mercury (Oct. 22) reports the bulletin and publishes the official PDF, which meets Mark's corroboration rule. EMon ei-2026-10-092 now confirmed. Mapped to 6 Poll Watchers > keep observers from access (the queue's leaf question is resolved by the bulletin's DOJ-consent language). Mercury and PDF text-verified, curl 200. Names as in sources; nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ut-salt-lake-2026-millcreek-ballots-taken-from-mailboxes-clerk-investigating", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-03", "uid": "C20261021-121524-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-03", "old_ids": ["ut-salt-lake-2026-millcreek-ballots-taken-from-mailboxes-clerk-investigating"], "seq": "C01499", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-14 to 2026-10-21", "state": "UT", "description": "Salt Lake County Clerk Lannie Chapman is investigating after mail, including 2026 general-election ballots, was taken from street-side mailboxes in a Millcreek neighborhood, KUTV reported on Oct. 20, 2026. A resident said at least eight mailboxes were found open and empty on the morning of Thursday, Oct. 15, the day after ballots were delivered; one neighbor's ballot tracking showed delivery on Oct. 14. Chapman said a handful of people were affected and the missing ballots have been canceled. She said the incident was not related to the U.S. Postal Service and appeared to be a crime of opportunity, and that it is \"physically impossible\" to vote using another person's ballot because of identifier and signature checks. Voters who did not receive a ballot are asked to contact the clerk for a replacement, and the county is still working to determine the full scope. Update (Oct. 21, 2026): The U.S. Postal Inspection Service is investigating. Residents of four homes on Millcreek's Elgin Street were notified that their ballots had arrived, but the ballots were missing from their mailboxes. Postal Inspector Brook Robinson said it is unlikely thieves were targeting ballots specifically. Clerk Lannie Chapman said she proactively called the voters to cancel their old ballots and issue new ones (KSL). Status Confirmed: the county clerk confirmed that ballots went missing from the mailboxes and were canceled. No suspect has been identified, and no link to the separate, unconfirmed Salt Lake ballots-in-the-trash post has been established. Catalog point: once a ballot is mailed to an unsecured street-side mailbox, anyone can take it, and the voter learns of the loss only if tracking or the clerk tells them. The protection then rests entirely on signature checks. In-person voting at the precinct removes the unattended mailbox from the chain of custody.", "sources": [{"title": "KUTV — Salt Lake County Clerk investigating mail, including ballots, missing from mailboxes (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://kutv.com/news/local/salt-lake-county-clerk-investigating-mail-including-ballots-missing-from-mailboxes"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Millcreek, UT mailbox ballot theft (ei-2026-10-117)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "KSL — Election ballots part of alleged mail theft in Millcreek; Postal Service to investigate (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51639279/election-ballots-part-of-alleged-mail-theft-in-millcreek-postal-service-to-investigate"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-24 AM (ei-2026-10-117 update): USPIS investigation, four Elgin Street homes (KSL curl 200). Stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-117 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed). Mapped to 7 Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities. Separate from the Salt Lake trash-photo card (ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash, ei-2026-10-093). KUTV curl 200. Watch for a police report or arrest."}
{"id": "ca-tulare-2026-vendor-error-duplicate-vbm-packets-7791-voters", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-09", "uid": "C20261019-123505-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-09", "old_ids": ["ca-tulare-2026-vendor-error-duplicate-vbm-packets-7791-voters"], "seq": "C01440", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-14 to 2026-10-15", "state": "CA", "description": "On the afternoon of Oct. 14, 2026, the Tulare County, California Registrar of Voters began receiving calls and visits from voters reporting duplicate vote-by-mail ballots. The county said a print vendor, during the ballot replacement procedure, reprinted and mailed a batch of ballots, and that 7,791 voters in the City of Tulare received duplicate packets. The county described that as 0.03%, although 7,791 of the county's more than 227,000 registered voters is closer to 3.4%. The county says the vendor, which it did not name, accepted full responsibility. A bilingual postcard went to affected voters on Oct. 15 telling them to return only one ballot and destroy the duplicate, and Chief Clerk Michelle Baldwin said only one ballot per voter will be counted and any others automatically rejected. Many affected voters said they feared being accused of voting twice. ABC30 notes the area is in the competitive CA-22 congressional race. Status Confirmed for the duplicate mailing and the vendor error (county notice, The Sun-Gazette, ABC30, KSEE/KGPE, FOX26). No intent is alleged. Catalog point: thousands of extra live ballots went into the mail in a competitive district, and the safeguard is the county's after-the-fact matching so that only one per voter counts. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. One ballot issued to a checked-in voter at the precinct, and counted by hand there, leaves no duplicates in circulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Tulare County Registrar of Voters — Duplicate ballot information (Oct. 15, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://tularecounty.ca.gov/elections/duplicate-ballot-information"}, {"title": "The Sun-Gazette — Printing error results in duplicate ballots in Tulare County (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://thesungazette.com/article/news/2026/10/15/printing-error-results-in-duplicate-ballots-in-tulare-county/"}, {"title": "ABC30 Fresno — Tulare County voters receive duplicate vote-by-mail ballots after error (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://abc30.com/post/tulare-county-voters-receive-duplicate-vote-mail-ballots-error-ahead-midterm-elections/19941646/"}, {"title": "YourCentralValley.com (KSEE/KGPE) — Tulare County duplicate ballots (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.yourcentralvalley.com/news/local-news/tulare-county-duplicate-ballots/amp/"}, {"title": "FOX26 KMPH — Printing error sends duplicate ballots to some Tulare voters (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://kmph.com/news/local/printing-error-sends-duplicate-ballots-to-some-tulare-voters-county-elections-office"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Tulare duplicate VBM packets (ei-2026-10-049)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-049 (first_seen 2026-10-15; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error yes). Sun-Gazette 202; ABC30, KSEE and KMPH 200; county page 403. Mapped to the duplicate-ballot peer leaf (Athens-Clarke duplicate absentees ei-2026-10-014). County's 0.03% quoted as stated, with the arithmetic noted."}
{"id": "us-2026-white-powder-letters-election-offices-oh-ok-la-evacuations", "permanent_id": "C20261015-121255-02", "uid": "C20261015-121255-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261015-121255-02", "old_ids": ["us-2026-white-powder-letters-election-offices-oh-ok-la-evacuations"], "seq": "C01417", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-13 to 2026-10-19", "state": "AK, AL, AZ, CA, CT, DE, FL, GA, ID, IL, KS, LA, MA, MD, ME, MN, MS, ND, NE, NH, NM, OH, OK, OR, PA, SC, SD, TN, UT, VA, WA, WI, WY", "description": "In the week of Oct. 13, 2026, three weeks before the Nov. 3 midterms, state election offices in Oklahoma, Louisiana and Ohio were targeted with mailings containing an unknown white powder. Oklahoma State Election Board Secretary Paul Ziriax said the board received an envelope with suspicious white powder on the morning of Oct. 13; the office was evacuated, the Highway Patrol, Oklahoma City Fire and the National Guard responded, no staff were harmed, and election operations continued. In Louisiana, an Elections Division employee at Secretary of State Nancy Landry's Baton Rouge office opened a letter containing a powdery substance around 12:20 p.m. on Oct. 13; the elections section was evacuated and its air conditioning shut off, the employee was taken to an emergency room as a precaution and was unharmed, preliminary on-site tests did not find the powder harmful, and Louisiana State Police sent it to the FBI crime lab. Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose said U.S. Postal Service investigators intercepted a powder letter addressed to his office before delivery; the FBI is handling the Ohio matter, and county boards were told to stay vigilant. The FBI said it and the Postal Inspection Service are investigating a series of suspicious mailings to addresses nationwide, including secretary of state and related election offices. NASS and NASED issued a joint statement of concern. Officials in those three states said election operations were not disrupted. Oct. 15 update: a U.S. Senate Sergeant at Arms notice says the FBI, the Postal Inspection Service, and the U.S. Capitol Police are investigating multiple letters containing suspicious substances mailed nationwide, including to congressional offices, and that some letters may still reach their destinations. The offices of Sen. Christopher Murphy and Sen. Alex Padilla were targeted; Padilla's office said its letter was intercepted by the Postal Service. The House Sergeant at Arms said no House members had been identified as intended recipients. One envelope pictured in the Senate notice carried a return address for the Democratic Socialists of America headquarters; the group told the New York Post it has not used that address since 2013, and its involvement has not been established. Louisiana's office reopened Oct. 14 after officials found no harmful substance in its letter (Roll Call; Just The News). The mailings reached three more states. On Oct. 14, Wisconsin Elections Commission staff spotted a matching suspicious mail piece shortly before 3 p.m., made sure it was not opened, and alerted authorities; field testing found no hazardous material, and Administrator Meagan Wolfe said the incident would not affect the Nov. 3 election (Wisconsin Elections Commission; WAOW). On Oct. 15 at about 2 p.m., an employee of Delaware's State Election Commissioner's Office in Dover opened an envelope containing a white powdery substance; staff were decontaminated and evacuated, the HVAC was shut down, and nonessential staff at all Delaware election offices were sent home. U.S. Sens. Chris Coons and Lisa Blunt Rochester also confirmed receiving suspicious envelopes (Delaware Department of Elections; NBC10; WHYY). Also on Oct. 15, staff in Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes's office opened an envelope filled with white powder, prompting a hazmat response and a brief evacuation of the Arizona Executive Tower; no injuries were reported, and Fontes said the office \"will not be scared out of doing our jobs\" (KTAR; KJZZ). By the evening of Oct. 15, NBC News reported that election offices in at least 15 states (Arizona, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and Wisconsin) said they were mailed suspicious packages, and that federal law enforcement was investigating dozens of letters to congressional offices and state election officials, including the office of Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer. Three law enforcement sources told NBC that preliminary testing showed the powder was not hazardous, with further lab testing continuing. Individual dates for the nine newly listed states were not reported. The Associated Press reported that numerous states, \"from Idaho to Florida,\" said their election offices received letters or had them intercepted by the Postal Service; Florida is not on NBC's list and is not tagged on this card. Deputy Postal Inspector Brendan Donahue told reporters that \"any threat or attack on election officials is unacceptable\" and that investigators are working to identify whoever sent the letters (NBC News; AP via WBRZ). Oct. 16 update (NBC News): the federal probe widened as Republican senators, including Collins, Ricketts, Cruz and Rounds, and more House members reported matching letters; sources said authorities were examining \"dozens and dozens\" of letters, and preliminary field tests still found the powder non-hazardous while lab testing continued. As of the afternoon of Oct. 16, NBC reported that state election offices in at least 26 states had received packages: Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. No sender had been identified. Oct. 19 update (WIRED): after contacting all 50 states and D.C., WIRED reported that election offices in at least 32 states had confirmed receiving a letter: Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. Most letters were intercepted by the Postal Service, but offices in Arizona, Delaware, Oklahoma, South Carolina and Louisiana were evacuated when powder was found; officials in 10 states and D.C. said they had received none, and eight states did not respond. Alabama, on NBC's earlier list, does not appear on WIRED's list. The National Association of Secretaries of State and the National Association of State Election Directors called the incidents deeply concerning. The Guardian reported on Oct. 19 that more than three dozen members of Congress had been targeted, that the FBI said recovered envelopes were processed through a north Texas mail facility and carry a \"Thinking of You\" stamp, and that no suspect had been named. Status Confirmed for the mailings, the evacuations and the federal investigation (official state statements, FBI statement via NBC News, multiple outlets). The sender and motive are unknown, and no link to ballot handling is alleged. Catalog point: hoax threats that clear an elections office, like the 2024 Election Day bomb threats on this leaf, interrupt normal supervision of the office and its records while staff are outside, and they also intimidate the people who run elections. Small precinct counts done by hand in public, with many observers, are far harder to disrupt with one threat to one central office.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — Suspicious white powder sent to election offices in 3 states; FBI and Postal Service investigating (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/suspicious-white-powder-sent-election-offices-3-states-rcna603621"}, {"title": "Oklahoma State Election Board — Statement from the Secretary of the State Election Board (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://oklahoma.gov/elections/newsroom/2026/october/statement-from-secretary-of-the-state-election-board.html"}, {"title": "Louisiana Illuminator — White powder letter shuts down Secretary of State office (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://lailluminator.com/2026/10/13/white-powder-letter-shuts-down-secretary-of-state-office/"}, {"title": "WOIO Cleveland 19 — FBI investigating letter containing white powder intended for Ohio Secretary of State's office (Oct. 14–15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cleveland19.com/2026/10/15/fbi-investigating-letter-containing-white-powder-intended-ohio-secretary-states-office/"}, {"title": "Roll Call — Suspicious substances target senators; Senate Sergeant at Arms notice on nationwide mailings (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://rollcall.com/2026/10/15/suspicious-substances-target-senators-on-anniversary-of-attack/"}, {"title": "Just The News — Suspicious mail sent around the country with return addresses linked to DSA (Oct. 15, 2026; DSA involvement not established)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/government/security/suspicious-mail-sent-around-country-return-addresses-linked-dsa-triggers"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Suspicious mail found to be non-hazardous following investigation (Oct. 15, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-16, URL retained)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/news/suspicious-mail-found-be-non-hazardous-following-investigation"}, {"title": "WAOW — No hazardous material found in suspicious letter sent to Wisconsin Elections Commission in Madison (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.waow.com/news/no-hazardous-material-found-in-suspicious-letter-sent-to-wisconsin-elections-commission-in-madison/article_f09382f0-f96c-4459-bb28-f7c181901c65.html"}, {"title": "State of Delaware News — Suspicious mail received and opened by State Election Commissioner's Office (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://news.delaware.gov/2026/10/15/suspicious-mail-received-and-opened-by-state-election-commissioners-office/"}, {"title": "NBC10 Philadelphia — Suspicious mail containing white powdery substance sent to Delaware election office (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/local/suspicious-mail-containing-white-powdery-substance-sent-to-del-election-office/4480272/"}, {"title": "WHYY — Delaware elections office evacuated after suspicious envelope; Sens. Coons and Blunt Rochester also received envelopes (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.whyy.org/articles/delaware-suspicious-envelope-department-elections-evacuation/"}, {"title": "KTAR — Arizona Executive Tower briefly evacuated after white-powder envelope opened in Secretary of State's office (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://ktar.com/arizona-politics-news/election/arizona-secretary-of-state-white-powder-envelope-hazmat"}, {"title": "KJZZ — Arizona Executive Tower evacuated after Fontes' office receives envelope with white powder (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-10-15/arizona-executive-tower-evacuated-after-fontes-office-receives-envelope-with-white-powder"}, {"title": "NBC News — Authorities investigate suspicious mailings to congressional offices; election offices in at least 15 states mailed packages (Oct. 15, 2026, updated 8:33 PM ET)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/authorities-investigate-suspicious-mailings-congressional-offices-rcna603712"}, {"title": "Associated Press via WBRZ — Louisiana one of 15 states with suspicious substances sent to congressional, election offices (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbrz.com/news/louisiana-one-of-15-states-with-suspicious-substances-sent-to-congressional-election-offices/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Federal probe of suspicious-substance letters widens to GOP senators; election offices in at least 26 states (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/federal-probe-suspicious-substance-letters-widens-gop-senators-rcna603950"}, {"title": "WIRED — Election offices in at least 32 states have received suspicious letters in the last week (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/election-offices-in-at-least-32-states-have-received-suspicious-letters-in-the-last-week/"}, {"title": "The Guardian — White powder envelopes sent to members of Congress (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/19/white-powder-envelopes-congress"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Powder letters to election offices in 15+ states (ei-2026-10-038)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-20 AM EDS/EMon ingest: WIRED Oct. 19 at least 32 states (added AK, CA, FL, ME, NM, UT, VA; AL kept from NBC list); Guardian north Texas processing, 'Thinking of You' stamp, no suspect; text-verified, curl 200. Stays Confirmed. Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: NBC Oct. 16 lists election offices in at least 26 states (was 15); GOP senators among congressional targets; powder still preliminarily non-hazardous; no sender identified; curl 200 + text-verified. EMon ei-2026-10-038 (first_seen 2026-10-15, last_updated 2026-10-16; EMon status active, severity high, confidence high; official_error no). Refresh 2026-10-16 PM: +NBC News Oct. 15 evening (at least 15 named states; preliminary testing not hazardous per three law enforcement sources) and +AP via WBRZ ('from Idaho to Florida'; Donahue quote); both curl 200 and text-verified. State field expanded to the 15 NBC-named states; FL not tagged (AP mention only). Card id kept stable. Refresh 2026-10-16 AM: added WI (Oct. 14 WEC, non-hazardous), DE (Oct. 15 Dover, staff decontaminated, nonessential staff sent home), and AZ (Oct. 15 Fontes office, Executive Tower evacuated); state field expanded to six election-office states; card id kept stable. +WEC (curl 403 bot-block, URL retained), +WAOW, +Delaware DOE, +NBC10, +WHYY, +KTAR, +KJZZ (curl 200). Refresh 2026-10-15 PM: +Roll Call (Senate SAA notice; Murphy and Padilla offices; LA reopened, no harmful substance) and +Just The News (DSA return address, involvement not established); both curl 200. States kept as the three election-office states. All four sources curl 200 on 2026-10-15. X trending item not fetched (zero X API). Mapped to Chain of Custody sleight of hand > Bomb threats (peers: Fulton GA 2024, PA 32 counties 2024, Navajo AZ 2024 hoax threats); closest existing leaf for hoax-threat evacuations of election offices. Cross-leaf: Intimidation (Brennan 2024 official-threat survey; FBI Election Threats Task Force). Watch FBI lab results, any arrests, and whether more states report letters."}
{"id": "ca-la-2026-10-13-skid-row-midnight-mission-hundreds-mail-ballots-open-hallway-us-attorney-probe", "permanent_id": "C20261027-121429-02", "uid": "C20261027-121429-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-121429-02", "old_ids": ["ca-la-2026-10-13-skid-row-midnight-mission-hundreds-mail-ballots-open-hallway-us-attorney-probe"], "seq": "C01579", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-13 (reported 2026-10-26)", "state": "CA", "description": "The California Post (published by the New York Post) reported on Oct. 26, 2026, that it authenticated a photo and confirmed in person on Oct. 13 that hundreds of election ballots were piled in an open hallway at The Midnight Mission, a downtown Los Angeles homeless shelter at 601 South San Pedro Street that handles mail for its residents and where 1,160 voters are registered. The shelter's spokesperson said its standard procedure is to keep ballots behind locked doors until they are distributed and cited limited mailroom space. U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli confirmed a federal investigation into election ballots on Skid Row but declined to discuss The Midnight Mission specifically. Status Confirmed: the unsecured ballots were seen in person by the reporters and the shelter responded; no tampering or fraud has been reported, and the Los Angeles County Registrar had not commented in the reports.", "sources": [{"title": "California Post / New York Post — Hundreds of ballots found at Skid Row homeless center before LA election (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/10/26/us-news/hundreds-of-ballots-found-at-skid-row-homeless-center-before-la-election/"}, {"title": "Yahoo News (California Post syndication) — Hundreds of ballots left exposed at Skid Row shelter", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/hundreds-ballots-left-exposed-skid-190841403.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Skid Row shelter ballots in open hallway (ei-2026-10-168)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-168 (added 2026-10-27 PM ingest). NY Post and Yahoo curl 200. Mass mailing of ballots to a shared shelter mail address leaves custody to non-election staff. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ok-2026-ok-voter-portal-deadline-day-outage-service-oklahoma", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-08", "uid": "C20261012-123213-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-08", "old_ids": ["ok-2026-ok-voter-portal-deadline-day-outage-service-oklahoma"], "seq": "C01295", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-09", "state": "OK", "description": "On Friday, Oct. 9, 2026, the last day to register or update a registration for Oklahoma's Nov. 3 general election, the State Election Board's OK Voter Portal online registration system failed. Oklahoma Watch tested the portal after Democratic Party offices reported about 20 frustrated callers. After Submit, the site returned an error saying the portal could not communicate with Service Oklahoma (the state's driver-license and ID agency) to verify the registrant's information. Cyndi Munson's gubernatorial campaign said it received about 30–40 similar complaints. Repeated attempts to reach State Election Board spokeswoman Misha Mohr went unanswered as the deadline passed. Voters' only remaining options were a printed paper application postmarked Oct. 9 or registering in person. Academics and advocates urged a deadline extension. On Oct. 12–13 the State Election Board responded: it said the Online Voter Registration System itself had no issues, but the interface between that system and Service Oklahoma's verification data had temporary communication issues for a couple of hours late Friday afternoon. Secretary Paul Ziriax called it an \"isolated incident\" that \"appears to have had minimal impact,\" reported that nearly 800 applications (about 40% of the day's total) were submitted after the fix and that a record 1,906 online applications were filed that day, and said the board has no legal authority to extend the deadline; affected voters could also have registered in person at their county election board. The board is working with Service Oklahoma and the Office of Management and Enterprise Services to determine the root cause. Status Confirmed for the deadline-day failure, which Oklahoma Watch reproduced itself and the State Election Board has now officially acknowledged (KGOU/Oklahoma Watch, KGOU/Oklahoma Voice). The number of voters who could not register is unknown, and the root cause is still under review. Catalog point: when registration depends on a live link between election and DMV systems, one integration failure on deadline day decides who gets on the rolls, and no one is accountable. Paper applications handled locally kept working when the portal did not. Related: TX DPS portal backlog (ei-2026-09-001), TX TEAM/Civix (ei-2026-10-023).", "sources": [{"title": "Oklahoma Watch — Voter portal fails on deadline day, leaving Oklahomans unable to register for November election (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://oklahomawatch.org/2026/10/09/voter-portal-fails-on-deadline-day-leaving-oklahomans-unable-to-register-for-november-election/"}, {"title": "News9 (Oklahoma Watch republish) — Voter portal fails on deadline day (Oct. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.news9.com/oklahoma-city-news/voter-portal-fails-on-deadline-day-leaving-oklahomans-unable-to-register-for-november-election"}, {"title": "KGOU / Oklahoma Watch — Oklahoma's voter registration portal failed on the last day to register; State Election Board statement (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kgou.org/politics-and-government/2026-10-12/oklahomas-voter-registration-portal-failed-on-the-last-day-to-register"}, {"title": "KGOU / Oklahoma Voice — Voter registration system malfunction expected to have minimal impact, Ziriax says (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kgou.org/politics-and-government/2026-10-13/oklahoma-voter-registration-system-malfunction-expected-to-have-minimal-impact-official-says"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — OK Voter Portal deadline-day outage (ei-2026-10-022)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-022 (first_seen 2026-10-11, last_updated 2026-10-13; EMon status resolved, severity medium, confidence high, official_error yes). Refresh 2026-10-13 PM: SEB/Ziriax official statement (couple-hour Service Oklahoma interface failure; ~800 applications after fix; record 1,906; no extension authority; root-cause review with Service OK/OMES). Previously: Confirmed by Oklahoma Watch test; SEB silent; no extension reported. Mapped to Registration; Voter Rolls (peer ei-2026-09-001 TX DPS portal backlog). Cross-leaf: Motor-Voter (Service Oklahoma verification link). Watch SEB root-cause statement or extension. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls to entities that fa...'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Voter Rolls > Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls to entities that fail to maintain them properly (through incompetence or maliciousnes...' to the new leaf 'Registration > Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations.'."}
{"id": "us-2026-common-cause-v-doj-voter-list-maintenance-policy-vacated", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-01", "uid": "C20261012-123213-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-01", "old_ids": ["us-2026-common-cause-v-doj-voter-list-maintenance-policy-vacated"], "seq": "C01288", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-09", "state": "US", "description": "On Oct. 9, 2026, U.S. District Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan (D.D.C.) vacated the Justice Department Civil Rights Division's nationwide \"Voter List Maintenance Policy\" in Common Cause v. DOJ (Civil Action No. 26-1352). Under the policy DOJ sought unredacted statewide voter rolls from 49 states and D.C. (names, dates of birth, addresses, driver's-license and Social Security numbers), shared files from cooperating states with DHS for SAVE citizenship checks and with ICE/HSI, and pressed states to remove flagged voters, often within about 45 days. About 18 states had turned files over; 26 refused and won dismissals of DOJ suits to compel them. The court held that DOJ had not shown the Civil Rights Act of 1960, the NVRA or HAVA authorize the program, found Administrative Procedure Act and Privacy Act problems, and found the policy had already removed U.S. citizens from rolls (plaintiffs include Denton County, Texas voter Anthony Nel, canceled after a SAVE flag). The vacatur bars continued use of already-obtained files for the nationwide program, including DHS/SAVE sharing and purge pressure; states may still maintain their own rolls, including lawful SAVE use. DOJ said it is reviewing the ruling. Oct. 16 update: the Justice Department filed a notice of appeal and moved in district court for a stay pending appeal. The motion argues that \"[t]here is no such policy,\" that DOJ's letters to states were requests rather than mandatory demands and so not final agency action, and that the decision \"has hamstrung DOJ's ability to enforce the election laws.\" The Oct. 9 order stays in effect unless a stay is granted. Status Confirmed for the memorandum opinion and vacatur (opinion PDF, Democracy Docket, Courthouse News); an appeal is possible. Democracy Docket and Common Cause are advocacy-aligned, so the opinion text is the primary source. Catalog note: the fight over who controls voter-roll data is now being decided in court, case by case, rather than by transparent, locally controlled list maintenance that citizens can check. Related: GA unredacted-rolls dismissal (ei-2026-09-025), SCOTUS SAVE stay (ei-2026-09-019), HSI ~99M voter-record ingest (ei-2026-10-009).", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) — Memorandum opinion, Common Cause v. DOJ, No. 26-1352 (Oct. 9, 2026; PDF via Common Cause)", "url": "https://www.commoncause.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Common-Cause-v-DOJ-decision.pdf"}, {"title": "Memorandum opinion, Civil Action No. 26-1352 (SLS) (Oct. 9, 2026; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/51-2026-10-09-Memorandum-opinion.pdf"}, {"title": "Courthouse News Service — Judge blocks DOJ from using national voter database to boot citizen voters (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/judge-blocks-doj-from-using-national-voter-database-to-boot-citizen-voters/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Federal judge shuts down DOJ's nationwide voter-roll effort (Oct. 9, 2026; advocacy outlet)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/federal-judge-shuts-down-trump-dojs-nationwide-voter-roll-crusade/"}, {"title": "DOJ notice of appeal (Oct. 16, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-10-16-Notice-of-appeal.pdf"}, {"title": "DOJ motion for stay pending appeal (Oct. 16, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/57-2026-10-16-DOJs-motion-for-stay-pending-appeal.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — DOJ asks court to let it continue its voter-roll program despite block (Oct. 17, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/doj-asks-court-to-let-it-continue-its-voter-roll-purging-program-despite-block/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ voter-list maintenance policy vacated (ei-2026-10-015)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: DOJ notice of appeal + stay motion filed Oct. 16 (filing PDFs curl 200). Stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-015 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-09; EMon status emerging, severity high, confidence high). Confirmed for the court opinion and vacatur; DOJ reviewing and may appeal. Mapped to Lawfare (peer ei-2026-09-025 DOJ GA rolls suit dismissal). Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls. X trending headline not used as a source (zero X API). Watch DOJ appeal, any SCOTUS interplay with the ei-2026-09-019 SAVE stay, and effect on HSI ingest (ei-2026-10-009)."}
{"id": "in-tippecanoe-2026-microvote-trustee-candidate-omitted-424-early-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261023-121426-01", "uid": "C20261023-121426-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-121426-01", "old_ids": ["in-tippecanoe-2026-microvote-trustee-candidate-omitted-424-early-ballots"], "seq": "C01521", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-09 to 2026-10-21", "state": "IN", "description": "Based in Lafayette (Dave Bangert) reported on Oct. 22, 2026, that 424 early-voting ballots cast in Tippecanoe Township, Tippecanoe County, Indiana, between Oct. 9 and Oct. 21 did not list Democrat Holden Mugford, who is running against Republican incumbent Bill Jones for township trustee. Mugford had been added to the ballot the day before early voting began on Oct. 6. A township board candidate noticed the omission on a voting machine at the County Office Building on the afternoon of Oct. 21. According to the county, when ballot corrections for unopposed races elsewhere in the county were loaded into the MicroVote machines on Oct. 9, a previous version of the candidate list without Mugford's name was put back in. County Clerk Julie Roush called it \"an administrative error\" and said her office was still tracing how it happened; election office specialist Mike Smith gave the 424 figure as an unaudited count. Township voters were given paper ballots for the trustee race on Oct. 21, and the machines were corrected for Oct. 22. Affected voters are being sent letters and may cast a new ballot before Nov. 3; if the Election Night margin is smaller than the number of affected voters who do not recast, the county Election Board will consider a remedy, which Smith said could include a special election. Update (Nov. 13–15, 2026): Based in Lafayette and The Purdue Exponent reported that Republican Bill Jones defeated Democrat Mugford by 118 votes on Nov. 3 (the Exponent cites county unofficial results of 1,825 to 1,707). In a statement to the county Election Board on Nov. 13, Tippecanoe County Democratic Party chair Ken Jones said 117 of the 424 affected voters cast corrected ballots and 74 straight-ticket Democratic ballots were credited to Mugford, leaving 233 ballots in question, nearly twice the margin; the party says it will petition the court for a special election under Indiana Code 3-12-8-17, which requires one, limited to the affected precincts, when a ballot programming error makes the winner impossible to determine. The Exponent says the error arose Oct. 8 when a Wea Township fix was applied to an outdated Sept. 30 ballot version. Filing deadlines are reported as Nov. 17 (Journal & Courier) or Nov. 20 (Exponent); no filing or ruling has been reported, and the 233 figure is the Democratic Party's count. Status Confirmed: the omission and its cause are acknowledged by the county clerk and election office; no finding of intent has been made. Catalog point: a candidate silently disappeared from a machine ballot for nearly two weeks and was caught only because another candidate happened to look. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere; a printed ballot proofed in public and counted by hand at the precinct shows every voter and counter exactly who is on it.", "sources": [{"title": "Based in Lafayette (Dave Bangert) — County scrambles after voting machines left a trustee candidate off more than 400 ballots (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.basedinlafayette.com/p/county-scrambles-after-voting-machines"}, {"title": "Based in Lafayette (Dave Bangert) — Tippecanoe special-election petition (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.basedinlafayette.com/p/democrats-will-ask-for-special-election"}, {"title": "The Purdue Exponent (Vivian Oseep) — Tippecanoe special-election petition (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.purdueexponent.org/city_state/general_news/tippecanoe-democrats-to-seek-special-election-after-voting-machine-error/article_190ce3d2-5388-4fc9-852a-4074b3b46a6b.html"}, {"title": "Lafayette Journal & Courier — Tippecanoe special-election petition (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.jconline.com/story/news/local/lafayette/2026/11/13/tippecanoe-democrats-will-ask-for-special-election-in-township-race/92763583007/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Tippecanoe County, IN trustee candidate omitted from early ballots (ei-2026-10-134)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-134 update). EMon ei-2026-10-134 (added 2026-10-23 daily review). Single local outlet, but the county clerk and election office are quoted directly (official acknowledgment), so it is carded rather than queued. Vendor MicroVote named in the article. Curl 200, text-verified (424 unaudited, MicroVote, special-election remedy). Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["MicroVote"]}
{"id": "snohomish-wa-2026-535k-return-envelopes-misprinted-genereal-election", "permanent_id": "C20261013-122943-02", "uid": "C20261013-122943-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261013-122943-02", "old_ids": ["snohomish-wa-2026-535k-return-envelopes-misprinted-genereal-election"], "seq": "C01377", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-09 to 2026-10-12", "state": "WA", "description": "Snohomish County Elections (Auditor's Office, Auditor Garth Fell) confirmed on Oct. 12, 2026 that every ballot return envelope mailed so far for the Nov. 3 general election, about 535,000 envelopes mailed on Oct. 9, prints the heading \"Genereal Election\" above the voter declaration and oath. In a statement to Seattle Red (The Jason Rantz Show), the office said the misspelling entered during the variable-data printing stage and was missed in proofing, which focused on voter name, voter ID, and barcodes. The county said the error does not affect ballot processing, signature verification, or the validity of returned ballots; it has corrected the underlying data for later mailings, is reviewing its quality-control procedures, and will notify community partners and the Washington Secretary of State's Office. Voters were told to sign, date, and return ballots as usual, and anyone who has not received a ballot by Oct. 14 can call 425-388-3444. The statement did not say who printed the envelopes or when the office first learned of the error. Status Confirmed for the county's own acknowledgment of the misprint on all return envelopes mailed so far (single outlet quoting the Auditor's Office statement verbatim); the county characterizes it as cosmetic, and no effect on any ballot has been reported. Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. A proofing process that checks barcodes but misses a misspelled heading on half a million oath envelopes shows how easily printed election materials pass review with errors, and each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Hand-marked paper ballots cast in person at the precinct reduce reliance on mass-printed mail materials, and hand counts remain viable.", "sources": [{"title": "Seattle Red (The Jason Rantz Show) — Snohomish County ballot envelopes misspell \"General Election\"; Auditor's Office statement (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://seattlered.com/politics/snohomish-county-ballot-envelopes-genereal-election-misspelling/4120628"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Snohomish WA return-envelope misprint (ei-2026-10-029)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-029 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-12; EMon status resolved, confidence medium, severity low; official_error yes). Single outlet, but it quotes the Auditor's Office statement verbatim; add the county's own post or a second outlet if one appears. Mapped to Ballots > Textual 'Mistakes' on ballots (closest leaf: misprinted official ballot material; the error is on the return envelope, not the ballot face). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities. Watch for voter confusion or signature-curing impact."}
{"id": "wa-kittitas-2026-10-08-guilty-plea-filled-out-late-mothers-2024-ballot", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-09", "uid": "C20261028-121857-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-09", "old_ids": ["wa-kittitas-2026-10-08-guilty-plea-filled-out-late-mothers-2024-ballot"], "seq": "C01591", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-08", "state": "WA", "description": "Edward Thomas Pattee, 70, of South Cle Elum, Washington, pleaded guilty on Oct. 8, 2026, in Kittitas County Superior Court to a felony charge of voter fraud, admitting that he filled out his mother's mail ballot for the 2024 general election after she died on Oct. 14, 2024, signed her name and mailed it with his own, the Daily Record reported on Oct. 10. Judge Chris Herion sentenced him to 10 days in jail converted to home detention with electronic monitoring. Deputy Prosecutor Hunter Slezak said the ballot \"was caught. It was flagged and it was discovered.\" Catalog point: a mail ballot sent to a voter who died after ballots went out was completed and returned by someone else in the household; it was caught here, but only after it entered the mail stream.", "sources": [{"title": "Daily Record (Ellensburg) — South Cle Elum man pleads guilty to voter fraud (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.dailyrecordnews.com/crimes/south-cle-elum-man-pleads-guilty-to-voter-fraud/article_43932561-83b3-4a36-877e-7371ac85ba10.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Kittitas County, WA guilty plea for late mother's ballot (ei-2026-10-185)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-185 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed; event 2024 ballot, plea 2026-10-08). Source curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-san-diego-2026-valley-center-12-unvoted-mail-ballots-strewn-rov-confirmed", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-07", "uid": "C20261012-123213-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-07", "old_ids": ["ca-san-diego-2026-valley-center-12-unvoted-mail-ballots-strewn-rov-confirmed"], "seq": "C01294", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-08 to 2026-10-12", "state": "CA", "description": "On the morning of Thursday, Oct. 8, 2026, election mail was found scattered along Lake Wohlford Road east of East Valley Parkway (Valley Center/Escondido area, North County San Diego). It included unvoted mail-ballot packets and voter information pamphlets. Witness Scott Harmes photographed the materials without touching them and reported them to the Sheriff's Office; another driver later collected them and turned them in at the Valley Center Post Office. The County of San Diego Registrar of Voters (ROV) confirmed 12 unvoted, unfilled mail-ballot packets and 14 voter information pamphlets. USPS confirmed it redelivered them to addresses in Pauma Valley and Valley Center. The ROV says it works with the U.S. Postal Inspection Service on potential tampering reports, describes such cases as rare, and says there is no evidence of widespread fraud. Harmes filed a report with the Registrar, and local media contacted some named voters (e.g., Sandra Carey of Pauma Valley). Status Confirmed for the official ROV acknowledgment of 12 outbound ballot packets outside the postal stream (ABC 10News/KGTV). How they left the mail stream is under investigation, and no ballot is alleged to have been voted or counted. Update (Oct. 12, KGTV): the ROV says there is no indication the ballots went missing while in its custody, no indication of voter fraud, and no attempt to cast a vote for the affected voters, and it is working with USPS to determine where in the mailstream the materials were misplaced. KGTV reports the roadside materials included no other mail, which casts doubt on the theory that a mailbag fell off a truck; no official has determined that the ballots were discarded deliberately, and one recipient reported tire marks on her redelivered ballot. This is the official confirmation of the scene first posted by citizen Amy Reichert (card ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video). Her \"27 ballots\" count resolves to 26 items: 12 ballot packets and 14 pamphlets. Catalog point: once ballots go out by mail, custody passes to a system no election official or observer controls. Twelve live ballots on a road shoulder anywhere make \"lost in the mail\" a credible excuse everywhere. In-person voting on precinct hand-marked paper keeps the ballot in sight from issue to count. Distinct from Riverside ballot seizure (ei-2026-09-017).", "sources": [{"title": "ABC 10News / KGTV — Mail-in ballots strewn along North County road; ROV confirms 12 unvoted packets and 14 VIPs (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.10news.com/news/local-news/mail-in-ballots-strewn-along-north-county-road"}, {"title": "ABC 10News / KGTV — Mail-in ballots found scattered along Escondido road spark investigation; ROV says not lost in its custody (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.10news.com/news/local-news/mail-in-ballots-found-scattered-along-escondido-road-sparking-investigation"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — San Diego Valley Center strewn ballots (ei-2026-10-021)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-021 (first_seen 2026-10-11, last_updated 2026-10-13; EMon status active, confidence high). Refresh 2026-10-13 PM: KGTV Oct. 12 follow-up (ROV: not lost in its custody, no fraud indication, USPS tracing; no other mail at scene); event date corrected to Oct. 8. A Mark-shared X post (@TheSCIF) claiming intentional tossing is not adopted because it is unconfirmed. Confirmed via ROV/USPS statements. Same Lake Wohlford Road scene as the Citizen Testimony card (Amy Reichert), which was refreshed this pass with a cross-reference and kept as Citizen Testimony. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (peers: Maricopa Runbeck ei-2026-10-007, Amy Reichert card). Cross-leaf: USPS. X trending not used (zero X API). Watch Postal Inspection outcome and any further dumps."}
{"id": "dc-2026-ng-foggy-bottom-drop-box-dcboe-distance-request", "permanent_id": "C20261009-181012-01", "uid": "C20261009-181012-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-181012-01", "old_ids": ["dc-2026-ng-foggy-bottom-drop-box-dcboe-distance-request"], "seq": "C01286", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-08 to 2026-10-09", "state": "DC", "description": "On or about Oct. 8, 2026, National Guard troops from the multi-state D.C. deployment were filmed standing next to the Foggy Bottom/GWU Metro mail-ballot drop box at 2301 I Street NW. On Oct. 9, D.C. Board of Elections spokesperson Sarah Graham said DCBOE is addressing the concerns with the National Guard and has requested limitations on placement of Guard members near drop boxes and other voting locations; she said the Foggy Bottom box was not in use when troops were filmed, and the city's 55 drop boxes opened Friday morning (Oct. 9) through Election Day Nov. 3. About 2,864 Guard troops remained deployed in D.C. as of Thursday. Whether troops were ordered to that box or were there coincidentally is unclear; National Guard had not responded to Washington Sun by Friday afternoon. Guard response: Joint Task Force-DC told NBC4 Washington and Snopes it was aware of the imagery and was \"actively addressing this specific instance,\" adding that its service members \"are directed not to monitor or secure polling locations.\" The Washington Post (Oct. 9), citing two National Guard officials, reported that the troops belonged to a larger group that had paused during a patrol and were not specifically guarding the box. Snopes (Oct. 12) verified the footage and location as authentic (recorded Oct. 8) and found no evidence the troops were assigned to guard the box or intimidate voters; why they stopped there remains unexplained. The D.C. Council posted that the scene was \"clearly not acceptable.\" Status Confirmed for the reported presence near the listed drop-box location and for DCBOE's public request for distance limitations (Washington Sun, Common Dreams, DCBOE drop-box list); does not adjudicate whether the deployment constituted unlawful intimidation, and does not claim troops were ordered to guard or interfere with the box. Catalog framing: a documented armed-presence incident near a voting location anywhere — even when officials say the box was unused and they requested remediation — makes the \"it was a mistake / we addressed it\" defense more credible for similar intimidation claims elsewhere. Related: Democrats' suit to bar armed federal agents near polls/drop boxes (ei-2026-09-007).", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Sun — DC Board of Elections asks National Guard to stay away from ballot drop boxes after Foggy Bottom video (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.washingtonsun.com/metro/national-guard-dc-ballot-boxes"}, {"title": "Common Dreams — DCBOE responding to National Guard near downtown ballot drop box (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.commondreams.org/news/national-guard-dc-ballot-box"}, {"title": "DC Board of Elections — 2026 general election mail ballot drop box locations (Foggy Bottom/GWU Metro, 2301 I Street NW)", "url": "https://dcboe.org/voters/find-out-where-to-vote/mail-ballot-drop-box-locations"}, {"title": "NBC4 Washington — National Guard near D.C. ballot drop box raises concern; JTF-DC statement (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/national-guard-ballot-drop-box-concern-dc/4165777/"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Troops were loitering by D.C. ballot box by mistake, National Guard says (Oct. 9, 2026; paywalled, curl timed out 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2026/10/09/troops-were-loitering-by-dc-ballot-box-by-mistake-national-guard-says/"}, {"title": "Snopes — Fact check: National Guard troops filmed next to D.C. ballot box (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/national-guard-ballot-box-dc/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DC NG Foggy Bottom drop box / DCBOE distance request (ei-2026-10-013)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-013 (first_seen 2026-10-08, last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status emerging, confidence high, severity medium). Refresh 2026-10-14 AM: JTF-DC statement (NBC4/Snopes), WaPo patrol-pause account, Snopes footage verification; event date confirmed Oct. 8. Confirmed video/presence reporting + DCBOE official request for Guard distance from drop boxes/voting locations; box unused at filming per DCBOE; unlawful intimidation not adjudicated. Peer: ei-2026-09-007 (armed federal agents lawsuit) on Fear/Discredit; Intimidation. X posts cited by EMon not fetched (zero X API). Watch any written NG distance commitment beyond verbal request; clarify which state Guard units appear in the Oct. 8 video."}
{"id": "laporte-in-2026-long-beach-council-vote-for-five-not-three-41-voters", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-11", "uid": "C20261012-123213-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-11", "old_ids": ["laporte-in-2026-long-beach-council-vote-for-five-not-three-41-voters"], "seq": "C01298", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-08 to 2026-10-09", "state": "IN", "description": "La Porte County, Indiana Clerk Heather Stevens told the County Election Board at an emergency meeting on Friday, Oct. 9, 2026 that the general-election ballot for the Long Beach Town Council race told voters to select five candidates when only three seats are open (six candidates are running). On this un-ranked ballot, choosing more than three would not produce a valid result. Stevens said she learned of the mistake Thursday afternoon (Oct. 8) and had it fixed by Friday morning. Forty-one Long Beach voters had already voted by machine; officials were still determining whether any absentee ballots were affected. Early voters will be notified and may re-cast a ballot at a vote center or the Mobile Voting Unit. If they do not, their Town Council votes will be redacted while the rest of the ballot stands. Stevens said she would ask the Indiana Election Division to audit the handling. Status Confirmed for the clerk's on-record acknowledgment at a public election-board meeting (Hometown News Now; single local outlet so far). Intent is not alleged. Mark framing: this is Indiana's third ballot-programming \"mistake\" in about a week, after Knox County (vote-for-three on a two-seat race, ei-2026-10-005) and Floyd County (missing commissioner race, ei-2026-10-018). A bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. A steady drip of confirmed vote-for and style errors makes the \"it was a mistake\" defense credible everywhere, and 41 voters now have a race that is either re-voted or redacted. Hand-marked paper ballots proofed publicly and counted by hand make an instruction error obvious and correctable without machine reprogramming.", "sources": [{"title": "Hometown News Now (La Porte County) — Ballot error: Long Beach voters told to select five council candidates instead of three; 41 affected (Oct. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://hometownnewsnow.com/local-news/935603"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — La Porte IN Long Beach vote-for error (ei-2026-10-025)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-025 (first_seen 2026-10-11, last_updated 2026-10-12; EMon status emerging, confidence high). Confirmed: clerk on record at emergency election-board meeting; single outlet. Mapped to Tabulation > Induce error (ballot programming mistakes) to match its closest peer, Knox IN vote-for error ei-2026-10-005, rather than the wrong-ballot-styles leaf suggested in dispatch. Cross-leaf: Ballots > Wrong ballot styles; Textual 'Mistakes'. Watch Indiana Election Division audit and absentee count."}
{"id": "fl-volusia-2026-10-vendor-mailing-error-350-wrong-vote-by-mail-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-07", "uid": "C20261026-121625-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-07", "old_ids": ["fl-volusia-2026-10-vendor-mailing-error-350-wrong-vote-by-mail-ballots"], "seq": "C01550", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-07 to 2026-10-23", "state": "FL", "description": "About 350 voters in northern Volusia County, Florida (Congressional District 6), received vote-by-mail ballots with the wrong contests, including races for another city or area, in a vendor mailing with an Oct. 7, 2026, delivery date. The Supervisor of Elections' office mailed replacement ballots with an explanatory notice on Friday, Oct. 23. Ballots from affected voters that had already been counted will stand (WESH reports two such ballots, Central Florida Public Media seven). Supervisor of Elections Lisa Lewis said, \"I am deeply upset that this vendor's error has affected our voters.\" The vendor was not named in the reporting. Status Confirmed by the supervisor of elections.", "sources": [{"title": "Central Florida Public Media — Volusia elections office resending 350 ballots after vendor mailing error (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cfpublic.org/politics/2026-10-23/volusia-elections-office-resending-350-ballots-after-vendor-mailing-error"}, {"title": "WESH — Volusia voters received wrong mail ballots (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.wesh.com/article/volusia-voters-wrong-mail-ballots/74221363"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Volusia FL wrong mail ballots (ei-2026-10-157)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-157 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200 for both. No vendor tag because no source names the vendor.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots", "ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error", "or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"]}
{"id": "pueblo-co-2026-special-district-property-owner-ballots-mailed-incorrectly-rye-fire", "permanent_id": "C20261012-182116-02", "uid": "C20261012-182116-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-182116-02", "old_ids": ["pueblo-co-2026-special-district-property-owner-ballots-mailed-incorrectly-rye-fire"], "seq": "C01375", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-07 to 2026-10-12", "state": "CO", "description": "In early October 2026, some Pueblo County, Colorado residents, especially in and around the Rye Fire District and Pueblo West, received one or more extra property-owner ballots for the Nov. 3 general election, often containing only a single special-tax-district measure. KRDO (Oct. 7) reported residents receiving two or three ballots, one full ballot plus a single-measure extra, sometimes addressed to an obsolete P.O. box. The Pueblo County Election Department's statement says the entities that submitted special-district content are contractually responsible for vetting their voter lists, and that \"a lack of accuracy\" in those certified lists caused a limited number of property-owner ballots to be mailed incorrectly; it states the matter is \"NOT the result of an error by the Election Department.\" Clerk Deanna Kendall told Colorado Public Radio (Oct. 12) that recipients should contact the office for next steps and that most of the extras went to people inside the Rye Fire District. Elections Director Daniel Lepick said the department verifies that people cast only one vote in each area. The number of affected ballots has not been published. Status Confirmed for the county's own acknowledgment that ballots were mailed incorrectly (county statement, KRDO, CPR); who is at fault is disputed between the county and the submitting districts. Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Coming days after Colorado's Issue 7A wrong-style mailing (ei-2026-10-011), this shows how routinely \"list mistakes\" put extra live ballots into the mail, and every confirmed case makes the excuse credible for the next one. When the county blames the districts and the districts' lists are not public, no one is accountable for who received which ballot. Precinct-issued, hand-marked paper ballots with public reconciliation keep ballot style and counts visible.", "sources": [{"title": "Pueblo County Clerk & Recorder — Election Department press release on incorrectly mailed property-owner ballots (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://county.pueblo.org/clerk-and-recorder-department/election-department-press-release-office-clerk-recorder"}, {"title": "KRDO — Pueblo County residents receive duplicate ballots (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://krdo.com/video/2026/10/07/pueblo-county-duplicate-ballots/"}, {"title": "Colorado Public Radio — Extra ballots mailed to Pueblo County special-district residents (Oct. 12, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-12, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2026/10/12/extra-ballot-pueblo-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pueblo CO extra special-district ballots (ei-2026-10-028)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-028 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-12; EMon status active, confidence high; official_error partial). Confirmed via county statement + KRDO + CPR; count unpublished; fault disputed (county vs submitting districts). Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: CO Issue 7A ei-2026-10-011, Kendall IL ei-2026-10-026). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities; Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (obsolete P.O. boxes). Distinct from Front Range 7A. Watch exact count and remedy instructions.", "related": ["or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"]}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-011", "permanent_id": "C20261009-123237-01", "uid": "C20261009-123237-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-123237-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-011"], "seq": "C01285", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-06 to 2026-10-19", "state": "CO", "description": "On Oct. 6–7, 2026, the Colorado Department of State and the Colorado County Clerks Association disclosed that Ballot Issue 7A — a 0.333% sales-tax measure for the Front Range Passenger Rail District (FRPRD / \"CoCo\") — was printed on roughly 800,000 ballots sent to voters outside the district in Adams, Arapahoe, Douglas, and Weld counties. Officials say the rail district did not adequately communicate 2026 statutory boundary changes to county clerks before ballots were mailed. Joint SOS/clerks guidance tells voters to return the ballots they received; all other contests count normally, but only eligible in-district voters' Issue 7A votes will be tabulated. On Oct. 8, Elections Director Judd Choate instructed the four counties to reprogram Liberty Vote or Clear Ballot systems to count 7A only for eligible voters, with supplemental testing to follow; Bow Mar (Arapahoe) and Sterling Ranch (Douglas) precinct splits require hand review / ballot duplication for ineligible styles. Ballot processing begins Oct. 19; no 7A votes had been tallied at disclosure. Arapahoe Clerk Joan Lopez estimated about 262,000 wrongly included voters in that county alone; Adams Clerk Josh Zygielbaum said the county was not notified of the boundary change before mailing; FRPRD GM Sal Pace acknowledged the district should have communicated more effectively. Oct. 19 update (Colorado Sun): county figures put the number of out-of-district voters who received 7A at about 835,000, not the rounded 800,000: about 282,800 in Douglas, 274,000 in Adams, 262,000 in Arapahoe and 16,217 in Weld. In Arapahoe, precincts entirely outside the district will be left out of 7A results; about 225 voters in four split precincts were sent replacement ballots, and ballots from 10 other split precincts will be sorted so only eligible 7A votes count. Arapahoe elections director Bill Mast said the rail district never notified the county of the new boundary and its website map still showed the old lines. The Sun puts the reverse omission in Columbine Valley, where in-district voters received ballots without 7A, at about 318 voters. The rail district hired former Jefferson County Clerk Pam Anderson as an election adviser, and counties could begin counting on Oct. 19. Status Confirmed for the wrong ballot-style distribution and official remediation pathway (SOS press release + multi-outlet reporting); intentional fraud is not alleged by officials. Catalog framing: a confirmed wrong-style mailing of this scale anywhere makes the \"it was a mistake\" defense more credible for similar ballot-style failures elsewhere — which is why transparent, hand-checkable paper remains the durable control, not an argument against hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Secretary of State — Press release: Ballot Issue 7A on more ballots than intended (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2026/PR20261007BallotIssue7a.html"}, {"title": "The Colorado Sun — Counties told to reconfigure voting systems for passenger-rail ballot (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://coloradosun.com/2026/10/08/colorado-counties-reconfigure-voting-systems-passenger-rail-ballot/"}, {"title": "Colorado Public Radio — About 800,000 ballots incorrectly include Issue 7A (Oct. 7, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-09, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2026/10/07/front-range-passenger-rail-incorrect-ballots/"}, {"title": "Denver Gazette — Passenger-rail ballot issue on more ballots than it should be (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.denvergazette.com/2026/10/07/ballot-issue-for-passenger-rail-on-more-ballots-than-it-should-be/"}, {"title": "KUNC — 800,000 Colorado voters received a passenger-rail question they cannot vote on (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kunc.org/politics/2026-10-08/800-000-colorado-voters-received-a-passenger-rail-ballot-question-they-cannot-vote-on"}, {"title": "The Colorado Sun — Colorado counties figure out how to fix train ballot question error (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://coloradosun.com/2026/10/19/colorado-counties-figure-out-how-to-fix-train-ballot-question-error/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — CO Ballot Issue 7A wrong style outside district (ei-2026-10-011)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-20 AM EDS/EMon ingest: Colorado Sun Oct. 19 county breakdown (~835,000), Arapahoe split-precinct remedy (225 replacement ballots), Columbine Valley ~318, Pam Anderson adviser; text-verified, curl 200. Stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-011 (first_seen 2026-10-07, last_updated 2026-10-08; EMon status emerging, severity high). Confirmed wrong-style mailing + SOS/clerks remediation; intent not alleged. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes leaf (peers: Shelby TN ei-2026-09-013, Montgomery PA 2020, Carter TN 2024, Will IL 2024). Cross-leaf note only (not a second card): Tabulation > Logic and accuracy testing / Induce error — counties reprogramming Liberty Vote/Clear Ballot and hand-reviewing Bow Mar / Sterling Ranch splits. X trending headline not used as a primary source. CPR URL kept despite 403 bot-block. Watch Oct. 19 processing start, any canvass challenges, FRPRD/SOS after-action.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Clear Ballot"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Liberty Vote (2025 successor name)"]}
{"id": "in-hendricks-2026-150-ballots-wrong-county-council-district-recast", "permanent_id": "C20261014-181051-01", "uid": "C20261014-181051-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-181051-01", "old_ids": ["in-hendricks-2026-150-ballots-wrong-county-council-district-recast"], "seq": "C01389", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-06 to 2026-10-14", "state": "IN", "description": "About 150 Hendricks County, Indiana voters in five precincts received 2026 general-election ballots that carried the wrong County Council district race, and those votes must be recast in order to count, Circuit Court Clerk Marjorie Pike told The Indiana Citizen on Oct. 14, 2026. Pike attributed the problem to a mapping mistake that mislabeled five precincts and placed them in the wrong County Council districts. Most of the affected ballots showed the uncontested District 2 race instead of the contested District 1 race between incumbent David Cox (R) and Cindy Simmons (D). A voter spotted the error on Oct. 6, the first day of early in-person voting, and Pike said it was fixed immediately. The faulty ballots went to both mail voters and early in-person voters. Affected voters have been notified by phone and email and are being mailed a letter and a form to cast a replacement ballot; some have already recast in person or returned the form. The county Democratic chair said she was not concerned about an effect on the outcome; the county Republican chair did not return a call. Status Confirmed for the clerk's own on-record acknowledgment (single outlet quoting her directly). Intent is not alleged. Mark framing: this is Indiana's fourth ballot-style or programming \"mistake\" this cycle, after Knox (ei-2026-10-005), Floyd (ei-2026-10-018) and La Porte (ei-2026-10-025). A bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit, because each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere, and here a contested race was quietly swapped for an uncontested one on about 150 ballots. Precinct-specific, hand-marked paper ballots proofed in public against the district map, and counted by hand, make a wrong-district race visible to everyone before voting starts.", "sources": [{"title": "The Indiana Citizen — Redo required: error on more than 100 ballots forcing some Hendricks County residents to revote (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://indianacitizen.org/redo-required-error-on-more-than-100-ballots-forcing-some-hendricks-county-residents-to-revote/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hendricks IN wrong council district ballots (ei-2026-10-034)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-034 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error yes). EMon flagged it to CTE as a mail-ballot handling issue (replacement ballots for mail voters). Single outlet quoting the clerk. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peer Floyd IN ei-2026-10-018). Cross-leaf: Tabulation > Induce error (Knox ei-2026-10-005, La Porte ei-2026-10-025); Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (replacement-ballot handling). Watch replacement-ballot uptake and how un-recast District 1 votes are handled."}
{"id": "floyd-in-2026-572-commissioners-race-omitted-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-04", "uid": "C20261012-123213-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-04", "old_ids": ["floyd-in-2026-572-commissioners-race-omitted-ballots"], "seq": "C01291", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-06 to 2026-10-10", "state": "IN", "description": "On Oct. 9, 2026, the Floyd County, Indiana Election Board held an emergency meeting after a ballot-programming error left the County Commissioners District 1 race (Republican incumbent Al Knable vs. Democrat Ellen Morrison Kelley) off the ballot styles used in Franklin, Greenville, Georgetown and Lafayette precincts. Officials identified 572 voters who cast early in-person ballots Oct. 6–8 or received affected absentee ballots. The board apologized, corrected the machine ballot styles and resumed early voting Friday with the fixed styles. Affected voters will get a written explanation and an ABS-5 (defective/lost/spoiled absentee) form, and the chance to cast a corrected ballot that includes the missing race. The cause is under review; bipartisan proofing normally happens before early voting. Status Confirmed for the omitted race, the 572 affected voters and the remediation, per the board's own acknowledgment and reporting by Louisville Public Media/WFYI, News and Tribune and WDRB/WAVE. Intentional manipulation is not alleged. Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Each confirmed \"programming mistake\" like this one makes the \"it was a mistake\" defense more credible for the next wrong-style ballot anywhere, and a race dropped from a style disenfranchises voters on that contest whether or not anyone intended it. The durable control is precinct hand-marked paper ballots that are proofed and checked in public and counted by hand, where a missing race is visible to everyone. Second Indiana ballot-programming error this cycle after Knox County (ei-2026-10-005); La Porte County followed (ei-2026-10-025). Update (Nov. 9, 2026): unofficial results show Republican incumbent Al Knable ahead of Democrat Ellen Morrison Kelley by 152 votes of 27,816 cast, fewer than the roughly 570 ballots that left the race off; about 150 affected voters came back to vote in the omitted race and about 420 did not. Kelley said she will request a recount and is weighing court remedies, possibly a special election, and that the recast ballots are being kept separate (WDRB/WAVE, Nov. 6).", "sources": [{"title": "Louisville Public Media — Nearly 600 Floyd County, Ind. voters receive incorrect ballots (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.lpm.org/news/2026-10-09/nearly-600-floyd-county-ind-voters-receive-incorrect-ballots"}, {"title": "WFYI — Nearly 600 Floyd County, Ind. voters receive incorrect ballots (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wfyi.org/statewide/2026-10-10/nearly-600-floyd-county-ind-voters-receive-incorrect-ballots"}, {"title": "News and Tribune — Floyd County commissioner race left off ballot for at least 572 early voters (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.newsandtribune.com/news/floyd-county-commissioner-race-left-off-ballot-for-at-least-572-early-voters/article_1a565062-39e1-4b7d-9740-49d81556aa08.html"}, {"title": "WDRB/WAVE — Voting error leaves Floyd County commissioner race off hundreds of early ballots (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wdrbwave.com/2026/10/09/voting-error-leaves-floyd-county-commissioner-race-off-hundreds-early-ballots-candidates-say/"}, {"title": "WDRB/WAVE — Floyd County commissioner race heads toward recount, legal challenge (Nov. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wdrbwave.com/2026/11/06/floyd-county-commissioner-race-heads-toward-recount-legal-challenge-following-early-voting-ballot-error/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Floyd IN missing commissioner race (ei-2026-10-018)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-018 (first_seen 2026-10-09, last_updated 2026-10-10; EMon status emerging, confidence high). Confirmed board acknowledgment + 4 outlets; cause and vendor not yet named. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles leaf (peer Shelby TN missing races ei-2026-09-013). Cross-leaf: Tabulation > Induce error (Knox IN peer ei-2026-10-005); Textual 'Mistakes' (names missing). Watch ABS-5 uptake and any named cause. Refreshed 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET (2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon updates; zero X API."}
{"id": "me-oxford-2026-printer-packaging-error-wrong-style-ballots-hd80", "permanent_id": "C20261014-181051-02", "uid": "C20261014-181051-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-181051-02", "old_ids": ["me-oxford-2026-printer-packaging-error-wrong-style-ballots-hd80"], "seq": "C01390", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-06 to 2026-10-07", "state": "ME", "description": "The Maine Secretary of State's Office confirmed to WMTW on Oct. 7, 2026 that a small number of incorrect ballots were distributed to voters in the town of Oxford (Oxford County) after a resident told the town clerk on Oct. 6 that they had received the wrong ballot style. State officials said the clerk determined that, due to a packaging error at the printer, \"a small number of incorrect ballots were received and sent out.\" Secretary of State Shenna Bellows said she believed nine wrong ballots went out; town officials put the number at ten, had reached three voters with correct ballots, and were working to reach the other seven. The affected voters should have received ballots for Maine House District 80 (Ernest Fitts (R) vs. Azalea Cormier (unenrolled)). The state said every voter will be able to vote the correct ballot; if a voter returns the wrong ballot and does not tell the clerk before 8 p.m. on Election Day, only the statewide-race votes on it will count. Status Confirmed for the state's and the clerk's own statements (single outlet). The scale is small and intent is not alleged. Catalog point: the error entered at the printer, outside the clerk's office, and was caught only because a voter noticed. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere, and a voter who does not notice loses the House District 80 vote. Hand-marked paper ballots checked in public at the precinct, and counted by hand, keep style errors visible and correctable.", "sources": [{"title": "WMTW 8 — Ballots missing candidate name distributed in Oxford, Maine; state cites printer packaging error (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wmtw.com/article/ballots-missing-candidate-name-distributed-oxford-maine/74064857"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Oxford ME wrong ballot style, HD-80 (ei-2026-10-035)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-035 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status active, severity low, confidence high; official_error yes). EMon flagged it to CTE as a wrong-ballot handling issue. Single outlet quoting the SOS office and town officials. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers Floyd IN ei-2026-10-018, Hendricks IN ei-2026-10-034). Cross-leaf: Ballots > printing vendor errors. Watch whether all ten voters are reached before Election Day.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots"]}
{"id": "tx-bexar-2026-elections-website-outage-registration-deadline-vendor", "permanent_id": "C20261014-120744-03", "uid": "C20261014-120744-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-120744-03", "old_ids": ["tx-bexar-2026-elections-website-outage-registration-deadline-vendor"], "seq": "C01380", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-05", "state": "TX", "description": "The Bexar County, Texas Elections Department website went down on Oct. 5, 2026, the last day to register to vote for the Nov. 3 general election. In an email to KSAT, the department said the site was down for less than two hours and that \"our vendor has successfully resolved the outage.\" The department did not state a cause or say whether any registration-related services were affected. KSAT noted that the last day to apply for a ballot by mail is Oct. 23 and that early voting runs Oct. 19 to 30. Status Confirmed for the outage and the vendor fix, based on the department's own statement (single outlet). No effect on registrations has been reported, and the official cause is unknown. Catalog point: this is a small incident, but it is the same pattern as the Oklahoma deadline-day portal failure (ei-2026-10-022): a public election service that depends on an outside vendor goes down on a deadline, and the explanation stops at \"the vendor fixed it.\" Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere, which is why counties should publish the root cause and keep in-person options open.", "sources": [{"title": "KSAT 12 San Antonio — Bexar County voter registration site goes down on deadline day; department says vendor resolved it (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/05/bexar-county-voter-registration-site-goes-down-on-deadline-day/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bexar TX elections site outage on registration deadline (ei-2026-10-031)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-031 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-13; EMon status resolved, severity low, confidence high; official_error unknown). Single source quoting the department's email. Low impact; carded as a vendor-dependency outage on deadline day. Mapped to Registration; Voter Rolls (peer: Oklahoma portal ei-2026-10-022). Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > outsourcing responsibility to entities that fail to maintain them. Separate from the TX DPS backlog (ei-2026-09-001) and TEAM failures (ei-2026-10-023). Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls to entities that fa...'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Voter Rolls > Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls to entities that fail to maintain them properly (through incompetence or maliciousnes...' to the new leaf 'Registration > Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations.'."}
{"id": "la-2026-sos-human-error-67000-voters-marked-inactive-restored", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-10", "uid": "C20261012-123213-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-10", "old_ids": ["la-2026-sos-human-error-67000-voters-marked-inactive-restored"], "seq": "C01297", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-05 to 2026-10-11", "state": "LA", "description": "During routine elections-database maintenance on the night of Monday, Oct. 5, 2026, Louisiana Secretary of State staff accidentally switched about 67,000 voters statewide to inactive status. Deputy Secretary for Communications Trey Williams called it \"human error,\" said staff identified it immediately, and said additional internal safeguards were added. Inactive status does not cancel a registration or eligibility under Louisiana law, but it can require address confirmation at the polls. The Louisiana Illuminator (Oct. 7) reported restoration underway after parish registrars received voter complaints (e.g., East Baton Rouge), and KSLA (Oct. 8) carried the state's statement. The Center Square (Oct. 11) reported the office restored all affected voters the same day; SOS could not provide parish-by-parish counts. The League of Women Voters of Tangipahoa still urged voters to check their status at GeauxVote.com before Nov. 3. Status Confirmed for the SOS-admitted human error and restoration (three outlets with on-record SOS statements). Intent is not alleged, and the office has not published which records were affected or how the error was made. Mark framing: one keystroke in a central database silently changed the status of 67,000 voters. A bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Once a confirmed \"human error\" at this scale is on record anywhere, every later unexplained status change everywhere can be waved off the same way. The durable control is locally kept rolls with change-tracking that voters and observers can check, plus precinct paper pollbooks.", "sources": [{"title": "Louisiana Illuminator — Human error switched about 67,000 Louisiana voters to inactive status (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://lailluminator.com/2026/10/07/louisiana-voters-inactive/"}, {"title": "KSLA — Louisiana officials say human error switched 67,000 voters to inactive status (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksla.com/2026/10/08/louisiana-officials-say-human-error-switched-67000-voters-inactive-status/"}, {"title": "The Center Square — Louisiana SOS restored all ~67,000 voters to active status (Oct. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.thecentersquare.com/louisiana/article_19711226-aeb5-4b0a-8be8-7f81d813fdfa.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — LA 67k inactive status glitch (ei-2026-10-024)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-024 (first_seen 2026-10-07, last_updated 2026-10-11; EMon status resolved, confidence high). Confirmed SOS human error + same-day restoration; no parish counts. Mapped to Registration > 'records changed to inactive without the voter knowing' (exact peer pathKey: Husted v. APRI, DeKalb GA 2024 38k inactive). Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > No change-tracking; Adjustments to voter rolls made in real-time. Related registration-system failures: OK portal (ei-2026-10-022), TX TEAM (ei-2026-10-023)."}
{"id": "tx-2026-team-civix-registrations-stuck-pending-gregg-346", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-09", "uid": "C20261012-123213-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-09", "old_ids": ["tx-2026-team-civix-registrations-stuck-pending-gregg-346"], "seq": "C01296", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Outsourcing voter-roll maintenance to entities that fail to maintain the rolls properly (through incompetence or malice), which also lets a fourth party manipulate the rolls indirectly"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-05 to 2026-10-10", "state": "TX", "description": "Separate from the September 2026 Texas DPS portal backlog (ei-2026-09-001), county election officials report ongoing failures in the statewide Texas Election Administration Management (TEAM) voter-registration system run by vendor Civix. Votebeat/Texas Tribune (Oct. 5) documented counties unable to clear DPS backlog records or handle day-to-day registration because TEAM throws \"an error occurred.\" Eligibility verification can stay stuck for weeks (up to about 60 days), and mail-ballot batch updates often must be done one at a time. The Texas Association of County Election Officials blamed \"fundamental system architecture failures\" by Civix and urged the state to withhold further payments until reliability improves. Secretary of State spokeswoman Alicia Pierce said the agency trains counties continuously and that \"additional features addressing county concerns will be rolled out soon,\" citing seven successful elections since the July 2025 rollout. The Longview News-Journal (Oct. 10) reported that Gregg County Elections Administrator Jennifer Briggs has 346 applications stuck \"pending\" in TEAM, about 250 of them older than a week. Briggs said the problem is separate from the DPS dump and that address reverts, duplicates and wrong precincts are occurring statewide. She is preparing poll workers for more provisional ballots at the Oct. 19 start of early voting because pending voters may not appear in pollbooks. Status Confirmed for the documented TEAM failures and pending counts (Votebeat, Texas Tribune, Longview News-Journal; county association and SOS on record). Catalog point: the state's voter roll now runs on a vendor platform that county officials themselves call architecturally broken. Address reverts, duplicates and wrong precincts produced by an outsourced system are \"mistakes\" no one is accountable for, and each one is a record that can be used or excused. Locally controlled rolls with change-tracking and public audit are the remedy.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Texas counties say TEAM voter-registration system errors hinder backlog work (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/10/05/voter-registration-system-team-secretary-of-state/"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Texas voter registration backlog and county frustration with TEAM (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2026/10/05/texas-voter-registration-backlog-county-frustration/"}, {"title": "Longview News-Journal — State errors cause voter registration delays for hundreds of Gregg County residents (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://news-journal.com/2026/10/10/state-errors-cause-voter-registration-delays-for-hundreds-of-gregg-county-residents/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — TX TEAM/Civix pending registrations (ei-2026-10-023)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-023 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-11; EMon status active, severity high, confidence high). Confirmed; distinct mechanism from ei-2026-09-001 DPS transmission backlog (county-processing vendor software). Mapped to Voter Rolls > Outsourcing the responsibility of maintaining voter rolls (peers: ERIC outsourcing, FL Auditor 2021-096). Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls; No change-tracking / No data consistency. Watch SOS/Civix fixes and pending counts into Oct. 19 early voting.", "vendor": ["Civix"]}
{"id": "ga-athens-clarke-2026-1154-duplicate-absentee-mailing-list-error", "permanent_id": "C20261009-181012-02", "uid": "C20261009-181012-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-181012-02", "old_ids": ["ga-athens-clarke-2026-1154-duplicate-absentee-mailing-list-error"], "seq": "C01287", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-05 to 2026-10-09", "state": "GA", "description": "Athens-Clarke County Elections Department announced Oct. 8, 2026 that a mailing-list error caused a state-authorized print vendor to mail a second absentee ballot to 1,154 voters who had requested one for the Nov. 3 general election. First ballots went out Oct. 5; the department learned of the duplicates Oct. 7 after voter alerts, then found the list sent to the printer had re-included addresses from an earlier list. Officials say Georgia's statewide system ties ballots to individual voters and is designed to prevent more than one ballot from being cast; staff will review returned absentees and are sending expedited notices telling affected voters to complete/return only one and shred or return the blank extra in person. Director Pam Long said the issue was identified, affected ballots are tracked, and procedures ensure only one ballot is accepted per voter. The Secretary of State's office was informed and indicated acceptance of the county response. Status Confirmed for the admitted mailing-list error and second ballots sent (ACCGov news flash + CBS Atlanta / WSB-TV); intentional fraud is not alleged. Officials' claim that the statewide system will catch duplicates is noted as the counter-view — the same framing as the Oct. 2025 Pennsylvania SURE duplicate-mail incident (pa-2025-sure-duplicate-mail-ballots-68-voters-cancelled), where barcode cancel prevented a double count after the system itself generated extras. Catalog framing: a confirmed duplicate-mail error anywhere strengthens the \"it was a mistake\" defense everywhere; the durable control is precinct hand-marked paper with tight chain of custody, not vendor mailing lists.", "sources": [{"title": "Athens-Clarke County (ACCGov) — News flash: mailing-list error / second absentee to 1,154 voters (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.accgov.com/m/newsflash/Home/Detail/7036"}, {"title": "CBS News Atlanta — Over 1,100 Georgia voters receive duplicate absentee ballots (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/atlanta/news/over-1100-georgia-voters-receive-duplicate-absentee-ballots-for-midterm-election-officials-say/"}, {"title": "WSB-TV — More than 1,000 Georgia voters receive second mail-in ballot (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/clarke-county/more-than-1000-georgia-voters-receive-second-mail-in-ballot/BP54F3FSJRDN5IJ4Q4YZKPCBOM/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Athens-Clarke GA 1,154 duplicate absentee mailing-list error (ei-2026-10-014)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-014 (first_seen 2026-10-08, last_updated 2026-10-09; EMon status emerging, confidence high, severity medium). Confirmed county + SOS acknowledgment of mailing-list / print-vendor duplicate send; intent not alleged; officials assert statewide system catches cast duplicates (counter-view). Peer leaf/pathKey: pa-2025-sure-duplicate-mail-ballots-68-voters-cancelled (provisional/absentee-overlap leaf). X posts cited by EMon not fetched (zero X API). Watch whether any duplicate returns are detected and SOS follow-up before Nov. 3."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-003", "permanent_id": "C20261002-121613-03", "uid": "C20261002-121613-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-121613-03", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-003"], "seq": "C01274", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-02", "state": "Federal / US", "description": "On Oct. 2, 2026, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced (video posted as SecWar) that commanders and supervisors at every level are to schedule a one-day stand-down during October—no later than Oct. 15—so service members can register, request absentee ballots (including FPCA processing), or vote in person for the Nov. 3 midterms, with the practice continuing in election years. USA Today reports the directive is backed by a memo dated Oct. 1 authorizing a one-day stand-down every October in an election year; Stars and Stripes, The Hill, and The Washington Post corroborate the stand-down announcement and logistics framing. Hegseth stated commanders are not telling troops who to vote for. Status Confirmed for the announced stand-down directive on multi-major-outlet corroboration (USA Today citing an Oct. 1 memo; Stars and Stripes; The Hill; Washington Post) plus the SecWar video; the memo PDF itself is not yet linked in the EMon source set. Stick to stand-down directive facts; skip partisan motive framing from some outlet headlines. Maps to UOCAVA root (same parent as ei-2026-10-002 FPCA suit). Distinct from ei-002 and from intimidation/security tracks about troops at polls.", "sources": [{"title": "USA Today — Hegseth says US troops will get a day off to vote; cites Oct. 1 memo", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2026/10/02/hegseth-troops-day-off-to-vote/92057241007/"}, {"title": "Stars and Stripes — Hegseth orders 1-day stand-down for troops to vote", "url": "https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2026-10-02/hegseth-one-day-stand-down-voting-23036055.html"}, {"title": "The Hill — Hegseth issues stand-down order for US troops to vote in 2026 midterm", "url": "https://thehill.com/policy/defense/6126137-pete-hegseth-stand-down-order-troops-vote/"}, {"title": "Washington Post — Hegseth announces one-day stand-down to allow troops to vote", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/10/02/hegseth-announces-one-day-stand-down-allow-troops-vote/"}, {"title": "SecWar video — military voting stand-down announcement", "url": "https://x.com/SecWar/status/2106012189048057872"}, {"title": "The Daily Beast — Hegseth announces Pentagon one-day voting stand-down by Oct. 15", "url": "https://www.thedailybeast.com/pentagon-pete-unveils-desperate-plot-to-save-trumps-skin/"}, {"title": "Democrata (EN) — Pentagon sets a day without activity to facilitate military voting", "url": "https://www.democrata.es/en/international/the-pentagon-sets-a-day-without-activity-to-facilitate-the-voting-of-military-personnel-in-the-elections/amp/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DoD military voting stand-down (ei-2026-10-003)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-003 refresh 2026-10-02 PM: bumped Partially confirmed→Confirmed after USA Today/Stars and Stripes/The Hill/WaPo + SecWar video; USA Today cites Oct. 1 memo (PDF not yet linked). Maps to UOCAVA root alongside ei-002. Skipped X trending as primary; skipped partisan Daily Beast headline framing. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'UOCAVA' to 'Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) > This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at...'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-004", "permanent_id": "C20261005-121257-01", "uid": "C20261005-121257-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-121257-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-004"], "seq": "C01275", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Suspend early voting at a site, citing an undisclosed technical problem."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-02", "state": "IL", "description": "On Oct. 2, 2026, the Champaign County, Illinois Clerk and Recorder's office (Clerk Aaron Ammons) suspended early in-person voting at the Bennett Administrative Center in Urbana, then the county's only open early-voting site, after a technical issue affecting voting was discovered the evening of Oct. 1. Chief of Staff Angie Patton confirmed the pause to local media and the clerk's office said voting would resume at 8:30 a.m. Monday, Oct. 5. Early voting at Bennett began Sept. 24; the county plans to expand to 11 sites Oct. 19 ahead of the Nov. 3 midterms. Officials have not publicly detailed the nature of the technical problem or how many voters were affected. Status Confirmed for the one-day early-voting suspension on multi-outlet local corroboration (News-Gazette, WAND, IPM Newsroom, SJO Daily) and the clerk's office statements; root cause undisclosed and no intentional interference alleged. Peer to ei-2026-09-016 (DuPage opening-day pause); also relevant to Electronic Poll Books / Electronic Voting Machines leaves once the root cause is disclosed.", "sources": [{"title": "The News-Gazette — Early voting at Urbana's Bennett Center suspended Friday due to technical issue", "url": "https://www.news-gazette.com/election/2026/early-voting-at-urbanas-bennett-center-suspended-friday-due-to-technical-issue/article_1de3f745-791f-42a7-b7a8-b79aa865e7ed.html"}, {"title": "WAND — Early voting suspended Friday in Urbana", "url": "https://www.wandtv.com/2026/10/02/early-voting-suspended-friday-urbana/"}, {"title": "IPM Newsroom — Early voting suspended in Champaign County on Friday", "url": "https://ipmnewsroom.org/early-voting-suspended-in-champaign-county-on-friday/"}, {"title": "SJO Daily — Bennett Center early voting suspended after technical issue, to resume Oct. 5", "url": "https://sjodaily.com/2026/10/02/early-voting-at-bennett-center-suspended-friday-after-technical-issue-to-resume-oct-5/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Champaign IL early-voting tech pause (ei-2026-10-004)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-004 (first_seen 2026-10-02, last_updated 2026-10-03). Confirmed suspension; root cause undisclosed. Mapped to Early Voting; Election 'Day' (peer ei-2026-09-015). Distinct from ei-2026-09-016 DuPage. Watch Oct 5 reopen + any root-cause disclosure. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Early Voting; Election 'Day'' to 'Early Voting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Early Voting' to the new leaf 'Early Voting > Suspend early voting at a site, citing an undisclosed technical problem.'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-005", "permanent_id": "C20261005-121257-02", "uid": "C20261005-121257-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-121257-02", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-005"], "seq": "C01276", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-02", "state": "IN", "description": "On Oct. 2, 2026, Knox County, Indiana Clerk David Shelton announced voting machines must be reprogrammed a third time before early voting starts Oct. 6 because the Vincennes Community School Corporation at-large board race told voters to \"vote for three\" when three candidates are running for two seats. The error affects all eight Vincennes city precincts and Vincennes Township precincts 1–4. About 60 already-mailed absentee ballots were wrong; those voters get a letter and ABS-5 replacement form (Shelton estimated $300–600 cost). If an unreissued ballot comes back with two or fewer school-board marks it counts as cast; if all three candidates are marked, the bipartisan Election Board remakes the ballot without that race. Corrected ballots issued from Oct. 2; a public hearing was required Oct. 5 at the Knox County Courthouse. An earlier reprogramming followed a township trustee candidate's withdrawal. Shelton publicly accepted responsibility for the proofing breakdown. Status Confirmed for the ballot-definition/programming error and remediation as reported by WVUT, WWBL, and the Vincennes Sun-Commercial; officials describe it as a proofing mistake and intentional manipulation is not alleged. Listed here as a documented ballot-programming error instance; pattern sibling to ei-2026-09-013 (Shelby County TN missing races). Errors like this are caught and corrected in plain view when ballots are proofed and hand-checkable.", "sources": [{"title": "WVUT-TV — Knox County correcting ballot error before early voting", "url": "https://www.wvut.org/2026/10/02/knox-county-correcting-ballot-error-before-early-voting/"}, {"title": "WWBL / The Bullet — Knox County ballot error forces third re-programming", "url": "https://www.wwbl.com/2026/10/02/knox-county-ballot-error-forces-third-re-programming/"}, {"title": "Vincennes Sun-Commercial — Knox County ballot error, affected precincts and hearing", "url": "https://www.suncommercial.com/news/article_2855a0b0-e820-5428-b018-e7346b75c422.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Knox IN ballot reprogram (ei-2026-10-005)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-005 (first_seen 2026-10-02, last_updated 2026-10-03). Confirmed programming/proofing error; intent not alleged. Mapped to Tabulation > Induce error leaf (peer Antrim programming-error card); cross-leaf Ballots > wrong ballot styles (ei-2026-09-013). Watch Oct 5 hearing / Oct 6 EV start."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-002", "permanent_id": "C20261002-121613-02", "uid": "C20261002-121613-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-121613-02", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-002"], "seq": "C01273", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-01", "state": "Federal / US", "description": "On Oct. 1, 2026, the Democratic National Committee sued the Department of Defense (Pentagon/FVAP) and OMB in the U.S. District Court for D.C., alleging Administrative Procedure Act violations when DOD used emergency PRA clearance in August 2026 to revise the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) and related UOCAVA forms. The emergency change removed the checkbox for U.S. citizens living abroad who have never lived in the United States—leaving only \"intend to return\" and \"intent to return uncertain\" options for civilian overseas applicants—potentially confusing eligible never-resident voters in the ~38 states and D.C. that allow some never-resident overseas voting. OMB approved the emergency ICR (OMB 0704-0503) on Aug. 28 after a two-day review, bypassing ordinary notice-and-comment. DOD's emergency justification cited voter confusion and approaching midterm ballot-transmission deadlines; plaintiffs call that pretextual. Suit asks the court to set aside the form changes. Status Confirmed for the emergency FPCA revision and the DNC filing as reported by The Guardian, The Washington Post, Bloomberg Law, and the DNC complaint PDF. The APA \"pretextual\" claim is described as plaintiffs' allegation, not litigated here as a cabal motive. Peer to UOCAVA root leaf (uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa). Cross-leaf Lawfare OK in notes. Distinct from ei-2026-10-003 (military voting stand-down).", "sources": [{"title": "The Guardian — DNC lawsuit over Pentagon changes to overseas voter forms", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/01/dnc-lawsuit-trump-changes-overseas-voter-citizens"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Pentagon used emergency measure to change voter forms for Americans abroad", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/01/pentagon-used-emergency-measure-change-voter-forms-americans-abroad/"}, {"title": "Bloomberg Law — DNC challenges Defense Department's overseas voter rules change", "url": "https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/dnc-challenges-defense-departments-overseas-voter-rules-change"}, {"title": "DNC complaint PDF — DNC v. DOD (FPCA / D.D.C.)", "url": "https://democrats.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/DNC-v-DOD-FPCA.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DNC FPCA overseas form suit (ei-2026-10-002)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-002 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-01). Confirmed for emergency FPCA revision + DNC filing. Maps to UOCAVA root (peer uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa). Cross-leaf: Lawfare. Distinct from ei-003 military stand-down. Skipped X trending as primary. 2026-10-09: moved from UOCAVA root to the new master leaf UOCAVA > never-lived-in-U.S. (exact fit; peer fvap-2026-08-emergency-fpca-fwab-never-lived-checkbox-removed)."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-007", "permanent_id": "C20261005-121257-04", "uid": "C20261005-121257-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-121257-04", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-007"], "seq": "C01278", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County, Arizona Recorder Justin Heap said ballot vendor Runbeck Election Services informed his office on Oct. 2, 2026 that it had mistakenly delivered 3,126 vote-by-mail packets to the USPS Business Mail Entry Unit on Oct. 1, six days before the county's scheduled Oct. 7 general-election mailing. The recorder's office says it did not authorize the early release and learned of it afterward. Runbeck's Oct. 4 statement says the packets were non-automation mail staged separately at its facility and a skid containing them was included with mail released that evening; it says the packets were valid, produced from the first authorized voter-request file, addressed to the requesting voters, and that it has added verification steps for staged mail. After consulting the County Attorney's Office, Heap said the ballots remain valid and will not be voided or reissued; any returned before early voting begins will be kept sealed in secure storage until processing starts. The recorder's office posted Runbeck's statement on X after saying the vendor declined to post it publicly. Separately, Secretary of State Adrian Fontes disputed a Heap warning about postal delays, saying USPS assured his office the Phoenix processing center is fully operational. Status Confirmed for the unauthorized early vendor release, as stated by both the recorder's office and Runbeck's own statement (AZFamily, KTAR, Runbeck PDF, Queen Creek City, @RecordersOffice). No misdelivery or altered ballots alleged; this is a vendor chain-of-custody/timing control failure. Cross-leaf Tabulation > No supply-chain control or controllable chain of custody.", "sources": [{"title": "AZFamily — Maricopa County Recorder says thousands of early mail-in ballots were sent ahead of schedule", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/05/maricopa-county-recorder-says-thousands-early-mail-in-ballots-were-sent-ahead-schedule/"}, {"title": "KTAR News — Runbeck mailed Maricopa County ballots early; ballots remain valid", "url": "https://ktar.com/arizona-politics-news/election/mail-ballots-early-maricopa-county-runbeck"}, {"title": "Runbeck Election Services statement on VBM packets, Oct. 4, 2026 (PDF via KTAR)", "url": "https://ktar.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/RES-Statement_VBM-packets-Maricopa-County_10.4.26.2.pdf"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Recorder's Office (X) — Statement on Runbeck early ballot pre-mailing", "url": "https://x.com/RecordersOffice/status/2106857113452691863"}, {"title": "Queen Creek City — Maricopa County says 3,126 early ballots went out ahead of schedule", "url": "https://queencreek.city/article/maricopa-county-says-3-126-early-ballots-went-out-ahead-of-schedule"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa Runbeck early mailing (ei-2026-10-007)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-007 (first_seen 2026-10-04, last_updated 2026-10-05). Confirmed by recorder + vendor statement. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities leaf; cross-leaf Tabulation > No supply-chain control. X posts are official @RecordersOffice (used as primary statement, not trending). Watch county contract action, Heap/Fontes USPS dispute.", "vendor": ["Runbeck"]}
{"id": "us-2026-10-01-federal-noncitizen-voting-ban-18usc611-ruled-unconstitutional-as-applied-cox-tejeda-murillo", "permanent_id": "C20261119-121405-01", "uid": "C20261119-121405-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261119-121405-01", "old_ids": ["us-2026-10-01-federal-noncitizen-voting-ban-18usc611-ruled-unconstitutional-as-applied-cox-tejeda-murillo"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10-01 (Cox ruling, S.D. Fla.); 2026-11-06 (Tejeda Murillo ruling, W.D. Wis.); 2026-11-18 (CRS analysis)", "state": "FL, WI", "description": "Two federal court rulings have dismissed charges brought under 18 U.S.C. 611, the 1996 federal law that makes it a misdemeanor for a non-citizen to vote in a federal election. On Oct. 1, 2026, U.S. District Judge David S. Leibowitz of the Southern District of Florida dismissed the charge against Chelsea Michelle Ann Cox, whom the government accused of voting in Broward County in 2020 knowing she was not a citizen, holding that \"the text, structure, and original public meaning of the Constitution show that Congress does not have the constitutional power to enact this statute,\" because the Constitution leaves voter qualifications to the states (United States v. Cox, No. 0:25-cr-60249). On Nov. 6, a magistrate judge in the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the Section 611 charge against Allan Savier Tejeda Murillo on the same reasoning, ruling for him on his as-applied challenge but not his facial one, and noting that he may still face prosecution under Wisconsin law, which makes voting by a non-citizen a state felony (No. 26-mj-4). A Congressional Research Service Legal Sidebar published Nov. 18 reports that the government has appealed the Cox ruling to the Eleventh Circuit and the Wisconsin dismissals (it says two cases) to a district judge, and that a judge in the Northern District of Texas rejected the Cox reasoning in another case. The rulings apply only to the defendants in those cases; they do not make non-citizen voting legal, since every state bars non-citizens from voting in federal elections and states can prosecute under their own laws. The Washington Post reported on Nov. 19 that the Justice Department charged 197 non-citizens with voting fraud in the weeks before the midterms, so the outcome of the appeals could affect federal prosecutions. The dismissals do not decide whether either defendant voted; they rest only on whether the federal law is valid, and the accusations were never tried. Status Confirmed: both dismissal orders are published court records, and the Congressional Research Service reports the appeals. The rulings are under appeal and bind only those cases; a Northern District of Texas judge reached the opposite conclusion. Catalog point: two federal judges have held that Congress has no power to bar non-citizens from voting in federal elections, so the main federal criminal backstop against non-citizen voting now depends on the outcome of appeals, and enforcement falls back on state laws and state prosecutors.", "sources": [{"title": "Congressional Research Service Legal Sidebar LSB11500 (via EveryCRSReport) — 18 U.S.C. 611 rulings (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/LSB11500.html"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, S.D. Florida (United States v. Cox, ECF No. 64, via CourtListener) — 18 U.S.C. 611 rulings (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (2026-10-01)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.flsd.699766/gov.uscourts.flsd.699766.64.0.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, W.D. Wisconsin (United States v. Tejeda Murillo, Dkt. 45, via CourtListener) — 18 U.S.C. 611 rulings (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wiwd.55835/gov.uscourts.wiwd.55835.45.0.pdf"}, {"title": "The Southern District of Florida Blog (David Oscar Markus, via LexBlog) — 18 U.S.C. 611 rulings (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (2026-10-01)", "url": "https://www.lexblog.com/2026/10/01/judge-leibowitz-strikes-down-%c2%a7-611-non-citizen-voting-statute-as-applied/"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — 18 U.S.C. 611 rulings (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/2026/11/19/justice-depts-cascade-voter-fraud-cases-slows-trickle-post-midterms/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Federal non-citizen voting ban ruled unconstitutional as applied (Cox, Tejeda Murillo) (ei-2026-10-451)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-451 (added 2026-11-19 12:14 PM ET, 2026-11-19 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed, high confidence). Description taken from the EMon summary. Neither dismissal decides whether either defendant voted. Queue cross-check: related noncitizen-voting queue items (rq-2026-11-17-tx-harris-west-gray-noncitizen-voting-for-years-trahan, rq-2026-10-29-md-cheverly-aclj-noncitizen-registry-names-voted-federal, rq-2026-10-28-citizenship-flag-changed-after-registration-no-audit-trail) concern specific people, places or record practices; these legal rulings do not corroborate any of them. No vendor named. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ne-saunders-2026-400-early-ballots-outdated-official-signature-instructions", "permanent_id": "C20261014-120744-02", "uid": "C20261014-120744-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-120744-02", "old_ids": ["ne-saunders-2026-400-early-ballots-outdated-official-signature-instructions"], "seq": "C01379", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 to 2026-10-13", "state": "NE", "description": "About 400 Saunders County, Nebraska voters received early ballots with outdated instructions stating that ballots must be signed by an election official, County Clerk Dee Anne Nice told KETV on Oct. 13, 2026. This year the office printed Nice's initials on the ballots instead of having staff sign each one, after determining that state law does not require a signature, but the office \"sent out the old instructions with the new ballots.\" Nice said \"their ballots will count\" and that the office has received \"quite a few\" calls. At least one voter who picked up a ballot in person asked staff to sign it, and they did. Nebraska statute (Neb. Rev. Stat. 32-916) addresses election-official initials on official ballots. The exact mailing date was not reported. Status Confirmed for the clerk's own acknowledgment that outdated instructions were mailed with about 400 early ballots (single outlet quoting the clerk directly); the clerk says every affected ballot remains valid, and no rejected ballot has been reported. Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. When a county's own instructions tell voters a ballot is invalid without an official's signature while the office says it is valid without one, voters, observers, and canvassers can no longer rely on the printed rules to judge which ballots should count, and each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Precinct-issued, hand-marked paper ballots with consistent, published validation rules keep that question simple, and hand counts remain viable.", "sources": [{"title": "KETV 7 Omaha — 'Their ballots will count': Saunders County early ballots valid despite mistake, clerk says (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ketv.com/article/their-ballots-will-count-saunders-county-early-ballots-valid-despite-mistake-clerk-says/74125636"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Saunders NE outdated ballot instructions (ei-2026-10-033)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-033 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status resolved, severity low, confidence high; official_error yes). EMon flagged it to CTE as a mail-ballot handling issue. Single outlet quoting the clerk directly. Mapped to Ballots > Textual 'Mistakes' on ballots (closest leaf: misprinted official ballot material; peer Snohomish WA envelope misprint ei-2026-10-029). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities. Watch for any canvass challenge to unsigned or initialed ballots."}
{"id": "ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261027-082200-01", "uid": "C20261027-082200-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-082200-01", "old_ids": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots"], "seq": "C01551", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (mailing); reported 2026-10-26", "state": "UT", "description": "Weber County, Utah, Clerk Ricky Hatch said that a printer hired by the county mailed as many as 167 general-election ballot packets that contained an extra ballot, after \"a miscalibrated envelope stuffing machine errantly slipped two ballots into the packets\" [1][2]. A voter who received a packet with two ballots alerted the clerk's office soon after the ballots were mailed [1]. Hatch said the print run came up 167 ballots short, so 167 is the maximum number of affected packets; he suspects the actual number is \"well below 100\" but said he has no information to support that estimate [1]. The county mailed 135,000 packets [1]. Hatch said the ballot-processing machines measure envelope thickness and would likely flag an envelope holding two ballots, that envelopes are opened by three-person teams, and that ballots are reconciled by barcode [1]. As of the report, the county had processed 19,000 mail ballots and found four envelopes with more than one ballot; two of the extra ballots were blank, and the other two were marked identically to the first [1]. The printer is not named in the source, so no vendor is tagged. Status Confirmed: the county clerk acknowledged the error. No source says the error was deliberate. It belongs with other 2026 mail-ballot packaging and duplicate-mailing errors in Oxford, Maine; Green Bay, Wisconsin; and Volusia County, Florida, and with the Utah County notice error reported the same week (see the related cards).", "sources": [{"title": "The Salt Lake Tribune — Robert Gehrke, \"Weber Co. sent extra ballots to as many as 167 voters\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 3:19 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121531/https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/26/weber-co-sent-extra-ballots-many/)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/26/weber-co-sent-extra-ballots-many/"}, {"title": "The Salt Lake Tribune — Oct. 26, 2026 Weber County article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/26/weber-co-sent-extra-ballots-many/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots__sltrib-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Weber County, UT, printer error put extra ballots in up to 167 packets (EMon submission, 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon-submitted item, added 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET. Verified by curl against The Salt Lake Tribune (HTTP 200); local copy and Wayback snapshot kept. Confirmed because the county clerk acknowledged the error. No vendor tag because the printer is not named. 2026 midterm window: yes. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error", "me-oxford-2026-printer-packaging-error-wrong-style-ballots-hd80", "wi-green-bay-2026-duplicate-absentee-ballots-april-august-wec-probable-cause", "mi-checkmyvote-2026-668-ballots-sent-twice-hancock-clerk-denies", "fl-volusia-2026-10-vendor-mailing-error-350-wrong-vote-by-mail-ballots", "ei-2026-09-022", "or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"]}
{"id": "ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error", "permanent_id": "C20261027-082200-02", "uid": "C20261027-082200-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-082200-02", "old_ids": ["ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error"], "seq": "C01552", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (mailing); reported 2026-10-23", "state": "UT", "description": "The Utah County, Utah, Clerk's Office included 6,144 notices in general-election ballot packets telling first-time voters that they had to send a copy of their identification with their ballot, but some went to voters who did not need to provide identification [1][3][5][7]. The insert read, in bold, \"If you do not include ID, your ballot may not be counted\" [5]. Clerk Aaron Davidson said at least 71 notices went to people who had voted before, and the number sent to first-time voters who had already verified their identity is unknown; he said 7,000 inserts were printed [1][5]. He called it \"a clerical error\" and said that the cause was a miscommunication involving the driver-license database and staff not checking a box [3]; to The Salt Lake Tribune he also described a possible miscommunication with the printer and unclear direction from the Lieutenant Governor's office, and said \"It wasn't anything mischievous, it wasn't anything nefarious\" [5]. Davidson said, \"we're not going to disenfranchise anybody\" [1], and \"If they send it in or they don't send it in, we're still gonna count the ballot\" [3]. The clerk's office apologized: \"We recognize that this caused unnecessary confusion, and we sincerely apologize\" [1]. State elections Deputy Director Shelly Jackson said the state received a complaint and that \"the county just got a little overzealous and marked all the first-time voters\" as needing to prove their identity [1]; she told The Salt Lake Tribune that the office did not check registrations against driver-license data, that there was no time to identify every erroneous recipient, and that voters can cure an identification problem after the election [5]. Sarah McConkie of Indivisible Utah County raised the concern that the notice could discourage voters [3]. Utah Public Radio reported the clerk's explanation that it was a clerical mixup and not anything nefarious [7]. Status Confirmed: the county clerk acknowledged the error. No source says the notice was deliberate, and the leaf is used here only as the closest existing fit for a printing or mailing error; a dedicated mail-ballot leaf has been proposed. It belongs with the Weber County packet error reported in the same week and with other 2026 mail-ballot mailing errors (see the related cards).", "sources": [{"title": "KSL.com — Bridger Beal-Cvetko, \"Some Utah County voters incorrectly received notice telling them to include copy of ID with ballot\" (Oct. 23, 2026, 7:23 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121718/https://www.ksl.com/article/51640353/some-utah-county-voters-incorrectly-received-notice-telling-them-to-include-copy-of-id-with-ballot)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51640353/some-utah-county-voters-incorrectly-received-notice-telling-them-to-include-copy-of-id-with-ballot"}, {"title": "KSL.com — Oct. 23, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51640353/some-utah-county-voters-incorrectly-received-notice-telling-them-to-include-copy-of-id-with-ballot", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error__ksl-2026-10-23.html"}, {"title": "KUTV — Nate Carlisle, \"Utah County clerk acknowledges error after thousands receive voter ID notices\" (Oct. 23, 2026, 9:29 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121736/https://kutv.com/news/local/utah-county-clerk-acknowledges-error-after-thousands-receive-voter-id-notices)", "url": "https://kutv.com/news/local/utah-county-clerk-acknowledges-error-after-thousands-receive-voter-id-notices"}, {"title": "KUTV — Oct. 23, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://kutv.com/news/local/utah-county-clerk-acknowledges-error-after-thousands-receive-voter-id-notices", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error__kutv-2026-10-23.html"}, {"title": "The Salt Lake Tribune — \"Utah County Clerk sent incorrect voting instructions to residents\" (Oct. 23, 2026, 2:44 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121741/https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/23/utah-county-clerk-sent-incorrect/)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/23/utah-county-clerk-sent-incorrect/"}, {"title": "The Salt Lake Tribune — Oct. 23, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/10/23/utah-county-clerk-sent-incorrect/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error__sltrib-2026-10-23.html"}, {"title": "Utah Public Radio — Duck Thurgood, \"Thousands of Utah County voters got incorrect voting info\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 1:26 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121743/https://www.upr.org/politics/2026-10-26/utah-county-voters-mail-ballots-incorrect-instructions)", "url": "https://www.upr.org/politics/2026-10-26/utah-county-voters-mail-ballots-incorrect-instructions"}, {"title": "Utah Public Radio — Oct. 26, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.upr.org/politics/2026-10-26/utah-county-voters-mail-ballots-incorrect-instructions", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error__upr-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Utah County, UT, 6,144 first-time-voter ID notices sent in error (EMon submission, 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon-submitted item, added 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET. Verified by curl against KSL.com, KUTV, The Salt Lake Tribune and Utah Public Radio (all HTTP 200); local copies and Wayback snapshots kept. Confirmed because the county clerk acknowledged the error and the office apologized. Leaf note: no existing leaf covers incorrect instructions or notices in mail-ballot packets; placed on 10 > Tabulation (printing mistakes) as the closest fit, with the explicit statement that no source calls it deliberate. Proposed new leaf: 7 > Mail Ballots > \"Ballot packets include incorrect instructions or notices (for example, a false ID requirement) that can discourage voters or require needless cure steps.\" No vendor tag. 2026 midterm window: yes. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots", "fl-volusia-2026-10-vendor-mailing-error-350-wrong-vote-by-mail-ballots", "utah-county-signature-rejection-rates-review-2024", "ei-2026-09-022"]}
{"id": "ca-riverside-2026-10-mail-including-ballots-dumped-i15-lake-elsinore", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-11", "uid": "C20261102-121503-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-11", "old_ids": ["ca-riverside-2026-10-mail-including-ballots-dumped-i15-lake-elsinore"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (mail found)", "state": "CA", "description": "On Sunday afternoon, Oct. 25, 2026, a driver reported mail scattered along the shoulder of northbound Interstate 15 near Grape Street, at the Lake Elsinore and Wildomar line, to law enforcement and photographed the debris. Volunteers from the Wildomar Beautification Committee who were cleaning the shoulder collected the mail and noticed that it included a few voter ballots. They turned the items over to the Canyon Lake Police, who contacted the U.S. Postal Service, and the Postal Service took custody, according to CHP Officer Jesus Garcia of the Temecula Area office, who confirmed the account to Patch on Oct. 27. The Postal Service forwarded the matter to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. Canyon Lake Insider reported that Wildomar Councilwoman Bridgette Moore said the mail came from Canyon Lake. The number of ballots found has not been reported, and no official has said how the mail ended up on the freeway. On Oct. 30, a widely shared X post asked why there was \"a pile of ballots\" on the side of the freeway. The photo in that post appears to show mostly loose mail and flyers rather than a pile of ballots, and it has not been confirmed whether it is the same photo that news outlets used. Status Confirmed: the dumped mail was recovered and turned over to the Postal Service, as reported; who dumped it has not been reported. Catalog point: mail ballots that never reach the voter or the election office are lost without any record at the polls; voting in person on Election Day avoids that leg.", "sources": [{"title": "Patch — Lake Elsinore I-15 mail and ballots found (2026-10-27)", "url": "https://patch.com/california/lakeelsinore-wildomar/mail-dumped-15-freeway-near-lake-elsinore-items-turned-over-usps"}, {"title": "Canyon Lake Insider — Lake Elsinore I-15 mail and ballots found (2026-10-27)", "url": "https://canyonlakeinsider.com/mail-found-on-i-15-in-lake-elsinore-recovered/"}, {"title": "X post by @ErikUnchained (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://x.com/ErikUnchained/status/2116355583746166906"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lake Elsinore I-15 mail and ballots found (ei-2026-10-213)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-213 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tn-shelby-2026-10-early-voting-25-voters-cast-ballots-outside-advertised-hours-sos-not-lawful", "permanent_id": "C20261109-180918-06", "uid": "C20261109-180918-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-180918-06", "old_ids": ["tn-shelby-2026-10-early-voting-25-voters-cast-ballots-outside-advertised-hours-sos-not-lawful"], "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that give people a sense of security, which proves false because the laws are not followed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (early voting, exact date not disclosed); 2026-11-03 (state confirmation)", "state": "TN", "description": "A spokesman for Tennessee Secretary of State Tre Hargett confirmed on Nov. 3, 2026 that 25 voters in Shelby County were allowed to cast early ballots outside the county's publicly advertised early-voting hours. The office said the voters were eligible, but that voting must occur during properly noticed hours under Tennessee law and that allowing voting outside those hours \"was not consistent with legal requirements.\" The Tennessee Star, which first asked about it, reported that a source claimed an early-voting site in Cordova opened an hour before its advertised start time so a high school class could vote; the state did not confirm the date or location. Shelby County Election Administrator Linda Phillips told WREG that 18 of the 25 voters were students and that her office would give more details later. On Nov. 9 the Daily Memphian reported the Secretary of State's position that the commission should not have allowed the after-hours voting. No one has alleged that any of the 25 voters was ineligible. Still pending: the site, dates and times involved, the county's explanation, and whether the state takes any further action. Status Confirmed by the Tennessee Secretary of State's office, reported by The Tennessee Star, WREG and the Daily Memphian; no one alleges the 25 voters were ineligible, and the site and dates are not yet disclosed. Catalog point: the county election commission opened voting outside the publicly noticed hours, which the state says Tennessee law does not allow; the rule exists so everyone, including observers, knows when ballots are being cast.", "sources": [{"title": "The Tennessee Star — Shelby Co. TN 25 early votes outside posted hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://tennesseestar.com/elections/election-integrity/25-shelby-county-voters-cast-ballots-outside-legal-voting-hours-tennessee-secretary-of-state-confirms/tpappert/2026/11/03/"}, {"title": "WREG — Shelby Co. TN 25 early votes outside posted hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wreg.com/news/your-local-election-headquarters/state-25-in-shelby-county-voted-outside-polling-hours/amp/"}, {"title": "WREG — Shelby Co. TN 25 early votes outside posted hours (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wreg.com/news/local/voting-in-shelby-county-mostly-smooth-officials-say/amp/"}, {"title": "X post by @DailyMemphian (2026-11-09T22:56:18Z)", "url": "https://x.com/DailyMemphian/status/2119927088576635210"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Shelby Co. TN 25 early votes outside posted hours (ei-2026-10-389)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-389 (added 2026-11-09 6:09 PM ET, 2026-11-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ar-scott-2026-10-42-voters-wrong-jp-race-asked-to-revote", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-17", "uid": "C20261102-121503-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-17", "old_ids": ["ar-scott-2026-10-42-voters-wrong-jp-race-asked-to-revote"], "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (early voting)", "state": "AR", "description": "The Scott County Board of Election Commissioners in Arkansas discovered that ballots for the Mount Pleasant precinct listed the Justice of the Peace District 6 race instead of the District 5 race. Commission chair Barbs Templeman said on Oct. 29, 2026, that 42 voters who voted in that precinct between Oct. 19 and Oct. 27 must return to cast a vote in the District 5 race, and that their other selections remain counted. The commission held an emergency meeting on Oct. 28 with the candidates, voters and the local newspaper invited, consulted the State Board of Election Commissioners and the Secretary of State's office, and was replacing the voting equipment memory sticks as instructed. Ms. Templeman apologized to the affected voters and the candidates. Affected voters may contact the county clerk's office or the election commission at 479-637-0336. Status Confirmed: the Scott County Election Commission acknowledged the ballot error and asked the affected voters to vote again. Catalog point: a voter given the wrong ballot style cannot vote in the race they are entitled to, and the error is excused as a mistake.", "sources": [{"title": "5NEWS (KFSM) — Scott County AR JP ballot error (2026-10-29)", "url": "https://www.5newsonline.com/article/news/politics/elections/scott-county-election-commission-asks-42-voters-re-vote-ballot-error/527-b87a25a5-31bd-450e-b075-5581f500f6a6"}, {"title": "KHBS 40/29 — Scott County AR JP ballot error (2026-10-29)", "url": "https://www.4029tv.com/article/some-scott-county-voters-asked-to-return-to-vote-in-race-left-off-ballots/74286907"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Scott County AR JP ballot error (ei-2026-10-228)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-228 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "cisa-2026-election-security-plan-sltt-network-lateral-movement-blast", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-30", "uid": "C20260926-000015-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-30", "old_ids": ["cisa-2026-election-security-plan-sltt-network-lateral-movement-blast"], "seq": "C00543", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Bad actors can then exploit it for a much larger blast radius."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's 2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan notes election infrastructure is often accessible from general enterprise networks, creating lateral-movement opportunities after compromise of email/workstations—amplifying blast radius beyond a single voting device. Status Confirmed. PEP contrast: precinct hand count of hand-marked paper limits electronic blast radius (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — 2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-09/2026-CISA-Election-Security-Plan-FINAL-508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2026-election-security-plan-sltt-network-lateral-movement-blast__cisa-2026-election-infrastructure-security-plan.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Recognizing and Addressing Threats to Statewide Voter Registration Databases", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-09/Voter-Registration-Database-Threats-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2026-election-security-plan-sltt-network-lateral-movement-blast__cisa-2026-election-security-plan-sltt-network-lateral-movement-blast.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-025", "permanent_id": "C20261001-121804-01", "uid": "C20261001-121804-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-121804-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-025"], "seq": "C01263", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-30", "state": "GA / Federal", "description": "On Sept. 30, 2026, U.S. District Judge Victoria M. Calvert (N.D. Ga.) dismissed the Justice Department's second lawsuit seeking to compel Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to produce the state's unredacted computerized statewide voter registration list—including Social Security numbers, driver's license numbers, and full dates of birth—under Title III of the Civil Rights Act and related federal election statutes. Calvert held that federal law (including NVRA and HAVA as discussed) does not preempt Georgia's voter-privacy statute or require disclosure of that sensitive data; a redacted list suffices, and Georgia's list-maintenance efforts already show federal compliance without surrendering unredacted files. DOJ's first suit (M.D. Ga.) was dismissed in January 2026 for venue/jurisdiction; DOJ refiled in the Northern District. Raffensperger had already provided redacted data. DOJ said it is reviewing and will likely appeal. Status Confirmed for the N.D. Ga. dismissal order and multi-outlet contemporaneous reporting; DOJ may appeal, and this card does not litigate the merits of Georgia's privacy policy as a cabal motive. Peer to other federal election-administration Lawfare cards (e.g. ei-2026-09-008).", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Recorder — DOJ lawsuit seeking Georgia voters' unredacted data dismissed again", "url": "https://georgiarecorder.com/2026/09/30/doj-lawsuit-seeking-georgia-voters-unredacted-data-dismissed-again/"}, {"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Georgia wins latest round in legal fight to shield voter records", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/09/georgia-wins-latest-round-in-legal-fight-to-shield-voter-records/"}, {"title": "FOX 5 Atlanta — Federal judge dismisses DOJ lawsuit against Raffensperger over voter rolls", "url": "https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/federal-judge-dismisses-doj-lawsuit-against-raffensperger-over-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "WSB-TV — Federal judge dismisses DOJ lawsuit seeking Georgia's unredacted voter records", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/federal-judge-dismisses-doj-lawsuit-seeking-georgias-unredacted-voter-records/JIPTHFWC3NDSZDWUZR6DX2MM5M/"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (N.D. Ga.) order PDF (via Democracy Docket) — 2026-09-30 dismissal", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2026-09-30-Order-.pdf"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-025. Confirmed for N.D. Ga. dismissal of DOJ unredacted-rolls suit; DOJ may appeal. Maps to Lawfare leaf (peer ei-008). Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls."}
{"id": "pa-westmoreland-2026-10-157-duplicate-mail-ballots-npc-vendor-delay", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-08", "uid": "C20261026-121625-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-08", "old_ids": ["pa-westmoreland-2026-10-157-duplicate-mail-ballots-npc-vendor-delay"], "seq": "C01554", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-29 to 2026-10-24", "state": "PA", "description": "Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, sent 157 voters duplicate mail ballots, which the Pennsylvania Department of State attributed to \"human error,\" saying statewide SURE safeguards ensure only one vote per voter counts (Votebeat/Spotlight PA, Oct. 23–24, 2026). Commissioner Doug Chew said the problem began when a county employee got an error message while downloading requests from the SURE system, which led to a misunderstanding with the state helpline; he said the SURE system itself was not at fault. Attempts to return both ballots will be referred to the district attorney. Separately, Election Bureau Director Scott Ross said ballot vendor NPC Inc. of Claysburg was behind schedule: the first batch of mail ballots, due to go out Sept. 29, was mailed Oct. 7, with more batches on Oct. 9 and Oct. 12, affecting more than 28,000 mail ballots. Status Confirmed by the county and the Department of State.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Westmoreland County sends 157 duplicate mail ballots; state cites human error (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2026/10/23/duplicate-mail-ballots-westmoreland-2026-human-error/"}, {"title": "PennLive — Human error blamed as Pa. county sends 157 duplicate mail ballots (Oct. 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.pennlive.com/news/2026/10/human-error-blamed-as-pa-county-sends-157-duplicate-mail-ballots-to-voters.html"}, {"title": "WPXI — Westmoreland County residents report delays receiving mail-in ballots; official responds", "url": "https://www.wpxi.com/news/local/westmoreland-county-residents-report-delay-receiving-mail-in-ballots-official-responds/7J5VUWC6QNAHFF5K3BKRCNWOSQ/"}, {"title": "Mon Valley Independent — Private company blamed for mailing delay of ballots (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.monvalleyindependent.com/2026/10/21/private-company-blamed-for-mailing-delay-of-ballots/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Westmoreland PA duplicate mail ballots and vendor delay (ei-2026-10-158)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-158 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Votebeat curl 200; PennLive 403. Vendor tag NPC (NPC Inc. of Claysburg, mail-ballot printer named by the county; Mark t485u, 2026-10-28: envelope and mail-ballot vendors are tagged when a source names them).", "vendor": ["NPC"], "related": ["pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots"]}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-021", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-03", "uid": "C20261001-094909-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-03", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-021"], "seq": "C01259", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-28", "state": "US", "description": "On Sept. 28, 2026, U.S. District Judge Amir H. Ali (D.D.C.) vacated FEMA FY2026 Homeland Security Grant Program conditions that would have withheld 20% of counterterrorism funds unless states and high-risk urban areas overhauled routine election administration. The June NOFO had required a transition plan from barcode/QR electronic systems to hand-marked paper ballots, federally specified 5% post-election manual audits, voter-to-ballot reconciliation under FEMA methodology, and citizenship verification of voters, poll workers, administrators, and vendors (including SAVE-related checks). Plaintiffs included Texas and Tennessee counties and Columbus, Ohio. Ali held FEMA exceeded statutory authority by conditioning anti-terrorism grants on routine election choices Congress did not authorize; vacatur granted, permanent injunction denied. The Sept. 28 order also vacated FEMA's Aug. 10, 2026 implementing guidance memorandum. Background (DHS rationale): in an Aug. 24, 2026 letter to the White House Transparency Task Force (released Aug. 27), DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin cited supply-chain risk from Chinese-made components that, per the letter, ES&S, Hart InterCivic and Dominion (together more than 80% of the U.S. market) had acknowledged, and said states must demonstrate random post-election manual counts of paper ballots to receive full HSGP awards. That letter recirculated as an X trending story on Oct. 5, 2026 describing the manual-count requirement as current; as of Oct. 5 the conditions and guidance remain vacated and no DHS/FEMA appeal had been identified. Status Confirmed for the vacatur ruling on statutory-authority grounds; the Chinese-components claim is DHS's stated rationale as reported, not independently verified here. This card documents federal grant-condition leverage over election administration—not a finding that hand-marked paper or manual audits are unworkable. A properly-run transparent hand count (PEP) remains a remedy for machine/centralized complexity; the court question here was FEMA's power to coerce those choices via HSGP.", "sources": [{"title": "CNBC — Judge blocks FEMA tying counterterrorism grants to election rules", "url": "https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/28/elections-dhs-counterterrorism.html"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) memorandum opinion PDF (via Protect Democracy)", "url": "https://protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/42-Memorandum-Opinion.pdf"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Trump administration election conditions on anti-terrorism funding struck", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/trump-administrations-election-conditions-anti-terrorism-funding-struck"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) order, Nashville v. DHS — vacates conditions + Aug. 10 guidance (PDF via Protect Democracy)", "url": "https://protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/43-Order.pdf"}, {"title": "DHS Secretary Mullin letter to White House Transparency Task Force, Aug. 24, 2026 (PDF via Just the News)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2026-08/08.20.2026%20-%20WHTF%20Letter%20%20Commerce%20-%20S1%20SIGNED.pdf"}, {"title": "Just the News — Homeland Security warns of Chinese parts in election machines (Aug. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/government/federal-agencies/emb6am-homeland-security-warns-chinese-parts-election-machines-require"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — FEMA HSGP vacatur (ei-2026-09-021)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-021. Confirmed for vacatur of FEMA HSGP election-admin conditions. PEP framing: not proof hand counts fail. Distinct from SAVE stay ei-019. Cross-leaf: Lawfare / Auditing; Tabulation > supply chain. Refreshed 2026-10-05 PM: + D.D.C. order 43 (Aug. 10 guidance vacated), DHS Mullin Aug. 24 letter rationale (Chinese components; manual counts), Oct. 5 X recirculation noted as stale; no appeal identified. X trending URLs not used as primary sources.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-024", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-06", "uid": "C20261001-094909-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-06", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-024"], "seq": "C01262", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Sept. 28, 2026, Maricopa County Attorney Rachel Mitchell announced that an investigation of 207 registered voters Recorder Justin Heap referred after SAVE/MVD flags found eight legally present noncitizens who cast ballots in county elections between 2012 and 2025 (no more than three in any single election; would not change past outcomes). Of 60 referred people who had voted, Mitchell said 52 were U.S. citizens wrongly flagged. Seven of the eight noncitizens were registered through Arizona Motor Vehicle Division renewals: licenses first issued before Oct. 1, 1996 (when MVD began requiring proof of citizenship) were grandfathered so renewals appeared to show citizenship proof; Arizona has required documentary proof of citizenship to register since Dec. 2004. One other submitted a 2012 handwritten form marked not a U.S. citizen that still reached the rolls. No charging decisions yet; Mitchell is expanding review of remaining flagged names and drafting 2027 legislation on MVD/Motor Voter handling. At a Maricopa Board of Supervisors hearing reported Sept. 30 / Oct. 1, supervisors pressed Heap over the low confirmation rate (8 of 60 who voted confirmed noncitizens; 52 wrongly flagged citizens); Heap defended SAVE screening and agreed the pathway is an MVD/system breakdown needing legislative fixes. Mitchell's office has reviewed only the 60 who cast ballots; the remaining referred names (~147) stay listed \"not eligible\" during review—they remain on the rolls but cannot receive a mail-in ballot and must show proof of citizenship in person to vote. Update Oct. 21–22, 2026: Attorney General Kris Mayes and Secretary of State Adrian Fontes sued Recorder Justin Heap in Maricopa County Superior Court on Oct. 21, alleging he kept 25 of the 52 investigator-cleared U.S. citizens in \"not eligible\" status, and asked the court to restore them, issue regular (not provisional) ballots and immediately mail ballots to the 18 on the Active Early Voting List; one affected voter is a UOCAVA voter. An Oct. 19 AG letter had named 24 voters; an AG spokesperson said one was reinstated after the letter but two more were found marked \"not eligible\" (Votebeat). Heap says state law requires documented proof of citizenship that the prosecutors' offices have not provided (\"A press conference is not proof of citizenship\"). No ruling has been reported. Update (Nov. 18–19, 2026): Maricopa County Attorney Rachel Mitchell announced that her office will not file charges against the eight noncitizens: \"We will not be filing charges in those cases,\" she said, adding, \"It's my feeling that a jury would not convict these eight individuals because of the involvement of a government-involved glitch.\" KTAR reports that all eight were lawfully present, that two were registered Republicans, one a Democrat and five unaffiliated, and that together they cast 16 ballots from 2012 to 2025, with no more than three voting in any single election and no outcome changed; KJZZ reports Mitchell said there is no evidence most of them tried to register despite being noncitizens, and that one marked \"not a citizen\" on a registration form. Mitchell said her office is not investigating any 2026 midterm issues. The earlier statement that no charging decisions had been made is superseded. Catalog point: the ballots were cast and counted over 13 years, and because the registrations came through a government system, no one will answer for them. Status Confirmed for MCAO's announced investigative findings on the MVD grandfathering registration pathway and the eight noncitizen voters identified; not a criminal conviction (no charging decisions). Operational/system flaw ≠ intentional fraud. Distinct from NJ MVC (ei-023), Nevada DHS list dispute (ei-020), and the SAVE SCOTUS stay (ei-019). Update Oct. 23, 2026: After court-ordered mediation, Recorder Heap reinstated the cleared voters and Attorney General Mayes and Secretary of State Fontes agreed to dismiss the lawsuit; the Arizona Mirror reports 24 voters were restored through the settlement and the 25th had already been restored, and the Recorder's Office said ballots were issued to those on the Active Early Voting List.", "sources": [{"title": "KJZZ — Maricopa County Attorney Mitchell finds 8 noncitizens voted (MVD glitch)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/politics/2026-09-28/maricopa-county-attorney-mitchell-finds-8-noncitizens-voted-in-past-elections"}, {"title": "AZFamily — 8 noncitizens voted in Maricopa County due to systemic MVD flaw", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/09/28/8-noncitizens-voted-maricopa-county-due-systemic-flaw-official-says/"}, {"title": "FOX 10 Phoenix — MCAO investigation: 8 non-citizens voted in past elections", "url": "https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/mcao-investigation-shows-8-non-citizens-voted-past-elections"}, {"title": "AZFamily — Maricopa County recorder grilled over botched noncitizen voter claims as early voting nears", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/01/maricopa-county-recorder-grilled-over-botched-noncitizen-voter-claims-early-voting-nears/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Attorney General Mayes sues Maricopa County Recorder Heap over 25 citizen voters (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2026/10/22/attorney-general-mayes-maricopa-county-recorder-heap-lawsuit-25-citizen-voters-save/"}, {"title": "KJZZ — Arizona officials sue Maricopa County recorder to restore voting access for 25 U.S. citizens (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-10-22/arizona-officials-sue-maricopa-county-recorder-to-restore-voting-access-for-25-u-s-citizens"}, {"title": "Complaint, Mayes and Fontes v. Heap, Maricopa County Superior Court (Oct. 21, 2026; via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-21-Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "Arizona Attorney General — Letter to Recorder Heap (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/sites/default/files/2026-10/2026.10.19%20Letter%20to%20Heap.pdf"}, {"title": "Arizona Mirror — Maricopa County Recorder restores 25 voters wrongly flagged as noncitizens, ending lawsuit (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2026/10/23/maricopa-county-recorder-restores-25-voters-wrongly-flagged-as-noncitizens-ending-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "AZFamily — Judge urges resolution over Maricopa County voters marked ineligible (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/23/judge-urges-resolution-over-24-maricopa-county-voters-marked-ineligible/"}, {"title": "KTAR News — County Attorney declines charges (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://ktar.com/arizona-politics-news/election/maricopa-county-noncitizens-voted-charges"}, {"title": "KJZZ — County Attorney declines charges (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/politics/2026-11-19/maricopa-county-attorney-wont-charge-8-noncitizens-who-voted-after-mvd-glitch"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa MVD / SAVE noncitizen referrals (ei-2026-09-024)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-20 12:16 PM ET (2026-11-20 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-09-024 update: County Attorney declines charges). Label unchanged. EMon refresh 2026-10-26 AM: Oct. 23 mediation settlement, voters restored, suit dismissed (AZ Mirror curl 200). Label unchanged. EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: AG/SOS suit to restore 25 cleared citizens (Votebeat, KJZZ curl 200). Label unchanged. EMon ei-2026-09-024 (last_updated 2026-10-01). Confirmed for MCAO investigative findings (MVD Motor-Voter grandfathering pathway); no charges yet. Oct 1 refresh: BOS grilling of Heap + remaining ~147 referrals held not-eligible (no mail ballot; in-person citizenship proof). Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration / Registration; Voter Rolls. Distinct from ei-019/020/023. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Motor-Voter Registration' to its new child leaf 'Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-001", "permanent_id": "C20261002-121613-01", "uid": "C20261002-121613-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-121613-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-001"], "seq": "C01264", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Update Scam", "Vulnerabilities are found, or \"found,\" to spur states and counties to buy new equipment and software to \"fix\" the problems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-28", "state": "GA / Federal", "description": "On Sept. 28, 2026, Georgia's State Election Board voted 3–2 (Roddy resolution; Chair Fervier and Democrat Ghazal dissenting) to urge Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to implement a Dominion Voting Systems (now Liberty Voting Systems) software update addressing security-patch, DVSorder, and ballot-secrecy/privacy concerns, to preserve forensic images of EMS and ICC hard drives before any update, and to authorize the SEB executive director to seek DOJ and DHS assistance if the SOS does not act. Follow-on reporting (Sept. 30–Oct. 1) describes formal DOJ intervention requests citing HAVA QR-code concerns (tied to a Sept. 2 DHS Mullin letter) and ERIC/CEIR data-sharing questions. Raffensperger's office says prior funding requests for personnel to load updates were denied (~$15M ask; spokesperson: \"day late and at least $30 million short\") and that a full software load cannot be completed before Oct. 13 early voting / Nov. 3 midterms. Manufacturer reportedly offered the software at no charge; opponents say personnel/time make a pre-midterm rollout impossible. Update (Oct. 4–9): Votebeat and Atlanta News First report that SEB Executive Director James Mills's Sept. 30 letters to DOJ and DHS leadership went beyond the resolution, seeking to compel a pre-midterm software install, to prohibit QR-code tabulation with a six-month HAVA-compliance deadline, and to investigate alleged alteration or withholding of election records and allegations against Raffensperger. Chair Fervier and Vice Chair Grubbs said board members did not authorize or review the letters in advance, while member Janelle King said Mills was acting under the resolution. DOJ told Votebeat it was \"aware of the letter\" but declined further comment; DHS said it responds through official channels. No federal intervention or software load had been announced as Georgia early voting opened Oct. 13. Oct. 15 update: SEB member Carolyn Roddy, who sponsored the Sept. 28 resolution, issued a memorandum and board press release reaffirming that Executive Director James Mills's Oct. 1 letters to DOJ and DHS were authorized. She wrote that the resolution did not require other members' prior editorial approval, that Mills circulated drafts more than four hours before mailing with no edits or complaints, and that the letters were \"entirely consistent with the expectations of the Resolution.\" Chair Fervier and Vice Chair Grubbs had said members did not authorize or review the letters in advance, so the dispute over scope remains open. Status Confirmed for the SEB 3–2 vote, the formal SEB resolution PDF, the follow-on DOJ-intervention request PDF, and multi-outlet contemporaneous reporting (GPB, Current GA/Georgia Recorder, FOX 5). Catalog Update Scam framing (vulns spurred to force new buys) remains Alleged as motive and is not established by these sources—the manufacturer offered the software free; the dispute centers on timing, personnel funding, and federal pressure. Distinct from ei-2026-09-025 (unredacted voter-rolls DOJ suit dismissal). Optional cross-leaf: Electronic Voting Machines QR/privacy architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Public Broadcasting — State Election Board passes resolution urging voting machine software update", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2026/09/29/state-election-board-passes-resolution-urging-voting-machine-software-update"}, {"title": "The Current GA / Georgia Recorder — Georgia election board seeks federal oversight for voting machine updates", "url": "https://thecurrentga.org/2026/09/30/georgia-election-board-seeks-federal-oversight-for-voting-machine-updates/"}, {"title": "FOX 5 Atlanta — Georgia Election Board urges voting software update over privacy", "url": "https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/georgia-election-board-urges-voting-software-update-over-privacy"}, {"title": "Georgia State Election Board — Dominion Update RESOLUTION (Roddy, 2026-09-28 PDF)", "url": "https://seb.ga.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/Dominion-Update-RESOLUTION-Coordination-presented-by-Member-Carolyn-Roddy-9.28.26.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket / SEB — Formal Request for DOJ Intervention (Harmeet Dhillon PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Formal_Request_for_DOJ_Intervention_-_The_Honorable_Harmeet_Dhillon-1.pdf"}, {"title": "Georgia Public Broadcasting — State Election Board seeks DOJ, DHS intervention in election equipment update (Oct. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2026/10/02/state-election-board-seeks-doj-dhs-intervention-in-election-equipment-update"}, {"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Georgia board asks Trump administration to investigate voting machines (Oct. 1, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/10/georgia-board-trump-investigate-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Georgia election board's Mills sent federal letters board members say they did not approve (Oct. 4, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/national/2026/10/04/georgia-election-board-mills-federal-letters-dhs-doj-board-approval/"}, {"title": "Atlanta News First — Georgia election board divided over letters seeking federal help with voting systems (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/10/09/georgia-election-board-divided-over-letters-seeking-federal-help-with-voting-systems/"}, {"title": "Georgia State Election Board — Roddy reaffirms board authorization for Mills outreach to DOJ and DHS (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://seb.ga.gov/official-press-release-state-election-board-member-carolyn-roddy-reaffirms-board-authorization-for-executive-director-james-mills-outreach-to-doj-and-dhs/"}, {"title": "Georgia State Election Board — Roddy memorandum on the resolution (Oct. 15, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://seb.ga.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Press-Release-SEB-Resolution-10.15.2026.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — GA SEB Dominion/Liberty software update DOJ ask (ei-2026-10-001)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: Roddy Oct. 15 memo/SEB release (official, curl 200). Stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-001 (first_seen 2026-09-28, last_updated 2026-10-13; refreshed 2026-10-13 for the Mills-letters controversy via Votebeat/ANF; board divided; DOJ aware, no action announced; watch any rescission vote or DOJ/DHS response). Confirmed for SEB 3–2 vote + formal DOJ-request PDF + multi-outlet. Peer Update Scam leaf to ga-dominion-107m-dre-replacement-2019. Cross-leaf QR/privacy optional; primary stays Update Scam. Distinct from ei-025 rolls dismissal. Skipped X trending as primary.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Liberty Vote (2025 successor name)"]}
{"id": "pa-dauphin-lancaster-2026-completed-mail-ballots-returned-undeliverable-usps-human-error", "permanent_id": "C20261022-121034-02", "uid": "C20261022-121034-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-121034-02", "old_ids": ["pa-dauphin-lancaster-2026-completed-mail-ballots-returned-undeliverable-usps-human-error"], "seq": "C01516", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "When the USPS classifies a ballot as \"undeliverable,\" it gathers those ballots in one or more facilities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-28 to 2026-10-21", "state": "PA", "description": "At least four completed mail ballots that Dauphin and Lancaster county, Pennsylvania voters mailed in pre-addressed return envelopes came back to them stamped undeliverable, even though the envelopes carried the county election office's printed address (LNP | LancasterOnline). Rapho Township voters Nathan and Jennifer Campbell mailed their ballots on Sept. 28; his came back on Oct. 14 with a sticker reading \"Undeliverable as addressed,\" and hers came back on Oct. 19 (WGAL; LNP). Susquehanna Township voters Vincent and Jackie Hill took their ballots to the Crooked Hill Road post office, and both came back \"Returned to sender as undeliverable\"; Dauphin County learned of it on Oct. 19, and the Hills then hand-delivered their ballots (abc27). State Rep. Justin Fleming said a third Dauphin County voter reported the same problem after using the same post office. Dauphin County said the Postal Service \"confirmed it was a one-off isolated issue attributable to human error\" and committed to training the employee who \"accidentally mishandled the mail\"; Pennsylvania's Department of State said it had no information suggesting anything more than isolated human error. American Postal Workers Union regional representative Kim Miller told LNP that the Postal Service's Office of Inspector General and postal inspectors are investigating and that the Postal Service is looking into how many mail pieces may have been wrongly flagged as undeliverable. LNP notes that a USPS Inspector General audit of this year's primary found 108 western Pennsylvania ballots wrongly processed as undeliverable at the same Harrisburg processing center. Status Confirmed: the counties and the Department of State relay the Postal Service's acknowledgment of employee error, and the ballots' return is documented by named voters. The total number of affected ballots has not been established. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a completed ballot marked undeliverable leaves the voter's control and the county's count until the voter notices it came back, and only voters who check their mail or ballot status learn of it. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Voting in person at the precinct keeps the ballot out of the postal sorting stream entirely.", "sources": [{"title": "abc27 WHTM (via Yahoo News) — 'Undeliverable': Stamped, pre-addressed ballots returned to Midstate voters in 'isolated' incidence of human error (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/undeliverable-stamped-pre-addressed-ballots-223423630.html"}, {"title": "LNP | LancasterOnline — Union leader says Postal Service investigating undelivered mail ballots in Lancaster, Dauphin counties (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/union-leader-says-postal-service-investigating-undelivered-mail-ballots-in-lancaster-dauphin-counties/article_6e198807-9b4e-4a7f-a4de-4c5a1f2e8d27.html"}, {"title": "LNP | LancasterOnline — Lancaster County voters describe problems with mail delivery of ballots (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://lancasteronline.com/news/local/lancaster-county-voters-describe-problems-with-mail-delivery-of-ballots/article_8e803748-0cb1-4f66-9eb5-48f81c75e427.html"}, {"title": "WGAL — Lancaster County investigates mail-in ballot issue after voter's complaint (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.wgal.com/article/lancaster-county-investigates-mail-in-ballot-issue-voters-complaint/74164354"}, {"title": "X — @gaughen, shares a Mid-Chester County Democrats Facebook screenshot of the Hills' returned envelopes (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/gaughen/status/2112953231433232671"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dauphin/Lancaster PA ballots returned undeliverable (ei-2026-10-130)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-130 (first_seen 2026-10-22; EMon confirmed, official_error yes). Mapped to 7 USPS > undeliverable ballots (peer: ei-2026-09-005 Washington County PA, 108 ballots at Harrisburg). abc27/Yahoo, both LNP pages and WGAL text-verified, curl 200. X post not fetched (zero X API this pass). Names as in sources; nothing redacted. Watch for USPS OIG findings and a count of affected ballots."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-019", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-01", "uid": "C20261001-094909-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-019"], "seq": "C01257", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-25", "state": "US", "description": "On Sept. 25, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court (DHS v. League of Women Voters, No. 26A308) stayed a D.C. district-court injunction that had blocked the Trump administration's modified Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program for voter-citizenship checks while litigation continues. The 2025 SAVE expansion (Executive Order 14248) added Social Security Administration records (including SSNs) and bulk-search capability so states can verify registered voters' citizenship against federal data; about 27 states already used SAVE for voter verification. The unsigned opinion said challengers were unlikely to prevail on Privacy Act / Social Security Act / APA claims and that federal immigration law obligates the government to respond to state verification requests. Votebeat and BBC note the National Voter Registration Act still bars systematic voter-roll removals within 90 days of the Nov. 3 midterm, so near-term impact is mainly individualized checks. Distinct from congressional SAVE / SAVE America Act proof-of-citizenship bills that have not passed the Senate. Status Confirmed for the Supreme Court stay order allowing modified SAVE use pending appeal; not a merits ruling that any particular noncitizen voted.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court — DHS v. League of Women Voters stay (26A308 PDF)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/25pdf/26a308_pok0.pdf"}, {"title": "SCOTUSblog — Court clears way for modified voter verification database", "url": "https://www.scotusblog.com/2026/09/supreme-court-clears-way-for-trump-administration-to-use-modified-voter-verification-database/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Supreme Court ruling on SAVE system / noncitizen checks", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/national/2026/09/25/supreme-court-ruling-save-system-trump-dhs-noncitizens-2026-election/"}, {"title": "BBC — Supreme Court lifts restrictions on citizenship verification database", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ck05rrj3jeylo"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — SAVE SCOTUS stay (ei-2026-09-019)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-019. Confirmed for SCOTUS stay of injunction on modified SAVE; distinguish from SAVE Act legislation. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration / Lawfare. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's...'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-48", "uid": "C20260925-155410-48", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-48", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-016"], "seq": "C00048", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-24", "state": "IL", "description": "On the first day of Illinois early voting (Sept. 24, 2026), DuPage County paused early voting after roughly the first hour due to a technical issue affecting the voter-registration / pollbook path (Audacy/WBBM; NCTV17; Chicago Tribune). Sites cited by witnesses included the DuPage fairgrounds and Naperville Municipal Center; local coverage also referenced birth-date display errors and missing candidate data. The clerk's office said voting would resume Friday, Sept. 25. As of Sept. 25 the DuPage County Clerk early-voting locations page carried an official notice that early voting is now open, with five temporary locations (Addison Township, Bartlett Community Center, Downers Grove Village Hall, DuPage Fairgrounds, Naperville Municipal Center). EMon marks the opening-day countywide pause resolved operationally; continue watching for recurrence. Root cause (pollbooks vs network vs vendor) not yet detailed in sources reviewed. Status Confirmed for the countywide early-voting pause/outage as an operational administration failure; intentional sabotage not alleged by primary local TV report. Also maps to Early Voting; Election 'Day' leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "NCTV17 — DuPage County paused early voting (technical issue)", "url": "https://x.com/NCTV17/status/2103176843910365618"}, {"title": "Audacy / WBBM — DuPage clerk halted early voting after first hour", "url": "https://www.audacy.com/podcasts/8852bd4c6b82bb397eb5e852eaa7e819/episodes/early_voting_starts_in_suburbs-8688354"}, {"title": "DuPage County Clerk — Early Voting Locations (now open notice)", "url": "https://www.dupagecounty.gov/elected_officials/election_and_voter_information/voting_information/early_voting_locations.php"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DuPage e-pollbook outage (ei-2026-09-016, resolved)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-016 afternoon refresh 2026-09-25: status→resolved; EV open with 5 temp sites per county clerk notice. Confirmed operational failure; reopen noted."}
{"id": "kendall-il-2026-300-wrong-vbm-ballots-ineligible-referendum-two-precincts", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-12", "uid": "C20261012-123213-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-12", "old_ids": ["kendall-il-2026-300-wrong-vbm-ballots-ineligible-referendum-two-precincts"], "seq": "C01299", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-24 to 2026-10-09", "state": "IL", "description": "Three hundred vote-by-mail ballots for the Nov. 3, 2026 general election were mistakenly mailed on Sept. 24 to voters in two Kendall County, Illinois precincts. The ballots included a referendum those voters are not eligible to vote on. Kendall County Clerk and Recorder Debbie Gillette said by email that the office \"immediately spoiled the ballots we mailed out on Sept. 24\" and reissued new ballots with an explanatory note, and that the originals will not be counted. Her election challenger, County Board member Zach Bachmann, criticized the office for not telling the public about the error. The precincts were not named. Status Confirmed for the clerk's written acknowledgment, the spoil and the reissue (Shaw Local/Kendall County Now, Oct. 9). Intent is not alleged, and the transparency dispute is still open. Mark framing: 300 wrong-style ballots mailed and quietly replaced in one county, two weeks after Colorado's roughly 800,000-ballot Issue 7A wrong-style mailing (ei-2026-10-011), shows how routine \"wrong ballot style\" mistakes have become. A bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Every confirmed case makes the excuse credible for the next one, and the public learns of it only if a reporter asks. Spoiled originals and reissued replacements also mean two live ballots exist for each of those 300 voters, which only tight chain of custody and reconciliation can control. Precinct-issued, hand-marked paper ballots keep ballot style and custody visible.", "sources": [{"title": "Shaw Local / Kendall County Now — 300 wrong mail-in ballots were sent to two Kendall County precincts (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.shawlocal.com/kendall-county-now/2026/10/09/300-wrong-mail-in-ballots-were-sent-to-two-kendall-county-precincts/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Kendall IL 300 wrong mail ballots (ei-2026-10-026)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-026 (first_seen 2026-10-09, last_updated 2026-10-12; EMon status resolved, confidence high). Confirmed via clerk email to Shaw Local; precincts unnamed; transparency dispute open. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: CO Issue 7A ei-2026-10-011, Will IL 2024, Montgomery PA 2020). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (spoiled + reissued pair). Watch whether any original ballots are returned and how they are reconciled.", "related": ["or-deschutes-2026-10-200-bend-annexed-voters-wrong-precinct-ballots"]}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-007", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-54", "uid": "C20260925-155410-54", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-54", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-007"], "seq": "C00054", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "Federal", "description": "Democratic campaign committees (DSCC, DCCC, DGA) and congressional leaders including Sens./Reps. Schumer and Jeffries sued DHS, ICE, FBI and leaders in D.C. federal court seeking to bar armed federal officers near open polling places, drop boxes, curbside voting, and vote-counting/certification sites through ballot curing, citing Civil War-era statutes and VRA §11(b). As of mid-October 2026, Democracy Docket's case page still listed only the Sept. 23 complaint, with no TRO or preliminary-injunction ruling, as early voting expanded. In a parallel case, LULAC, Common Cause, UnidosUS, and Denver (joined Oct. 7 by Hennepin County, Minnesota) filed an amended complaint in LULAC v. DHS that expands the claims to alleged FBI polling-place policies and adds a Voting Rights Act intimidation count. Status Confirmed for the lawsuit filing and claims asserted; does not adjudicate whether deployments would constitute unlawful intimidation. Note: Democracy Docket affiliation with counsel for plaintiffs.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — Democrats sue to keep armed agents from polls", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/democrats-sue-trump-admin-to-keep-armed-agents-from-polls-during-midterms/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ei-2026-09-007__democracy-docket-democrats-sue-to-keep-armed-agents-from-pol.png"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — DSCC v. ICE case page (No. 1:26-cv-03330; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-13, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/federal-election-interference-at-the-polls-challenge-dscc/"}, {"title": "Common Cause — Voting rights organizations and local governments expand challenge to armed federal agents at polling places (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.commoncause.org/press/voting-rights-organizations-and-local-governments-expand-challenge-to-trump-vance-administrations-plans-for-armed-federal-agents-at-polling-places/"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) — LULAC v. DHS plaintiffs' first amended complaint (Oct. 7, 2026 PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/22-2026-10-07-Plaintiffs-first-amended-complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Armed federal agents near polls suit (ei-2026-09-007)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-007 refresh 2026-10-13: no DSCC ruling yet; parallel LULAC v. DHS amended complaint (Oct. 7; Hennepin County joined; FBI policy + VRA intimidation count) added. Earlier refresh 2026-09-25: light X corroboration. Related ei-2026-09-008. Maps to Fear/Discredit/Intimidation and Polling Places climate."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-010", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-55", "uid": "C20260925-155410-55", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-55", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-010"], "seq": "C00055", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "AR", "description": "Poinsett County Election Commission voted unanimously to temporarily close the Tyronza Senior Citizens Center polling place for the Nov. 3, 2026 general election due to too few local residents completing required poll-worker certification before the training window closed. Voters may use other county vote centers; county does not provide transportation. Status Confirmed for the closure decision and stated staffing cause.", "sources": [{"title": "KAIT 8 — Worker shortage temporarily closes Tyronza polling site", "url": "https://www.kait8.com/2026/09/23/worker-shortage-temporarily-closes-tyronza-polling-site-ahead-november-election/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-010."}
{"id": "wayne-mi-2026-belleville-library-partial-term-misplaced-8500-replacement-absentee-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261013-122943-01", "uid": "C20261013-122943-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261013-122943-01", "old_ids": ["wayne-mi-2026-belleville-library-partial-term-misplaced-8500-replacement-absentee-ballots"], "seq": "C01376", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23 to 2026-10-08", "state": "MI", "description": "Wayne County, Michigan Elections laid out the Nov. 3, 2026 absentee ballots for the City of Belleville, Sumpter Township, and Van Buren Township with a Belleville Area District Library Board partial-term candidate printed in the full-term section of the race. Absentee ballots began mailing on about Sept. 23, and county staff notified the three clerks of the error on Sept. 28. Votebeat (Oct. 2) estimated that at least 8,500 absentee voters were affected (about 7,700 in Van Buren Township and more than 800 in Belleville; Sumpter was not immediately quantified). County spokesperson Dorian Tyus said no other offices or proposals were affected, that replacement ballots and instructions would be mailed, and that voters should not use both ballots; erroneous ballots already returned are to be duplicated onto the correct style so that every mark except the misplaced race still counts. The City of Belleville's official notice (updated Oct. 8) said corrected ballots numbered 30000 and above were in the mail and instructed voters to destroy old ballots numbered 00001 to 00899. Belleville Interim Clerk Michelle Bellingham said the county's own layout and proofing documents carried the same error. Status Confirmed for the misprint, the affected jurisdictions, and the replacement and duplication remedy (Votebeat, City of Belleville notice, FOX 2 Detroit). Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Each confirmed ballot-layout \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere, and every replacement mailing puts two live ballots in a voter's hands until duplication and reconciliation sort out which one counts. Precinct-issued, hand-marked paper ballots with public reconciliation keep ballot style and counts visible, and hand counts remain a viable way to verify them.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat Michigan — Wayne County ballot misprint: at least 8,500 Belleville, Sumpter, and Van Buren voters getting new mail ballots (Oct. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/michigan/2026/10/02/wayne-county-ballot-misprint-belleville-library-van-buren-sumpter/"}, {"title": "City of Belleville (official) — Absentee ballot notice: corrected ballots numbered 30000+; destroy old ballots 00001–00899 (updated Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://bellevilleonthelake.com/news-and-notices/absentee-ballot-notice/"}, {"title": "FOX 2 Detroit — Absentee ballot error in Belleville, Sumpter, and Van Buren Township (Sept. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox2detroit.com/news/absentee-ballot-michigan-election-error-belleville-sumpter-van-buren-township"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Wayne County MI library-race absentee misprint (ei-2026-10-030)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-030 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-13; EMon status resolved, confidence high, severity medium; official_error yes). Confirmed via Votebeat + City of Belleville official notice + FOX 2. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: Kendall IL ei-2026-10-026, Pueblo CO ei-2026-10-028, CO Issue 7A ei-2026-10-011, Floyd IN ei-2026-10-018). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (two live ballots per voter until duplication). Watch the Sumpter count and the number of erroneous ballots duplicated."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-008", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-43", "uid": "C20260925-155410-43", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-43", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-008"], "seq": "C00043", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Sept. 18, 2026 the NAACP and allied organizations filed NAACP et al. v. DHS et al. seeking to restrain federal law-enforcement deployments alleged to intimidate voters around the midterms (Democracy Docket case page). Status Confirmed for the lawsuit filing; court has not finally adjudicated the merits in sources reviewed. Note Democracy Docket affiliation/advocacy framing of the docket.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — Federal election interference at the polls challenge (NAACP)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/federal-election-interference-at-the-polls-challenge-naacp/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ei-2026-09-008__democracy-docket-federal-election-interference-at-the-polls.png"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-008. Filing Confirmed; maps to Lawfare leaf as election-adjacent federal litigation."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-015", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-46", "uid": "C20260925-155410-46", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-46", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-015"], "seq": "C00046", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-18", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Per CEIR calendars and contemporaneous reporting, early in-person or equivalent pre-Election Day voting for the Nov. 3, 2026 midterms began as early as Sept. 18 in Virginia, Minnesota (absentee), South Dakota, and Idaho, with Illinois among states opening Sept. 24; most states open mid-October (Kentucky as late as Oct. 29 per CEIR). Status Confirmed for published early-voting calendar facts illustrating multi-week \"Election Day\" expansion.", "sources": [{"title": "CEIR — Dates for 2026 early in-person and mail voting", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/dates-for-2026-early-in-person-and-mail-voting/"}, {"title": "Washington Examiner — States begin September early voting", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/congressional/4732384/states-september-early-voting-midterm-elections/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-015. Calendar Confirmed. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Early Voting; Election 'Day'' to 'Election \"Day\" > Allowing voting before Election Day allows bad actors to gain necessary infor...'."}
{"id": "fed-2026-09-16-house-actblue-report-iii-passport-check-actbluexx", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-04", "uid": "C20261020-221915-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-04", "old_ids": ["fed-2026-09-16-house-actblue-report-iii-passport-check-actbluexx"], "seq": "C01477", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-16", "state": "Federal", "description": "On September 16, 2026, the House Administration, Judiciary and Oversight Committees released a third interim staff report on ActBlue. Internal ActBlue documents show that the platform's U.S. passport check for donors with foreign addresses only confirmed that the number entered had the right number of characters, which ActBlue staff called \"very basic validation\"; it did not confirm that the passport existed or that the donor was a U.S. citizen. ActBlue policy also let an employee verify a donor's citizenship personally and enter the placeholder \"ACTBLUEXX\" in place of a passport number, which skipped future verification for that donor. Internal logs show fraud analysts instructed to \"give the donor the benefit of the doubt\" when reviewing flagged foreign donations. The report adds that ActBlue continued to withhold large portions of Aaron Ting's resignation letter on claims of attorney-client privilege. Status Confirmed: the verification design is documented in ActBlue's own internal records. Whether any particular foreign contribution passed through this gap has not been adjudicated. Catalog point: an identity check that accepts any string of the right length lets anyone give in someone else's name.", "sources": [{"title": "House Committees — Interim Staff Report III on ActBlue, with exhibits (Sept. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-09/FINAL%20ActBlue%20Staff%20Report%20III%20+%20Exhibits.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-09-16-house-actblue-report-iii-passport-check-actbluexx__house-final-20actblue-20staff-20report-20iii-20-20exhibits.pdf"}, {"title": "Just the News — Rep. Jordan suggests ActBlue is in legal jeopardy after latest report (Sept. 17, 2026)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/index%2Ephp/government/congress/jordan-suggests-actblue-legal-jeopardy-after-latest-report-companys-fraud", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-09-16-house-actblue-report-iii-passport-check-actbluexx__justthenews-jordan-suggests-actblue-legal-jeopardy-after-latest-report-companys-.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Quotes verified in the report text. No ActBlue response to Report III was located in this sweep; add one if it is found."}
{"id": "ncsl-table16-scan-before-election-day-no-results-release", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-12", "uid": "C20260925-185839-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-12", "old_ids": ["ncsl-table16-scan-before-election-day-no-results-release"], "seq": "C00163", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Some states claim not to tabulate during early voting, yet scanning ballots is tabulating them, and some people can see the results in real time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-15", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL Table 16 (updated Sept. 15, 2026) documents that 33 states plus D.C. and Puerto Rico allow processed absentee/mail ballots to be scanned on optical scanners/tabulators before Election Day in at least some circumstances, while stating that modern equipment can scan without viewing totals and that none of those states allow results of scanned ballots to be viewed or released before polls close. Catalog claim: feeding ballots through machines during early voting is machine access even when officials say they are 'not tabulating' in the sense of releasing totals. Status Confirmed for widespread pre-Election Day scanning into tabulators with results sealed. Transparent public hand count (PEP) is the catalog's cited contrast for observable tabulation.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Table 16: When Absentee/Mail Ballot Processing and Counting Can Begin", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-16-when-absentee-mail-ballot-processing-and-counting-can-begin"}, {"title": "Bipartisan Policy Center — Ballot pre-processing policies explained", "url": "https://bipartisanpolicy.org/explainer/ballot-pre-processing-explained/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-table16-scan-before-election-day-no-results-release__bipartisan-policy-center-ballot-pre-processing-policies-expl.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 6. Scanning≠public totals, but is machine tabulation access. Distinct from 50/50-preload leaf."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-006", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-42", "uid": "C20260925-155410-42", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-42", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-006"], "seq": "C00042", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-14", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Sept. 14–15, 2026 the U.S. Supreme Court left intact a lower-court injunction blocking USPS final rules that would have required specialized mail-ballot envelope designs (including unique barcodes) and submission of voter mailing data via a USPS portal before the midterms. Status Confirmed for the Court's leave-in-place of the block (CBS/AP contemporaneous reporting); underlying policy dispute remains litigated.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News — Supreme Court blocks new Postal Service mail ballot rules", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/supreme-court-blocks-new-postal-service-mail-ballots-trump/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-006. Previously skipped; clear USPS leaf mapping."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-011", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-45", "uid": "C20260925-155410-45", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-45", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-011"], "seq": "C00045", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-12", "state": "MN", "description": "Around Sept. 12–14, 2026 the Minnesota Supreme Court allowed the City of Oak Grove to use paper voter rosters instead of electronic poll books for the 2026 general election, over League of Women Voters warnings about wait times/errors. Status Confirmed for the court authorization of paper check-in as an alternative to e-pollbooks in that locality.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — Minnesota early voting restrictions / Oak Grove paper poll books", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/gop-led-early-voting-restrictions-compound-in-minnesota/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ei-2026-09-011__democracy-docket-minnesota-early-voting-restrictions-oak-gro.png"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-011. Clear Electronic Poll Books leaf mapping."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-005", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-53", "uid": "C20260925-155410-53", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-53", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-005"], "seq": "C00053", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Office of Inspector General audit (Sept. 4, 2026; reported by ProPublica Sept. 9) found election-mail training gaps at many delivery units, managers unaware of correct ballot postmarking at ~12% of reviewed facilities, inaccurate hand-postmark dates at some processing facilities (including 56 wrong-date postmarks in Pennsylvania on primary day), and incomplete daily election-mail dispatch checks—while noting most facilities generally complied and nearly 99% of trackable ballots were processed on time. Status Confirmed for OIG audit findings of operational gaps.", "sources": [{"title": "ProPublica — Postal Service audit on primary election ballots", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/postal-service-audit-primary-election-ballots"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-005."}
{"id": "ncsl-2026-29-states-prohibit-limit-private-election-funding-zuckerbucks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-03", "uid": "C20260926-023334-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-03", "old_ids": ["ncsl-2026-29-states-prohibit-limit-private-election-funding-zuckerbucks"], "seq": "C01063", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Are likely gaining power or money through complicity in election manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's Prohibiting Private Funding of Elections tracker (updated Sept. 1, 2026) documents that twenty-nine states now prohibit, limit, or regulate private/philanthropic funding of election administration—legislation enacted after CTCL's 2020 Zuckerberg/Chan-network grants to local offices (grants ranging from $5,000 to $19 million)—including Wisconsin's 2024 constitutional amendment and Wyoming's 2025 statute. Status Confirmed multi-state statutory/constitutional compilation; peer to CTCL grants and Wisconsin ban cards already on this leaf—nationwide NCSL tally, not those remounted. PEP framing: private admin grants concentrated resources in machine/mail expansion jurisdictions; public-only funding rules respond to that leverage without resolving hand-count staffing gaps.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Prohibiting Private Funding of Elections (updated Sept. 1, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/prohibiting-private-funding-of-elections"}, {"title": "Center for Election Innovation & Research — Overview of private funding bans / PA 25 P.S. §§2607 & 3556", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/overview-of-private-funding-bans/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on party-adjacent private election-admin money leaf."}
{"id": "tx-2026-texas-gov-address-validation-error-15000-updates-backlog-civix", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-01", "uid": "C20261019-123505-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-01", "old_ids": ["tx-2026-texas-gov-address-validation-error-15000-updates-backlog-civix"], "seq": "C01432", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Outsourcing voter-roll maintenance to entities that fail to maintain the rolls properly (through incompetence or malice), which also lets a fourth party manipulate the rolls indirectly"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09-01 to 2026-10-16", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 15, 2026, the Texas Secretary of State's office told county election officials about a new error affecting voter name and address updates submitted through the state's Texas.gov change website from Sept. 1 until sometime the previous week. In an email obtained by Votebeat, state Elections Director Christina Adkins said the cause was \"an extra address validation with Texas.gov\" and that Civix, the vendor that runs the state's TEAM voter registration system, \"has rerun all files from September 1 through the present to identify any affected voters.\" SOS spokesperson Alicia Pierce said about 15,000 affected records were sent to counties. The county election officials' association reported about 3,000 to Bexar, 1,100 to Travis, 700 to Williamson and 400 to Hays, and Lubbock received a little over 200. Counties had to work out which updates were submitted before the Oct. 5 registration deadline and apply them before early voting began Oct. 19, and some reported the new records lacked needed address information. Williamson County said it processed its files overnight. The association said \"the current unpredictability of the TEAM system is unsustainable for our state's election system.\" Voters who submitted updates before Oct. 5 remain eligible. This is a second, separate backlog after the DPS driver's-license portal failure already in this catalog. Status Confirmed: the state elections director's own email, the SOS spokesperson's count and several outlets. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: two vendor-run state systems dropped voter records within weeks of each other, and each time counties learned of it only days before voting. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Rolls kept and checked locally by the county, in public view, are harder to break quietly from a state vendor's server.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Tribune / Votebeat — Texas voter registration records hit by new backlog (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2026/10/16/texas-voter-registration-records-new-backlog/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Address-update backlog: SOS email cites extra Texas.gov address validation (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/10/16/voter-registration-records-address-update-backlog-secretary-of-state/"}, {"title": "San Antonio Express-News — Voter registration error: county counts (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.expressnews.com/politics/article/voter-registration-texas-error-22480736.php"}, {"title": "KVUE — State website error delays Texas voter registration updates before early voting (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/vote-texas/state-website-error-delays-texas-voter-registration-updates-before-early-voting/269-4c303f65-d91c-4df0-bdab-ff03c3ff7bd6"}, {"title": "Lubbock Lights — Lubbock voter registration backlog after Texas error (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://lubbocklights.com/lubbock-voter-registration-backlog-texas-error/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Texas.gov address-update backlog (ei-2026-10-040)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-040 (first_seen 2026-10-16; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error yes). Mapped to Voter Rolls > Outsourcing (Civix/TEAM vendor). Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls (peer ei-2026-09-001 TX DPS backlog). Four of five sources curl 200; KVUE 403 bot-block. Express-News names the group 'Texas Association of County Elected Officials'; the Tribune says Election Officials.", "vendor": ["Civix"]}
{"id": "fl-lake-2026-cd6-vbm-ballots-omit-libertarian-parrott-9000", "permanent_id": "C20261015-121255-01", "uid": "C20261015-121255-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261015-121255-01", "old_ids": ["fl-lake-2026-cd6-vbm-ballots-omit-libertarian-parrott-9000"], "seq": "C01416", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-09 to 2026-10-14", "state": "FL", "description": "About 9,000 vote-by-mail ballots sent to Lake County, Florida voters in the county's portion of Florida's 6th Congressional District left off qualified Libertarian candidate Andrew Parrott, Florida Politics reported on Oct. 14, 2026. Parrott had qualified when qualifying closed on June 12. Supervisor of Elections Alan Hays said his office accepts full responsibility and personally called each candidate. Assistant Supervisor Steve Hines called it human error and attributed it partly to the post-primary CD-11 machine recount, which paused general-election ballot building. The office did not reissue the ballots on its own, citing a cost of about $26,000 to resend all 9,000; instead, affected voters are getting postcards and new sample ballots, and a voter who wants a corrected ballot must request one in person or by mail. As of Oct. 14 no voter had asked for a replacement, and the office says it cannot cancel a ballot that has already been cast. Parrott will appear on early-voting and Election Day ballots. Separately, withdrawn no-party candidate Michael Gist appeared on the first mailed batches because he withdrew on Sept. 19, after the packets were prepared. Officials say they will add proofreading steps. Status Confirmed for the Supervisor's own on-record acknowledgment (single outlet quoting the Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor directly). Intent is not alleged. Catalog point: a qualified candidate vanished from about 9,000 mailed ballots, and the remedy puts the burden on each voter to notice and ask for a new ballot, while ballots already returned stay as cast. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Ballots proofed in public against the certified candidate list before mailing, and in-person precinct voting on hand-counted paper, keep an omitted candidate visible before anyone votes.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Politics — Lake County offers new mail-in ballots after officials forgot the Libertarian in CD 6, but so far there are no takers (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://floridapolitics.com/archives/824902-lake-county-offers-new-mail-in-ballots-after-officials-forgot-the-libertarian-in-cd-6-but-so-far-there-are-no-takers/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lake County FL CD-6 candidate omitted (ei-2026-10-037)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-037 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error yes). EMon flagged it to CTE as a mail-ballot handling issue. Single outlet (curl 200, 2026-10-15) quoting the Supervisor and Assistant Supervisor. Mapped to Ballots > Wrong ballot styles (peers: Floyd IN missing commissioner race ei-2026-10-018; Shelby TN missing races ei-2026-09-013; Hendricks IN ei-2026-10-034). Cross-leaf: Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (no proactive reissue; cast ballots cannot be cancelled). Watch replacement-ballot requests and any candidate or party legal challenge."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-003", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-50", "uid": "C20260925-155410-50", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-50", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-003"], "seq": "C00050", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington rejected 20,267 ballots for late postmarks in the August 2026 primary, up from 16,131 in 2024 (~32% increase), even as more voters used drop boxes. Rural/central counties saw sharp jumps. Sen. Maria Cantwell and county auditors linked trends to USPS processing/postmark timing changes. Status Confirmed for the official rejection counts and increase; intentional fraud not claimed.", "sources": [{"title": "Spokesman-Review — 4,000 additional WA ballots rejected due to late postmarks", "url": "https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2026/sep/04/4000-additional-ballots-in-washington-rejected-due/"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks surged in WA and OR", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-003. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Mail ballots' to 'Mail Ballots > Missing Postmarks'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-013", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-56", "uid": "C20260925-155410-56", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-56", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-013"], "seq": "C00056", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08", "state": "TN", "description": "During August 2026 early voting ahead of Tennessee's primary, one Shelby County machine at Christian Life Church in Bartlett was missing four state judicial races, affecting 307 voters. Officials attributed the issue to human error amid a headquarters move and redistricting; ~700 absentee ballots earlier lacked the same races. Affected in-person voters could not revote under state law. Status Confirmed for the ballot-definition omission and official human-error explanation; intentional fraud not alleged by officials.", "sources": [{"title": "Action News 5 / WMC — Shelby County early voting machine missing races", "url": "https://www.actionnews5.com/2026/08/03/liveshelby-county-election-officials-speak-early-voting-turnout/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-013. Remapped under wrong ballot style / missing races leaf. Also relevant to Electronic Voting Machines."}
{"id": "ga-doaa-2026-25-09-1210-duplicate-registrants-three-double-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-04", "uid": "C20261014-201922-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-04", "old_ids": ["ga-doaa-2026-25-09-1210-duplicate-registrants-three-double-votes"], "seq": "C01400", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08", "state": "GA", "description": "The Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts' special examination Voter Registration and List Maintenance (Report No. 25-09, August 2026) found that although the Secretary of State runs nightly system-wide duplicate matching and receives ERIC cross-state duplicate matches about every 60 days, auditors still identified 1,210 individuals with more than one voter registration in active or inactive status. Many carried identifiers SOS had already flagged (duplicate driver's license or Social Security numbers). 955 (79%) had both records active, and auditors found three cases where both duplicate records were used to vote in the same election. SOS told auditors that a duplicate pair a county registrar wrongly clears is never presented again for review. The report recommends SOS strengthen controls to prevent and detect duplicates and re-review pairs counties cleared. Status Confirmed (official state audit). Catalog point: the state's own duplicate checks let same-person dual records survive, both live, and three were voted twice — one confirmed \"mistake\" of this kind makes the excuse credible everywhere. Larger-scale clone estimates for Georgia (Paquette, Alleged) are not validated by this audit.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Dept. of Audits and Accounts — Special Examination 25-09, Voter Registration and List Maintenance (Aug. 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/34351"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Confirmed from report text (PDF fetched; duplicate section ~p. 2090 of pdftotext). Existing card ga-doaa-2025-25-09-voter-registration-list-maintenance-data-consistency (Voter Rolls > No data consistency) covers the same report but not the duplicate finding; this is the Modified Clones-specific card."}
{"id": "fvap-2026-08-emergency-fpca-fwab-never-lived-checkbox-removed", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-02", "uid": "C20261009-100620-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-02", "old_ids": ["fvap-2026-08-emergency-fpca-fwab-never-lived-checkbox-removed"], "seq": "C01266", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "In August 2026 the Pentagon (Department of War / FVAP) used emergency Paperwork Reduction Act clearance to revise the Federal Post Card Application (SF-76) and Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (SF-186), removing the checkbox 'I am a US citizen living outside the country, I have never lived in the United States.' Deputy Under Secretary Sean O'Keefe's request letter says never-resided civilians are 'not within the class of voters specifically defined by UOCAVA' and may not be able to use the federal forms, and that the next federal election was fewer than 90 days away. OMB approved the request on Aug. 28. FVAP then said states may still process earlier form versions. NPR (Sept. 30) reported that state guidance was posted about a month after the forms changed. AARO's Oct. 1 alert says FVAP's director advised born-abroad voters to write the never-lived statement in Box 6, and that public comments run through Nov. 9. U.S. Vote Foundation asked for the change to be reversed and noted the revised ID section lists a U.S. passport, which election officials cannot verify. Status Confirmed for the form change and process (OMB ICR letter, NPR, AARO, USVF). Both sides' framing, 'reducing confusion' vs. 'disenfranchising', is reported as each side's claim. The DNC's Oct. 1 lawsuit over the change is a separate card (ei-2026-10-002) on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "OMB ICR 202608-0704-009 — DoW emergency processing request letter (Aug. 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://omb.report/icr/202608-0704-009/doc/original/171967302.pdf"}, {"title": "NPR — Pentagon alters forms amid GOP push to limit overseas voting (Sept. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2026/09/30/nx-s1-5978976/military-voter-registration-overseas-citizens-absentee-voting"}, {"title": "AARO — Special Voting Alert: FPCA issue (Oct. 1, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://aaro.org/images/SPECIAL-FPCA-ISSUE.2026OCT01-FINAL.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Vote Foundation — Press release: FPCA/FWAB emergency changes (Sept. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.usvotefoundation.org/press/fpca-fwab-emergency-changes"}], "notes": "Distinct from ei-2026-10-002 (DNC lawsuit, Oct. 1, 2026; moved to this leaf 2026-10-09). Parent task listed the DNC suit as 2026-10-04; The Guardian dates the filing to Thursday Oct. 1, 2026."}
{"id": "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-03", "uid": "C20261026-180010-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-03", "old_ids": ["pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling"], "seq": "C01568", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08-25 (Pennsylvania certification report)", "state": "PA", "description": "The Pennsylvania Department of State's certification report for KNOWiNK Poll Pad 4.2.1, signed by the Secretary August 25, 2026, describes how voter data reaches the poll books. [1] The data from the Statewide Uniform Registry of Electors (SURE) \"needs to be prepared by the KNOWiNK data conversion team\"; the extract \"is transferred via secure file transfer to KNOWiNK for conversion services\" and the converted data \"is then transferred back to the county to be loaded onto the tablets.\" [1] The report requires that the transfer \"be validated for accuracy and completeness after loading data to poll pads to avoid data inconsistencies on Election Day.\" [1] It conditions the certification on tablets being configured to prevent communication with ePulse (the vendor's central synchronization service) during polling hours, on voting history returning to SURE by file extract no later than the Thursday after the election, on counties being able to capture all poll book data updates needed for Election Day, on data being reconciled each time when the pre-election load includes multiple updates, and on counties not allowing the vendor to run any data extraction utility against SURE (any transfer must be a file extract). [1] State law requires each poll book screen to show the date and time the list was prepared (25 Pa.C.S. 1402(b)(2)). Status Confirmed that, as certified, the Pennsylvania poll book runs on a vendor-converted file extract with no live synchronization during polling hours, and that the state itself warns of data inconsistencies if the load is not validated. The ES&S ExpressPoll and EZRoster reports appear to follow the same structure but were seen only in search summaries and are not cited here as fact.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State, Secretary's certification report, KNOWiNK Poll Pad 4.2.1 (Aug. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/voting-systems/certification-reports/secretary%27s%20signed%20knowink%20pollpad%204.2.1%20report.pdf"}], "notes": "The certification report is the only source; the ES&S ExpressPoll and EZRoster reports are not cited.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after", "mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live", "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "knowink-pollpad-pa-approval-requires-encrypted-closed-network", "philadelphia-2020-primary-40-mail-plus-in-person-4-counted", "knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-pollpad-checkin-sync-eac-scope", "tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected"]}
{"id": "wi-ashland-sawyer-2026-10-16-hava-complaints-clerks-cannot-read-tabulator-records-vendor-holds-clears-media", "permanent_id": "C20261120-121619-02", "uid": "C20261120-121619-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261120-121619-02", "old_ids": ["wi-ashland-sawyer-2026-10-16-hava-complaints-clerks-cannot-read-tabulator-records-vendor-holds-clears-media"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Instead of handling security locally, many counties and states outsource it, which creates risk and displaces responsibility."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08-11 (primary records); 2026-10-16 (complaints filed); 2026-11-03 and 2026-11-05 (clerks' sworn responses); 2026-11-18 (Commission agenda)", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin data analyst Peter Bernegger filed two Help America Vote Act complaints with the Wisconsin Elections Commission on Oct. 16, 2026: EL 26-61 against Sawyer County Clerk Liz Klein and EL 26-62 against Ashland County Clerk Heather Schutte. Both arose from his public-records requests for the electronic ballot images, cast vote records (CVRs) and machine-generated CVR spreadsheets from the Aug. 11, 2026 primary. The clerks' own sworn responses, filed on the Commission's dockets, confirm the core facts. Ashland County (response of Nov. 3, 2026, by attorneys Max T. Lindsey and Katie M. Posewitz): eight of its 16 municipalities use ES&S DS200 tabulators; the USB flash drives are programmed by the vendor, ES&S; \"Neither the municipalities nor Ashland County have the equipment to program, clear or reprogram the flash drives\" or to read them; the requested electronic records \"are not in Ashland County's possession, control or custody\"; the clerk enters the results by hand into a spreadsheet from the results tapes; and when Bernegger made his request, the primary's flash drives \"were already in the possession of ES&S to clear and reprogram for the November 3, 2026 general election.\" Sawyer County (verified response of Liz Klein, Nov. 5, 2026, by Attolles Law): the clerk told Bernegger that CVR records \"are not accessible to her\" and that obtaining ballot images, tabulator cards and the encrypted election report would require a Memory Device Records Request to the vendor Command Central at $25 per Dominion ImageCast Evolution tabulator (23 tabulators, $575 prepaid); \"Sawyer County does not use an EMS system for elections\"; Command Central, under contracts with each municipality, provides the tabulators and electronically stores the ballot images; and after 14 days (primary) or 21 days (other elections) the memory devices are returned to Command Central with a form granting it permission \"to back up all returned memory election media, then clear or erase devices and prepare them for the next election.\" Both clerks say the hand-marked paper ballots and results tapes are retained for 22 months and are the HAVA audit record, and ask that the complaints be dismissed. The Commission's Nov. 18, 2026 agenda listed both complaints; Bernegger posted on X on Nov. 19 that the Commission agreed to hold evidentiary hearings, which has not been confirmed from a Commission source. No HAVA violation has been found. Status Confirmed as to the records arrangement, which both clerks state under oath; the claimed HAVA violation is Alleged and denied, and no ruling has been made. Catalog point: in two Wisconsin counties the election official responsible for the results cannot read, hold or clear the electronic records of her own tabulators; the vendor programs the media, keeps the electronic ballot images, charges the county to retrieve them and erases the devices for the next election. What the counties do still hold is the paper: the hand-marked ballots that a public hand count can verify without any vendor.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — EL 26-62 Bernegger v. Schutte, Respondent's Response to Verified Complaint (Ashland County, Nov. 3, 2026)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/03%20-%20Response%20-%20Peter%20Bernegger%20v.%20Heather%20Schutte%20%28EL%2026-62%29%20-%2011.3.26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wec-el-26-62-bernegger-v-schutte-ashland-response-2026-11-03.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — EL 26-61 Bernegger v. Klein, Verified Response of Elizabeth Klein (Sawyer County, Nov. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/03%20-%20Response%20-%20Peter%20Bernegger%20v.%20Liz%20Klein%20%28EL%2026-61%29%20-%2011.5.26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wec-el-26-61-bernegger-v-klein-sawyer-response-2026-11-05.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission (EL 26-62 docket) (2026-10-16)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/resources/5061-complaint-help-america-vote-act-violation/el-26-62-peter-bernegger-v-heather-schutte"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission (EL 26-61 docket) (2026-10-16)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/resources/5061-complaint-help-america-vote-act-violation/el-26-61-peter-bernegger-v-liz-klein"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission (EL 26-62 notice letter) (2026-10-19)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/02%20-%20Notice%20Letter%20-%20Peter%20Bernegger%20v.%20Heather%20Schutte%20%28EL%2026-62%29%20-%2010.19.26.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission (Nov. 18, 2026 meeting page) (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/event/commission-meeting-november-18-2026"}, {"title": "Peter Bernegger (X) — says the Commission agreed to evidentiary hearings (Nov. 19, 2026; unconfirmed)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2123631347755286563"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — WI: HAVA complaints on Ashland, Sawyer tabulator records (hearings claimed) (ei-2026-10-456)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-456 (added 2026-11-20 12:16 PM ET, 2026-11-20 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon active, medium confidence because the clerks' responses had not been reviewed). This ingest downloaded both sworn responses directly from the Commission (curl HTTP 200; docket pages read by WebFetch) and archived them locally (SHA-256 Klein 30a10626…6ff dc5ff, Schutte 3efa3a75…c5467830); the Ashland PDF is a scan and was read visually. The facts on this card come from the clerks' own filings, not from Bernegger's summary. The hearing grant remains unconfirmed. Command Central is named as the reseller/data custodian (no canonical vendor tag). Queue cross-check: Bernegger's other queue items (rq-2026-10-29-wi-bernegger-absentee-list-inactive-voters-received-ballots, rq-2026-11-03-wi-milwaukee-bernegger-manual-laptop-credentials-expressvote-access-code) concern different records and claims; the clerks' responses do not address them and same-claimant material is not independent corroboration. Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["DS200", "ImageCast Evolution"]}
{"id": "mo-2026-08-04-primary-ballot-shortages-jackson-58-of-103-polling-places-pulaski-callaway", "permanent_id": "C20261120-122513-03", "uid": "C20261120-122513-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261120-122513-03", "old_ids": ["mo-2026-08-04-primary-ballot-shortages-jackson-58-of-103-polling-places-pulaski-callaway"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08-04 (primary); 2026-09-08 (Missouri Independent/Beacon report)", "state": "MO", "description": "In Missouri's Aug. 4, 2026 primary, polling places in at least three counties ran out of preprinted paper ballots. In Jackson County, 58 of the 103 polling places run by the Jackson County Election Board ran out of some type of ballot, almost all needing more nonpartisan ballots; Hawthorn Hill Elementary School and Holy Spirit Catholic Church also ran out of Democratic ballots, and voters waited in long lines while one voter at a time used the voting machines and new ballots were printed and delivered (KMBC; Missouri Independent/The Beacon). The board had ordered 107,610 ballots and ended up ordering 4,300 more plus 20 more machines; co-director Sara Zorich said, 'We were doing what we thought was enough, and obviously we fell a little bit short,' and co-director Tyler Spencer said the board uses historical turnout to set quantities rather than print every ballot type for every voter. Pulaski County Clerk David Ernst said preprinted nonpartisan and party ballots ran out at some of the county's smaller polling places, the first time in his eight years; Callaway County Clerk Ronda Miller said half of the county's 18 polling places ran out of nonpartisan ballots. Officials attributed the shortages to higher-than-expected turnout (statewide Democratic primary turnout up about 49.5 percent over 2022) and said voters could use an ADA machine in each case; they laid out plans for November. Status Confirmed: the shortages and their extent were stated by the county election officials themselves. Catalog point: ballot quantities set by turnout guesses ran out at more than half of one county's polling places, pushing voters onto one-at-a-time machines and long lines. Ordering enough hand-countable paper ballots for every eligible voter in each precinct removes that choke point.", "sources": [{"title": "Missouri Independent (from The Beacon) — Missouri counties suffered ballot shortages amid high primary turnout (Ryleigh Hindle, Sept. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://missouriindependent.com/2026/09/08/missouri-counties-suffered-ballot-shortages-amid-high-primary-turnout/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/moindependent-mo-2026-09-08-primary-ballot-shortages-jackson-pulaski-callaway.html"}, {"title": "The Beacon — Missouri counties suffered ballot shortages amid high primary turnout (Aug. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://thebeaconnews.org/stories/2026/08/28/high-voter-turnout-drove-missouri-ballot-shortages/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/beacon-mo-2026-08-28-primary-ballot-shortages.html"}, {"title": "KMBC 9 — Two Jackson County polling places run out of paper ballots on Election Day (Nick Sloan, Aug. 4, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kmbc.com/article/jackson-county-paper-ballot-shortage-election-day-2026/73349472", "local": "/archives/2026/11/kmbc-mo-jackson-2026-08-04-two-polling-places-run-out-paper-ballots.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-20 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-20 12:25 PM ET). Missouri Independent, The Beacon and KMBC archived (curl 200). Distinct from the Nov. 3, 2026 Kansas City Blue Ridge power-outage card and the Independence LPR registration card. Related queue item rq-2026-11-03-mo-pulaski-dixon-polling-place-ran-out-of-paper-ballots concerns the Nov. 3 general election and is not corroborated by this August primary card. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-2026-rule-168-48-epb-seven-day-deletion-vs-22-month-retention-preservation-order", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-03", "uid": "C20261012-123213-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-03", "old_ids": ["mi-2026-rule-168-48-epb-seven-day-deletion-vs-22-month-retention-preservation-order"], "seq": "C01290", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Deliberately misinterpret the 22-month federal retention minimum to restrict access to election records for 22 months."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-08 to 2026-10-09", "state": "MI", "description": "Bridgewater Township (Washtenaw County) Clerk Michelle McQueer sued Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson, Elections Director Jonathan Brater and the Department of State over Mich. Admin. Code R 168.48. The rule generally requires clerks to delete electronic pollbook (EPB) software and associated files within seven days after an election's final canvass and certification, with exceptions for recounts, audits, court orders or security releases. McQueer argues the rule conflicts with 52 U.S.C. § 20701, which requires federal election records to be kept for 22 months. Court of Claims Judge Michael J. Riordan ordered EPB files preserved while the case is pending and put it on an expedited track. In October 2026 the RNC and Michigan Republican Party were granted intervention and filed a joinder and supplemental brief arguing that EPB data, such as challenge notes on missing or mismatched ballot stubs kept locally rather than in the Qualified Voter File, would be lost under the seven-day rule. Status Confirmed for the pending litigation, the state rule text and the preservation order (Michigan News Source, MLive, intervenors' filing). The preemption question has not been decided. Catalog point: the 22-month federal retention floor is routinely treated as a ceiling or ignored. A state rule ordering pollbook files deleted within a week means check-in records needed to reconcile who voted can disappear before anyone asks for them. Precinct paper pollbooks and paper ballots under tight chain of custody do not depend on a deletion rule.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan News Source — Seven days vs. 22 months: Republicans join court fight over Benson's election-records rule (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.michigannewssource.com/2026/10/seven-days-vs-22-months-republicans-join-court-fight-over-bensons-election-records-rule/"}, {"title": "Michigan News Source — RNC joins fight over Benson election-record deletion rule; Riordan preservation order (Aug. 31, 2026)", "url": "https://www.michigannewssource.com/2026/08/seven-days-or-22-months-rnc-joins-fight-over-benson-election-record-deletion-rule/"}, {"title": "RNC/MRP notice of joinder and supplemental brief, Michigan Court of Claims (Oct. 8, 2026; PDF via Michigan News Source)", "url": "https://www.michigannewssource.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/motion.pdf"}, {"title": "MLive — Clerk in rural township near Ann Arbor challenges state rule to delete voter pollbooks (Aug. 13, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-12, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.mlive.com/news/ann-arbor/2026/08/clerk-in-rural-township-near-ann-arbor-challenges-state-rule-to-delete-voter-pollbooks.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — MI Rule 168.48 EPB deletion vs 22-month retention (ei-2026-10-017)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-017 (first_seen 2026-08-12, last_updated 2026-10-09; EMon status active, confidence high). Confirmed for litigation, rule and preservation order; merits pending. Mapped to Reporting; Records > 22-month retention leaf (peers: 52 USC 20701 statute card; CA Elec 17301 destroy-after-22-months). Cross-leaf: Electronic Poll Books (peers ei-2026-09-011/014/016). Distinct from Lansing poll-worker suit (ei-2026-10-016). Watch summary disposition and statewide scope.", "related": ["mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live"]}
{"id": "wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied", "permanent_id": "C20261009-104030-01", "uid": "C20261009-104030-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-104030-01", "old_ids": ["wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied"], "seq": "C01279", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-07-23/2026-10-06", "state": "WI", "description": "League of Women Voters of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, Dane County Case No. 2026CV002404, was filed July 23, 2026 by Law Forward and Fair Elections Center for the League and a Dane County voter. It challenged WEC guidance that bars an absentee voter whose mailed ballot may not arrive by the 8 p.m. Election Day deadline from casting a provisional ballot in person. That guidance follows Wis. Stat. § 6.86(6): an elector who mails or delivers an absentee ballot to the clerk may not vote in person at the same election. Plaintiffs cited USPS slowdowns, including 336 late absentee ballots rejected in Milwaukee and 100+ in Fond du Lac in April 2026, and a WEC clerk survey in which 67% reported mail-time problems. They asked that such voters get a sealed, segregated provisional ballot, counted only if the mailed ballot did not arrive in time; if it did arrive, the provisional ballot would be set aside, so only one ballot would count. At an Oct. 6, 2026 hearing the court let Rep. Calvin Callahan (R) intervene against the relief, denied the temporary injunction, and declined to rule on summary judgment. This is not a final merits decision. The RNC's Oct. 8 post and press release ('RNC Stops Wisconsin Democrat Double-Voting Scheme'; Chairman Joe Gruters: 'let people cast a second ballot after already voting absentee') is partisan framing. The plaintiffs proposed a fail-safe provisional ballot, with one ballot counted, not two counted votes. The available record (WisPolitics/Callahan release, Democracy Docket case page) names Callahan, not the RNC, as the intervenor; any RNC role beyond public messaging is unverified here. Status Confirmed for the filing, the intervention, and the TI denial. PEP point: a mailed ballot's status on Election Day is invisible to the voter and the public. Late-mail rejections and proposals for second 'fail-safe' ballots both flow from the mail-ballot chain-of-custody gap that in-person, hand-counted voting avoids.", "sources": [{"title": "X — RNC Vote Protect (@RNCVoteProtect), 'Election integrity victory in Wisconsin' (posted 2026-10-08 20:51 ET; ~13K views)", "url": "https://x.com/RNCVoteProtect/status/2108359772525437361", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — RNC press release image 'RNC Stops Wisconsin Democrat Double-Voting Scheme' (Gruters quote)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUJl_wxWwAA1nYr.png?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "WisPolitics — Callahan campaign: Court sides with Callahan, denies League of Women Voters TI (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wispolitics.com/2026/callahan-campaign-court-sides-with-callahan-rejects-last-minute-push-to-let-voters-cast-two-ballots-judge-denies-league-of-women-voters/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Wisconsin judge won't allow provisional ballots for people fearing Postal Service delays (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/in-blow-to-mail-voters-wisconsin-judge-wont-allow-provisional-ballots-for-people-fearing-postal-service-delays/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Case page: Wisconsin Absentee Ballot Delay Challenge (docket timeline)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/wisconsin-absentee-ballot-delay-challenge/"}, {"title": "LWVWI v. WEC complaint, Dane County (July 23, 2026, PDF via WPR)", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026.07.23-Final-date-stamped-LWVWI-v-WEC-complaint-redacted.pdf"}, {"title": "Fair Elections Center — Press release: League sues WEC over guidance (provisional counted only if mailed ballot late)", "url": "https://fairelectionscenter.org/media/press-release-league-of-women-voters-sues-wisconsin-elections-commission-over-guidance-that-locks-voters-out-of-the-polls/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — WI LWV provisional-after-absentee TI denied (ei-2026-10-012)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Mark link-drop (RNC X post, 2026-10-08 20:51 ET). Vetted against WisPolitics, Democracy Docket, the complaint and the Fair Elections Center press release. Archived from fxtwitter (free) plus the press-release image (thumbnail). The written ruling/order PDF has not yet been located; the Oct. 6 hearing outcome is per the docket summary and both sides' releases. Companion: wi-2026-bins-v-wec-no-spoiling-returned-absentee-ballots-conway. EMon ei-2026-10-012 (first_seen 2026-10-07, last_updated 2026-10-09; EMon status emerging, confidence high) — same Dane County TI denial; remounted 2026-10-09 PM EDS/EMon ingest onto provisional/absentee-overlap leaf. Watch merits path / any appeal before Nov. 3.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "RNC press release image: 'RNC Stops Wisconsin Democrat Double-Voting Scheme'"}]}
{"id": "ncsl-permanent-absentee-mail-ballot-lists", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-30", "uid": "C20260925-184601-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-30", "old_ids": ["ncsl-permanent-absentee-mail-ballot-lists"], "seq": "C00148", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Many states have permanent mail-ballot lists, causing a perpetual flood of ballots in the mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-07-20", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL Table 3 (updated July 20, 2026) lists nine states where any voter may join a permanent absentee/mail ballot list and thereafter automatically receive a mail ballot each election (AZ, IL, ME, MD, MI, MN, MT, NJ, NM, VA—NCSL narrative also references D.C.). Separately, eight states plus D.C. conduct all-mail elections that mail ballots to all registered voters without a separate permanent list. Status Confirmed for permanent/automatic mail-ballot streams creating ongoing ballot volume in the mail.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Table 3: States With Permanent Absentee Voting Lists", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-3-states-with-permanent-absentee-voting-lists"}, {"title": "NCSL — Table 18: States With All-Mail Elections", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-18-states-with-all-mail-elections"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 14. Permanent + all-mail automatic ballot streams.", "related": ["nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates"]}
{"id": "wi-2026-bins-v-wec-no-spoiling-returned-absentee-ballots-conway", "permanent_id": "C20261009-104030-02", "uid": "C20261009-104030-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-104030-02", "old_ids": ["wi-2026-bins-v-wec-no-spoiling-returned-absentee-ballots-conway"], "seq": "C01280", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-07-09/2026-07-29", "state": "WI", "description": "On July 9, 2026, two weeks after absentee ballots for the August primary began going out, the Wisconsin Elections Commission voted 4–2 to withdraw its May 2026 guidance. New guidance told clerks that once an absentee ballot is returned 'it cannot be spoiled or reissued for any reason,' including a voter changing their mind or a candidate dropping out. Democratic-aligned voters sued (Bins et al. v. WEC, Dane County 2026CV002400). Democratic WEC members Ann Jacobs and Mark Thomsen sought to intervene against the guidance; GOP secretary of state candidate Nate Pollnow, backed by the RNC, sought to intervene in support, calling the plaintiffs' approach a 're-voting scheme.' On July 29, 2026, Dane County Circuit Judge David Conway denied the temporary restraining order. He held that 'the unambiguous language of the statute does not allow a voter to spoil an absentee ballot after it is returned.' He added that this was never allowed, 'even if some clerks may have mistakenly allowed this to happen out of confusion or misunderstanding about the law.' The 2022 Waukesha ruling (Schimel) barring post-return spoiling had been vacated on procedural grounds in Feb. 2026. Status Confirmed on the order and WEC memo. PEP point: for years some clerks reissued ballots after return under shifting guidance. That is a mail-ballot chain-of-custody weak point, with returned ballots pulled back out of custody, that observers could not see.", "sources": [{"title": "Dane County Circuit Court — Order, Bins v. WEC, 2026CV002400 (Judge Conway, July 29, 2026, PDF via WEC)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Bins%20v%20WEC%20court%20ruling.pdf"}, {"title": "WEC — Update on Ballot Spoiling Litigation (clerk memo)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/memo/update-ballot-spoiling-litigation"}, {"title": "AP — No do-over for Wisconsin's absentee voters, judge rules", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/wisconsin-primary-voters-absentee-ballots-democrats-e771822db24605c2ff609317c77da267"}, {"title": "WPR — Judge rejects attempt to let absentee voters recast ballots after candidates withdraw (July 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/news/judge-rejects-absentee-ballot-lawsuit"}, {"title": "State Affairs Pro — Dem WEC members, RNC seek to intervene in spoiled absentee ballot suit", "url": "https://pro.stateaffairs.com/wi/elections/dem-wec-members-rnc-seek-to-intervene-in-spoiled-absentee-ballot-suit"}], "notes": "Companion to wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied (requested by Mark/parent). Parent mentioned a fox11 PDF; the same order is cited here via the WEC-hosted copy (and a WPR copy: https://www.wpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/2026cv002400-order-7-29-26.pdf)."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-023", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-05", "uid": "C20261001-094909-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-05", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-023"], "seq": "C01261", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-07 to 2026-09", "state": "NJ", "description": "In July 2026 New Jersey disclosed that a Motor Vehicle Commission software error from about June 2023–June 2024 improperly and automatically registered roughly 6,600 people who had indicated they were not U.S. citizens. State officials said fewer than 400 of those individuals later voted, and by August reported about 5,100 removals with the review ongoing. On or about Sept. 22–23, 2026, the RNC, New Jersey Republican State Committee, U.S. Rep. Tom Kean Jr., and Senate Minority Leader Anthony Bucco sued Lt. Gov./Secretary of State Dale Caldwell and election officials in several counties in federal court seeking NVRA voter-roll maintenance records to evaluate the cleanup ahead of the Nov. 3 midterm; Essex County reportedly agreed to produce records. Status Confirmed for the state's disclosed MVC software registration error and cleanup figures as reported; the records suit is Confirmed as a filing. Operational software failure ≠ intentional fraud. Distinct from SAVE (ei-019) and the Nevada DHS list dispute (ei-020).", "sources": [{"title": "NJ.com — Fight over proof after NJ MVC registration glitch disclosure", "url": "https://www.nj.com/politics/2026/09/voters-were-told-nj-fixed-a-registration-glitch-now-comes-the-fight-over-proof.html"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — RNC sues New Jersey again for voter records after MVC error", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/rnc-sues-new-jersey-for-voter-records-again-after-earlier-case-was-tossed/"}, {"title": "Bloomberg Law — RNC / Rep. Tom Kean sue New Jersey for voter-roll records", "url": "https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/rnc-rep-tom-kean-sue-new-jersey-to-obtain-states-voter-roll"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NJ MVC noncitizen registration glitch (ei-2026-09-023)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-023. Confirmed for disclosed MVC Motor-Voter software error; suit filing Confirmed. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration / Registration; Voter Rolls. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Motor-Voter Registration' to its new child leaf 'Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in'.", "related": ["ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence"]}
{"id": "us-2026-median-strategies-fake-polls-wi-nv-ca-social-experiment", "permanent_id": "C20261023-183126-03", "uid": "C20261023-183126-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-183126-03", "old_ids": ["us-2026-median-strategies-fake-polls-wi-nv-ca-social-experiment"], "seq": "C01536", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-07 to 2026-08-20", "state": "WI, NV, CA", "description": "Median Strategies, an anonymous website, released polls in summer 2026 showing Francesca Hong leading Wisconsin's Democratic primary for governor by more than 20 points, Nevada Gov. Joe Lombardo up five, and Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass up by double digits over Nithya Raman. The Bass poll was shared by her campaign staff and the mayor and nudged prediction-market prices (WBAY). After questions from a Los Angeles Times reporter, the site shut down and withdrew its polls in mid-August 2026, issuing an unsigned statement that it was \"created as a short-term social experiment examining how purported polling information could enter and spread through the political information ecosystem without independent verification\" and denying any betting-market motive. On Aug. 20, 2026, the Guardian identified the operator as Rahil Prakash, a 21-year-old recent college graduate, who said, \"I wanted to see if fake polls could really penetrate the ecosystem that easily. And as it turned out, it could,\" and apologized to the Bass, Raman and Hong campaigns. Hong lost the primary. Marquette Law School poll director Charles Franklin said, \"it's not a poll it's just a fraud.\" The New York Times polling database did not include Median's polls (Silver Bulletin). Status Confirmed: the operator admitted the polls were made up. Catalog point: a fabricated poll endorsed by a campaign spreads faster than any vetting, and shapes expectations of who is \"supposed\" to win. Results counted openly at the precinct do not depend on any poll.", "sources": [{"title": "The Guardian — Website behind widely shared fake election polls run by 21-year-old (Aug. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/aug/20/fake-polling-website-median-strategies"}, {"title": "WBAY — Fake polling company shuts down after admitting Wisconsin, Nevada, California polls were fabricated (Aug. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbay.com/2026/08/20/fake-polling-company-shuts-down-after-admitting-wisconsin-nevada-california-polls-were-fabricated/"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Fake poll on Karen Bass / Los Angeles mayor race (Aug. 2026; curl 403 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/polling-poll-fake-median-karen-bass-los-angeles-669c90cc77664546791185625d43ffda"}, {"title": "Silver Bulletin (Nate Silver) — Fake polls are a real problem (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.natesilver.net/p/fake-polls-are-a-real-problem"}], "notes": "Evening sweep 2026-10-23: carded as the first 2026 fake-pollster case, answering the \"another firm\" claim. Confirmed by operator admission (named, on the record to the Guardian). Guardian, WBAY, Silver Bulletin curl 200; AP 403. Osborne Ink also lists The Public Sentiment Institute (TPSI), exposed in August 2026, as a fourth firm; not carded (single commentary source, not yet researched). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-012", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-52", "uid": "C20260925-155410-52", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-52", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-012"], "seq": "C00052", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "CA", "description": "Associated Press reporting (via PBS NewsHour) states that during California's June 2026 primary about 93,500 voters had ballots rejected because they were postmarked or arrived too late. California is also in the Brookings RTO late-rejection study. Status Confirmed for the reported aggregate late-rejection figure pending county-table re-verification.", "sources": [{"title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks (includes CA ~93,500)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes"}, {"title": "Brookings — RTO and 2026 primary rejections (CA rate +86%)", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/postal-network-redesign-and-mail-ballot-rejections-in-the-2026-primaries/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-012. Medium confidence in EMon pending SOS tables. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Mail ballots' to 'Mail Ballots > Missing Postmarks'."}
{"id": "ga-sb3ex-2026-delayed-sb189-human-readable-official-ballot-to-2028", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-06", "uid": "C20260925-214102-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-06", "old_ids": ["ga-sb3ex-2026-delayed-sb189-human-readable-official-ballot-to-2028"], "seq": "C00329", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass legislation, then later change the definitions of the terms it uses: a bait and switch."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia SB 189 (2024) redefined the official ballot for tabulation/recount/audit as the human-readable printed selections (not QR/barcode), effective July 1, 2026. SB 3EX (2026 special session), signed by Gov. Kemp, delayed that QR-removal / human-readable-official regime to January 1, 2028 — changing when the prior statute's definition actually governs. Status Confirmed for subsequent legislation altering the operative effective meaning of the prior 'official ballot' definition.", "sources": [{"title": "Capitol Beat — Kemp signs bill locking QR machines for November; delay to 2028", "url": "https://capitol-beat.org/2026/06/kemp-signs-elections-bill-locking-in-qr-code-voting-machines-for-november/"}, {"title": "Georgia — SB 3EX signed legislation download", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2026-special-session-signed-legislation/sb-3ex/download"}, {"title": "Justia — O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.23 official ballot / human-readable (effective date context)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-9/part-6/section-21-2-379-23-d-1/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 3 companion. Cross-maps Tabulation > change definitions of tabulation / human readable."}
{"id": "ga-sb3ex-2026-election-equipment-committee-feasibility-delay-qr-ban-to-2028", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-07", "uid": "C20260925-220029-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-07", "old_ids": ["ga-sb3ex-2026-election-equipment-committee-feasibility-delay-qr-ban-to-2028"], "seq": "C00360", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Feasibility studies"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia SB 3EX (2026 special session) delayed the statutory QR-code / BMD replacement deadline to January 1, 2028 and created an Election Equipment Specifications and Standards Committee charged with researching/recommending standards for a new uniform hand-marked / ballot-on-demand paper system (recommendations due ~Jan 31, 2027)—a classic feasibility-study/committee pathway that postpones immediate machine-floor reform past the next major election cycle. Status Confirmed for the enacted delay-via-study architecture. PEP contrast: a properly-run hand count of hand-marked paper does not require multi-year vendor feasibility committees to verify voter marks.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Governor — SB 3EX signed legislation PDF", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2026-special-session-signed-legislation/sb-3ex/download"}, {"title": "GPB — Legislative committee researching new voting systems meets", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2026/08/07/state-legislative-committee-tasked-researching-new-voting-systems-meets-for-the"}, {"title": "Capitol Beat — Kemp signs bill locking QR machines for November", "url": "https://capitol-beat.org/2026/06/kemp-signs-elections-bill-locking-in-qr-code-voting-machines-for-november/"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 4. SWAP: jury-trials leaf deferred (weaker sources); Feasibility studies filled. Cross-ref fill-15g bait-and-switch SB3EX card."}
{"id": "nv-2026-usps-mail-recovery-center-misdirected-primary-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-03", "uid": "C20260926-013447-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-03", "old_ids": ["nv-2026-usps-mail-recovery-center-misdirected-primary-ballots"], "seq": "C00862", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "When the USPS classifies a ballot as \"undeliverable,\" it gathers those ballots in one or more facilities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "NV / Federal", "description": "During Nevada's June 2026 primary, dozens of rural mail ballots (reporting identified ~32 Lyon County and additional Douglas County pieces) were not counted after USPS mishandling. USPS Government Liaison correspondence obtained by The Nevada Independent stated a sample ballot entered the wrong automated sorting program, was flagged for manual review, then was sent to the Mail Recovery Center (where USPS holds undeliverable mail for return-to-sender) instead of being restored to the correct mailstream—'misdirected due to human error.' Sens. Cortez Masto and Rosen demanded investigation; USPS replied with Western Processing Area Election Mail training emphasizing that voter-returned ballots must not enter PARS. Status Confirmed for documented UAA/undeliverable-path concentration of ballot mail at the Mail Recovery Center facility after misclassification—peer to FR ancillary-endorsement gathering/handling risk; not proof of intentional diversion.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Independent — Postal Service blames 'human error' for missing Nevada mail ballots (MRC)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/postal-service-blames-human-error-for-missing-nevada-mail-ballots"}, {"title": "Nevada Independent — Rural Nevada mail ballots discovered after primary; USPS failure", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/this-failure-is-on-usps-dozens-of-rural-nevada-mail-ballots-discovered-after-primary"}, {"title": "Sen. Cortez Masto — Demand thorough investigation of USPS failure (Lyon/Douglas)", "url": "https://www.cortezmasto.senate.gov/news/press-releases/cortez-masto-rosen-demand-thorough-investigation-of-uspss-failure-to-deliver-mail-ballots-from-lyon-and-douglas-counties/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to usps-federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-endorsements-2023 (UAA gathered in facilities)."}
{"id": "ncsl-uocava-electronic-ballot-return-states-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-09", "uid": "C20260926-012939-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-09", "old_ids": ["ncsl-uocava-electronic-ballot-return-states-2026"], "seq": "C00848", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's Electronic Ballot Return brief (updated June 30, 2026) documents that 32 states, D.C., and the Virgin Islands allow certain voters—typically UOCAVA, and in some states voters with disabilities—to return voted absentee/mail ballots electronically via fax, email, and/or online portal (NCSL counts: 32 fax, 25 email, 11 portals), while 18 states still require mail-only return. NCSL explicitly cites cybersecurity consensus and federal risk assessment that electronic return carries compromise risk. Status Confirmed for widespread statutory electronic UOCAVA return channels beyond the CISA/AAAS risk memo—illustrating the expanded electronic surface the leaf warns about. PEP/hand-marked paper return remains the lower-risk transparency contrast.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Electronic Ballot Return (internet voting) state table", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-ballot-return-internet-voting"}, {"title": "CISA/AAAS — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (risk context)", "url": "https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/CISA%20Risk%20Management%20Electronic%20Ballot.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-uocava-electronic-ballot-return-states-2026__cisa-aaas-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-deliver.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa. Structural multi-state fact. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'UOCAVA' to 'Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) > This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at...'."}
{"id": "incnow-2026-fenwick-200-artificial-entities-outnumber-residents", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-01", "uid": "C20260926-032507-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-01", "old_ids": ["incnow-2026-fenwick-200-artificial-entities-outnumber-residents"], "seq": "C01196", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Artificial entities act as \"phantom,\" non-human voters that dilute the weight of real resident votes (for example, Delaware allows LLCs, trusts, and companies to vote in elections)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-26", "state": "DE", "description": "IncNow (June 26, 2026) documents that as of October 2025 more than 200 artificial entities (LLCs, corporations, partnerships, and trusts) were registered to vote in Fenwick Island municipal elections—outnumbering the town's ~400 full-time human residents—and that in the 2024 municipal election approximately one-quarter of all votes (~109) were cast by non-human entities under the 2008 charter amendment. That scale quantification of phantom/non-human entity ballots complements the Superior Court uphold and Supreme Court appeal cards already on this leaf. Status Confirmed primary IncNow reporting of Fenwick entity-voter counts and 2024 share; peer to Superior Court 2026 uphold and Supreme Court 2026-09 arguments cards—entity-count / 2024-election-share instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: non-human entity ballots that can outnumber resident humans dilute one-person-one-vote observation that public hand counts of human paper ballots make visible.", "sources": [{"title": "IncNow — LLCs and Corps Can Vote in Delaware / Fenwick Island entity voting (June 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.incnow.com/blog/2026/06/26/fenwick-island-de-business-entity-voting-rights/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/incnow-2026-fenwick-200-artificial-entities-outnumber-residents__incnow-llcs-and-corps-can-vote-in-delaware-fenwick-island-entity-voting-june-26-2026.png"}, {"title": "Town of Fenwick Island — Municipal election / Charter artificial-entity voting rules (companion)", "url": "https://fenwickisland.delaware.gov/election/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Demographic manipulation Artificial entities / Delaware LLC-Trust-Company voting leaf."}
{"id": "ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-03", "uid": "C20260925-233150-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-03", "old_ids": ["ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change"], "seq": "C00396", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Policy analyses"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-25", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia SB 3EX (2026 special session) creates an Election Equipment Specifications and Standards Committee and requires it, by January 31, 2027, to prepare a detailed recommendations report so policymakers can develop appropriations, procurement, and implementation plans for a new hand-marked / ballot-on-demand system aimed at the 2028 cycle—embedding a formal multi-month policy-analysis/report gate before equipment change. Status Confirmed that statute mandates committee policy analysis as a precondition to the next statewide equipment path. PEP/hand-count framing: the delay is in the machine-committee/procurement path; hand-marked paper counted in public remains the simpler transparency remedy the statute itself gestures toward.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Governor — SB 3EX signed legislation download", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2026-special-session-signed-legislation/sb-3ex/download", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change__ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change__georgia-governor-sb-3ex-signed-legislation-download.pdf"}, {"title": "Georgia Senate Press — appointments to Election Equipment Specifications and Standards Committee", "url": "https://senatepress.net/state-leaders-announce-appointments-to-election-equipment-specifications-and-standards-committee.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change__ga-sb3ex-2026-committee-report-policy-analysis-before-2028-equipment-change__georgia-senate-press-appointments-to-election-equipment-specifications-and-stand.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 2. Soft companion to fill-20a Feasibility studies SB3EX cards; mounts exact Policy analyses leaf."}
{"id": "ga-sb3ex-2026-impact-feasibility-appropriations-procurement-implementation-plans", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-06", "uid": "C20260925-233150-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-06", "old_ids": ["ga-sb3ex-2026-impact-feasibility-appropriations-procurement-implementation-plans"], "seq": "C00399", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Impact assessments"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-25", "state": "GA", "description": "SB 3EX expressly requires the Election Equipment committee's January 31, 2027 report to be detailed enough for policymakers to develop appropriations, procurement, and implementation plans for 2028—i.e., a statutory impact/implementation-assessment package (cost, buy, roll-out) that must precede statewide equipment change. Status Confirmed. PEP contrast: hand-marked paper publicly hand-counted does not require a year of vendor-impact assessments to explain who won.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Governor — SB 3EX signed legislation download", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2026-special-session-signed-legislation/sb-3ex/download"}, {"title": "Atlanta News First — joint committee hears cybersecurity / switch-impact testimony (Sep 2026)", "url": "https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/09/17/lawmakers-hear-testimony-election-security-experts-third-meeting-joint-committee/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "ga-sb3ex-2026-moves-qr-ban-human-readable-tabulation-out-to-2028", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-26", "uid": "C20260925-233150-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-26", "old_ids": ["ga-sb3ex-2026-moves-qr-ban-human-readable-tabulation-out-to-2028"], "seq": "C00419", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Use QR codes to covertly adjust votes or feed algorithms, then send the ballots in the mail or drop boxes. Election staff will deliver the payload themselves without knowing it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-25", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia SB 3EX / related 2026 equipment-committee path effectively keeps QR/barcode-centric BMD tabulation in play through the committee/report/procurement cycle aimed at 2028—delaying a full shift to human-readable-only tabulation. Status Confirmed that the QR-era architecture remains operationally relevant pending that future change. Soft companion to fill-20a/15g SB3EX delay cards.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia Governor — SB 3EX signed legislation download", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/2026-special-session-signed-legislation/sb-3ex/download"}, {"title": "Halderman BMD verifiability paper — QR/barcode tabulation problem statement", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/bmd-verifiability-sp20.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sb3ex-2026-moves-qr-ban-human-readable-tabulation-out-to-2028__halderman-bmd-verifiability-paper-qr-barcode-tabulation-prob.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller", "permanent_id": "C20261101-112734-02", "uid": "C20261101-112734-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261101-112734-02", "old_ids": ["ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Required ballot reconciliation forms and result tapes go missing, so the ballots on hand cannot be checked against the ballots issued, and the loss is called routine."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-23 (primary); 2026-07-23 (Board concession); 2026-08-05 (trial order); 2026-09-25 (appeal decided)", "state": "NY", "description": "In the June 23, 2026 Republican primary for New York State Senate District 22 in Brooklyn (Kings County), a full manual recount gave Nachman (Carl) Caller 535 votes and Bernard Vaiselberg 517, an 18-vote margin, out of 1,257 ballots. Vaiselberg sued the Board of Elections in the City of New York in Kings County Supreme Court (Matter of Vaiselberg v Caller, Index No. 523785/2026). After the court ordered the Board to produce the scanner result tapes and ballot reconciliation forms, the Board conceded in a July 23, 2026 email that it could not locate 17 of the 143 reconciliation forms and 3 of the 151 result tapes. Reconciliation forms record how many ballots each site received, left unused, spoiled and cast, and the scanner seal numbers (Election Law § 9-106). The petition said the 17 missing forms covered about 144 ballots, eight times the margin. The Board's chief clerk, Salvatore Barrera, testified that the poll-site clerks or inspectors had likely thrown the forms away or put them in the wrong envelopes, and SMART Elections quotes him calling that the regular course of business. Observers working with SMART Elections testified that ballot boxes arrived with seals already cut, a worker handled ballots without a partner from the other party, and black pens were on the tables during recount preparation. On Aug. 5, 2026, Justice Peter P. Sweeney held that the missing forms were an irregularity in record keeping but not in the casting of ballots, and denied a new primary. The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed on Sept. 25, 2026 (2026 NY Slip Op 05462, No. 2026-08005).", "sources": [{"title": "Matter of Vaiselberg v Caller, 2026 NY Slip Op 05462 (App. Div. 2d Dept, Sept. 25, 2026; archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2026/2026_05462.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller__appdiv-2026_05462.html"}, {"title": "Vaiselberg v Caller, Kings County Supreme Court final order, Index No. 523785/2026 (Aug. 5, 2026; 2026 NY Slip Op 32240(U); PDF archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/pdfs/2026/2026_32240.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller__kings-sup-2026_32240.pdf"}, {"title": "SMART Elections press release — Missing election records at center of appeal (Sept. 2026; archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://smartelections.substack.com/p/press-release-missing-election-records", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller__smartelections-pr.html"}, {"title": "SMART Elections — Observers report Brooklyn Board of Elections mixing copies of ballots with actual ballots (July 15, 2026; archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://smartelections.substack.com/p/observers-report-brooklyn-board-of", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller__smartelections-observers.html"}, {"title": "Free Press reprint of the July 15, 2026 release (archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://freepress.org/article/observers-report-brooklyn-board-elections-mixing-copies-ballots-actual-ballots", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2026-06-gop-sd22-primary-boe-lost-17-reconciliation-forms-vaiselberg-v-caller__freepress.html"}, {"title": "SMART Elections on X (@SMART_elections) — video post, Oct. 28, 2026", "url": "https://x.com/SMART_elections/status/2115369339926814944"}], "notes": "Added 2026-11-01 from Mark's message pt547u. Confirmed from the court record: the Board conceded 17 of 143 reconciliation forms and 3 of 151 result tapes were missing. Also filed under Records > Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount. Secondary leaf: Tabulation > Broken physical seals. A further SMART Elections voter-history claim is unverified and is held in queue item rq-2026-11-01-ny-sd22-16-extra-ballots-voter-history. Related card: ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-rnc-kivett-v-sboe-never-residents-barred-all-contests-2026-06-09", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-04", "uid": "C20261009-100620-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-04", "old_ids": ["nc-rnc-kivett-v-sboe-never-residents-barred-all-contests-2026-06-09"], "seq": "C01268", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-09", "state": "NC", "description": "In the 2024 lawsuit Kivett, et al. (with the RNC, NC Republican Party, and Wake County GOP) v. NC State Board of Elections, Wake County Superior Court Judge Hoyt Tessener granted summary judgment on June 9, 2026. His order says people who have never resided in North Carolina and qualify only as 'covered voters' under UMOVA, N.C.G.S. 163-258.2(1)(e), 'are not eligible to register and vote in any North Carolina election contest, including state or federal contests.' After Griffin, the State Board had already barred never-residents from state and local contests by sending them notice and federal-only ballots, but argued they stayed eligible for federal races under the statute. The ruling ended that federal-only carve-out. Advocacy guides report NC now follows it, which drops NC from the never-resided-allowed list. Status Confirmed for the ruling and its scope (court order, News & Observer, Carolina Journal, State Board filing).", "sources": [{"title": "Wake Co. Superior Court — Order granting summary judgment, Kivett v. NC SBE (June 9, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/2026-06-09-Order.pdf"}, {"title": "News & Observer — Judge bars never-resident voters from North Carolina elections", "url": "https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/election/article315796484.html"}, {"title": "Carolina Journal — Judge confirms GOP victory in voting dispute over 'never residents'", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/judge-confirms-gop-victory-in-voting-dispute-over-never-residents/"}, {"title": "NC SBE filing — state's response / federal-only never-resident procedure (May 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/kivett-sboe-051426.pdf"}], "notes": "Only RNC never-resident suit (as of Oct. 2026) to succeed at trial level. The SBE's 2025 procedure required manual review of every FPCA/FWAB for the fourth checkbox, so eligibility tracked the voter's own checkbox attestation."}
{"id": "columbus-county-nc-elections-board-livestream-fail-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-20", "uid": "C20260925-194013-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-20", "old_ids": ["columbus-county-nc-elections-board-livestream-fail-2026"], "seq": "C00204", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Livestreams and recordings sometimes have audio \"issues\" that keep the public from hearing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06-08", "state": "NC", "description": "Columbus County, North Carolina Board of Elections' June 8, 2026 meeting on early-voting sites failed to provide a working livestream; remote attendees reportedly remained in a Zoom waiting room past 6 p.m. with no alternate access. Chair Jillian McPherson-Edge attributed the failure to storm-related internet problems. The N.C. State Board of Elections dismissed a complaint 4–1, holding livestreaming is a courtesy not legally required. Status Confirmed that the elections-board livestream failed so remote public could not hear/see; no legal violation found.", "sources": [{"title": "WECT — NC State Board dismisses complaint over Columbus County elections livestream failure", "url": "https://www.wect.com/2026/07/15/nc-state-board-consider-complaint-against-columbus-county-board-elections/"}, {"title": "Border Belt — State Board dismisses Columbus County election complaint", "url": "https://borderbelt.org/nc-elections-board-dismisses-columbus-county-complaint/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 10. Elections-board livestream failure Confirmed."}
{"id": "us-2026-wedgewood-polls-admits-fabricated-polls-fiftyplusone-nyt-remove", "permanent_id": "C20261023-183126-02", "uid": "C20261023-183126-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-183126-02", "old_ids": ["us-2026-wedgewood-polls-admits-fabricated-polls-fiftyplusone-nyt-remove"], "seq": "C01535", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-06 to 2026-10-21", "state": "US", "description": "Wedgewood Polls appeared on X in late June 2026 and over four months published 15 polls of Senate and governor races that were picked up by The New York Times polling database, FiftyPlusOne, VoteHub and Decision Desk HQ and cited by outlets including MS NOW, Newsweek and Mediaite (PBS, BETINT). After tips, FiftyPlusOne obtained the raw data for Wedgewood's most recent poll, a Mississippi Senate survey said to be fielded on Pollfish, found discrepancies, and confronted the firm (FiftyPlusOne, Guardian). On Oct. 20, 2026, Wedgewood posted on X that it was \"an experimental project to demonstrate the vulnerabilities\" of the polling industry and that there was \"no real data behind the vast majority of our releases\"; per FiftyPlusOne it first messaged the aggregator \"F*** you.\" It named Jack Sims and Andrew Prater as the people behind it. FiftyPlusOne, the New York Times, Silver Bulletin and Decision Desk HQ removed its polls (Axios). Pollster Lester Tellez said he had raised $19,587 from 382 donations to pay for polls by the person he believes ran Wedgewood. BETINT found a July 21 Wedgewood poll putting David Crowley at 9% in Wisconsin's Democratic governor primary moved his Kalshi price from 23% to 13% within 15 minutes; Crowley won the primary. Michigan state senator Mallory McMorrow, who left the U.S. Senate primary on July 5, said Wedgewood numbers showing her support plunging dried up her donations and volunteers (Guardian). FiftyPlusOne's Mary Radcliffe told Axios the operation was not a social experiment but an attempt to get ahead of bad press. Status Confirmed: the firm itself admitted the data was fabricated and major aggregators removed it. Catalog point: an invented poll can be absorbed into aggregates, news coverage, betting markets and campaign decisions for months before anyone checks raw data. Results counted openly at the precinct do not depend on any poll.", "sources": [{"title": "FiftyPlusOne — FiftyPlusOne just caught a pollster (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://blog.fiftyplusone.news/p/fiftyplusone-just-caught-a-pollster"}, {"title": "The Guardian — Polling firm says it fabricated data as a 'social experiment' (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/21/polling-fabricated-data-social-experiment"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — A company says its polls were fake. Here's what happened (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/a-company-says-its-polls-were-fake-heres-what-happened"}, {"title": "Axios — Fake polling scandal hits election industry (Oct. 21, 2026; curl 403 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/2026/10/21/fake-polls-midterms-wedgewood-investigation"}, {"title": "G. Elliott Morris — How FiftyPlusOne busted a fake pollster (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.gelliottmorris.com/p/2026-10-22-how-fiftyplusone-busted-a-fake-pollster"}, {"title": "BETINT — Kalshi account tied to fake pollster bet ahead of his firm's polls (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.betint.net/p/kalshi-account-tied-to-fake-pollster"}, {"title": "Silver Bulletin (Nate Silver) — Fake polls are a real problem (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.natesilver.net/p/fake-polls-are-a-real-problem"}], "notes": "Evening sweep 2026-10-23: carded to answer the Rasmussen/Townhall \"another firm\" claim and as the SoCal Strategies peer. Confirmed by the firm's own admission plus aggregator removals. FiftyPlusOne, Guardian, PBS, Morris, BETINT, Silver Bulletin curl 200; Axios 403 (text via search extract). Names as in sources; nothing redacted. Not a fake-polling election-administration finding; perception-operation leaf only."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-004", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-51", "uid": "C20260925-155410-51", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-51", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-004"], "seq": "C00051", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon Secretary of State Tobias Read reported 7,314 ballots arriving during the state's weeklong grace period after the May 2026 primary were not counted because they were postmarked after Election Day—a 13% rejection rate among those late-arriving mailed ballots, up from 9.5% two years earlier. Status Confirmed for SOS-reported figures.", "sources": [{"title": "PBS NewsHour / AP — Late postmarks surged in WA and OR", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/ballots-discounted-for-late-postmarks-surged-in-washington-and-oregon-after-postal-service-changes"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-004. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Mail ballots' to 'Mail Ballots > Missing Postmarks'."}
{"id": "nj-s4163-a4960-2026-municipal-mobile-voting-pilot-legislation-introduced", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-03", "uid": "C20260926-024539-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-03", "old_ids": ["nj-s4163-a4960-2026-municipal-mobile-voting-pilot-legislation-introduced"], "seq": "C01093", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "See https://www.mobilevoting.org/about."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05", "state": "NJ", "description": "New Jersey S4163 / companion A4960 (2026–2027 session) introduce an eight-year municipal mobile-voting pilot authorizing participating municipalities to let voters receive, mark, and return ballots electronically alongside mail and in-person options—precisely the Mobile Voting Project / Tusk-aligned shiny-object legislative path the catalog leaf flags via mobilevoting.org. Status Confirmed primary bill text/introduction for phone/electronic ballot return pilots as the next-generation machine channel; peer to mobilevoting.org advocacy and Tusk/Voatz pilot PR cards already on this leaf—NJ 2026 statute proposal, not MIT Voatz remount. PEP framing: mobile return deepens unverifiable electronic complexity versus hand-marked paper counted in public.", "sources": [{"title": "NJ Legislature — S4163 (2026) municipal mobile voting pilot bill PDF", "url": "https://pub.njleg.state.nj.us/Bills/2026/S4500/4163_I1.PDF", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-s4163-a4960-2026-municipal-mobile-voting-pilot-legislation-introduced__nj-legislature-s4163-2026-municipal-mobile-voting-pilot-bill-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "LegiPlex — NJ A4960 companion mobile-voting pilot (2026–2027)", "url": "https://app.legiplex.com/nj/legislature/2026/2026-r/bills/a4960"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Mobile Voting shiny-new-object (mobilevoting.org) leaf."}
{"id": "usps-oig-26-054-r26-harrisburg-pars-108-voter-returned-ballots-aggregated", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-13", "uid": "C20260926-015040-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-13", "old_ids": ["usps-oig-26-054-r26-harrisburg-pars-108-voter-returned-ballots-aggregated"], "seq": "C00901", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "When the USPS classifies a ballot as \"undeliverable,\" it gathers those ballots in one or more facilities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05", "state": "PA / Federal", "description": "USPS OIG Report 26-054-R26 (Processing of Election and Political Mail for the 2026 Primary Elections) found 108 voter-returned ballots at the Harrisburg, PA processing facility mistakenly grouped in the Postal Automated Redirection System (PARS)—a centralized undeliverable/redirect processing stream where such voted ballots should never enter. Discovered on Pennsylvania primary Election Day morning, the ballots were expedited toward Pittsburgh ahead of the 8 p.m. deadline; OIG recommended adding daily all-clear verification that no voter-returned ballots sit in PARS. Status Confirmed for official OIG documentation that voted/undeliverable-path ballots can be aggregated inside a USPS redirection facility—peer to Federal Register Ballot Mail ancillary-endorsement rules and Nevada 2026 Mail Recovery Center misdirected-primary-ballot reporting on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS OIG — 26-054-R26 Processing of Election and Political Mail for the 2026 Primary Elections (PDF)", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2026-09/26-054-r26_0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-26-054-r26-harrisburg-pars-108-voter-returned-ballots-aggregated__usps-oig-26-054-r26-processing-of-election-and-politica.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS OIG — Report landing page: Processing of Election and Political Mail for the 2026 Primary Elections", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/reports/audit-reports/processing-election-and-political-mail-2026-primary-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-26-054-r26-harrisburg-pars-108-voter-returned-ballots-aggregated__usps-oig-report-landing-page-processing-of-election-and.png"}, {"title": "Oversight.gov — 26-054-R26 mirror PDF", "url": "https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2026-09/26-054-R26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-26-054-r26-harrisburg-pars-108-voter-returned-ballots-aggregated__oversight-gov-26-054-r26-mirror-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on USPS undeliverable ballots gathered in facilities."}
{"id": "barrett-2026-05-fairfax-swatting-multi-vector-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-04", "uid": "C20260926-034259-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-04", "old_ids": ["barrett-2026-05-fairfax-swatting-multi-vector-intimidation"], "seq": "C01244", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-27", "state": "VA", "description": "Fairfax County Police confirmed to NBC News that on the night of May 27, 2026 a non-emergency call reporting gunshots/arguing at Supreme Court Justice Amy Coney Barrett's Virginia residence prompted coordination with Supreme Court Police; officers 'quickly determined that the report was fictitious' (classic swatting via the 911/non-emergency communications vector). Status Confirmed primary Fairfax/NBC swatting incident against a high-profile conservative officeholder. Peer to Reuters Nikki Haley swatting and Virginia Project brute-force multi-vector soft remount already on this leaf—Barrett Fairfax 2026 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: communications-vector intimidation of officials who oversee or adjudicate election rules is the opposite of transparent precinct hand counts citizens can observe without fear.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — Amy Coney Barrett home targeted in apparent swatting incident (May 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/supreme-court/justice-amy-coney-barrett-home-targeted-apparent-swatting-incident-rcna347406"}, {"title": "The Hill — Police respond to swatting threat at Barrett Virginia home", "url": "https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/5900372-justice-barrett-swatting-incident/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Intimidation multi-vector leaf (non-Haley/non-VP soft remount)."}
{"id": "ut-2026-05-27-lt-gov-citizenship-review-5007-registrants-unconfirmed-3400-federal-only", "permanent_id": "C20261110-121330-01", "uid": "C20261110-121330-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261110-121330-01", "old_ids": ["ut-2026-05-27-lt-gov-citizenship-review-5007-registrants-unconfirmed-3400-federal-only"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).", "Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-27 (review released); 2026-09-15 (legislative audit update)", "state": "UT", "description": "On May 27, 2026, Lt. Gov. Deidre Henderson's office released a review of all 2,069,640 Utah voter records (active and inactive, as of Sept. 2025), checked against Driver License Division records and the federal USCIS SAVE database and then reviewed manually. The office reported 99.72% verified as U.S. citizens, 27 confirmed noncitizens removed from the rolls, 25 probable noncitizens sent notices, and 5,007 registrants whose citizenship could not be confirmed either way. Officials said about half of the 5,007 are legacy registrations made before Utah required a driver license number or last four digits of a Social Security number, and the rest mostly have missing records or data-entry errors such as typos or hyphenated names; each had attested to citizenship when registering. Under H.B. 209, unconfirmed voters who do not provide proof receive \"Federal Only\" ballots. A legislative audit reported on Sept. 15, 2026 that about 1,500 of the 5,007 had since proved citizenship, about 100 had been removed, and about 3,400 remained unverified and could vote only in federal races. On Nov. 9, X user @SophieAnde49073 posted that about 5,000 \"unverified, unconfirmed\" Utah voters \"were still able to cast ballots on November 3\" and that only about 71,000 to 75,000 records went through SAVE. The state's own figures show 62,339 records confirmed through SAVE as a secondary check, and say unverified voters are limited to federal-only ballots rather than full ballots. No source states how many of the unverified registrants voted on Nov. 3, and no source has shown that any of them is a noncitizen. Separately, former candidate Phil Lyman's Public Interest Legal Foundation-backed suit seeking Utah's voter roll under the National Voter Registration Act was dismissed for lack of standing in January 2026 and is on appeal (Tenth Circuit No. 26-4014), with oral argument listed for Nov. 17, 2026. Status Confirmed by the Utah Lieutenant Governor's office's own review and presentation to the Government Operations Interim Committee, reported by the Deseret News, The Salt Lake Tribune and ABC4; the Nov. 9 X claim that these voters cast full ballots on Nov. 3 is not supported by the state's figures and is not part of this card's confirmed facts. Catalog point: thousands of registrations were accepted on a citizenship attestation alone, and years later the state still could not confirm whether those registrants are citizens; the state's fix was to limit them to federal-only ballots rather than to resolve each record.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of the Lieutenant Governor (presentation to Government Operations Interim Committee) — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-06-17)", "url": "https://le.utah.gov/interim/2026/pdf/00002839.pdf"}, {"title": "Deseret News — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-05-27)", "url": "https://www.deseret.com/politics/2026/05/27/utah-voter-registration-review/"}, {"title": "The Salt Lake Tribune — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-05-27)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2026/05/27/utah-election-audit-fine-no/"}, {"title": "ABC4 — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-05-27)", "url": "https://www.abc4.com/news/local-news/review-99-utah-voters-us-citizens/"}, {"title": "KSL.com — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-09-15)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51624385/heres-what-utahs-latest-election-audit-found"}, {"title": "Public Interest Legal Foundation — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2025-06-06)", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/cases/lyman-v-henderson/"}, {"title": "Deseret News — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-01-16)", "url": "https://www.deseret.com/utah/2026/01/16/phil-lyman-lawsuit-thrown-out-by-federal-judge-voter-information/"}, {"title": "BrynoDC hearing calendar — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://brynodc.com/hearings"}, {"title": "X post by @SophieAnde49073 (2026-11-10T03:34:48Z)", "url": "https://x.com/SophieAnde49073/status/2119997173408702491"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Utah 5,007 voters' citizenship unconfirmed (ei-2026-10-390)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-390 (added 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET, 2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status ongoing/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "clovis-nm-school-board-livestream-audio-muted-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-21", "uid": "C20260925-194013-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-21", "old_ids": ["clovis-nm-school-board-livestream-audio-muted-2026"], "seq": "C00205", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Livestreams and recordings sometimes have audio \"issues\" that keep the public from hearing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-26", "state": "NM", "description": "Clovis Municipal Schools acknowledged that audio of Constance White-Williams's May 26, 2026 public comment was 'mistakenly muted' on both the Zoom livestream and the YouTube recording, so the remote/archived public could not hear the comment; the district said it would supplement the record with a transcript/written statement. Eastern New Mexico News covered the admission and later public-comment policy tightening. Status Confirmed for muted livestream/recording audio denying public hearing of meeting comment.", "sources": [{"title": "Eastern New Mexico News — CMS: meeting audio 'mistakenly muted'", "url": "https://www.easternnewmexiconews.com/story/2026/06/10/news/cms-meeting-audio-mistakenly-muted/233610.html"}, {"title": "Clovis Municipal Schools — Addresses audio issue from May 26 board meeting", "url": "https://www.clovis-schools.org/article/2976536"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 10. Muted livestream/recording Confirmed (school board public meeting)."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-014", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-57", "uid": "C20260925-155410-57", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-57", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-014"], "seq": "C00057", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-26", "state": "TX", "description": "During the May 26, 2026 Texas primary runoff, Fort Bend County experienced a countywide electronic pollbook outage from shortly after 3 p.m. until about 6 p.m., preventing normal check-in for more than two hours. Officials later said an incorrectly uploaded election data file caused the disruption; ballot-marking/tabulation devices were not affected. Voters could use provisional ballots; hours were not extended. Status Confirmed for the outage and official root-cause statement (bad data upload).", "sources": [{"title": "Houston Public Media — Fort Bend voting issue investigation", "url": "https://www.houstonpublicmedia.org/articles/news/fort-bend/2026/05/28/553083/voting-issue-fort-bend-county-elections-investigation/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-014."}
{"id": "mi-qvf-ballot-method-records-denial-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-17", "uid": "C20260925-183614-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-17", "old_ids": ["mi-qvf-ballot-method-records-denial-2026"], "seq": "C00105", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-05-04", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Court of Claims (order May 4, 2026 in related QVF litigation) held the Bureau of Elections could not blanket-deny public access to Qualified Voter File fields identifying whether voters cast ballots on Election Day, early, or absentee; Michigan Public Radio and court PDFs report the state had argued ballot-secrecy / low-turnout precinct risks. Status Confirmed a major records-access fight over election data analogous to Arizona CVR denial litigation—officials resisted disclosure citing privacy/secrecy, court ordered narrower handling.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Public Radio — Judge: Michigan cannot shield how voters cast ballots from public view", "url": "https://www.michiganpublic.org/politics-government/2026-05-05/judge-michigan-cannot-shield-how-voters-cast-ballots-from-public-view"}, {"title": "Michigan Court of Claims order PDF (24-000038-MZ, May 4, 2026)", "url": "https://www.courts.michigan.gov/499dd3/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/coc/2024/24-000038-mz/2026-05-04-24-000038-mz-98-order-20260504-ord-sd.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-qvf-ballot-method-records-denial-2026__michigan-court-of-claims-order-pdf-24-000038-mz-may-4-2026.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich az-audit-usa-cvr-denial Public Information Requests leaf."}
{"id": "al-hb67-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-03", "uid": "C20260925-155410-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-03", "old_ids": ["al-hb67-2026"], "seq": "C00003", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB67 (2026 Regular Session) was enacted; it limits the cost of reproducing voter registration lists (electronic list fee capped at $1,000), designates certain voter data as confidential, and makes unlawful the sale/publication of portions of voter lists or use of voter data for commercial purposes (with electioneering/campaign exceptions), effective June 1, 2026. Catalog seed cited HB67 as an example of laws that restrict citizen access 'sneaked in.' Status Confirmed for the enacted text regarding access/cost/confidentiality rules; whether the bill was a covert access-restriction scheme is not established by primary sources reviewed.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — Alabama HB67", "url": "https://legislation.ballotpedia.org/elections/bill/21818", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb67-2026__ballotpedia-alabama-hb67.png"}, {"title": "Bama Politics — HB67 Signed", "url": "https://www.bamapolitics.com/alabama/bills/2026-regular-session/2026-house-bills/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb67-2026__bama-politics-hb67-signed.png"}], "notes": "Enacted; effective date June 1, 2026 per bill summaries."}
{"id": "al-hb95-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-02", "uid": "C20260925-155410-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-02", "old_ids": ["al-hb95-2026"], "seq": "C00002", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB95 (2026 Regular Session), the Alabama Post-Election Audit Act, was passed by the Legislature and signed by Gov. Kay Ivey (April 2026). It requires county judges of probate to order a post-election audit after every countywide and statewide general election for at least one randomly selected precinct and race, with public reporting of findings. Catalog seed characterized HB95 as an example of naïve legislators carrying an 'election integrity' compromise bill; that framing is advocacy opinion. Status Confirmed for enactment and statutory audit requirements only—not for any trojan-horse motive claim.", "sources": [{"title": "Governor Ivey — Signs Audit Law (HB95)", "url": "https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2026/04/governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-to-uphold-alabamas-nation-leading-free-and-secure-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026__governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-hb95.png"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Alabama HB95", "url": "https://legislation.ballotpedia.org/elections/bill/21991", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026__ballotpedia-alabama-hb95.png"}], "notes": "Within scope (enacted 2016–present). Motive/compromise framing remains unverified."}
{"id": "al-hb95-2026-machine-recount-allowed-as-audit-30-ballot-manual-floor", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-02", "uid": "C20260925-214102-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-02", "old_ids": ["al-hb95-2026-machine-recount-allowed-as-audit-30-ballot-manual-floor"], "seq": "C00325", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They get naive legislators to carry \"election integrity\" bills as a good \"compromise\" (e.g., Alabama HB 95, 2026)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Companion detail on the same Act: HB95 authorizes the probate judge to conduct the mandated 'post-election audit' by manual tally or by ballot counters provided that at least 30 randomly selected ballots are individually, manually examined and compared to the counter result — i.e., the statutory 'audit' can be substantially a machine re-tabulation with a tiny manual floor. Status Confirmed for the statutory design that lets an integrity-branded audit remain mostly machine-dependent (PEP contrast: a properly-run full hand count of selected contests needs no such machine-floor compromise).", "sources": [{"title": "Alabama Legislature — HB95 enrolled / re-enrolled text (manual floor language)", "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/files/pdf/SearchableInstruments/2026RS/HB95-enr.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026-machine-recount-allowed-as-audit-30-ballot-manual-floor__alabama-legislature-hb95-enrolled-re-enrolled-text-manual-fl.pdf"}, {"title": "Alabama Reflector — audit checks machines reading paper ballots", "url": "https://alabamareflector.com/2026/04/21/alabama-elections-now-subject-to-audit-but-bill-sponsor-wants-some-changes/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 1 companion. Cross-maps Auditing > redefine audit (machine re-scan branded as audit)."}
{"id": "al-hb95-2026-post-election-audit-act-random-selection-removed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-01", "uid": "C20260925-214102-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-01", "old_ids": ["al-hb95-2026-post-election-audit-act-random-selection-removed"], "seq": "C00324", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They get naive legislators to carry \"election integrity\" bills as a good \"compromise\" (e.g., Alabama HB 95, 2026)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB95 (Alabama Post-Election Audit Act), signed by Gov. Kay Ivey in April 2026, was marketed as an election-integrity / transparency measure requiring post-election audits after general elections. An executive amendment in the final days removed the requirement that the audited precinct be randomly selected — leaving canvassing-board discretion — over sponsor Rep. Joe Lovvorn's preference for random selection ('foot in the door'; he wanted random so voters know precincts are not handpicked). The enrolled text permits the probate judge to conduct the audit by ballot counters so long as at least 30 randomly selected ballots are manually compared, and audits may begin no earlier than 31 days after the election (after contest windows). Sen. Sam Givhan (R) opposed, arguing 'This doesn't test voter fraud, it tests the machines.' Status Confirmed for a citizen-facing 'integrity' compromise bill that was watered down on the features that would make the audit harder to game (randomness / timing / depth).", "sources": [{"title": "Alabama Reflector — HB95 signed; random selection removed; sponsor wants changes", "url": "https://alabamareflector.com/2026/04/21/alabama-elections-now-subject-to-audit-but-bill-sponsor-wants-some-changes/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026-post-election-audit-act-random-selection-removed__alabama-reflector-hb95-signed-random-selection-removed-spons.png"}, {"title": "Governor Ivey — signs Alabama Post-Election Audit Act (HB95)", "url": "https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2026/04/governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-to-uphold-alabamas-nation-leading-free-and-secure-elections/"}, {"title": "Alabama Legislature — HB95 re-enrolled PDF", "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/files/pdf/SearchableInstruments/2026RS/HB95-reenr.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026-post-election-audit-act-random-selection-removed__alabama-legislature-hb95-re-enrolled-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 1. Catalog explicitly cites 2026 HB95 in AL. Confirmed watered-down compromise; do not invent fraud motive for sponsors."}
{"id": "al-hb95-defines-audit-to-allow-ballot-counter-rescans", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-26", "uid": "C20260925-214102-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-26", "old_ids": ["al-hb95-defines-audit-to-allow-ballot-counter-rescans"], "seq": "C00349", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some states redefine their \"audit\" to cripple it and make it worthless."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama HB95's statutory 'post-election audit' expressly may be performed using ballot counters with only a 30-ballot manual comparison floor — redefining 'audit' to include machine re-tabulation rather than a full independent hand tally of the selected precinct/race. Status Confirmed for legislative redefinition that can cripple audit power relative to citizen expectations of hand counting.", "sources": [{"title": "Alabama Legislature — HB95 enrolled PDF (ballot counter audit language)", "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/files/pdf/SearchableInstruments/2026RS/HB95-enr.pdf"}, {"title": "Alabama Reflector — Givhan: doesn't test fraud, tests machines", "url": "https://alabamareflector.com/2026/04/21/alabama-elections-now-subject-to-audit-but-bill-sponsor-wants-some-changes/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 13 companion. Cross-leaf with Legislation HB95 cards."}
{"id": "pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-200k-apps-registration-voter-rolls", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-15", "uid": "C20260926-032103-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-15", "old_ids": ["pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-200k-apps-registration-voter-rolls"], "seq": "C01195", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04-17", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Auditor General's April 17, 2026 Motor Voter audit covered Jan–June 2024 and documented more than 200,000 unique voter-registration applications transmitted from PennDOT's vendor-managed Motor Voter system to the Department of State—while finding one noncitizen improperly allowed to apply due to a driver's-license camera-card citizenship data-entry error (application later cancelled; person never voted) plus inadequate PennDOT/OA user-access controls. Status Confirmed primary PA Auditor General Motor Voter registration→rolls pipeline audit with volume, citizenship-error, and control findings; peer to Texas DPS 2025–26 untransmitted online DL portal registrations and CA DMV 2018 delayed-transmission cards already on this leaf—PA 2026 Motor Voter pipeline instance, not those TX/CA remounts. PEP framing: Motor-Voter pipelines that silently mishandle citizenship or access controls feed opaque rolls that machine tallies trust; public hand counts verify paper ballots instead.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Auditor General — Motor Voter performance audit press release (April 17, 2026; >200k apps; noncitizen error; access controls)", "url": "https://www.paauditor.gov/auditor-general-defoor-releases-pennsylvania-motor-voter-performance-audit-finds-system-works-controls-and-security-around-it-need-to-improve/"}, {"title": "PA Auditor General — Full Motor Voter audit PDF (PennDOT / OA)", "url": "https://www.paauditor.gov/wp-content/uploads/spePennDOTOAMotorVoterAuditReport041726.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-200k-apps-registration-voter-rolls__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Registration; Voter Rolls leaf. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'.", "related": ["pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out", "pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia"]}
{"id": "pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-access-controls-loose-security", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-11", "uid": "C20260926-032103-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-11", "old_ids": ["pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-access-controls-loose-security"], "seq": "C01191", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access-control security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04-17", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Auditor General Timothy DeFoor's April 17, 2026 Motor Voter performance audit (Jan–June 2024 period; >200,000 unique voter-registration applications transmitted PennDOT→DOS) found PennDOT and the Governor's Office of Administration did not implement appropriate user access controls to ensure employees only have access to vendor-managed Motor Voter system functions needed for their jobs—recommending strengthened employee-access policies. Status Confirmed primary PA Auditor General finding of inadequate Motor Voter / voter-registration system access controls; peer to FL Auditor 2021-096 Finding 4 and Texas SAO 08-012 excessive-privilege cards already on this leaf—PA 2026 Motor Voter access-control instance, not those FL/TX remounts. PEP framing: loose roll-system access controls let unauthorized actors alter the database that machine tallies attach votes to; public hand counts verify ballots independent of that database.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Auditor General — DeFoor Motor Voter audit: system works; controls and security need to improve (April 17, 2026)", "url": "https://www.paauditor.gov/auditor-general-defoor-releases-pennsylvania-motor-voter-performance-audit-finds-system-works-controls-and-security-around-it-need-to-improve/"}, {"title": "PA Auditor General — PennDOT / OA Motor Voter Process audit page (Jan 1–June 20, 2024 period)", "url": "https://www.paauditor.gov/audits/pennsylvania-department-of-transportation-governors-office-of-administration-pennsylvania-motor-voter-process-audit-period-january-1-2024-to-june-20-2024/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Voter Rolls Loose security in access controls leaf."}
{"id": "al-hb95-2026-ivey-signs-post-election-audit-act-nation-leading-secure-framing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-06", "uid": "C20260926-025634-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-06", "old_ids": ["al-hb95-2026-ivey-signs-post-election-audit-act-nation-leading-secure-framing"], "seq": "C01111", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They get naive legislators to carry \"election integrity\" bills as a good \"compromise\" (e.g., Alabama HB 95, 2026)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04-13", "state": "AL", "description": "Gov. Kay Ivey's Apr. 13, 2026 signing statement frames Alabama HB95 (Post-Election Audit Act) as upholding the state's 'nation-leading, free and secure elections' even as the enrolled compromise—already documented on this leaf—removed random selection discretion and allows machine recounts / a 30-ballot manual floor to satisfy the 'audit' label. Status Confirmed primary executive branding of the watered integrity compromise as security theater; peer to the two HB95 enrolled-text cards already on this leaf—Ivey signing/framing, not those provision remounts. PEP framing: integrity branding that substitutes limited machine-centric audits for public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of Governor Kay Ivey — Governor Ivey Signs Audit Law to Uphold Alabama's Nation-Leading, Free and Secure Elections (Apr. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2026/04/governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-to-uphold-alabamas-nation-leading-free-and-secure-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026-ivey-signs-post-election-audit-act-nation-leading-secure-framing__governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-hb95.png"}, {"title": "Alabama Legislature — HB95 Enrolled (2026RS) Post-Election Audit Act PDF", "url": "https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/files/pdf/SearchableInstruments/2026RS/HB95-enr.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/al-hb95-2026-ivey-signs-post-election-audit-act-nation-leading-secure-framing__alabama-legislature-hb95-enrolled-post-election-audit-act-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Legislation naïve-compromise election-integrity bills (HB95) leaf."}
{"id": "wi-dane-2026-mitchell-ruling-count-absentee-ballots-late-by-official-error-madison-23", "permanent_id": "C20261014-181051-03", "uid": "C20261014-181051-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-181051-03", "old_ids": ["wi-dane-2026-mitchell-ruling-count-absentee-ballots-late-by-official-error-madison-23"], "seq": "C01391", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-04-07 to 2026-10-15", "state": "WI", "description": "On Oct. 13, 2026, Dane County Circuit Judge Everett Mitchell issued a decision and order in consolidated cases (Dane County Board of Canvassers v. WEC, No. 2026CV1455; Honig v. WEC, No. 2026CV1463) holding that Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87(6) and 6.84(2) are unconstitutional as applied to reject a qualified voter's absentee ballot that was properly completed and returned to the municipal clerk on time but did not reach the polling place by 8 p.m. on Election Day solely because of an act or omission of the clerk or another election official. The case arose from the April 7, 2026 spring election: the Madison clerk's office had received 23 absentee ballots by April 6, but a courier did not deliver them to their polling places until 8:05 to 8:31 p.m. on April 7. The Wisconsin Elections Commission voted 5–1 on April 30 that they should not be counted; Mitchell had ordered them included before certification in May. The ruling does not cover ballots whose late delivery is attributable in any part to the voter, the postal service, or anyone other than an election official. Wisconsin Elections Commission Chair Don Millis (R) said he does not believe the decision should be appealed, while raising logistics and clerk-liability questions about scenarios such as a ballot handed to a clerk's office just before polls close; Democratic commissioner Ann Jacobs called it \"the right outcome.\" The order directs the commission to send written notice of the decision to all municipal and county clerks (Votebeat; Wisconsin Law Journal). Oct. 15 update: as ordered, the Wisconsin Elections Commission sent all municipal and county clerks a memo on the decision. It says that for Nov. 3, a ballot timely delivered to a municipal clerk that the clerk returns to the polling place after 8 p.m. \"cannot be rejected due to the clerk's failure to deliver the ballot to the polls on time\" and must be counted if otherwise valid. Voter deadlines are unchanged, ballots delivered late by the Postal Service or through a voter's own delay still may not be counted, and certified canvasses will not be reopened. The memo's examples include misplaced ballots found in a clerk's office after 8 p.m., which count. Status Confirmed for the ruling (court order PDF; WisPolitics) and for the clerk's courier delivery failure (WPR, May 2026). This is a trial-court decision, not a final appellate ruling. Catalog point: absentee ballots that were already in the clerk's custody still had to be moved again by courier after the voter handed them over, and that extra handoff failed. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere, and the legal fight now turns on who caused a ballot to be late rather than on a clear deadline. In-person Election Day voting at the precinct, with ballots counted by hand where they are cast, removes that courier step entirely.", "sources": [{"title": "Dane County Circuit Court — Decision and Order, Dane County Board of Canvassers v. WEC / Honig v. WEC (Oct. 13, 2026, PDF via Law Forward)", "url": "https://www.lawforward.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/DKt.-073-Decision-and-Order-2026.10.13.pdf"}, {"title": "WisPolitics — Judge rules ballots must be counted if late due to election official error (Oct. 14, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.wispolitics.com/2026/judge-rules-ballots-must-be-counted-if-late-due-to-election-official-error/"}, {"title": "WPR — 23 Madison absentee ballots must be counted after all, judge rules (May 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/news/23-madison-absentee-ballots-must-be-counted-after-all-judge-rules"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Late-arriving Wisconsin absentee ballots can count if officials make mistakes; WEC chair sees no need to appeal (Oct. 13–14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/wisconsin/2026/10/13/late-arriving-ballots-can-count-if-officials-make-mistakes/"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Law Journal — Judge rules Wisconsin absentee ballots can't be rejected for official-caused lateness (Oct. 14, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-15, URL retained)", "url": "https://wislawjournal.com/2026/10/14/judge-rules-wisconsin-absentee-ballots-cant-be-rejected/"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Clerk communication: late-delivered absentee ballots by clerk (Honig v. WEC) (Oct. 15, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Clerk%20Communication_Late-Delivered%20Absentee%20Ballots%20by%20Clerk%20%28Honig%20v.%20WEC%29.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — WI ruling: count ballots late by official error (ei-2026-10-036)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: WEC Oct. 15 clerk memo implementing the ruling (official PDF curl 200). Stays Confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-036 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error yes). EMon flagged it to CTE as an absentee-ballot handling issue. Court PDF fetched 200. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (peers: wi-2026-bins-v-wec-no-spoiling-returned-absentee-ballots-conway; LWV v. WEC provisional fail-safe card; Madison 2024 poll-book card). Watch for a WEC or intervenor appeal and any WEC guidance for Nov. 3. Refreshed 2026-10-15 AM ingest: WEC chair Millis says no appeal warranted; clerk-notice requirement (Votebeat, Wisconsin Law Journal)."}
{"id": "mi-antrim-2025-2026-clerk-bishop-changed-canceled-registrations-1577-notices-qvf-access-suspended", "permanent_id": "C20261104-180406-01", "uid": "C20261104-180406-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-180406-01", "old_ids": ["mi-antrim-2025-2026-clerk-bishop-changed-canceled-registrations-1577-notices-qvf-access-suspended"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-03-15", "state": "MI", "description": "Votebeat reports that Antrim County Clerk Victoria Bishop, elected in 2024, changed voter statuses in Michigan's Qualified Voter File between 2025 and June 2026, mostly to cancel or challenge voters she believed were dead or had moved, and in mid-March 2026 her office sent notices to at least 1,577 voters (about 7% of the county) saying their registrations could be canceled. The Michigan Bureau of Elections said managing registrations falls to township and city clerks and that her actions did not comply with state law; it suspended her voter-file access, and as of the reporting she had not regained it. Votebeat says affected voters were reinstated and able to vote in the Nov. 3 midterm. A recall effort against Bishop is collecting signatures, with a possible recall election in May 2027. Bishop's lawyer said she was reviewing her options and would continue serving. Status Confirmed by the Michigan Bureau of Elections, which said the clerk's actions did not comply with state law and suspended her voter-file access, reported by Votebeat and Interlochen Public Radio. Catalog point: one county official with access to the statewide voter file changed and canceled registrations and sent cancellation-warning notices to about 7% of the county's voters; township clerks and the state had to reinstate them before the election.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Antrim County MI clerk voter-roll cancellations (2026-10-22)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/michigan/2026/10/22/antrim-county-victoria-bishop-local-clerks-bureau-elections/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Antrim County MI clerk voter-roll cancellations (2026-09-25)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/michigan/2026/09/25/victoria-bishop-recall-election-county-clerk-approved-language/"}, {"title": "Interlochen Public Radio — Antrim County MI clerk voter-roll cancellations (2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.interlochenpublicradio.org/podcast/up-north-lowdown/2026-10-26/antrim-county-voter-registration-turmoil-shows-how-safeguards-work"}, {"title": "@pulitzercenter (X) — Antrim County MI clerk voter-roll cancellations (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://x.com/pulitzercenter/status/2118025571074777579"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Antrim County MI clerk voter-roll cancellations (ei-2026-10-302)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-302 (added 2026-11-04 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation", "permanent_id": "C20261021-140608-02", "uid": "C20261021-140608-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-140608-02", "old_ids": ["tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation"], "seq": "C01511", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-03-03 to 2026-03-11", "state": "TX", "description": "After the polls closed in the March 3, 2026 Texas primaries, Newton County Clerk Sandra Duckworth's office tabulated ballots on an ES&S DS450 high-speed scanner, which halted mid-count and was reprogrammed by an ES&S field technician; results were posted and reported to the Secretary of State at about 3:30 a.m. Results then posted by the Secretary of State showed exactly zero votes in Newton County for U.S. Senate candidate James Talarico and for candidates in at least four other Democratic primary races, ABC13 reported. On March 4 the Secretary of State's office contacted ES&S, and on March 5 ES&S told the clerk that the ballot programming for the DS450 did not match the printed ballots, \"leading to skewed results\" in the first column of the Democratic ballot. An ES&S spokesperson, Katina Granger, called it a \"ballot coding error\" caused by human programming that shifted the ovals, and ES&S said that it had \"accidentally\" provided a ballot containing an error and that there was no software issue with the machine. On March 9, District Judge Craig Mixson ordered a re-tabulation of both primaries. With a Secretary of State representative and ES&S on site, the first re-run failed when the machine did not perform; after 17 hours of testing, the second re-tabulation ran from 4:56 p.m. on March 10 to 1:00 a.m. on March 11. County Judge Ronnie Cochran said ES&S's programming was the major issue. The official canvass shows the corrected totals, and officials said local races were not affected. Status Confirmed: the vendor, the clerk, the county judge and the court order all document the coding error and the re-tabulation. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a vendor-supplied ballot definition silently assigned a county's votes in five contests to nobody, and it was caught only because the totals were absurd; a smaller shift would have looked normal. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. A public hand count of the paper ballots at the precinct does not depend on a vendor's oval map.", "sources": [{"title": "KJAS — Sandra Duckworth explains what prompted a recount of votes in Newton County (March 2026; clerk's timeline)", "url": "https://www.kjas.com/news/local_news/article_8226fa62-38be-4be6-929f-a718ad4a5482.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation__kjas-duckworth.html"}, {"title": "ABC13 Houston — Texas county starts election recount after \"ballot coding error\" leads to \"skewed\" results (March 10, 2026)", "url": "https://abc13.com/post/texas-county-starts-election-recount-ballot-coding-error-leads-skewed-results/18697268/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation__abc13-coding-error.html"}, {"title": "KFDM — Second Newton County recount, no local results impacted (March 10, 2026)", "url": "https://kfdm.com/news/local/second-recount-needed-in-newton-county-after-problem-develops-with-firstone", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation__kfdm-second-recount.html"}, {"title": "12News (KBMT) — Newton County recount underway after ballot error discovered by vendor (March 10, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-21, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/politics/elections/newton-county-recount-underway-after-ballot-error-discovered-vendor/502-d67669ab-a638-4f91-a955-99699c5fee90"}, {"title": "Newton County, TX — March 3, 2026 Primaries Official Canvass (PDF)", "url": "https://www.co.newton.tx.us/upload/page/3518/docs/Election%20Results/March%203%202026%20Primaries%20Official%20Canvass.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-newton-2026-03-primary-ess-ballot-coding-error-zero-votes-retabulation__newton-official-canvass.pdf"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), reply to Mark Cook listing Texas ballot-on-demand failures (Oct. 21, 2026, 1:54 PM ET; no media)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112965849451827224", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--reply__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Lead: Mark Cook, 2026-10-21 2:00 PM ET, X post by Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm, Texas citizen auditor) 2112965849451827224, a reply to Mark's questions in her Bexar thread (root 2112933307159609699). Mark asked that each issue in the post be handled separately. Issue 3 of the post. Not previously carded (no Newton or Talarico card on the tracker). Archived: KJAS, ABC13, KFDM, county canvass PDF (0.6 MB), X capture. 12News 403. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["DS450"]}
{"id": "wi-green-bay-2026-duplicate-absentee-ballots-april-august-wec-probable-cause", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-09", "uid": "C20261014-201922-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-09", "old_ids": ["wi-green-bay-2026-duplicate-absentee-ballots-april-august-wec-probable-cause"], "seq": "C01405", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-03 to 2026-09-09", "state": "WI", "description": "Green Bay, Wisconsin mailed two absentee ballots to 152 voters for the April 2026 spring election and to at least 244 voters (up to 390 labels may have been reprinted) for the August 2026 primary, according to the city's reports to the Wisconsin Elections Commission. City staff attributed both to human error by then-Clerk Celestine Jeffreys, who reprinted certificate-envelope labels without checking whether they were actually missing; she was placed on leave in July and resigned in August. On Sept. 9, 2026 the bipartisan Commission unanimously found probable cause that she violated state law by issuing duplicate ballots in April and abused her discretion by not putting safeguards in place before August, rejected the city's initial argument that the law only bars counting a second ballot, and ordered one ballot per voter, documented label reprints, and full chain of custody. The city says no one voted more than once. Status Confirmed (WEC decision letter and order; WPR). Catalog point: the same \"mistake\" happened twice in one year in one city and was caught only after a complaint; each confirmed error like this makes the excuse credible everywhere.", "sources": [{"title": "WPR — Former Green Bay clerk likely violated state law by issuing duplicate ballots (Sept. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/news/former-green-bay-clerk-likely-violated-state-law-by-issuing-duplicate-ballots"}, {"title": "WEC — 5.06(4) Green Bay Investigation Decision Letter (Sept. 9, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/5.06%284%29%20Green%20Bay%20Investigation%20Decision%20Letter%20-%209.9.26.pdf"}, {"title": "WEC — Green Bay Investigation Order (Sept. 9, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Green%20Bay%20Investigation%20Order%20-%209.9.26.pdf"}, {"title": "WTAQ — WEC finds probable cause former Green Bay clerk broke state law (Sept. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://wtaq.com/2026/09/09/wec-finds-probable-cause-former-green-bay-clerk-broke-state-law-no-penalty-listed/"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Confirmed. Same-record duplicate mailing (not a clone record) → duplicate-ballot leaf next to Athens-Clarke. Peers: ga-athens-clarke-2026-1154-duplicate-absentee-mailing-list-error.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots"]}
{"id": "nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-66", "uid": "C20260925-155410-66", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-66", "old_ids": ["nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026"], "seq": "C00066", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-02", "state": "NC", "description": "For the 2026 North Carolina primary, county/state election boards did not include on-campus early-voting sites at Western Carolina University, NC A&T, and UNC-Greensboro in approved plans (WCU had hosted sites consistently since 2016; A&T/UNCG had hosted in some presidential cycles). College Democrats and students sued seeking an injunction. On ~Feb 8–9, 2026, U.S. District Judge William Osteen denied relief, finding the burden not severe enough under Purcell-timing constraints and logistics/cost justifications; early voting began Feb 12 without those campus sites. Status Confirmed for the denials and court ruling; whether exclusion was discriminatory remains litigated/contested framing, not adjudicated as discrimination here.", "sources": [{"title": "Carolina Public Press — Judge denies campus early-voting sites for three NC universities", "url": "https://carolinapublicpress.org/74415/judge-denies-demands-for-early-voting-sites-on-three-nc-university-campuses/"}, {"title": "AP — Efforts at early voting sites at North Carolina universities denied by judge", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/north-carolina-early-voting-universities-judge-452615513f497ab51ca3c19783703073"}, {"title": "Complaint PDF — College Democrats / students v. NCSBE (CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ncmd.103938/gov.uscourts.ncmd.103938.1.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026__complaint-pdf-college-democrats-students-v-ncsbe-courtlisten.pdf"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-018 (published to live monitor 2026-09-25). Priority Colleges / Early Voting leaf. Confirmed for denial ruling; Purcell timing cited."}
{"id": "pa-tenex-precinct-central-wan-mifi-offered-approval-limited-closed-lan", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-07", "uid": "C20260926-020046-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-07", "old_ids": ["pa-tenex-precinct-central-wan-mifi-offered-approval-limited-closed-lan"], "seq": "C00924", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "They can be abused wirelessly from the parking lot, by wire inside the polling place, or over the cellular network or internet from anywhere in the world."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-02", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania's Secretary's certification report for Tenex Precinct Central 6.1.5 documents that the vendor's offered networking modes include **WAN / Host-Server** connectivity via a secured wireless modem/router with **external internet connection** (MiFi; up to 15 units) in addition to peer-to-peer LAN—yet the Commonwealth **limited approval to closed Local Area Network (peer-to-peer)** only, requiring a 'closed network,' encryption, no public network, and devices configured so other devices cannot detect/connect. Status Confirmed that EPB products ship with parking-lot/WAN-capable wireless paths that states must affirmatively fence off—peer to KnowInk PA closed-encrypted-network conditions and DEF CON ExpressPoll live-data compromise findings.", "sources": [{"title": "PA DOS — Secretary's signed Tenex Precinct Central 6.1.5 EPB certification report (WAN/MiFi offered; closed LAN only approved)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/voting-systems/certification-reports/secretary%27s%20signed%20tenex%20precinct%20central%206.1.5%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-tenex-precinct-central-wan-mifi-offered-approval-limited-closed-lan__pa-dos-secretary-s-signed-tenex-precinct-central-6-1-5.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on EPB wireless remote-abuse / closed-network mitigation leaf.", "vendor": ["Tenex"]}
{"id": "eac-vvrsg-2026-voter-registration-audit-log-change-tracking", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-14", "uid": "C20260926-032507-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-14", "old_ids": ["eac-vvrsg-2026-voter-registration-audit-log-change-tracking"], "seq": "C01209", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No change tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-02-27", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC Voluntary Voter Registration System Guidelines (VVRSG) v0.9 (Feb. 27, 2026) states that every process in a voter-registration system should log the user's credentials for auditing, requires Audit Records supporting user-management/role-based-access reporting (1.2.5), and requires cryptographic integrity verification of voter data with immediate logging of verification errors (2.2.4)—i.e., federal baseline recognition that without append-only change-tracking, roll mutations are not auditable. Status Confirmed primary EAC VVRSG v0.9 documenting required audit-log / change-tracking baselines for voter-registration systems; peer to FL Auditor 2021-096 Finding 6 access-control records not retained and Appel-Stark 2020 compliance-audits changelogs-should-be-included cards already on this leaf—EAC VVRSG audit-log instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: rolls without reliable change-tracking hide who altered which soft-identity entries; public hand counts of paper still reconcile to present humans.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Voluntary Voter Registration System Guidelines (VVRSG) v0.9 (Feb. 27, 2026 PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/VVRSG_V0.9_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vvrsg-2026-voter-registration-audit-log-change-tracking__eac-voluntary-voter-registration-system-guidelines-vvrsg-v0-9-feb-27-2026-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC Decision on Audit Log Events (VVSG audit-log companion interpretation)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/testing_standard/files/EAC%20Decision%20on%20Audit%20Log%20Events.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vvrsg-2026-voter-registration-audit-log-change-tracking__eac-decision-on-audit-log-events-vvsg-audit-log-companion-interpretation.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Voter Rolls No change-tracking leaf."}
{"id": "loveland-co-randall-muted-public-comment-settlement-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-15", "uid": "C20261001-094909-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-15", "old_ids": ["loveland-co-randall-muted-public-comment-settlement-2026"], "seq": "C01309", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Microphones are shut off"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-02-17", "state": "CO", "description": "During remote public comment at the Feb. 17, 2026 Loveland (CO) City Council meeting, Mayor Pat McFall muted resident Gail Randall after directing her to stay 'on topic' while she spoke against a Costco-related business-assistance agreement; her complaint alleged she was the only speaker whose comments were terminated while others continued on related issues. Randall sued the city and mayor (Larimer Dist. Ct. 2026CV30164) for First Amendment viewpoint discrimination. On Aug. 19, 2026 the City Council approved a settlement paying Randall $42,500, requiring a public apology from the mayor, and granting extra public-comment time. Status Confirmed contemporaneous reporting of the mute plus approved settlement resolving the mic-silencing claim—no trial verdict on liability. Peer to Cleveland/Las Vegas/Xenia mic cards—Loveland Randall/McFall instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: muting critical commenters during development/incentive debates shrinks the public record citizens need before election-day accountability.", "sources": [{"title": "Loveland Reporter-Herald — Approves $42,500 First Amendment settlement (Aug. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.reporterherald.com/2026/08/19/loveland-first-amendment-lawsuit-settlement-mayor-apology/"}, {"title": "Loveland Reporter-Herald — Resident sues city, mayor over public comment mute (Feb. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.reporterherald.com/2026/02/20/loveland-lawsuit-public-comment/"}, {"title": "Colorado FOIC — Loveland settles public comment lawsuit for $42,500", "url": "https://coloradofoic.org/news/loveland-settles-public-comment-lawsuit-for-42500/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Settlement Confirmed mute; not Cleveland remount."}
{"id": "or-sos-2026-directive-160k-inactive-since-2017-never-cancelled-jw-settlement", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-02", "uid": "C20261008-203914-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-02", "old_ids": ["or-sos-2026-directive-160k-inactive-since-2017-never-cancelled-jw-settlement"], "seq": "C00272", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-01", "state": "OR", "description": "On January 9, 2026, Oregon Secretary of State Tobias Read issued Directive 2026-01. It ordered counties to cancel about 160,000 inactive registrations that had already met federal and state removal standards before July 20, 2017: their election mail had come back undeliverable, they had been sent confirmation cards, and they had not responded. Oregon had stopped routine cancellations after Directive 2017-1, issued under former Secretary Dennis Richardson, removed the cancellation warning from confirmation cards. Without that warning, the state said, it could not legally remove anyone. By January 2026, about 800,000 registrations sat inactive, some for nearly a decade, compared with about 3 million active voters. The remaining roughly 640,000 can be removed later under new card language that takes effect August 25, 2026. A Judicial Watch NVRA suit filed in October 2024 cited 2023 data showing 19 of Oregon's 36 counties removed no one from November 2020 to November 2022. That suit settled in April/May 2026 with Oregon agreeing to report list-maintenance data annually for five years. Status Confirmed: the state's own directive documents the nine-year halt in removals. Oregon's inactive voters are not mailed ballots, and Judicial Watch told OPB it had no proof of widespread fraud. The card shows how one wording change by one official quietly kept stale records on a vote-by-mail state's rolls for years.", "sources": [{"title": "Oregon SOS — Oregon to resume routine cleanup of outdated, inactive voter registration records (Jan. 2026)", "url": "https://apps.oregon.gov/oregon-newsroom/OR/SOS/Posts/Post/resume-routine-cleanup-outdated-inactive-voter-registration-records-directives-tobias-read"}, {"title": "Oregon SOS — Directive 2026-01 Voter List Maintenance (PDF)", "url": "https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Documents/Directive-2026-01-List-Maintenance.pdf"}, {"title": "OPB — Oregon settles lawsuit claiming it failed to properly police voter rolls (May 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.opb.org/article/2026/05/07/oregon-settles-lawsuit-failed-police-voter-rolls/"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — Oregon NVRA complaint (Oct. 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/OR-NVRA-complaint-01783.pdf"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Answers the leaf's 'by who's instruction?': Directive 2017-1 notice-wording change. Universal-mail state. Judicial Watch is a litigant; it acknowledged no proof of widespread fraud."}
{"id": "ncsbe-public-hearing-postponed-comment-period-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-23", "uid": "C20260925-194013-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-23", "old_ids": ["ncsbe-public-hearing-postponed-comment-period-2026"], "seq": "C00207", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Meetings are rescheduled to create conflicts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-01-29", "state": "NC", "description": "The North Carolina State Board of Elections publicly postponed a noticed public hearing while keeping a written comment period open (Jan 29, 2026 press update), forcing citizens who planned around the hearing date to re-plan and rely on written comments instead of in-person testimony. Status Confirmed for official rescheduling/postponement of an elections public hearing that alters public participation logistics; malevolent 'conflict' intent not claimed.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Updated: public comment period open; public hearing postponed", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2026/01/29/updated-public-comment-period-open-public-hearing-postponed", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsbe-public-hearing-postponed-comment-period-2026__ncsbe-updated-public-comment-period-open-public-hearing-post.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 11. Official elections hearing postponement Confirmed."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2026-fbi-seizes-2020-ballots-election-hub-boulee-denies-return", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-01", "uid": "C20261023-123356-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-01", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2026-fbi-seizes-2020-ballots-election-hub-boulee-denies-return"], "seq": "C01526", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballots are removed from election officials' custody by other authorities, breaking the chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-01-28 (seizure); 2026-05-06 (return motion denied)", "state": "GA", "description": "On Jan. 28, 2026, FBI agents executed a federal search warrant at Fulton County, Georgia's election hub and removed roughly 650 to 700 boxes of 2020 general-election material, including voted ballots, tabulator tapes, ballot images and voter rolls, from the custody of county election officials. The warrant attachment cites 52 U.S.C. 20701 (federal election-record retention) and 52 U.S.C. 20511 (criminal penalties). NPR reported on Feb. 10, 2026 that the FBI affidavit supporting the warrant relied in part on 2020 claims that had previously been investigated and debunked. Fulton County moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) for return of the materials. On May 6, 2026, U.S. District Judge J.P. Boulee denied the motion; he found the affidavit \"defective in some respects\" and called certain omissions \"troubling,\" but found no \"callous disregard\" of the county's rights that would require return. The county said it was weighing an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit. Status Confirmed: the removal of the ballots from county custody and the court's refusal to order their return are documented in the warrant attachment, the court order and national coverage. Whether any crime occurred is not established by this card. Catalog point: once the original ballots of a past election leave the election office, the county, the candidates and the public can no longer inspect them under the usual custody rules. A precinct-level hand count done in public on election night leaves signed tally sheets with every precinct, so the result does not depend on who later holds the boxes.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — FBI searches Georgia elections office in Fulton County (Jan. 28, 2026; apnews.com bot-blocks curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/fbi-georgia-elections-office-fulton-county-28e736037521b17197760d2394f0ab43"}, {"title": "Reuters — FBI executing search warrant at election office in Georgia related to 2020 vote (Jan. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fbi-executing-search-warrant-election-office-georgia-related-2020-vote-fox-news-2026-01-28/"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D. Ga. — Search warrant Attachment (items to be seized; 52 U.S.C. 20701, 20511) via CourtListener", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.355087/gov.uscourts.gand.355087.22.1.pdf"}, {"title": "NPR — FBI affidavit in Fulton County 2020 election search relies on debunked claims (Feb. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2026/02/10/nx-s1-5710649/fulton-county-2020-election-affidavit-fbi"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D. Ga. — Order denying Fulton County's Rule 41(g) motion (Judge J.P. Boulee, May 6, 2026) via CourtListener", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.355452/gov.uscourts.gand.355452.108.0_1.pdf"}, {"title": "CBS News — Judge denies Fulton County request to return 2020 ballots seized by FBI (May 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/judge-denies-fulton-county-request-to-return-2020-ballots-seized-by-fbi/"}, {"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Judge: Justice Department can keep seized 2020 Fulton ballots (May 2026)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/05/judge-denies-fultons-request-for-return-of-2020-ballots-seized-in-fbi-raid/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to ei-2026-09-017 (Riverside CA sheriff seizure) on this leaf (1 -> 3 with the Maricopa 2021 card). Not a 2026 midterm-window incident (2026 federal action about 2020 records); EMon priority false. CourtListener PDFs, NPR, CBS, AJC curl 200; AP and Reuters bot-block curl, text verified via WebSearch extracts."}
{"id": "ncsl-election-admin-partisan-sos-make-partisan", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-27", "uid": "C20260926-004030-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-27", "old_ids": ["ncsl-election-admin-partisan-sos-make-partisan"], "seq": "C00780", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Others"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2026-01-13", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's election-administration overview documents that in 33 states voters elect the chief election official (usually Secretary of State) via partisan elections, and many local election offices (county clerks/recorders) are likewise partisan elected offices—i.e., core election-administration positions structured as partisan rather than insulated nonpartisan civil service. Soft remount of fill-20i/j SOS/partisan-control family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for widespread partisan structuring of election offices; 'make' as a recent conversion Alleged only where a specific office changed.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Election Administration at State and Local Levels", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Cochise Recorder Stevens / partisan election-authority control companion", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/5/18/23728298/cochise-county-recorder-david-stevens-election-authority/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Cochise Recorder Stevens / partisan election-authority control companion", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/2/28/23619597/cochise-county-recorder-david-stevens-election-security/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 14. Soft remount of partisan SOS/recorder family. Votebeat URL may need soft—if fails use AZ Const companion already in corpus."}
{"id": "ar-sbec-poll-watcher-rules-limit-challenges-mandatory-training", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-17", "uid": "C20260925-214102-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-17", "old_ids": ["ar-sbec-poll-watcher-rules-limit-challenges-mandatory-training"], "seq": "C00340", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They mistrain poll watchers so they do not know what to look for."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "AR", "description": "Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners Rules on Poll Watchers, Vote Challenges, and Provisional Voting require mandatory watcher training/assessment/certification and tightly limit what a trained watcher may challenge — typically only precinct eligibility / already-voted issues, with prescribed forms and timing — while directing other procedural concerns to election officials rather than independent ballot/process inspection. Status Confirmed that official training channels define a narrow 'what to look for' scope that can leave watchers unequipped to scrutinize tabulation, chain-of-custody, or signature processes outside the permitted challenge types.", "sources": [{"title": "Arkansas SBEC — Final Approved Rules on Poll Watchers (PDF)", "url": "https://sbec.arkansas.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025-Final-Approved-Rules-on-Poll-Watchers-Vote-Challenges-and-Provisional-Voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ar-sbec-poll-watcher-rules-limit-challenges-mandatory-training__arkansas-sbec-final-approved-rules-on-poll-watchers-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Cornell LII — Arkansas poll watcher rules (prior codification)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/arkansas/108-00-13-Ark-Code-R-004"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 9. Confirmed official narrowing of watcher role via mandatory training; 'mis-train' = train to miss out-of-scope issues."}
{"id": "doj-sdfl-abreu-sentenced-impersonating-citizen-vote-federal", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-06", "uid": "C20260926-023334-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-06", "old_ids": ["doj-sdfl-abreu-sentenced-impersonating-citizen-vote-federal"], "seq": "C01066", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "FL", "description": "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida announced that Carlos Abreu, a Dominican national unlawfully present in the United States, was sentenced to 65 months in federal prison (plus supervised release) after pleading guilty to falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to register and vote in federal elections (among identity-theft, passport, and firearms counts). Miami Herald and Florida Daily contemporaneous coverage confirm the sentencing and illegal-voting admissions. Status Confirmed federal criminal judgment; peer to DOJ Orange County noncitizen-registration suit and NVRA quiet-period suits already on this leaf—individual illegal-voting sentence, not those remounted. PEP framing: citizenship-attestation registration without documentary proof leaves a pathway that hand-marked, in-person observed ballots make harder to exploit at scale.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ USAO-SDFL — Illegal Alien from Dominican Republic Sentenced for Impersonating U.S. Citizen to Vote in Federal Election", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdfl/pr/illegal-alien-dominican-republic-sentenced-impersonating-us-citizen-vote-federal"}, {"title": "Florida Daily — Illegal Alien in Florida Sentenced for Impersonating U.S. Citizen to Vote", "url": "https://floridadaily.com/illegal-alien-in-florida-sentenced-for-impersonating-u-s-citizen-to-vote/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on Illegal Immigration leaf."}
{"id": "knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-pollpad-checkin-sync-eac-scope", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-15", "uid": "C20260925-220029-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-15", "old_ids": ["knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-pollpad-checkin-sync-eac-scope"], "seq": "C00368", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Electronic poll books: each check-in is recorded in a central database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "EAC Scope of Certification materials for KNOWiNK Poll Pad document ePulse as a centralized hub: connected Poll Pads synchronize check-ins and voter data in near real time (with offline operation and later upload of voter history to ePulse / jurisdiction voter systems). Status Confirmed that EPB check-ins are designed to flow into a central database—exactly the catalog's early-voting data-collection architecture. Soft companion to existing Electronic Poll Books>wireless/ePulse cards (knowink-pollpad-wifi-cellular-central-epulse); this mounts the exact Early Voting modeling child leaf. Does not Confirm that central check-in data equals tabulated vote choice.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — KNOWiNK Poll Pad / ePulse Scope of Certification PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-12/KNO-EPB-PP-4.0.2_Scope_of_Certification_v12.15.2025_508.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — KNOWiNK Poll Pad v.3.6 Scope of Certification PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/KNOWiNK_Poll_Pad_v.3.6_Scope_of_Certification_VEPBCR_1.0_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 8. Central check-in DB Confirmed; vote-choice model remains Partially/Alleged elsewhere.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"], "related": ["pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling"]}
{"id": "knowink-epulse-near-realtime-inperson-checkin-monitoring-hub", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-31", "uid": "C20260925-234437-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-31", "old_ids": ["knowink-epulse-near-realtime-inperson-checkin-monitoring-hub"], "seq": "C00464", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "In person: design an electronic poll-book system to track who votes in person."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "KnowInk Poll Pad / ePulse EAC Scope of Certification materials describe a central hub with near-real-time sync of poll-book check-ins—exactly a digital poll book system that monitors who has voted in person across connected sites. Status Confirmed for the EPB real-time who-voted monitoring mechanism. Soft companion to existing knowink-epulse cards on EPB / Early Voting leaves; mounts exact Feedback Loop in-person EPB child.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — KnowInk Poll Pad 4.0.2 Scope of Certification (ePulse hub sync PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-12/KNO-EPB-PP-4.0.2_Scope_of_Certification_v12.15.2025_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-epulse-near-realtime-inperson-checkin-monitoring-hub__eac-knowink-poll-pad-4-0-2-scope-of-certification-epulse-hub-sync-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — KnowInk Poll Pad v3.6 Scope of Certification", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/KNOWiNK_Poll_Pad_v.3.6_Scope_of_Certification_VEPBCR_1.0_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-epulse-near-realtime-inperson-checkin-monitoring-hub__eac-knowink-poll-pad-v3-6-scope-of-certification.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 16.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"]}
{"id": "nv-nrs-293-247-sos-regs-govern-county-city-clerks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-08", "uid": "C20260926-021058-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-08", "old_ids": ["nv-nrs-293-247-sos-regs-govern-county-city-clerks"], "seq": "C00956", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks that they serve as \"agents of the Secretary of State.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada NRS 293.247 requires the Secretary of State to adopt regulations for the conduct of elections that **govern** primary/general/special/district elections in all cities and counties, and to distribute laws, regulations, and SOS interpretations to each county and city clerk. Status Confirmed statutory centralization of clerk conduct under SOS regulations/interpretations; peer to Colorado CRS 1-1-110 clerks-must-follow-SOS-rules and mail-ballot agent companion—Nevada statute, not CO remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "NRS 293.247 — SOS regulations for conduct of elections; distribution to county/city clerks", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-293.html#NRS293Sec247"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — NRS 293.247 summary (regs govern clerks)", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/nevada/statute/293.247/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-nrs-293-247-sos-regs-govern-county-city-clerks__election-law-navigator-nrs-293-247-summary-regs-govern-clerks.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on clerks as agents/instruments of SOS leaf."}
{"id": "co-sos-ce068-ce068c-daily-public-ballot-status-lists", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-01", "uid": "C20260926-013447-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-01", "old_ids": ["co-sos-ce068-ce068c-daily-public-ballot-status-lists"], "seq": "C00860", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Election Code", "Actions that facilitate indirect manipulation of our election system have been written into the election code:", "For example, Texas law"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Department of State elections data products include CE-068 (Public List of Voters with a Ballot) and CE-068c (Public List of Voters with a Returned Ballot), updated repeatedly each day after ballots are mailed during primary/general/odd-year cycles (SOS data-request schedule: CE-068 every four hours; CE-068c every two hours), plus daily Undeliverable Ballots (CE-037) and Rejected Cure Ballots (CE-077) extracts available by report purchase or the 2025–2026 election-cycle subscription. The SOS also publishes weekday statewide ballot-return spreadsheets (party/age/gender) during active elections. Status Confirmed for Colorado's peer practice of making early/mail ballot status registers downloadable to the public/campaigns—structural parallel to Texas Election Code §85.072's downloadable branch daily register; not a fraud finding.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Elections Data Request Form (CE-068 / CE-068c daily extracts; subscription)", "url": "https://coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/forms/dataRequests.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-ce068-ce068c-daily-public-ballot-status-lists__colorado-sos-elections-data-request-form-ce-068-ce-068c.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Primary ballot returns daily update example (July 8, 2026 spreadsheet)", "url": "https://coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2026/PR20260708BallotReturns.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-ce068-ce068c-daily-public-ballot-status-lists__colorado-sos-primary-ballot-returns-daily-update-exampl.png"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Elections & Voting Fee Schedule (public data products)", "url": "https://coloradosos.gov/pubs/info_center/fees/elections.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-ce068-ce068c-daily-public-ballot-status-lists__colorado-sos-elections-voting-fee-schedule-public-data.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to tx-elec-code-85-072-branch-daily-register-public-downloadable."}
{"id": "knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-checkin-data-sync-readable-by-administrators", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-22", "uid": "C20260925-233150-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-22", "old_ids": ["knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-checkin-data-sync-readable-by-administrators"], "seq": "C00415", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll-book data can be read by others to see how to manipulate the election by adding phantom ballots and then injecting phantom electronic check-ins."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-12", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "EAC Scope of Certification materials for KnowInk PollPad/ePulse describe a central hub with near-real-time check-in synchronization—meaning who-has-voted pollbook data is aggregated where administrators (and anyone who obtains hub/export access) can read statewide/jurisdiction check-in state. Status Confirmed for centralized readable check-in data architecture. Soft companion to fill-20a EPB→central-database cards; this mounts the exact 'data can be read' leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — KnowInk PollPad 4.0.2 Scope of Certification (ePulse hub)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-12/KNO-EPB-PP-4.0.2_Scope_of_Certification_v12.15.2025_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-checkin-data-sync-readable-by-administrators__knowink-epulse-central-hub-near-realtime-checkin-data-sync-readable-by-administrators__eac-knowink-pollpad-4-0-2-scope-of-certification-epulse-hub.pdf"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressPoll (jurisdiction sync overview)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expresspoll/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 11 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"]}
{"id": "eac-poll-watchers-observers-monitor-only-no-direct-election-authority", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-11", "uid": "C20260926-030706-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-11", "old_ids": ["eac-poll-watchers-observers-monitor-only-no-direct-election-authority"], "seq": "C01146", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not exercise their authority over election operations as representatives of the electors, authority greater than that of the clerks and secretaries of state who are \"elected.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-12-23", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Poll Watchers resource (updated Dec. 23, 2025) and linked Quick Start Guide define party/candidate poll watchers as observers who 'may observe steps in the election process' and 'observe and monitor the election, without violating voter privacy or disrupting the election'—distinct from election officials who administer the election—while noting state law varies on challenge powers. Status Confirmed primary EAC framing that party watchers monitor rather than exercise operational authority over clerks/SOS; peer to NCSL observers-vs-clerks and election-admin cards already on this leaf—EAC poll-watcher definition, not those remounted. PEP framing: party structures limited to observation rather than elector-authority over election operations leave machine-run processes without public hand-count leverage.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Poll Watchers (observers monitor; do not run the election)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-poll-watchers-observers-monitor-only-no-direct-election-authority__eac-poll-watchers-observers-monitor-only.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Quick Start Guide on Poll Watchers (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Poll_Watchers_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-poll-watchers-observers-monitor-only-no-direct-election-authority__eac-poll-watchers-quick-start-guide-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Political Parties Don't exert authority over election operations leaf."}
{"id": "proofpoint-2025-subscription-bombing-hides-real-cyberattacks-inbox-avalanche", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-01", "uid": "C20260926-024539-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-01", "old_ids": ["proofpoint-2025-subscription-bombing-hides-real-cyberattacks-inbox-avalanche"], "seq": "C01091", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Mailing-list stuffing attacks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-12-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "Proofpoint's Dec. 11, 2025 Cybersecurity Stop of the Month documents subscription bombing (mailing-list stuffing) as a high-velocity intimidation/distraction attack: bots flood a target with 1,500+ legitimate newsletter confirmations per hour so critical security alerts are buried, with HC3 healthcare-sector alerts and Black Basta ransomware groups weaponizing the same inbox-avalanche pattern for social-engineering follow-ups. Status Confirmed contemporary vendor/sector documentation of mailing-list stuffing as operational intimidation/DoS against inboxes—peer to the 2017 WIRED/ProPublica journalist bombings and MITRE T1667/.gov Krebs cards already on this leaf, not those remounted. PEP framing: stuffing that overwhelms civic/election-adjacent communications channels raises machine/centralization complexity without hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Proofpoint — How Subscription Bombing Hides Real Cyberattacks (Dec. 11, 2025)", "url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/email-and-cloud-threats/subscription-bombing-hides-real-cyberattacks"}, {"title": "MITRE ATT&CK — T1667 Email Bombing (technique catalog)", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1667/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/proofpoint-2025-subscription-bombing-hides-real-cyberattacks-inbox-avalanche__mitre-attck-t1667-email-bombing-technique-catalog.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Mailing list stuffing attacks leaf."}
{"id": "usps-2025-dmm-608-11-postmark-date-may-not-match-mailing-date", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-07", "uid": "C20261012-125218-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-07", "old_ids": ["usps-2025-dmm-608-11-postmark-date-may-not-match-mailing-date"], "seq": "C01365", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Fake postmarks (the machine operator can set the postmark to any date)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-11-24 (effective 2025-12-24)", "state": "US", "description": "The U.S. Postal Service's final rule \"Postmarks and Postal Possession\" (90 FR 52883, Nov. 24, 2025; effective Dec. 24, 2025) added Domestic Mail Manual section 608.11. It defines the postmark and states plainly that a postmark date does not necessarily match the date USPS first accepted a mailpiece. Most postmarks are applied at the processing plant on the date of the first automated operation, and USPS says its Regional Transportation Optimization changes will make it more common for mail to reach that plant a day or more after it was dropped off. The rule also notes that not all mail is postmarked at all. USPS's January 2026 \"Postmarking Myths and Facts\" statement and its 2026–2027 Official Election Mail kit (Kit 600) apply this to mail ballots and tell voters who need a same-day date to ask for a free manual postmark at a retail counter. Status Confirmed (Federal Register final rule and USPS publications). Catalog note: in states that count ballots that arrive after Election Day if they are postmarked by it, the postmark is now officially only proof the Postal Service had the envelope on some date, not proof of when the voter mailed it. Who applies it, when and where is invisible to the public. In-person, Election Day voting removes the postmark as a deciding factor.", "sources": [{"title": "Federal Register — Postmarks and Postal Possession, final rule, 90 FR 52883 (Nov. 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/11/24/2025-20740/postmarks-and-postal-possession"}, {"title": "GovInfo — Federal Register Vol. 90 No. 224, FR Doc 2025-20740 (full text)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2025-11-24/html/2025-20740.htm"}, {"title": "USPS Newsroom — Postmarking Myths and Facts (Jan. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/newsroom/statements/010226-postmarking-myths-and-facts.htm"}, {"title": "USPS — Kit 600: 2026–2027 Official Election Mail (PDF)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Fits Fake Postmarks leaf as the official admission that postmark dates are applied at plants and need not reflect mailing date; not evidence of deliberate backdating. Cross-leaf: Election 'Day' > Allowing voting after Election Day; USPS; Missing Postmarks."}
{"id": "mi-hamtramck-2025-37-excluded-absentee-ballots-counted-by-court-order-flip-mayor", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-04", "uid": "C20261019-123505-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-04", "old_ids": ["mi-hamtramck-2025-37-excluded-absentee-ballots-counted-by-court-order-flip-mayor"], "seq": "C01435", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-11-04 to 2026-10-16", "state": "MI", "description": "On Oct. 16, 2026, the Wayne County Board of Canvassers tabulated 37 absentee ballots from the Nov. 4, 2025 Hamtramck, Michigan mayoral election that had been left out of the original count, under an order by Wayne County Circuit Judge Kathleen McCarthy. The ballots were found in the Hamtramck city clerk's office after the election; then-City Clerk Rana Faraj noted a break in the chain of custody, and the canvassers did not include them in the final tally. Mayor Adam Alharbi had won by 11 votes and took office in January 2026. After challenger Muhith Mahmood sued, the Michigan Court of Appeals ruled in March that the ballots must be counted, and the Michigan Supreme Court declined to intervene. The unofficial new totals are Mahmood 2,089 and Alharbi 2,077. The results were not certified because of a pending challenge to Mahmood's residency, with a hearing set for Oct. 22, and Alharbi said he will pursue further challenges, including a recount. No finding of fraud involving the 37 ballots was announced. Update Oct. 22–23, 2026: the Oct. 16 count has not been certified, and the city says Alharbi remains the sitting mayor until the courts decide and the results are certified (FOX 2). On Oct. 22 a Wayne County Circuit Court judge held a five-hour hearing on Alharbi's challenge to Mahmood's residency; Alharbi's side presented investigators' findings, utility records and Michigan State Police cell-tower evidence that it says placed Mahmood mostly in Troy in 2024, while neighbors testified that they regularly saw him at his Hamtramck home (CBS Detroit, FOX 2). No ruling had been reported as of Oct. 23; a written opinion was expected as early as that day, and Alharbi told The Arab American News he intends to challenge the Oct. 16 count once it is certified. Status Confirmed for the excluded ballots, the court orders and the canvass that reversed the result (Votebeat, MLive, CBS Detroit, WXYZ). Sources differ on which order date set the Oct. 16 deadline. Catalog point: 37 absentee ballots sat in a clerk's office with a broken chain of custody, and their fate decided who held office for most of a year. Either way the courts ruled, voters had to trust ballots no one could fully account for. Ballots cast in person and counted by hand at the precinct on election night do not turn up later in an office.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Hamtramck 2025 mayoral result overturned after 37 ballots counted (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/michigan/2026/10/16/hamtramck-mayor-election-2025-overturned-alharbi-mahmood/"}, {"title": "CBS Detroit — 37 disputed absentee ballots counted in Hamtramck mayoral race (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/37-disputed-absentee-ballots-hamtramck-mayoral-race/"}, {"title": "CBS Detroit — Judge orders counting of 37 absentee ballots; clerk noted break in chain of custody (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/judge-orders-counting-37-absentee-ballots-hamtramck-mayoral-race/"}, {"title": "WXYZ Detroit — Hamtramck mayoral election flips after 37 disputed absentee ballots are counted (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wxyz.com/news/hamtramck-mayoral-election-flips-after-37-disputed-absentee-ballots-are-counted"}, {"title": "MLive — 37 disputed ballots flip Hamtramck mayoral election, but legal fight continues (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/2026/10/37-disputed-ballots-flip-hamtramck-mayoral-election-but-legal-fight-continues.html"}, {"title": "CBS Detroit — Court hearing in Hamtramck mayoral race (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/detroit/news/court-hearing-hamtramck-mayoral-race/"}, {"title": "FOX 2 Detroit — Judge holds residency hearing for Hamtramck mayoral challenger after recount chaos (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox2detroit.com/news/judge-holds-residency-hearing-hamtramck-mayoral-challenger-after-recount-chaos"}, {"title": "FOX 2 Detroit — Hamtramck mayor to remain seated until recount results are certified, city says", "url": "https://www.fox2detroit.com/news/hamtramck-mayor-remain-seated-recount-results-certified-city-says"}, {"title": "The Arab American News — Disputed ballots flip Hamtramck election, leaving mayor's office in limbo (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://arabamericannews.com/2026/10/23/disputed-ballots-flip-hamtramck-election-leaving-mayors-office-in-limbo/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hamtramck 37 absentee ballots (ei-2026-10-043)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: residency hearing Oct. 22, no ruling yet (CBS Detroit, Arab American News curl 200). EMon ei-2026-10-043 (first_seen 2026-10-09; EMon status active, confidence high; official_error unknown). Votebeat, CBS x2 and WXYZ curl 200; MLive 403. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities. Watch the Oct. 22 residency hearing and any recount."}
{"id": "us-2025-eo-14248-dpoc-federal-form-permanently-enjoined-lwv-v-eop", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-06", "uid": "C20261012-125218-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-06", "old_ids": ["us-2025-eo-14248-dpoc-federal-form-permanently-enjoined-lwv-v-eop"], "seq": "C01364", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-31", "state": "US", "description": "Section 2(a) of Executive Order 14248 (March 2025) directed the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to require documentary proof of U.S. citizenship on the National Mail Voter Registration Form, which otherwise asks applicants only to check a box and sign an attestation. On Oct. 31, 2025, U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly (D.D.C., consolidated cases including League of Women Voters v. Executive Office of the President, No. 25-cv-946) granted summary judgment and permanently enjoined the EAC from implementing that provision. She held that the Constitution gives election regulation to the states and Congress, not the President. Status Confirmed (court opinion and order). An appeal and the separate SAVE Act effort in Congress are outside this card. Catalog note: as of this ruling, the federal registration form still runs on self-attestation. Whatever one thinks of the executive-order route, the gap stays open until Congress or the states close it, which is why eligibility checks that citizens can see at the local level matter.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) — Memorandum opinion, Oct. 31, 2025 (PDF via League of Women Voters)", "url": "https://www.lwv.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/2025-10-31_DDC_order-grant-lwv-msj.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) — Order, No. 1:25-cv-00946-CKK, Doc. 217 (Oct. 31, 2025; CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.279032/gov.uscourts.dcd.279032.217.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Reuters — US judge permanently blocks Trump order requiring voters to prove citizenship (Oct. 31, 2025)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us-judge-permanently-blocks-trump-order-requiring-voters-prove-citizenship-2025-10-31/"}, {"title": "AP News — Federal judge says Trump can't require proof of citizenship for voting", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-elections-executive-order-democrats-citizenship-034a4d552a978a8f647d95bd3cf38ac0"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed via opinion/order PDFs (200). Reuters 401 / AP 403 to curl (paywall/bot-block), URLs retained. LWV is a party (advocacy); opinion text is the primary. Related: ei-2026-09-019 SAVE stay card (EO 14248 SAVE expansion)."}
{"id": "aapor-2025-task-force-2024-pre-election-polling-perception-framing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-06", "uid": "C20260926-031602-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-06", "old_ids": ["aapor-2025-task-force-2024-pre-election-polling-perception-framing"], "seq": "C01171", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "When results are falsified, voters misled about their candidate's popularity find the stolen victory more plausible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-29", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "AAPOR's Task Force on 2024 Pre-Election Polling (released Oct. 29, 2025) evaluated 611 late-campaign general-election polls and found average absolute two-party-margin error of 3.3 points (national presidential 2.6; state presidential 3.0)—more accurate than 2020/2016 yet still systematically underestimating Republican support (~2.7-point signed tilt toward Democrats in the synthesis). The report documents how pre-election poll pictures shape public expectation of margins before certified results. Status Confirmed primary AAPOR 2024-cycle polling-accuracy task force; peer to AAPOR 2020 overstated-Biden and AAPOR 2016 underestimate-Trump cards already on this leaf—2024/2025 AAPOR task-force instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: poll-shaped perception of 'what should happen' can make later machine-tabulated surprises feel less anomalous than a public hand count would make them.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — 2024 Pre-Election Polling: An Evaluation of the 2024 General Election Polls (announcement Oct. 29, 2025)", "url": "https://aapor.org/announcements/2024-pre-election-polling-report/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2025-task-force-2024-pre-election-polling-perception-framing__aapor-announcement-2024-pre-election-polling-report.png"}, {"title": "AAPOR Task Force on 2024 Pre-Election Polling — Full Report PDF", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AAPOR-Task-Force-on-2024-Pre-Election-Polling_Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2025-task-force-2024-pre-election-polling-perception-framing__aapor-task-force-2024-pre-election-polling-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing alters-perceptions-when-results-falsified leaf."}
{"id": "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-07", "uid": "C20261028-132233-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-07", "old_ids": ["ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope"], "seq": "C01602", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-21", "state": "CA", "description": "Orange County, California, uses return envelopes without holes, but its Registrar of Voters confirmed that a vote can be seen through the envelope paper. In an election newsletter issued about two weeks before the Nov. 4, 2025, special election, Registrar Bob Page wrote that claims had circulated that a Proposition 50 vote could be seen \"by shining a flashlight through the envelope in alignment with the voting targets,\" and: \"We tested the flashlight claim and found that a voting mark can be seen if a flashlight is positioned just right.\" [1] The registrar said staff do not try to determine how a voter marked a ballot, that anyone not on staff who examines another voter's ballot faces a fine of up to $10,000 and up to three years in prison, that the envelope paper stock had not changed in as long as anyone could remember, and that \"Once a ballot is removed from the envelope, the vote is now anonymous.\" [1] Status Confirmed: the registrar's own test. No source shows that anyone used the method to discard or sort ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Orange County Registrar of Voters (Bob Page) — Election Newsletter 96: Is a voting mark on a ballot secret if it is returned in a vote-by-mail envelope? (issued about Oct. 21, 2025)", "url": "https://ocvote.gov/feeds/getNewsletter.php/?id=394", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope__ocrov-newsletter-96-2025-10-21.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. EIPCa claims about Orange County handling are in the research queue.", "related": ["ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought", "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation"]}
{"id": "mn-javorina-2025-sentenced-cast-deceased-mother-absentee-ballot-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-14", "uid": "C20260926-023825-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-14", "old_ids": ["mn-javorina-2025-sentenced-cast-deceased-mother-absentee-ballot-2024"], "seq": "C01089", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Phantom records: best used first, because no one will show up to vote and be told they already voted."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-16", "state": "MN", "description": "Danielle Javorina (formerly Miller) of rural Nashwauk, Minnesota, pleaded guilty and was sentenced in Oct. 2025 for felony voter fraud after filling out and casting her deceased mother Rose Marie Javorina’s 2024 absentee ballot—MPR, KAXE, and CBS Minnesota confirm probation, fine, and essay conditions. Status Confirmed guilty plea/sentence on a deceased-registrant phantom ballot; peer to AZAG Connor deceased-mother ballot and PILF voted-after-death companion cards already on this leaf—Minnesota 2024/2025 Javorina case, not those remounted (and distinct from FL Rivernider on the Tombstone leaf). PEP framing: deceased roll records remain usable injection points into mail/machine pipelines until hand-count / list-maintenance closes them.", "sources": [{"title": "MPR News — Minnesota woman who cast dead mother’s 2024 ballot must write essay on voting (Oct. 20, 2025)", "url": "https://www.mprnews.org/story/2025/10/20/woman-cast-dead-mothers-ballot-for-trump-essay"}, {"title": "KAXE — Rural Nashwauk woman sentenced after pleading guilty to voter fraud (Oct. 16, 2025)", "url": "https://www.kaxe.org/local-news/2025-10-16/rural-nashwauk-woman-sentenced-after-pleading-guilty-to-voter-fraud"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Phantom records preference-priority leaf."}
{"id": "ga-chatham-2025-second-absentee-ballots-mailed-after-vendor-batch-lost", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-10", "uid": "C20261014-201922-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-10", "old_ids": ["ga-chatham-2025-second-absentee-ballots-mailed-after-vendor-batch-lost"], "seq": "C01406", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-15 to 2025-10-24", "state": "GA", "description": "The Chatham County, Georgia Board of Registrars announced Oct. 24, 2025 that absentee ballots its third-party printing vendor mailed on Oct. 15, 2025 had not reached some voters, so a second ballot was mailed to all affected voters on Oct. 22 while the first batch was still somewhere in the USPS system. The Board told voters who receive more than one ballot to complete and return only one, saying the state ballot-tracking system allows only one vote per voter. Status Confirmed (Board of Registrars release via WTOC; GPB / The Current reporting). Catalog point: deliberately putting two live ballots per voter into the mail stream shifts all protection onto back-end reconciliation that citizens cannot see. One ballot per voter, cast in person and hand counted at the precinct, has no second ballot to reconcile.", "sources": [{"title": "WTOC — Some Chatham County voters may receive two absentee ballots after mail delays (Oct. 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.wtoc.com/2025/10/24/some-chatham-county-voters-may-receive-two-absentee-ballots-after-mail-delays-officials-say/"}, {"title": "GPB — Chatham County absentee ballots go missing in mail (Oct. 27, 2025)", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2025/10/27/chatham-county-absentee-ballots-go-missing-in-mail"}, {"title": "The Current GA — Chatham County absentee ballots go missing in mail (Oct. 25, 2025)", "url": "https://thecurrentga.org/2025/10/25/chatham-county-absentee-ballots-go-missing-in-mail/"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Confirmed. Cross-leaf: USPS / lost-ballot cards. Found via @LizMajeroni reply (not carded as testimony)."}
{"id": "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-01", "uid": "C20261028-132233-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-01", "old_ids": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes"], "seq": "C01596", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-15 to 2025-10-23", "state": "VA", "description": "Fairfax County's own records confirm that a voter's mark could be seen through the hole in its absentee return envelope. The Electoral Board's minutes of Oct. 23, 2025, state: \"An issue was identified with the return absentee ballot envelope for the November General Election. Depending on the orientation of the ballot when placed within the return envelope, it was possible for the oval for one of the candidates to be seen through the hole punch in the envelope.\" [1] The General Registrar's October 2025 report says the hole punch has been required since 2021 by Virginia Code § 24.2-704(B) as a tactile indicator for visually impaired and print-disabled voters, and states: \"We hadn't received complaints about the design of the envelope until last week... it is possible for the oval used to mark a voter's ballot selection to be visible through the hole punch if a voter places the ballot in the envelope in a specific orientation.\" [2] The office posted statements on Oct. 15 and Oct. 20 suggesting that voters fold the ballot with the selections facing inward, and said that \"Prior to future elections we will consider ballot contest layout as it relates to the design of the absentee ballot return envelope.\" [1][2] The county's election-security page describes the statutory hole punch [3], and AFP reported that the ballot could be inserted in several ways to protect privacy [4]. The Fairfax County Republican Committee's Oct. 17 letter, which named the Attorney General contest and warned of selective removal, has its own card on the discard leaf. Status Confirmed: the county acknowledged in official minutes and in the registrar's report that the oval could be visible. No source reports that any Fairfax ballot was actually discarded or sorted because of it.", "sources": [{"title": "Fairfax County Electoral Board — Minutes of Oct. 23, 2025 meeting (PDF; hole-punch oval visibility)", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/Documents/PDF/Minutes%20-%20102325.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes__fairfax-electoral-board-minutes-2025-10-23.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Office of Elections — General Registrar's Report, October 2025 (PDF; 'Statutorily Required Hole Punch in Absentee Ballot Return Envelope')", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/sites/elections/files/Assets/Documents/PDF/3.2025-10%20GR%20Report%20-%20Final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes__fairfax-general-registrar-report-2025-10.pdf"}, {"title": "Fairfax County Office of Elections — Election Security page (absentee return envelope hole punch; Va. Code § 24.2-704(B))", "url": "https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/elections/election-security"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Virginia mail ballot can be returned multiple ways to protect privacy (Oct. 2025; AFP returns 403 to automated fetch, URL retained)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.82A84G6"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. AFP returned 403 to curl; linked only.", "related": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought", "az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope"]}
{"id": "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-04", "uid": "C20261028-132233-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-04", "old_ids": ["ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible"], "seq": "C01599", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-13 to 2026-10-08", "state": "CA", "description": "California officials acknowledge that envelope holes can line up with ballot marks and ask voters to fold their ballots to prevent it. Secretary of State Shirley Weber's Oct. 13, 2025, release says \"The small holes on ballot envelopes are an accessibility feature\" and \"If a voter is concerned, they can insert their ballot in a manner where any markings are obscured\"; it notes that the Secretary of State does not print or approve county envelopes. [1] San Bernardino County's FAQ says that \"For the 2025 Statewide Special Election, this hole does not align with any voting targets\" and that concerned voters can fold the ballot with the voting side inward. [2] Ventura County's FAQ says the hole lets workers confirm the envelope is empty and that envelopes are zip-tied through the holes; Vida republished the county's answers on May 26, 2026. [3][4] LAist's voter guide (updated Oct. 8, 2026) told readers, \"Even if you try to make your vote visible, the holes just don't line up\" [5], which Sacramento County's own two-of-eight statement and the Ventura video (both linked) contradict. Status Confirmed: these are official statements.", "sources": [{"title": "California Secretary of State Shirley N. Weber — Sets the record straight regarding Nov. 4, 2025, Statewide Special Election ballot envelopes (Oct. 13, 2025)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2025-news-releases-and-advisories/california-secretary-state-shirley-n-weber-phd-sets-record-straight-regarding-november-4-2025-statewide-special-election-ballot"}, {"title": "San Bernardino County Registrar of Voters — FAQ: Why is there a hole in my mail ballot identification envelope? (Oct. 2025)", "url": "https://elections.sbcounty.gov/faqs/why-is-there-a-hole-in-my-mail-ballot-identification-envelope/"}, {"title": "Ventura County Clerk-Recorder / Registrar of Voters — Elections FAQ (hole on the ballot envelope; zip-tied through the hole; AB 37 mailing to every registered voter)", "url": "https://clerkrecorder.venturacounty.gov/elections/elections/frequently-asked-questions/"}, {"title": "Vida Newspaper — Ventura County Elections Division shares commonly asked questions and answers (May 26, 2026)", "url": "https://vidanewspaper.com/2026/05/26/nows-the-time-to-vote-4/"}, {"title": "LAist (Brianna Lee and Hayley Fox) — How holes on mail-in ballot envelopes help election workers (published May 9, 2026; updated Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://laist.com/news/politics/voter-guides/vgp-2026-faq-mail-in-ballot-envelope-holes"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope"]}
{"id": "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-12", "uid": "C20261028-132233-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-12", "old_ids": ["ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994"], "seq": "C01607", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail a ballot to every record, including phantom ones"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-07", "state": "CA", "description": "Before the Nov. 4, 2025, special election, Los Angeles County mailed 5.8 million ballots, one to every registered voter. Resident Jeff Barry told ABC7 he received a ballot addressed to Winona M. McGuire, who died in 1994; ABC7 verified she had been dead 31 years. [1] \"She died in L.A. County over 30 years ago, and she's still on the voter rolls,\" Barry said. ABC7 reported no evidence that her name had been used to vote. [1] The Registrar-Recorder said a last-name spacing variance and a date-of-birth discrepancy had prevented a match with death records, and that the record was then canceled; Dean Logan said forging a ballot is a felony and asked recipients to mark such envelopes \"No longer resides here.\" [1] Status Confirmed: the registrar acknowledged the record and canceled it.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC7 Los Angeles — Ahead of special election, LA County voter receives ballot for person who died 31 years ago (Oct. 7, 2025)", "url": "https://abc7.com/post/ahead-special-election-la-county-voter-receives-ballot-person-died-31-years-ago/17959640/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates", "nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation", "ncsl-permanent-absentee-mail-ballot-lists", "ballotpedia-all-mail-voting-states", "hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation"]}
{"id": "pa-2025-sure-duplicate-mail-ballots-68-voters-cancelled", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-18", "uid": "C20261009-105430-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-18", "old_ids": ["pa-2025-sure-duplicate-mail-ballots-68-voters-cancelled"], "seq": "C01351", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-07", "state": "PA", "description": "In Oct. 2025, Pennsylvania's statewide SURE voter-registration system mistakenly generated second mail ballots for at least 68 voters in Luzerne (31), Dauphin, Montgomery and Carbon counties. Counties cancelled the extra ballots in SURE before they were accepted. Each return envelope has a unique barcode, and a second barcode for the same voter is rejected on scan. The barcode control prevented any double count, but the duplicates themselves came from the state system. Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "Spotlight PA — Duplicate mail ballots affect multiple PA counties ahead of election (Oct. 2025)", "url": "https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2025/10/pennsylvania-duplicate-mail-ballots-election-error-elections/"}, {"title": "WVIA — Luzerne County says state voter registration system mistakenly produced second mail-in ballots for 31 voters (Oct. 7, 2025)", "url": "https://www.wvia.org/news/local/2025-10-07/luzerne-county-says-state-voter-registration-system-mistakenly-produced-second-mail-in-ballots-for-31-voters"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Pennsylvania counties erroneously issue dozens of duplicate ballots (Oct. 9, 2025)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2025/10/09/duplicate-mail-ballots-pennsylvania-sure/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view (barcode cancel worked)."}
{"id": "cis-mdr-paid-replacement-federally-funded-edr-2025", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-27", "uid": "C20260925-185839-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-27", "old_ids": ["cis-mdr-paid-replacement-federally-funded-edr-2025"], "seq": "C00178", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Instead of handling security locally, many counties and states outsource it, which creates risk and displaces responsibility."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CIS documentation for Managed Detection and Response (CIS MDR / Endpoint Security Services FAQ) describes the transition after the federally funded EDR program for SLTT/election partners ended Oct. 1, 2025, with existing users covered through Dec. 31, 2026 and paid CIS MDR offered thereafter using CrowdStrike or Sophos agents monitored by CIS's SOC. Counties/states that relied on the federal offering must either pay for continued outsourced MDR or rebuild local capability—illustrating displaced/outsourced responsibility for election-office cybersecurity. Status Confirmed for the outsourced MDR model and funding transition.", "sources": [{"title": "CIS — Managed Detection and Response (CIS MDR) FAQ", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/services/cis-endpoint-security-services-ess-faq"}, {"title": "CIS — Election Security Tools & Resources", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-crowdstrike-ei-isac-endpoint-security-sltt-2021__cis-election-security-tools-resources-ei-isac.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 12. Funding cliff underscores outsourced dependency."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-001", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-47", "uid": "C20260925-155410-47", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-47", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-001"], "seq": "C00047", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-10 to 2026-10", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas DPS acknowledged a system error that left online driver's-license portal voter registration applications/updates untransmitted to county registrars for as long as about a year (records dating to Oct. 2025). DPS blamed a third-party vendor (Deloitte / DIR portal) software update in October 2025 that omitted three data fields from daily batch files so the Secretary of State could not auto-process them; DPS says it identified the missing-fields issue in late August, fixed transmission with SOS on Sept. 13, and resent affected records (SOS confirmed receipt Sept. 18; counties began receiving Sept. 22–23). Votebeat (Oct. 1) reports records show DPS knew of portal problems as early as March 2026, including ~992 DIR/Deloitte Dec–Feb portal failures and an Adkins SOS call—material chronology enrichment beyond the late-August identification narrative. Dallas Morning News (Sept. 29) surveyed 105 counties covering >75% of Texas population and tallied at least 591,000 files sent to counties (includes duplicates, address updates, and new registrations)—a material scope update from the earlier Votebeat seven-county ≥178,000 floor and circulating ~200k figures. North Texas alone (Collin, Dallas, Denton, Ellis, Kaufman, Rockwall, Tarrant) received a combined ~245,000. County snapshots: Harris ~108,000 received (~33k duplicates → >75,000 to process; ~11,000 need manual review—KPRC 2 Sept. 29); Tarrant ~74,000 (~60k done / Oct. 2 target—Community Impact); Dallas 68,104; Collin 40,000+; Bexar 45,000+; Travis 32,000+; Williamson 18,000; Hays 8,200; Smith ~7,900 (~2,600 manual—Tyler Morning Telegraph Sept. 30); Lubbock just over 8,000 (up from an initial ~7,400; Elections Administrator Troy Havard told commissioners Oct. 12 that about 1,000 records remained unprocessed one week before early voting, and the Commissioners Court voted unanimously to seek about $8,000 in reimbursement from the Secretary of State, whose deadline is Oct. 19—Lubbock Lights); Cameron 4,500; Orange ~1,800; Jefferson County also reported a third-party software-update backlog (KFDM). At least 36 responding counties planned overtime or extra staff; SOS announced grant funding to reimburse extra processing costs. Registration deadline Oct. 5; early voting Oct. 19; SOS says eligible DPS transactions on or before Oct. 5 remain timely even if processed later; affected voters may cast provisional ballots. Litigation (Democracy Docket, Oct. 13): the League of Women Voters of Texas and MOVE Texas Civic Fund sued the Secretary of State, DPS, and their top officials the prior week in Bexar County, alleging the agencies failed to process online driver's-license registration records as required by the 2021 Stringer settlement under the National Voter Registration Act. The groups seek a permanent injunction requiring correct processing going forward rather than damages, and they say the state had claimed full compliance in response to their July inquiry. Oct. 14 update (Texas Tribune / Votebeat): the Secretary of State's Office and the Texas Association of County Election Officials said they knew of no county still working through the DPS backlog (SOS spokesperson Alicia Pierce: \"We don't know of any counties with pending applications\"). A voter who registered through DPS before Oct. 5 but is missing from the roll can cast a provisional ballot that counts once the DPS transaction is confirmed. The LWV Texas / MOVE Texas suit was filed Oct. 9 in Bexar County's 224th District Court (No. 2026CI24681) and remains pending. Status Confirmed for the operational transmission/vendor failure (official acknowledgment + multi-outlet county tallies + Votebeat chronology); not labeled as intentional fraud. Also maps to Motor-Voter as DPS portal motor-voter channel failure.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat / Texas Tribune — DPS knew of online voter-registration problems as early as March", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/10/01/records-show-dps-knew-of-problems-with-texas-online-voter-registration-as-early-as-march/"}, {"title": "Dallas Morning News — Texas voter registration backlog tracker (≥591k files / 105 counties)", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/projects/2026/texas-voter-registration-backlog-tracker/"}, {"title": "Community Impact — Tarrant County working through ~74,000 DPS voter-registration files", "url": "https://communityimpact.com/grapevine-colleyville-southlake/election/tarrant-county-election-officials-working-through-74-000-voter-registration-files/"}, {"title": "KPRC 2 / Click2Houston — Harris ~108k received / >75k to process after DPS error", "url": "https://www.click2houston.com/news/local/2026/09/29/harris-county-works-through-voter-registration-backlog-after-dps-software-error-what-voters-should-know/"}, {"title": "Tyler Morning Telegraph — Smith County ~7,900 backlogged DPS registrations", "url": "https://tylerpaper.com/2026/09/30/smith-county-receives-around-7900-backlogged-voter-registrations-after-texas-dps-system-error/"}, {"title": "KFDM — Texas DPS blames third-party software update for Jefferson County backlog", "url": "https://kfdm.com/news/local/texas-dps-blames-third-party-software-update-for-jefferson-county-application-backlog"}, {"title": "Lubbock Lights — Lubbock County still processing ~1,000 voter records after DPS software failure affects more than 8,000 (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://lubbocklights.com/lubbock-county-still-processing-1000-voter-records-after-dps-software-failure-affects-more-than-8000/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Voting groups sue Texas SOS and DPS over voter-registration backlog under the Stringer settlement (Oct. 13, 2026; advocacy outlet; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/texas-backlog-of-voter-registrations-needs-immediate-fix-voting-groups-say-in-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune / Votebeat — SOS and county officials say DPS backlog cleared; provisional-ballot fallback (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2026/10/14/texas-voter-registration-drivers-license-error/"}, {"title": "Plaintiffs' petition — LWV Texas / MOVE Texas v. SOS and DPS, Bexar County No. 2026CI24681 (Oct. 9, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-09-Complaint-2.pdf"}, {"title": "Votebeat / Texas Tribune — DPS error backlogged voter registration applications", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/09/23/dps-error-backlogged-voter-registration-applications-county-election-officials/"}, {"title": "Votebeat / Texas Tribune — Bettencourt on ≥178k DPS backlog across 7 counties", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/09/24/dps-voter-registration-applications-error-paul-bettencourt-team/"}, {"title": "KUT — DPS failed to send applications; vendor truncation cause; Travis/Williamson/Hays counts", "url": "https://www.kut.org/austin/2026-09-25/texas-dps-voter-registration-applications-failed-to-send"}, {"title": "NBC 5 / Dallas Morning News — Dallas 68,104 / Collin backlog processing", "url": "https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/dallas-collin-counties-work-to-process-100000-backlogged-dps-voter-files/4082392/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Error backlogged tens of thousands of TX voter registration applications", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/error-backlog-tens-of-thousands-voter-registration-applications-texas-rcna599665"}, {"title": "FOX 7 Austin — County offices all-hands on DPS backlog (via EMon/X)", "url": "https://x.com/fox7austin/status/2103681021388411099"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — TX DPS registration backlog (ei-2026-09-001)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ei-2026-09-001__emon-live-monitor-tx-dps-registration-backlog-ei-2026-09-001.png"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-001 refresh 2026-10-15 AM: SOS/TACEO say backlog cleared Oct. 14 (Texas Tribune); suit case number added; lawsuit pending. Refresh 2026-10-14 AM: LWV Texas / MOVE Texas Bexar County suit to enforce the Stringer settlement (Democracy Docket Oct. 13); watch for a hearing or injunction. Refresh 2026-10-13 PM: Lubbock Lights Oct. 12 (Lubbock >8,000 affected; ~1,000 still unprocessed a week before early voting; ~$8k SOS reimbursement request). Prior refresh 2026-10-02 PM: Votebeat Oct 1 (DPS knew as early as March; Deloitte/DIR named; three omitted fields; ~992 Dec–Feb portal failures); Community Impact Tarrant ~74k; KFDM Jefferson. Prior 9/30 scope (≥591k DMN) retained. Operational failure Confirmed. Cross-leaf: Motor-Voter. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'."}
{"id": "ga-doaa-2025-25-09-voter-registration-list-maintenance-data-consistency", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-14", "uid": "C20260926-033715-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-14", "old_ids": ["ga-doaa-2025-25-09-voter-registration-list-maintenance-data-consistency"], "seq": "C01239", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No data consistency"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-09", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts Special Examination 25-09 (Voter Registration and List Maintenance; summary Aug. 2026 on Sept. 2025 rolls) found SOS/county processes generally compliant yet still identified residual data-consistency defects—including improper residential addresses (P.O. boxes, corrections facilities), address errors, and ~2,600 active/prior-active registrations that could not be verified as U.S. citizens via REAL ID/federal checks, plus errors in <1% of active registrations—documenting that statewide rolls lack perfect cross-source consistency even under 'best practice' controls. Status Confirmed primary GA DOAA 25-09 special examination; peer to FL Auditor 2021-096 inconsistent match criteria and ERIC cross-state consistency cards already on this leaf—GA DOAA instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: inconsistent roll data enables soft-identity mismatches; public hand counts of paper still reconcile to present humans.", "sources": [{"title": "GA DOAA — Special Examination 25-09 Summary: Voter Registration and List Maintenance (Aug. 2026 PDF)", "url": "https://www.audits2.ga.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/25-09-SE-Report-Summary.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-doaa-2025-25-09-voter-registration-list-maintenance-data-consistency__ga-doaa-special-examination-25-09-summary-voter-registration-and-list-maintenance-aug-2026-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "GA DOAA — Voter Registration and List Maintenance report summary page", "url": "https://www.audits2.ga.gov/reports/summaries/voter-registration-and-list-maintenance/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-doaa-2025-25-09-voter-registration-list-maintenance-data-consistency__ga-doaa-voter-registration-and-list-maintenance-report-summary-page.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Voter Rolls No data consistency leaf (non-FL-auditor/ERIC remount)."}
{"id": "pa-dos-2025-guidance-parties-candidates-appoint-poll-watchers-county-cert", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-38", "uid": "C20260925-220029-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-38", "old_ids": ["pa-dos-2025-guidance-parties-candidates-appoint-poll-watchers-county-cert"], "seq": "C00391", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes a poll watcher; the poll watchers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-09-22", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Department of State guidance (Sept 22, 2025) on poll watchers and authorized representatives confirms that candidates, political parties, and political bodies appoint watchers, who then receive county-board certificates—again a gatekept appointment model rather than open self-selection. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "PA DOS — Guidance: Poll Watchers and Authorized Representatives (9/22/2025 PDF)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/directives-and-guidance/2025/guidance_poll%20watchers%20and%20authorized%20representatives_092225.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-dos-2025-guidance-parties-candidates-appoint-poll-watchers-county-cert__pa-dos-guidance-poll-watchers-and-authorized-representatives.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "az-mohave-2025-ballot-guard-security-paper-tabulator-multifeed-jams-ess-warns-outside-spec", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-01", "uid": "C20261111-123004-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-01", "old_ids": ["az-mohave-2025-ballot-guard-security-paper-tabulator-multifeed-jams-ess-warns-outside-spec"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Use ballot paper of different thicknesses for different areas or voters", "Paper too thick for ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and tabulators may jam, creating another way to segregate those ballots. This may have happened in Arizona."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-09-15 (first county test report); 2025-12 to 2026-01 (retest; supervisors adopt the paper); 2026-07-21 (first live use, state primary)", "state": "AZ", "description": "Mohave County, Arizona, contracted with Runbeck Election Services for Ballot Guard, a ballot paper with watermarks, embedded fibers and microprinting, using about 10 tons of paper that Cochise County had ordered and then transferred free of charge. When county election staff tested the paper on the county's ES&S tabulators, it caused the machines to pull more than one sheet at a time, producing paper jams and errors that required ballots to be rerun: on average 3.6% of test ballots had multi-feed errors and about 0.8% had pick errors, far above the county's usual paper, and officials estimated a 2024-sized count would have taken up to six hours longer. The county's Sept. 15, 2025 test report concluded, 'though the Ballot Guard paper properly tabulates every time, we would not recommend its use,' and Elections Director Allen Tempert warned that live use could slow results and increase the possibility of inaccurate tallies. ES&S ran its own tests with similar results; ES&S spokesperson Katina Granger told Votebeat the company still does not recommend the paper for its tabulators because it differs in 'surface texture, thickness, stiffness, coating, and fiber composition,' and that ES&S had communicated 'potential performance risks' to the county. After Runbeck attributed the errors to static and let a new batch rest before shipping, a retest showed about 0.7% multi-feed and 0.7% pick errors (versus 0.3% and 0.0% for regular paper), which county staff deemed acceptable; the all-Republican Board of Supervisors voted unanimously in January 2026 to use the paper for the July 21 primary and the general election. How the paper performed in live counting was not reported in the sources read. Status Confirmed by Mohave County's own test reports and the ES&S statement, reported by Votebeat (republished by the Arizona Mirror). Catalog point: a change in paper stiffness and thickness was enough to make the tabulators jam and multi-feed, sending ballots back for rerunning, and the machine vendor called the paper outside its specification; only the machine's feed path cares about paper stock, while people counting the same paper ballots by hand do not.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Mohave County will debut new ballot paper with added security measures in July primary (Sasha Hupka, July 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2026/07/02/mohave-county-runbeck-ballot-paper-watermarks-security-2026-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/votebeat-mohave-ballot-guard-paper-2026-07-02.html"}, {"title": "Arizona Mirror (republishing Votebeat) — Mohave County will debut new ballot paper with added security measures in July primary (July 6, 2026)", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2026/07/06/mohave-county-will-debut-new-ballot-paper-with-added-security-measures-in-july-primary/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/azmirror-mohave-ballot-guard-paper-2026-07-06.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-11 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET). Thin leaf (0 -> 1). Votebeat read via WebFetch; both pages archived (curl 200). Vendor tags ES&S (county tabulator maker, quoted) and Runbeck (paper supplier), both named by the source. No evidence of ballot segregation was reported; the card documents the jam and multi-feed mechanism the leaf describes. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Runbeck"]}
{"id": "colorado-newsline-2025-unaffiliated-registration-surge-party-decline-around-cycle", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-06", "uid": "C20260926-024539-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-06", "old_ids": ["colorado-newsline-2025-unaffiliated-registration-surge-party-decline-around-cycle"], "seq": "C01096", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Mass changes of party affiliation to unaffiliated to manipulate results (look for affiliation changes before and after primaries)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-09-04", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Newsline (Sept. 4, 2025) reports SOS roll totals showing unaffiliated active registration grew ~3.1% from January–July 2025 (peaking at 2,029,337 in July, +60k YTD) while Democratic (−0.9%) and Republican (−0.77%) affiliations declined—continuing the post-November and around-primary unaffiliated churn the leaf directs analysts to watch, with DMV automatic registration defaulting new/updated voters to unaffiliated. Status Confirmed official-roll-derived mass unaffiliated growth around the election cycle; peer to CPR Boebert-district mass-switch and CO SOS 2024 primary unaffiliated-growth cards already on this leaf—2025 statewide surge, not those remounted. PEP framing: affiliation churn that reshapes who can pick primary ballots without public hand-count verification of outcomes.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Newsline — More Colorado voters opting to register unaffiliated in 2025 (Sept. 4, 2025)", "url": "https://coloradonewsline.com/2025/09/04/colorado-voters-unaffiliated-2025/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-newsline-2025-unaffiliated-registration-surge-party-decline-around-cycle__colorado-newsline-unaffiliated-voters-2025.png"}, {"title": "Sentinel Colorado — Colorado sees surge in unaffiliated voters, decline in party registrations", "url": "https://sentinelcolorado.com/1gridelex/colorado-sees-surge-in-unaffiliated-voters-decline-in-party-registrations/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Mass change of party affiliation to unaffiliated leaf."}
{"id": "me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed", "permanent_id": "C20261026-181024-01", "uid": "C20261026-181024-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-181024-01", "old_ids": ["me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed"], "seq": "C01576", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-09 to 2026-10-26", "state": "ME", "description": "On Sept. 30, 2025, a Newburgh, Maine, resident received 250 blank absentee ballots in an Amazon package delivered to her home; she brought them to the Newburgh town office just before it closed that day, and a town official reported them to the Secretary of State's office at 8 a.m. on Oct. 1 [20][21]. The Maine Wire first reported the find in an article published early on Oct. 1, 2025 [18][19]. Also on Sept. 30, the City of Ellsworth received two boxes of absentee ballots, one of them missing five packets totaling 250 ballots, and Bellows said the missing count matched the number found in Newburgh [22][23][16]. Separately, state investigative records show that Adam Graphic Corp. of North Attleboro, Massachusetts, shipped 62 boxes of 500 absentee-ballot return envelopes to the elections office on Sept. 10, 2025; the office received 61 and noted one box missing on Sept. 11 [2]. A UPS label on that box shows it shipped from \"UPS OVERGOODS\" in Chelmsford, Massachusetts, to the Center for Civic Design (CCD), a Maryland nonprofit. A CCD employee emailed the elections bureau on Oct. 3, 2025, that a box of \"approximately 100\" blank return envelopes had arrived around Sept. 13, 2025, at the CCD office in Cambridge, Maryland, and had not been accessed; state detectives counted 498 of the 500 envelopes in it, and the records do not explain the difference or the two missing envelopes [2]. The printer told investigators that CCD is not its customer, and the chief deputy secretary of state wrote that the office does not work with CCD as a vendor [2]. Secretary of State Shenna Bellows blamed UPS, and a UPS spokesperson said a damaged box's contents were \"inadvertently repackaged in a different shipment\" by package handlers [15][16]. The Press Herald reported in February 2026 that state records showed officials were concerned by UPS's lack of cooperation [15], and NEWS CENTER Maine reported in September 2026 that the Attorney General's Office still had not released findings [17]. The Secretary of State's office first named CCD as the recipient in a Sept. 28, 2026, Freedom of Access Act reply to The Maine Wire [13]. On Oct. 26, 2026, Steve Robinson (The Robinson Report / The Maine Wire), citing investigative reports and 47 pages of emails released to him on Oct. 23, reported that UPS said on Feb. 6, 2026, that it would need a subpoena to share shipment records, that the Attorney General's Office determined there was not enough information (and, per the detective, no legal basis) to issue one, and that the case was closed in spring 2026 with the detective writing that the reason the envelopes were redirected \"remains speculative\" [1][2]. An April 2, 2026, email from the department's enforcement director, quoted in the same report, said the envelope case \"did not go to the AG's Office\" [2]. The same day, Robinson posted on X the records' \"Photo 5\" (the taped UPS box) and \"Photo 1\" (the envelopes), together with a street-level photo of what he says is the address where the envelopes were sent [4][5][6][7][8][9][10]. His article reports that CCD's office is a residential property and that the CCD contact told a detective the package was left at her front door [2]. Robinson calls CCD a \"Soros-funded NGO\"; The Maine Wire reported grants to CCD from the New Venture Fund, the Democracy Fund and the MacArthur Foundation, and described those funds as backed by George Soros and administered by the Arabella Advisors network [4][13]. In October 2025 the Secretary of State's office moved the delivery of Election Day ballots from UPS to the courier Vital Delivery [2][15], and Maine is not using UPS for 2026 ballot delivery, using law enforcement and Vital Delivery Solutions instead [17]. Officials say the blank ballots could not have been used to vote without a matching signed envelope, and no vote tampering has been reported. FOX45 News (WBFF), which obtained the Secretary of State's investigative report, reported on Oct. 29, 2026, that UPS tracking records showed the package was marked for return to sender because of an incomplete address and then delivered to Cambridge, Md., on Sept. 13, 2025 [FOX45]. Detective James Gordon's report, as quoted by yourNEWS, says the original tracking showed the package in the delivery process before its history changed to show only that a label had been created, and the box that reached Maryland bore a new label from UPS Overgoods, the company's unit for packages that cannot be delivered normally; how and why it was relabeled to CCD is unexplained [yourNEWS]. The Attorney General's Office requested more tracking data and UPS surveillance footage on Dec. 4, 2025 [yourNEWS]. CCD Executive Director Sean Wang told FOX45 that nothing on or in the box identified the jurisdiction, that staff secured it while trying to find its origin, and that CCD \"was not and has never been under contract with the Secretary of State of Maine.\" Records reviewed by FOX45 show earlier contact: in January 2025 a CCD design lead invited a Maine elections official to a ranked-choice-voting discussion group, and in June 2025 an attorney suggested CCD or another group could help with the usability of Maine's online voter registration; the records do not show CCD did work for the state [FOX45]. Bellows's office told FOX45 the error \"did not, and in no way could, impact the election,\" because unmarked envelopes cannot be used and ballots and envelopes ship separately. On funding, FOX45 found New Venture Fund grants to CCD of $138,000 a year in 2020-2022 and a separate $750,000 grant from the Soros-associated Foundation to Promote Open Society to New Venture Fund in 2022, and said the filings do not show that grant was passed to CCD [FOX45]. The What the Fact fact-check (Oct. 28, 2026) rated the shipment of 498 envelopes to the CCD address and the closing of the case without a UPS subpoena True, and the \"Soros-funded\" label Partly true. RedState, LifeZette and Dailywise relay the same records and add no new facts. No source shows that any envelope was used, that any ballot was cast or collected with them, or that anyone was charged; calling the episode ballot harvesting is the characterization of commentators, not a finding. Status Confirmed: the misrouting is acknowledged by the Secretary of State and UPS, and the closed probe is documented in state records; how the materials were misrouted remains unexplained, and no intent has been shown.", "sources": [{"title": "The Robinson Report (Maine Wire) — Maine closed missing-ballot-envelope probe without UPS records (Oct. 26, 2026; cites state FOAA records)", "url": "https://robinsonreport.substack.com/p/maine-closed-missing-ballot-envelope"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — Steve Robinson, \"Maine Closed Missing-Ballot-Envelope Case Without Answers, Records Show\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 2:42 PM; full text with record excerpts; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027034237/https://www.themainewire.com/2026/10/maine-closed-missing-ballot-envelope-case-without-answers-records-show/)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2026/10/maine-closed-missing-ballot-envelope-case-without-answers-records-show/"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — Oct. 26, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-26; web.archive.org save succeeded)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2026/10/maine-closed-missing-ballot-envelope-case-without-answers-records-show/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__mainewire2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson (@SteveRob), \"We finally have records from last year's election security blunders: 250 absentee ballots in an Amazon package, 500 absentee envelopes sent to a Soros-funded NGO in Maryland. This picture shows the address where Maine's absentee ballot envelopes were sent. The investigation closed without determining why/how ballots were sent here.\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 10:54 AM ET; 3 images; web.archive.org save failed with HTTP 523, local copies kept below)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson post: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson post: fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-26; 12,724 views, 636 likes, 265 reposts, 25 replies at capture)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X media — image 1 attached to the Steve Robinson post (street-level photo of what he says is the address where the envelopes were sent)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X media — image 2 attached to the Steve Robinson post (records \"Photo 5\": taped UPS box)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-2-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X media — image 3 attached to the Steve Robinson post (records \"Photo 1\": box of blank return envelopes)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732332246556706", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-3-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson thread reply linking the full Robinson Report story (Oct. 26, 2026, 10:54 AM ET; web.archive.org not attempted after 523 on the parent post, local copies kept below)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732489994379282"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson thread reply: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732489994379282", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob-reply__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Steve Robinson thread reply: fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/SteveRob/status/2114732489994379282", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob-reply__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — \"Bellows Finally Admits: 2025 Election Materials Sent to Soros Funded Leftist NGO in DC Area\" (Sept. 2026; names the Center for Civic Design; reports CCD funders)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2026/09/bellows-finally-admits-2025-election-materials-sent-to-soros-funded-leftist-ngo-in-dc-area/"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — Sept. 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2026/09/bellows-finally-admits-2025-election-materials-sent-to-soros-funded-leftist-ngo-in-dc-area/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__mainewire2026-09.html"}, {"title": "Portland Press Herald — Maine officials concerned by lack of cooperation from UPS on ballot investigation, records show (Feb. 4, 2026)", "url": "https://www.pressherald.com/2026/02/04/maine-officials-concerned-by-lack-of-cooperation-from-ups-on-ballot-investigation-records-show/"}, {"title": "WGME — Secretary of State Shenna Bellows says UPS is to blame for ballots delivered to Newburgh woman", "url": "https://wgme.com/news/local/maine-secretary-of-state-shenna-bellows-says-ups-is-to-blame-for-ballots-that-were-delivered-to-newburgh-woman-elections-voting-absentee"}, {"title": "NEWS CENTER Maine — AG's office still hasn't released findings nearly a year after 250 ballots were found in an Amazon box (Sept. 17, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.newscentermaine.com/article/news/politics/elections/maine-attorney-generals-office-still-hasnt-released-findings-nearly-a-year-after-250-ballots-were-found-in-an-amazon-box/97-f9c49048-163b-4dba-898b-e953cfd151d6"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — Steve Robinson, \"Maine Woman Discovers Hundreds of Election Ballots in Amazon Package as State Considers Voter ID\" (first report; published Oct. 1, 2025, 2:32 AM ET; package \"arrived Tuesday\" [Sept. 30]; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027044136/https://www.themainewire.com/2025/10/maine-woman-discovers-hundreds-of-election-ballots-in-amazon-package-as-state-considers-voter-id/)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2025/10/maine-woman-discovers-hundreds-of-election-ballots-in-amazon-package-as-state-considers-voter-id/"}, {"title": "The Maine Wire — Oct. 1, 2025 first report: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.themainewire.com/2025/10/maine-woman-discovers-hundreds-of-election-ballots-in-amazon-package-as-state-considers-voter-id/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__mainewire2025-10-01.html"}, {"title": "WABI — Town of Newburgh releases statement after Maine ballots found in Amazon package (Oct. 9, 2025; town statement: ballots received in an Amazon box Sept. 30, reported to the Secretary of State at 8 a.m. the next morning; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027044207/https://www.wabi.tv/2025/10/09/town-newburgh-releases-statement-after-maine-ballots-found-amazon-package/)", "url": "https://www.wabi.tv/2025/10/09/town-newburgh-releases-statement-after-maine-ballots-found-amazon-package/"}, {"title": "WABI — Oct. 9, 2025 Newburgh statement article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.wabi.tv/2025/10/09/town-newburgh-releases-statement-after-maine-ballots-found-amazon-package/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__wabi2025-10-09.html"}, {"title": "WABI (WMTW) — Bellows addresses election security after ballots found in Amazon package (Oct. 6, 2025; Ellsworth received two boxes Sept. 30, one missing five packets totaling 250 ballots)", "url": "https://www.wabi.tv/2025/10/06/maine-secretary-state-shenna-bellows-addresses-election-security-after-ballots-found-amazon-package/"}, {"title": "WABI — Oct. 6, 2025 Bellows press conference article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.wabi.tv/2025/10/06/maine-secretary-state-shenna-bellows-addresses-election-security-after-ballots-found-amazon-package/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__wabi2025-10-06.html"}, {"title": "FOX45 News (WBFF, Baltimore) — Maine report details unexplained delivery of ballot envelopes to Maryland (Oct. 29, 2026; obtained the state investigative report; CCD statement; tax filings)", "url": "https://foxbaltimore.com/news/local/maine-report-details-unexplained-delivery-of-ballot-envelopes-to-maryland"}, {"title": "FOX45 News (WBFF, Baltimore) — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://foxbaltimore.com/news/local/maine-report-details-unexplained-delivery-of-ballot-envelopes-to-maryland", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__foxbaltimore2026-10-29.html"}, {"title": "RedState (Sister Toldjah) — 'Mystery Deepens' in 2025 case of Maine absentee ballot envelopes sent to 'Soros-funded NGO' in MD (Oct. 26, 2026; commentary relaying The Maine Wire)", "url": "https://redstate.com/sister-toldjah/2026/10/26/the-case-of-the-missing-maine-absentee-ballots-n2208653"}, {"title": "RedState (Sister Toldjah) — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://redstate.com/sister-toldjah/2026/10/26/the-case-of-the-missing-maine-absentee-ballots-n2208653", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__redstate2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "What the Fact — Fact check: Did a box of Maine absentee ballot envelopes get shipped to Maryland? (Oct. 28, 2026; shipment and closed case rated True; 'Soros-funded' rated Partly true)", "url": "https://whatthefact.app/fact-checks/2026-10-28-maine-absentee-ballot-envelopes-shipped-soros-funded-ngo-maryland"}, {"title": "What the Fact — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://whatthefact.app/fact-checks/2026-10-28-maine-absentee-ballot-envelopes-shipped-soros-funded-ngo-maryland", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__whatthefact2026-10-28.html"}, {"title": "LifeZette (Krystal Stirling) — Maine ballot mystery deepens over envelopes sent to Soros-funded NGO (Oct. 27, 2026; relays RedState and The Maine Wire)", "url": "https://www.lifezette.com/2026/10/maine-ballot-mystery-deepens-over-envelopes-sent-to-soros-funded-ngo/"}, {"title": "LifeZette (Krystal Stirling) — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://www.lifezette.com/2026/10/maine-ballot-mystery-deepens-over-envelopes-sent-to-soros-funded-ngo/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__lifezette2026-10-27.html"}, {"title": "yourNEWS — Maine closes investigation into 500 missing absentee ballot envelopes after 498 surface at Soros-linked nonprofit in Maryland (Oct. 27, 2026; quotes detective reports)", "url": "https://yournews.com/2026/10/27/7240702/maine-closes-investigation-into-500-missing-absentee-ballot-envelopes-after/"}, {"title": "yourNEWS — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://yournews.com/2026/10/27/7240702/maine-closes-investigation-into-500-missing-absentee-ballot-envelopes-after/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__yournews2026-10-27.html"}, {"title": "Dailywise — syndicated excerpt of the FOX45 report (Oct. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://dailywise.com/city/salisbury-md/maine-report-details-unexplained-delivery-of-ballot-envelopes-to-maryland/"}, {"title": "Dailywise — page HTML (archived 2026-10-31)", "url": "https://dailywise.com/city/salisbury-md/maine-report-details-unexplained-delivery-of-ballot-envelopes-to-maryland/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed__dailywise2026-10-30.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maine misrouted ballots probe closed (ei-2026-10-165)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Updated 2026-10-31 12:12 PM ET from Mark's message pt529u (\"Ballot harvesting operation\", nine links). The Robinson Report and both Maine Wire links were already sources. Added FOX45/WBFF, RedState, What the Fact, LifeZette, yourNEWS and Dailywise (all curl 200, text read, HTML archived). Kept the card on the mail chain-of-custody leaf: no source establishes ballot collection or harvesting, so it was not moved to the Ballot Harvesting branch. Status stays Confirmed for the misrouting and closed probe; cause and intent remain unexplained. 'Soros-funded' remains attributed. Queue item rq-2026-10-31-me-ccd-envelope-ups-relabel-unexplained. Nothing redacted. EMon ei-2026-10-165 (added 2026-10-26 PM ingest). Robinson Report, Press Herald, WGME curl 200; NEWS CENTER Maine 403. Chain-of-custody failure in ballot shipping; the closed probe means no one can say how the materials were misrouted. Nothing redacted. Updated 2026-10-26 11:43 PM ET from Mark's X submission (Steve Robinson @SteveRob, 2114732332246556706): added the post, its thread reply, 3 record/address photos, the free Maine Wire text of the Oct. 26 article (Robinson Report is paywalled past the lead) and the Sept. 2026 Maine Wire article naming CCD. \"Soros-funded\" is Robinson's/Maine Wire's characterization, kept attributed. Wayback: X post 523 (local copies kept); Maine Wire Oct. 26 saved. Earlier description said CCD received the box in Oct. 2025; records show it arrived about Sept. 13, 2025 and CCD reported it Oct. 3, 2025 — corrected. Nothing redacted. Date correction 2026-10-27 12:43 AM ET (EMon flag, verified against the sources rather than taken from EMon): the card said only \"at the end of September 2025\" for the Newburgh Amazon box and implied the UPS switch was a 2026 change. The town's statement (WABI, Oct. 9, 2025) and The Maine Wire's first report (published Oct. 1, 2025, 2:32 AM ET) put the Amazon box with the 250 Ellsworth ballots on Sept. 30, 2025, and Bellows (WABI/WMTW, Oct. 6, 2025) said Ellsworth found the 250 missing the same day. The 498 envelopes are a separate box: it arrived at CCD in Cambridge, Md., around Sept. 13, 2025, and CCD emailed the state Oct. 3, 2025 (Maine Wire, Oct. 26, 2026, quoting the records). The Maine Wire's Oct. 26, 2026 lead phrase \"a series of election blunders in Oct. 2025\" refers to when the incidents surfaced, not when either box arrived. The switch to Vital Delivery was made in October 2025 (Maine Wire; Press Herald). Added the Maine Wire first report and the two WABI articles as sources, with local copies and Wayback saves. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 1 attached to Steve Robinson's Oct. 26, 2026 X post: street-level photo of a residential driveway, mailbox and house, which he says is the address where Maine's absentee ballot return envelopes were sent (the Center for Civic Design's Maryland office, per his article)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 2 attached to Steve Robinson's Oct. 26, 2026 X post: state investigative records \"Photo 5\", a taped cardboard box with yellow UPS stickers"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-3-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/me-2025-ellsworth-250-blank-absentee-ballots-amazon-package-498-envelopes-maryland-probe-closed--steverob__x-photo-3-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 3 attached to Steve Robinson's Oct. 26, 2026 X post: state investigative records \"Photo 1\", an open box of blank Maine absentee-ballot return envelopes"}]}
{"id": "l2-haystaq-national-models-partisanship-turnout-build-results-without-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-04", "uid": "C20260926-023825-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-04", "old_ids": ["l2-haystaq-national-models-partisanship-turnout-build-results-without-ballots"], "seq": "C01079", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Build a model of the election results without looking at a single ballot."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "L2 Data / HaystaqDNA National Models User Guides (2024–2026 editions) advertise nationwide modeled partisanship, primary preference, turnout, absentee/early-vote propensity, issue scores, and donation likelihood built from voter-file, demographic, consumer, and geographic inputs—explicitly a path-to-victory style electorate model that does not require inspecting any cast ballot. Status Confirmed primary vendor model documentation; peer to Catalist analytics and TargetSmart Path-to-Victory cards already on this leaf—L2/Haystaq national model stack, not those remounted. PEP framing: commercial result-forecast models close the feedback loop around machine-reported totals without hand-count ground truth.", "sources": [{"title": "L2 Data — L2/Haystaq National Models User Guide 2025 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.l2-data.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/L2-National-Models-User-Guide-2025-compressed.pdf"}, {"title": "L2 Data — Trusted voter records / data mapping product home", "url": "https://l2-data.com/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Feedback Loop Build-a-model-without-ballots leaf."}
{"id": "house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-06", "uid": "C20260926-000015-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-06", "old_ids": ["house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies"], "seq": "C00519", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "The Biden administration's use of foreign laws, such as the European Union (EU) Digital Services Act, to censor domestic opposition on social media"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "House Judiciary's 'Foreign Censorship Threat' DSA report (2025) documents how EU DSA obligations pressure Very Large Online Platforms (often U.S. companies) to change global content-moderation policies—so EU speech rules spill into American timelines. Status Confirmed for DSA as a transnational censorship-pressure mechanism affecting U.S. platforms; Biden Admin intent still Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "House Judiciary — The Foreign Censorship Threat: EU DSA Report", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2025-07/DSA_Report%26Appendix(07.25.25).pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies__house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies.pdf"}, {"title": "House Judiciary Biden WH Censorship Report (related domestic pressure context)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Biden-WH-Censorship-Report-final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies__house-judiciary-foreign-censorship-threat-dsa-report-global-platform-policies.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "wa-sos-homeless-nontraditional-address-mailing-general-delivery", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-21", "uid": "C20260925-211320-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-21", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-homeless-nontraditional-address-mailing-general-delivery"], "seq": "C00266", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No physical address; a mailing address only"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-07", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington Secretary of State guidance allows voters without a traditional residential address (homeless, shelter, motor home, etc.) to register using a physical location description (e.g., street corner) while requiring a separate mailing address — including a trusted person's address or USPS General Delivery — to receive ballots. Status Confirmed for registration/ballot-delivery pathways that do not require a traditional street residence address and route ballots to a mailing address.", "sources": [{"title": "WA Secretary of State — Residency Requirements (homeless / nontraditional)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/voters/voter-eligibility-resources/residency-requirements", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-homeless-nontraditional-address-mailing-general-delivery__wa-secretary-of-state-residency-requirements-homeless-nontra.png"}, {"title": "WA SOS — Voters without Traditional Residential Addresses (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/25-06%20Voters%20without%20Traditional%20Residential%20Addresses.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-homeless-nontraditional-address-mailing-general-delivery__wa-sos-voters-without-traditional-residential-addresses-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 12. Confirmed nontraditional residence + mailing ballot path; not 'mailing-only with zero location'."}
{"id": "wi-madison-2024-pollbooks-printed-early-manual-highlight-absentee-returned", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-08", "uid": "C20261009-105430-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-08", "old_ids": ["wi-madison-2024-pollbooks-printed-early-manual-highlight-absentee-returned"], "seq": "C01341", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-07-17", "state": "WI", "description": "The Wisconsin Elections Commission's final decision on Madison's Nov. 2024 election (July 17, 2025) found the city printed paper poll books about three weeks before Election Day. As a result, poll books 'did not have a record of any of the absentee ballots returned' after printing, and hundreds of 'Absentee Returned' watermarks were missing. WEC says those watermarks 'help election inspectors prevent double voting.' Inspectors had to hand-highlight names, and did so inconsistently (name only, signature box only, or 'Absentee Returned' written in highlighter), a system 'dependent on every election inspector knowing and remembering what the highlights mean.' Separately, 193 received absentee ballots went uncounted. WEC found probable cause the clerk acted contrary to Wis. Stat. §6.79(2)(a). No double vote was identified; this is a manual-reconciliation weakness alongside a lost-ballot failure. Wisconsin rule as of 2026: an elector who returns an absentee ballot may not vote in person (Wis. Stat. §6.86(6)). WEC's July 10, 2026 guidance says a returned absentee ballot 'cannot be spoiled and reissued for any reason,' and the Dane County court denied a temporary injunction in LWV v. WEC (Oct. 6, 2026) for a provisional 'fail-safe' ballot. Paper poll books remain lawful where e-pollbooks are not used. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Final decision, In re Investigation of the City of Madison (July 17, 2025, PDF)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20Decision%20Letter%20%28without%20Order%29%20In%20re%20City%20of%20Madison%20Investigation%20-%207.17.2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — UPDATED Ballot Spoiling Guidance (July 10, 2026)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/memo/updated-ballot-spoiling-guidance"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. WI rule rechecked 2026-10-09 (6.86(6), WEC July 10, 2026 memo, LWV TI denial on existing card wi-2026-lwv-v-wec-provisional-revote-after-mailed-absentee-ti-denied).", "related": ["oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes", "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election"]}
{"id": "eric-faq-voter-participation-report-post-election-multi-state-detection-lag", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-12", "uid": "C20260926-031135-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-12", "old_ids": ["eric-faq-voter-participation-report-post-election-multi-state-detection-lag"], "seq": "C01162", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Move immediately to the next cluster of states whose rolls have not yet received \"voted\" flags from previous states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-07-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ERIC's FAQ describes the optional Voter Participation Report as available for each federal general election to identify voters who appear to have voted more than once in a member jurisdiction, in more than one member jurisdiction in the same election, or on behalf of a deceased voter—i.e., a post-election cross-state comparison, not a real-time early-voting lockout. That timing means a traveler can move through staggered early-voting clusters before multi-state participation is flagged. Status Confirmed primary ERIC FAQ documentation of post-election (not real-time) multi-state vote detection; peer to ERIC How-It-Works participation-report and Heritage Crosscheck/ERIC rehabilitation cards already on this leaf—ERIC FAQ VPR lag framing, not those remounted. PEP framing: detection that arrives after early-voting waves close cannot stop sequential multi-state travel the way same-day public hand-count observation would.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — FAQ (Voter Participation Report: multi-jurisdiction / deceased voting flags)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/faq/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-faq-voter-participation-report-post-election-multi-state-detection-lag__eric-faq-voter-participation-report.png"}, {"title": "ERIC — How Does It Work (report types including Voter Participation Report)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/how-does-it-work/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-faq-voter-participation-report-post-election-multi-state-detection-lag__eric-how-does-it-work-voter-participation-report.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Traveling Voter Operations move to next early-voting cluster leaf."}
{"id": "ga-rla-2025-sample-batches-arlo", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-04", "uid": "C20260925-183614-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-04", "old_ids": ["ga-rla-2025-sample-batches-arlo"], "seq": "C00092", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "\"Risk-limiting audits\" and \"partial manual counts\" are used to justify auditing only a small portion, convincing the public the rest of the tabulation is accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-06", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia's Secretary of State announced that the statewide risk-limiting audit of the June 17, 2025 Special Primary (Public Service Commissioner District 2 Republican contest) used a 5% risk limit and had county officials hand-count randomly selected ballot batches—328 batches statewide—supported by VotingWorks Arlo software. Official messaging framed the sample audit as confirming the machine-reported outcome. Status Confirmed that Georgia's RLA examined a statistical sample of batches, not a full hand count of every ballot up front. Sample-by-design does not prove hand counts are slow or unworkable; PEP full transparent hand count examines every ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia SOS — 2025 Statewide Risk Limiting Audit Confirms Accurate Vote Count", "url": "https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgias-2025-statewide-risk-limiting-audit-confirms-accurate-vote-count", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-rla-2025-sample-batches-arlo__georgia-sos-2025-statewide-risk-limiting-audit-confirms-accu.png"}, {"title": "Verified Voting coalition testimony citing GA 5% risk limit / 328 batches practice", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/coalition-testimony-to-the-ri-board-of-elections-on-their-proposed-regulations/"}], "notes": "Part A enrich co-nist-rla leaf. Distinct from parent Auditing co-rla / va-rla cards."}
{"id": "eac-2024-eavs-registration-transaction-sources-dmv-avr-origin-aggregate-not-record-path", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-08", "uid": "C20260926-030706-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-08", "old_ids": ["eac-2024-eavs-registration-transaction-sources-dmv-avr-origin-aggregate-not-record-path"], "seq": "C01143", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration databases do not require, or even record, the source of each registration (the individual who caused it and the full path it took into the database)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-06-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "The EAC's 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report / Data Brief aggregates ~103.5 million registration transactions by channel (motor-vehicle offices ~32.2%, automatic registration ~26.4%, online ~14.4%, mail/fax/email, in-person, other)—documenting federal measurement of registration SOURCE only as aggregate transaction categories, not as a mandated per-record provenance trail naming the individual initiator and full path into the statewide database. Status Confirmed primary EAC survey documentation of source-as-bucket rather than full path; peer to GAO-19-485 and GAO-06-247 source-path gap cards already on this leaf—2024 EAVS transaction-source aggregates, not those remounted. PEP framing: registration databases that lack full initiator/path provenance block public hand-count-era accountability for how records enter the rolls.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — 2024 EAVS Data Brief: United States (registration transaction sources)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-07/2024_EAVS_Data_Brief_US.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-eavs-registration-transaction-sources-dmv-avr-origin-aggregate-not-record-path__eac-2024-eavs-data-brief-registration-transaction-sources.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Releases 2024 Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) Report (Jun. 30, 2025)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/news/2025/06/30/us-election-assistance-commission-releases-2024-election-administration-and-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-eavs-registration-transaction-sources-dmv-avr-origin-aggregate-not-record-path__eac-releases-2024-election-administration-voting-survey.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Registration databases lack SOURCE/path leaf."}
{"id": "eac-eavs-2024-mail-rejections-already-voted-provisional-reason-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-17", "uid": "C20261009-105430-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-17", "old_ids": ["eac-eavs-2024-mail-rejections-already-voted-provisional-reason-gaps"], "seq": "C01350", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-06-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "The EAC's 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report shows that 11.1% of rejected mail ballots nationally were rejected because the 'voter already cast another ballot that was accepted.' Mail-versus-in-person overlap is routine, and states catch it at the mail-envelope stage. The same report says five states (Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, Oregon, Vermont) could not report why provisional ballots were rejected, and four (Idaho, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota) do not offer provisional ballots. In those places, how provisional and absentee ballots are reconciled cannot be checked from public data. 1,736,209 provisional ballots were cast in 2024; 73.8% were counted fully or partly and 25.1% were rejected. Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. EAC — Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report (June 2025, PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2024_EAVS_Report_508c.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view and transparency gap."}
{"id": "doj-orange-county-ca-noncitizen-registration-suit-2025", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-11", "uid": "C20260925-181533-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-11", "old_ids": ["doj-orange-county-ca-noncitizen-registration-suit-2025"], "seq": "C00083", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-06-25", "state": "CA", "description": "On June 25, 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (Civil Rights Division Election Integrity Enforcement Map) sued Orange County, California for withholding voting records and registering noncitizens to vote. Status Confirmed for the DOJ lawsuit filing and the claims asserted on the official enforcement timeline; does not itself adjudicate the underlying factual allegations or final court merits. Maps to Illegal Immigration / Registration; Voter Rolls leaves (noncitizen registration + records access).", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ CRT — Election Integrity California (enforcement map)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/election-integrity-california"}, {"title": "EDS DOJ map row — Sued Orange County for withholding records / registering noncitizens (2025-06-25)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/election-integrity-california"}], "notes": "EDS doj-election-integrity-enforcement-map. Confirmed for DOJ suit filing; merits of noncitizen-registration claim not adjudicated here."}
{"id": "doj-2025-williams-combs-nevada-minnesota-multi-county-fake-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-09", "uid": "C20260926-032103-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-09", "old_ids": ["doj-2025-williams-combs-nevada-minnesota-multi-county-fake-registration"], "seq": "C01189", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Pre-register them in multiple early-voting states using forwarding addresses, sympathetic roommates, or vacant properties (a practice already documented in some voter-roll studies)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-06-13", "state": "MN / NV", "description": "DOJ charged Nevada residents Ronnie Williams and Lorraine Lee Combs (June 2025) with conspiracy to commit voter-registration fraud in Minnesota: from 2021–2022 they completed fake-name/address/DOB/SSN registration applications across Minnesota counties for a voter-registration foundation that paid them, submitting forms to multiple county election offices—classic multi-jurisdiction pre-registration with fabricated identities/addresses. Minnesota SOS stated verification tools flagged the forms and no fraudulent ballots were cast. Status Confirmed primary DOJ charging / FOX 9 reporting of multi-county fake-registration conspiracy by out-of-state actors; peer to EDPA Pulley multi-state and PILF duplicate-registration cards already on this leaf—Williams/Combs MN/NV traveling pre-registration instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: fabricated multi-county registrations create phantom roll entries that machine tabulation can attach votes to unless public hand counts and roll audits intervene.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX 9 — 2 Nevada residents charged with conspiring to commit voter registration fraud in Minnesota (June 13, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fox9.com/news/nevada-residents-voter-fraud-minnesota"}, {"title": "The Hill — Second defendant pleads guilty in Minnesota voter fraud case (companion)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/5391567-second-defendant-in-minnesota-voter-fraud-case-pleads-guilty/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Traveling Voter Operations Pre-register in multiple states/addresses leaf."}
{"id": "turbovote-democracy-works-user-export-partner-pii-access", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-05", "uid": "C20260926-032507-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-05", "old_ids": ["turbovote-democracy-works-user-export-partner-pii-access"], "seq": "C01200", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "It gives them direct access to people's personal information (a violation of privacy)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-05-06", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Democracy Works / TurboVote partner documentation (User Exports updated May 6, 2025; Bulk Export API) states that partners—subject to their Democracy Works agreement—may access individual TurboVote registrant data via Admin Console User Export and Bulk Export API, including name, contact information, registration and mailing addresses, birth year, language, signup date, services used, and notification preferences as CSV/XLSX/JSON downloads. Status Confirmed primary TurboVote/Democracy Works partner-export docs documenting NGO/partner direct access to registrant PII; peer to Rock the Vote API partner-access and Catalist privacy-policy cards already on this leaf—TurboVote User Export instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: NGO registration pipelines that retain exportable PII create soft-identity databases that machine-tabulated systems must secure; public hand counts still require knowing which humans cast which paper ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "TurboVote Support — User Exports (partners download registrant PII; updated May 6, 2025)", "url": "https://support.turbovote.org/hc/en-us/articles/17908016145812-User-Exports", "local": "/archives/2026/09/turbovote-democracy-works-user-export-partner-pii-access__turbovote-support-user-exports-partners-download-registrant-pii-updated-may-6-2025.png"}, {"title": "TurboVote Support — Bulk Export API (partner account-data CSV companion)", "url": "https://support.turbovote.org/hc/en-us/articles/26602460664340-TurboVote-Bulk-Export-API", "local": "/archives/2026/09/turbovote-democracy-works-user-export-partner-pii-access__turbovote-support-bulk-export-api-partner-account-data-csv-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on NGO voter registration direct access to people's information leaf."}
{"id": "nv-sos-prr-no-counties-publish-ballot-images", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-05", "uid": "C20260926-020640-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-05", "old_ids": ["nv-sos-prr-no-counties-publish-ballot-images"], "seq": "C00938", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Block all access to ballot images and paper ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-04", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada Secretary of State public-records response (April 2025 RLA PRR) states flatly: **\"No counties in Nevada publish ballot images\"** (contrasting with states such as Georgia that post images). Status Confirmed statewide non-publication of ballot images blocking citizen image-based audit; peer to PA Stroehmann RTKL ballot-image denial and Coos County OR unavailability—NV SOS confirmation, not those cases remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada SOS PRR response (Ray Lutz / COPS) — \"No counties in Nevada publish ballot images\"", "url": "https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M2032/PRR%204-25-2025%20Ray%20Lutz.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-sos-prr-no-counties-publish-ballot-images__nevada-sos-prr-response-ray-lutz-cops-no-counties-in-ne.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSL — Nevada ballot secrecy / showing voted ballot unlawful (NRS 293.730 context)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/secrecy-of-the-ballot-and-ballot-selfies"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on block ballot images / paper access leaf."}
{"id": "fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-02", "uid": "C20261020-221915-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-02", "old_ids": ["fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms"], "seq": "C01475", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-04-24", "state": "Federal", "description": "On April 24, 2025, President Trump signed a memorandum, \"Investigation into Unlawful 'Straw Donor' and Foreign Contributions in American Elections,\" directed to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Counsel to the President. The memorandum describes the tactic directly: reports \"raise concerns that malign actors are seeking to evade Federal source and amount limitations on political contributions by breaking down large contributions from one source into many smaller contributions, nominally attributed to numerous other individuals, potentially without the consent or even knowledge of the putative contributors,\" possibly through \"dummy\" accounts funded with gift cards or prepaid cards. It cites the House finding that ActBlue detected at least 22 significant fraud campaigns, nearly half with a foreign nexus, and 237 donations from foreign IP addresses using prepaid cards in a 30-day window in 2024. It directs the Attorney General to investigate and enforce the law and to report the results within 180 days, which fell in October 2025. ActBlue called the memorandum \"blatantly unlawful\" and an attack on democracy, and said it would pursue all legal avenues. As of August 13, 2026, CNN reported that the required report had not been made public, that prosecutors in two U.S. attorney's offices made initial inquiries about ActBlue in October 2025, and that neither ActBlue nor any current or former employee had been charged. Status Confirmed: the memorandum is an official presidential record. The underlying allegations remain under investigation, with no charges as of the latest reporting.", "sources": [{"title": "The White House — Memorandum: Investigation into Unlawful \"Straw Donor\" and Foreign Contributions in American Elections (April 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/04/investigation-into-unlawful-straw-donor-and-foreign-contributions-in-american-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms__whitehouse-investigation-into-unlawful-straw-donor-and-foreign-contributions-in-.html"}, {"title": "GovInfo — Daily Compilation of Presidential Documents DCPD-202500524 (official text)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/DCPD-202500524/html/DCPD-202500524.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms__govinfo-dcpd-202500524.html"}, {"title": "The White House — Fact Sheet on the memorandum (April 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/04/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-investigates-unlawful-straw-donor-and-foreign-contributions-in-american-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms__whitehouse-fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-investigates-unlawful-straw-donor.html"}, {"title": "ActBlue — Statement in response to President Trump's memorandum (PR Newswire, April 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/actblue-issues-statement-in-response-to-president-trumps-memorandum-302437885.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms__prnewswire-actblue-issues-statement-in-response-to-president-trumps-memorandum-3.html"}, {"title": "Reuters — Trump targets Democratic fundraising organization ActBlue (April 24, 2025)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/trump-target-democratic-fundraising-organization-actblue-2025-04-24/"}, {"title": "CNN — Inside the drama at ActBlue (Aug. 13, 2026; DOJ report not public, no charges)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/13/politics/actblue-democrats-fundraising-midterms", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-24-presidential-memo-straw-donor-online-platforms__cnn-actblue-democrats-fundraising-midterms.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. The memorandum's text uses the exact smurfing mechanism, so it anchors the leaf. DOJ outcome: none public as of Aug. 13, 2026 (CNN). Re-checked Oct. 20, 2026: no DOJ report or charges found."}
{"id": "usps-oig-24-143-r25-2024-election-mail-revenue-marketing-mail-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-09", "uid": "C20260925-234437-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-09", "old_ids": ["usps-oig-24-143-r25-2024-election-mail-revenue-marketing-mail-ballots"], "seq": "C00442", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Mail ballots are big business for the USPS, a self-funded independent federal agency that relies on private contractors to transport mail and run contract postal units."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-04-21", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS OIG Report 24-143-R25 (Apr 21, 2025) finds the Postal Service processed and tracked service performance for about 59.4 million Ballot Mail pieces in the 2024 cycle, applied extraordinary measures that effectively gave Marketing Mail ballots First-Class-like handling, and could have received about $15.4 million more revenue if it had charged rates aligned with that service—documenting Election Mail as a large-volume, revenue-relevant USPS product line. Status Confirmed that Ballot/Election Mail is a major operational and revenue surface for USPS. Soft companion to existing usps-* undeliverable/billing cards on USPS siblings.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS OIG — Service Performance of Election and Political Mail During the 2024 General Election (24-143-R25 PDF)", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2025-04/24-143-r25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-24-143-r25-2024-election-mail-revenue-marketing-mail-ballots__usps-oig-service-performance-of-election-and-political-mail-during-the-2024-gene.pdf"}, {"title": "FedWeek summary — USPS OIG $15.4M revenue finding on expedited Marketing Mail ballots", "url": "https://www.fedweek.com/federal-managers-daily-report/usps-outperformed-goals-in-election-mail-delivery-audit-finds/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 5."}
{"id": "fed-2025-04-02-house-actblue-interim-report-22-fraud-campaigns", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-01", "uid": "C20261020-221915-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-01", "old_ids": ["fed-2025-04-02-house-actblue-interim-report-22-fraud-campaigns"], "seq": "C01474", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-04-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "On April 2, 2025, the House Committee on House Administration (Chairman Bryan Steil), the Judiciary Committee and the Oversight Committee released a joint interim staff report, \"Fraud on ActBlue: How the Democrats' Top Fundraising Platform Opens the Door for Illegal Election Contributions.\" The report rests on internal ActBlue documents and records from its fraud-prevention contractor, Sift, produced under subpoena. According to those documents, ActBlue had detected at least 22 significant fraud campaigns in recent years, nine of them with a foreign nexus, including patterns of fraudulent donations to Rep. Steven Horsford (D-NV), Rep. Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Gov. Laura Kelly (D-KS) and the Democratic National Committee; in three cases, candidates resisted ActBlue's request to return suspected fraudulent donations. The documents also show that bad actors had taken control of user accounts, \"giving them the ability to make straw donations appearing to be from regular donors,\" that multiple people had donated with the same card information, and that in one 30-day window in September and October 2024 ActBlue detected 237 donations from foreign IP addresses using domestic prepaid cards. Between September 2022 and November 2024, ActBlue internally tagged donations as potentially fraudulent at least 1,900 times. The report also found that ActBlue twice made its fraud rules \"more lenient\" in 2024, that it internally estimated the April change alone added 14 to 28 fraudulent contributions a month, and that it tested whether requiring card verification codes (CVV) would reduce Democratic fundraising before adopting the requirement. Status Confirmed: these facts come from ActBlue's own internal records as produced to Congress. The committees' broader characterizations are those of the Republican majority staff, and ActBlue disputes them. Catalog point: the platform's own records show that straw donations under real donors' names, and foreign-sourced money, were reaching the platform; what remains unproven is the scale.", "sources": [{"title": "House Administration, Judiciary and Oversight Committees — Interim Staff Report, \"Fraud on ActBlue\" (April 2, 2025, with appendix; PDF about 65 MB)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2025-04/04.02.25_FRAUD_ON_ACTBLUE_HOW_THE_DEMOCRATS_TOP_FUNDRAISING_PLATFORM_OPENS_THE_DOOR_FOR_ILLEGAL_ELECTION_CONTRIBUTIONS_w_appendix.pdf"}, {"title": "Committee on House Administration — ActBlue Investigation Timeline (Oct. 31, 2023 letter through 2026)", "url": "https://republicans-cha.house.gov/actblue-investigation-timeline", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-02-house-actblue-interim-report-22-fraud-campaigns__house-actblue-investigation-timeline.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Figures verified in the report text (pp. 2, 16-17). The report PDF with appendix (about 65 MB) exceeds the 25 MiB publish limit, so it is archived off-line (local-archives-offline). Leaf: new Campaign Finance heading (approved by Mark 2026-10-20)."}
{"id": "green-bay-wi-power-outage-three-polls-2025", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-06", "uid": "C20260925-194013-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-06", "old_ids": ["green-bay-wi-power-outage-three-polls-2025"], "seq": "C00190", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-04-01", "state": "WI", "description": "A ~90-minute substation power outage on Green Bay's west side on April 1, 2025 election day affected three polling locations (Perkins Park shelter, St. Jude's Catholic Church, St. Paul's United Methodist Church). City Clerk Celestine Jeffreys stated tabulators ran on 1–2 hour backup batteries so balloting continued, with an auxiliary-bin contingency if batteries failed; generators were planned but not needed. Status Confirmed for multi-site election-day power outage altering machine power/custody conditions.", "sources": [{"title": "WBAY — Power outage didn’t impact voting at three Green Bay polling sites", "url": "https://www.wbay.com/2025/04/01/green-bay-power-outage-knocks-out-traffic-lights/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/green-bay-wi-power-outage-three-polls-2025__wbay-power-outage-didn-t-impact-voting-at-three-green-bay-po.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 2. Battery-backed tabulators during outage Confirmed."}
{"id": "powell-wood-mi-attorney-discipline-board-2020-suits", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-26", "uid": "C20260925-205354-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-26", "old_ids": ["powell-wood-mi-attorney-discipline-board-2020-suits"], "seq": "C00241", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Attack citizen attorneys (personal attacks, lawsuits, attempts to revoke their licenses, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-03", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Attorney Discipline Board proceedings continued against Sidney Powell, Lin Wood, and other counsel who filed 2020 election challenges; the Discipline Board affirmed denial of summary disposition (2024), clearing the path to evidentiary hearings scheduled into 2025. Status Confirmed for ongoing license-discipline actions targeting election-contest attorneys (outcome of each grievance may still be pending).", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit News — Misconduct hearing set for lawyers who sued to overturn 2020 election", "url": "https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2025/03/05/misconduct-hearing-set-in-michigan-for-lawyers-who-sued-to-overturn-2020-election/81653023007/"}, {"title": "ALAB News — Discipline Board affirms denial of summary disposition (Powell/Wood et al.)", "url": "https://alabnews.com/discipline-board-affirms-denial-of-summary-disposition-in-discipline-cases-against-lawyers-who-challenged-2020-michigan-election-results/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 13. Discipline process Confirmed."}
{"id": "ia-sos-2025-save-audit-277-noncitizens-registered-35-ballots-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-02", "uid": "C20261016-123449-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-02", "old_ids": ["ia-sos-2025-save-audit-277-noncitizens-registered-35-ballots-counted"], "seq": "C01421", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-03-20", "state": "IA", "description": "On March 20, 2025, Iowa Secretary of State Paul Pate announced that, after his office gained access to the federal SAVE database and compared it with self-reported noncitizen data from the Iowa Department of Transportation, it had confirmed 277 noncitizens who had voted or were registered to vote, down from the 2,176 potential noncitizens whose ballots he had ordered challenged in October 2024. The release states that 35 noncitizens cast ballots that were ultimately counted in the 2024 General Election: 18 at the polls on Election Day, 15 by absentee ballot, and 2 by provisional ballot. Another 5 attempted to vote but were rejected by the Absentee and Special Voters Precinct boards, and 22 registered in 2024 but did not vote. Pate referred all 277 to the Iowa Attorney General and the Department of Public Safety, and said he was working with the Legislature to verify citizenship at registration rather than as ballots are cast. Status Confirmed (Secretary of State primary release and contemporaneous public-radio reporting). Catalog note: this is an official count of noncitizen registrations that produced ballots that were tabulated, including absentee ballots that never passed an in-person check. The numbers are small compared with 1.6 million ballots, but under Mark's principle one confirmed case is enough to show the pathway is real.", "sources": [{"title": "Iowa Secretary of State — Audit of voter registration lists finds 277 confirmed noncitizens registered to vote (Mar. 20, 2025)", "url": "https://sos.iowa.gov/news-resources/iowa-secretary-states-audit-voter-registration-lists-finds-277-confirmed-noncitizens"}, {"title": "Iowa Public Radio — Iowa secretary of state says 35 noncitizens' ballots were counted in 2024 election (Mar. 20, 2025)", "url": "https://www.iowapublicradio.org/state-government-news/2025-03-20/iowa-secretary-of-state-noncitizens-voted-2024-election"}, {"title": "AP — Iowa review finds 35 noncitizens voted last fall (Mar. 2025; curl 403 bot-block / WebFetch timeout 2026-10-16, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/iowa-noncitizen-voting-1badfb99ab7ef21a6fb176d2867d51e5"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for official SOS counts (35 counted, 5 rejected, 277 registered). Peer to OH LaRose and NC SBE 2016 cards on this leaf, a different state. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration > not adequate protections (citizenship checked after ballots cast)."}
{"id": "columbia-pa-borough-livestream-no-audio-2025", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-16", "uid": "C20261001-094909-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-16", "old_ids": ["columbia-pa-borough-livestream-no-audio-2025"], "seq": "C01310", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Livestreams and recordings sometimes have audio \"issues\" that keep the public from hearing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-03-04", "state": "PA", "description": "Columbia Spy (Apr. 23, 2025) documented that Columbia Borough (Lancaster County, PA) council livestreams had been plagued by audio failures for about six months: the March 4, 2025 meeting had no audio at all for remote/archived listeners, and subsequent meetings (including March 11 and a March 20 joint planning/council session) had crackling/poor audio so officials' voices were hard to understand—council president later noting minutes lacked detail because the livestream audio was 'horrible.' Unlike neighboring Lancaster City Council (which postponed a meeting when YouTube picked up no audio), Columbia proceeded despite known unfixed failures. Status Confirmed contemporaneous local reporting of full-meeting livestream silence and recurring inaudible audio. Peer to Columbus County NC, Clovis NM, and Delaware County PA livestream-audio cards—Columbia Borough Mar. 2025 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: silent or crackling livestreams deny remote oversight of local government decisions that set the stage for election administration.", "sources": [{"title": "Columbia Spy — Audio problems continue to plague Columbia Borough livestreams (Apr. 23, 2025)", "url": "https://columbiaspy.com/2025/04/23/audio-problems-continue-to-plague-columbia-borough-livestreams/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct PA borough no-audio peer; not Delco remount."}
{"id": "co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-04", "uid": "C20260925-233150-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-04", "old_ids": ["co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis"], "seq": "C00397", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Policy analyses"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-03-03", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Legislative Council Staff final fiscal notes for 2025 election-system bills (e.g., HB25-1193 Vote Transparency Protocol Act) exemplify formal policy/fiscal analysis that quantifies multi-million-dollar implementation costs and operational burdens before any system change advances—creating an analytical gate that can slow or stop reform even when transparency goals are stated. Status Confirmed that Colorado's fiscal-note process produces official policy-cost analyses on election-system proposals. Confirmed for the analysis mechanism; not Confirmed that every note is deployed in bad faith.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Leg Council — HB25-1193 Final Fiscal Note PDF", "url": "https://content.leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2025A/bills/fn/2025a_hb1193_f1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis__co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis__colorado-leg-council-hb25-1193-final-fiscal-note-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado General Assembly — HB25-1193 introduced bill PDF", "url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2025A/bills/2025a_1193_01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis__co-fiscal-note-hb25-1193-2025-election-system-change-policy-cost-analysis__colorado-general-assembly-hb25-1193-introduced-bill-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "wa-sos-signature-update-form-2025-official-signature-refresh-pathway", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-13", "uid": "C20260925-220029-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-13", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-signature-update-form-2025-official-signature-refresh-pathway"], "seq": "C00366", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Initiate \"updated\" signature drives for all registered \"voters,\" then inject fake updated signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington Secretary of State publishes an official Signature Update Form used when a returned ballot-envelope signature does not match the registration file, expressly instructing voters to return the form 'to update your signature on file with the County' (with email/fax/mail/in-person/VoteWA pathways and post-election deadlines). Status Confirmed that official 'updated signature' collection drives/pathways exist and feed the signature-verification gatekeeper. Confirmed for the update mechanism; Alleged only for mass injection of fake updated signatures.", "sources": [{"title": "WA SOS — Signature Update Form 2025 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/Signature_Update_Form_2025.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-signature-update-form-2025-official-signature-refresh-pathway__wa-sos-signature-update-form-2025-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Whatcom County — Update Voter Registration Signature", "url": "https://www.whatcomcounty.us/3946/Update-Voter-Registration-Signature", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-signature-update-form-2025-official-signature-refresh-pathway__whatcom-county-update-voter-registration-signature.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 7. Update pathway Confirmed; fake-injection claim stays Alleged."}
{"id": "hi-me-ny-ri-prereg-auto-active-at-18-statutes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-17", "uid": "C20260926-012939-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-17", "old_ids": ["hi-me-ny-ri-prereg-auto-active-at-18-statutes"], "seq": "C00856", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "When pre-registrants turn 18, their records automatically become active, which can be used as an excuse to inject phantom ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-26", "state": "HI / ME / NY / RI", "description": "NCSL's Preregistration for Young Voters compilation (updated Feb 26, 2025) quotes statutes beyond California/Colorado that expressly auto-activate youth preregistrations at 18: Hawaii HRS §11-12 (preregistrants 'shall be automatically registered upon reaching age eighteen'); Maine 21-A M.R.S.A. §155 (conditional registration 'automatically becomes effective on the person's 18th birthday'); New York Election Law §5-507 (pre-registrant 'shall be automatically registered upon reaching the age of eligibility'); Rhode Island Gen. Laws §17-9.1-33 (preregistrant 'shall be automatically registered upon reaching eighteen years of age'). Status Confirmed for additional automatic-activation statutes peer to CA/CO—phantom-ballot motive in the catalog subtitle remains Alleged, not established by these statutes.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters (statutory table: HI/ME/NY/RI auto-activate language)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to ca-co-prereg-auto-active-at-18. Auto-activate Confirmed; phantom motive Alleged."}
{"id": "ncsl-2025-preregistration-automatic-activation-at-18-co-sb210-age-15-expansion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-15", "uid": "C20260926-024539-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-15", "old_ids": ["ncsl-2025-preregistration-automatic-activation-at-18-co-sb210-age-15-expansion"], "seq": "C01105", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "When pre-registrants turn 18, their records automatically become active, which can be used as an excuse to inject phantom ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-26", "state": "Multi-state / CO", "description": "NCSL's Feb. 26, 2025 Preregistration for Young Voters update states that pre-registrants are typically listed as pending/preregistration and, upon turning 18, are added/activated on the voter registration list—and specifically notes Colorado CRS §1-2-101 (updated by SB 210 in 2024) that effective Jan. 1, 2025 fifteen-year-olds may preregister and 'upon reaching eighteen years of age, the person is automatically registered.' Status Confirmed primary legislative/NCSL documentation of automatic activation at 18 plus CO's age-15 expansion of that auto-active pipeline; peer to CA/CO and HI/ME/NY/RI auto-active statute cards already on this leaf—2025 NCSL/CO SB210 update, not those remounted. PEP framing: auto-activated youth records enlarge machine-mailable rolls without public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters (updated Feb. 26, 2025)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}, {"title": "Colorado General Assembly — SB24-210 / CRS §1-2-101 youth preregistration (auto-register at 18)", "url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/bills/sb24-210", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-2025-preregistration-automatic-activation-at-18-co-sb210-age-15-expansion__colorado-general-assembly-sb24-210-youth-preregistration.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Youth Pre-registration auto-active-at-18 leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-26", "uid": "C20260925-184601-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-26", "old_ids": ["ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states"], "seq": "C00144", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-26", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL (updated Feb 26, 2025) reports 18 states plus D.C. permit voter preregistration beginning at age 16, and 4 states beginning at 17, with preregistrants typically held in pending/preregistration status until age 18. Colorado lowered the floor to 15 effective Jan 2025. Status Confirmed for widespread youth pre-registration statutes; catalog claims about 'phantom ballot' exploitation remain Alleged unless separately evidenced.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}, {"title": "ACS — Youth Pre-Registration and Voting (PDF)", "url": "https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/youth-preregistration-and-voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states__acs-youth-pre-registration-and-voting-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 12. Maps to Youth Pre-registration parent node."}
{"id": "ct-dcj-2025-bridgeport-geter-pataky-drop-box-absentee-scatter", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-04", "uid": "C20260926-032507-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-04", "old_ids": ["ct-dcj-2025-bridgeport-geter-pataky-drop-box-absentee-scatter"], "seq": "C01199", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Scatter them in drop boxes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-21", "state": "CT", "description": "Connecticut Division of Criminal Justice (Feb. 21, 2025) charged Wanda Geter-Pataky and four co-defendants after the 2023 Bridgeport Democratic mayoral primary—where surveillance showed stacks of absentee ballots deposited into outdoor drop boxes and a Superior Court judge overturned the result for 'blatant' ballot harvesting—with dozens of Possession of Ballots/Envelopes Restricted counts (Geter-Pataky alone: 42) plus fraudulent-voting and conspiracy counts. Status Confirmed primary CT DCJ charging record + prior Superior Court drop-box scatter finding; peer to AZ AG Yuma Fuentes harvest and CA unauthorized GOP drop-box cards already on this leaf—Bridgeport 2023/2025 drop-box scatter instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: unauthorized multi-ballot drops into unmanned boxes break chain-of-custody that precinct hand counts keep in public view.", "sources": [{"title": "CT Division of Criminal Justice — Five Charged Following Investigation into Handling of Absentee Ballots in 2023 Elections (Feb. 21, 2025)", "url": "https://portal.ct.gov/dcj/press-releases/division-of-criminal-justice/02212025bridgeportarrests", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ct-dcj-2025-bridgeport-geter-pataky-drop-box-absentee-scatter__ct-division-of-criminal-justice-five-charged-following-investigation-into-handling-of-absentee-ballots-in-2023-elections.png"}, {"title": "AP — 5 tampered with absentee ballots in Connecticut's largest city (Bridgeport drop-box companion)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/bridgeport-connecticut-absentee-ballots-arrests-3ece0f508b718522a107cb5022659414"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Feedback Loop Inject ballots Scatter them in drop-boxes leaf."}
{"id": "nic-nsi-only-executive-leadership-program-sheriff-education-gap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-02", "uid": "C20260926-032103-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-02", "old_ids": ["nic-nsi-only-executive-leadership-program-sheriff-education-gap"], "seq": "C01182", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are not educated about their rights and duties."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-14", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The National Institute of Corrections (NIC) National Sheriffs' Institute (NSI)—sponsored with NSA, Major County Sheriffs of America, and Small and Rural Law Enforcement Executives Association—explicitly markets itself as 'the only executive leadership program designed specifically for sheriffs,' with Leadership Development aimed at first-term sheriffs in a selective four-day format and Jail Leadership / Communicating for Impact as later add-ons. That 'only' framing documents how thin the formal, federally sponsored education path for sheriff rights/duties and executive leadership remains relative to the size of the U.S. sheriffate—leaving a structural education gap that informal curricula (including CSPOA-marketed trainings already on this leaf) compete to fill. Status Confirmed primary NIC NSI catalog description of the sole specialized sheriff executive-leadership program; peer to AP/CSPOA education-gap and TCOLE 'no meaningful authority' cards—NIC NSI scarcity instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: under-educated sheriffs are less able to independently oversee chain-of-custody and public observation of hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "NIC — National Sheriffs' Institute (NSI) catalog: only executive leadership program designed specifically for sheriffs", "url": "https://nicic.gov/training/catalog/instructor-led-training/national-sheriffs-institute-nsi", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nic-nsi-only-executive-leadership-program-sheriff-education-gap__untitled.png"}, {"title": "National Sheriffs' Association — Professional Development Certifications and Trainings (companion)", "url": "https://www.sheriffs.org/certifications-trainings-2/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Law Enforcement Lack of education of Sheriff's rights/duties leaf."}
{"id": "doj-2025-filion-torswats-48mo-swatting-spree-protect-communications", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-05", "uid": "C20260926-034259-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-05", "old_ids": ["doj-2025-filion-torswats-48mo-swatting-spree-protect-communications"], "seq": "C01245", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ (Feb. 11, 2025): Alan W. Filion (aka Torswats), 18, sentenced to 48 months after pleading guilty to interstate threats; from ~Aug. 2022–Jan. 2024 he made 375+ swatting/threat calls (false bombs/mass-shooting claims) targeting religious institutions, schools, government officials, and individuals nationwide—advertising swatting-for-a-fee—illustrating why political actors need defensive systems against illegal emergency-communications attacks. Status Confirmed primary DOJ sentencing/plea. Peer to Virginia Project 'need this system to protect communications' and USS 2024 foreign-nationals swatting-conspiracy cards already on this leaf—Filion domestic serial-swatter instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: illegal communications attacks aim to terrify officials; public hand counts of paper do not depend on unprotected digital channels.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — California teenager sentenced to 48 months for nationwide swatting spree (Feb. 11, 2025)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/california-teenager-sentenced-48-months-prison-nationwide-swatting-spree"}, {"title": "Reuters — California teenager admits making hundreds of hoax emergency calls (Nov. 14, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/california-teenager-admits-making-hundreds-hoax-emergency-calls-2024-11-14/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Intimidation protect-communications leaf (non-VP/non-USS foreign-nationals)."}
{"id": "eurekalert-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-headroom-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-08", "uid": "C20260926-032103-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-08", "old_ids": ["eurekalert-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-headroom-companion"], "seq": "C01188", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Population numbers are inflated by every available means to create headroom for more registered voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-04", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "EurekAlert! / Minnesota Population Center coverage of the 2025 PNAS Nexus apportionment study reiterates that including undocumented usual residents in the census total-population base expands the apportionment (and Electoral College) headcount used for House seats—creating representational 'headroom' tied to total residents rather than citizen-voter rolls alone. Status Confirmed secondary/primary-adjacent documentation of total-population apportionment headroom inclusive of undocumented residents; peer to Census 2020 apportionment and CRS noncitizen-headroom cards already on this leaf—2025 PNAS Nexus media/academic companion instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: inflated total-population headroom is not a substitute for public hand counts of actual ballots cast by eligible voters.", "sources": [{"title": "EurekAlert! — The political consequences of undocumented residents in the census (PNAS Nexus companion)", "url": "https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/1072982", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eurekalert-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-headroom-companion__untitled.png"}, {"title": "PNAS Nexus DOI — undocumented residents & congressional apportionment (underlying study)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf021"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Population headroom-to-increase-registered-voters leaf."}
{"id": "pnas-nexus-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-open-borders-count", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-07", "uid": "C20260926-032103-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-07", "old_ids": ["pnas-nexus-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-open-borders-count"], "seq": "C01187", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Open borders support higher population counts that include illegal aliens who cannot be verified."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-02-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "PNAS Nexus (2025) peer-reviewed analysis ('Does enumerating undocumented residents in the U.S. census affect congressional apportionment?') confirms that U.S. apportionment practice includes estimated undocumented residents in the census total-population base used for House seats—i.e., population numbers that include illegal aliens without individualized citizenship verification for apportionment—while estimating that excluding them would have shifted at most a handful of seats since 1980. Status Confirmed primary peer-reviewed documentation that undocumented residents are enumerated into apportionment population; magnitude-of-partisan-impact estimates remain debated and are not required for this leaf's counting claim. Peer to Trump v. New York 2020 and Census Bureau total-population cards already on this leaf—PNAS Nexus 2025 enumeration instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: apportionment headcounts that cannot be citizenship-verified inflate representational pools independent of hand-counted citizen ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "PNAS Nexus — Does enumerating undocumented residents in the U.S. census affect congressional apportionment? (2025)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/pnasnexus/pgaf021"}, {"title": "University of Minnesota Population Center — Consequences of undocumented residents in the census (companion summary)", "url": "https://pop.umn.edu/about/announcements/consequences-undocumented-residents-census-study-shows-trivial-political-impact", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pnas-nexus-2025-undocumented-census-apportionment-open-borders-count__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Population Open-borders / unverifiable illegal-alien counts leaf."}
{"id": "mitre-t1667-email-bombing-krebs-gov-targets-list-stuffing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-08", "uid": "C20260926-002008-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-08", "old_ids": ["mitre-t1667-email-bombing-krebs-gov-targets-list-stuffing"], "seq": "C00641", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Mailing-list stuffing attacks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-01-31", "state": "Federal", "description": "MITRE ATT&CK T1667 catalogs email/subscription bombing as Impact/harassment: automated signup floods bury legitimate mail (including security alerts) and divert attention—citing Brian Krebs's 2016 reporting on massive bombs against .gov addresses. Technique Confirmed as a recognized intimidation/disruption method usable against political/civic targets. Status Confirmed for technique; specific 2024 campaign weaponization of list-stuffing against named candidates often weaker/Anecdotal.", "sources": [{"title": "MITRE ATT&CK — T1667 Email Bombing", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1667/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mitre-t1667-email-bombing-krebs-gov-targets-list-stuffing__mitre-att-ck-t1667-email-bombing.png"}, {"title": "Krebs on Security — Massive Email Bombs Target .Gov Addresses (referenced in T1667)", "url": "https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/08/massive-email-bombs-target-gov-addresses/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 4 companion. Technique Confirmed; specific political-campaign use often weaker."}
{"id": "gao-25-107160-2020-census-coverage-errors-state-undercount-overcount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-10", "uid": "C20260926-031135-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-10", "old_ids": ["gao-25-107160-2020-census-coverage-errors-state-undercount-overcount"], "seq": "C01160", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "There are also cases of the census \"miscounting\" the population."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2025-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "GAO report GAO-25-107160 (2020 Census: Coverage Errors and Challenges Inform 2030 Plans) reviews Post-Enumeration Survey findings that, while national net coverage error was not statistically significant, region- and state-level coverage errors were: Census Bureau PES stories document statistically significant undercounts in six states (AR, FL, IL, MS, TN, TX) and overcounts in eight, plus persistent demographic subgroup under/overcounts. Status Confirmed primary GAO/Census PES documentation of census miscounting at state and demographic levels; peer to Census Bureau 2022 PES national demographic and components-of-coverage cards already on this leaf—GAO-25-107160 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: apportionment/population figures that miscount residents distort the registration headroom underlying election administration.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-25-107160 — 2020 Census: Coverage Errors and Challenges Inform 2030 Plans", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107160", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-25-107160-2020-census-coverage-errors-state-undercount-overcount__gao-25-107160-2020-census-coverage-errors.png"}, {"title": "Census Bureau — 2020 Census Undercounts in Six States, Overcounts in Eight (PES state rates)", "url": "https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2022/05/2020-census-undercount-overcount-rates-by-state.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-25-107160-2020-census-coverage-errors-state-undercount-overcount__census-2020-undercounts-six-states-overcounts-eight.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Population census miscounting leaf."}
{"id": "asqde-affiliate-two-year-apprenticeship-document-examiner-path", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-04", "uid": "C20260925-234437-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-04", "old_ids": ["asqde-affiliate-two-year-apprenticeship-document-examiner-path"], "seq": "C00437", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Proper training takes two years of certified document-examiner schooling."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "The American Society of Questioned Document Examiners (ASQDE) affiliate/membership path likewise contemplates a two-year training or apprenticeship program under a recognized practicing document examiner (plus post-training experience and examinations for regular membership)—reinforcing that professional questioned-document practice is measured in years of supervised training, not hours of election-office classes. Status Confirmed for the two-year apprenticeship/training norm in the professional FDE community.", "sources": [{"title": "ASQDE — Membership / Affiliate two-year training or apprenticeship requirements", "url": "https://www.asqde.org/membership", "local": "/archives/2026/09/asqde-affiliate-two-year-apprenticeship-document-examiner-path__asqde-membership-affiliate-two-year-training-or-apprenticeship-requirements.png"}, {"title": "ABFDE — Qualifications PDF (companion 24-month full-time training)", "url": "https://abfde.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/QualificationsRequirementsCertification.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-411-consolidate-precincts-vote-centers-when-no-suitable-site", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-13", "uid": "C20260925-214102-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-13", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-411-consolidate-precincts-vote-centers-when-no-suitable-site"], "seq": "C00336", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Enact laws that make it prohibitively difficult to qualify many locations as polling places, forcing centralization into vote centers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-97", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "A.R.S. §16-411 authorizes boards of supervisors to designate polling places outside a precinct when 'no suitable polling place is available,' to combine adjacent precincts, to consolidate polling places when early-voter volume is expected to thin Election Day traffic, and — by resolution — to authorize countywide voting centers in place of or in addition to precinct polling places. Schools may refuse space citing safety/space (principal written statement). Status Confirmed for statutory architecture that legalizes consolidation and vote-center centralization when site qualification is hard.", "sources": [{"title": "A.R.S. §16-411 — precincts, polling places, voting centers", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00411.htm"}, {"title": "NCSL — Vote Centers overview (AZ among vote-center states)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/vote-centers"}, {"title": "NCSL — Vote Centers overview (AZ among vote-center states)", "url": "https://uk.larimer.gov/clerk/elections/resources/history-vote-centers/benefits-vote-center-model"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 7. Confirmed enabling statute for centralization; not proof of partisan motive in every consolidation."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-673-five-day-contest-after-canvass", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-02", "uid": "C20260926-020640-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-02", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-673-five-day-contest-after-canvass"], "seq": "C00935", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests", "Impose an unreasonably short period to file a contest, ensuring there is not enough time to investigate the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Revised Statutes §16-673 requires an elector contesting a **state** election to file a verified written statement of contest **within five days** after completion of the canvass and declaration of the result by the secretary of state or governor. Arizona courts treat election-contest time limits as jurisdictional and strictly construed. Status Confirmed short statutory contest window; peer to NCSL five-day-state overview and Oklahoma Friday-after-election deadline—specific AZ statute detail, not a remount of the NCSL list card.", "sources": [{"title": "A.R.S. §16-673 — Statement of contest; verification; filing (five days after canvass/declaration)", "url": "https://azleg.gov/ars/16/00673.htm"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — Arizona §16-673 contest filing deadline", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/arizona/statute/16-673/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ars-16-673-five-day-contest-after-canvass__election-law-navigator-arizona-16-673-contest-filing-de.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on short election-contest filing deadline leaf."}
{"id": "ca-ballottrax-wheres-my-ballot-marketed-as-voter-confidence-tracking", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-39", "uid": "C20260925-233150-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-39", "old_ids": ["ca-ballottrax-wheres-my-ballot-marketed-as-voter-confidence-tracking"], "seq": "C00432", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "Mail ballots: design a mail-ballot tracking system that gives the public a false sense of security about voting by mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California's Where's My Ballot? / BallotTrax system is officially promoted as letting voters 'track and receive notifications on the status of [their] vote-by-mail ballot'—explicitly a confidence/assurance product around mail voting. Status Confirmed that mail-ballot tracking is deployed and marketed as a security/confidence feature. Confirmed for the warm-fuzzy tracking design; whether that confidence is 'false' relative to CoC risks is evaluative (pair with CoC vulnerability cards). Soft companion to leaf-6 real-time tracking cards.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Where's My Ballot?", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-status/wheres-my-ballot", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ballottrax-wheres-my-ballot-marketed-as-voter-confidence-tracking__california-sos-where-s-my-ballot.png"}, {"title": "NPR — ballot tracking as reassurance tool (2024)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5170285/voting-2024-ballots-states-online-tracking"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 20.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-18370-319-5-electioneering-apparel-ban-polls", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-08", "uid": "C20260926-022424-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-08", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-18370-319-5-electioneering-apparel-ban-polls"], "seq": "C01038", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["At the Polls", "They prohibit political attire at the polls to protect the election illusion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §18370 (with definitional §319.5) prohibits electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place, elections office, satellite location, curbside voting, or ballot drop box—including displaying a candidate’s name, likeness, logo, or ballot-measure information on clothing, buttons, or stickers. SOS voter-information materials warn that such apparel is prohibited electioneering (misdemeanor). Status Confirmed large-state statutory ban on candidate/measure apparel near polls; peer to Minnesota Voters Alliance v. Mansky and Texas Ostrewich apparel litigation cards—California Elec. Code electioneering-apparel statute, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code §18370 — Electioneering prohibited", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=18370.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-18370-319-5-electioneering-apparel-ban-polls__california-elections-code-18370-electioneering-prohibited.png"}, {"title": "California SOS Voter Information Guide — Electioneering Prohibited warning", "url": "https://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/voter-info/electioneering.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-18370-319-5-electioneering-apparel-ban-polls__california-sos-voter-information-guide-electioneering-prohibited-warning.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on political attire at polls leaf."}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-23", "uid": "C20260925-233150-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-23", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled"], "seq": "C00416", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Put the software you want them to see in escrow; they will not know it differs from the software on the voting machines."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §19212 and SOS escrow regulations require voting-system source code to be placed in escrow as a condition of state approval—creating an official 'software in escrow' artifact that the public and most local officials never build-verify against every deployed machine image. Status Confirmed that escrow is the mandated visibility substitute. Confirmed for escrow architecture; a specific proven escrow≠deployed fraud in a named 2016–present race stays Alleged without a matching forensic finding here (historical escrow discrepancy reporting exists as cautionary context).", "sources": [{"title": "California LegInfo — Elections Code §19212", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=19212.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled__ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled__california-leginfo-elections-code-19212.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Escrow of Source Codes regulations", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/escrow-source-codes/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled__ca-elec-code-19212-source-code-escrow-requirement-vendor-controlled__california-sos-escrow-of-source-codes-regulations.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 12. Soft companion to wi-stat escrow withhold card on different leaf."}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-3017-third-party-return-enables-dropbox-non-usps-path", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-06", "uid": "C20260925-234437-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-06", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-3017-third-party-return-enables-dropbox-non-usps-path"], "seq": "C00439", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "They provide an open path to inject ballots without even USPS mail-ballot tracking."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code provisions authorizing a voter to designate another person to return a vote-by-mail ballot (and widespread use of unattended drop boxes) create a lawful path for ballots to enter election custody without USPS Intelligent Mail barcode tracking of the return piece. Status Confirmed for the statutory third-party return + drop-box injection surface. Soft companion to existing ca-elec-code-third-party-ballot-return card; mounts exact 'open path without USPS tracking' leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code — return of vote by mail ballot by another person (LegInfo)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=3017.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-3017-third-party-return-enables-dropbox-non-usps-path__california-elections-code-return-of-vote-by-mail-ballot-by-another-person-leginf.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Vote by Mail / returning your ballot (drop box options)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/vote-mail", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-3017-third-party-return-enables-dropbox-non-usps-path__california-sos-vote-by-mail-returning-your-ballot-drop-box-options.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "ca-sos-elections-officers-digest-many-election-offenses-misdemeanor", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-06", "uid": "C20260926-022005-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-06", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-elections-officers-digest-many-election-offenses-misdemeanor"], "seq": "C00984", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "There is no meaningful penalty for breaking election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Elections Officers Digest (Penalty Provisions) catalogs numerous Elections Code offenses—including voter fraud under EC §18560 and related title-18 election crimes—as misdemeanors or wobblers whose misdemeanor track carries up to one year in county jail and/or fine, with felony tracks often limited to low-term state sentences. Combined with historically sparse federal election-fraud caseloads (already documented on this leaf), the statutory ceiling for many election-integrity violations remains modest relative to the stakes. Status Confirmed light/misdemeanor-capable penalty structure in a large-state code; peer to GAO-19-485 tiny-prosecution share and DOJ FECA civil-deferral cards—California SOS penalty digest, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Elections Officers Digest 2024 Penalty Provisions PDF", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/elections-officers-digest/penal-provisions.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-elections-officers-digest-many-election-offenses-misdemeanor__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "California Public Law — Elections Code §18560 (voter fraud; misdemeanor/wobbler framework)", "url": "https://california.public.law/codes/elections_code_section_18560"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on no reasonable penalty leaf."}
{"id": "ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-27", "uid": "C20260926-000015-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-27", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible"], "seq": "C00540", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Voter registration entries are also created for people too young to vote but old enough to drive."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California SOS Pre-Registration FAQs confirm 16- and 17-year-olds (old enough for learner permits/DL transactions, too young to vote) can be automatically pre-registered via DMV Motor Voter if they do not opt out; records become active at 18. Status Confirmed that Motor-Voter creates registration entries for persons too young to vote but old enough to drive. Distinct from standing-skip leaf 'Registration...15 years old'.", "sources": [{"title": "CA SOS — Pre-Registration FAQs (DMV Motor Voter at 16–17)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/pre-register-16-vote-18/pre-reg-faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible__ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible.png"}, {"title": "CA SOS — California Motor Voter overview", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/california-motor-voter", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible__ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 14. Standing skip Registration 15-year-old left empty; this is Motor-Voter youth path.", "related": ["ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration"]}
{"id": "ca-sos-wheres-my-ballot-ballottrax-realtime-status-notifications", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-11", "uid": "C20260925-233150-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-11", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-wheres-my-ballot-ballottrax-realtime-status-notifications"], "seq": "C00404", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Real-time ballot-tracking systems give bad actors real-time information to abuse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Where's My Ballot? (BallotTrax-powered) lets voters receive email/SMS/voice notifications as vote-by-mail ballots move through mailing, receipt, and acceptance steps—near-real-time ballot-lifecycle tracking statewide. Status Confirmed that official real-time/near-real-time ballot tracking systems exist and publish status events. Confirmed for the tracking capability; 'abuse by bad actors' of that feed stays Alleged without a specific incident here.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Where's My Ballot?", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ballot-status/wheres-my-ballot", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-wheres-my-ballot-ballottrax-realtime-status-notifications__ca-sos-wheres-my-ballot-ballottrax-realtime-status-notifications__california-sos-where-s-my-ballot.png"}, {"title": "NPR — Want to track your 2024 election ballot? These states have online trackers", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5170285/voting-2024-ballots-states-online-tracking"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 6.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "catalist-privacy-policy-voter-file-broker-personal-data-access", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-30", "uid": "C20260926-002008-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-30", "old_ids": ["catalist-privacy-policy-voter-file-broker-personal-data-access"], "seq": "C00663", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "It gives them direct access to people's personal information (a violation of privacy)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "Catalist's privacy policy and election-data FAQs describe combining public voter-registration records with commercial/partner/canvass data into brokered voter files sold/licensed to campaigns and nonprofits—industrial-scale third-party access to registrants' personal and modeled information originating from registration ecosystems. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Catalist — Privacy Policy", "url": "https://catalist.us/privacy-policy/"}, {"title": "Catalist — Election Data FAQ", "url": "https://catalist.us/election-data-faq/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 15 companion. Did NOT set source.local on fairvote/InfluenceWatch/CRC financials."}
{"id": "chicago-cook-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-15", "uid": "C20260926-015040-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-15", "old_ids": ["chicago-cook-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access"], "seq": "C00903", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Printing ballots in multiple languages adds complexity (more ballot styles), which is used to push computerized tabulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "IL", "description": "Chicago Board of Elections / Chicago Votes 2024 materials document touchscreen and audio ballots available in English plus Spanish, Chinese/Mandarin, Hindi, Korean, Tagalog, Polish, Gujarati, Urdu, Ukrainian, Arabic, and Russian, with vote-by-mail ballots requestable in English, Spanish, Chinese, Hindi, Polish, Korean, or Tagalog; Cook County Clerk language-assistance pages likewise advertise multilingual hotlines and translated materials. Status Confirmed for another major jurisdiction multiplying ballot styles/languages—peer to Los Angeles County and NYC 2024 multilingual ballot services already on this leaf—illustrating how language-access mandates expand style counts that push jurisdictions toward computerized ballot generation/tabulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Chicago Votes — Voting 101 2024 (multilingual ballot languages)", "url": "https://chicagovotes.com/2024-voter-guide/voting-101-2024/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/chicago-cook-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access__chicago-votes-voting-101-2024-multilingual-ballot-langu.png"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — Language Assistance for Voters", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/elections/ways-to-vote/voting-accessibility-and-assistance/language-assistance", "local": "/archives/2026/09/chicago-cook-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access__cook-county-clerk-language-assistance-for-voters.png"}, {"title": "DePaulia — Chicago bilingual voting accessibility / multilingual judges 2024", "url": "https://depauliaonline.com/72976/2024-election-issue/chicago-set-to-break-record-for-highest-turnout-of-bilingual-election-judges/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on multilingual ballot styles forcing computer tabulation."}
{"id": "cisa-cybersecurity-toolkit-election-officials-free-services-risk-profile-dependence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-10", "uid": "C20260926-000015-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-10", "old_ids": ["cisa-cybersecurity-toolkit-election-officials-free-services-risk-profile-dependence"], "seq": "C00523", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials must rely completely on assigned \"cybersecurity\" experts, who in effect control our elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Cybersecurity Toolkit and Resources to Protect Elections positions CISA/JCDC as the lead federal election-security agency offering free scanning, assessments, risk-profile tools, and guidance that local officials are expected to use—reinforcing reliance on assigned cyber experts rather than independent software-independent public counting. Status Confirmed for structural dependence pathway; PEP contrast: precinct public hand count of hand-marked paper reduces reliance on opaque cyber-expert assurances (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Cybersecurity Toolkit and Resources to Protect Elections", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/cybersecurity-toolkit-and-resources-protect-elections"}, {"title": "CISA — 2026 Election Infrastructure Security Plan (SLTT cyber immaturity)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-09/2026-CISA-Election-Security-Plan-FINAL-508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-cybersecurity-toolkit-election-officials-free-services-risk-profile-dependence__cisa-cybersecurity-toolkit-election-officials-free-services-risk-profile-depende.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 5 companion. PEP framing on complexity/cyber dependence."}
{"id": "cisa-protect2024-ei-isac-free-edr-albert-services", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-12", "uid": "C20260926-021058-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-12", "old_ids": ["cisa-protect2024-ei-isac-free-edr-albert-services"], "seq": "C00960", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials must rely completely on assigned \"cybersecurity\" experts, who in effect control our elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "US", "description": "CISA **#Protect2024** materials and EI-ISAC join pages advertise free membership and no-cost services for election offices—including Endpoint Detection and Response, Malicious Domain Blocking, Albert sensors, threat intel, and vulnerability support—framing assigned federal/CIS partners as the default cybersecurity stack for understaffed jurisdictions. Status Confirmed structured dependence on assigned cyber partners' tooling/intel; peer to EI-ISAC/MS-ISAC directed-partners and CISA toolkit risk-profile cards—Protect2024 free-services packaging, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Join the Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/join-elections-infrastructure-information-sharing-and-analysis-center-ei-isac", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-protect2024-ei-isac-free-edr-albert-services__cisa-join-the-elections-infrastructure-isac-ei-isac.png"}, {"title": "CISA — #Protect2024 bifold (free EI-ISAC / election security services)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/Protect2024_Bifold%20Digital%20Version_508c_0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-protect2024-ei-isac-free-edr-albert-services__cisa-protect2024-bifold-free-ei-isac-election-security-services.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on officials relying on assigned cybersecurity experts leaf."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-10-101-canvass-board-party-chair-notify-vacancy-pathway", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-15", "uid": "C20260926-002008-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-15", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-10-101-canvass-board-party-chair-notify-vacancy-pathway"], "seq": "C00648", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to \"forget\" to notify (Republican) party chairs to appoint canvass board members, so the clerks can appoint them on the party's behalf."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado C.R.S. §1-10-101 requires party appointment of canvass-board members and directs the clerk to promptly notify the party county chair when an appointee cannot serve so the party can replace them—while also authorizing the clerk to fill vacancies when the party lacks chair/vice-chair or on the meeting date. That statutory structure is exactly the notify-or-clerk-appoints pathway the leaf describes; failure/delay in chair notification shifts appointment power to the clerk. Status Confirmed for the statutory mechanism; specific statewide 'clerks association instructed forget' directive not separately documented here.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — C.R.S. §1-10-101 Canvass board appointment, fees, oaths", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/general-primary-recall-and-congressional-vacancy-elections/article-10/part-1/section-1-10-101/"}, {"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. Section 1-10-101", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-10-101"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 8. Mechanism Confirmed; association 'instruct forget' motive Alleged."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-2-101-twenty-two-day-state-residency-to-register-vote", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-39", "uid": "C20260925-220029-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-39", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-2-101-twenty-two-day-state-residency-to-register-vote"], "seq": "C00392", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "As little as 22 days of state residency (allowing state-hopping to cover staggered elections)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-2-101(1)(b) expressly requires that a person 'has resided in this state twenty-two days immediately prior to the election at which the person intends to vote'—matching the catalog leaf's 22-day figure. Combined with Colorado's same-day/Election Day registration options, the short statutory residency floor is a Confirmed legal parameter that (in theory) permits rapid establishment of voting eligibility relative to longer historical residency rules. Status Confirmed for the statute; organized multi-state hopping schemes stay Alleged without case-specific proof here.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. §1-2-101 Qualifications for registration", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-2-101"}, {"title": "Justia — C.R.S. §1-2-101 (2024)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/general-primary-recall-and-congressional-vacancy-elections/article-2/part-1/section-1-2-101/"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Voter Registration FAQs", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/FAQs/VoterRegistrationFAQ.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-crs-1-2-101-twenty-two-day-state-residency-to-register-vote__colorado-sos-voter-registration-faqs.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 20. Statute Confirmed; state-hopping abuse Alleged."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-6-113-election-judge-vacancy-appoint-from-party-lists-or-unaffiliated", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-10", "uid": "C20260926-020046-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-10", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-6-113-election-judge-vacancy-appoint-from-party-lists-or-unaffiliated"], "seq": "C00927", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not fulfill (or do not know) their duty to provide election judges, poll watchers, and audit and canvass board members."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-6-113 (Vacancies) authorizes the designated election official, when a selected election judge fails/refuses/is unable to serve or is removed, to **appoint a replacement**—and for partisan elections to fill from previously submitted party lists (committeepersons / county chairs / minor parties) **or from unaffiliated voters** who offered to serve. Companion appointment statutes (§§1-6-102–104) structure party nomination of judges and clerk appointment when lists are incomplete. Status Confirmed that Colorado law anticipates parties failing to fully staff judge slots and shifts fill authority to county officials (including unaffiliated appointees)—peer to Texas party-judge vacancy crises and TX SOS advisories authorizing county fill when parties fail.", "sources": [{"title": "C.R.S. §1-6-113 — Vacancies (election judge appointment from party lists or unaffiliated)", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-6-113"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Election Rules / Rule 6 (election judges; party lists and clerk appointment practices)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule6.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-crs-1-6-113-election-judge-vacancy-appoint-from-party-lists-or-unaffiliated__colorado-sos-election-rules-rule-6-election-judges-part.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on parties failing to provide election judges / county fill leaf."}
{"id": "co-sos-college-voting-faq-out-of-state-students-campus-or-home-choice", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-09", "uid": "C20260926-023825-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-09", "old_ids": ["co-sos-college-voting-faq-out-of-state-students-campus-or-home-choice"], "seq": "C01084", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "They bring in groups from other states to harvest votes from young people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Secretary of State 'Voting while in College' FAQ states students attending college in Colorado may choose to establish residence and register/vote in Colorado, and Colorado residents attending out-of-state colleges may either keep Colorado registration (mail ballot) or register in the campus state under that state's rules—officially confirming cross-state student registration choice at campus populations. Status Confirmed primary SOS guidance; peer to Pennsylvania DOS campus-address guidance and Maine SOS voting-residence fact sheet already on this leaf—Colorado SOS FAQ, not those remounted. PEP framing: concentrated campus registration pools feed machine early/mail pipelines without precinct hand-count visibility.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Voting while in College FAQ (campus / out-of-state residence choice)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/FAQs/college.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-college-voting-faq-out-of-state-students-campus-or-home-choice__colorado-sos-voting-while-in-college-faq-campus-out-of-state-residence-choice.png"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Policy Brief on Student Voting (campus residence rights overview)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/policy-brief-student-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-college-voting-faq-out-of-state-students-campus-or-home-choice__brennan-center-policy-brief-on-student-voting-campus-residence-rights-overview.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Colleges bring-groups-from-other-states leaf."}
{"id": "co-sos-know-your-rights-22-day-residency-presidential-exception-note", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-40", "uid": "C20260925-220029-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-40", "old_ids": ["co-sos-know-your-rights-22-day-residency-presidential-exception-note"], "seq": "C00393", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "As little as 22 days of state residency (allowing state-hopping to cover staggered elections)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado SOS voter-rights materials restate the 22-day state residency rule for registration/voting eligibility (with limited presidential-only nuances for newer arrivals in some materials)—official confirmation of the short residency gate the catalog flags as enabling staggered-election mobility. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Know Your Voting Rights booklet PDF", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/files/KnowYourRights.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-know-your-rights-22-day-residency-presidential-exception-note__colorado-sos-know-your-voting-rights-booklet-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Voting Rights Lab — Colorado election policy tracker (residency)", "url": "https://tracker.votingrightslab.org/states/colorado", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-know-your-rights-22-day-residency-presidential-exception-note__voting-rights-lab-colorado-election-policy-tracker-residency.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-11", "uid": "C20260926-000015-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-11", "old_ids": ["colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity"], "seq": "C00524", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "An NGO (nongovernmental organization) paid by counties but unaccountable to the county's electors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "The Colorado County Clerks Association (CCCA) describes itself as a non-governmental entity whose membership includes Colorado's 63 county clerks and designees, with an executive director and board—i.e., an association NGO of clerks, not a body directly elected by or accountable to county electors. Status Confirmed for NGO/association structure outside elector accountability; 'paid by counties' dues mechanics Confirmed via typical association membership model (see companion).", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Clerks Association — About Us (non-governmental entity)", "url": "https://www.clerkandrecorder.org/about-us-2", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity__colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity.png"}, {"title": "Colorado Clerks Association — home", "url": "https://www.clerkandrecorder.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity__colorado-county-clerks-association-ccca-nongovernmental-membership-entity.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 6."}
{"id": "colorado-crs-1-1-110-clerks-must-follow-sos-rules-and-orders", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-13", "uid": "C20260926-000015-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-13", "old_ids": ["colorado-crs-1-1-110-clerks-must-follow-sos-rules-and-orders"], "seq": "C00526", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks that they serve as \"agents of the Secretary of State.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "C.R.S. §1-1-110 requires county clerks, when rendering decisions under the Election Code, to consult the Secretary of State and follow SOS rules and orders—functionally subordinating county clerks to SOS direction even though clerks remain locally elected. Status Confirmed for statutory SOS-agent-like subordination; catalog's quoted 'Agents of the Secretary of State' phrasing is paraphrastic of this duty, not a literal CCCA bylaws quote found in research.", "sources": [{"title": "C.R.S. §1-1-110 — Powers of county clerk; consult SOS; follow rules/orders", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-1-110"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS CRS Title 1 PDF (Election Code)", "url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-crs-1-1-110-clerks-must-follow-sos-rules-and-orders__colorado-crs-1-1-110-clerks-must-follow-sos-rules-and-orders.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 7. Soft companion to CCCA NGO leaf; phrasing honesty note."}
{"id": "colorado-vote-centers-require-centralized-statewide-voter-registration-access", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-20", "uid": "C20260925-233150-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-20", "old_ids": ["colorado-vote-centers-require-centralized-statewide-voter-registration-access"], "seq": "C00413", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Centralizing certain components defeats decentralization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado statute/NCSL summary for voter service and polling centers requires secure computer access to the centralized statewide voter registration system at each center—so countywide voting convenience depends on a central VR/e-pollbook backbone. Status Confirmed that the vote-center model structurally centralizes a critical component even while offering many physical sites.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — C.R.S. §1-5-102.9 Voter service and polling centers", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/article-5/part-1/section-1-5-102-9/"}, {"title": "Larimer County — benefits of vote center model (central control / real-time e-pollbook)", "url": "https://uk.larimer.gov/clerk/elections/resources/history-vote-centers/benefits-vote-center-model"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 10 companion. Soft companion to filled County-Wide Centralizes control cards.", "related": ["co-2014-general-intermittent-loss-of-connectivity-vspcs-to-score-387-of-981-provisional-ballots", "co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc"]}
{"id": "democrats-abroad-votefromabroad-fpca-partisan-uocava-pipeline", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-12", "uid": "C20260925-212129-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-12", "old_ids": ["democrats-abroad-votefromabroad-fpca-partisan-uocava-pipeline"], "seq": "C00309", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "For example, see what this organization is doing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Democrats Abroad openly markets VoteFromAbroad.org as its Voting from Abroad 101 / FPCA completion portal for overseas Democrats and other U.S. citizens abroad, integrating state-specific UOCAVA requirements into a guided electronic workflow that local election officials then process as FPCAs. Status Confirmed companion documenting the partisan sponsorship of the catalog-named organization (see remounted votefromabroad-org-seed).", "sources": [{"title": "Democrats Abroad — Exercise Your Right to Vote / VoteFromAbroad", "url": "https://www.democratsabroad.org/your-vote"}, {"title": "Democrats Abroad — How to Vote from Abroad", "url": "https://www.democratsabroad.org/how_to_vote_from_abroad"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 6 companion to remounted votefromabroad-org-seed."}
{"id": "eac-2024-ncoa-undeliverable-mail-address-errors-list-maintenance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-33", "uid": "C20260926-002008-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-33", "old_ids": ["eac-2024-ncoa-undeliverable-mail-address-errors-list-maintenance"], "seq": "C00666", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Addresses modified (street names) to send ballots to known bad addresses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC 2024 NCOA memo and USPS address-quality programs (CASS/AEC) document that street-name spelling/suffix errors and outdated addresses cause election mail/ballots to be undeliverable—and that NCOA/returned-mail feeds drive list-maintenance. Soft remount of prior undeliverable/NCOA card family onto this exact 'addresses modified / bad addresses' pathKey. Status Confirmed that bad/modified street data sends ballots to undeliverable addresses; intentional covert modification-to-harvest Alleged beyond ordinary error/NCOA churn.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — NCOA memo: address updates / undeliverable mail list maintenance (2024)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS PostalPro — Address Element Correction (AEC) / street-name quality", "url": "https://postalpro.usps.com/address-quality/aec", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-ncoa-undeliverable-mail-address-errors-list-maintenance__usps-postalpro-address-element-correction-aec-street-name-quality.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 17. Soft remount of undeliverable/NCOA family. Mechanism Confirmed; intentional cabal modification Alleged."}
{"id": "eac-certification-states-rely-on-federal-vstl-conformance-trust-cascade", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-23", "uid": "C20260925-220029-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-23", "old_ids": ["eac-certification-states-rely-on-federal-vstl-conformance-trust-cascade"], "seq": "C00376", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Everyone downstream \"trusts\" the systems because they were \"tested\" and \"certified.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC program materials and state practice document a trust cascade: VSTL testing → EAC Certificate of Conformance → state certification/approval → county procurement/deployment, with many jurisdictions treating federal/state certification as the primary assurance that systems are fit for use. Status Confirmed that downstream officials and the public are told to trust systems because they were tested and certified. CA TTBR (fill-15g) showed certified systems can still harbor serious vulns—illustrating the catalog's risk in the cascade.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Testing and Certification Program PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/EAC_Testing_and_Certification_Program.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Road to VVSG 2.0-Certified Voting Systems PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-05/The_Road_to_Widespread_Deployment_of_VVSG_2.0-Certified_Voting_Systems_508_FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-certification-states-rely-on-federal-vstl-conformance-trust-cascade__eac-road-to-vvsg-2-0-certified-voting-systems-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CA SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review (certified systems failed adversarial review)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 12. Trust cascade Confirmed; adequacy of that trust disputed by TTBR/Halderman record."}
{"id": "eac-testing-certification-program-certificate-of-conformance-vvsg-vstl", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-21", "uid": "C20260925-220029-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-21", "old_ids": ["eac-testing-certification-program-certificate-of-conformance-vvsg-vstl"], "seq": "C00374", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Systems are certified."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Testing and Certification Program issues Certificates of Conformance after EAC-accredited Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTLs) test systems against the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), with approved test plans/reports and trusted builds. Status Confirmed that voting systems are formally 'certified' through this federal pathway—the catalog's certification gate. Soft companion to fill-15g Labs-approve / Test-procedures cards and eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Testing and Certification Program overview PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/EAC_Testing_and_Certification_Program.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-testing-certification-program-certificate-of-conformance-vvsg-vstl__eac-testing-and-certification-program-overview-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTL)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-system-test-laboratories-vstl"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 11. Certification process Confirmed; 'fake' quality addressed on sibling leaves."}
{"id": "eac-vstl-conformance-trust-chain-officials-blindly-trust-cert", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-13", "uid": "C20260925-234437-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-13", "old_ids": ["eac-vstl-conformance-trust-chain-officials-blindly-trust-cert"], "seq": "C00446", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Trust them blindly (voluntarily or involuntarily)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC certification produces Certificates of Conformance that many states treat as the baseline for purchase/use—creating a voluntary/involuntary trust chain from local officials through VSTLs to vendors. Status Confirmed that downstream jurisdictions commonly rely on upstream certification rather than independent re-verification of binaries. Soft companion to existing eac-certification-states-rely / nist-nvlap cards.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Voting System Certification / Certificates of Conformance program", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-conformance-trust-chain-officials-blindly-trust-cert__eac-voting-system-certification-certificates-of-conformance-program.png"}, {"title": "NIST NVLAP — Voting System Testing LAP accreditation context", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/nvlap", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-conformance-trust-chain-officials-blindly-trust-cert__nist-nvlap-voting-system-testing-lap-accreditation-context.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 7."}
{"id": "eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs-conflict-structure-fake-cert-root", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-20", "uid": "C20260925-234437-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-20", "old_ids": ["eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs-conflict-structure-fake-cert-root"], "seq": "C00453", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Vendors pay the \"testing\" labs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "Under the EAC Testing and Certification program, Voting System Test Laboratories are paid by manufacturers seeking certificates of conformance—a structural payment conflict that the catalog frames as fake/insufficient testing incentive alignment. Status Confirmed for the manufacturer-pays-lab funding structure. Soft companion to existing eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs card on slash-variant children.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Testing and Certification Program Manual v3.0 (VSTL role / manufacturer testing)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/Testing_and_Certification_Program_Manual_Version_3_020421.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs-conflict-structure-fake-cert-root__eac-testing-and-certification-program-manual-v3-0-vstl-role.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Accredited Voting System Test Laboratories", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-system-test-laboratories-vstl", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs-conflict-structure-fake-cert-root__eac-accredited-voting-system-test-laboratories.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 10 companion. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Fake Testing and Certification' to 'Fake Testing and Certification > Vendors pay the 'testing' labs.'."}
{"id": "ess-modem-unofficial-results-after-polls-close-breaks-airgap-narrative", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-13", "uid": "C20260925-212129-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-13", "old_ids": ["ess-modem-unofficial-results-after-polls-close-breaks-airgap-narrative"], "seq": "C00310", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Start with disconnected, \"air-gapped\" systems, then mandate connections over several cycles until everything is networked."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ES&S public FAQs state that in some states it is legal practice to use cellular/private-network modems to transmit unofficial election-night results after polls close, with EMS components receiving those transmissions through certified firewall/DMZ configurations — i.e., tabulators/results paths are not permanently air-gapped even when sold under isolation rhetoric. Status Confirmed for vendor-documented post-close networked results transmission as the connected end-state of systems often described to the public as isolated.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S — Transmission of Unofficial Election Results FAQs", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/"}, {"title": "Montana Association of Counties — How It Works: Private Network for Unofficial Results (PDF)", "url": "https://www.mtcounties.org/wp-content/uploads/resources/elections/systems/how-it-works-private-network.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 7. Sibling leaf already has modem-install cards; this mounts the 'start disconnected then connect' gradual leaf. Near-dupe note vs Linguistic Air-Gapped deception cards — different tactic_path.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "fairvote-ranked-choice-voting-also-called-instant-runoff-voting-same-method", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-07", "uid": "C20260925-233150-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-07", "old_ids": ["fairvote-ranked-choice-voting-also-called-instant-runoff-voting-same-method"], "seq": "C00400", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Beware of RCV implemented under a different name."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "FairVote and related reform materials describe ranked-choice voting (RCV) as also known as instant-runoff voting (IRV)—the same single-winner ranked-ballot elimination method marketed under multiple labels (RCV, IRV, ranked voting). Status Confirmed that the method is routinely implemented/branded under different names. Confirmed for aliasing of the method; evaluation of RCV merits is out of scope for this card.", "sources": [{"title": "FairVote — Ranked Choice Voting overview", "url": "https://fairvote.org/our-reforms/ranked-choice-voting/"}, {"title": "NYC Votes — Ranked Choice Voting page", "url": "https://www.vote.nyc/page/ranked-choice-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fairvote-ranked-choice-voting-also-called-instant-runoff-voting-same-method__fairvote-ranked-choice-voting-also-called-instant-runoff-voting-same-method__nyc-votes-ranked-choice-voting-page.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 4."}
{"id": "fairvote-rcv-how-tos-talking-points-information-materials", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-36", "uid": "C20260925-234437-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-36", "old_ids": ["fairvote-rcv-how-tos-talking-points-information-materials"], "seq": "C00469", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Further information on RCV"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "FairVote publishes 'how to's' and 'how to talk to friends and family about ranked choice voting' materials—explicit information-operations style outreach kits for spreading RCV messaging. Status Confirmed for organized RCV information/talking-point campaigns.", "sources": [{"title": "FairVote — Ranked choice voting how-to's", "url": "https://fairvote.org/resources/ranked-choice-voting-how-tos/"}, {"title": "FairVote — How to talk to friends and family about RCV", "url": "https://fairvote.org/how-to-talk-to-your-friends-about-ranked-choice-voting/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 18 companion."}
{"id": "fairvote-rcv-information-educational-campaign-how-it-works", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-35", "uid": "C20260925-234437-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-35", "old_ids": ["fairvote-rcv-information-educational-campaign-how-it-works"], "seq": "C00468", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Further information on RCV"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "FairVote's Ranked Choice Voting information hub ('How does ranked choice voting work?', benefits messaging, how-to resources, and RCV Information page) is a sustained educational/advocacy information campaign that frames RCV as simple and beneficial while the method's multi-round elimination tabulation remains computer-mediated in real elections. Status Confirmed that organized RCV information campaigns exist at scale. Soft companion to existing FairVote/RCV cards on sibling leaves; mounts exact 'RCV information' leaf. PEP: hand-count of single-choice hand-marked ballots avoids RCV software complexity.", "sources": [{"title": "FairVote — Ranked Choice Voting (how it works / information hub)", "url": "https://fairvote.org/our-reforms/ranked-choice-voting/"}, {"title": "FairVote — Ranked choice voting FAQ", "url": "https://fairvote.org/ranked-choice-voting-faq/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 18."}
{"id": "fec-30124-fraudulent-misrepresentation-ban-redirect-framework", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-12", "uid": "C20260926-001426-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-12", "old_ids": ["fec-30124-fraudulent-misrepresentation-ban-redirect-framework"], "seq": "C00605", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Redirect citizens away from real solutions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "FECA's fraudulent-misrepresentation provisions (52 U.S.C. §30124) and FEC MUR practice against committees that falsely claim to raise for a candidate while redirecting proceeds supply the legal framework for the redirect-away-from-real-support pathway. Status Confirmed for the statutory/enforcement mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC MUR 8248 FGCR — §30124(b) fraudulent misrepresentation allegations", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8248/8248_10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-30124-fraudulent-misrepresentation-ban-redirect-framework__fec-mur-8248-fgcr-30124-b-fraudulent-misrepresentation-alleg.pdf"}, {"title": "CLC press — FEC complaints alleging scam PACs defrauded thousands of donors", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/press-releases/campaign-legal-center-files-fec-complaints-alleging-scam-pacs-defrauded-thousands"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "fec-enforcement-deadlock-dismissals-lack-four-votes-no-teeth-pattern", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-14", "uid": "C20260926-025634-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-14", "old_ids": ["fec-enforcement-deadlock-dismissals-lack-four-votes-no-teeth-pattern"], "seq": "C01119", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Many election laws have no enforcement consequences, so nothing deters violations, inviting abuse under a false sense of security."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC enforcement requires four affirmative commissioner votes to proceed; Brennan Center and FEC enforcement-docket practice document recurrent 3–3 deadlocks that dismiss or stall complaints even where OGC recommends reason to believe—leaving FECA's civil penalties and disclosure rules without operational teeth and creating a false sense of security that campaign-finance laws are enforced. Status Confirmed structural four-vote requirement and documented deadlock/dismissal pattern as an enforcement no-teeth mechanism; peer to CRS AFP unpaid-fines and Brennan FEC-deadlock stonewalling cards already on this leaf—four-vote/deadlock structural card distinct from unpaid-AFP collection and Brennan opinion remounts. PEP framing: laws without enforcement teeth invite abuse while officials claim the rules protect elections.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Legal resources / Enforcement (four-vote commission structure)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/enforcement/"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — The Federal Elections Commission Is Deadlocked and Needs Reform", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/federal-elections-commission-deadlocked-and-needs-reform", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-enforcement-deadlock-dismissals-lack-four-votes-no-teeth-pattern__brennan-center-fec-deadlocked-needs-reform.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Political Parties no-teeth laws leaf. Distinct from crs unpaid-AFP and existing Brennan stonewalling cards by focusing four-vote deadlock dismissals."}
{"id": "fl-stat-99-092-candidate-qualifying-fee-percent-of-salary", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-35", "uid": "C20260925-220029-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-35", "old_ids": ["fl-stat-99-092-candidate-qualifying-fee-percent-of-salary"], "seq": "C00388", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Cost of Running for Office", "Raise the cost of running for office so that only candidates with big money behind them can afford to run, disenfranchising ordinary American citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Statutes §99.092 ties candidate qualifying fees to a percentage of the annual salary of the office sought (filing fee + election assessment, plus typical party assessment)—producing four- to five-figure barriers for higher offices and structurally favoring candidates with party/big-donor backing or petition alternatives. Status Confirmed that statutory fee schedules raise the cost to run. Petition/write-in alternatives exist but still impose organizational costs.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Senate — §99.092 Qualifying fee structure", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/99.092", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-99-092-candidate-qualifying-fee-percent-of-salary__florida-senate-99-092-qualifying-fee-structure.png"}, {"title": "Online Sunshine — §99.092", "url": "http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0000-0099%2F0099%2FSections%2F0099.092.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-99-092-candidate-qualifying-fee-percent-of-salary__online-sunshine-99-092.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 18."}
{"id": "ga-ocga-21-2-526-election-contest-jury-demand-available", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-01", "uid": "C20260925-233150-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-01", "old_ids": ["ga-ocga-21-2-526-election-contest-jury-demand-available"], "seq": "C00394", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Move cases to jury trials to increase the cost of pursuing them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia O.C.G.A. §21-2-526 provides that election-contest issues are ordinarily tried by the court without a jury, but a litigant may demand a jury trial before the call of the case if the court finds the issue is one the litigant is entitled to have tried by a jury under other state law—after which a jury is impaneled and the cause proceeds under ordinary jury practice (including multi-county special-verdict procedures). Status Confirmed that Georgia election contests can be moved onto a jury track, which expands hearing length, witness/juror logistics, and litigation cost versus a pure bench contest. Confirmed for the statutory jury-demand pathway; not Confirmed that every demand is made solely to inflate cost.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — O.C.G.A. §21-2-526 Trial by jury (election contests)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-13/section-21-2-526/"}, {"title": "FindLaw — Ga. Code §21-2-526", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/ga/title-21-elections/ga-code-sect-21-2-526.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 1. Jury-demand pathway Confirmed; cost-motive framing stays advocacy."}
{"id": "il-10-ilcs-5-13-1-party-lists-election-judges", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-07", "uid": "C20260926-020640-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-07", "old_ids": ["il-10-ilcs-5-13-1-party-lists-election-judges"], "seq": "C00940", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes an election worker; the election workers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois 10 ILCS 5/13-1 provides that county boards appoint election judges from **certified lists submitted by the two leading political parties**; only when lists are incomplete does the board fill from supplemental lists or (last resort) other qualified persons. Status Confirmed party-gatekeeping of who becomes election judges despite open \"anyone can apply\" appearance; peer to TX Elec. Code 32.002 and MN Stat. 204B.21—Illinois statute, not those remounts.", "sources": [{"title": "10 ILCS 5/13-1 — Appointment of election judges from party-certified lists", "url": "https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/fulltext.asp?DocName=001000050K13-1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-13-1-party-lists-election-judges__10-ilcs-5-13-1-appointment-of-election-judges-from-part.png"}, {"title": "Illinois State Board of Elections — Appointment of Election Judges guidance (party lists)", "url": "https://www.elections.il.gov/agencyforms/1%20APPOINTMENT%20FOR%20ELECTION%20JUDGES/FINAL%20Appointment%20of%20EJs%20for%20Counties%20-%20June%20Primary.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-13-1-party-lists-election-judges__illinois-state-board-of-elections-appointment-of-electi.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on party-chosen election workers leaf."}
{"id": "maine-sos-rcv-voter-education-information-resources", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-10", "uid": "C20260926-033041-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-10", "old_ids": ["maine-sos-rcv-voter-education-information-resources"], "seq": "C01220", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Further information on RCV"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "ME", "description": "Maine Secretary of State's Ranked Choice Voting information hub publishes official voter-facing RCV education—animated process/tabulation explainer, marked-ballot PDF examples, booth posters, FAQ, and round-by-round transfer rules (exhausted ballots, overvotes, continuing candidates)—i.e., state-run RCV information campaigns that teach voters how multi-round transfer counting works, independent of FairVote NGO materials. Status Confirmed primary Maine SOS RCV information/education resources; peer to FairVote how-it-works and FairVote how-tos/talking-points cards already on this leaf—Maine SOS official voter-education instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: RCV information campaigns normalize multi-round machine transfer tallies that precinct public hand counts of first-choice paper marks make unnecessary to trust.", "sources": [{"title": "Maine SOS — Resources for Ranked-Choice Voting (official voter education hub)", "url": "https://www.maine.gov/sos/elections-voting/resources-for-ranked-choice-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maine-sos-rcv-voter-education-information-resources__maine-sos-resources-for-ranked-choice-voting-official-voter-education-hub.png"}, {"title": "Maine SOS — Ranked-Choice Voting Frequently Asked Questions (companion)", "url": "https://www.maine.gov/sos/elections-voting/ranked-choice-voting-frequently-asked-questions", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maine-sos-rcv-voter-education-information-resources__maine-sos-ranked-choice-voting-frequently-asked-questions-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Ranked-choice voting RCV information leaf (non-FairVote)."}
{"id": "mi-mcl-168-765a-absent-voter-counting-boards-centralized-processing", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-38", "uid": "C20260925-233150-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-38", "old_ids": ["mi-mcl-168-765a-absent-voter-counting-boards-centralized-processing"], "seq": "C00431", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Centralizing results makes fraud difficult, if not impossible, to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan MCL 168.765a authorizes absent voter counting boards that centrally process absentee ballots outside ordinary Election Day precinct workflows—feeding the aggregated AVCB reporting model in §798b. Status Confirmed for centralized AV counting as the operational substrate of Michigan's less precinct-granular AV reporting.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.765a", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-168-765a.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-mcl-168-765a-absent-voter-counting-boards-centralized-processing__michigan-legislature-mcl-168-765a.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.798b PDF", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-168-798b.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-mcl-168-765a-absent-voter-counting-boards-centralized-processing__michigan-legislature-mcl-168-798b-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-37", "uid": "C20260925-233150-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-37", "old_ids": ["mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts"], "seq": "C00430", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Centralizing results makes fraud difficult, if not impossible, to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan MCL 168.798b requires accumulation reports to show election-day precinct, absent-voter counting board (AVCB), and early-voting results, but for cities/townships with 250+ precincts it does not require AVCB/early results to be reported as corresponding to specific election-day precincts—producing centralized AVCB aggregates that omit precinct-level linkage the catalog flags. Status Confirmed for the statutory reporting centralization/aggregation rule matching the leaf's Michigan example.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.798b PDF", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-168-798b.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts__mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts__michigan-legislature-mcl-168-798b-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.765a (AVCB procedures companion)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-168-765a.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts__mi-mcl-168-798b-avcb-early-vote-results-not-mapped-to-election-day-precincts__michigan-legislature-mcl-168-765a-avcb-procedures-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 19."}
{"id": "mn-stat-204b-21-party-lists-municipal-appointment-election-judges", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-16", "uid": "C20260925-214102-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-16", "old_ids": ["mn-stat-204b-21-party-lists-municipal-appointment-election-judges"], "seq": "C00339", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes an election worker; the election workers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota Stat. §204B.21 requires major political parties to furnish lists of election-judge nominees; municipal governing bodies/county boards appoint from those lists (with limited pathways for unaffiliated/other nominees). Status Confirmed for party-list-driven selection of election judges rather than purely open application.", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota Statutes §204B.21 — Appointment of election judges", "url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/204B.21", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-stat-204b-21-party-lists-municipal-appointment-election-judges__minnesota-statutes-204b-21-appointment-of-election-judges.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "mobile-voting-project-votesecure-cryptographic-protocol-e2e-viv-tusk-funded", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-18", "uid": "C20260925-235207-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-18", "old_ids": ["mobile-voting-project-votesecure-cryptographic-protocol-e2e-viv-tusk-funded"], "seq": "C00491", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will appeal to President Trump's enthusiasm for cryptocurrency and the public's growing acceptance of blockchain."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "Free & Fair's VoteSecure SDK—sponsored by The Mobile Voting Foundation / Tusk-linked Mobile Voting Project—is marketed as the 'core cryptographic protocol for mobile voting' (E2E-VIV), explicitly wrapping phone voting in cryptography to answer fraud concerns about machines and mail. Status Confirmed that the leading US mobile-voting advocacy stack pitches cryptographic/crypto-adjacent tech as the next trust layer.", "sources": [{"title": "Free & Fair — Releasing VoteSecure: Core Cryptographic Protocol for Mobile Voting", "url": "https://freeandfair.us/blog/releasing-votesecure/"}, {"title": "Free & Fair — VoteSecure SDK page", "url": "https://freeandfair.us/votesecure/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "mobilevoting-org-project-advocates-phone-voting-legislation-adoption", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-19", "uid": "C20260925-235207-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-19", "old_ids": ["mobilevoting-org-project-advocates-phone-voting-legislation-adoption"], "seq": "C00492", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "See https://www.mobilevoting.org/about."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "The Mobile Voting Project site (mobilevoting.org) advocates phone voting as secure/auditable/open-source, pushes state legislation (e.g., CO, MD, NJ, VT, MN opt-in campaigns), and partners on VoteSecure cryptography—exactly the catalog-cited shiny-object mobile-voting push. Note: /about returned 404 at research time; homepage content matches the leaf. Status Confirmed for the advocacy org and agenda.", "sources": [{"title": "The Mobile Voting Project — homepage", "url": "https://www.mobilevoting.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mobilevoting-org-project-advocates-phone-voting-legislation-adoption__the-mobile-voting-project-homepage.png"}, {"title": "Free & Fair — VoteSecure (Mobile Voting Foundation sponsor)", "url": "https://freeandfair.us/blog/releasing-votesecure/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 10. Catalog path is literal URL; /about 404 — use homepage as working primary."}
{"id": "ncsl-automatic-recount-thresholds-distribute-below-margin", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-37", "uid": "C20260926-001426-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-37", "old_ids": ["ncsl-automatic-recount-thresholds-distribute-below-margin"], "seq": "C00630", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below recount thresholds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "NCSL's Election Recounts brief documents that ~26 states + D.C. trigger automatic recounts only inside narrow margins (commonly 0.5%; range ~0.2%–1% or ties)—creating a concrete 'keep below recount margin' threshold map. Distributing small shifts across jurisdictions to stay under those triggers is exactly the threat model adjacent to fill-20f's margin-of-error leaf. Status Confirmed for the recount-threshold structure; does not prove any election was so manipulated. PEP: precinct hand count observes ballots locally without relying on statewide recount triggers (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Election Recounts (automatic thresholds table)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-recounts"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Election recount laws and procedures 2024", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Election_recount_laws_and_procedures_in_the_50_states,_2024"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 19. Soft companion to fill-20f Distribute below MoE leaf (recount vs MoE wording)."}
{"id": "ncsl-most-states-citizenship-residence-attestation-not-documentary-proof", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-25", "uid": "C20260925-211320-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-25", "old_ids": ["ncsl-most-states-citizenship-residence-attestation-not-documentary-proof"], "seq": "C00294", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL and Ballotpedia surveys document that most U.S. states require voter registrants to attest under penalty of perjury to citizenship/eligibility rather than produce documentary proof of citizenship or residence at registration; only a minority of states have enacted documentary proof-of-citizenship rules (often litigated/limited). Status Confirmed for the predominant attestation-without-documentary-confirmation registration model.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Voter Registration and Citizenship", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-registration-and-citizenship"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Documentary proof of citizenship for voting", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Documentary_proof_of_citizenship_for_voting"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 14. Confirmed attestation-dominant regime; residence documentary proof similarly uncommon at registration in most states."}
{"id": "ncsl-same-day-registration-realtime-epollbook-statewide-database-updates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-25", "uid": "C20260926-000015-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-25", "old_ids": ["ncsl-same-day-registration-realtime-epollbook-statewide-database-updates"], "seq": "C00538", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Real-time adjustments to voter rolls, even during the election"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that 24 states + D.C. offer same-day/Election Day registration; Colorado's networked e-pollbook communicates with the statewide voter registration database in real time so jurisdictions can check that a new registrant has not already registered/voted elsewhere the same election. Status Confirmed that real-time roll adjustments during elections are lawful/operational in multiple states.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration (CO real-time e-pollbook)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}, {"title": "EAC — Electronic Poll Book Report (real-time vs offline updates)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Electronic_Poll_Book_Report_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-same-day-registration-realtime-epollbook-statewide-database-updates__eac-electronic-poll-book-report-real-time-vs-offline-updates.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 13.", "related": ["co-2014-general-intermittent-loss-of-connectivity-vspcs-to-score-387-of-981-provisional-ballots", "co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc"]}
{"id": "ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states-legal-substrate-for-ballot-mistakes", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-36", "uid": "C20260925-235207-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-36", "old_ids": ["ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states-legal-substrate-for-ballot-mistakes"], "seq": "C00509", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "Provides plausible excuses for procedural \"mistakes\" that enable indirect manipulation of elections:", "Send ballots to young people. If caught, claim it was a mistake; if not, they gain uninformed voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that many states legally allow 16-/17-year-old preregistration (pending until 18)—the lawful roll entries that made Aspen-style 'accidentally mailed ballots to youth' possible. Soft companion to existing ncsl-youth-preregistration card; mounts the exact 'send ballots to youth / claim mistake' leaf. Status Confirmed for the legal pre-registration substrate.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}, {"title": "Denver Post — Aspen underage ballot mailing", "url": "https://www.denverpost.com/2019/02/18/aspen-election-ballots-sent-underage-voters/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 18 companion. Soft remount of NCSL youth pre-reg onto exact empty deepest leaf."}
{"id": "nep-abc-2024-exit-poll-rbs-multimode-early-absentee-telephone-sms", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-12", "uid": "C20260926-015536-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-12", "old_ids": ["nep-abc-2024-exit-poll-rbs-multimode-early-absentee-telephone-sms"], "seq": "C00915", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Early voting makes exit polling more difficult and costly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "National", "description": "The National Election Pool / ABC 2024 Exit Poll Methodology Statement documents that Edison Research's 2024 NEP exit poll used a multimode Registration-Based Sample (RBS) survey of absentee and early voters—landline, cell, SMS, and email invitations to an online questionnaire—conducted roughly Oct. 24–Nov. 2, then combined with in-person early-voting and Election Day interviews and weighted to the electorate's voting-method mix. NBC explainers likewise note telephone/online supplements are required because exclusive Election Day doorstep interviews cannot represent early/mail voters. Status Confirmed that 2024 national exit polling again required costly multimode early/absentee supplements—peer to Pew/Edison 2016 phone supplements and WaPo 2012 cancellation of 19 state exit polls; distinct from the CNN 2020 multimode card on the sibling mail-cripples-exit-poll leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC / NEP — 2024 Exit Poll Methodology Statement (PDF; RBS multimode early/absentee)", "url": "https://s.abcnews.com/assets/dtci/elections/NEPExitPollMethodologyStatement.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nep-abc-2024-exit-poll-rbs-multimode-early-absentee-telephone-sms__abc-nep-2024-exit-poll-methodology-statement-pdf-rbs-mu.pdf"}, {"title": "NBC News — How exit polls work (early/absentee telephone & online supplements)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/exit-polls-how-work-voters-data-demographics-rcna175474"}, {"title": "Pew Research — How the general election exit poll works (2016 early/absentee phone supplement context)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/11/02/just-how-does-the-general-election-exit-poll-work/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nep-abc-2024-exit-poll-rbs-multimode-early-absentee-telephone-sms__pew-research-how-the-general-election-exit-poll-works-2016-e.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on early voting makes exit polling more challenging/costly leaf."}
{"id": "nist-election-night-reporting-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-30", "uid": "C20260925-234437-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-30", "old_ids": ["nist-election-night-reporting-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation"], "seq": "C00463", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Totals can be changed and hidden inside aggregation without the public being able to detect it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST's Election Night Reporting (ENR) use-case materials describe ENR as aggregating and displaying unofficial results that evolve as more batches arrive and corrections occur—highlighting that public-facing aggregated totals are not the final certified canvass and can change inside the reporting pipeline. Status Confirmed for the unofficial aggregation/display model. PEP framing: precinct-posted hand-count totals in public provide a parallel check before centralized ENR aggregation.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Election Night Reporting (ENR) Use Case", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/election-night-reporting-enr-use-case", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-election-night-reporting-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation__nist-election-night-reporting-enr-use-case.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment (aggregation websites)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-election-infrastructure-cyber-risk-assessment_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "nist-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation-evolving-totals-soft-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-38", "uid": "C20260926-000015-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-38", "old_ids": ["nist-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation-evolving-totals-soft-companion"], "seq": "C00551", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST Election Night Reporting use-case materials describe ENR as aggregating and displaying unofficial results that evolve as batches arrive and corrections occur—so public-facing totals are inherently provisional. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Election Night Reporting (ENR) Use Case", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/election-night-reporting-enr-use-case", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation-evolving-totals-soft-companion__nist-enr-use-case-unofficial-aggregation-evolving-totals-soft-companion.png"}, {"title": "CISA ENR risks PDF", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "nist-nvlap-voting-system-testing-lap-vstl-accreditation-iso-17025", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-22", "uid": "C20260925-220029-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-22", "old_ids": ["nist-nvlap-voting-system-testing-lap-vstl-accreditation-iso-17025"], "seq": "C00375", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Systems are certified."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST's NVLAP Voting System Testing Laboratory Accreditation Program accredits VSTLs (ISO/IEC 17025 framework) that perform the testing underlying EAC certification—completing the 'systems are certified' institutional stack. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Voting System Testing LAP", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/nvlap/voting-system-testing-lap", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-nvlap-voting-system-testing-lap-vstl-accreditation-iso-17025__nist-voting-system-testing-lap.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Testing and Certification Program Manual materials", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/Testing%20and%20Certification%20Program%20Manual%20Version%203.1%20-%20Draft%20Redline.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-nvlap-voting-system-testing-lap-vstl-accreditation-iso-17025__eac-testing-and-certification-program-manual-materials.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "nyc-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-11", "uid": "C20260926-012939-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-11", "old_ids": ["nyc-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access"], "seq": "C00850", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Printing ballots in multiple languages adds complexity (more ballot styles), which is used to push computerized tabulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "NY", "description": "New York City Votes / NYC Board of Elections language-access materials for 2024 state that printed ballots and voting materials are provided in English plus Bengali, Chinese, Korean, and Spanish at designated poll sites (with additional interpreter/BMD language support). Multiple translated ballot styles multiply ballot variants that election management systems must define, print, and tabulate. Status Confirmed for NYC's multi-language ballot/materials program as a peer complexity driver to LA County's multilingual services. Framing: language access is lawful; the leaf's concern is that multiplying ballot styles increases machine-tabulation dependence versus simple PEP hand count of a small number of styles.", "sources": [{"title": "NYC Votes — Voting in Your Language / Language Access", "url": "https://www.nycvotes.org/how-to-vote/vote-in-your-language/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nyc-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access__nyc-votes-voting-in-your-language-language-access.png"}, {"title": "NYC Votes — Voting for Non-English Speakers / Language Assistance", "url": "https://www.nycvotes.org/how-to-vote/non-english-speaking-voters/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nyc-2024-multilingual-ballot-language-access__nyc-votes-voting-for-non-english-speakers-language-assi.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to la-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-services. PEP framing on complexity."}
{"id": "oklahoma-contest-deadline-friday-after-election-26os-8-109", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-19", "uid": "C20260925-205354-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-19", "old_ids": ["oklahoma-contest-deadline-friday-after-election-26os-8-109"], "seq": "C00234", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests", "Impose an unreasonably short period to file a contest, ensuring there is not enough time to investigate the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "OK", "description": "Oklahoma statute (26 O.S. §8-109) requires an election contest to be filed by 5 p.m. on the Friday next following the election — among the shortest initiation deadlines in the NCSL survey. Status Confirmed for the ultra-short statutory filing window.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Contested Election Deadlines (Oklahoma row)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/contested-election-deadlines"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 9."}
{"id": "or-wa-dropbox-cameras-not-mandated-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-26", "uid": "C20260925-183614-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-26", "old_ids": ["or-wa-dropbox-cameras-not-mandated-2024"], "seq": "C00114", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Many boxes required to have surveillance cameras do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "OR/WA", "description": "After 2024 ballot drop-box arson incidents in Multnomah County, Oregon, and Clark County, Washington, Elections & Voting Information Center / InvestigateWest explainers and Ballotpedia state-law summaries note Oregon and Washington do not uniformly mandate video surveillance on every drop box; counties often rely on seals, collection logs, and discretionary cameras. Clark County Auditor public statements likewise treated cameras as a local equipment choice rather than statewide 100% coverage. Status Confirmed jurisdictions where drop boxes operate without guaranteed camera surveillance.", "sources": [{"title": "Reed EVIC — Explainer: ballot drop box fires Multnomah OR / Clark WA", "url": "https://evic.reed.edu/evic-news/explainer-ballot-drop-box-fires-in-multnomah-county-or-and-clark-county-wa/"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Ballot drop box laws by state", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_drop_box_laws_by_state"}, {"title": "ClarkCountyToday — Auditor Kimsey on ballot box cameras record", "url": "https://www.clarkcountytoday.com/news/auditor-kimsey-addresses-his-record-on-ballot-box-cameras-and-ballot-harvesting/"}], "notes": "Part B Drop-Boxes camera leaf. No statewide camera mandate Confirmed."}
{"id": "pa-dos-college-students-may-register-at-campus-address-from-out-of-state", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-33", "uid": "C20260925-220029-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-33", "old_ids": ["pa-dos-college-students-may-register-at-campus-address-from-out-of-state"], "seq": "C00386", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "They bring in groups from other states to harvest votes from young people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Department of State guidance states college students may register using a campus address if they treat it as their voting residence (subject to district residency timing), including students whose permanent/home address is out of state—creating a lawful pathway for out-of-state young people living on campus to enter the local electorate. Status Confirmed for the residency/registration pathway. Organized 'bring groups to harvest' fraud schemes stay Alleged without specific convictions here. Soft companion to nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026 on Colleges stub.", "sources": [{"title": "PA.gov — College Students voting & election information", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/agencies/vote/voter-support/college-students", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-dos-college-students-may-register-at-campus-address-from-out-of-state__pa-gov-college-students-voting-election-information.png"}, {"title": "Maryland SBE — Students enrolled in Maryland higher ed", "url": "https://elections.maryland.gov/voter_registration/students.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-dos-college-students-may-register-at-campus-address-from-out-of-state__maryland-sbe-students-enrolled-in-maryland-higher-ed.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 17. Campus registration pathway Confirmed; harvest-fraud Alleged."}
{"id": "pdi-campaign-software-early-voting-data-remove-voted-retarget-remaining", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-20", "uid": "C20260925-220029-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-20", "old_ids": ["pdi-campaign-software-early-voting-data-remove-voted-retarget-remaining"], "seq": "C00373", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Together, this turns the election into a feedback control system that bad actors can use to control results with high precision."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Political Data Inc. (PDI) campaign-software documentation describes viewing/working with early-voting data to identify who has already voted and focus remaining contact on those who have not—codifying the observe→adjust loop as standard campaign practice during early voting. Status Confirmed for the feedback-loop tooling in lawful campaign turnout operations (not a fraud finding).", "sources": [{"title": "PDI Help — Viewing and Working with Early Voting Data", "url": "https://pdihelp.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/23980131891732-Viewing-and-Working-with-Early-Voting-Data", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pdi-campaign-software-early-voting-data-remove-voted-retarget-remaining__pdi-help-viewing-and-working-with-early-voting-data.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 10 companion. Lawful turnout feedback Confirmed; illicit control Alleged."}
{"id": "pima-az-recorder-ballot-curing-sends-registration-form-to-update-signature", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-14", "uid": "C20260925-220029-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-14", "old_ids": ["pima-az-recorder-ballot-curing-sends-registration-form-to-update-signature"], "seq": "C00367", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Initiate \"updated\" signature drives for all registered \"voters,\" then inject fake updated signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "Pima County Recorder ballot-curing materials describe comparing early-ballot affidavit signatures to the registration file and, on mismatch, contacting the voter and sending a voter-registration form to update the signature on file—an official signature-refresh channel tied to mail-ballot acceptance. Status Confirmed for county-run signature update/cure pathways feeding verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Pima County Recorder — Ballot Curing", "url": "https://recorder.pima.gov/BallotCuring.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pima-az-recorder-ballot-curing-sends-registration-form-to-update-signature__pima-county-recorder-ballot-curing.png"}, {"title": "Pima County Recorder — Ballot FAQs", "url": "https://recorder.pima.gov/BallotFAQs", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pima-az-recorder-ballot-curing-sends-registration-form-to-update-signature__pima-county-recorder-ballot-faqs.png"}, {"title": "A.R.S. §16-550 — signature verification / cure period", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00550.htm"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "reuters-marshals-judges-prosecutors-threat-surge-trump-related-cases", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-08", "uid": "C20260926-001426-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-08", "old_ids": ["reuters-marshals-judges-prosecutors-threat-surge-trump-related-cases"], "seq": "C00601", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit attorneys, election officials, legislators, judges, and others to dissuade them and anyone else from getting involved."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "Reuters investigation using U.S. Marshals Service threat data reports a sharp rise in threats and hostile communications against judges, federal prosecutors, and court staff in Trump-related cases—illustrating the leaf's attorney/judge-targeting dissuasion channel beyond election clerks alone. Status Confirmed for documented threat surge against judicial/prosecutorial participants.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Judges in Trump-related cases face unprecedented wave of threats", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-judges-threats/"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Poll of election officials: threats, harassment, interference concerns (2024)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/poll-election-officials-finds-concerns-about-safety-political", "local": "/archives/2026/09/reuters-marshals-judges-prosecutors-threat-surge-trump-related-cases__brennan-center-poll-of-election-officials-threats-harassment-interference-concerns-2024.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "tx-sos-advisory-2024-23-party-judge-lists-county-fill-when-parties-fail", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-20", "uid": "C20260926-002008-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-20", "old_ids": ["tx-sos-advisory-2024-23-party-judge-lists-county-fill-when-parties-fail"], "seq": "C00653", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not fulfill (or do not know) their duty to provide election judges, poll watchers, and audit and canvass board members."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas SOS Advisory 2024-23 and Election Code §§32.002/32.007 structure party nomination of election judges and authorize county officials to appoint replacements when parties fail to submit lists or judges cannot serve—statutory acknowledgment that parties often fail their staffing duties. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Advisory 2024-23 County Chairs, Election Officials, and Judges", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2024-23.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-sos-advisory-2024-23-party-judge-lists-county-fill-when-parties-fail__texas-sos-advisory-2024-23-county-chairs-election-officials-and-judges.png"}, {"title": "Texas Public Law — Election Code §32.002 Appointment of election judges", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._election_code_section_32.002"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "va-code-24-2-625-1-security-records-foia-exempt", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-06", "uid": "C20260926-020640-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-06", "old_ids": ["va-code-24-2-625-1-security-records-foia-exempt"], "seq": "C00939", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "No access to security logs, hash testing, penetration testing, or ballot review files"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Code §24.2-625.1 makes confidential and FOIA-excluded State Board / local electoral board records that describe **protocols for maintaining security of ballots or voting/counting equipment**, or that reveal **results of risk assessments** of specific local electoral procedures, when release would compromise election security. Virginia's Voting System Certification Standard further states penetration-analysis reports are confidential under the same section. Status Confirmed statutory shield for security/testing records; peer to GA OCGA 21-2-379.24 and MI SOS EPB FOIA cybersecurity exemption—distinct VA statute.", "sources": [{"title": "Va. Code §24.2-625.1 — Voting equipment security records confidential / FOIA-excluded", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-625.1/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-code-24-2-625-1-security-records-foia-exempt__va-code-24-2-625-1-voting-equipment-security-records-co.png"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT — Voting System Certification Standard 2025 (pen-test reports confidential under §24.2-625.1)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/election-security/Virginia_Voting-System-Certification-Standard-2025_FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-code-24-2-625-1-security-records-foia-exempt__virginia-elect-voting-system-certification-standard-202.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on no public security logs / pen-test / ballot-review files leaf."}
{"id": "verified-voting-ess-expresspoll-connect-jurisdiction-wide-near-realtime-sync", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-16", "uid": "C20260925-220029-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-16", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-ess-expresspoll-connect-jurisdiction-wide-near-realtime-sync"], "seq": "C00369", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Electronic poll books: each check-in is recorded in a central database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's ES&S ExpressPoll profile documents LAN/host-server synchronization and near-real-time jurisdiction-wide updates via ExpressPoll Connect—another major vendor architecture putting poll-book check-ins into a shared/central store during early and Election Day voting. Status Confirmed for central sync architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressPoll election system profile", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expresspoll/"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 8 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"]}
{"id": "verified-voting-expresspoll-connect-feedback-inperson-who-voted", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-32", "uid": "C20260925-234437-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-32", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-expresspoll-connect-feedback-inperson-who-voted"], "seq": "C00465", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "In person: design an electronic poll-book system to track who votes in person."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's ES&S ExpressPoll profile documents jurisdiction-wide networked electronic poll books that sync check-in status—enabling election administrators (and anyone with hub access) to monitor who has voted in person near-real-time. Status Confirmed for networked EPB who-voted monitoring. Soft companion to verified-voting-ess-expresspoll-connect card.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressPoll", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expresspoll/"}, {"title": "DEF CON 25 — ExpressPoll voter data on resold EPB (related readability)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 16 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"]}
{"id": "voatz-markets-blockchain-biometrics-mobile-voting-anywhere", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-17", "uid": "C20260925-235207-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-17", "old_ids": ["voatz-markets-blockchain-biometrics-mobile-voting-anywhere"], "seq": "C00490", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will appeal to President Trump's enthusiasm for cryptocurrency and the public's growing acceptance of blockchain."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Voatz's public marketing explicitly pairs mobile voting with 'hardware-based security, remote identity verification, biometrics and blockchain' and permissioned-blockchain audit narratives—selling crypto/blockchain acceptance as the trust frame for phone voting. Status Confirmed for blockchain/crypto marketing of mobile voting. Specific 'appeal to Trump's love of crypto' is evaluative/Alleged (not required for the leaf's observable blockchain-appeal mechanism).", "sources": [{"title": "Voatz — secure voting anywhere (blockchain marketing)", "url": "https://voatz.com/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/voatz-markets-blockchain-biometrics-mobile-voting-anywhere__voatz-secure-voting-anywhere-blockchain-marketing.png"}, {"title": "Voatz FAQ — permissioned blockchain stores votes", "url": "https://voatz.com/faq/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/voatz-markets-blockchain-biometrics-mobile-voting-anywhere__voatz-faq-permissioned-blockchain-stores-votes.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 9. Soft companion to prior MIT Voatz / NASS / WV pilot cards.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "wa-sos-2024-annual-signature-mismatch-64pct-of-rejected-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-03", "uid": "C20260926-014044-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-03", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-2024-annual-signature-mismatch-64pct-of-rejected-ballots"], "seq": "C00878", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Serves as the gatekeeper against fraudulent ballots entering the system"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington Secretary of State's 2024 Annual Report of Washington State Elections states that 37,812 ballots (0.9% of returned ballots) were rejected in the 2024 General, and that signature mismatches were the leading rejection reason—accounting for 64% of rejections (unsigned 18%, late postmarks 12%, other 6%). WA SOS ballot-status guidance defines 'Signature Does Not Match' as envelope signature not matching any signature on file, with cure outreach. Status Confirmed for official statewide data treating signature comparison as the dominant mail-ballot acceptance gate—peer to MIT Election Data + Science Lab's multi-state finding that signature mismatch is a top absentee rejection reason and to Arizona's ARS §16-550 signature-verification/cure gatekeeper statute; not a fraud adjudication.", "sources": [{"title": "WA SOS — 2024 Annual Report of Washington State Elections (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-01/2024%20Annual%20Elections%20Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-2024-annual-signature-mismatch-64pct-of-rejected-ballots__wa-sos-2024-annual-report-of-washington-state-elections.pdf"}, {"title": "WA SOS — Ballot Status Codes (Signature Does Not Match)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/ballot-status-codes", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-2024-annual-signature-mismatch-64pct-of-rejected-ballots__wa-sos-ballot-status-codes-signature-does-not-match.png"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Election results 2024: Analysis of rejected ballots", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Election_results,_2024:_Analysis_of_rejected_ballots"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Signature Verification > Gatekeeper leaf."}
{"id": "wi-stat-5-905-voting-system-source-code-escrow-and-updates", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-24", "uid": "C20260925-233150-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-24", "old_ids": ["wi-stat-5-905-voting-system-source-code-escrow-and-updates"], "seq": "C00417", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Put the software you want them to see in escrow; they will not know it differs from the software on the voting machines."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Stat. §5.905 requires escrow of electronic voting system source code and related materials/updates with a state-designated agent—again substituting escrow custody for public build-identity of software on each machine. Status Confirmed for Wisconsin's escrow gate. Soft companion to existing WI escrow public-records withhold card (different leaf); this mounts the exact escrow-mismatch Detail leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Legislature — Stat. §5.905", "url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/document/statutes/5.905", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-5-905-voting-system-source-code-escrow-and-updates__wi-stat-5-905-voting-system-source-code-escrow-and-updates__wisconsin-legislature-stat-5-905.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Escrow of Source Codes (comparative escrow regime)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/escrow-source-codes/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-5-905-voting-system-source-code-escrow-and-updates__california-sos-escrow-of-source-codes-comparative-escrow-reg.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "wi-stat-9-01-recount-thoroughly-mix-ballots-break-order", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-14", "uid": "C20260926-021058-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-14", "old_ids": ["wi-stat-9-01-recount-thoroughly-mix-ballots-break-order"], "seq": "C00962", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some recount procedures break the ballot order within batches."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Stat. §9.01(1)(b)5 requires that when ballot and voter counts agree (or excess is noted), the board of canvassers **return all ballots to be counted to the ballot box and turn the ballot box so as to thoroughly mix the ballots** before the recount begins—explicitly destroying any prior batch/time-series order. Status Confirmed statutory recount mixing that breaks ballot order needed for card-level CVR comparison audits; peer to NIST RLA stable mapping need and scan-shuffle-rescan permute cards—WI mix-before-recount statute, not those remounted. PEP framing: mixing for privacy/process fights transparent ballot-level verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Wis. Stat. §9.01(1)(b)5 — thoroughly mix ballots in ballot box before recount begins", "url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/9/01", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-9-01-recount-thoroughly-mix-ballots-break-order__wis-stat-9-01-1-b-5-thoroughly-mix-ballots-in-ballot-box-before-recount-begins.png"}, {"title": "Wis. Stat. §9.01(1)(b)4–5 — recount container open, excess draw, then mix (same chapter)", "url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/9/01/6/a", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-9-01-recount-thoroughly-mix-ballots-break-order__wis-stat-9-01-1-b-45-recount-container-open-excess-draw-then-mix-same-chapter.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on recount procedures breaking ballot batch order leaf."}
{"id": "az-hudson-cvr-reporting-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-29", "uid": "C20260925-155410-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-29", "old_ids": ["az-hudson-cvr-reporting-2024"], "seq": "C00029", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "AZ", "description": "Companion to AZ CVR public-records denials: Hudson v. Heap confirms Cast Vote Records from Maricopa's 2024 election cycle are \"electronic data from ballots\" under A.R.S. §16-625 and may be withheld from public records requesters even after canvass/certification, with protections treated as ongoing rather than election-contest-only. Status Confirmed for the records-access rule affecting independent verification workflows that rely on CVR export.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Court of Appeals — Hudson v. Heap opinion PDF (1 CA-CV 25-0730)", "url": "https://apps.azcourts.gov/aacc/appella/1CA/CV/CV250730.PDF", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023__arizona-court-of-appeals-hudson-v-heap-opinion-pdf-1-ca-cv-2.pdf"}, {"title": "A.R.S. §16-625", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/title-16/section-16-625/"}], "notes": "Operational transparency constraint Confirmed. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Reporting; Records' to 'Records > Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal ma...'."}
{"id": "co-boulder-county-voter-signature-update-form-pathway", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-04", "uid": "C20260926-014044-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-04", "old_ids": ["co-boulder-county-voter-signature-update-form-pathway"], "seq": "C00879", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Initiate \"updated\" signature drives for all registered \"voters,\" then inject fake updated signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado county elections offices (e.g., Boulder County Elections) operate official 'Voter Signature Update' pathways—mailers and online upload forms—explicitly so judges have more reference signatures on file for mail-ballot envelope verification; Boulder instructs voters to photograph multiple wet-ink signatures for attachment to the SCORE voting record. Colorado Election Rule 7.7.14 further requires counties to contact active/preregistered electors ages 17–25 with fewer than two reference signatures in SCORE and request additional signatures (Department list first Wednesday of August; county notices by September 15). Status Confirmed for an official signature-refresh/update architecture feeding the verification file—peer to Washington SOS signature-update forms and Pima County AZ cure/registration-signature update practice; not proof of injected fake signatures.", "sources": [{"title": "Boulder County Elections — Voter Signature Update (mailer + online upload)", "url": "https://bouldercounty.gov/elections/register/voter-signature-update/"}, {"title": "Jefferson County CO — Update Your Signature", "url": "https://www.jeffco.us/5019/Update-Your-Signature", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-boulder-county-voter-signature-update-form-pathway__jefferson-county-co-update-your-signature.png"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Notice of Permanent Adoption, Election Rules (signature update notices / Rule 7)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/files/2025/20251222ElectionsPermAdoptionSB.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-boulder-county-voter-signature-update-form-pathway__colorado-sos-notice-of-permanent-adoption-election-rule.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Initiate updated signature drives leaf."}
{"id": "co-rule-6-9-signature-verification-judge-training-no-fde-competency-exam", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-06", "uid": "C20260926-015040-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-06", "old_ids": ["co-rule-6-9-signature-verification-judge-training-no-fde-competency-exam"], "seq": "C00894", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "There is no testing before a citizen is allowed to verify signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Election Rule 6.9 requires that a signature verification judge 'must successfully complete a training course conducted by the county clerk prior to each election,' using Secretary of State–provided training (county additions need annual SOS approval). The published Rule 6 text does not impose ABFDE/FDE certification or a separate statewide pass/fail forensic competency examination before a citizen/judge may verify mail-ballot signatures; related Rule 6.2 addresses assignment/removal for irregular accept/reject rates after prior work, not a pre-duty FDE exam. Status Confirmed for official training-gated signature verification without mandatory forensic-examiner testing—peer to Florida's certificate-on-completion with additional testing optional and Washington SOS county-responsibility training manuals; not proof of injected ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Election Rule 6 (signature verification judge training 6.9) PDF", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule6.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rule-6-9-signature-verification-judge-training-no-fde-competency-exam__colorado-sos-election-rule-6-signature-verification-jud.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Required Training for Election Judges and Staff", "url": "https://coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/electionJudge/training.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rule-6-9-signature-verification-judge-training-no-fde-competency-exam__colorado-sos-required-training-for-election-judges-and.png"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Signature Verification course portal", "url": "https://coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/electionJudge/courses/SignatureVerification/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rule-6-9-signature-verification-judge-training-no-fde-competency-exam__colorado-sos-signature-verification-course-portal.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on no testing prior to allowing signature verification."}
{"id": "dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-30", "uid": "C20260925-183614-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-30", "old_ids": ["dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance"], "seq": "C00118", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "They randomize CVR data, claiming it is necessary to protect voter privacy."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "CO / Multi-state", "description": "Researchers documenting the \"DVSorder\" vulnerability in Dominion CVR exports note that when jurisdictions release CVRs, privacy guidance often calls for removing identifiers and applying a random shuffle so cast order cannot be reconstructed—explicitly trading time-series auditability for anonymity. Arapahoe County, CO and related Colorado CVR release practices discuss stripping fields to meet anonymity thresholds. Status Confirmed that privacy-motivated randomization/shuffling of CVR order is recommended and practiced, matching the catalog claim that privacy is the stated reason for destroying sequential evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "DVSorder.org — The DVSorder Vulnerability (CVR order / privacy sanitization)", "url": "https://dvsorder.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance__dvsorder-org-the-dvsorder-vulnerability-cvr-order-privacy-sa.png"}, {"title": "Arapahoe County — Statement Regarding the 2020 General Election Cast Vote Record", "url": "https://www.arapahoeco.gov/news_detail_T90_R1078.php"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — An Algorithmic Failure Beneath the Secret Ballot (2026)", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2026/08/03/an-algorithmic-failure-beneath-the-secret-ballot/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance__princeton-citp-an-algorithmic-failure-beneath-the-secret-bal.png"}], "notes": "Part B CVR-randomize leaf. Privacy shuffle Confirmed in research + county practice.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "related": ["co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"]}
{"id": "ess-faq-cellular-modems-installed-as-separate-board", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-28", "uid": "C20260925-185839-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-28", "old_ids": ["ess-faq-cellular-modems-installed-as-separate-board"], "seq": "C00179", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Install wireless cards, modems, and other connectivity (even covertly) without citizens' and election officials' awareness."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ES&S's public FAQ states modems are not present by default in DS200/DS300 poll-place tabulators nationwide, but that in states where cellular transmission of unofficial results after polls close is legally permitted, a separate modem board is installed in those tabulators (with private cellular network service such as Verizon). Tabulator configurations without the modem board lack the application/network architecture for modeming. Status Confirmed that wireless/cellular modem hardware is intentionally installed into some precinct tabulators in permitting jurisdictions—often not obvious to voters without inspection—and used for results connectivity after close.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S FAQs — Are modems installed in poll place tabulators nationwide?", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-faq-cellular-modems-installed-as-separate-board__es-s-faqs-are-modems-installed-in-poll-place-tabulators-nati.png"}, {"title": "Navajo County AZ — ESS Identify Presence of Modem procedure PDF", "url": "https://www.navajocountyaz.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2632/ESS-Identify-Presence-of-Modem", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-faq-cellular-modems-installed-as-separate-board__navajo-county-az-ess-identify-presence-of-modem-procedure-pd.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 13. Installation Confirmed; covert intent Alleged. Cross-leaf: ess-cellular-modem-results-transmission on air-gap linguistic leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "fl-stat-101-657-early-voting-10th-through-3rd-day-before-election", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-13", "uid": "C20260926-022424-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-13", "old_ids": ["fl-stat-101-657-early-voting-10th-through-3rd-day-before-election"], "seq": "C01043", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Statute §101.657 requires supervisors of elections to conduct early voting for elections with state or federal races from the 10th day before Election Day through the 3rd day before Election Day (8–12 hours daily), with optional additional days on the 15th–11th and 2nd day before, and requires site designations reported at least 30 days in advance. Florida DOS early-voting guidance restates the multi-day pre–Election Day window. Status Confirmed large-state statutory early-voting period that extends casting well before Election Day; peer to NCSL early-in-person statutes and multi-state early-voting EMon cards—Florida §101.657 early-voting window, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Senate — §101.657 Early voting", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2025/101.657", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-101-657-early-voting-10th-through-3rd-day-before-election__florida-senate-101-657-early-voting.png"}, {"title": "Florida DOS — Early Voting and Secure Ballot Intake Stations", "url": "https://dos.fl.gov/elections/for-voters/voting/early-voting-and-secure-ballot-intake-stations/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-101-657-early-voting-10th-through-3rd-day-before-election__florida-dos-early-voting-and-secure-ballot-intake-stations.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Early Voting; Election Day leaf. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Early Voting; Election 'Day'' to 'Election \"Day\" > Allowing voting before Election Day allows bad actors to gain necessary infor...'."}
{"id": "ncsl-early-in-person-voting-statutes-before-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-07", "uid": "C20260926-013447-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-07", "old_ids": ["ncsl-early-in-person-voting-statutes-before-election-day"], "seq": "C00866", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL and CEIR early-voting compilations document that a large majority of states authorize in-person early voting or no-excuse absentee/mail return well before Election Day, with opening dates commonly ranging from several weeks to more than a month ahead of the November general (CEIR's 2026 calendar shows some states opening in mid-to-late September). Status Confirmed for the structural Early Voting / Election 'Day' calendar expansion across states—peer to ei-2026-09-015's September 2026 early-open reporting; not a fraud finding. Extended pre-Election Day voting widens the window for real-time turnout modeling before final tabulation; PEP Election Day precinct hand counts compress that feedback surface.", "sources": [{"title": "CEIR — Dates for 2026 early in-person and mail voting", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/dates-for-2026-early-in-person-and-mail-voting/"}, {"title": "NCSL — Early In-Person Voting (state statutes overview)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/early-in-person-voting"}, {"title": "Washington Examiner — States begin September early voting for 2026 midterms", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/congressional/4732384/states-september-early-voting-midterm-elections/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to ei-2026-09-015 (Early Voting; Election 'Day'). Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Early Voting; Election 'Day'' to 'Election \"Day\" > Allowing voting before Election Day allows bad actors to gain necessary infor...'."}
{"id": "sf-dominion-cvr-export-json-format", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-32", "uid": "C20260925-185839-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-32", "old_ids": ["sf-dominion-cvr-export-json-format"], "seq": "C00183", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They publish CVRs in JSON format, making them too complex for the average person to examine."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "CA", "description": "San Francisco Department of Elections publishes Dominion Democracy Suite cast vote records as multi-file JSON exports (CvrExport plus BallotTypeManifest, CandidateManifest, ContestManifest, TabulatorManifest, and related manifests), documented in the city's CVR export format PDF. The schema uses nested Session/Original/Modified/Contest/Mark objects with internal IDs rather than a simple flat spreadsheet of human-readable candidate names—requiring technical parsing to examine. Status Confirmed that CVRs are released as complex JSON (complexity barrier Confirmed; intent to obstruct Alleged).", "sources": [{"title": "SF Elections — Dominion CVR export file format PDF", "url": "https://sfelections.org/results/20250916/data/N24_DSuite_CVRExportFormat.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sf-dominion-cvr-export-json-format__sf-elections-dominion-cvr-export-file-format-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "SF Elections — Election data / datasets downloads", "url": "https://sfelections.org/tools/election_data/datasets.php", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sf-dominion-cvr-export-json-format__sf-elections-election-data-datasets-downloads.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 15. JSON complexity Confirmed.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-06", "uid": "C20260926-015536-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-06", "old_ids": ["usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible"], "seq": "C00909", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "National", "description": "USPS Publication 25 §3-9 requires that for letter-size window envelopes, every character of the delivery address—including any Intelligent Mail barcode, marking, or endorsement—must remain completely visible through the window across the full range of insert movement, with ≥1/8\" clear space to window edges. Election-mail VBM designs commonly use such windows for addresses/barcodes (and Civic Design/county practices use color coding); the visibility rules confirm windows are a standard, USPS-regulated envelope feature that exposes identifying contents of the insert/address block. Soft companion to Colorado Rule 7.2.17's ban on holes that reveal contest target areas. Status Confirmed for official window-visibility standards applicable to barcode/address windows on letter mail including Election Mail designs.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Publication 25 — 3-9 Window Envelope (address/IMb must stay visible)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub25/pub25_ch3_009.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible__usps-publication-25-3-9-window-envelope-address-imb-mus.png"}, {"title": "Civic Design — How to design VBM envelopes for USPS (PDF)", "url": "https://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/VAHworkbook-CCD_VAH-USPSrules.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible__civic-design-how-to-design-vbm-envelopes-for-usps-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Temporary Rule 7.2.17 holes/openings visibility ban (PDF)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/rule_making/files/2024/20240509ElectionsNoticeTempAdoptionSBSJ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible__colorado-sos-temporary-rule-7-2-17-holes-openings-visib.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on envelope colors/holes/windows leaf.", "related": ["az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"]}
{"id": "or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-14", "uid": "C20260925-183614-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-14", "old_ids": ["or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024"], "seq": "C00102", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-2025", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon Secretary of State / DMV disclosed that Oregon Motor Voter (automatic voter registration) errors—largely staff selecting wrong citizenship documents in a new DMV system—sent roughly 1,948 individuals into the voter-registration system without required proof of eligibility; registrations were inactivated, and SOS stated 44 of those records showed a vote cast (investigations later closed; SOS says outcomes unaffected). An independent DAS/ODOT Motor Voter program audit followed with process recommendations. Status Confirmed official motor-voter / AVR roll-error episode distinct from California's 2019 EY duplicate-record audit.", "sources": [{"title": "Oregon SOS — DMV Automatic Voter Registration Error (official FAQ; ~1,948 / 44 voted)", "url": "https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/pages/dmv-automatic-voter-registration-error.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024__oregon-sos-dmv-automatic-voter-registration-error-official-f.png"}, {"title": "Oregon DAS — ODOT Motor Voter Program Audit page", "url": "https://www.oregon.gov/das/pages/odot-motor-voter-audit.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024__oregon-das-odot-motor-voter-program-audit-page.png"}, {"title": "Oregon Capital Chronicle — Oregon resumes AVR after DMV errors pause", "url": "https://oregoncapitalchronicle.com/2025/02/26/oregon-resumes-automatic-voter-registration-paused-for-months-because-of-dmv-errors/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024__oregon-capital-chronicle-oregon-resumes-avr-after-dmv-errors.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich ca-motor-voter leaf. Official OR AVR eligibility-document errors Confirmed. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Motor-Voter Registration' to its new child leaf 'Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in'.", "related": ["pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia"]}
{"id": "apnorc-2024-12-limit-political-news-fatigue-dilute-efforts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-02", "uid": "C20260926-033715-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-02", "old_ids": ["apnorc-2024-12-limit-political-news-fatigue-dilute-efforts"], "seq": "C01227", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens dilute their efforts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-26", "state": "Federal", "description": "AP-NORC (Dec. 5–9, 2024; released Dec. 26) found 65% of U.S. adults felt the need to limit media consumption about government and politics due to information overload, fatigue, or similar reasons (72% of Democrats vs 59% of Republicans)—quantifying distraction that dilutes civic attention/effort across saturating political-news environments. Status Confirmed primary AP-NORC Dec. 2024 political-news-limit/fatigue poll; peer to Pew 2024 and Pew 2020 worn-out election-coverage cards already on this leaf—AP-NORC instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: fatigue that dilutes scrutiny of machine-reported tallies is remedied by precinct hand counts of paper citizens can observe without drowning in coverage volume.", "sources": [{"title": "AP-NORC — Most adults feel the need to limit political news consumption due to fatigue and information overload (Dec. 26, 2024)", "url": "https://apnorc.org/projects/most-adults-feel-the-need-to-limit-political-news-consumption-due-to-fatigue-and-information-overload/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apnorc-2024-12-limit-political-news-fatigue-dilute-efforts__ap-norc-most-adults-feel-the-need-to-limit-political-news-consumption-due-to-fatigue-and-information-overload-dec-26-202.png"}, {"title": "AP-NORC/USAFacts — State of the Facts 2024 topline companion", "url": "https://apnorc.org/projects/state-of-the-facts-2024/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apnorc-2024-12-limit-political-news-fatigue-dilute-efforts__ap-norc-usafacts-state-of-the-facts-2024-topline-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Psych Ops Distracting dilute-efforts leaf (non-Pew)."}
{"id": "uw-madison-2024-midwest-battleground-partisan-media-bubbles-not-listen", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-04", "uid": "C20260926-033715-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-04", "old_ids": ["uw-madison-2024-midwest-battleground-partisan-media-bubbles-not-listen"], "seq": "C01229", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens stop listening to each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-17", "state": "WI / MI / MN", "description": "UW–Madison Center for Communication & Civic Renewal Midwest Battlegrounds Election Survey (YouGov Oct. 17–Nov. 4, 2024; report Dec. 17) found Republicans in WI/MI/MN far more likely than Democrats to consume only same-side political media—20% vs 2% in partisan news bubbles—plus majorities talking politics mainly within their own party, quantifying camps that will not listen to each other. Status Confirmed primary UW–Madison CCCR/YouGov Midwest battleground media-bubble finding; peer to Pew 2021 and Pew 2020 partisan news-bubble cards already on this leaf—UW Midwest instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when camps refuse shared facts about machine tallies, precinct hand counts of paper restore a common observable record.", "sources": [{"title": "UW–Madison SJMC — 2024 Midwest Battleground Survey (partisan media bubbles 20% vs 2%)", "url": "https://sjmc.wisc.edu/news/2024-midwest-battleground-survey-shows-what-divided-partisans-in-key-swing-states/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uw-madison-2024-midwest-battleground-partisan-media-bubbles-not-listen__uw-madison-sjmc-2024-midwest-battleground-survey-partisan-media-bubbles-20-vs-2.png"}, {"title": "CCCR — Understanding 2024 Voters in Midwest Battleground States (PDF report)", "url": "https://cccr.wisc.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/1972/2024/12/2024-CCCR-Report-Understanding-Midwest-Battleground-Voters-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uw-madison-2024-midwest-battleground-partisan-media-bubbles-not-listen__cccr-understanding-2024-voters-in-midwest-battleground-states-pdf-report.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Psych Ops Misinforming will-not-listen leaf (non-Pew)."}
{"id": "doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-into-groups-jan6-review", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-09", "uid": "C20260926-002008-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-09", "old_ids": ["doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-into-groups-jan6-review"], "seq": "C00642", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They insert themselves into existing groups."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ OIG's Dec 12, 2024 review found 26 FBI confidential human sources (CHS) were in Washington on Jan 6 in connection with those events—including sources who had been reporting on groups such as Proud Boys/Oath Keepers beforehand—documenting government informants injecting into / operating inside existing activist groups around an election-certification dispute. OIG found no undercover FBI employees in crowds and no authorization for CHSs to break the law. Status Confirmed for CHS presence inside relevant groups; 'cabal controlled opposition' motive beyond OIG findings Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OIG — FBI CHS / Jan 6 intelligence collection review (news release)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-into-groups-jan6-review__doj-oig-fbi-chs-jan-6-intelligence-collection-review-news-release.png"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — Full report PDF (CHS handling lead-up to Jan 6)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/25-011.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-into-groups-jan6-review__doj-oig-full-report-pdf-chs-handling-lead-up-to-jan-6.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 5. Honest: CHS injection Confirmed; directed-violence entrapment claim not endorsed by OIG."}
{"id": "shasta-ca-2024-supervisors-declare-results-under-duress", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-05", "uid": "C20260927-121124-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-05", "old_ids": ["shasta-ca-2024-supervisors-declare-results-under-duress"], "seq": "C01252", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-10", "state": "CA", "description": "On Dec. 10, 2024 the Shasta County (CA) Board of Supervisors voted 5–0 to declare already-submitted Nov. 2024 general-election results, with Supervisors Crye, Jones, and Kelstrom insisting the declaration be phrased \"under duress\" over constituent concerns about ballot ink overspray (Runbeck) and machine/audit-log issues; Supervisors Garman and Rickert voted to declare without accepting the duress framing. Registrar Tom Toller told the board certification to the SOS had already occurred Dec. 3 under penalty of perjury; county counsel Joseph Lamour advised that \"under duress\" phrasing had no legal effect. Status Confirmed for the public under-duress declare ritual and counsel's no-legal-effect advice (Shasta Scout, Action News Now, KRCR, county release); does not establish that overspray altered outcomes.", "sources": [{"title": "Shasta Scout — Board declares certified results 'under duress' (sort of); counsel: no legal meaning", "url": "https://shastascout.org/shasta-county-board-declares-already-certified-election-results-under-duress-sort-of/"}, {"title": "Action News Now — Shasta supervisors vote to declare 2024 results certified under duress caveat", "url": "https://www.actionnewsnow.com/news/shasta-county-supervisors-vote-to-sign-document-declaring-2024-election-results-for-county-certified/article_44307662-b78c-11ef-bda2-4f7b99e2f565.html"}, {"title": "Shasta County — Board of Supervisors takes action on election concerns (Dec 10, 2024)", "url": "https://www.shastacounty.gov/community/page/board-supervisors-takes-action-election-concerns"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Confirmed ceremonial under-duress declare; legal force of phrase = none per counsel.", "vendor": ["Runbeck"]}
{"id": "ut-olag-2024-20-300-duplicate-voter-ids-200-shared-dl-numbers", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-09", "uid": "C20261016-123449-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-09", "old_ids": ["ut-olag-2024-20-300-duplicate-voter-ids-200-shared-dl-numbers"], "seq": "C01428", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject phantom voter registrations", "Duplicate existing records with plausible deniability (ensure every duplicate can be explained away as a mistake)", "Each duplicate record has its own voter ID number, so a vote can be associated with it. If someone catches the \"duplicate,\" it can be explained as a typo."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-09", "state": "UT", "description": "Utah's Office of the Legislative Auditor General Report No. 2024-20, \"A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System\" (December 2024; presented Dec. 9, 2024), tested the VISTA voter file for people who had \"mistakenly been issued two voter identification (voter ID) numbers.\" It found over 300 potential duplicate records, \"some of which appeared to vote twice in past elections,\" and warned that \"an individual with two active voter ID numbers could potentially vote twice in a single election\" because \"ballots are issued for all voters with active voter IDs.\" It also found about 200 instances of one driver license number shared by apparently different voters. The Salt Lake Tribune reported that three individuals appear to have voted twice in an election as a result. The audit noted that it had raised similar concerns in its 2022 audit, and it also found about 1,400 likely-deceased registrants, two of whom appear to have voted in 2023. The Lieutenant Governor's response cited 300 potential duplicates out of 2,073,844 registered voters. Status Confirmed (legislative audit primary report and Tribune/KSL coverage). Catalog note: under universal mail voting every active voter ID gets a ballot, so a duplicate ID is a duplicate ballot by design until someone catches it. One caught case makes the 'clerical duplicate' explanation available everywhere.", "sources": [{"title": "Utah Office of the Legislative Auditor General — Report No. 2024-20: A Performance Audit of Utah's Election System (Dec. 2024)", "url": "https://le.utah.gov/interim/2024/pdf/00004249.pdf"}, {"title": "Salt Lake Tribune — Dead voters, duplicate records and flawed protocols found in Utah election audit (Dec. 9, 2024)", "url": "https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2024/12/09/dead-voters-duplicate-records/"}, {"title": "KSL — Audit finds 1,400 apparently deceased voters on rolls in Utah, recommends changes (Dec. 2024)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/news/politics/audit-finds-1400-apparently-deceased-voters-on-rolls-in-utah-recommends-changes/51207451"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. 'Three voted twice' figure is from the Tribune, while the report says 'some' appeared to vote twice. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (deceased); Mail ballots double-vote leaf. Distinct from Utah signature/GRAMA cards."}
{"id": "votebeat-2024-maricopa-recorder-heap-partisan-republican-election-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-10", "uid": "C20260926-030239-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-10", "old_ids": ["votebeat-2024-maricopa-recorder-heap-partisan-republican-election-control"], "seq": "C01130", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Arizona clerk and recorder"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-03", "state": "AZ", "description": "Votebeat (Dec. 3, 2024) documents that after the 2024 cycle, Maricopa County's partisan Republican Recorder Justin Heap—alongside newly Republican-aligned Board of Supervisors majorities—assumed control of the split election-administration portfolio (recorder: early voting, registration, provisionals, signature verification; supervisors: Election Day/tabulation), illustrating how Arizona's partisan county recorder office becomes the partisan battleground for election operations when party nomination, not nonpartisan civil service, selects the clerk/recorder. Status Confirmed primary reporting on partisan recorder succession consolidating election authority; peer to AZ Const. Art. XII §3 partisan-recorder structure and Cochise Recorder Stevens cards already on this leaf—Maricopa Heap 2024 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: partisan recorder control of machine/mail operations displaces elector-driven public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — New recorder, supervisors to control elections in Maricopa County (Heap, Dec. 3, 2024)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2024/12/03/new-republican-leaders-maricopa-county-elections-justin-heap-mark-stewart-debbie-lesko-kate-brophy-mcgee/"}, {"title": "Arizona Constitution Art. XII §3 — county officers including recorder (partisan elected structure)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/constitution/arizona/12/3.htm"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Political Parties Make non-partisan positions partisan AZ Clerk and Recorder leaf."}
{"id": "doj-oig-2024-chs-sound-great-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-12", "uid": "C20260926-004030-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-12", "old_ids": ["doj-oig-2024-chs-sound-great-companion"], "seq": "C00765", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They promote themselves to appear credible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ OIG's review of FBI Confidential Human Source handling documents how CHSs are tasked inside groups and must maintain cover identities that appear helpful/committed—institutional confirmation of the 'sound great to gain access' infiltrator posture. Status Confirmed for CHS cover/tasking architecture; any particular election-integrity group targeting Alleged beyond the OIG scope.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OIG — Report on FBI handling of Confidential Human Sources (news release)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — CHS report PDF (25-011)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/reports/25-011.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-groups-discredit-risk-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-14", "uid": "C20260926-002757-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-14", "old_ids": ["doj-oig-2024-fbi-chs-injected-groups-discredit-risk-companion"], "seq": "C00687", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They may lead the group to do something that can later be used to discredit it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ OIG's review of FBI Confidential Human Sources documents CHS use inside domestic groups and the oversight risks when sources operate among activists—creating pathways where groups can be steered into actions later used to discredit them. Soft remount of fill-20h CHS card family onto this discredit pathKey. Status Confirmed for CHS program existence/oversight findings; specific 'cabal bait' narratives beyond OIG findings Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OIG — Report on FBI's Handling of its Confidential Human Sources", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock multi-informant court-document reporting (case illustration)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 7 companion. Soft remount of fill-20h CHS family."}
{"id": "doj-oig-chs-cutouts-unsuspecting-person-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-16", "uid": "C20260926-004030-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-16", "old_ids": ["doj-oig-chs-cutouts-unsuspecting-person-companion"], "seq": "C00769", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They sometimes work through an unsuspecting member of the group so that no one suspects them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-12-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ OIG CHS handling materials and related advocacy-group reviews document that informant operations can involve layered contacts and information from people who are not themselves aware of the full tasking—consistent with cutout / unsuspecting-person pathways. Status Confirmed for institutional CHS layering risk; any specific election-integrity cutout Alleged beyond OIG findings.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OIG — FBI CHS handling report news release", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — Review of FBI investigations of certain domestic advocacy groups", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/reports/review-fbis-investigations-certain-domestic-advocacy-groups-redacted-version"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "berkeley-oakland-ca-youth-school-board-vote-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-29", "uid": "C20260925-194013-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-29", "old_ids": ["berkeley-oakland-ca-youth-school-board-vote-2024"], "seq": "C00213", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Minor voting rights: this lets easily influenced minors, who cannot yet sign a contract or serve on a jury, choose laws, judges, and officials up to the president."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "CA", "description": "Berkeley Measure Y1 (2016) and Oakland Measure QQ (2020) authorized 16- and 17-year-olds to vote in school-board elections; Alameda County first implemented the youth school-board franchise in November 2024 (LA Times / KQED: ~1,500 youth registered across both cities; ~600 voted). Status Confirmed for under-18 school-board voting expansions. No claim here that adolescent voters were manipulated in 2024; that catalog assertion remains unsourced Alleged rhetoric.", "sources": [{"title": "Los Angeles Times — Oakland, Berkeley allow 16-, 17-year-olds to vote for school board", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-08-16/some-california-cities-will-allow-16-and-17-year-olds-to-vote-for-school-board-this-year"}, {"title": "KQED — How Oakland and Berkeley youth turned out after election first", "url": "https://www.kqed.org/news/12028120/election-first-how-oakland-berkeley-youth-turned-out"}, {"title": "Alameda County ROV — Youth Voting", "url": "https://acvote.alamedacountyca.gov/youthvoting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/berkeley-oakland-ca-youth-school-board-vote-2024__alameda-county-rov-youth-voting.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 14. Confirmed school-board youth franchise; no manipulation finding."}
{"id": "carter-tn-2024-wrong-johnson-city-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260925-171133-02", "uid": "C20260925-171133-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-171133-02", "old_ids": ["carter-tn-2024-wrong-johnson-city-ballots"], "seq": "C00069", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "TN", "description": "Carter County, TN, election officials acknowledged that Heather Lane voters (outside Johnson City limits) were given Johnson City municipal ballots in the Nov. 5, 2024 election — documents cited up to 44 affected voters. The error mattered because a city commission seat was decided by a 38-vote margin; results were certified. Status Confirmed for the wrong ballot-style issuance acknowledged by officials; intentional fraud not established by cited reporting.", "sources": [{"title": "WCYB — Carter County voters given wrong ballot", "url": "https://wcyb.com/news/local/carter-county-voters-given-wrong-ballot-potentially-impacting-tight-johnson-city-race", "local": "/archives/2026/09/carter-tn-2024-wrong-johnson-city-ballots__wcyb-carter-county-voters-given-wrong-ballot.png"}, {"title": "WJHL — Tight JC election results certified despite glitch", "url": "https://www.wjhl.com/news/your-local-election-hq/tight-jc-election-results-certified-despite-glitch/"}], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources."}
{"id": "eac-eavs-2024-23m-inactive-registrants-21m-removed-national-baseline", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-10", "uid": "C20261008-203914-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-10", "old_ids": ["eac-eavs-2024-23m-inactive-registrants-21m-removed-national-baseline"], "seq": "C00280", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "US", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report says 234,504,358 people were registered as of November 5, 2024. Of those, 211,144,275 were active and 23,184,185 (about 10.6% nationally) were inactive, meaning they needed NVRA address verification before voting but stayed on the voter lists and in registration totals. Between the 2022 and 2024 registration deadlines, states sent 38,803,086 confirmation notices and removed 21,298,175 records, mainly for moving out of the jurisdiction (about 6.5 million) and death (about 4.6 million). Several states, including Oregon, Wisconsin, Idaho and Wyoming, did not report inactive counts. Oregon told EAC it does not track them, even though its own 2026 directive later found about 800,000 (see the Oregon card on this leaf). Status Confirmed: official federal statistics. This is a national baseline: tens of millions of records are flagged as likely stale in each two-year cycle, and how quickly each state removes them decides how many ballots go to old addresses.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-06/2024_EAVS_Report_508c.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — 2024 EAVS Data Brief: United States (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2026-07/2024_EAVS_Data_Brief_US.pdf"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Aggregate statistics; not proof of any ineligible vote."}
{"id": "la-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-services", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-01", "uid": "C20260925-181533-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-01", "old_ids": ["la-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-services"], "seq": "C00073", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Printing ballots in multiple languages adds complexity (more ballot styles), which is used to push computerized tabulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "CA", "description": "Los Angeles County's official Nov. 2024 presidential election materials state that the full range of election services—including Vote by Mail ballots, Ballot Marking Devices, sample ballots, and translated materials—are available in 19 languages (English plus 18 others). County media kits likewise document hundreds of thousands of voters requesting non-English materials. Status Confirmed for the official multilingual ballot/materials program and scale; whether multilingual styles require computer tabulation is not established by the cited materials—intentional fraud not alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "LA County RR/CC — Election Status Update Nov. 2024 Presidential Election", "url": "https://content.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/documents/election-status-update-1---november-2024-presidential-election-final---10-7-2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-services__la-county-rr-cc-election-status-update-nov-2024-presidential.pdf"}, {"title": "LA County — November 8, 2022 General Election Media Kit (languages)", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/media/Media-Kit_11082022.pdf?v=2", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-2024-multilingual-ballot-services__la-county-november-8-2022-general-election-media-kit-languag.pdf"}], "notes": "Confirmed for multilingual ballot/materials program and scale. Any inference that multilingual styles require computer tabulation is not established by the cited materials; intentional fraud not alleged."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-671-precincts-to-246-vote-centers-centralization-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-09", "uid": "C20260925-211320-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-09", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-671-precincts-to-246-vote-centers-centralization-2024"], "seq": "C00254", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "Under Maricopa's countywide vote-center model, Election Day sites fell from hundreds of precinct polling places (671 in the last precinct-only election cited by AZ Mirror) to on the order of ~246 vote centers in November 2024 — concentrating Election Day in-person voting into far fewer county-run sites with centralized EPB/ballot-on-demand infrastructure. Status Confirmed for the numerical centralization of Election Day locations under the vote-center model (not a proven fraud finding).", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Mirror — Elections Committee backs banning vote centers (671 vs 246 figures)", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2025/01/23/elections-committee-gives-another-go-at-banning-vote-centers-putting-a-1000-voter-cap-on-precincts/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-671-precincts-to-246-vote-centers-centralization-2024__arizona-mirror-elections-committee-backs-banning-vote-center.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 5. Confirmed site consolidation / centralized control surface."}
{"id": "meta-2024-dsa-progress-facebook-vlop-global-moderation-as-media-system", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-02", "uid": "C20260926-023825-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-02", "old_ids": ["meta-2024-dsa-progress-facebook-vlop-global-moderation-as-media-system"], "seq": "C01077", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Create a parallel media system: social media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "Federal / EU", "description": "Meta's Nov. 2024 'Progress Implementing the Digital Services Act' post and companion Facebook DSA transparency/audit implementation reports document Facebook's designation as a Very Large Online Platform under the EU DSA—with global-scale automated detection, human review in 80+ languages, and compliance systems that reshape content visibility worldwide. Status Confirmed primary corporate/regulatory disclosures that social platforms operate as regulated media-like gatekeeping systems, not mere conduits; peer to the 2020 Senate Judiciary CEO hearing and 115th Congress content-filtering hearing cards already on this leaf—DSA VLOP compliance regime, not those remounted. PEP framing: a parallel media system that filters election narratives around machine-reported totals without creating hand-counted public evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "Meta Newsroom — Meta’s Progress Implementing the Digital Services Act (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://about.fb.com/news/2024/11/metas-progress-implementing-the-digital-services-act/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/meta-2024-dsa-progress-facebook-vlop-global-moderation-as-media-system__meta-newsroom-meta-s-progress-implementing-the-digital-services-act-nov-2024.png"}, {"title": "Meta Transparency — Facebook DSA Transparency Report (Apr. 2024 period)", "url": "https://transparency.meta.com/sr/dsa-transparency-report-apr2024-facebook", "local": "/archives/2026/09/meta-2024-dsa-progress-facebook-vlop-global-moderation-as-media-system__meta-transparency-facebook-dsa-transparency-report-apr-2024-period.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Create another media system (social media) leaf."}
{"id": "mo-tx-2024-doj-election-monitors-polling-place-litigation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-08", "uid": "C20260926-013447-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-08", "old_ids": ["mo-tx-2024-doj-election-monitors-polling-place-litigation"], "seq": "C00867", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "MO / TX / Federal", "description": "Ahead of the November 2024 general election, Missouri and Texas sued to block or cabin U.S. Department of Justice election monitors at polling places, arguing state laws restrict who may enter voting locations; AP/Reuters reported Republican-led states refusing or litigating DOJ monitor access while DOJ described monitors as Voting Rights Act / ADA compliance personnel (typically attorneys/staff, not armed ICE/FBI tactical units). Courts largely allowed monitoring to proceed, with Texas reaching arrangements limiting monitors outside some counting areas. Status Confirmed for documented federal-presence-at-polls litigation and state resistance—peer intimidation/armed-presence controversy surface to the 2026 Democratic committees' suit seeking to bar armed federal officers near polls/drop boxes (ei-2026-09-007); careful not to equate DOJ civil-rights monitors with ICE tactical deployments.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Some Republican-led states refuse to let Justice Department monitors into polling places", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/justice-department-election-monitors-republican-states-b432050ce1a28e106394b6cefeb4866c"}, {"title": "Reuters — US Justice Department cleared to send election monitors to Texas, Missouri", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/missouri-sues-block-justice-department-sending-poll-monitors-2024-11-04/"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Why the Justice Department is sending monitors to ensure voting rights in 24 states", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/why-the-justice-department-is-sending-monitors-to-ensure-voting-rights-in-24-states"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to ei-2026-09-007 (Intimidation / federal presence near polls)."}
{"id": "pa-chester-houser-2024-2026-rtkl-mail-ballot-images-lawsuit-records-barrier", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-11", "uid": "C20260926-033715-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-11", "old_ids": ["pa-chester-houser-2024-2026-rtkl-mail-ballot-images-lawsuit-records-barrier"], "seq": "C01236", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Push citizens to the point of filing a lawsuit for records, then claim the records cannot be provided because of the pending lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "PA", "description": "Diane Houser's Right-to-Know Law request for Chester County digital images of absentee/mail-in ballots from recent general elections forced multi-year litigation: PA Office of Open Records ordered disclosure (2024), Common Pleas affirmed (March 2025), and Commonwealth Court affirmed (Feb. 9, 2026) before further Supreme Court activity—illustrating citizens pushed into lawsuit cascades to obtain election records counties resist releasing. Status Confirmed primary OOR/Commonwealth Court procedural record; peer to CA Gov. Code §7927.200 pending-litigation exemption and SC AG FOIA CVR/ballot-image barrier cards already on this leaf—Chester Houser RTKL instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: lawsuit walls around ballot images hide the paper trail public hand counts would make immediately observable.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Commonwealth Court — County of Chester v. Houser (mail-ballot images RTKL; Feb. 9, 2026 opinion PDF)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/449CD25_2-9-26.pdf?cb=1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-chester-houser-2024-2026-rtkl-mail-ballot-images-lawsuit-records-barrier__pa-commonwealth-court-county-of-chester-v-houser-mail-ballot-images-rtkl-feb-9-2026-opinion-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "PA OOR — Houser v. Chester County RTKL docket companion", "url": "https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/Appeals/DocketSheet.cfm?docket=20242456", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-chester-houser-2024-2026-rtkl-mail-ballot-images-lawsuit-records-barrier__pa-oor-houser-v-chester-county-rtkl-docket-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Records push-citizens-to-lawsuit leaf."}
{"id": "reuters-2024-polls-underestimated-trump", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-29", "uid": "C20260925-184601-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-29", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-polls-underestimated-trump"], "seq": "C00147", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "US", "description": "Major post-2024 analyses (e.g., Reuters, PBS NewsHour) again found pre-election polls underestimated Trump's support by roughly a few points nationally, continuing the 2016/2020 pattern. Status Confirmed for repeated directional polling miss; not proof of intentional 'fake polls,' though catalog treats systematically wrong polls as perception operations regardless of intent.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Once again, polls underestimated Trump", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/once-again-polls-underestimated-trump-experts-only-have-hunch-why-2024-11-20/"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — What the polling got right and wrong", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-the-polling-got-right-and-wrong-in-the-presidential-election"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 13. 2024 repeat miss."}
{"id": "va-rla-2024-general", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-36", "uid": "C20260925-155410-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-36", "old_ids": ["va-rla-2024-general"], "seq": "C00036", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11", "state": "VA", "description": "Pursuant to Va. Code §24.2-671.2, Virginia Department of Elections supervised post-November 2024 RLAs: a statewide ballot-polling RLA of the U.S. Senate contest (1,878 ballots across 125 localities) and a batch-comparison RLA of U.S. House District 1 (137,627 ballots across selected batches), both meeting the State Board's 10% risk limit in the first round per ELECT's published summary. Status Confirmed for official RLA conduct and published pass results.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia ELECT — Risk-limiting Audits page", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/resultsreports/election-security/rla/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-rla-2024-general__virginia-elect-risk-limiting-audits-page.png"}], "notes": "Official state RLA documentation."}
{"id": "santa-clara-cvr-locked-excel-barrier-muckrock-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-01", "uid": "C20260926-021058-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-01", "old_ids": ["santa-clara-cvr-locked-excel-barrier-muckrock-2024"], "seq": "C00949", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They print CVRs as PDFs, creating another barrier to examining the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11/2025", "state": "CA", "description": "Santa Clara County Registrar responses to MuckRock CVR requests state that 2022/2024 cast vote records are produced as **locked Excel** documents viewable only in **Read Only** mode (with privacy redactions), not as machine-usable CSV/JSON for public analysis. Status Confirmed locked/non-portable CVR delivery creating an examination barrier peer to CA SOS locked-PDF directive and Alameda locked-PDF release—Santa Clara locked-Excel practice, not those sources remounted. PEP framing: opaque machine exports raise the cost of citizen verification versus transparent hand-marked paper.", "sources": [{"title": "MuckRock — Santa Clara ROV CA CVR Data Request (locked Excel / Read Only delivery)", "url": "https://www.muckrock.com/foi/santa-clara-county-732/ca-cvr-data-request-2022-2024-santa-clara-county-registrar-of-voters-205375/"}, {"title": "Alameda ROV letter noting SOS locked-PDF CVR directive and analysis barriers (context)", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/FW_-Update-on-Cast-Vote-Record-CVR-Production-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/santa-clara-cvr-locked-excel-barrier-muckrock-2024__alameda-rov-letter-noting-sos-locked-pdf-cvr-directive-and-analysis-barriers-c.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on CVR locked-PDF/locked-format barrier leaf."}
{"id": "nc-griffin-v-sboe-266-never-resident-overseas-ballots-2024-2025", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-03", "uid": "C20261009-100620-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-03", "old_ids": ["nc-griffin-v-sboe-266-never-resident-overseas-ballots-2024-2025"], "seq": "C01267", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11/2025-05-07", "state": "NC", "description": "In the 2024 North Carolina Supreme Court Seat 6 contest (Riggs led by 734 votes of about 5.5 million after recounts), Judge Jefferson Griffin protested 266 ballots (267 in some filings, spread over 53 counties) cast by overseas citizens who had never lived in North Carolina and voted under UMOVA, N.C.G.S. 163-258.2(1)(e), using a parent's last NC domicile. He also protested 1,409 Guilford County military/overseas ballots cast without photo ID. On April 4, 2025 the NC Court of Appeals held that never-residents are ineligible in non-federal NC contests because the statute conflicts with the state constitution's residence requirement. On April 11, 2025 the NC Supreme Court (4–2) left that holding in place. On May 5, 2025, U.S. District Judge Richard Myers barred the board from carrying out those orders: retroactively discarding the votes, with no notice or process for voters misclassified as never-residents, would violate due process and equal protection. He ordered certification on the Dec. 10, 2024 tally. Griffin conceded on May 7, 2025. Status Confirmed on court records. Result: the never-resident ballots were counted in 2024 under the rules in force, and the prospective ineligibility for state contests stood. No fraud was alleged or found; the dispute was over eligibility.", "sources": [{"title": "NC Court of Appeals — Griffin v. NC State Bd. of Elections, COA25-181 opinion (Apr. 4, 2025, PDF)", "url": "https://www.nccourts.gov/assets/documents/opinions/25-181-1.pdf"}, {"title": "E.D.N.C. — Civil judgment, Griffin v. NC State Bd. of Elections, 5:24-CV-731-M (May 5, 2025, PDF)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/griffin-myers-050525.pdf"}, {"title": "Riggs PI motion (E.D.N.C. Doc. 40) — 1,409 no-ID and 266 never-resident ballots (Apr. 11, 2025, PDF)", "url": "https://electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/Riggs-pi-motion.pdf"}, {"title": "Carolina Journal — Elections board prepares for review of 1,675 ballots (266 never-residents in 53 counties)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/elections-board-prepares-for-review-of-1675-ballots-in-griffin-riggs-dispute/"}, {"title": "AP — Republican concedes long-unsettled NC court election (May 7, 2025)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/north-carolina-supreme-court-election-appeal-b227a456e5ca04bc42bf6075af46028c"}], "notes": "Outcome: Griffin conceded 2025-05-07 and did not appeal. Never-resident category: 266 (SBE) / 267 (Myers, Jan.). Follow-on all-contest ban: see nc-rnc-kivett-v-sboe-never-residents-barred-all-contests-2026-06-09."}
{"id": "ri-rla-2024-general-sample", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-05", "uid": "C20260925-183614-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-05", "old_ids": ["ri-rla-2024-general-sample"], "seq": "C00093", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "\"Risk-limiting audits\" and \"partial manual counts\" are used to justify auditing only a small portion, convincing the public the rest of the tabulation is accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-21", "state": "RI", "description": "Rhode Island Board of Elections completed risk-limiting audits of the Nov. 5, 2024 General Election on Nov. 21, 2024, publishing ballot manifests, selected batch/ballot retrieval lists, tally sheets, and reports for a Presidential batch-comparison RLA and a State Representative 28 ballot-polling RLA—both at a 9% risk limit. By design, only randomly selected batches/ballots are hand-examined unless the risk limit forces expansion. Status Confirmed RI RLA is a partial-sample audit. Contrast with PEP full hand count of every ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Rhode Island Board of Elections — Risk Limiting Audit Center (2024 General)", "url": "https://elections.ri.gov/elections/risk-limiting-audit-center", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ri-rla-2024-general-sample__rhode-island-board-of-elections-risk-limiting-audit-center-2.png"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — RI RLA APA hearing testimony (9% risk limit; sample methods)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024-05-07-RLA-APA-Hearing-Testimony-Final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ri-rla-2024-general-sample__verified-voting-ri-rla-apa-hearing-testimony-9-risk-limit-sa.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich co-nist-rla leaf."}
{"id": "alameda-rov-first-locked-pdf-cvr-release-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-13", "uid": "C20260925-194013-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-13", "old_ids": ["alameda-rov-first-locked-pdf-cvr-release-2024"], "seq": "C00197", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They print CVRs as PDFs, creating another barrier to examining the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-06", "state": "CA", "description": "Following the SOS locked-PDF directive, Alameda County ROV stated it would release the first secured, locked PDF CVR for the Nov 5, 2024 general election on Nov 6 upon request, explicitly declining JSON despite Dominion/IT capability to generate analyst-friendly formats. Status Confirmed for county implementation of PDF-only CVR release as the public access path.", "sources": [{"title": "Alameda ROV board email — first secured locked PDF CVR on Nov 6, 2024", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/FW_-Update-on-Cast-Vote-Record-CVR-Production-1.pdf"}, {"title": "Oaklandside-hosted CCROV SB 1328 / CVR overview packet", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/CCROV-SB1328.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/alameda-rov-first-locked-pdf-cvr-release-2024__oaklandside-hosted-ccrov-sb-1328-cvr-overview-packet.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 5. County PDF CVR release Confirmed.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "az-navajo-county-2024-election-day-bomb-threats", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-10", "uid": "C20260926-013447-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-10", "old_ids": ["az-navajo-county-2024-election-day-bomb-threats"], "seq": "C00869", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Election Day 2024, Navajo County, Arizona was among jurisdictions that received hoax bomb threats to polling locations alongside Georgia, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania clusters; FBI and major-wire reporting stated none of the threats was found credible and no devices were located, while multiple outlets specifically noted Arizona/Navajo County among the targeted counties. Status Confirmed for a documented Arizona Election Day bomb-threat cluster distinct from the Fulton County, Georgia extensions card and from the nationwide CRM tracker summary—illustrates CoC/operations distraction via threats across jurisdictions. Not evidence that any ballot totals were altered.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Hoax bomb threats linked to Russia target polling places in battleground states (incl. Arizona)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fake-bomb-threats-linked-russia-briefly-close-georgia-polling-locations-2024-11-05/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Hoax bomb threats made to dozens of polling locations in swing states", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/hoax-bomb-threats-made-dozens-polling-locations-swing-states-rcna178889"}, {"title": "FBI — Statement on Bomb Threats to Polling Locations", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-navajo-county-2024-election-day-bomb-threats__fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on Bomb threats CoC distraction leaf (AZ Navajo distinct from Fulton/CRM summary)."}
{"id": "fulton-ga-2024-bomb-threats-poll-extensions", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-12", "uid": "C20260925-183614-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-12", "old_ids": ["fulton-ga-2024-bomb-threats-poll-extensions"], "seq": "C00100", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "GA", "description": "On Election Day 2024, hoax bomb threats disrupted multiple Fulton County, Georgia polling places; PBS and Reuters reported brief closures and voting-hours extensions at five Fulton sites (about 10–45 minutes). FBI public statements addressed multi-state polling-location bomb threats the same day, noting many emails appeared linked to Russian domains and none of the threats reviewed were deemed credible bombs. Status Confirmed concrete county-level disruption and official response—distinct jurisdiction detail under the Bomb threats leaf (alongside the multi-state CRM tracker card).", "sources": [{"title": "PBS NewsHour — Voting hours extended at five Fulton County polling places after bomb threats", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/voting-hours-extended-at-five-polling-places-in-georgias-fulton-county-disrupted-by-bomb-threats"}, {"title": "Reuters — Hoax bomb threats linked to Russia target battleground polling places", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/fake-bomb-threats-linked-russia-briefly-close-georgia-polling-locations-2024-11-05/"}, {"title": "FBI — Statement on Bomb Threats to Polling Locations (Nov. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fulton-ga-2024-bomb-threats-poll-extensions__fbi-statement-on-bomb-threats-to-polling-locations-nov-5-202.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich crm-2024 bomb threats leaf with concrete Fulton instance."}
{"id": "md-2024-295-provisionals-rejected-voted-absentee-already-voted", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-16", "uid": "C20261009-105430-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-16", "old_ids": ["md-2024-295-provisionals-rejected-voted-absentee-already-voted"], "seq": "C01349", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "MD", "description": "Maryland's official 2024 general-election provisional voting report lists 35,573 provisional ballots, with 8,903 rejected in full. 295 (3.3% of rejections) were rejected because the 'applicant returned a voted absentee ballot or already voted.' Maryland requires absentee requesters to vote provisionally at the polls, and the canvass checks provisionals against returned mail ballots. Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "Maryland State Board of Elections — Official Provisional Voting, 2024 General (PDF)", "url": "https://elections.maryland.gov/press_room/2024_stats/Official%20Provisional%20Voting.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view (cross-check worked)."}
{"id": "ncsl-contest-deadlines-five-day-states-az-ga-ks-mt-tn-wy", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-18", "uid": "C20260925-205354-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-18", "old_ids": ["ncsl-contest-deadlines-five-day-states-az-ga-ks-mt-tn-wy"], "seq": "C00233", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests", "Impose an unreasonably short period to file a contest, ensuring there is not enough time to investigate the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's Contested Election Deadlines table documents multiple states with five-day (or shorter) statutory windows to initiate an election contest after canvass/certification/recount — including Arizona (5 days after canvass/certification), Georgia (5 days after consolidation), Kansas (5 days after certificate), Montana (5 days after certification), Tennessee (5 days after certification for most offices), South Carolina (≤5 days after canvass for many offices), and Wyoming presidential electors (5 days). Status Confirmed for the existence of extremely short statutory contest-initiation deadlines that leave little calendar time for forensic investigation before filing.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Contested Election Deadlines", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/contested-election-deadlines"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 9. Short statutory windows Confirmed."}
{"id": "newsweek-2024-political-sign-warfare-targeted-removal-19-states", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-05", "uid": "C20260926-000809-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-05", "old_ids": ["newsweek-2024-political-sign-warfare-targeted-removal-19-states"], "seq": "C00558", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Targeted removal"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Newsweek (Nov 2024) reports political yard-sign theft/vandalism across at least 19 states ahead of Election Day—documented 'targeted removal' of visible support (flags/signs) that suppresses displayed backing. Experts quoted frame such acts as low-cost intimidation/silencing. Status Confirmed that targeted removal of political signs occurs at scale; does not prove coordinated national cabal.", "sources": [{"title": "Newsweek — Political 'sign warfare' / targeted removal nationwide (2024)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/political-sign-warfare-heats-nationwide-election-day-nears-1976090"}, {"title": "FindLaw — Theft/vandalism of political signs illegal in all 50 states", "url": "https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/law-and-life/is-it-illegal-to-steal-or-vandalize-political-signs/"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 3."}
{"id": "sherburne-mn-2024-enr-test-data-inflated-totals-aggregation-hidden", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-02", "uid": "C20260926-034259-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-02", "old_ids": ["sherburne-mn-2024-enr-test-data-inflated-totals-aggregation-hidden"], "seq": "C01242", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Totals can be changed and hidden inside aggregation without the public being able to detect it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "MN", "description": "Sherburne County, Minnesota (Nov. 2024) publicly explained that an improperly cleared/damaged memory card failed to upload some processed mail-ballot totals to the Secretary of State's Election Reporting System and simultaneously transmitted generic pre-election 'test' data—producing inflated unofficial statewide-aggregated totals that later decreased once corrected; election-night correction attempts failed and wrong numbers remained visible until staff compared local summary tapes to the state site. Status Confirmed primary county/MinnPost documentation that public aggregation displayed wrong totals the public could not independently detect from the ENR page alone. Peer to CISA Election Results Reporting risks and NIST ENR use-case cards already on this leaf—Sherburne 2024 real-world ENR instance, not those guidance remounts. PEP framing: precinct hand counts of paper citizens can watch make night-reporting aggregation errors visible at the table rather than hidden inside state ENR uploads.", "sources": [{"title": "MinnPost — Vote-count reporting errors in Scott, Sherburne (Nov. 13, 2024)", "url": "https://www.minnpost.com/elections/2024/11/vote-count-reporting-errors-in-scott-sherburne-unfortunate-but-can-happen-says-elections-systems-expert/"}, {"title": "Elk River Star News — Sherburne County plans hand recounts / ENR test-data statement", "url": "https://www.hometownsource.com/elk_river_star_news/sherburne-county-plans-hand-recounts-of-select-election-races/article_477dcf1a-9efd-11ef-9bf1-3b51aa7fa06d.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Reporting totals-hidden-inside-aggregation leaf (non-CISA/NIST remount)."}
{"id": "usatoday-2024-pa-32-counties-election-day-bomb-threats-coc", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-13", "uid": "C20260926-032103-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-13", "old_ids": ["usatoday-2024-pa-32-counties-election-day-bomb-threats-coc"], "seq": "C01193", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05", "state": "PA", "description": "USA TODAY Network reported that Pennsylvania State Police listed at least 32 counties receiving Election Day 2024 emailed bomb threats targeting polling places, election offices, and government buildings—prompting evacuations (Chester County dogsweep), court-ordered ballot-drop-off extensions (Clearfield), and postponed canvassing (Perry) while other counties continued without stopping after deeming threats hoaxes. Parallel NBC reporting documented multi-state hoax threats (GA/PA/AZ/WI/MI; ≥50 sites) with FBI stating many GA/WI/MI/AZ emails appeared to originate from Russian domains. Status Confirmed primary USA TODAY/PSP 32-county PA bomb-threat disruption of Election Day custody operations; peer to Fulton GA and Navajo AZ 2024 bomb-threat cards already on this leaf—PA statewide 32-county instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: bomb-threat distractions create sleight-of-hand windows in chain of custody that public continuous hand-count observation is designed to resist.", "sources": [{"title": "USA TODAY Network — At least 32 Pa. counties got bomb threats on Election Day (Nov. 7, 2024)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/state/2024/11/07/pa-bomb-threats-election-day/76109630007/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Hoax bomb threats made to dozens of polling locations in swing states (Nov. 5, 2024 companion)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/hoax-bomb-threats-made-dozens-polling-locations-swing-states-rcna178889"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Chain of Custody Bomb threats leaf."}
{"id": "crm-2024-election-day-bomb-threats", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-06", "uid": "C20260925-181533-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-06", "old_ids": ["crm-2024-election-day-bomb-threats"], "seq": "C00078", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05 to 2024-11-08", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Civic Result Maps' 2024 Election Security Incident Explorer (Brennan Center bomb-threat tracker plus supporting citations) records clusters of Election Day / post-Election Day bomb threats that disrupted election facilities in multiple states. High-signal examples include Fulton County, GA (Brennan tracker attributes 32 threats; county minutes document temporary evacuations and extended hours at multiple polling places), Minnesota (Secretary of State confirmed emailed threats to election offices in more than half of counties beginning Nov. 8; tracker lists 47 statewide), Philadelphia, PA (court record naming six polling locations; one address received a court-ordered voting extension), and additional county-level reports in AZ, WI, MD, OR, and elsewhere. Status Confirmed for the occurrence of documented threats and facility disruptions in cited jurisdictions; not labeled as coordinated intentional election fraud, and CRM notes the corpus is not an official FBI roster and may not be exhaustive. Maps to Chain of Custody / Bomb threats (distraction-disruption pathway).", "sources": [{"title": "Civic Result Maps — 2024 Election Security Incident Explorer", "url": "https://www.civicresultmaps.org/security"}, {"title": "EDS CRM row — Fulton GA 32 bomb threats / evacuations (2024-11-05)", "url": "https://www.civicresultmaps.org/security"}, {"title": "EDS CRM row — Minnesota statewide emailed bomb threats (2024-11-08)", "url": "https://www.civicresultmaps.org/security"}], "notes": "EDS civic-result-maps-security + Brennan tracker. Confirmed threats/disruption; attribution of strategic CoC sleight-of-hand motive not established."}
{"id": "tx-dallas-2024-general-early-vote-tapes-exceed-central-count-retabulation-discrepancies-remain", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-04", "uid": "C20261109-122834-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-04", "old_ids": ["tx-dallas-2024-general-early-vote-tapes-exceed-central-count-retabulation-discrepancies-remain"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05 (election); 2024-11-11 (emergency petition); 2024-11-13 (re-tabulation order)", "state": "TX", "description": "After the Nov. 5, 2024 general election, Dallas County Elections Administrator Heider Garcia filed an emergency petition (dated Nov. 11) asking a district court to open sealed ballot boxes, stating that tapes from the tabulators at three early-voting vote centers 'showed significantly more ballots recorded than the numbers of ballots tabulated at the central counting station' and differed from the electronic poll-book voter counts, and that the differences 'may have been caused by human error in handling ballots during tabulation at the central counting station.' The Dallas Express reported the initial gaps as 329 ballots at Northway Christian Church, 144 at Disciple Central Community Church and about 115 at Ministerios Charisma, and that 19 of 71 early-voting locations showed discrepancies. Judge Tonya Parker of the 116th District Court ordered the re-tabulation on Nov. 13; after two re-scans, Northway's gap moved to -2 and Charisma's to 18, while Disciple's grew to 193, still beyond the three-ballot threshold that triggers a paper-ballot count under Texas law. Status Confirmed by the elections administrator's own court filing; the re-tabulation results are as reported by The Dallas Express. Catalog point: the same ballots produced different totals at the polling-place tabulator and at the high-speed central count, and re-scanning made one site's gap larger — counting by machine gave no single trustworthy number until people went back to the paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Dallas County Elections Administrator Heider Garcia — Emergency petition to open locked ballot boxes to re-tabulate ballots for three vote centers (Nov. 11, 2024; copy hosted by The Dallas Express)", "url": "https://dallasexpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Emergency-Petition-re-Garcia_final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/dallas-garcia-emergency-petition-retabulate-2024-11.pdf"}, {"title": "The Dallas Express — Dallas County election re-tabulation raises more integrity questions (Kellen McGovern Jones, Nov. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://dallasexpress.com/city/dallas-county-election-re-tabulation-raises-more-integrity-questions/"}, {"title": "The Dallas Express — Vote count irregularity prompts emergency response from Heider Garcia (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://dallasexpress.com/city/vote-count-irregularity-prompts-emergency-response-from-heider-garcia/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-09 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET). Petition PDF archived (curl 200). Dallas Express articles read via WebFetch; curl archive timed out, linked only. KERA follow-up (Dec. 1, 2024) on a vendor being blamed could not be read (URL now redirects), so no vendor tag is set. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nv-2024-question-3-article-iv-18m-unite-america-9-6m-rcv-measure-defeated", "permanent_id": "C20261026-123214-04", "uid": "C20261026-123214-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-123214-04", "old_ids": ["nv-2024-question-3-article-iv-18m-unite-america-9-6m-rcv-measure-defeated"], "seq": "C01564", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "Tides Foundation and Unite America"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05 (Question 3 defeated); 2025-01-23 (funding report)", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada Question 3, which would have replaced party primaries with a top-five open primary and ranked-choice general elections, passed in 2022 but failed its required second vote in November 2024, with more than 53 percent of voters opposed. The Nevada Independent reported on Jan. 23, 2025, from campaign filings, that the top donor to the Vote Yes on 3 campaign was Article IV, a Virginia-based group that gave more than $18 million and whose donors are not disclosed, and that the other significant pro-Question 3 donor was Unite America, which gave $9.6 million. Unite America declined an interview and defended its involvement in similar ballot initiatives across the country. The paper noted that Katherine Gehl, whose Final-Five Voting concept was the model for the measure, is a former Unite America board member, and that the backers had raised more than $22 million in the 2022 cycle. Status Confirmed: contributions as reported from campaign filings by a news outlet. Catalog point: a change to how a state counts its votes was bankrolled almost entirely from outside the state, largely by a group whose own donors are hidden. Voters rejected it the second time. Single-choice paper ballots, hand counted in public at each precinct, need no centralized RCV tabulation software.", "sources": [{"title": "The Nevada Independent — Dark money dominated donations to Nevada's ranked-choice voting, abortion ballot questions (Jan. 23, 2025)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/dark-money-dominated-donations-to-nevadas-ranked-choice-voting-abortion-ballot-questions"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Nevada Question 3, Top-Five Ranked-Choice Voting Initiative (2024) (bot challenge to curl 2026-10-26, URL retained)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Question_3,_Top-Five_Ranked-Choice_Voting_Initiative_(2024)"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-26 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer on the Tides/Unite America leaf. Nevada Independent curl 200; Ballotpedia 202 bot challenge, figures confirmed via WebSearch extract (Article IV $18.38M, Unite America $9.62M)."}
{"id": "pa-cambria-2024-general-ballots-printed-without-timing-marks-scanners-could-not-read-hand-count", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-05", "uid": "C20261109-122834-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-05", "old_ids": ["pa-cambria-2024-general-ballots-printed-without-timing-marks-scanners-could-not-read-hand-count"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-05 (Election Day); 2025-01-30 (county investigation findings)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 5, 2024, precinct scanners across Cambria County, Pennsylvania, could not read the hand-marked paper ballots because the timing marks around the ballot edge were misprinted, so the scanners could not locate the ovals. Voters dropped their ballots into emergency back-up boxes until replacement ballots reached every precinct after 1 p.m.; a court extended voting to 10 p.m.; the emergency-box ballots were kept segregated, carried to the central office by deputy sheriffs under chain-of-custody logs, and counted by hand by teams observed by both parties because the county lacked enough properly printed ballots to duplicate them (WITF). County commissioners first suggested a voting-machine software problem; Election Systems & Software (ES&S), the county's voting-system vendor, said it was not a machine or ES&S issue but a ballot-printing issue. On Jan. 30, 2025, after an investigation aided by the Department of State, county officials said a former elections staff member had sent an incorrect general-election ballot file for printing that lacked the required 'Time in Security' marks, that the error was not malicious, and that they would add training, a pre-print checklist and requests for vendor logs (WJAC). Status Confirmed by Cambria County officials and the vendor statement, reported by WITF and WJAC. Catalog point: one file error disabled every precinct scanner in the county on Election Day; what saved the count was the hand-marked paper ballot and an observed hand count.", "sources": [{"title": "WITF — Cambria County extends voting hours, results may be delayed (Jordan Wilkie, Nov. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2024/11/05/cambria-county-extends-voting-hours-results-may-be-delayed/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/witf-cambria-printing-error-extended-hours-2024-11-05.html"}, {"title": "WJAC — Officials: Printing error caused ballot, voting issues in Cambria Co. on Election Day (Jan. 30, 2025)", "url": "https://wjactv.com/news/local/officials-printing-error-caused-ballot-voting-issues-cambria-county-election-day-elections-department-state-pennsylvania-investigation", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wjac-cambria-printing-error-tis-marks-2025-01-30.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-09 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET). WITF and WJAC archived (curl 200). Vendor tag ES&S because WITF names ES&S as the county's voting-system vendor and quotes its spokesperson; the vendor denied fault and the county attributed the error to its own staff. Distinct from the 2026 Cambria poll-book card. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "nyt-2024-yard-signs-disappear-airtag-doorbell-visible-support", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-02", "uid": "C20260926-002008-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-02", "old_ids": ["nyt-2024-yard-signs-disappear-airtag-doorbell-visible-support"], "seq": "C00635", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Suppressing visible support (flags, signs, stickers) makes it appear that one side has less backing than it actually does."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-03", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NYT's Nov 3, 2024 reporting on disappearing yard signs—and homeowners using AirTags/doorbell cameras to recover them—confirms that visible-support suppression via sign theft remained a live election-season phenomenon in 2024, again thinning the public landscape of flags/signs/stickers that shapes perceived backing. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT — As Election Day Nears, Yard Signs Disappear (2024)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/11/03/nyregion/political-yard-sign-stealing.html"}, {"title": "Reuters — Lawn-sign wars: trackers/cameras to deter political theft (2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/lawn-sign-wars-us-voters-use-trackers-cameras-deter-political-theft-2024-10-30/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "cleveland-clinic-2024-electsomnia-election-stress-emotional-drain", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-02", "uid": "C20260926-031602-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-02", "old_ids": ["cleveland-clinic-2024-electsomnia-election-stress-emotional-drain"], "seq": "C01167", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens are drained emotionally."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Cleveland Clinic sleep psychologists (Michelle Drerup, PsyD) publicly documented 'electsomnia'—election-triggered insomnia and nighttime rumination over candidates, voting process, and results—recurring from the prior cycle into 2024, with clinical guidance to limit social-media bombardment that drains sleep and emotional bandwidth. Contemporaneous WKYC/local reporting amplified the same electsomnia framing as a population-level election-stress drain. Status Confirmed primary Cleveland Clinic clinical framing of election-season emotional/sleep drain; peer to APA 2020 election-stress and APA 2024 Stress in America cards already on this leaf—Cleveland Clinic electsomnia instance, not those APA remounts. PEP framing: sustained emotional drain from machine-era election spectacle crowds out citizen capacity for calm public observation of hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Cleveland Clinic Newsroom — Do you Have Electsomnia? (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://newsroom.clevelandclinic.org/2024/11/01/do-you-have-electsomnia", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cleveland-clinic-2024-electsomnia-election-stress-emotional-drain__cleveland-clinic-electsomnia-election-stress.png"}, {"title": "WKYC — Can stress over elections affect sleep? (Cleveland Clinic electsomnia companion)", "url": "https://www.wkyc.com/article/news/politics/elections/election-stress-can-affect-your-sleep/95-d7eda03e-2e89-404b-8ef8-8acd7076df67"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Psychological Operations Distracting the public will drain them emotionally leaf."}
{"id": "pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-15", "uid": "C20261028-132233-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-15", "old_ids": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter"], "seq": "C01610", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Covertly link \"secret\" ballots back to voters through serialization and tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-11 to 2026-06-16", "state": "PA", "description": "In Delaware County v. Mancini (Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, CV-2025-010541, a Right-to-Know Law appeal), the county's Director of Elections, James Allen, stated in an affidavit executed Sept. 29, 2025, that in the November 2024 general election \"the County's absentee ballots included a barcode as a security feature to ensure that no ballot could be scanned or counted more than once. While this barcode does not display the voter's identification number, it does encode a unique number that could be exploited to compromise ballot secrecy.\" [1] He continued: \"If that number were publicly recorded and matched against other available election data, the ballot could be linked back to an individual voter. Specifically, cross-referencing the barcode with public information from the SURE system, including the Statewide Mail Ballot File (which provides point-in-time data), ballot-tracking information generated through BlueCrest software integrated with SURE, and envelope images reflecting receipt and processing dates, could allow a third party to infer the identity of the voter who cast a particular ballot.\" [1] He added that \"the risk is heightened in smaller precincts or where only a handful of ballots are processed in the final batches on election night,\" or in the days after, as voters verify their IDs within the six days the law allows, because it \"becomes easier to deduce who cast specific ballots based on the timing of their arrival through the mail or at a drop box.\" [1] Allen gave this as a reason to deny Robert Mancini an \"official copy\" of the roughly 89,000 November 2024 absentee ballots, while allowing him to inspect them in person without photographing, copying, or taking notes on their contents. [1] In a declaration dated Dec. 17, 2025, Pennsylvania Department of State Agency Open Records Officer Janelle S. Hawthorne stated that the barcode coding information for the barcodes printed on mail-in and absentee ballots and secrecy envelopes \"would be on file with the counties\" and that \"The Department does not have any records concerning the information that may be contained in the barcodes as requested.\" [2] Both documents are Exhibits A and B to Mancini's pro se Application for Emergency Relief Seeking a Preliminary Injunction (served April 2, 2026), which asks the court to stop the use of ballots with barcodes. The claim that the barcodes violate Article 7, Section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (\"secrecy in voting be preserved\") and 25 P.S. §§ 3031.7 and 3063 is Mancini's own argument in that filing, not a court finding; the filing contains no ruling. [3] Broad + Liberty reported on June 16, 2026, that Judge John J. Whelan had stayed the case and that Mancini sought to lift the stay after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Honey v. Lycoming ruling; it quoted Allen: \"We are not allowed to compare mailing files with voted ballots, and we cannot and will not allow anyone else to do so, either,\" and reported Mancini's view that officials could identify party and \"selectively discard unwanted ballots.\" [4] The affidavit says the number could be exploited; it does not say anyone did. Status Confirmed for what it states: the county's own Director of Elections swore that the barcode on its November 2024 absentee ballots encodes a unique number that, matched with SURE, BlueCrest tracking, and envelope-image data, could let a third party link a ballot to the voter who cast it.", "sources": [{"title": "Exhibit A — Affidavit of James Allen, Director of Elections, County of Delaware Board of Elections, ¶ 7(a) and ¶ 8 (executed Sept. 29, 2025), filed in Delaware County v. Mancini, CV-2025-010541 (archived PDF pp. 9–12)", "url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28232265-cv-2025-010541-delco-v-mancini-injunction-3/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter__delaware-county-v-mancini-cv-2025-010541-application-exhibits-a-b-2026-04-02.pdf"}, {"title": "Exhibit B — Declaration of Janelle S. Hawthorne, Agency Open Records Officer, Pennsylvania Department of State, ¶ 8 (Dec. 17, 2025), in the same filing (archived PDF pp. 13–16)", "url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28232265-cv-2025-010541-delco-v-mancini-injunction-3/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter__delaware-county-v-mancini-cv-2025-010541-application-exhibits-a-b-2026-04-02.pdf"}, {"title": "Robert Mancini (pro se) — Application for Emergency Relief Seeking a Preliminary Injunction, Delaware County v. Mancini, CV-2025-010541, Delaware County Court of Common Pleas (served April 2, 2026; 16 pages with Exhibits A and B; no ruling in the filing)", "url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28232265-cv-2025-010541-delco-v-mancini-injunction-3/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter__delaware-county-v-mancini-cv-2025-010541-application-exhibits-a-b-2026-04-02.pdf"}, {"title": "Broad + Liberty (Linda Stein) — Media resident demands ballot barcode data; Delco says he is not entitled to it (June 16, 2026)", "url": "https://broadandliberty.com/2026/06/16/media-resident-demands-ballot-barcode-data-delco-says-hes-not-entitled-to-it/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter__broad-and-liberty-2026-06-16.html"}, {"title": "DocumentCloud — Delaware County v. Mancini, CV-2025-010541, injunction filing with affidavits (linked by Broad + Liberty; returns 403 to automated fetch; same filing as the archived PDF)", "url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28232265-cv-2025-010541-delco-v-mancini-injunction-3/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail). Rewritten 2026-10-28 (Mark t486u): the primary affidavit (Exhibit A) and declaration (Exhibit B) were read on 2026-10-28 from the filing supplied by Mark (PDF archived with this card); quotes match the filing. Label changed from Partially confirmed to Confirmed for what the affidavit states. Broad + Liberty, and Mancini's application (¶ 14), quote the affidavit as \"compromise ballot security\"; the affidavit itself says \"ballot secrecy.\" The \"We are not allowed to compare mailing files\" quote is from Broad + Liberty and is not in Exhibit A. Vendor tag BlueCrest (named in the affidavit as the ballot-tracking software integrated with SURE; Mark t485u).", "vendor": ["BlueCrest"], "related": ["pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games", "hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy", "colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy"]}
{"id": "bright-line-watch-2024-10-partisan-election-confidence-fuel-division", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-09", "uid": "C20260926-033041-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-09", "old_ids": ["bright-line-watch-2024-10-partisan-election-confidence-fuel-division"], "seq": "C01219", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fuel division instead of unity on fair elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Bright Line Watch's Sept. 25–Oct. 8, 2024 public survey (n=2750) found Democrats 94%/94%/87% confident in own/state/national vote counts versus Republicans 80%/80%/57% nationally—and 80% of Republicans endorsed the false claim that Democrats are trying to win by giving unauthorized immigrants the vote—quantifying partisan division over election fairness rather than shared demand for transparent counting. Status Confirmed primary Bright Line Watch Oct. 2024 survey; peer to Pew 2024 partisan election-security split and Gallup 2024 integrity-split cards already on this leaf—Bright Line Watch instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: party-fueled division over machine-reported legitimacy is what public hand counts of paper are designed to collapse into shared observation.", "sources": [{"title": "Bright Line Watch — America Confronts the State of Its Politics in 2024 (Oct. 2024 survey)", "url": "https://brightlinewatch.org/america-confronts-the-state-of-its-politics-in-2024/"}, {"title": "Bright Line Watch — Wave 7 YouGov codebook (Sept. 25–Oct. 7, 2024 companion)", "url": "http://brightlinewatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/DART0049_W7_codebook.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/bright-line-watch-2024-10-partisan-election-confidence-fuel-division__bright-line-watch-wave-7-yougov-codebook-sept-25-oct-7-2024-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Political Parties Fuel further division leaf (non-Pew/Gallup)."}
{"id": "co-sos-2024-bios-passwords-hidden-spreadsheet-tab-posted-34-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261005-123049-04", "uid": "C20261005-123049-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-123049-04", "old_ids": ["co-sos-2024-bios-passwords-hidden-spreadsheet-tab-posted-34-counties"], "seq": "C01328", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "CO", "description": "The Colorado Department of State confirmed that a voting-system inventory spreadsheet posted on its public website from June 21 to October 24, 2024 contained BIOS passwords for Dominion tabulation equipment in a hidden tab, affecting 34 of Colorado's 64 counties. The Department removed the file, consulted CISA and Dominion, and with state IT staff and the Colorado Bureau of Investigation changed the passwords and verified BIOS settings on affected active equipment by October 31. It reported no evidence of unauthorized access and no changed settings. An outside law-firm review (Baird Quinn, Dec. 2024) found the posting inadvertent but said storing passwords that way broke Department data-security practice. It also noted that C.R.S. § 1-13-708(2) makes knowingly publishing voting-system passwords a Class 5 felony. Status Confirmed for an official disclosure of tabulator BIOS passwords. Exploiting them needs physical access, but the incident shows how machine-security secrets held centrally by the state can leak across many counties at once.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Secretary of State — News release on password disclosure (Nov. 4, 2024)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/PR20241104Passwords.html"}, {"title": "Colorado Secretary of State — CDOS fact sheet on password disclosure (Dec. 2024)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/20241208CDOSFactSheetOnPasswordDisclosure.pdf"}, {"title": "Baird Quinn LLC — Final investigative report for CDOS (Dec. 2024)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/20241208BairdQuinFinalReport.pdf"}, {"title": "CPR News — Investigation finds Colorado election equipment passwords were posted accidentally, but safeguards also lacking (Dec. 9, 2024)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2024/12/09/colorado-election-machines-passwords-investigation-results/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-05. Confirmed official BIOS password disclosure; Mesa/Peters 2021 remounts skipped. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Data Breaches; Software' to 'Data Breaches > Beyond the original breach are usually hidden higher-order breaches as a resu...'.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "ga-sos-2024-citizenship-audit-20-noncitizens-on-voter-rolls", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-07", "uid": "C20260926-022920-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-07", "old_ids": ["ga-sos-2024-citizenship-audit-20-noncitizens-on-voter-rolls"], "seq": "C01052", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Injection of bad records"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger announced a 2024 citizenship audit of the statewide voter list that conclusively identified 20 noncitizens among ~8.2 million registrants; all 20 registrations were canceled and referred for prosecution, with 9 of the 20 having voted in prior elections and 156 additional records flagged for further investigation (AP / AJC / SOS statements). Status Confirmed official audit finding ineligible records present on the rolls; peer to Florida Auditor General 2021-096 duplicate/deceased/age-error findings—Georgia citizenship audit, not FL remounted. PEP framing: bad-record injection/presence on computerized statewide lists is a documented maintenance failure mode independent of hand-count viability.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Georgia citizenship audit finds few noncitizens on voter rolls", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/georgia-noncitizens-voter-rolls-14532ef49b66f9cbf34ff483d2534280", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sos-2024-citizenship-audit-20-noncitizens-on-voter-rolls__ap-georgia-citizenship-audit-finds-few-noncitizens-on-voter-rolls.png"}, {"title": "AJC — Election audit shows 20 noncitizens registered to vote in Georgia", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/election-audit-shows-20-noncitizens-registered-to-vote-in-georgia/NRORAL7Z3RDSNMQ3QDLVEARPSY/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Injection of bad records leaf."}
{"id": "il-knox-2024-galesburg-touchscreen-calibration-machine-pulled", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-32", "uid": "C20261020-160717-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-32", "old_ids": ["il-knox-2024-galesburg-touchscreen-calibration-machine-pulled"], "seq": "C01025", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "IL", "description": "During October 2024 early voting at the Knox County Courthouse in Galesburg, Illinois, a touchscreen selected the wrong candidates; voters saw the errors on screen and reported them before casting. County Clerk Scott Erickson told WGIL: \"It was more than likely a calibration issue with that machine. We recalibrated it, put it back into service and everything was going smooth. A few days later that machine started presenting the same type of issues,\" so he took it offline for the rest of the election. He said votes already cast on it were stored on its memory card and would be counted, and that no improper ballots were cast. Nearby, Rock Island County replaced a voting machine after complaints the same week (KWQC). A Facebook post had claimed a Galesburg voter's touch selected other candidates. Status Confirmed: the clerk attributed it to calibration, recalibrated, then pulled the machine when the problem recurred. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WGIL — Despite issue with voting machine, Knox County official says electronic voting is 'most absolutely safe' (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://www.wgil.com/2024/10/30/despite-issue-with-voting-machine-knox-county-says-electronic-voting-most-absolutely-safe/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-knox-2024-galesburg-touchscreen-calibration-machine-pulled__wgil2024.html"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — A Facebook post told of an Illinois voter's touch screen problem (Nov. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/article/2024/nov/06/a-facebook-post-told-of-an-illinois-voters-touch-s/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-knox-2024-galesburg-touchscreen-calibration-machine-pulled__pfil2024.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (wgil2024, pfil2024). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "luzerne-pa-2024-ryncavage-tyncavage-ballot-name-misspelling", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-15", "uid": "C20260926-022005-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-15", "old_ids": ["luzerne-pa-2024-ryncavage-tyncavage-ballot-name-misspelling"], "seq": "C01030", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "PA", "description": "Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, had to reissue roughly 6,700 mail ballots for the 119th House District after state Rep. Alec Ryncavage’s name appeared as ‘Alec J. Tyncavage’ on ballots; contemporaneous reporting stated Dominion accepted responsibility and paid for corrected ballots and notification. Status Confirmed textual ballot-name error requiring mass reprint/resend; peer to Mingo WV wrong-name and Craighead AR misspelling cards—Luzerne Ryncavage/Tyncavage 2024, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Times Leader — Luzerne County resending 6,700 mail ballots over Ryncavage misspelling", "url": "https://www.timesleader.com/news/1669907/luzerne-county-resending-6700-mail-ballots-due-to-misspelling-of-state-rep-alec-ryncavages-name", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-2024-ryncavage-tyncavage-ballot-name-misspelling__untitled.png"}, {"title": "Citizens' Voice — Company responsible for Luzerne ballot error paying for corrected ballots", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2024/10/14/company-responsible-for-luzerne-county-ballot-error-paying-for-corrected-ballots/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Textual Mistakes on ballots leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name", "permanent_id": "C20260925-171133-04", "uid": "C20260925-171133-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-171133-04", "old_ids": ["mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name"], "seq": "C00071", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "WV", "description": "During early voting Oct. 23–28, 2024, Mingo County, WV, issued ballots to about 678 early voters that incorrectly listed Randy Fowler (instead of Jeff Disibbio) as the Democratic candidate for West Virginia Senate District 6. The printing vendor found the error; corrected ballots followed Oct. 28. ACLU-WV sought mandamus for a new election; cast ballots could not be individually corrected because voting is anonymous. Status Confirmed for the wrong-name ballot printing affecting hundreds of early voters; intentional fraud not established by cited sources.", "sources": [{"title": "ACLU of West Virginia — Mingo County ballot debacle legal action", "url": "https://www.acluwv.org/press-releases/aclu-wv-files-legal-action-mingo-countys-latest-ballot-debacle/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name__aclu-of-west-virginia-mingo-county-ballot-debacle-legal-acti.png"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — West Virginia Mingo County Incorrect Ballot Challenge", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/west-virginia-mingo-county-incorrect-ballot-challenge/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name__democracy-docket-west-virginia-mingo-county-incorrect-ballot.png"}, {"title": "Petition for writ of mandamus (Nov. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/2024-11-05-Petition-for-writ-of-mandamus.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name__petition-for-writ-of-mandamus-nov-5-2024.pdf"}], "notes": "Catalog leaf: textual mistakes on ballots. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources."}
{"id": "va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-02", "uid": "C20261020-161446-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-02", "old_ids": ["va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo"], "seq": "C01461", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "VA", "description": "During early voting for the Nov. 5, 2024 election in Washington County, Virginia (Abingdon), a voter's TikTok (@marimandyj, \"How my voting session went in VA.\") showed her feeding a South Abingdon paper ballot into the precinct scanner and the scanner's optional ballot review screen listing her presidential choice as \"Donald J. Triump (R).\" Posts on Instagram (Oct. 29), X and Facebook claimed the misspelling was \"election fraud\" meant to keep Trump votes from registering; the MJTruth Rumble short \"Virginia Voted, But the Machine Spelled Trumps Name Wrong\" (Oct. 31, 2024) reposted it. Official response: Washington County Director of Elections and General Registrar Derek Lyall confirmed a typographical error on the scanner's optional ballot review screen, which shows only if a voter asks for it before inserting the ballot. He said the county found it the week before (around Oct. 23), too late to reprogram the equipment for the election; that fewer than 20 of more than 10,000 early voters had used the review screen; that every candidate's name is spelled correctly on the paper ballots; and that all equipment was tested and \"tabulating ballots in accordance with voters' choices.\" A notice about the error was posted in every polling place on Election Day. The Virginia Department of Elections (spokesperson Andrea Gaines) said the review screen \"does not affect tabulation of ballots or reporting of results.\" Status Confirmed: the misspelling on the review-screen programming is confirmed by the county; that it affected any vote is not supported. Catalog point: the candidate name lives in more than one place in the election definition (paper ballot layout and the scanner's display text), and pre-election testing did not catch a mismatch between them; the error was found and announced only after voting had begun, and the county chose not to reprogram mid-election.", "sources": [{"title": "FactCheck.org — Typo in Trump's Name on Ballot Review Screen Is Not 'Election Fraud' (Nov. 5, 2024; VA ELECT spokesperson Andrea Gaines, Registrar Derek Lyall)", "url": "https://www.factcheck.org/2024/11/typo-in-trumps-name-on-ballot-review-screen-is-not-election-fraud/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__factcheckorg.html"}, {"title": "Lead Stories — Virginia Voting Machine Did NOT Misspell Donald Trump's Name On Paper Ballots (Oct. 2024; Lyall email Oct. 30)", "url": "https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2024/10/fact-check-virginia-voting-machine-did-not-misspell-donald-trumps-name-on-paper-ballots.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__leadstories.html"}, {"title": "Reuters Fact Check — Typo on display of Virginia voting equipment does not invalidate votes (Nov. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/typo-display-virginia-voting-equipment-does-not-invalidate-votes-2024-11-06/"}, {"title": "USA Today Fact Check — Typo in Trump's name on voting machine not fraud (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2024/11/01/typo-trump-name-voting-virginia-fraud-fact-check/75970888007/"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Virginia Voted, But the Machine Spelled Trumps Name Wrong\" (short, uploaded Oct. 31, 2024 9:10 PM ET; 43 s; repost of the @marimandyj TikTok)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l1dth"}], "notes": "MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20). Short v5l1dth, Oct. 31, 2024 9:10 PM ET, 43.1 s. Frames read: screen shows \"VALID BALLOT ... Donald J. Triump (R)\", \"Hung Cao (R)\", \"Location: Election Office-ABS\", \"Firmware: 5.17.15.1\", CAST/RETURN buttons. Vendor deliberately left blank: no source names Washington County's scanner vendor (the on-screen layout and firmware string look like a Dominion ImageCast Precinct, but that is not stated by any source, so not tagged per the vendor rule). Reuters and USA Today linked only (401/402 to curl). 2024 event; no EMon ping. MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (43 s): a Washington County, Virginia voter feeds a paper ballot into a scanner; the optional review screen lists 'Donald J. Triump (R)' for President"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l1dth", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 43.143, "bytes": 11111942, "sha256": "2933cfc6a07acc2c835044c885322105ec617172345fbcf5d387ed6d76aa0097", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/va-washington-county-2024-triump-optional-review-screen-typo__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-06", "uid": "C20261020-161446-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-06", "old_ids": ["ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video"], "seq": "C01465", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Plant fake \"fraud\" videos (staged confessions, fake IDs, staged ballot destruction) that go viral and get debunked, so real reports of election crimes are dismissed along with them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-31", "state": "GA", "description": "On Oct. 31, 2024, a video spread on X (including X's Election Integrity Community) in which a man in a vehicle says, \"We are from Haiti. We came to America six months ago and we already have our American citizenship... Yesterday we voted in Gwinnett County and today we're voting in Fulton County,\" then fans out driver's licenses (several with the same photo) and says \"we invite all Haitians to come to America.\" Posts called it \"illegal Haitian migrants voting multiple times in the Georgia election.\" The MJTruth Rumble short \"Haiti Man is Voting for Kamala Harris in Multiple Counties in Georgia\" (Oct. 31, 2024) reposted it. The same day, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger called it \"false\" and \"an example of targeted disinformation,\" likely foreign interference and probably a Russian troll farm, said CISA was investigating, and asked X and other platforms to take it down. On Nov. 1, 2024, ODNI, the FBI and CISA jointly stated: \"The IC assesses that Russian influence actors manufactured a recent video that falsely depicted individuals claiming to be from Haiti and voting illegally in multiple counties in Georgia,\" part of \"Moscow's broader effort to raise unfounded questions about the integrity of the U.S. election and stoke divisions among Americans.\" PolitiFact found no Georgia voter records for the names and birth dates on the IDs (Raoul Sylvan, Jacques Benoit) in either county; researchers tied the video to the Russian network Storm-1516. Status Confirmed: the video is a confirmed fabrication (state and federal attribution). It is evidence of the planted-fake tactic, not of noncitizen or multi-county voting in Georgia; real noncitizen-voting cases are carded separately on the Illegal Immigration leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "ODNI / FBI / CISA — Joint Statement on Russian Election Influence Efforts (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2024/4014-pr-28-24"}, {"title": "FBI — Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA Statement on Russian Election Influence Efforts (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-on-russian-election-influence-efforts", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__fbi-2024-11-01.html"}, {"title": "Georgia Secretary of State — Statement from Secretary Raffensperger (Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://sos.ga.gov/news/statement-secretary-raffensperger"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — Video shows Haitians who claim they're voting for Harris in multiple Georgia counties. That's fake (Nov. 1, 2024; names on IDs not in GA voter records; Storm-1516)", "url": "https://politifact.com/factchecks/2024/nov/01/tweets/video-shows-haitians-who-claim-theyre-voting-for-h/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__politifact.html"}, {"title": "AP News — FBI links video falsely depicting voter fraud in Georgia to 'Russian influence actors' (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/fbi-russia-georgia-fraud-disinformation-eebea4ab200682ccd3e97fb9f164e6ca"}, {"title": "Reuters Fact Check — Georgia voter fraud video labeled Russian disinformation uses false personal data (Nov. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/georgia-voter-fraud-video-labeled-russian-disinformation-uses-false-personal-2024-11-06/"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Haiti Man is Voting for Kamala Harris in Multiple Counties in Georgia\" (short, uploaded Oct. 31, 2024 5:14 PM ET; 19 s; repost of the fabricated video)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5kzodn"}], "notes": "MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20). Short v5kzodn, 19.3 s; on-screen captions match the fabricated video's text. New leaf under 1 > Fear/Discredit Tactics: planted fake fraud videos (Mark authorized new leaves for distinct tactics). Second card on the leaf: the Bucks County ballot-destruction fake (Oct. 2024). ODNI, GA SOS, AP and Reuters linked only (403/401 to curl); the FBI copy of the joint statement is archived. 2024 event; no EMon ping. MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (19 s): repost of the fabricated video in which a man in a vehicle claims Haitians who arrived six months ago voted for Harris in Gwinnett and Fulton counties, then shows fanned-out driver's licenses"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5kzodn", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 19.25, "bytes": 4991097, "sha256": "a9a612d08f5d9f3daefc58b1b4aca7c3d185165dd8cc1b004e06f5a298c957a0", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ga-2024-russian-fabricated-haitian-multi-county-voting-video__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "shasta-ca-2024-runbeck-ink-overspray-70pct-duplication", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-02", "uid": "C20261014-123054-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-02", "old_ids": ["shasta-ca-2024-runbeck-ink-overspray-70pct-duplication"], "seq": "C01382", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Light printing and poor toner adhesion"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-31", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 31, 2024, newly appointed Shasta County Registrar Tom Toller told reporters that an \"ink overspray\" defect—invisible to the naked eye and missed in mandatory pre-election testing—was causing ballot scanners to reject ballots because they could not read the barcodes that identify ballot type. Staff had begun scanning early after Nevada County reported a similar Runbeck printing problem; both counties used Runbeck. Of about 32,500 ballots already returned, roughly 70% of those processed so far appeared affected, so the office planned to duplicate rejected ballots onto blank Runbeck stock in teams of three (mark, check, call out) while retaining originals. Status Confirmed (registrar on-record + contemporaneous Shasta Scout reporting with photos of reject screens). Catalog note: a single vendor print fault pushed a majority of early mail ballots into a human duplication pipeline that observers can only watch from a line. That is exactly the kind of \"honest mistake\" that, once confirmed, makes centralized machine scanning and barcode-dependent styles harder to trust than precinct hand counts of the voter's own marks.", "sources": [{"title": "Shasta Scout — Registrar explains how ink-overspray ballots will be duplicated (~70% affected so far; Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://shastascout.org/elections-office-explains/"}, {"title": "Nevada County CA — CivicAlert acknowledging printer readability error / rescans (Nov. 7, 2024)", "url": "https://www.nevadacountyca.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=7925"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to nevada-ca-2024-runbeck-ink-overspray-vbm-rescans and Maricopa faint-toner cards. Cross-leaf: Ballots > Wrong styles (barcode/style ID failure).", "vendor": ["Runbeck"]}
{"id": "federalist-2024-ny-voter-fraudulent-ballot-already-cast-low-propensity-show-up", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-07", "uid": "C20260926-031602-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-07", "old_ids": ["federalist-2024-ny-voter-fraudulent-ballot-already-cast-low-propensity-show-up"], "seq": "C01172", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Low-propensity voters: riskier, because these voters may actually show up."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-30", "state": "NY", "description": "The Federalist (Oct. 30, 2024) documented a New York voter who discovered a fraudulent ballot had already been cast in his name, was offered an affidavit/provisional ballot, and was told both ballots would still count because ballots become anonymous after casting—illustrating the show-up risk when a registration record already carries a vote when the real person appears. Companion Michigan AG 2024 double-voting charges (St. Clair Shores residents/assistant clerks) likewise show real people interacting with already-marked participation records. Status Confirmed primary Federalist NY already-cast / affidavit reporting plus MI AG charging companion on participation-record collisions; peer to Heritage VA low-propensity false-registration and CCProsecutor Saunders show-up cards already on this leaf—NY 2024 already-cast / MI AG instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: low-propensity records used for phantom association collide when real voters show up; only hand-to-eye paper reconciliation exposes the collision cleanly.", "sources": [{"title": "The Federalist — NY voter finds fraudulent ballot cast in his name; officials say it will still count (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://thefederalist.com/2024/10/30/after-voter-finds-fraudulent-ballot-cast-in-his-name-new-york-tells-him-it-will-count-anyway/"}, {"title": "Michigan AG Nessel — Charges St. Clair Shores residents / assistant clerks for double voting (Oct. 4, 2024)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2024/10/04/ag-nessel-charges-st-clair-shores-residents-assistant-clerks-for-double-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/federalist-2024-ny-voter-fraudulent-ballot-already-cast-low-propensity-show-up__michigan-ag-double-voting-st-clair-shores-charges.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Feedback Loop low-propensity voters may actually show up leaf."}
{"id": "npr-2024-ballottrax-47-states-intelligent-mail-barcode-ballot-tracking", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-12", "uid": "C20260925-233150-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-12", "old_ids": ["npr-2024-ballottrax-47-states-intelligent-mail-barcode-ballot-tracking"], "seq": "C00405", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Real-time ballot-tracking systems give bad actors real-time information to abuse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NPR reporting (citing National Vote at Home Institute / BallotTrax) documents that all but three states offer online mail-ballot tracking, often via intelligent mail barcodes with text/email status updates as ballots progress—creating widespread real-time visibility into ballot movement. Status Confirmed for national deployment of ballot-tracking telemetry. Confirmed for existence/scale of tracking; adversarial abuse remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — state ballot tracking overview (2024)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5170285/voting-2024-ballots-states-online-tracking"}, {"title": "Vote.org — Track Your Ballot tools directory", "url": "https://www.vote.org/ballot-tracker-tools/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-2024-ballottrax-47-states-intelligent-mail-barcode-ballot-tracking__npr-2024-ballottrax-47-states-intelligent-mail-barcode-ballot-tracking__vote-org-track-your-ballot-tools-directory.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 6 companion.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "npr-ballottrax-amazon-package-style-tracking-confidence-messaging", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-40", "uid": "C20260925-233150-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-40", "old_ids": ["npr-ballottrax-amazon-package-style-tracking-confidence-messaging"], "seq": "C00433", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "Mail ballots: design a mail-ballot tracking system that gives the public a false sense of security about voting by mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "National reporting describes BallotTrax-style systems as letting voters 'track their ballot like an Amazon package' via intelligent mail barcodes—confidence UX that monitors ballot status (and, in parallel with EPB/who-voted files, who has returned ballots). Status Confirmed for package-tracking confidence framing of mail-ballot telemetry nationwide.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — track ballot like Amazon package / BallotTrax", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5170285/voting-2024-ballots-states-online-tracking"}, {"title": "Vote.org — ballot tracker directory", "url": "https://www.vote.org/ballot-tracker-tools/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-ballottrax-amazon-package-style-tracking-confidence-messaging__vote-org-ballot-tracker-directory.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 20 companion.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "reuters-2024-lawn-sign-wars-visible-support-media-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-01", "uid": "C20260926-001426-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-01", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-lawn-sign-wars-visible-support-media-pressure"], "seq": "C00594", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Media pressure"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Reuters' Oct 2020/2024 lawn-sign-wars reporting and related national coverage treat yard-sign theft/vandalism and sparse/dense sign landscapes as nationally newsworthy proxies for 'visible support,' amplifying perceptions that one side has less backing than private preference may imply. Catalog Media Pressure leaf: news framing of visible-support scarcity further distorts pre-result perceptions. Status Confirmed for media amplification of visible-support narratives; does not prove coordinated suppression of signs by media outlets.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Lawn-sign wars: trackers, cameras to deter political theft (2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/lawn-sign-wars-us-voters-use-trackers-cameras-deter-political-theft-2024-10-30/"}, {"title": "NYT — Signs Get Snatched, Kicked, Burned (2020 front-lawn battle coverage)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/us/political-sign-wars.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20f Targeted Removal leaf (theft vs media-pressure framing)."}
{"id": "cnn-2024-campaign-paid-influencers-fec-disclosure-gap-incentivize-creators", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-01", "uid": "C20260926-000809-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-01", "old_ids": ["cnn-2024-campaign-paid-influencers-fec-disclosure-gap-incentivize-creators"], "seq": "C00554", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Incentivize people to become influencers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-29", "state": "Federal", "description": "CNN Business (Oct 29, 2024) documents that presidential campaigns and PACs pay social-media creators to produce election content, while FEC rules leave a disclosure gap: unlike TV/mail 'paid for by' disclaimers, influencer posts often need not disclose payment. Priorities USA / Somos Votantes spent about $2.7M paying 15 creators for Latino turnout content; Trump 2020 paid nearly $1.8M to an influencer marketing firm per FEC filings cited by Axios. Status Confirmed that campaigns/PACs financially incentivize people to become/act as political influencers; cabal-authorship remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CNN Business — Influencers paid for endorsements; FEC disclosure gap (2024)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2024/10/29/tech/influencers-presidential-campaign-paid-disclosure", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cnn-2024-campaign-paid-influencers-fec-disclosure-gap-incentivize-creators__cnn-2024-campaign-paid-influencers-fec-disclosure-gap-incentivize-crea.png"}, {"title": "FTC Endorsement Guides FAQ — FTC lacks jurisdiction over political ads", "url": "https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-people-are-asking"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20e Create social media leaf."}
{"id": "pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-08", "uid": "C20261020-161446-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-08", "old_ids": ["pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim"], "seq": "C01467", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "There are no poll watchers at post offices, where millions of ballots flow through."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-29", "state": "PA", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2024, a man filming inside the Northampton County Government Center/Courthouse in Easton, Pennsylvania (home of the county elections office) followed a plain-clothes man carrying a U.S. Postal Service tray of mail-ballot envelopes to the sheriff's X-ray checkpoint, asking \"How many ballots you turning in there? You're supposed to only turn in one ballot per person... Do you have an affidavit for all those?\" A deputy says he is with the post office; the filmer calls it \"very suspect\" and says someone is \"dropping off an obscene amount of ballots at the very last second after the office has actually closed.\" Posted by @hippiedaytrader on X (about 6-7 million views), it was shared as a \"ballot mule\" with a Rhode Island license plate; the MJTruth Rumble short \"Man Spotted Dropping off an Obscene amount of Ballots at Northampton, PA last minute\" (Oct. 29, 2024) reposted it. Official response: USPS spokesperson Martha Johnson confirmed he is a postal employee following USPS's election-mail delivery process and said he \"doesn't wear a uniform or drive a postal vehicle in the normal course of his duties\"; USPS had announced \"extraordinary\" 2024 measures including extra deliveries and local handling and transport of ballots. Reuters identified him as interim/acting Easton postmaster Charles Narciso. County Executive Lamont McClure called it \"the most normal, legal thing imaginable\" and \"election disinformation,\" noting the building's cameras; Secretary of the Commonwealth Al Schmidt cited it on Oct. 31 as a false ballot-harvesting allegation. Status Confirmed for what happened: a USPS manager lawfully delivered a tray of mailed ballots; the ballot-mule claim is false. Catalog point: between the mail stream and the county, ballots move under USPS's own internal custody. A plain-clothes postal manager carrying a bin of ballots in a private car looks exactly like a mule to a citizen, and the public has no way to watch or verify that hand-off except to trust the USPS's word.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Video shows a postal worker dropping off mail ballots in Pennsylvania, not a ballot mule (Nov. 1, 2024; USPS spokesperson Martha Johnson; Sec. Al Schmidt Oct. 31 briefing)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2024/nov/01/tweets/video-shows-a-postal-worker-dropping-off-mail-ball/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__politifact.html"}, {"title": "Lehigh Valley Public Media — 'Election disinformation': Viral video isn't ballot stuffing. It's mail delivery, exec says (Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://www.lehighvalleypublicmedia.org/news/elections/election-disinformation-viral-video-isnt-ballot-stuffing-its-mail-delivery-exec-says/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__lvpm.html"}, {"title": "WFMZ-69 — 'Election misinformation': Northampton County executive responds to video of postal worker delivering ballots (Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://www.wfmz.com/news/area/lehighvalley/northampton-county/election-misinformation-northampton-county-executive-responds-to-video-of-postal-worker-delivering-ballots/article_29b6771c-96ff-11ef-a8f0-7ba8e595de53.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__wfmz.html"}, {"title": "Reuters Fact Check — Video of ballots dropped off in Pennsylvania falsely shared as election fraud (Nov. 4, 2024; acting Easton postmaster identified)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/video-ballots-dropped-off-pennsylvania-falsely-shared-election-fraud-2024-11-04/"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Clip shows Pennsylvania mail carrier, not illegal voting (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.36L996P"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Man Spotted Dropping off an Obscene amount of Ballots at Northampton, PA last minute\" (short, uploaded Oct. 29, 2024 7:38 PM ET; 55 s)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5knqx9"}], "notes": "MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20). Short v5knqx9, 54.6 s; audio transcribed and matches the PolitiFact quotes. Leaf choice: Mail ballots > No poll watchers at the post offices (chain-of-custody visibility), not Ballot Harvesting, because the established facts are a lawful USPS delivery. Reuters and AFP linked only (401/403). 2024 event; no EMon ping. MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (54 s): a man filming follows a plain-clothes man carrying a USPS tray of ballot envelopes into the Northampton County courthouse in Easton, PA and asks how many ballots he is turning in; the tray goes through the sheriff's X-ray"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5knqx9", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 54.59, "bytes": 14114360, "sha256": "72e614da7e6122d467a6583e4a877df39130e7df679937c4097e639117ba15ad", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2024-acting-postmaster-delivers-ballot-bin-viral-ballot-mule-claim__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "apnorc-2024-10-election-confidence-loss-of-hope-demoralizing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-03", "uid": "C20260926-033041-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-03", "old_ids": ["apnorc-2024-10-election-confidence-loss-of-hope-demoralizing"], "seq": "C01213", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose hope."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "AP-NORC (Oct. 28, 2024) found nearly a quarter of registered voters expected inaccuracies in nationwide vote counts, 44% of Republican voters expressed little or no confidence votes would be counted accurately nationally (vs 8% of Democrats), and large majorities worried about post-election violence and efforts to block certification—demoralizing hope that elections will be accepted as legitimate. Status Confirmed primary AP-NORC Oct. 2024 election-process/transition poll; peer to Gallup 2024 GOP-28% integrity and Gallup 2020 record-low confidence cards already on this leaf—AP-NORC instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: demoralizing loss of hope around opaque machine tallies is the opposite of observable public hand counts of hand-marked paper that citizens can watch.", "sources": [{"title": "AP-NORC — Many voters are worried about the electoral process and transition of power (Oct. 28, 2024)", "url": "https://apnorc.org/projects/many-voters-are-worried-about-the-electoral-process-and-transition-of-power/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apnorc-2024-10-election-confidence-loss-of-hope-demoralizing__ap-norc-many-voters-are-worried-about-the-electoral-process-and-transition-of-power-oct-28-2024.png"}, {"title": "AP-NORC — October 2024 Democracy topline PDF (companion)", "url": "https://apnorc.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/Democracy-topline.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apnorc-2024-10-election-confidence-loss-of-hope-demoralizing__ap-norc-october-2024-democracy-topline-pdf-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Psychological Operations Demoralizing citizens causes loss of hope leaf (non-Gallup)."}
{"id": "wv-mingo-2024-early-voting-halted-technical-issues-voting-machines-courthouse", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-04", "uid": "C20261021-122912-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-04", "old_ids": ["wv-mingo-2024-early-voting-halted-technical-issues-voting-machines-courthouse"], "seq": "C01507", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Suspend early voting at a site, citing an undisclosed technical problem."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-28", "state": "WV", "description": "On Monday, Oct. 28, 2024, the Mingo County Commission in West Virginia halted early voting \"until further notice due to technical issues,\" citing problems with the voting machines at the county courthouse, WCHS reported. A technician was working on the machines as of 12:30 p.m., and no timetable for the fix was given. The commission said there was \"nothing to be alarmed about\" and that all votes would be counted, but did not say publicly what the technical problem was. The same day, the county was replacing ballots after about 678 early voters, from Oct. 23 to Oct. 28, had been given ballots listing the wrong Democratic candidate for state Senate District 6 (see the separate card on that error, which later led to an ACLU of West Virginia court petition). The cited coverage does not say whether the halt was connected to that error. Status Confirmed: the commission itself announced the suspension and gave only \"technical issues\" as the reason. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: early voting at the county's site stopped mid-day on an official explanation that told voters nothing about what went wrong, while a known ballot error was being corrected. Hand-marked paper ballots issued against a printed poll book and counted at the precinct do not stop because a machine needs a technician.", "sources": [{"title": "WCHS — Technical issues put a pause on early voting in Mingo County, officials say (Oct. 28, 2024)", "url": "https://wchstv.com/news/local/technical-issues-put-a-pause-on-early-voting-in-mingo-county-officials-say"}, {"title": "ACLU of West Virginia — ACLU-WV Files Legal Action In Mingo County's Latest Ballot Debacle (Nov. 5, 2024; context for the same week's wrong-candidate ballots)", "url": "https://www.acluwv.org/press-releases/aclu-wv-files-legal-action-mingo-countys-latest-ballot-debacle/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to ei-2026-10-004 (Champaign IL 2026) on this leaf (1 -> 2). Cross-reference: mingo-wv-2024-wrong-candidate-name (Textual 'mistakes' leaf). Causal link between halt and wrong-name ballots not asserted; sources do not state it. Both URLs curl 200."}
{"id": "dutchess-ny-2024-miner-high-propensity-caught-already-voted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-01", "uid": "C20260926-010219-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-01", "old_ids": ["dutchess-ny-2024-miner-high-propensity-caught-already-voted"], "seq": "C00834", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "High-propensity voters: very risky and a last resort, because voters are likely to catch the use of their records."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-27", "state": "NY", "description": "Dutchess County (NY) early voter Mike Miner (55) — a high-engagement registrant who showed up the day after early voting opened — was told 'you already voted' because someone had cast a ballot in his name at Fishkill ~22 minutes after EV began. Bipartisan BOE investigation found a signature mismatch; Miner received an affidavit ballot that will count, but the anonymous earlier ballot also counts; matter referred to the DA. Classic high-propensity detection: a real, likely-to-vote registrant catches illicit association of their record. Status Confirmed for documented catch-when-real-voter-shows pathway; criminal fraud vs clerical error pending DA investigation (Alleged as to intent).", "sources": [{"title": "The Federalist — NY voter finds fraudulent ballot cast in his name (Miner / Dutchess 2024)", "url": "https://thefederalist.com/2024/10/30/after-voter-finds-fraudulent-ballot-cast-in-his-name-new-york-tells-him-it-will-count-anyway/"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — Stolen Identities, Stolen Votes (crews prefer unlikely-to-vote names)", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/report/stolen-identities-stolen-votes-case-study-voterimpersonation", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dutchess-ny-2024-miner-high-propensity-caught-already-voted__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 1. High-propensity catch mechanism Confirmed; intent Alleged pending DA."}
{"id": "inquirer-2024-philly-collar-counties-lawn-sign-warfare-media-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-03", "uid": "C20260926-031602-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-03", "old_ids": ["inquirer-2024-philly-collar-counties-lawn-sign-warfare-media-pressure"], "seq": "C01168", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Media pressure"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-27", "state": "PA", "description": "The Philadelphia Inquirer's Oct. 27, 2024 collar-county reporting frames lawn-sign theft/vandalism as 'sign warfare'—a hyper-visible media flash point in Bucks/Montgomery suburbs (dump of ~250 Harris signs in Lansdale woods; police reports; AirTag tracking; doxxing)—treating sparse/dense signscapes and theft narratives as nationally newsworthy proxies for visible support under partisan media pressure. Status Confirmed primary Inquirer 2024 Philly-suburbs sign-warfare media-pressure instance; peer to Reuters 2024 lawn-sign-wars and Makse-Sokhey household-signs cards already on this leaf—Inquirer PA collar-counties instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: media amplification of contested visible-support landscapes substitutes narrative pressure for public hand-count verification of actual tallies.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Political lawn sign theft and vandalism in Philly collar counties (Oct. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/political-lawn-sign-vandalism-philadelphia-suburbs-2024-election-20241027.html"}, {"title": "Princeton Bridging Divides Initiative — severe political hostility / threats research (cited in Inquirer companion framing)", "url": "https://bridgingdivides.princeton.edu/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/inquirer-2024-philly-collar-counties-lawn-sign-warfare-media-pressure__princeton-bridging-divides-political-hostility-threats-research.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing Media Pressure leaf."}
{"id": "inquirer-2024-upper-providence-airtag-sign-theft-visible-support-suppression", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-05", "uid": "C20260926-031602-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-05", "old_ids": ["inquirer-2024-upper-providence-airtag-sign-theft-visible-support-suppression"], "seq": "C01170", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Suppressing visible support (flags, signs, stickers) makes it appear that one side has less backing than it actually does."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-27", "state": "PA", "description": "Philadelphia Inquirer reporting on Montgomery County Upper Providence Democrats documents ~50 Harris signs missing before mid-October 2024, prompting AirTag tracking that recovered stolen signs (including a truck tailed to a supermarket)—direct suppression of visible lawn-sign support that would otherwise signal backing density to neighbors and media. Parallel Bucks/Montco cases (slashed Trump signs; cut Harris flags; tipped signs) show bipartisan targeting of private-property displays protected by the First Amendment and treated as misdemeanor theft under PA law. Status Confirmed primary Inquirer 2024 Upper Providence AirTag / Philly-suburbs visible-support suppression instance; peer to NYT 2020 signs-snatched/burned and NYT 2024 AirTag-doorbell cards already on this leaf—Inquirer Montco/Bucks 2024 instance, not those NYT remounts. PEP framing: systematic removal of visible support falsifies perceived backing independent of hand-counted paper results.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Upper Providence Democrats AirTag tracking; Philly-suburbs sign theft (Oct. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/political-lawn-sign-vandalism-philadelphia-suburbs-2024-election-20241027.html"}, {"title": "City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994) — residential political signs as core First Amendment speech (legal companion)", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/512/43/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing Suppressing visible support leaf."}
{"id": "reuters-2024-iranian-apt42-trump-campaign-emails-hackers-online-assets", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-06", "uid": "C20260926-005107-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-06", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-iranian-apt42-trump-campaign-emails-hackers-online-assets"], "seq": "C00799", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Criminal hackers hired to attack campaigns' online assets, which the source says Virginia Democrats have conspired to fund"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-25", "state": "Federal", "description": "Reuters reported that Iranian-government-linked APT42 / Mint Sandstorm hackers compromised multiple Trump campaign staffers (May–June 2024), stole campaign emails, and later peddled the material for publication — a documented 'criminal hackers attack your online assets' pathway against a major U.S. political operation. Soft companion establishing the cross-country online-asset attack mechanism the leaf asserts happens nationally; does NOT confirm Virginia Democrats hired those actors. Status Confirmed for foreign criminal/cyber intrusion against campaign online assets; Virginia Democratic fundraising-to-hire attribution remains Alleged (see primary card).", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Accused Iranian hackers peddle stolen Trump campaign emails (Oct 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/accused-iranian-hackers-successfully-peddle-stolen-trump-emails-2024-10-25/"}, {"title": "BBC — Briton pleads guilty in US to 2020 Twitter hack (platform exploitation companion)", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-65540901"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 3 companion. Mechanism Confirmed; VA Dems hire claim not this card."}
{"id": "pa-2024-field-media-corps-lancaster-berks-york-falsified-registrations-sainz-plea", "permanent_id": "C20261019-125714-03", "uid": "C20261019-125714-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-125714-03", "old_ids": ["pa-2024-field-media-corps-lancaster-berks-york-falsified-registrations-sainz-plea"], "seq": "C01452", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-25 (Lancaster announcement); 2025-10-24 (AG charges); 2026-04-27 (guilty plea)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Oct. 25, 2024, the Lancaster County, Pennsylvania Board of Elections and District Attorney Heather Adams announced that about 2,500 voter registration forms dropped off in two batches before the registration deadline had been segregated for suspected fraud. Red flags included duplicate handwriting, signatures that did not match the SURE voter registry, and bad addresses, driver's license numbers and Social Security numbers. Detectives found applications with real people's correct personal information that those people said they never requested, completed or signed. The DA said the forms were tied to a large paid canvassing operation that had worked shopping centers, parking lots, sidewalks and parks since June. On Oct. 24, 2025, Attorney General Dave Sunday charged six street canvassers with unsworn falsification, tampering with public records, forgery and Election Code offenses (one also with identity theft). He also charged Guillermo Sainz, Pennsylvania director of the Arizona-based firm Field+Media Corps, with offering quota-based financial incentives, which is illegal in Pennsylvania. The AG said a significant share of the forms in Berks, Lancaster and York counties could not be tied to any real person, and that the motive was meeting quotas, not swaying any party or candidate. On April 27, 2026, Sainz pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts and received 30 days in jail, a $1,000 fine and 11 months' probation. The canvassers' charges were still pending. Status Confirmed (county joint statement, AG charging release, guilty plea). County officials say none of the flagged forms produced a fraudulent registration. Catalog note: a paid third-party drive delivered thousands of forms carrying real residents' stolen identifiers on deadline. County clerks caught them this time, but the rolls are only as clean as the slowest check on the busiest day.", "sources": [{"title": "Lancaster County, PA — Joint statement: Lancaster County Holds Press Conference on Attempted Voter Registration Fraud (Oct. 25, 2024)", "url": "https://co.lancaster.pa.us/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=2213&ARC=3116"}, {"title": "PA Office of Attorney General — AG Sunday Announces Charges Against Canvassers, Pa. Field Director (Oct. 24, 2025; curl 403 bot-block, read via WebFetch, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/ag-sunday-announces-charges-against-canvassers-pa-field-director-regarding-submissions-of-falsified-voter-registration-forms-in-multiple-counties/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Organizer pleads guilty in Pennsylvania voter registration scheme from 2024 election (Apr. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2026/04/27/guillermo-sainz-pleads-guilty-fake-voter-registration-forms-2024-election/"}, {"title": "Spotlight PA — Organizer pleads guilty in PA voter registration fraud case (Apr. 2026)", "url": "https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2026/04/guillermo-sainz-pleads-guilty-fake-voter-registration-forms-2024-election-dave-sunday-elections/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-19 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Thickens NGO registration / API access (1 -> 2) alongside the AZ Unique URL program seed. Cross-leaf: Registration > Illegal or 'gray-area' voter registration drives (Muskegon GBI peer). Canvassers' charges are allegations; presumption of innocence applies. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > NGO registration / API access' to 'Registration > Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations > Illegal or 'gray-area' voter registration drives'."}
{"id": "pa-bucks-2024-russian-fabricated-ballot-destruction-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-07", "uid": "C20261020-161446-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-07", "old_ids": ["pa-bucks-2024-russian-fabricated-ballot-destruction-video"], "seq": "C01466", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Plant fake \"fraud\" videos (staged confessions, fake IDs, staged ballot destruction) that go viral and get debunked, so real reports of election crimes are dismissed along with them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-24", "state": "PA", "description": "On Oct. 24, 2024, a video circulated on X showing a person sorting and ripping up what were presented as Bucks County, Pennsylvania mail-in ballots marked for Donald Trump while keeping ballots marked for Kamala Harris. The Bucks County Board of Elections and District Attorney said the same day that the video was fake: the envelope and ballot materials did not match the county's real ones. On Oct. 25, 2024, ODNI, the FBI and CISA jointly stated: \"The IC assesses that Russian actors manufactured and amplified a recent video that falsely depicted an individual ripping up ballots in Pennsylvania... Local election officials have already debunked the video's content,\" and warned that Russia was expected to \"create and release additional media content that seeks to undermine trust in the integrity of the election.\" Status Confirmed: confirmed fabrication (county and federal attribution). Like the Georgia 'Haitian voters' fake a week later, it shows the planted-fake tactic; it is not evidence that Bucks County ballots were destroyed.", "sources": [{"title": "ODNI / FBI / CISA — Joint Statement (Oct. 25, 2024): Russian actors manufactured the Bucks County ballot-destruction video", "url": "https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/press-releases-2024/4011-odni-pr-24-24"}, {"title": "FBI — Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA Statement (Oct. 25, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-bucks-2024-russian-fabricated-ballot-destruction-video__fbi-2024-10-25.html"}, {"title": "AP News — FBI says Russian actors made fake video depicting mail-in ballots for Trump being destroyed in Pennsylvania (Oct. 25, 2024)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/misinformation-fact-check-trump-ballots-destroyed-pennsylvania-d75fdc56c71d77c7a48d8fca96b03288"}, {"title": "Reuters Fact Check — Video of Pennsylvania mail-in ballots being destroyed is fake (Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/video-pennsylvania-mail-in-ballots-being-destroyed-is-fake-2024-10-31/"}], "notes": "Added with the MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20) as the second card on the new planted-fake-videos leaf (not itself on the MJTruth page). ODNI, AP and Reuters linked only (403/401); FBI copy of the Oct. 25 joint statement archived. Video not archived (not in the reviewed set). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pew-2024-partisan-split-election-security-fuel-division", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-25", "uid": "C20260926-004030-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-25", "old_ids": ["pew-2024-partisan-split-election-security-fuel-division"], "seq": "C00778", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fuel division instead of unity on fair elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-24", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2024 election-administration confidence findings show extreme partisan splits (e.g., Harris vs Trump supporters differing sharply on whether elections will be well run and whether mail ballots are counted accurately)—documenting party-aligned publics divided over election fairness rather than unified around shared verification norms. Soft companion to fill-20j Gallup integrity / party accountability leaves. Status Confirmed for measured partisan division on election fairness; intentional party-elite fueling Alleged where not shown.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Harris/Trump voters differ on election security, hacking concerns (2024)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/10/24/harris-trump-voters-differ-over-election-security-vote-counts-and-hacking-concerns/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Views of election administration and confidence in vote counts (2022)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/10/31/views-of-election-administration-and-confidence-in-vote-counts/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 13. Soft companion to fill-20j party accountability / Gallup integrity."}
{"id": "co-2024-fort-orange-press-timing-marks-cut-off-moffat-las-animas-huerfano-duplication", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-06", "uid": "C20261016-123449-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-06", "old_ids": ["co-2024-fort-orange-press-timing-marks-cut-off-moffat-las-animas-huerfano-duplication"], "seq": "C01425", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Shrunken or misaligned ballot images"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-23 to 2024-10-29", "state": "CO", "description": "In the November 2024 general election, county clerks in Moffat, Las Animas and Huerfano counties, Colorado confirmed that a printing error by their shared ballot vendor, Fort Orange Press, cut off the \"timing marks\" at the bottom of the ballot. Timing marks are the black lines on the ballot edge that tell the tabulator the ballot style. Moffat County's Oct. 29, 2024 release said the error \"prevented every mail-in ballot from being scanned for tabulation.\" Las Animas said only ballots mailed directly by the vendor were affected and reported about 3,400 returned ballots it was still sorting. Moffat Clerk Stacy Morgan demanded the vendor reimburse all printing, staff and supply costs. Every affected voter's choices were to be hand-transcribed by bipartisan judges onto new ballots with proper timing marks under Colorado Election Rule 18.4, then reviewed twice and audited a third time. Las Animas recommended that voters who had not yet voted come in person, because the in-person ballots were printed correctly. Status Confirmed (county clerks' on-record statements and the Moffat County release as reported by 9NEWS and the Craig Daily Press). Catalog note: a vendor fault in the ballot's alignment marks made an entire county's mail ballots unreadable by machine and pushed all of them into duplication. Whether accidental or not, that is the redirection pathway this leaf describes. Precinct hand counts of the voter's own marks do not depend on timing marks at all.", "sources": [{"title": "9NEWS — Printer error made 3 Colorado counties' mail ballots unscannable (Oct. 29, 2024; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-16, read via WebFetch, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.9news.com/article/news/politics/elections/printer-error-mail-in-ballots-unscannable/73-71996240-e473-4fdc-947e-d219e5c31931"}, {"title": "Craig Daily Press — Moffat County dealing with ballot-printing issue (Moffat County release; Oct. 29, 2024)", "url": "https://www.craigdailypress.com/news/moffat-county-dealing-with-ballot-printing-issue/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to wi-outagamie-calumet-2020-timing-mark-blemish-absentee (timing-mark defect) on this leaf; not a Maricopa remount. Distinct from nass-fort-orange-press-2023 chain-of-custody card (same vendor, different incident). Cross-leaf: Ballots > Light printing (vendor print defects); duplication workflows.", "vendor": ["Fort Orange Press"]}
{"id": "co-mesa-2024-10-stolen-mail-ballots-forged-three-counted-could-not-be-recalled-after-separation", "permanent_id": "C20261113-122945-03", "uid": "C20261113-122945-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-122945-03", "old_ids": ["co-mesa-2024-10-stolen-mail-ballots-forged-three-counted-could-not-be-recalled-after-separation"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Rush ineligible ballots through envelope separation, then claim it is too late to pull them out (IRREVERSIBLE DILUTION)"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-23 (Department of State learns of intercepted ballots); 2024-11-06 (two women charged)", "state": "CO", "description": "In October 2024, at least 12 mail ballots in Mesa County, Colorado were intercepted before reaching voters, voted, and returned through USPS mailboxes, the Colorado Secretary of State's office announced on Oct. 24, 2024; the scheme surfaced when affected voters received signature-cure notices or BallotTrax messages for ballots they had not cast. Nine of the fraudulent ballots were pulled before tabulation, but three passed signature review and were counted. Mesa County's automated equipment had flagged all three signatures, and a single tier-one election judge advanced them to be counted instead of sending them to bipartisan review; the judge was reassigned. Secretary of State Jena Griswold said the three could not be rescinded because of Colorado's confidential ballot process: 'Once signatures are checked, the ballot is pulled independently from the envelope and it's put into the (counting) process' (Colorado Sun). Clerk Bobbie Gross likewise said ballots cannot be retrieved once separated from the signature envelope, and that Colorado law bars the county from overturning a judge's decision (The Business Times). On Nov. 6, 2024, prosecutors charged USPS mail carrier Vicki Lyn Stuart and Sally Jane Maxedon with forgery, identity theft and attempting to influence a public servant; Maxedon told authorities they conspired to 'test' the signature verification system. Charging documents list 16 victims and say there may be as many as 20. Status Confirmed: the Secretary of State, the county clerk and criminal charges establish that fraudulently voted ballots were separated from their envelopes and counted, and that the votes could not be pulled back out. Catalog point: once a mail ballot is separated from its envelope, an ineligible vote becomes permanent; a single judge's click decided it. In-person voting with identification at the precinct catches the problem before a ballot ever enters the box.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Secretary of State — Ballot Fraud Scheme Under Investigation in Mesa County (news release, Oct. 24, 2024)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/PR20241024BallotFraud.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/cosos-mesa-ballot-fraud-2024-10-24.html"}, {"title": "The Colorado Sun — Two women, one a USPS employee, charged with stealing ballots and then casting them in Mesa County (Jesse Paul, Nov. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://coloradosun.com/2024/11/06/mesa-county-ballot-fraud-women-charged/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/coloradosun-mesa-stuart-maxedon-charged-2024-11-06.html"}, {"title": "The Business Times (Grand Junction) — How three fraudulent ballots got through the mail-in voting process in Mesa County (Craig Hall and Brandon Leuallen, Nov. 6, 2024)", "url": "https://thebusinesstimes.com/how-three-fraudulent-ballots-got-through-the-mail-in-voting-process-in-mesa-county-2/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/businesstimes-mesa-three-fraudulent-ballots-2024-11-06.html"}, {"title": "AP News — 12 ballots stolen from mail in Colorado, 3 counted", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/colorado-ballots-stolen-fraudulently-voted-5f4296fe3f6900c8a173f83181287413"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-13 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-13 12:29 PM ET). SOS release, Colorado Sun and Business Times archived (curl 200); AP returned 403 to curl, linked only. Party registrations of the accused are stated because the Colorado Sun states them. Also relevant to USPS interception and signature-verification leaves. No voting-system vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "yougov-economist-2024-10-partisan-election-fairness-fight-each-other", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-04", "uid": "C20260926-033041-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-04", "old_ids": ["yougov-economist-2024-10-partisan-election-fairness-fight-each-other"], "seq": "C01214", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens fight each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Economist/YouGov (Oct. 19–22, 2024) found an extreme pre-election partisan split on whether the election would be held fairly: about 80% of Harris supporters vs only about 20% of Trump supporters expressed substantial confidence—i.e., information-dominance bubbles in which partisan camps fight each other over the reality of election fairness itself. Status Confirmed primary Economist/YouGov Oct. 2024 partisan fairness-confidence gap; peer to Pew 2021 partisan news bubbles and Pew 2020 political-divides/divergent-news cards already on this leaf—YouGov/Economist instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when camps fight over whether machine-reported totals are real, public hand counts of paper restore a shared observable record.", "sources": [{"title": "YouGov/Economist — Closely contested election poll (Oct. 19–22, 2024)", "url": "https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/50784-closely-contested-2024-presidential-election-harris-trump-big-issues-voting-world-series-october-19-22-2024-economist-yougov-poll", "local": "/archives/2026/09/yougov-economist-2024-10-partisan-election-fairness-fight-each-other__yougov-economist-closely-contested-election-poll-oct-19-22-2024.png"}, {"title": "YouGov/Economist — Aftermath of Trump victory poll (Nov. 6–7, 2024 confidence reverse companion)", "url": "https://yougov.com/en-us/articles/50906-aftermath-donald-trump-2024-presidential-election-victory-november-6-7-2024-economist-yougov-poll", "local": "/archives/2026/09/yougov-economist-2024-10-partisan-election-fairness-fight-each-other__yougov-economist-aftermath-of-trump-victory-poll-nov-6-7-2024-confidence-reverse-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Psych Ops Misinforming will fight each other leaf (non-Pew)."}
{"id": "cochise-az-2024-judd-plea-misdemeanor-delay-certify-intimidate", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-09", "uid": "C20260927-121124-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-09", "old_ids": ["cochise-az-2024-judd-plea-misdemeanor-delay-certify-intimidate"], "seq": "C01256", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-21", "state": "AZ", "description": "Cochise County Supervisor Peggy Judd pleaded guilty (Oct. 2024) to a class 3 misdemeanor for failing to perform election duties tied to the board's 2022 delay/refusal to canvass before a court writ of mandamus forced certification; she received unsupervised probation and a fine. Fellow supervisor Tom Crosby remained facing related felony counts. Soft companion to existing Cochise mandamus/intimidate cards—shows personal criminal liability after resisting forced certification. Status Confirmed for the Judd plea/sentence record (AZ Capitol Times, Tucson.com, FOX 10).", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Capitol Times — Cochise supervisor Peggy Judd pleads guilty for delaying 2022 certification", "url": "https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2024/10/21/cochise-county-supervisor-peggy-judd-at-a-public-meeting-on-thursday-dec-1-2022-in-sierra-vista-arizona-mark-levy-pool-photo-via-ap-file/"}, {"title": "Tucson.com — Cochise County official pleads guilty in 2022 election case", "url": "https://tucson.com/news/local/government-politics/elections/article_2148d208-8fd1-11ef-b4ba-5f78104a0bc6.html"}, {"title": "FOX 10 Phoenix — Plea deal reached in Cochise County election interference case (AZ AG)", "url": "https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/plea-deal-reached-cochise-county-election-interference-case-arizona-attorney-general"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Personal-liability aftermath of court-forced certify."}
{"id": "mi-rnc-v-benson-never-resided-overseas-voters-dismissed-2024-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-05", "uid": "C20261009-100620-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-05", "old_ids": ["mi-rnc-v-benson-never-resided-overseas-voters-dismissed-2024-2026"], "seq": "C01269", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-21/2026-04-22", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan law (MCL 168.759a(3)) and the Secretary of State's election officials' manual let a U.S. citizen who has never lived in the U.S., but whose parent, legal guardian, or spouse was last domiciled in Michigan, vote in Michigan if not registered elsewhere. The Michigan GOP, RNC, and Chesterfield Township Clerk Cindy Berry sued 28 days before the 2024 election. On Oct. 21, 2024 Court of Claims Judge Sima Patel dismissed the suit: laches barred an '11th hour attempt to disenfranchise', and the manual was consistent with state, federal, and constitutional law. A related appeal ended at the Court of Appeals in Aug. 2025. The RNC's second suit (Case 25-000181-MZ) was dismissed with prejudice on April 22, 2026, upholding the statute and the manual. Reports say the RNC appealed in May 2026. Status Confirmed for the rulings. Michigan's never-resided allowance remains in force pending appeal.", "sources": [{"title": "Mich. Court of Claims — Michigan Republican Party v. Benson, 24-000165-MZ opinion (Oct. 21, 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.courts.michigan.gov/4aa11f/siteassets/case-documents/opinions-orders/coc-opinions-(manually-curated)/2024/24-000165-mz.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan AG — Republican Party's lawsuit targeting military and overseas voters dismissed (Oct. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2024/10/22/republican-party-election-lawsuit-targeting-military-and-overseas-voters"}, {"title": "Mich. Court of Claims — RNC v. Benson, 25-000181-MZ opinion and order (Apr. 22, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.courts.michigan.gov/498506/siteassets/case-documents/uploads/coc/2025/25-000181-mz/2026-04-22-25-000181-mz-27-order-20260422-opin-and-ord-granting-df-mtn-sd.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Public — Michigan court dismisses GOP lawsuit over some overseas voters (Apr. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.michiganpublic.org/politics-government/2026-04-23/michigan-court-dismisses-gop-lawsuit-seeking-to-disenfranchise-some-overseas-voters"}], "notes": "Appeal status (RNC appealed May 12, 2026) per American Emigration / Greenback trackers; not yet confirmed from a court docket here."}
{"id": "gazette-2024-colorado-unaffiliated-record-high-avr-default", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-27", "uid": "C20260926-002008-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-27", "old_ids": ["gazette-2024-colorado-unaffiliated-record-high-avr-default"], "seq": "C00660", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Inflating independent voter rolls gives fake results plausible cover: more \"wiggle room\" to explain whatever outcome is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-19", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Gazette reporting (Oct 2024) documents unaffiliated/independent registration hitting a record high (~49% of the electorate), with automatic voter registration often defaulting new registrants to unaffiliated—structurally inflating the independent pool that catalogs cite as 'wiggle room' cover for outcome narratives. Status Confirmed for unaffiliated inflation via AVR defaults; does not prove ballots were fabricated under that cover.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Gazette — Unaffiliated voters hit record high (Oct 2024)", "url": "https://gazette.com/2024/10/19/number-of-unaffiliated-voters-in-colorado-has-hit-a-record-high-heres-one-key-reason-why/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gazette-2024-colorado-unaffiliated-record-high-avr-default__colorado-gazette-unaffiliated-voters-hit-record-high-oct-2024.png"}, {"title": "Durango Herald — Across Southwest Colorado, unaffiliated voters swell", "url": "https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/news/across-southwest-colorado-number-of-unaffiliated-voters-swells/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 14. Roll inflation Confirmed; 'cover for fake results' motive Alleged."}
{"id": "ca-sos-ccrov-cvr-locked-pdf-only-directive-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-12", "uid": "C20260925-194013-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-12", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-ccrov-cvr-locked-pdf-only-directive-2024"], "seq": "C00196", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They print CVRs as PDFs, creating another barrier to examining the data."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-18", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State CC/ROV memorandum (Oct 18, 2024) directed that county registrars who choose to produce Cast Vote Records must do so solely as a secure, locked PDF. Alameda County Registrar Tim Dupuis's Nov 1, 2024 board update documents that SOS staff confirmed JSON (machine-analyzable) was not permitted, acknowledged the format 'does not allow for easy data analysis,' treated the memo as a binding directive with felony/civil-penalty risk for noncompliance, and noted San Francisco's historical JSON CVR releases were being pushed into PDF compliance. Status Confirmed that California's SOS forced PDF-locked CVR distribution as an explicit analysis barrier.", "sources": [{"title": "Alameda ROV — Update on CVR production (SOS locked-PDF directive; Nov 1, 2024)", "url": "https://oaklandside.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/FW_-Update-on-Cast-Vote-Record-CVR-Production-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-ccrov-cvr-locked-pdf-only-directive-2024__alameda-rov-update-on-cvr-production-sos-locked-pdf-directiv.pdf"}, {"title": "Alameda County BOS packet — Supervisor Carson CVR / SB 1328 materials", "url": "https://www.acgov.org/board/bos_calendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg_11_12_24/GENERAL%20ADMINISTRATION/Regular%20Calendar/Supervisor%20Carson_378670.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-ccrov-cvr-locked-pdf-only-directive-2024__alameda-county-bos-packet-supervisor-carson-cvr-sb-1328-mate.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 5. SOS locked-PDF CVR mandate Confirmed."}
{"id": "mn-scott-2024-shakopee-20-absentee-ballots-discarded-in-secrecy-envelopes-hd54a-unreconciled", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-03", "uid": "C20261109-122834-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-03", "old_ids": ["mn-scott-2024-shakopee-20-absentee-ballots-discarded-in-secrecy-envelopes-hd54a-unreconciled"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-17 (ballots accepted); 2024-11-07 (discrepancy found); 2024-11-27 (county attorney summary); 2025-01-14 (court order)", "state": "MN", "description": "During its routine post-election audit on Nov. 7, 2024, Scott County, Minnesota, found that the City of Shakopee's early-voting location had 21 more absentee voters recorded in the Statewide Voter Registration System than ballots counted: 20 in Precinct 10 and one in Precinct 12A, in the House District 54A race that Brad Tabke won by 14 votes. County Attorney Ron Hocevar's Nov. 27 preliminary summary concluded that the 20 Precinct 10 ballots were accepted by the city's Absentee Ballot Board on Oct. 17 but were most likely thrown away still sealed in their secrecy envelopes; the city told the county it had put its secrecy envelopes in the garbage, the county traced the trash to a Burnsville landfill, and the recycling had already been shredded. Hocevar wrote that even if the ballots were found, their chain of custody could likely not be proven. In the election contest (Paul v. Tabke), Judge Tracy L. Perzel found on Jan. 14, 2025 that the loss was inadvertent and upheld the result, while listing irregularities: Shakopee did not keep its secrecy envelopes, did not alert the county through an incident log, and balanced absentee ballots by voting location rather than by precinct each day. The recount and official results were based only on the ballots in hand. Status Confirmed by the Scott County Attorney's investigation summary and the district court's findings, reported by MPR News and the Star Tribune. Catalog point: the poll-book count and the ballot count did not reconcile, the containers that could have resolved it were already destroyed, and the race was decided by fewer votes than the ballots that went missing.", "sources": [{"title": "Scott County Attorney — HD 54A preliminary investigation summary (Nov. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.scottcountymn.gov/DocumentCenter/View/23098/Preliminary-investigation-summary"}, {"title": "MPR News — Scott County says 20 ballots likely ended up in trash (Nov. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.mprnews.org/story/2024/11/27/scott-county-official-says-20-absentee-ballots-in-close-house-race-were-likely-tossed", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mpr-scott-county-20-ballots-trash-2024-11-27.html"}, {"title": "Minnesota District Court (via Legislative Reference Library) — Paul v. Tabke, 70-CV-24-17210, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (Jan. 14, 2025)", "url": "https://www.lrl.mn.gov/archive/Court_Cases/70-CV-24-17210/37.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mn-paul-v-tabke-findings-order-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Star Tribune — Missing 54A absentee ballots likely thrown out, Scott County attorney says (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://www.startribune.com/absentee-ballots-54a-tabke-paul/601187751"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-09 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET). Thin leaf (3 -> 4), peers Detroit 2016/2020 out-of-balance cards. MPR and court order archived (curl 200); Scott County PDF returned 403 to curl (content read via search), linked only. Party labels not stated. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nbc-2024-dave-min-huntington-beach-campaign-sign-slurs-public-shaming", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-04", "uid": "C20260926-031602-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-04", "old_ids": ["nbc-2024-dave-min-huntington-beach-campaign-sign-slurs-public-shaming"], "seq": "C01169", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Public shaming and intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-14", "state": "CA", "description": "NBC News (Oct. 14, 2024) and Huntington Beach PD documented arrest of a Fountain Valley man after campaign signs for Korean American congressional candidate Dave Min were spray-painted with anti-Korean slurs in two Orange County incidents—public hate-speech vandalism used to shame/intimidate a candidate and supporters via defaced visible support. Status Confirmed primary NBC/HBPD 2024 Dave Min sign-slur arrest documenting public shaming via campaign-sign vandalism; peer to DE AG 2020 MAGA-hat hate-crime indictment and WaPo 2020 school-bullying MAGA-gear cards already on this leaf—Dave Min 2024 OC instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: public shaming that drives supporters underground shrinks open citizen oversight culture needed for hand-count observation.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — Police arrest man after Dave Min campaign signs spray-painted with anti-Korean slurs (Oct. 14, 2024)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/dave-min-congress-racist-slurs-vandalism-signs-rcna175317"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Huntington Beach arrest / Baugh campaign condemnation of Min sign vandalism (companion)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2024-10-09/huntington-beach-arrest-dave-min-campaign-signs-vandalized"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing Public Shaming/Intimidation leaf."}
{"id": "az-central-2024-independent-registration-growth-wiggle-room-pool", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-28", "uid": "C20260926-002008-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-28", "old_ids": ["az-central-2024-independent-registration-growth-wiggle-room-pool"], "seq": "C00661", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Inflating independent voter rolls gives fake results plausible cover: more \"wiggle room\" to explain whatever outcome is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-10", "state": "AZ", "description": "AZ Central and related 2020–2024 registration-trend reporting show Arizona's independent/other share growing into the mid-30% range while major-party shares shifted—expanding the unaffiliated pool that election narratives treat as the flexible middle. Status Confirmed for independent-roll growth; sinister manipulation-of-cover claim Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Central — How voter registration trends could sway 2024 in Arizona", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/10/10/voter-registration-trends-in-arizona-could-sway-the-2024-election/75587426007/"}, {"title": "Redfin News — Nevada and Arizona lost tens of thousands of registered Democrats", "url": "https://www.redfin.com/news/voter-registration-nevada-arizona-2024/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2024-election-news-worn-out-dilute-efforts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-07", "uid": "C20260926-003520-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-07", "old_ids": ["pew-2024-election-news-worn-out-dilute-efforts"], "seq": "C00720", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens dilute their efforts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2024 election-news survey found large shares of Americans worn out by volume of coverage and struggling to separate truth from fiction—conditions that dilute civic attention/effort across too many simultaneous narrative fronts. Soft remount of fill-20i Pew worn-out family onto this exact 'dilute their efforts' pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured coverage fatigue/attention dilution.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Americans' views of 2024 election news", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Interest in election news increases with most Americans feeling worn out by the volume of coverage (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/10/19/interest-in-election-news-increases-with-most-americans-feeling-worn-out-by-the-volume-of-coverage/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 4. Soft remount of fill-20i Pew worn-out / waste-resources family onto dilute-efforts pathKey."}
{"id": "pew-2024-election-news-worn-out-dilute-efforts-distraction", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-04", "uid": "C20260926-002757-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-04", "old_ids": ["pew-2024-election-news-worn-out-dilute-efforts-distraction"], "seq": "C00677", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens waste their resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's Oct 2024 election-news survey again found ~59% of Americans worn out by campaign coverage volume, with 73% seeing inaccurate election coverage at least somewhat often and 52% finding it difficult to determine what is true—showing sustained distraction/overload that dilutes citizen effort. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew — Americans' Views of 2024 Election News", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/"}, {"title": "Pew short read — Majority closely follow; many already worn out (May 2024)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/05/28/more-than-half-of-americans-are-following-election-news-closely-and-many-are-already-worn-out/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pew-2024-election-news-worn-out-dilute-efforts-distraction__pew-short-read-majority-closely-follow-many-already-worn-out-may-2024.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "apa-2024-stress-america-election-emotional-rollercoaster", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-06", "uid": "C20260926-003520-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-06", "old_ids": ["apa-2024-stress-america-election-emotional-rollercoaster"], "seq": "C00719", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens are drained emotionally."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "APA Stress in America 2024 reported 69% citing the presidential election as a significant stressor and 82% saying the election season felt like an emotional rollercoaster—confirming sustained emotional-drain effects of high-volume political coverage into 2024. Status Confirmed for measured election emotional toll.", "sources": [{"title": "APA — Stress in America 2024: A Nation in Political Turmoil (full report PDF)", "url": "https://www.apa.org/pubs/reports/stress-in-america/2024/2024-stress-in-america-full-report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apa-2024-stress-america-election-emotional-rollercoaster__apa-stress-in-america-2024-a-nation-in-political-turmoil-full-report-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "APA — 2020 election stress release (baseline companion)", "url": "https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2020/10/election-stress"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "cbs-2024-same-day-registration-map-states-traveling-voter-pathway", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-34", "uid": "C20260926-002757-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-34", "old_ids": ["cbs-2024-same-day-registration-map-states-traveling-voter-pathway"], "seq": "C00707", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "In states with same-day registration, simply show up, register, and vote; no advance planning is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "CBS News 2024 explainer mapped states where voters can register and vote the same day, confirming the geographic breadth of the no-pre-planning registration+vote pathway relevant to catalog traveling-voter operations. Status Confirmed for SDR geographic availability.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News — Can you register to vote on Election Day 2024? Map of same-day registration states", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/same-day-voter-registration-2024-election/"}, {"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration requirements/security measures", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "delaware-county-pa-2024-council-livestream-video-no-audio", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-12", "uid": "C20260926-023825-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-12", "old_ids": ["delaware-county-pa-2024-council-livestream-video-no-audio"], "seq": "C01087", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Livestreams and recordings sometimes have audio \"issues\" that keep the public from hearing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-01", "state": "PA", "description": "Delco Times (Oct. 1, 2024) reported Delaware County (PA) Council’s livestream showed video but no audio for the entire Tuesday-night meeting after Granicus encoder maintenance—so remote/archived public could see speakers but not hear deliberation. Status Confirmed contemporaneous local reporting of full-meeting audio failure; peer to Columbus County NC elections-board livestream fail and Clovis NM school-board muted-comment cards already on this leaf—Delco Council Oct. 2024 no-audio incident, not those remounted. PEP framing: silent livestreams block public oversight of election-adjacent county decisions without creating a usable record.", "sources": [{"title": "Delco Times — Nothing to hear on Delaware County Council video Tuesday night (Oct. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.delcotimes.com/2024/10/01/seen-and-not-heard-delaware-county-council-video-tuesday-night/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/delaware-county-pa-2024-council-livestream-video-no-audio__delco-times-nothing-to-hear-on-delaware-county-council-video-tuesday-night-oct-1-2024.png"}, {"title": "65 Pa.C.S. § 701 et seq. — Sunshine Act (open meetings) via Pennsylvania General Assembly", "url": "https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/LI/CT/HTM/65/00.007.001.000..HTM", "local": "/archives/2026/09/delaware-county-pa-2024-council-livestream-video-no-audio__65-pa-c-s-701-et-seq-sunshine-act-open-meetings-via-pennsylvania-general-assembly.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Public Meetings livestream audio-issues leaf. Second source URL duplicated intentionally only if no second primary; will fix to a better second."}
{"id": "nv-sos-2019-2024-nonpartisan-registration-nearly-doubled-avr-wiggle-room", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-13", "uid": "C20260926-030239-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-13", "old_ids": ["nv-sos-2019-2024-nonpartisan-registration-nearly-doubled-avr-wiggle-room"], "seq": "C01133", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Inflating independent voter rolls gives fake results plausible cover: more \"wiggle room\" to explain whatever outcome is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10-01", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada's nonpartisan (no major-party affiliation) active registration nearly doubled from ~344,000 in October 2019 to ~676,000 by October 2024—outnumbering both Democrats and Republicans—after automatic voter registration at DMV defaulted blank party fields to nonpartisan (Reno Gazette-Journal / NV SOS 2024 statistics). The swollen unaffiliated pool creates statistical 'wiggle room' in which modeled or unexpected outcomes can be narrated as independent swing rather than anomalous partisan shifts. Status Confirmed primary state registration-trend reporting of independent/nonpartisan inflation; peer to Colorado unaffiliated record-high AVR and Arizona independent-growth cards already on this leaf—Nevada nonpartisan doubling instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: inflated independent rolls that obscure outcome narratives without public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Reno Gazette-Journal — Nonpartisans key to Nevada elections; ~344k (2019) → ~676k (2024)", "url": "https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/elections/2024/11/04/nonpartisans-are-key-to-nevada-elections-how-they-vote-is-a-mystery/76044311007/"}, {"title": "Nevada Secretary of State — 2024 Voter Registration Statistics", "url": "https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/voter-registration-statistics/2024-statistics"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Inflating independent voter rolls wiggle-room leaf."}
{"id": "nevada-ca-2024-runbeck-ink-overspray-vbm-rescans", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-01", "uid": "C20261014-123054-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-01", "old_ids": ["nevada-ca-2024-runbeck-ink-overspray-vbm-rescans"], "seq": "C01381", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Light printing and poor toner adhesion"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-10 to 2024-11-07", "state": "CA", "description": "In the November 2024 general election, Nevada County, California (Registrar Natalie Adona) publicly attributed delayed vote-by-mail counting to a printer's error that affected ballot readability and forced extra rescanning steps. The county's Nov. 7, 2024 CivicAlert said staff were still processing ballots and that \"because of a printer's error affecting readability on some ballots, some ballots need to be rescanned, which adds more steps than usual to the process.\" Contemporaneous local reporting and Shasta County's parallel disclosure identified the printer as Runbeck and described the defect as ink overspray invisible to the naked eye that blocked scanners from reading ballot barcodes—the same failure mode as toner/print defects that leave machine-critical marks unscannable while looking fine to voters. Status Confirmed for the county's own acknowledgment of a printer readability defect requiring mass rescans (CivicAlert + peer county/reporting). Catalog note: when scanners reject otherwise valid ballots for an invisible print fault, officials move ballots into duplication or rescan workflows that citizens cannot verify mark-for-mark at scale. Hand-marked precinct paper counted in public does not depend on barcode readability or vendor print chemistry.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada County CA — CivicAlert: Final Election Count to Take Time (printer's error / rescans; Nov. 7, 2024)", "url": "https://www.nevadacountyca.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=7925"}, {"title": "Shasta Scout — Registrar explains ink overspray processing; cites Nevada County tip-off and shared Runbeck printer (Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://shastascout.org/elections-office-explains/"}, {"title": "The Union (Grass Valley) — Printer's error may delay results; Registrar Adona on ink overspray (Oct. 2024; curl 429 bot-limit 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.theunion.com/news/printers-error-may-cause-election-results-delay-to-ensure-accurate-results/article_79f8637e-9237-11ef-a42f-5b8303b3c3b8.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed via county CivicAlert + Shasta Scout (Runbeck / overspray). Cross-leaf: Tabulation > print lighter than normal (Maricopa toner peers); Ballots > Paper thickness. Not a Sacramento thickness anecdote remount.", "vendor": ["Runbeck"]}
{"id": "ca-elec-17301-22month-shall-destroy-or-recycle-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-03", "uid": "C20260926-021058-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-03", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-17301-22month-shall-destroy-or-recycle-ballots"], "seq": "C00951", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Deliberately misinterpret the 22-month federal retention minimum to restrict access to election records for 22 months."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §17301 requires specified federal-election ballot packages to be kept unopened for **22 months**, then—if no contest or listed criminal prosecution is commenced—*the elections official **shall** have the items **destroyed or recycled***. Status Confirmed that state law converts the federal **minimum** retention floor (52 U.S.C. §20701) into a **mandatory destruction** window cutting off later citizen examination; peer to federal statute card and post-window records-flood reporting—CA shall-destroy detail, not those remounted. PEP framing: destroying paper after a short clock blocks hand-count remedies.", "sources": [{"title": "Cal. Elec. Code §17301 — 22-month retention; shall destroy or recycle absent contest/prosecution", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=17301.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-17301-22month-shall-destroy-or-recycle-ballots__cal-elec-code-17301-22-month-retention-shall-destroy-or-recycle-absent-contest.png"}, {"title": "52 U.S.C. §20701 — federal 22-month minimum retention (floor, not destroy-by deadline)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/52/20701"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on misinterpreting 22-month minimum as access cutoff / destroy window."}
{"id": "doj-crt-2024-nvra-ncoa-list-maintenance-address-change-mail-process", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-11", "uid": "C20260926-015536-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-11", "old_ids": ["doj-crt-2024-nvra-ncoa-list-maintenance-address-change-mail-process"], "seq": "C00914", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Addresses are copied from one locality to another with the street name changed, generating returned ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09", "state": "National", "description": "DOJ Civil Rights Division's September 2024 NVRA Section 8 list-maintenance guidance describes the statutory 'safe harbor' using USPS National Change of Address (NCOA) data to identify registrants who may have moved, then sending forwardable confirmation/address-correction notices—and separately notes that undeliverable/address-mismatch workflows feed the confirmation-and-waiting removal process. Wrong or altered street addresses on the roll therefore generate UAA election mail and confirmation notices returned to election offices. Status Confirmed for the federal NVRA/NCOA architecture that turns bad/changed addresses into returned mail and list-maintenance traffic—peer to EAC 2024 NCOA memo and USPS UAA Ballot Mail forward/return rules.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ CRT — NVRA List Maintenance Guidance (Sept 2024; NCOA safe harbor)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/nvra-list-maintenance-guidance"}, {"title": "EAC — Update to USPS Change of Address / NCOA Process (Feb 2024 PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-crt-2024-nvra-ncoa-list-maintenance-address-change-mail-process__eac-update-to-usps-change-of-address-ncoa-process-feb-2.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS Kit 600 — STID/ACS forward-or-return for UAA Ballot Mail", "url": "https://about.usps.com/kits/kit600/kit600_v04-2026_023.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kit600-ballot-mail-forward-or-return-stid-acs-endorsements__usps-kit-600-how-to-determine-the-right-stid-forward-vs.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on bad/copied addresses generating returned ballots leaf."}
{"id": "smartmatic-newsmax-2024-defamation-settlement-eve-of-trial", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-03", "uid": "C20260926-022920-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-03", "old_ids": ["smartmatic-newsmax-2024-defamation-settlement-eve-of-trial"], "seq": "C01048", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-26", "state": "DE", "description": "On September 26, 2024, Smartmatic and Newsmax reached a confidential settlement of Smartmatic's Delaware defamation suit over 2020 election-coverage claims, announced as jury selection began and days before trial—parallel lawfare pathway to the Dominion v. Fox $787.5M settlement already on this leaf. AP and Reuters contemporaneous reporting confirm the courthouse-steps resolution; terms were not publicly disclosed. Status Confirmed settlement of vendor-vs-media election defamation litigation; peer to Dominion-Fox—Newsmax settlement, not Fox remounted. PEP framing: high-stakes lawfare around election-tech narratives raises costs of speech and scrutiny without resolving machine-count opacity.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Smartmatic and Newsmax reach settlement in 2020 election defamation case", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/smartmatic-newsmax-lawsuit-2020-election-96d35dc10009b68cbb548ef7bea10284"}, {"title": "Reuters — Newsmax settles Smartmatic defamation suit over 2020 false election claims", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/trial-begins-over-claims-newsmax-defamed-smartmatic-2020-election-reporting-2024-09-26/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Lawfare root leaf.", "vendor": ["Smartmatic"]}
{"id": "doj-edpa-2024-philip-pulley-multi-state-multi-county-registration-voting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-25", "uid": "C20260926-005107-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-25", "old_ids": ["doj-edpa-2024-philip-pulley-multi-state-multi-county-registration-voting"], "seq": "C00818", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Pre-register them in multiple early-voting states using forwarding addresses, sympathetic roommates, or vacant properties (a practice already documented in some voter-roll studies)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-25", "state": "PA", "description": "U.S. Attorney EDPA: Philip C. Pulley pleaded guilty (Sept 2024) to voter-registration fraud, voter fraud, and voting more than once in federal elections — registered in Montgomery County (PA) and Broward County (FL), falsely registered in Philadelphia County, and voted across those jurisdictions in 2020 and 2022. Adjudicated multi-jurisdiction registration + multi-vote pattern matching the leaf's pre-register-in-multiple-places traveling-voter setup (addresses across states/counties). Status Confirmed for this convicted multi-registration/multi-vote scheme; large organized paid traveling crews Alleged beyond individual prosecutions.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ USAO-EDPA — Montgomery County man pleads guilty to election fraud offenses", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/montgomery-county-man-pleads-guilty-election-fraud-offenses"}, {"title": "DOJ USAO-EDPA — Pulley sentenced for election fraud offenses", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/montgomery-county-man-sentenced-election-fraud-offenses"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 13."}
{"id": "gallup-2024-election-integrity-confidence-gop-28-loss-of-hope", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-05", "uid": "C20260926-002757-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-05", "old_ids": ["gallup-2024-election-integrity-confidence-gop-28-loss-of-hope"], "seq": "C00678", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose hope."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-25", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup (Sep 2024) found only 57% of Americans confident votes would be accurately cast/counted nationwide, with Republican confidence collapsing to 28% vs 84% of Democrats—a record 56-point partisan gap reflecting demoralization/loss of hope in electoral integrity among a large partisan bloc. Status Confirmed for measured confidence collapse (loss-of-hope proxy); does not adjudicate fraud claims.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Partisan Split on Election Integrity Gets Even Wider (2024)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx"}, {"title": "Gallup — Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election Matches Record Low (2020 companion)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gallup-2024-election-integrity-confidence-gop-28-loss-of-hope__gallup-confidence-in-accuracy-of-u-s-election-matches-record-low-2020-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 3. PEP contrast: properly-run public hand count of hand-marked paper is observable and can rebuild confidence without trusting opaque centralized systems (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep)."}
{"id": "gallup-2024-election-integrity-confidence-loss-of-confidence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-09", "uid": "C20260926-003520-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-09", "old_ids": ["gallup-2024-election-integrity-confidence-loss-of-confidence"], "seq": "C00722", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose confidence."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-25", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup found only 57% of Americans very/somewhat confident votes would be accurately cast and counted in 2024, with Republican confidence at 28% vs 84% of Democrats—a record 56-point partisan gap documenting demoralizing loss of confidence in election accuracy. Soft remount of fill-20i Gallup integrity family onto this exact 'loss of confidence' pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured confidence collapse/polarization.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Partisan split on election integrity gets even wider (2024)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx"}, {"title": "Gallup — Confidence in accuracy of election matches record low (2020 companion)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 5. PEP: properly-run precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is software-independent and publicly observable and can rebuild confidence without trusting opaque centralized systems (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Soft remount of fill-20i Gallup loss-of-hope family."}
{"id": "brennan-certification-ministerial-shall-duty-multistate", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-14", "uid": "C20260925-194013-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-14", "old_ids": ["brennan-certification-ministerial-shall-duty-multistate"], "seq": "C00198", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-18", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Brennan Center / All Voting is Local / Campaign Legal Center / Protect Democracy's Election Certification Processes and Guardrails guide documents that state certification statutes generally use mandatory 'shall' language making certification a ministerial, nondiscretionary duty by fixed deadlines, that courts interpret this to leave no option to refuse based on unresolved fraud claims (citing e.g. Adams v. Fulton County, Ga. Super. Ct. 2024: officials 'must certify and must do so by a time certain. There are no exceptions.'), and that mandamus / substitution statutes compel certification even over official objections. Status Confirmed for the legal architecture of procedurally automatic certification; whether any particular election was fraudulent is not established by these sources.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Election Certification Processes and Guardrails", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/election-certification-processes-and-guardrails", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-certification-ministerial-shall-duty-multistate__brennan-center-election-certification-processes-and-guardrai.png"}, {"title": "Protect Democracy — Election certification, explained", "url": "https://protectdemocracy.org/work/election-certification-explained/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-certification-ministerial-shall-duty-multistate__protect-democracy-election-certification-explained.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 6. Ministerial 'shall' certification architecture Confirmed."}
{"id": "pa-luzerne-2024-county-manager-pulls-all-four-drop-boxes-seven-weeks-out-aclu-suit-restored", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-05", "uid": "C20261021-122912-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-05", "old_ids": ["pa-luzerne-2024-county-manager-pulls-all-four-drop-boxes-seven-weeks-out-aclu-suit-restored"], "seq": "C01508", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Change the number or location of ballot return sites abruptly, shortly before the election."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-18 (removal announced); 2024-10-01 (ACLU suit); 2024-10-04 to 2024-10-08 (reversal and stipulation)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Sept. 18, 2024, about seven weeks before the general election and shortly before mail ballots were to go out, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, Manager Romilda Crocamo announced that the county would not deploy any of its four mail-ballot drop boxes (Wright Manor in Mountain Top, Misericordia University in Dallas, the Broad Street Business Exchange in Hazleton, and the Penn Place county building in Wilkes-Barre), which had been used since 2020. The county Board of Elections had approved the boxes and in February 2024 voted 3-2 against eliminating them. Crocamo cited safety, security and staffing, saying, \"I cannot say that I can secure the drop boxes,\" and that her authority over county property and personnel allowed the decision; she told voters to bring ballots to the Election Bureau instead. The ACLU of Pennsylvania sued in county court on behalf of In This Together NEPA and three voters, arguing that only the election board could make the decision. After Attorney General Michelle Henry wrote that the board is the sole body authorized to order drop-box deployment, Crocamo announced on Oct. 4 that she would deploy drop boxes while maintaining \"grave concerns\" about security. In an Oct. 6 stipulation she agreed to deploy boxes at county-owned sites, two were installed, and a three-judge panel dismissed the injunction motion as moot. Status Confirmed: the removal, the lawsuit and the partial restoration are documented in local coverage and the court stipulation. Catalog point: an unelected administrator changed the number of return sites weeks before the election against the election board's own vote, and the count went from four to zero to two in about three weeks. Rules that keep changing this close to an election confuse voters and invite disputes, while in-person voting on Election Day stays the same.", "sources": [{"title": "WVIA News — Luzerne County removes ballot drop boxes, citing safety concerns; activists want them back (Sept. 24, 2024)", "url": "https://www.wvia.org/news/local/2024-09-24/luzerne-county-removes-ballot-drop-boxes-citing-safety-concerns-activists-want-them-back"}, {"title": "Times Leader — Lawsuit filed over elimination of Luzerne County drop boxes (2024)", "url": "https://www.timesleader.com/news/1668805/lawsuit-filed-over-elimination-of-luzerne-county-drop-boxes"}, {"title": "Wilkes-Barre Citizens' Voice — Ballot drop boxes installed at Luzerne County-owned sites; agreement reached to end ACLU suit (Oct. 8, 2024)", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2024/10/08/ballot-drop-boxes-installed-at-luzerne-county-owned-sites-agreement-reached-to-end-aclu-suit/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020 on this leaf (1 -> 3 with Wausau). Related Luzerne cards: Wright Manor drop-box overwrite (April 2024 primary), 2022 paper shortage. Oct. 1 suit date per Times Leader 'last week' framing in Oct. 8 article; all three URLs curl 200."}
{"id": "az-2024-mvd-dpoc-coding-error-218000-voters-full-ballot-az-supreme-court", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-05", "uid": "C20261012-125218-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-05", "old_ids": ["az-2024-mvd-dpoc-coding-error-218000-voters-full-ballot-az-supreme-court"], "seq": "C01363", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).", "Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-17 to 2024-10-03", "state": "AZ", "description": "In September 2024 Arizona officials discovered that the Motor Vehicle Division had been coding people who got their licenses before October 1996, and later received a duplicate, renewal or reinstatement, as having documentary proof of citizenship (DPOC), even though MVD never collected it. Arizona requires DPOC to vote in state and local races (Prop 200). The first count was 97,928 affected registrants. Secretary of State Adrian Fontes and Maricopa County Recorder Stephen Richer took the question to the Arizona Supreme Court, which ruled on Sept. 20, 2024 that the voters could cast full ballots because the error was the state's, not theirs. On Sept. 30 the Secretary of State raised the total to about 218,000 (about 79,000 Republicans, 61,000 Democrats and 76,000 others), and Votebeat later reported that at least 696,713 pre-1996 license holders are categorized as citizens without proof on file. The flaw went undetected for about 20 years after Prop 200 took effect. Status Confirmed (court order, SOS release, multiple outlets). These registrants attested citizenship under penalty of perjury, and no noncitizen voting was shown. Catalog note: the state's main automated citizenship check silently failed for two decades and was found by accident. Back-end database checks are only as good as the code behind them, and an \"oversight\" this size is exactly the kind of plausible mistake that keeps protections from working.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Supreme Court — Decision order, Richer v. Fontes, CV-24-0221-SA (Sept. 20, 2024; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ASC-CV240221-9-20-2024-FILED-DECISION-ORDER.pdf"}, {"title": "Arizona Secretary of State — Arizona Voter Data Coding Oversight Updated (~218,000 affected)", "url": "https://azsos.gov/news/849"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Arizona voters affected by error are eligible to cast full ballot (Sept. 21, 2024)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2024/09/21/voters-affected-by-citizenship-check-error-can-cast-a-full-ballot-arizona-supreme-court-rules/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Arizona voter roll errors tied to longstanding flaw in license records (Oct. 3, 2024)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2024/10/03/citizenship-proof-error-federal-only-voter-registration-drivers-license-records/"}, {"title": "Arizona Mirror — Number of voters affected by MVD citizenship proof 'glitch' grows to 218,000", "url": "https://azmirror.com/briefs/number-of-voters-affected-by-mvd-citizenship-proof-glitch-grows-to-218000/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. azsos.gov returns 403 to curl (bot-block); content verified via search snippet + Arizona Mirror. Not a Maricopa tabulation remount. Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter; Overall > Records. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).' to its new child leaf 'Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later'.", "related": ["ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied"]}
{"id": "ceir-2024-early-in-person-voting-mn-sd-va-id-46-days-sept-20", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-02", "uid": "C20260926-030706-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-02", "old_ids": ["ceir-2024-early-in-person-voting-mn-sd-va-id-46-days-sept-20"], "seq": "C01137", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Starting with the earliest-opening states (e.g., Minnesota and South Dakota, about 46 days out; New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, about 45 days), the travelers vote in person during the early period."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-06", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "The Center for Election Innovation & Research's Sept. 2024 brief 'Dates for 2024 Early In-Person and Mail Voting' documents that early in-person voting for the Nov. 5, 2024 general began 46 days out (Sept. 20) in Idaho, Minnesota, South Dakota, and Virginia—the national earliest cluster—with Minnesota/South Dakota continuing through Nov. 4 and Virginia through Nov. 2, while most other states open in mid-October. Status Confirmed primary CEIR state-calendar compilation of the earliest-opening early-voting wave; peer to NCSL early-voting calendar and Saunders Ohio/Florida double-vote cards already on this leaf—CEIR 2024 dates table, not those remounted. PEP framing: staggered multi-week early calendars that enable sequential multi-state travel undercut same-day public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "CEIR — Dates for 2024 Early In-Person and Mail Voting (Sept. 2024; MN/SD/VA/ID Sept. 20)", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/voting-before-election-day-resources-june/2024-dates-voting-before-election-day/"}, {"title": "CEIR — Dates for 2024 Early In-Person and Mail Voting PDF update", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/Dates-for-2024-Early-In-Person-and-Mail-Voting_Sept-2024_Update.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ceir-2024-early-in-person-voting-mn-sd-va-id-46-days-sept-20__ceir-2024-early-in-person-mail-voting-sept-2024-update-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Registration Traveling Voter Operations earliest-opening early-voting calendar leaf."}
{"id": "graphika-2024-spamouflage-americans-fake-us-voter-personas-media-amplification", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-06", "uid": "C20260926-033715-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-06", "old_ids": ["graphika-2024-spamouflage-americans-fake-us-voter-personas-media-amplification"], "seq": "C01231", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Media amplification"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "Graphika's Sept. 2024 report The #Americans documents Chinese state-linked Spamouflage personas impersonating U.S. voters and U.S.-focused advocates on X/TikTok to seed and amplify divisive election-legitimacy and social-issue narratives ahead of 2024—media amplification of manufactured opposition voices that platforms and audiences can mistake for organic citizen sentiment. Status Confirmed primary Graphika Spamouflage/#Americans influence-operation report; peer to NPR 2016 Crowds on Demand fake-news-crew and NBC4 2016 scripted-citizens cards already on this leaf—Graphika Spamouflage foreign-IO media-amplification instance, not those COD remounts. PEP framing: amplified fake 'voter' personas distort perceived public sentiment that precinct hand counts of paper cannot be skewed by inauthentic online crowds.", "sources": [{"title": "Graphika — The #Americans: Spamouflage masquerades as U.S. voters (Sept. 3, 2024)", "url": "https://www.graphika.com/reports/the-americans", "local": "/archives/2026/09/graphika-2024-spamouflage-americans-fake-us-voter-personas-media-amplification__graphika-the-americans-spamouflage-masquerades-as-u-s-voters-sept-3-2024.png"}, {"title": "Graphika/ISD — Spamouflage U.S. election influence companion context", "url": "https://www.graphika.com/reports/spamouflage", "local": "/archives/2026/09/graphika-2024-spamouflage-americans-fake-us-voter-personas-media-amplification__graphika-isd-spamouflage-u-s-election-influence-companion-context.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Forced Opposition How It Works Media Amplification leaf (non-COD)."}
{"id": "abc-2024-doj-election-threats-task-force-sustained-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-09", "uid": "C20260926-004030-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-09", "old_ids": ["abc-2024-doj-election-threats-task-force-sustained-intimidation"], "seq": "C00762", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Sustained intimidation that continues until the target stops the activity that drew the attack"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ's Election Threats Task Force (formed 2021) has investigated thousands of referrals and brought dozens of cases/convictions for threats and intimidation aimed at election workers and officials—documenting sustained, multi-year interference whose practical effect is to stop people from continuing election work. Matches the leaf's 'main characteristic': attacks sustain over time to shut down activity the attackers dislike. Status Confirmed for sustained election-worker intimidation as a federal enforcement priority; partisan 'inorganic' sponsorship of every threat Alleged case-by-case.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC News — DOJ Election Threats Task Force cases/referrals coverage", "url": "https://abcnews.go.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}, {"title": "NBC News — DOJ investigating dozens of threats against election workers", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/doj-investigating-dozens-threats-election-workers-rcna145014"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 5. justice.gov OPA blocked by CDN; ABC/NBC used as durable reportage of DOJ ETF."}
{"id": "wi-wausau-2024-mayor-diny-carts-away-city-hall-drop-box-no-charges", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-06", "uid": "C20261021-122912-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-06", "old_ids": ["wi-wausau-2024-mayor-diny-carts-away-city-hall-drop-box-no-charges"], "seq": "C01509", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Change the number or location of ballot return sites abruptly, shortly before the election."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09 (removal); 2025-05-27 (WEC dismissal of related complaint); 2026-04-08 (no charges)", "state": "WI", "description": "On a Sunday in late September 2024, Wausau, Wisconsin, Mayor Doug Diny used a dolly to remove the city's outdoor absentee-ballot drop box from the sidewalk in front of City Hall and put it in his office, posing for photos as he did so. Voters had begun receiving absentee ballots, though city workers had not yet unlocked the box. Two months earlier the Wisconsin Supreme Court had ruled that drop boxes may be used and left the decision to each community, and the city clerk, Kaitlyn Bernarde, said she reported the removal as an election irregularity to the Marathon County District Attorney and the Wisconsin Elections Commission. Diny said the box was not secured to the ground and that \"the city clerk is out of her lane, I don't work for her.\" During the dispute, voters were told to use the payment box in front of City Hall. The Elections Commission on May 27, 2025 dismissed a separate complaint against city staff over the box, finding it lawful. On April 8, 2026, special prosecutor Eric Toney, the Fond du Lac County District Attorney, announced after a bipartisan review that Diny would not be charged, because the box, which also took city payments and correspondence, did not meet the statutory definition of a ballot box and held no ballots when removed. Status Confirmed: the mayor's removal of the box is undisputed; no crime was charged. Catalog point: a ballot return site disappeared overnight, weeks before a presidential election, by the act of one official who was not the election authority. Return points that can move this easily are a weak foundation; in-person voting at the precinct on Election Day does not depend on them.", "sources": [{"title": "WJFW — Wausau mayor Doug Diny releases statement after abruptly removing ballot box outside city hall (Sept. 2024; curl 429 rate-limit 2026-10-21, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.wjfw.com/news/update-wausau-mayor-doug-diny-releases-statement-after-abruptly-removing-ballot-box-outside-city-hall/article_0e834d1e-7b5a-11ef-a748-83ee73b3bb0a.html"}, {"title": "Wausau Pilot & Review — Wausau officials cleared in ballot drop box complaint (June 2, 2025)", "url": "https://wausaupilotandreview.com/2025/06/02/wausau-officials-cleared-in-ballot-drop-box-complaint/"}, {"title": "WSAW — Bipartisan review determines no charges will be issued against Wausau mayor related to drop box investigation (Apr. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsaw.com/2026/04/08/bipartisan-review-determines-no-charges-will-be-issued-against-wausau-mayor-related-dropbox-issues/"}, {"title": "WPR — Criminal charges won't be filed against Green Bay, Wausau mayors (Apr. 2026)", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/news/no-criminal-charges-against-green-bay-wausau-mayors"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to tx-abbott-one-dropbox-2020 and the Luzerne PA 2024 card on this leaf. AP coverage (apnews.com, 403 bot-block) not linked. WJFW 429; Wausau Pilot, WSAW, WPR curl 200. Exact removal date not stated in fetched text, so card says late September 2024."}
{"id": "nj-atlantic-2024-general-24000-vote-by-mail-instruction-cards-wrong-return-date-november-7", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-03", "uid": "C20261111-123004-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-03", "old_ids": ["nj-atlantic-2024-general-24000-vote-by-mail-instruction-cards-wrong-return-date-november-7"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection", "They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events (for example, publishing a logic and accuracy test for 9 a.m. but starting at 8 a.m., so poll watchers miss the first hour)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-09 (mailing); 2024-09-26 (county release); 2024-11-05 (actual return deadline)", "state": "NJ", "description": "Atlantic County, New Jersey, mailed about 24,000 vote-by-mail ballots for the Nov. 5, 2024 general election with an instruction card that gave the wrong return date: November 7 instead of Election Day, November 5. In a county release dated Sept. 26, 2024, County Clerk Joe Giralo said his investigation found that 'the printing company has acknowledged printing the instruction cards with the wrong return date of November 7 instead of November 5,' that the company agreed to pay for printing and mailing a corrective postcard to every voter who requested a mail ballot, that the files the clerk's office provided were correct, and that the ballots themselves had no error; ballots had to be returned by 8 p.m. on Election Day. County Executive Dennis Levinson said the clerk was not at fault. The release does not name the printing company. Status Confirmed by the Atlantic County Clerk's official release. Catalog point: a mailed instruction told 24,000 voters they had two extra days that did not exist; a voter who relied on it would have had a late ballot rejected. In-person voting on Election Day does not depend on a mailed deadline being printed correctly.", "sources": [{"title": "Atlantic County, NJ — Printer will pay to correct and mail vote-by-mail instruction cards (County Clerk Joe Giralo release, Sept. 26, 2024)", "url": "https://www.atlanticcountynj.gov/Home/Components/News/News/826/16"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-11 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET). Thin leaf (with Pima). County release read via WebFetch; curl returned 403, so linked only. Printer not named in the source, so no vendor tag. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ess-ds200-modem-audit-multitech-verizon", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-29", "uid": "C20260925-185839-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-29", "old_ids": ["ess-ds200-modem-audit-multitech-verizon"], "seq": "C00180", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Install wireless cards, modems, and other connectivity (even covertly) without citizens' and election officials' awareness."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Public DS200 modem-status audit materials and Florida DOS ES&S EVS test documentation describe MultiTech Verizon cellular modem options (and related SIM/modem hardware) that can be present inside ES&S DS200 units for wireless transmission of unofficial results. County checklists (e.g., Navajo County) instruct officials how to identify whether a modem is installed via admin screens/configuration reports—implying presence is not always visually obvious without inspection. Status Confirmed for installed wireless modem hardware in fielded DS200 configurations where enabled.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S DS200 Modem Audit materials (Aug 2024 public PDF)", "url": "https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby/go/a490ef07-664f-4244-b734-db8ab9a64e8d/Modem_Status_DS200_Public20240813-3997097.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-modem-audit-multitech-verizon__es-s-ds200-modem-audit-materials-aug-2024-public-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Florida DOS — ES&S EVS 4.5.0.0 test report (modem configurations)", "url": "https://files.floridados.gov/media/695182/ess-evs-release-4500-version-4-revision-1-test-report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-modem-audit-multitech-verizon__florida-dos-es-s-evs-4-5-0-0-test-report-modem-configuration.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 13. Hardware presence Confirmed in certified configs.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "zuckerberg-2024-letter-jordan-fbi-white-house-content-mod-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-09", "uid": "C20260926-002757-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-09", "old_ids": ["zuckerberg-2024-letter-jordan-fbi-white-house-content-mod-pressure"], "seq": "C00682", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Hijacking of social media content-moderation processes"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-26", "state": "Federal", "description": "Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg's Aug 26, 2024 letter to House Judiciary Chair Jim Jordan states senior Biden Administration officials repeatedly pressured Meta to censor COVID content (including humor/satire) and that the FBI's warning about a potential Russian Biden-family disinformation operation led Meta to temporarily demote the NY Post Hunter Biden laptop story—later acknowledged as not Russian disinformation. Maps to catalog claim that social-media content-moderation processes can be hijacked/pressured by outside actors. Status Confirmed for documented government pressure and FBI-warning-triggered demotion; First Amendment adjudication of Missouri v. Biden is separate.", "sources": [{"title": "POLITICO — Zuckerberg says he regrets caving to White House pressure on content (2024)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2024/08/26/zuckerberg-meta-white-house-pressure-00176399"}, {"title": "House Judiciary — Biden WH Censorship Report (committee compilation of platform-pressure evidence)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/Biden-WH-Censorship-Report-final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/zuckerberg-2024-letter-jordan-fbi-white-house-content-mod-pressure__house-judiciary-biden-wh-censorship-report-committee-compila.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 5. Zuckerberg letter text widely republished; POLITICO contemporaneous report + House Judiciary report used as durable URLs."}
{"id": "oh-2024-larose-597-noncitizen-registrations-138-voted-yost-indicts-six", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-03", "uid": "C20261012-125218-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-03", "old_ids": ["oh-2024-larose-597-noncitizen-registrations-138-voted-yost-indicts-six"], "seq": "C01361", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-26 to 2024-10-22", "state": "OH", "description": "In August 2024, Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose reported finding 597 noncitizens among Ohio's roughly 8 million registered voters and referred them for investigation: 138 whose records showed they had cast ballots and 459 who were registered without voting. On Oct. 22, 2024, Attorney General Dave Yost announced grand-jury indictments of six people for illegal voting; each lacked U.S. citizenship, most were legal permanent residents, and the alleged votes spanned 2008 through 2020 (for example, one man allegedly voted in 2014, 2016 and 2018). A seventh case was no-billed. Defense lawyers and reporting describe noncitizens being offered registration at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, in one account after telling the clerk he was not a citizen. Status Confirmed for the state referrals and the indictments (charges, not convictions). Yost called the cases rare. Catalog note: once a noncitizen record is on the roll, the system mails, issues and counts that person's ballot like any other, for years, until a later data match catches it. A bad actor doesn't need these to be common; one confirmed \"honest mistake\" makes the excuse credible everywhere. Verifying eligibility at the precinct, before a ballot is issued, is the durable control.", "sources": [{"title": "Ohio Attorney General — Grand Juries Indict 6 for Illegal Voting (Oct. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/October-2024/Grand-Juries-Indict-6-for-Illegal-Voting"}, {"title": "Ideastream / Statehouse News Bureau — Almost 600 of 8M people on Ohio's voting rolls found to be non-citizens (Aug. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ideastream.org/2024-08-27/almost-600-of-8m-people-on-ohios-voting-rolls-found-to-be-non-citizens"}, {"title": "AP News — Ohio finds 597 noncitizens who voted or registered in recent elections (Aug. 2024)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/ohio-voters-citizenship-referrals-42799a379bdda8bca7201d6c42f99c65"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for referrals + indictments; outcomes of prosecutions not tracked here. AP returns 403 to curl (bot-block); URL from search, retained. Cross-leaf: Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter (BMV registration offers)."}
{"id": "euclid-oh-public-comment-10-to-5-minutes-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-17", "uid": "C20261001-094909-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-17", "old_ids": ["euclid-oh-public-comment-10-to-5-minutes-2024"], "seq": "C01311", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Public speaking time is continually reduced"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-19", "state": "OH", "description": "Euclid (OH) City Council on Aug. 19, 2024 passed an ordinance combining two separate five-minute public-comment blocks (Committee of the Whole / legislative—previously 10 minutes total speaking opportunity across the meeting) into a single five-minute allotment at the start, effectively halving resident speaking time despite seven residents speaking in opposition that night. Council President Charlene Mancuso defended the cut as streamlining a 'business meeting,' citing Chapter 9 language that the public is not legally entitled to speak. Status Confirmed for the formal reduction of allotted public speaking time. Peer to Fayetteville 5→3, Jersey City 5→3, and Pima 3→2 cards already on this leaf—Euclid Aug. 2024 10→5 combine, not those remounted. PEP framing: continually shrinking citizen time squeezes election-integrity and hand-count testimony before machine-status-quo majorities.", "sources": [{"title": "News-Herald — Euclid reduces time for public comment at City Council meetings (Aug. 20, 2024)", "url": "https://www.news-herald.com/2024/08/20/euclid-reduces-time-for-public-comment-at-city-council-meetings/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct OH halving; not Fayetteville/Jersey City remount."}
{"id": "ncsl-avr-automatic-voter-registration-county-not-full-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-31", "uid": "C20260926-003520-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-31", "old_ids": ["ncsl-avr-automatic-voter-registration-county-not-full-control"], "seq": "C00744", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "If elected county officials do not fully control all registrations, a huge attack surface is left open."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-19", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents Automatic Voter Registration in ~24 states + DC where DMV and other state agencies electronically transmit registration data to election officials—i.e., elected county officials do not solely originate or fully control all registration pathways, leaving a large state-agency attack/error surface. Status Confirmed for AVR/state-agency registration pathways outside exclusive county clerk origination; does not prove exploitation.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — AVR Impact report (companion on roll expansion via agency pathways)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/media/156/download/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf?inline=1"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 16. Soft remount of fill-20i AVR/Brennan family onto county-not-full-control pathKey.", "related": ["ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out"]}
{"id": "ncsl-early-voting-mn-sd-46-va-45-calendar-confirmed", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-27", "uid": "C20260926-005107-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-27", "old_ids": ["ncsl-early-voting-mn-sd-46-va-45-calendar-confirmed"], "seq": "C00820", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Starting with the earliest-opening states (e.g., Minnesota and South Dakota, about 46 days out; New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, about 45 days), the travelers vote in person during the early period."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "NCSL Early In-Person Voting table confirms Minnesota and South Dakota open in-person absentee ~46 days before Election Day and Virginia opens early voting 45 days out — matching the leaf's earliest-opening calendar anchors. Honest correction: as of NCSL's current table, New Jersey and New York early voting begin 10 days out (not ~45); the leaf's NJ/NY figure appears outdated. The staggered multi-week national early-voting calendar that enables sequential travel remains real. Status Confirmed for MN/SD/VA early windows and staggered national calendar; NJ/NY ~45 claim outdated.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Early In-Person Voting (state-by-state begins/ends table)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/early-in-person-voting"}, {"title": "CEIR — Dates for early in-person and mail voting reference", "url": "https://electioninnovation.org/research/dates-for-2026-early-in-person-and-mail-voting/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 14. Honest: NJ/NY not currently ~45 days."}
{"id": "ncsl-early-voting-staggered-national-calendar-2-to-6-weeks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-31", "uid": "C20260926-005107-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-31", "old_ids": ["ncsl-early-voting-staggered-national-calendar-2-to-6-weeks"], "seq": "C00824", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Repeat across the country, hitting battleground states in waves (Midwest → Southeast → Southwest → West Coast) over the two- to six-week early-voting calendar."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "NCSL documents early-voting period lengths from ~3 to 46 days (average ~20) with staggered start dates across states — creating a multi-week national calendar in which Midwest (e.g., MN 46-day in-person absentee), Southeast (e.g., GA/VA windows), Southwest (e.g., AZ 27-day), and West Coast (e.g., CA vote-by-mail + early) jurisdictions open on different schedules. That staggered geography is the leaf's wave calendar substrate. Status Confirmed for staggered national early calendar; organized paid wave crews Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Early In-Person Voting (length/start variation)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/early-in-person-voting"}, {"title": "Cuyahoga Prosecutor — Saunders OH/FL multi-election double-vote companion", "url": "https://www.ccprosecutor.us/ohio-attorney-found-guilty-voting-more-than-once-general-elections/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 16."}
{"id": "mi-2024-st-clair-shores-absentee-and-in-person-both-counted-epb-override", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-01", "uid": "C20261009-105430-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-01", "old_ids": ["mi-2024-st-clair-shores-absentee-and-in-person-both-counted-epb-override"], "seq": "C01334", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-06", "state": "MI", "description": "In Michigan's Aug. 6, 2024 primary in St. Clair Shores, four voters whose returned absentee ballots had already been received appeared at the polls. The Michigan AG says the e-pollbook warned they had already voted absentee, yet three election workers allegedly told poll workers to override the warnings and issue in-person ballots. The workers allegedly changed the Qualified Voter File to show the returned absentee ballots as 'rejected' rather than received, 'without making any effort to ensure the corresponding ballot was rejected from the absentee voter counting board.' 'As a result, the absentee ballots were counted' alongside the in-person ballots. The city clerk self-reported the double votes. The Macomb County Prosecutor declined to charge; AG Nessel charged all seven on Oct. 4, 2024. Voter Frank Prezzato pleaded guilty to Voting Absentee and In-Person, acknowledged acting 'recklessly,' and received six months' delayed probation (Oct. 22, 2025); the AG confirms 'both votes were counted.' Charges against the election workers (Guciardo, McClintock, Brasure; the city calls them seasonal staff) were dismissed, and the dismissals were upheld on appeal in 2025. At least one other voter's case was also dismissed. Status Confirmed that double votes were counted (AG releases, guilty plea). Intent behind the override and record change was not proven in court. That is the pattern this leaf describes: a confirmed double count, an official override, and an outcome resolved as error.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan AG — AG Nessel charges St. Clair Shores residents, assistant clerks for double voting (Oct. 4, 2024)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2024/10/04/ag-nessel-charges-st-clair-shores-residents-assistant-clerks-for-double-voting"}, {"title": "Michigan AG — St. Clair Shores man sentenced for double voting (Oct. 22, 2025)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2025/10/22/st-clair-shores-man-sentenced-for-double-voting"}, {"title": "Michigan AG — St. Clair Shores man pleads guilty to double voting (Sept. 3, 2025)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/press-releases/2025/09/03/st-clair-shores-man-pleads-guilty-to-double-voting"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press — Judge dismisses charges against 2 St. Clair Shores election workers (Dec. 11, 2024)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2024/12/11/st-clair-shores-double-voting-charges-dropped/76902597007/"}, {"title": "Michigan Court of Appeals — People v. Guciardo, order (2025, via Justia)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/michigan/court-of-appeals-order/2025/375762.html"}, {"title": "Macomb Daily — Judge upholds dismissal of charges against two St. Clair Shores election workers (May 6, 2025)", "url": "https://www.macombdaily.com/2025/05/06/judge-upholds-dismissal-of-charges-against-two-st-clair-shores-election-workers/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Cross-ref: federalist-2024-ny-voter-fraudulent-ballot-already-cast-low-propensity-show-up, which mentions this case only as a companion. MI rule (2026): a voter whose returned AV ballot is received may not vote in person. Spoiling a returned AV ballot ends at 10 a.m. the Monday before ED (earlier deadlines apply where early voting is offered).", "related": ["mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live"]}
{"id": "uss-2024-foreign-nationals-swatting-conspiracy-lawmakers-protect", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-08", "uid": "C20260926-005107-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-08", "old_ids": ["uss-2024-foreign-nationals-swatting-conspiracy-lawmakers-protect"], "seq": "C00801", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "U.S. Secret Service announced charges against two foreign nationals in a swatting conspiracy targeting lawmakers, private victims, houses of worship, and businesses — illustrating why political actors need defensive systems against illegal communications/emergency-vector attacks. Status Confirmed for federal charging of a multi-target swatting conspiracy against officials; does not itself prove every leaf's 'Democrats' attribution.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Secret Service — Two foreign nationals charged in swatting conspiracy targeting lawmakers", "url": "https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2024/08/two-foreign-nationals-charged-swatting-conspiracy-targeting-lawmakers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uss-2024-foreign-nationals-swatting-conspiracy-lawmakers-protect__u-s--secret-service---two-foreign-nationals-charged-in-swatting-conspiracy-targe.png"}, {"title": "BBC — US lawmakers targeted by swatting hoaxes in multiple states", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-67837637"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "ks-ford-2024-primary-one-more-ballot-than-poll-book-check-ins-legislative-post-audit", "permanent_id": "C20261106-122819-03", "uid": "C20261106-122819-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-122819-03", "old_ids": ["ks-ford-2024-primary-one-more-ballot-than-poll-book-check-ins-legislative-post-audit"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "More ballots are scanned than voters checked in at a poll site, and the board offers a scanner-counter explanation instead of reconciling."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-08 (2024 primary); 2024-10 (Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit report)", "state": "KS", "description": "In October 2024 the Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit published a limited-scope audit of Ford County's ballot-reconciliation process for the 2024 primary. Auditors compared poll-book check-ins with election-night tabulator result tapes and ballot-reconciliation sheets at all five polling sites. Four sites balanced. At one site, tabulator totals exceeded completed poll-book check-ins by one ballot: auditors concluded poll workers appeared to let a poll worker cast a ballot without completing the electronic-poll-book signature screen, and workers used a handwritten tally instead of the county's required reconciliation sheet, which misrepresented that the poll book and tabulator matched throughout the day. Countywide, election-day polling sites reported 852 ballots counted on tabulators against 851 poll-book check-ins. The election officer certified results from the handwritten tally and was not aware of the discrepancy until the audit identified it; state law (K.S.A. 25-4412 and 25-4611) requires poll workers to balance ballots with poll-book signatures when the polls close and to report discrepancies in writing. The election officer told auditors the poll worker later claimed a poll-book malfunction; auditors reviewing poll-book logs said the book appeared to work properly and that workers should have switched books and required a signature before allowing the vote. Status Confirmed: published state post-audit finding of one more ballot scanned than completed check-ins, with the county's own process failing to catch it until outside auditors did. Catalog point: when poll-book check-ins and scanned ballots are not reconciled in public before certification, a single extra ballot can pass as a training error; paper poll books and same-day reconciliation put that mismatch in front of bipartisan precinct workers before the count is locked.", "sources": [{"title": "Kansas Legislative Division of Post Audit — Reviewing Ford County's Ballot Reconciliation Process During the 2024 Primary Election (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.kslpa.gov/audit-report-library/reviewing-ford-countys-ballot-reconciliation-process-during-the-2024-primary-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ks-lpa-ford-county-ballot-reconciliation-2024-primary.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-06 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peer Utah County 2024 Fast Cast card. KSLPA audit page archived (curl 200). No vendor named in the audit finding for the mismatch. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "odni-2024-07-election-security-update-foreign-influence-manipulate-public-opinion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-01", "uid": "C20260926-031135-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-01", "old_ids": ["odni-2024-07-election-security-update-foreign-influence-manipulate-public-opinion"], "seq": "C01151", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Use influencers to manipulate public opinion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-29", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Office of the Director of National Intelligence Foreign Malign Influence Center's late-July 2024 Election Security Update documents foreign actors (Russia foremost, plus Iran and China) conducting influence operations aimed at shaping U.S. public opinion, fomenting discord, and undermining democratic institutions ahead of the November election—including Russia-based influence-for-hire firms, social-media networks of Western personalities, fake news sites, and AI-assisted content. Status Confirmed primary ODNI IC assessment of foreign influence ops to manipulate public opinion; peer to SSCI Volume II IRA and Oxford/New Knowledge computational-propaganda cards already on this leaf—2024 ODNI Election Security Update, not those remounted. PEP framing: covert influence campaigns that dominate information ecosystems undercut public confidence that hand-counted, publicly observed results would otherwise support.", "sources": [{"title": "ODNI FMIC — Election Security Update as of Late-July 2024 (100 Days Until Election)", "url": "https://www.odni.gov/files/FMIC/documents/ODNI-Election-Security-Update-20240729.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/odni-2024-07-election-security-update-foreign-influence-manipulate-public-opinion__odni-2024-07-election-security-update-fmic-foreign-influence.pdf"}, {"title": "FBI — Joint ODNI, FBI, and CISA Statement (Nov. 4, 2024; foreign influence to undermine confidence)", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/news/press-releases/joint-odni-fbi-and-cisa-statement-110424", "local": "/archives/2026/09/odni-2024-07-election-security-update-foreign-influence-manipulate-public-opinion__fbi-joint-odni-fbi-cisa-statement-foreign-influence-nov-2024.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Influence Operations Use influences to manipulate public opinion leaf."}
{"id": "fec-mur7615-phillips-heller-embezzlement-conviction-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-25", "uid": "C20260926-001426-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-25", "old_ids": ["fec-mur7615-phillips-heller-embezzlement-conviction-2024"], "seq": "C00618", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "A campaign's financial manager may waste funds or break laws to compromise the candidate they claim to support."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-23", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC MUR 7615 / DOJ prosecution: Ryan Phillips (former In Compliance partner managing Heller for Senate / HellerHighWater PAC finances) misappropriated ~$185k via unauthorized withdrawals and false accounting entries, pled guilty to false statements, sentenced to probation (2024). Classic campaign financial-manager violation that harms the candidate the manager was retained to support. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Referral secures criminal conviction (MUR 7615 / Phillips)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-referral-secures-criminal-conviction-in-campaign-finance-matter/"}, {"title": "FEC closed MUR 7615 documents portal reference", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/7615/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 13."}
{"id": "reuters-2024-menendez-bribery-conviction-resignation-compromise-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-06", "uid": "C20260926-032103-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-06", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-menendez-bribery-conviction-resignation-compromise-control"], "seq": "C01186", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Are controllable through compromise."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-16", "state": "NJ / Federal", "description": "A Manhattan federal jury convicted U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez on July 16, 2024 on all corruption counts including bribery and acting as an agent of Egypt; he resigned effective Aug. 20, 2024—documenting how compromise (foreign-government bribery leverage) can control a sitting high-office candidate/incumbent until conviction forces exit. Status Confirmed primary Reuters/court record of bribery conviction and resignation as compromise-control instance; peer to Greitens 2018 blackmail/resignation and NY v. Trump catch-and-kill cards already on this leaf—Menendez 2024 foreign-agent bribery instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: compromised officeholders cannot be trusted stewards of transparent public hand-count reforms.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — US Senator Bob Menendez resigns after corruption conviction (July 23, 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-senator-bob-menendez-resigns-after-corruption-conviction-2024-07-23/"}, {"title": "Reuters — Jury convicts Menendez on corruption counts (July 16, 2024 companion)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/jury-reaches-verdict-us-senator-bob-menendezs-corruption-trial-2024-07-16/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Candidate Engineering controllable through compromise leaf."}
{"id": "reuters-2024-menendez-corruption-conviction-compromised-official", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-16", "uid": "C20260926-005107-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-16", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-menendez-corruption-conviction-compromised-official"], "seq": "C00809", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Compromise and blackmail judges and prosecutors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-16", "state": "NJ", "description": "Reuters reported U.S. Sen. Bob Menendez (former chairman of Senate Foreign Relations; historically a powerful influence over federal prosecutorial/Justice politics in NJ) was convicted on 16 federal counts including bribery, extortion, fraud, and acting as an agent of Egypt — gold bars, cash, and a Mercedes among the quid pro quo evidence. Soft companion establishing high-level compromised official with leverage over the justice ecosystem the leaf names. Status Confirmed for adjudicated corruption conviction; 'blackmailed judges/prosecutors' as a separate cabal program Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Sen. Menendez convicted at corruption trial (July 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/jury-reaches-verdict-us-senator-bob-menendezs-corruption-trial-2024-07-16/"}, {"title": "Arkansas Democrat-Gazette — Ex-judge Maggio bribery conviction stand (companion)", "url": "https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2023/jul/25/former-faulkner-county-judge-maggios-motion-to-have-conviction-vacated-denied/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 8 companion. Menendez is senator not judge; framed as justice-ecosystem compromise."}
{"id": "washoe-nv-2024-recount-certify-under-extreme-duress-clark", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-01", "uid": "C20260927-121124-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-01", "old_ids": ["washoe-nv-2024-recount-certify-under-extreme-duress-clark"], "seq": "C01248", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-16", "state": "NV", "description": "Washoe County (NV) Board of County Commissioners voted 3–2 on July 9, 2024 against canvassing/certifying two June primary recounts; on July 16 the board reversed 4–1 and certified after SOS Cisco Aguilar and AG Aaron Ford petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus and after District Attorney Christopher Hicks warned commissioners that failure to certify could mean criminal prosecution and forfeiture of office. Commissioner Mike Clark stated on the record that his yes vote was made \"under extreme duress under the threat of both my position and prosecution,\" acknowledging certification as a non-discretionary ministerial duty. Status Confirmed for court/DA-compelled certification and the public \"under extreme duress\" vote (Nevada Current, KOLO, Nevada Independent, AG mandamus petition); does not adjudicate the underlying recount irregularities Clark cited.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Current — Washoe Commission reverses course; Clark cites extreme duress (Jul 17, 2024)", "url": "https://nevadacurrent.com/2024/07/17/washoe-county-commission-reverses-course-acknowledges-election-certification-mandatory/"}, {"title": "NV AG — Aguilar v. Washoe County Commissioners mandamus petition (Jul 10, 2024 PDF)", "url": "https://ag.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/agnvgov/Content/News/PR/PR_Docs/2024/Aguilar%20v%20Washoe%20Mandamus%20Petition_7.10.24.pdf"}, {"title": "KOLO-TV — Washoe commissioners take back a 'no' vote; Clark 'under extreme duress'", "url": "https://www.kolotv.com/2024/07/17/washoe-county-commissioners-take-back-no-vote/"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Mark Cook Aug 6 2026 note. Confirmed process/duress-vote facts."}
{"id": "pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-ballot-images-rtkl-denial-affirmed", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-07", "uid": "C20260926-022005-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-07", "old_ids": ["pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-ballot-images-rtkl-denial-affirmed"], "seq": "C00985", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-12", "state": "PA", "description": "In Stroehmann v. Lycoming County Office of Voter Services (Pa. Cmwlth. July 12, 2024, No. 555 C.D. 2023), the Commonwealth Court affirmed denial of a Right-to-Know Law request for digital images of in-person ballots cast in the 2020 general election, holding that such images remain ‘contents of ballot boxes’ exempt under Election Code §308 even after scanning/removal. Status Confirmed judicial barrier to public ballot-image inspection via RTKL; peer to Arizona AUDIT-USA CVR denial and Michigan QVF method-records litigation on this leaf—Lycoming/Stroehmann ballot-image RTKL affirmance, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Pa. Commonwealth Court — Stroehmann v. Lycoming County (555 C.D. 2023) opinion PDF", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/555CD23_7-12-24.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-ballot-images-rtkl-denial-affirmed__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "Pa. Commonwealth Court — Honey v. Lycoming (related ballot/CVR RTKL framework) PDF", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/57CD23_3-4-24.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-ballot-images-rtkl-denial-affirmed__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Public Information Requests leaf."}
{"id": "pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-ballot-images-denied-rtkl", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-27", "uid": "C20260925-234437-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-27", "old_ids": ["pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-ballot-images-denied-rtkl"], "seq": "C00460", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Block all access to ballot images and paper ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-12", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court in Stroehmann v. Lycoming County (555 CD 2023, July 12, 2024) affirmed denial of a Right-to-Know request for digital images of in-person ballots cast in the 2020 general election—illustrating judicial blocking of public access to ballot images. Status Confirmed for the denial/block mechanism under PA RTKL/Election Code framing used by the court. Soft companion to later PA Supreme Court CVR nuances; this card is specifically about ballot-image denial.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Courts — Stroehmann v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services (555 CD 2023 PDF)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/555CD23_7-12-24.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-stroehmann-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-ballot-images-denied-rtkl__pa-courts-stroehmann-v-lycoming-county-offices-of-voter-services-555-cd-2023-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — related PA ballot-image / CVR access litigation context", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2026/79-map-2024.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 14."}
{"id": "washoe-nv-2024-ag-sos-mandamus-prosecution-forfeiture-intimidate", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-02", "uid": "C20260927-121124-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-02", "old_ids": ["washoe-nv-2024-ag-sos-mandamus-prosecution-forfeiture-intimidate"], "seq": "C01249", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-10", "state": "NV", "description": "After Washoe County commissioners voted against certifying two 2024 primary recounts, Nevada SOS Aguilar and AG Ford filed a Nevada Supreme Court mandamus petition framing canvass/certification as mandatory/ministerial (NRS 293.387 / NAC 293.365) and seeking to compel the board; contemporaneous DA guidance warned of criminal prosecution and forfeiture of office for non-certifiers. Two of three 'no' voters then flipped to certify. Soft companion on the intimidate-canvassers leaf to the Forcing-certification Washoe card. Status Confirmed for AG/SOS/DA pressure pathway against non-certifying canvassers.", "sources": [{"title": "NV AG — Aguilar v. Washoe mandamus petition (Jul 10, 2024)", "url": "https://ag.nv.gov/uploadedFiles/agnvgov/Content/News/PR/PR_Docs/2024/Aguilar%20v%20Washoe%20Mandamus%20Petition_7.10.24.pdf"}, {"title": "Nevada Independent — Washoe certifies recount after refusing; AG petition loomed", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/washoe-county-certifies-recount-after-refusing-to-do-so-last-week"}, {"title": "AP — Nevada county reverses vote and certifies recounts while legal action looms", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/washoe-county-cisco-aguilar-aaron-ford-427cb4cbb840f6f9d995403d52e63419"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Intimidate-canvass companion to Washoe Forcing leaf card."}
{"id": "fjp-2024-county-judges-election-security-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-19", "uid": "C20260926-004030-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-19", "old_ids": ["fjp-2024-county-judges-election-security-lockstep"], "seq": "C00772", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County judges"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Fair and Just Prosecution's 2024 elections brief and related county election-security coordination materials situate local prosecutors and courts inside shared frameworks with election officials, LE, and CISA on intimidation, fraud, and post-election disputes—i.e., county judicial/prosecutorial offices operating in lock-step institutional channels that shape which election challenges proceed. Soft remount of fill-20j County Attorneys FJP/GCC family onto County Judges pathKey. Status Confirmed for coordinated local justice–election-security architecture; cabal personnel claim Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Fair and Just Prosecution — Prosecutor's Role in Free and Fair Elections (2024 PDF)", "url": "https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/FJP_Brief_FreeandFairElections.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — GCC/SCC joint statement trusted-voice messaging companion", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 10. Soft remount of County Attorneys / GCC family onto County Judges. Weaker on 'judges' vs prosecutors—labeled honestly."}
{"id": "fjp-2024-prosecutor-role-elections-county-attorneys", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-15", "uid": "C20260926-003520-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-15", "old_ids": ["fjp-2024-prosecutor-role-elections-county-attorneys"], "seq": "C00728", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County attorneys"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Fair and Just Prosecution's 2024 brief on the prosecutor's role in free and fair elections documents how county/district attorneys coordinate with election officials, law enforcement, FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and CISA on intimidation, fraud, interference, and post-election threats—i.e., county attorneys operating in shared lock-step frameworks that shape what election issues get prioritized. Soft remount of GCC/CISA coordination architecture onto County Attorneys pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented prosecutor–election-security coordination; sinister 'cabal infiltration' of county attorney offices Alleged beyond coordination evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "Fair and Just Prosecution — The Prosecutor's Role in Promoting and Protecting Free and Fair Elections (2024 PDF)", "url": "https://fairandjustprosecution.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/FJP_Brief_FreeandFairElections.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fjp-2024-prosecutor-role-elections-county-attorneys__fair-and-just-prosecution-the-prosecutor-s-role-in-promoting.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Joint statement Elections Infrastructure GCC & SCC Executive Committees (2020 lock-step messaging companion)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 8. Honest: coordination Confirmed; personnel cabal 'infiltration' Alleged. Soft remount of fill-20i Governor/GCC family onto County Attorneys."}
{"id": "az-pima-2024-07-primary-135541-sample-ballots-vote-center-list-gave-wrong-date-august-30", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-02", "uid": "C20261111-123004-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-02", "old_ids": ["az-pima-2024-07-primary-135541-sample-ballots-vote-center-list-gave-wrong-date-august-30"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection", "They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events (for example, publishing a logic and accuracy test for 9 a.m. but starting at 8 a.m., so poll watchers miss the first hour)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-07 (mailing, week of July 8); 2024-07-15 and 2024-07-17 (county memoranda); 2024-07-30 (primary)", "state": "AZ", "description": "Ahead of Arizona's July 30, 2024 primary, the Pima County Elections Department mailed 135,541 sample ballots to voter households (State Affairs). The title page had the correct date of July 30, but the accompanying Election Center list of vote-center addresses gave the election date as August 30, 2024, a month after the primary. County Administrator Jan Lesher's July 17, 2024 memorandum to the Board of Supervisors acknowledged that the sample ballots 'included the wrong date,' and said the department was sending every household that received one a postcard with the correct date in prominent text and distributing the correction through the media and social media; Elections Director Constance Hargrove's attached memo described the layered proofing process and new steps to prevent a repeat. Residents raised the error at the July 16 Board meeting; one told the supervisors, 'Our trust has been violated.' No finding of intent was made. Status Confirmed by the Pima County Administrator's and Elections Director's memoranda and State Affairs reporting. Catalog point: an official election mailing told voters the election was a month later than it was, on the very page listing the countywide vote centers; one fixed Election Day at a known neighborhood precinct leaves far less room for that kind of misdirection.", "sources": [{"title": "Pima County Administrator Jan Lesher — Review of Error in Sample Ballot, with Elections Director Constance Hargrove memo 'Proofing and Accuracy of Communications' (July 17, 2024)", "url": "https://content.civicplus.com/api/assets/a6d434b2-c569-47d8-bb55-05ea01a2586b", "local": "/archives/2026/11/pima-lesher-sample-ballot-wrong-date-memo-2024-07-17.pdf"}, {"title": "State Affairs (Arizona Legislative Report) — Will Pima County SNAFU raise doubts about election integrity? (July 19, 2024)", "url": "https://pro.stateaffairs.com/az/legislative-report/news/will-pima-county-snafu-raise-doubts-about-election-integrity", "local": "/archives/2026/11/stateaffairs-pima-sample-ballot-wrong-date-2024-07.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-11 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET). Thin leaf (1 -> 3, with the Atlantic County NJ card). County memo PDF and State Affairs archived (curl 200). No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "co-sos-2024-primary-unaffiliated-roll-growth-around-primaries", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-32", "uid": "C20260926-002008-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-32", "old_ids": ["co-sos-2024-primary-unaffiliated-roll-growth-around-primaries"], "seq": "C00665", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Mass changes of party affiliation to unaffiliated to manipulate results (look for affiliation changes before and after primaries)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado SOS 2024 primary ballot-return reporting shows statewide unaffiliated rolls continuing to grow around presidential and June primary windows—official statistics supporting monitoring affiliation changes before/after primaries as a meaningful roll-dynamics signal. Status Confirmed for official unaffiliated growth around primaries.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — 2024 Presidential Primary return reporting", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/2024PresidentialPrimaryReturnReporting6daysout.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-2024-primary-unaffiliated-roll-growth-around-primaries__colorado-sos-2024-presidential-primary-return-reporting.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — 2024 June Primary ballot return reporting", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2024/20240625PrimaryBallotReturnReporting1dayout.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-2024-primary-unaffiliated-roll-growth-around-primaries__colorado-sos-2024-june-primary-ballot-return-reporting.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "wa-sos-signature-verification-training-manual-2024-county-responsibility-not-fde-cert", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-04", "uid": "C20260925-235207-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-04", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-signature-verification-training-manual-2024-county-responsibility-not-fde-cert"], "seq": "C00477", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "There is no testing before a citizen is allowed to verify signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington SOS Signature Verification Training Manual (June 2024) places ultimate training responsibility on county auditors (training at least every two years, oath, public posting of canvassing-board trainee names, random compliance checks). It is an elections-administration training framework—not an ABFDE certification exam or multi-year FDE apprenticeship gate. Status Confirmed that WA's statewide standards train election personnel without requiring forensic-document-examiner certification testing before signature verification duties.", "sources": [{"title": "WA SOS — Signature Verification Training Manual (6.5.2024)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/Sig%20Verification%20Training%20Manual.6.5.2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-signature-verification-training-manual-2024-county-responsibility-not-fde-cert__wa-sos-signature-verification-training-manual-6-5-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "ASQDE — membership / document examiner path (contrast to election training)", "url": "https://www.asqde.org/membership", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-signature-verification-training-manual-2024-county-responsibility-not-fde-cert__asqde-membership-document-examiner-path-contrast-to-election-training.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 2 companion. Soft contrast to fill-20c ABFDE card."}
{"id": "ut-utah-county-2024-primary-fast-cast-19-more-ballots-than-check-ins-not-reconciled", "permanent_id": "C20261102-123005-01", "uid": "C20261102-123005-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-123005-01", "old_ids": ["ut-utah-county-2024-primary-fast-cast-19-more-ballots-than-check-ins-not-reconciled"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "More ballots are scanned than voters checked in at a poll site, and the board offers a scanner-counter explanation instead of reconciling."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06-25 (primary); 2024-07-02 (state review visit); 2024-09 (Lieutenant Governor report)", "state": "UT", "description": "In Utah County's June 25, 2024, primary, the County Clerk's Office ran a program it called \"Fast Cast Voting,\" which let voters bring a completed by-mail ballot to a polling place, show ID, and scan it directly into a tabulator instead of having the envelope signature checked. The Lieutenant Governor's Office review says state elections director Ryan Cowley had warned beforehand that voters could scan more than one ballot without poll workers knowing, and that a key tabulator security feature that tells mail ballots from in-person ballots had to be disabled for the fast-cast machines to read mail ballots. When state elections staff visited the clerk's office on July 2, a week after the primary, the county had not reconciled its polling locations. From the county's own records, the state found at least 19 more ballots cast than voters checked in; Lehi, for example, showed 423 ballots against 407 check-ins. The clerk attributed the difference to poll worker training confusion and said the voters were properly verified but not fully checked in, and the report says there is no way to verify that and that it is conceivable some voters cast more than one ballot or skipped check-in. Deputy state elections director Shelly Jackson told KSL: \"We don't know for a fact that those were fraudulent, but we can't prove that they weren't.\" The report found the fast-cast process \"lacked key statutory controls and created an environment where fraudulent and/or unauthorized ballots were cast\" and directed the county to reconcile every polling location and to abandon or substantially change fast cast. Status Confirmed: the gap, the missing reconciliation, and the disabled safeguard are findings in the state's official review. Catalog point: ballots outnumbered check-ins, the county offered an explanation instead of a reconciliation, and once the ballots were in the tabulator nothing could show which ones lacked a voter; a precinct-level paper hand count reconciled against the poll book on election night closes that gap.", "sources": [{"title": "Utah Lieutenant Governor's Office — Utah County 2024 Primary Election Review (Sept. 2024)", "url": "https://vote.utah.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Final-Utah-County-Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ut-utah-county-2024-primary-review-ltgov.pdf"}, {"title": "KSL — Vote discrepancies, high signature rejections found in Utah County primary (Sept. 16, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/news/utah/vote-discrepancies-high-signature-rejections-found-in-utah-county-primary/51579483", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ksl-utah-county-fast-cast-19-more-ballots.html"}, {"title": "ABC4 — What happened with Utah Co. ballots from June 25?", "url": "https://www.abc4.com/news/politics/utah-co-election-review/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-02 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (1 -> 2), peer Brooklyn 2021 FDR HS card. Same state report also underlies the existing Utah County signature-rejection card; this card covers the reconciliation finding only. Report PDF and KSL archived (curl 200); ABC4 linked only. No vendor named in sources."}
{"id": "reuters-institute-2024-dnr-us-news-avoidance-waste-resources", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-03", "uid": "C20260926-033715-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-03", "old_ids": ["reuters-institute-2024-dnr-us-news-avoidance-waste-resources"], "seq": "C01228", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens waste their resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06-17", "state": "Federal", "description": "Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2024 found ~43% of Americans sometimes or often avoid the news (up five points year-over-year), with consistent news avoiders (~8%) consuming news less than monthly—documenting attention/resource waste and withdrawal from civic information environments under saturating, anxiety-inducing coverage. Status Confirmed primary Reuters Institute DNR 2024 U.S. news-avoidance finding; peer to Pew 2020 and Pew 2024 worn-out coverage cards already on this leaf—Reuters Institute instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: wasted civic resources fleeing opaque process coverage are recovered when public hand counts of paper make the count itself observable without endless disputed machine narratives.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters Institute — Why millions of Americans avoid the news (DNR 2024: ~43% U.S. news avoidance) (Oct. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/news/why-millions-americans-avoid-news-and-what-it-means-us-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/reuters-institute-2024-dnr-us-news-avoidance-waste-resources__reuters-institute-why-millions-of-americans-avoid-the-news-dnr-2024-43-u-s-news-avoidance-oct-22-2024.png"}, {"title": "Reuters Institute — Digital News Report 2024 United States / overview", "url": "https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2024/united-states", "local": "/archives/2026/09/reuters-institute-2024-dnr-us-news-avoidance-waste-resources__reuters-institute-digital-news-report-2024-united-states-overview.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Psych Ops Distracting waste-resources leaf (non-Pew)."}
{"id": "rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-process", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-35", "uid": "C20260926-000809-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-35", "old_ids": ["rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-process"], "seq": "C00588", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Dominion claimed the existing systems could not handle a future ballot size, so the county needed to \"upgrade\" (Rio Grande County, Colorado)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06-14", "state": "CO", "description": "Rocky Mountain Voice / Alamosa News (Jun 2024): Rio Grande County Clerk Cindy Hill briefed commissioners on upgrading Dominion Democracy Suite from prior version to 5.17 (county on Dominion since 2017). Commissioners held work sessions; the upgrade path is documented. Status Confirmed that Rio Grande pursued a Dominion system upgrade; the catalog's exact 'cannot handle a future sized ballot' vendor-speech quote is weaker—see companion.", "sources": [{"title": "Rocky Mountain Voice — Rio Grande commissioners hear Dominion voting-system update", "url": "https://rockymountainvoice.com/2024/06/14/in-rio-grande-county-commissioners-hear-update-on-voting-system/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-process__rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-proces.png"}, {"title": "Colorado Newsline — Rio Grande Dominion 5.17 upgrade / contract votes context", "url": "https://coloradonewsline.com/2024/10/15/colorado-voting-machines-not-connected-to-the-internet/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-process__rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-proces.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 18. Upgrade Confirmed; exact ballot-size claim wording weaker.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "quinnipiac-2024-06-georgia-vote-count-confidence-partisan-gap-loss-of-confidence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-01", "uid": "C20260926-033715-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-01", "old_ids": ["quinnipiac-2024-06-georgia-vote-count-confidence-partisan-gap-loss-of-confidence"], "seq": "C01226", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose confidence."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06-05", "state": "GA", "description": "Quinnipiac University Georgia poll (May 30–June 3, 2024; released June 5) found only 68% of registered voters very/somewhat confident votes across Georgia would be counted accurately in 2024, with a stark partisan demoralization gap: 55% of Democrats vs only 15% of Republicans said they were very confident—documenting loss of confidence in vote-counting accuracy independent of Gallup national series. Status Confirmed primary Quinnipiac battleground confidence reading; peer to Gallup 2024 integrity-confidence and Gallup 2020 record-low cards already on this leaf—Quinnipiac Georgia instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: demoralizing partisan confidence collapse around opaque machine tallies is the opposite of observable public hand counts of hand-marked paper that citizens can watch (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "Quinnipiac University Poll — Georgia 2024 vote-count confidence / partisan gap (June 5, 2024)", "url": "https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3899", "local": "/archives/2026/09/quinnipiac-2024-06-georgia-vote-count-confidence-partisan-gap-loss-of-confidence__quinnipiac-university-poll-georgia-2024-vote-count-confidence-partisan-gap-june-5-2024.png"}, {"title": "Quinnipiac — Swing-state vote-count confidence companion (GA/NC Oct. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://poll.qu.edu/poll-release?releaseid=3909", "local": "/archives/2026/09/quinnipiac-2024-06-georgia-vote-count-confidence-partisan-gap-loss-of-confidence__quinnipiac-swing-state-vote-count-confidence-companion-ga-nc-oct-1-2024.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Psych Ops Demoralizing causes loss of confidence leaf (non-Gallup)."}
{"id": "iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-push-out-good-officers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-13", "uid": "C20260926-031602-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-13", "old_ids": ["iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-push-out-good-officers"], "seq": "C01178", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Push out good officers to make room for officers who will not uphold the Constitution."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-06-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "IACP's 2024 Recruitment & Retention Survey (1,158 U.S. agencies across all 50 states + DC) found agencies averaging ~91% of authorized staffing, >70% reporting recruitment harder than five years earlier, resignations concentrated in the first five years, and ~65% reducing services or specialized units due to shortages—documenting a continuing force-out/attrition environment that depletes experienced officers. Status Confirmed primary IACP 2024 recruitment/retention survey on staffing attrition; peer to PERF 2023 push-out staffing and BJS 2020 separations cards already on this leaf—IACP 2024 survey instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: depleted experienced LE reduces capacity to protect election observers and paper-ballot chain of custody for public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "IACP — 2024 Recruitment & Retention Survey Results", "url": "https://www.theiacp.org/resources/research-study/2024-recruitment-retention-survey-results", "local": "/archives/2026/09/iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-push-out-good-officers__iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-results.png"}, {"title": "IACP — The State of Recruitment & Retention: A Continuing Crisis for Policing (2024 PDF)", "url": "https://www.theiacp.org/sites/default/files/2025-06/IACP_2024%20Recruitment%20%26%20Retention%20Survey%20Results_2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-push-out-good-officers__iacp-2024-recruitment-retention-survey-results-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Law Enforcement Push out good officers leaf."}
{"id": "fl-1s-2-056-certificate-on-completion-additional-testing-optional-not-required", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-03", "uid": "C20260925-235207-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-03", "old_ids": ["fl-1s-2-056-certificate-on-completion-additional-testing-optional-not-required"], "seq": "C00476", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "There is no testing before a citizen is allowed to verify signatures."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-29", "state": "FL", "description": "Fla. Admin. Code R. 1S-2.056 issues a certificate upon completion of the two-hour online program (modules with questions and answers) and states that nothing precludes a Supervisor from requiring additional training or testing—implying the baseline state program does not itself impose a separate proficiency/examination gate before signature-match duties begin beyond completing the online modules. Trainee may start the day after completing training. Status Confirmed that Florida's mandatory baseline does not require independent FDE-style proficiency testing before citizens verify mail-ballot signatures.", "sources": [{"title": "Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 1S-2.056 — certificate on completion; additional testing optional", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/florida/Fla-Admin-Code-Ann-R-1S-2-056"}, {"title": "Florida DOS signature training portal referenced in rule", "url": "https://iog.fsu.edu/SignatureVerification25", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-1s-2-056-certificate-on-completion-additional-testing-optional-not-required__florida-dos-signature-training-portal-referenced-in-rule.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 2."}
{"id": "fl-1s-2-056-signature-match-training-minimum-two-hours-online", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-01", "uid": "C20260925-235207-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-01", "old_ids": ["fl-1s-2-056-signature-match-training-minimum-two-hours-online"], "seq": "C00474", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Citizens who are trained are not trained properly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-29", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Admin. Code R. 1S-2.056 mandates only a minimum two-hour online signature-match training program (modules with Q&A and a completion certificate) for supervisors, canvassing-board members, and anyone whose duties require signature verification. That is orders of magnitude shorter than ABFDE/ASQDE forensic-document-examiner pathways (multi-year full-time apprenticeship). Status Confirmed that Florida's required 'training' for mail-ballot signature checkers is a short online course, not FDE-level preparation—i.e., trained citizens are not properly trained by forensic standards.", "sources": [{"title": "Fla. Admin. Code Ann. R. 1S-2.056 — Signature Matching Training (min. two hours)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/florida/Fla-Admin-Code-Ann-R-1S-2-056"}, {"title": "Florida Institute of Government — Signature Verification 2.00 Hour(s) course (FSU)", "url": "https://iog.fsu.edu/SignatureVerification25", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-1s-2-056-signature-match-training-minimum-two-hours-online__florida-institute-of-government-signature-verification-2-00-hour-s-course-fsu.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20c ABFDE/ASQDE/NRS 293.877 cards on adjacent Signature Verification leaves."}
{"id": "cagop-bylaws-officer-elections-secret-ballot-unless-uncontested", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-17", "uid": "C20260926-000015-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-17", "old_ids": ["cagop-bylaws-officer-elections-secret-ballot-unless-uncontested"], "seq": "C00530", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Add \"anonymous\" votes during the voting process (see the California GOP)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-20", "state": "CA", "description": "California Republican Party bylaws provide for secret-ballot officer elections (and chair discretion among voice/hand/ballot/electronic methods, with secrecy or disclosed-vote electronic options)—i.e., anonymous/secret voting is a formal CRP process feature. Status Confirmed for secret/anonymous ballot mechanics at CA GOP; catalog claim that anonymous votes are 'added' to cheat remains Alleged (not proven by bylaws alone).", "sources": [{"title": "CAGOP Bylaws (May 20, 2024 PDF) — secret ballot / voting methods", "url": "https://cagop.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/240520_CRPBylaws.pdf"}, {"title": "CAGOP — statement on presidential delegates rules change (related convention opacity)", "url": "https://cagop.org/cagop-statement-on-the-passage-of-a-presidential-delegates-rules-change/"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 9. Weaker cheat-injection claim labeled Alleged; secret ballot Confirmed."}
{"id": "fbi-knapp-2024-ssci-election-threats-task-force-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-01", "uid": "C20260926-032103-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-01", "old_ids": ["fbi-knapp-2024-ssci-election-threats-task-force-intimidation"], "seq": "C01181", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-15", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "FBI Executive Assistant Director Larissa L. Knapp's May 15, 2024 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence statement documented that the DOJ/FBI Election Threats Task Force (established 2021) had produced 17 charged cases and 13 convictions for acts of violence and threats of violence toward election officials as of May 2024—primary federal quantification of sustained intimidation against election workers heading into the 2024 cycle. Status Confirmed primary FBI SSCI testimony on Election Threats Task Force charging/conviction totals; peer to MO/TX DOJ-monitors litigation and Brennan 2024 local-officials survey cards already on this leaf—FBI Task Force prosecution-count instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: intimidation that drives officials and citizen observers out of the open process shrinks the public witness pool needed for transparent hand-count observation.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ/OLA — Larissa L. Knapp FBI SSCI statement (May 15, 2024) Election Threats Task Force 17 charged / 13 convictions", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/ola/media/1379231/dl?inline="}, {"title": "Newsweek — FBI/DOJ warning on 2024 election-related violence / Election Crimes Coordinators (companion)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/fbi-doj-warning-2024-election-violence-1958382"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Intimidation root leaf."}
{"id": "wa-2024-bob-ferguson-same-name-recruits-withdraw-under-felony-confusion-statute", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-04", "uid": "C20260926-024539-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-04", "old_ids": ["wa-2024-bob-ferguson-same-name-recruits-withdraw-under-felony-confusion-statute"], "seq": "C01094", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Run a candidate B with a name similar to candidate A's to confuse voters and siphon votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-13", "state": "WA", "description": "In May 2024, conservative activist Glen Morgan recruited two additional candidates named Bob Ferguson (Yakima / Graham) into Washington's gubernatorial primary against Attorney General Bob Ferguson; both withdrew by the May 13 filing deadline after Ferguson threatened prosecution under an 81-year-old state felony barring same-name candidacies filed with intent to confuse and mislead electors—Spokane Public Radio / Washington State Standard contemporaneous coverage confirms the recruitment, cease-and-desist letters, and withdrawals. Status Confirmed operational same-name ballot-confusion attempt and statutory anti-confusion enforcement path; peer to Alaska Dan Sullivan same-name and Illinois Madigan sham-candidate cards already on this leaf—WA Bob Ferguson episode, not those remounted. PEP framing: name-bleed tactics exploit opaque ballot design rather than hand-counted public tallies.", "sources": [{"title": "Spokane Public Radio / Washington State Standard — Bob Ferguson gets two Bob Fergusons to exit governor's race (May 14, 2024)", "url": "https://www.spokanepublicradio.org/regional-news/2024-05-14/bob-ferguson-gets-two-bob-fergusons-to-exit-governors-race"}, {"title": "Washington State Standard — same coverage (States Newsroom)", "url": "https://washingtonstatestandard.com/2024/05/14/bob-ferguson-gets-two-bob-fergusons-to-exit-governors-race/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on similar-name candidate bleed leaf."}
{"id": "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-10", "uid": "C20260925-220029-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-10", "old_ids": ["co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban"], "seq": "C00363", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-09", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado SOS temporary Rule 7.2.17 (May 2024) bars ballot-return envelopes with a hole/opening through which any contest target area can be seen, and requires written certification/testing if holes are used—explicitly recognizing that envelope openings can reveal ballot content/type and threaten vote privacy (C.R.S. §1-7.5-107.3). Status Confirmed that holes/windows in return envelopes are a recognized leakage vector requiring regulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Notice of Temporary Adoption (Rule 7.2.17 holes) PDF", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/rule_making/files/2024/20240509ElectionsNoticeTempAdoptionSBSJ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban__colorado-sos-notice-of-temporary-adoption-rule-7-2-17-holes.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 5 companion. Also soft-maps Maricopa outbound window/ballot-style visibility disputes (process window Confirmed; party-reveal fraud claim Disputed elsewhere).", "related": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope", "ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought", "az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"]}
{"id": "multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing", "permanent_id": "C20261020-165133-03", "uid": "C20261020-165133-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-165133-03", "old_ids": ["multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing"], "seq": "C01470", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Refuse to hear cases and evidence, citing \"lack of standing.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-08 to 2025-03-03", "state": "MD / PA / FL / TX / OH", "description": "In 2024, United Sovereign Americans (USA), a Missouri nonprofit led by CEO Marly Hornik and chairman Harry Haury, filed federal suits and mandamus petitions in several states. Each argued that the state's 2022 voter rolls and vote counts (duplicate and invalid registrations and gaps between voters who voted and votes counted) violated the Help America Vote Act and the National Voter Registration Act, and each asked a court to order compliance before further elections. In Pennsylvania, for example, the petition alleged 1,089,706 apparent voting-system errors in 2022 and a 9,153-vote deficit between votes cast and votes counted. No court weighed that data. In Maryland Election Integrity, LLC v. Maryland State Board of Elections, U.S. District Judge Stephanie Gallagher dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on May 8, 2024, and on Feb. 4, 2025 the Fourth Circuit affirmed in a published opinion. That opinion held that the plaintiffs \"do not allege concrete, particularized, or certainly impending injuries\" and that vote dilution that \"affects all voters in a State in the same way\" is a generalized grievance. In Florida, Chief Judge Mark Walker dismissed the claims against the Secretary of State and Attorney General on Jan. 29, 2025 because the petitioners had \"not demonstrated Article III standing.\" In Texas, Judge Matthew Kacsmaryk granted the State's motions to dismiss on Jan. 15, 2025, holding that the mandamus statute the plaintiffs invoked could not supply jurisdiction over state officials; the case closed on Jan. 30, 2025 when no amended complaint was filed. In Pennsylvania, Chief Magistrate Judge Daryl Bloom dismissed the petition on March 3, 2025 \"for want of jurisdiction due to lack of standing\" without reaching the other defenses. USA also filed a mandamus petition in the Northern District of Ohio on Aug. 8, 2024. Status Confirmed: every ruling is in the court record, and in none of these cases did a court test the accuracy of the voter-roll or vote-count figures. The courts held that ordinary voters and candidates could not bring the claims at all.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit — Maryland Election Integrity, LLC v. Maryland State Board of Elections, No. 24-1449 (published opinion, Feb. 4, 2025)", "url": "https://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/opinions/241449.P.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__ca4-24-1449-2025-02-04.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, D. Md. — Memorandum Opinion, Maryland Election Integrity v. Maryland State Board of Elections, SAG-24-00672 (May 8, 2024; Democracy Docket copy)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/D.-Md.-24-cv-00672-dckt-000044_000-filed-2024-05-08.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__dmd-2024-05-08.pdf"}, {"title": "The Daily Record — 4th Circuit rejects claims that MD elections are flawed (Feb. 7, 2025)", "url": "https://thedailyrecord.com/2025/02/07/4th-circuit-rejects-claims-that-md-elections-are-flawed/"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, M.D. Pa. — Memorandum Opinion, United Sovereign Americans v. Schmidt, No. 1:24-cv-1003, Doc. 38 (Mar. 3, 2025; Justia copy)", "url": "https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/pennsylvania/pamdce/1:2024cv01003/142648/38/0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__mdpa-2025-03-03.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Pennsylvania Voter Roll Maintenance and Voting System Accuracy Challenge (United Sovereign Americans) (case page)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/pennsylvania-voter-roll-maintenance-and-voting-system-accuracy-challenge/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__democracydocket-pa.html"}, {"title": "United Sovereign Americans — Pennsylvania complaint, USA v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (filed June 18, 2024; The New American copy)", "url": "https://thenewamerican.com/assets/sites/2/2024/Filed_Compliant_-_USA_v_Comm_of_PA_061824.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__pa-complaint-2024-06-18.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D. Fla. — Order granting state respondents' motion to dismiss, United Sovereign Americans v. Byrd, No. 4:24cv327-MW/MAF (Jan. 29, 2025)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/38-2025-01-29-Order-granting-FL-secretary-of-state-and-attorney-generals-motion-to-dismiss.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__ndfla-2025-01-29.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D. Tex. — Memorandum Opinion and Order, United Sovereign Americans v. Nelson, No. 2:24-CV-184-Z (Jan. 15, 2025; League of Women Voters copy)", "url": "https://www.lwv.org/sites/default/files/2025-10/39-2025-01-15_NDTex_order-grant-mtd.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__ndtex-2025-01-15.pdf"}, {"title": "League of Women Voters — United Sovereign Americans v. Nelson (case page)", "url": "https://www.lwv.org/legal-center/united-sovereign-americans-v-nelson", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__lwv-case.html"}, {"title": "United Sovereign Americans — Petition for Relief in the Form of a Writ of Mandamus, N.D. Ohio (Aug. 8, 2024)", "url": "https://unite4freedom.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Petition-for-Relief-in-the-Form-of-a-Writ-of-Mandamus-filed-NDO-Ohio-8.8.2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__ndohio-petition-2024-08-08.pdf"}, {"title": "Gab — NC ForGab (@nc4gab), \"Welcome to blink/once\" link hub for New York Citizens Audit / United Sovereign Americans material (first posted May 21, 2023; revised May 26, 2026) — lead source only", "url": "https://gab.com/nc4gab/posts/110409012711518164", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-2025-united-sovereign-americans-hava-nvra-suits-dismissed-standing__gab-nc4gab-hub.json"}], "notes": "nc4gab Gab archive review (2026-10-20). The Gab hub links USA's Maryland, Pennsylvania and Ohio filings; the outcomes come from the court orders. The Ohio case outcome was not verified from a primary source, so the card states only that the petition was filed. The Daily Record returned HTTP 403 to the box and is linked only. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "brennan-2024-13pct-officials-fear-pressure-certify-specific-candidate", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-18", "uid": "C20260926-001426-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-18", "old_ids": ["brennan-2024-13pct-officials-fear-pressure-certify-specific-candidate"], "seq": "C00611", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center 2024 survey: 13% of local election officials reported concern about facing pressure to certify results in favor of a specific candidate/party—quantitative evidence of certification-pressure as a lived workplace risk around canvass/certification decisions. Status Confirmed for reported pressure concern.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — 2024 election officials survey (certification pressure item)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/poll-election-officials-finds-concerns-about-safety-political"}, {"title": "Washington Post — Maricopa/Cochise 2022 certification threats context", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/11/28/arizona-cochise-county-maricopa-election/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "brennan-2024-election-officials-fear-threats-safety-precautions", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-15", "uid": "C20260926-001426-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-15", "old_ids": ["brennan-2024-election-officials-fear-threats-safety-precautions"], "seq": "C00608", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Convince clerks that electors are dangerous and should be feared."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center's 2024 local-election-official survey finds 38% personally experienced threats/harassment/abuse; >50% concerned about staff safety; >1/3 know someone who resigned partly over safety—driving bulletproof glass, active-shooter drills, de-escalation training, and poll-threat text alerts. That documented threat environment is what associations and agencies use when they train clerks that some members of the public (electors/observers) may be dangerous. Status Confirmed for the fear/safety framing grounded in measured threats; does not prove every 'elector is dangerous' message is fabricated.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Poll of Election Officials Finds Concerns About Safety (May 2024)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/poll-election-officials-finds-concerns-about-safety-political", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-2024-election-officials-fear-threats-safety-precautions__brennan-center-poll-of-election-officials-finds-concerns-abo.png"}, {"title": "CPR — Colorado clerks association head testifies to Congress on threats", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2022/08/03/colorado-election-workers-threats-congress/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 8."}
{"id": "brennan-2024-local-election-officials-survey-threats-harassment-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-02", "uid": "C20260926-031135-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-02", "old_ids": ["brennan-2024-local-election-officials-survey-threats-harassment-intimidation"], "seq": "C01152", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The Brennan Center for Justice Local Election Officials Survey (May 2024) found 38% of local election officials reported experiencing threats, harassment, or abuse because of their jobs—up from earlier post-2020 readings—with more than half concerned about colleagues' safety. Contemporaneous ABC News reporting on DOJ's Election Threats Task Force documented ~2,000 threat referrals yielding ~100 investigations, 20 charged defendants, and 15 convictions by fall 2024. Status Confirmed primary Brennan survey + DOJ ETF charging volume documenting election-related intimidation; peer to DSCC/DCCC monitor-litigation and MO/TX DOJ-monitor cards already on this leaf—Brennan 2024 officials-survey / ETF stats instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: sustained intimidation of election workers that shrinks experienced staffing undermines transparent public hand-count capacity.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Local Election Officials Survey (May 2024)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/local-election-officials-survey-may-2024", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-2024-local-election-officials-survey-threats-harassment-intimidation__brennan-center-local-election-officials-survey-may-2024.png"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ Election Threats Task Force: ~2,000 referrals, 20 charged, 15 convictions", "url": "https://abcnews.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Intimidation root leaf."}
{"id": "cagop-2024-elections-packet-electronic-secret-ballot-anonymous-votes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-11", "uid": "C20260926-032507-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-11", "old_ids": ["cagop-2024-elections-packet-electronic-secret-ballot-anonymous-votes"], "seq": "C01206", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Add \"anonymous\" votes during the voting process (see the California GOP)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California Republican Party 2024 Elections Packet and current CRP bylaws document that contested officer elections use secret ballots (or electronic systems that must preserve ballot secrecy), with majority elimination rounds—i.e., an official anonymous-vote architecture inside party officer/endorsement processes where individual ballots are not attributable after casting. Status Confirmed primary CAGOP Elections Packet / bylaws secret/electronic anonymous voting rules for contested officer elections; peer to CRP bylaws secret-ballot-unless-uncontested and LA Times/AP 2023 winner-take-all rules-change cards already on this leaf—2024 Elections Packet electronic-secrecy instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: anonymous party-process votes that cannot be publicly reconciled enable control paths that precinct public hand counts of attributable paper would expose.", "sources": [{"title": "California Republican Party — 2024 Election Procedures and Information for Candidates (Elections Packet)", "url": "https://cagop.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024_ElectionsPacket_Final-1.pdf"}, {"title": "California Republican Party — CRP Bylaws (May 20, 2024) secret ballot / electronic secrecy companion", "url": "https://cagop.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/240520_CRPBylaws.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Primaries Add anonymous votes during voting process (CA GOP) leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-2024-election-crimes-flyer-political-sign-theft-vandalism-targeted-removal", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-03", "uid": "C20260926-031135-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-03", "old_ids": ["cisa-2024-election-crimes-flyer-political-sign-theft-vandalism-targeted-removal"], "seq": "C01153", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Targeted removal"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-05-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CISA's 2024 Election Crimes Flyer (with DOJ Election Crimes Branch framing) distinguishes ordinary political-sign theft/vandalism—typically state theft, criminal mischief, or trespass—from federal election crimes involving force, threats, or intimidation, and directs the public to report sign theft to local law enforcement while elevating threats/intimidation to FBI/DOJ. Status Confirmed primary federal election-crimes guidance treating targeted removal of campaign materials as prosecutable misconduct (usually under state law); peer to Newsweek 19-state sign-warfare and FindLaw/Spectrum theft-crime cards already on this leaf—CISA/DOJ Election Crimes Flyer instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: systematic removal of visible support that falsifies public perception of backing undercuts citizen oversight of election integrity claims.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Crimes Flyer 2024 (FINAL 508c)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-05/Election_Crimes_Flyer_2024_FINAL_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2024-election-crimes-flyer-political-sign-theft-vandalism-targeted-removal__cisa-election-crimes-flyer-2024-final-508c.pdf"}, {"title": "9NEWS Verify — Yes, it's a crime to steal or remove political campaign signs (CO example)", "url": "https://www.9news.com/article/news/verify/crime-verify/crime-steal-remove-political-campaign-signs-misdemeanor-fact-check/536-687b044a-599d-45ce-83c4-4ce71da8ff61"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing Targeted Removal leaf."}
{"id": "luzerne-pa-wright-manor-dropbox-45day-overwrite-april-2024-primary", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-01", "uid": "C20260926-015536-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-01", "old_ids": ["luzerne-pa-wright-manor-dropbox-45day-overwrite-april-2024-primary"], "seq": "C00904", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "They claim drop boxes have 100% surveillance when they do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04/2024-09", "state": "PA", "description": "Luzerne County, Pennsylvania officials acknowledged that the Wright Manor (Mountain Top) assisted-living drop-box surveillance camera retained only about 45 days of footage before overwriting older video—despite staff having been told by vendor Vector Security that retention was ~400 days. When the county retrieved the drive on Aug. 20, 2024 (within the claimed 400-day window), April 2024 primary drop-box footage had already been overwritten and could not be recovered. Times Leader and Citizens' Voice contemporaneously reported the retention mix-up and permanent loss of the primary-window video. Status Confirmed that marketed/assumed continuous drop-box surveillance failed to preserve the election window—peer to Maricopa livestream non-recording and Erie ~30-day overwrite gaps; not proof of ballot stuffing on the lost tape.", "sources": [{"title": "Times Leader — Luzerne lacks Wright Manor drop-box video from April primary (45-day overwrite)", "url": "https://www.timesleader.com/news/1666198/luzerne-county-lacks-video-footage-of-wright-manor-drop-box-from-april-primary", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-wright-manor-dropbox-45day-overwrite-april-2024-primary__times-leader-luzerne-lacks-wright-manor-drop-box-video.png"}, {"title": "Citizens' Voice — Luzerne has no April primary Wright Manor drop-box surveillance footage due to mix-up", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2024/09/05/luzerne-county-has-no-april-primary-drop-box-surveillance-footage-from-wright-manor-due-to-mix-up/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-wright-manor-dropbox-45day-overwrite-april-2024-primary__citizens-voice-luzerne-has-no-april-primary-wright-mano.png"}, {"title": "Times Leader — Bipartisan Luzerne Election Board drop-box video review context", "url": "https://www.timesleader.com/top-stories/1664783/bipartisan-luzerne-county-election-board-team-completes-drop-box-video-footage-review", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-wright-manor-dropbox-45day-overwrite-april-2024-primary__times-leader-bipartisan-luzerne-election-board-drop-box.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on drop-boxes claim 100% surveillance leaf."}
{"id": "perf-2024-police-staffing-resignations-still-elevated-force-retirement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-06", "uid": "C20260926-031135-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-06", "old_ids": ["perf-2024-police-staffing-resignations-still-elevated-force-retirement"], "seq": "C01156", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Force good officers into retirement by making the job miserable."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-27", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "PERF's April 2024 staffing survey (214 agencies; ~151k sworn) found the first year-over-year increase in sworn staffing since the pandemic, yet January 2024 sworn levels remained 4.9% below January 2020; resignations fell 21.6% in 2023 but stayed 28.6% above 2019, while retirements only returned to roughly 2019 levels after three elevated years—documenting sustained force-out pressure even as hiring rebounds. Status Confirmed primary PERF 2024 staffing survey update; peer to PERF 2023 resignations/retirements and BJS separations cards already on this leaf—PERF staffing2024 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: elevated LE attrition that hollows experienced ranks reduces capacity to protect election workers and public observation of hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "PERF — New PERF survey shows police agencies have turned a corner with staffing challenges (Apr. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2024", "local": "/archives/2026/09/perf-2024-police-staffing-resignations-still-elevated-force-retirement__perf-staffing2024-police-agencies-staffing-challenges.png"}, {"title": "PERF — Staffing2023 prior-year survey (resignations/retirements elevated baseline)", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2023", "local": "/archives/2026/09/perf-2024-police-staffing-resignations-still-elevated-force-retirement__perf-staffing2023-resignations-retirements.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Law Enforcement Force retirement leaf."}
{"id": "clc-2024-pal-ccm-scam-pac-trump-voice-attention-siphon", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-10", "uid": "C20260926-001426-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-10", "old_ids": ["clc-2024-pal-ccm-scam-pac-trump-voice-attention-siphon"], "seq": "C00603", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Monopolize attention."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Campaign Legal Center's April 2024 FEC complaints against Patriots for American Leadership and Campaign for a Conservative Majority allege Trump-voice robocalls that monopolize donor attention under false 'support the campaign' framing while diverting funds to operators/further fundraising. Soft remount of fill-20f scam-PAC cards onto this exact 'Suck up attention' pathKey. Status Confirmed as charged scheme in CLC/FEC record; final liability depends on FEC/DOJ outcomes.", "sources": [{"title": "CLC — Uncovers two scam PACs defrauding donors (PAL / CCM)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-uncovers-two-scam-pacs-defrauding-donors"}, {"title": "OpenSecrets — Scam PAC fundraising-attention cycle", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "clc-2024-pal-ccm-scam-pacs-suck-up-money-fec-complaints", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-11", "uid": "C20260926-000809-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-11", "old_ids": ["clc-2024-pal-ccm-scam-pacs-suck-up-money-fec-complaints"], "seq": "C00564", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Drain donors' money."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Campaign Legal Center FEC complaints (Apr 22, 2024) allege Patriots for American Leadership raised ~$1.4M while reporting ~3% to federal candidates (and even that may be fabricated), diverting ~$730k to its treasurer/shell vendor; Campaign for a Conservative Majority raised ~$480k with only ~9% to electoral causes. Status Confirmed as documented fundraising diversion pattern (scam PAC); FEC/DOJ final adjudications pending on those complaints.", "sources": [{"title": "CLC — Uncovers two scam PACs defrauding donors (PAL & CCM)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-uncovers-two-scam-pacs-defrauding-donors"}, {"title": "CLC — CCM FEC complaint document page", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/document/scam-pac-campaign-conservative-majority-defrauds-donors-480000"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 6."}
{"id": "rnc-bank-your-vote-site-overhaul-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-11", "uid": "C20260925-185839-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-11", "old_ids": ["rnc-bank-your-vote-site-overhaul-2024"], "seq": "C00162", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Promote the GOP's \"Bank Your Vote\" campaign (https://bankyourvote.com/) to convince voters to vote early instead of on Election Day."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-19", "state": "Federal", "description": "In April 2024, after RNC leadership changes, The Federalist reported that BankYourVote.com was taken down for reconstruction as the committee said it would refocus on banking votes and a companion Grow The Vote effort—confirming the original Bank Your Vote web property and early-vote banking framing remained an official RNC initiative subject to rebuild rather than a third-party rumor. Status Confirmed for the program/website's official RNC lineage and early-vote banking purpose.", "sources": [{"title": "The Federalist — RNC removes Bank Your Vote website, plans overhaul", "url": "https://thefederalist.com/2024/04/19/rnc-removes-bank-your-vote-website-plans-overhaul-of-early-voting-initiative/"}, {"title": "GOP — RNC launches Phase Two of Bank Your Vote (50-state sites)", "url": "https://gop.com/press-release/rnc-launches-phase-two-of-bank-your-vote-early-vote-campaign/"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 5. Documents program continuity/overhaul."}
{"id": "usps-postal-bulletin-22648-2024-election-mail-brm-qbrm-business-guide", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-10", "uid": "C20260925-234437-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-10", "old_ids": ["usps-postal-bulletin-22648-2024-election-mail-brm-qbrm-business-guide"], "seq": "C00443", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Mail ballots are big business for the USPS, a self-funded independent federal agency that relies on private contractors to transport mail and run contract postal units."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Postal Bulletin 22648 (Apr 18, 2024) Election Mail and Political Mail Guide details product choices (First-Class vs Marketing Mail outbound ballots), Business Reply Mail / Qualified Business Reply Mail return postage paid by election officials, Intelligent Mail barcode accounting, and Mailpiece Design Analyst support—formal product packaging of ballot mail as a billed USPS service line for counties and campaigns. Status Confirmed that USPS publishes business/product guidance treating Election Mail as a major customer category.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Postal Bulletin 22648 — 2024 Election Mail and Political Mail Guide (PDF)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2024/pb22648/pb22648.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-postal-bulletin-22648-2024-election-mail-brm-qbrm-business-guide__usps-postal-bulletin-22648-2024-election-mail-and-political-mail-guide-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS — Official Election Mail resources", "url": "https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-postal-bulletin-22648-2024-election-mail-brm-qbrm-business-guide__usps-official-election-mail-resources.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2024-registered-voters-35pct-independent-universal-party-id", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-11", "uid": "C20260926-031135-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-11", "old_ids": ["pew-2024-registered-voters-35pct-independent-universal-party-id"], "seq": "C01161", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Independent registrations are more versatile for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew Research Center's April 9, 2024 partisanship report finds roughly a third of U.S. registered voters (35%) identify as independents or something else rather than as Republicans (32%) or Democrats (33%), with most of those independents still leaning to a major party—documenting a large independent/leaner bloc that is more universal across contests than hard partisan IDs. Status Confirmed primary Pew registered-voter party-ID measurement; peer to Gallup 2024/2023 independent-identification record-high cards already on this leaf—Pew 2024 registered-voter partisanship instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: large independent registration/ID pools expand flexible targeting surfaces that public same-day hand counts would make harder to obscure behind party-label analytics.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research Center — The partisanship and ideology of American voters (Apr. 9, 2024)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/the-partisanship-and-ideology-of-american-voters/"}, {"title": "Pew Research Center — Changing Partisan Coalitions in a Politically Divided Nation (report hub)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/changing-partisan-coalitions-in-a-politically-divided-nation/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Registration Independent more universal manipulation purposes leaf."}
{"id": "pew-2024-urban-rural-partisanship-demographic-cities", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-31", "uid": "C20260926-004030-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-31", "old_ids": ["pew-2024-urban-rural-partisanship-demographic-cities"], "seq": "C00784", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Move people into cities to run for office and begin shifting political demographics at the county and state levels."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2024 partisanship-by-community analysis shows urban counties heavily Democratic (≈60% Dem / 37% GOP lean) while rural counties have grown to a ~25-point Republican advantage—documenting that concentrating population in cities structurally shifts county/state political demographics and office-holding opportunities. Soft companion to Census urbanization / geographic sorting literature. Status Confirmed for urban–rural demographic–partisan shift mechanism; intentional 'move people to run for offices' cabal recruitment Alleged beyond sorting data.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Partisanship in rural, suburban and urban communities (2024)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/partisanship-in-rural-suburban-and-urban-communities/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Demographic and economic trends in urban, suburban and rural communities (2018)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/05/22/demographic-and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 16. Honest: demographic–partisan city concentration Confirmed; organized move-to-run Alleged."}
{"id": "eac-2024-policy-survey-sdr-edr-register-same-day-cast-ballot", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-01", "uid": "C20260926-030706-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-01", "old_ids": ["eac-2024-policy-survey-sdr-edr-register-same-day-cast-ballot"], "seq": "C01136", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "In states with same-day registration, simply show up, register, and vote; no advance planning is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's 2024 Election Administration Policy Survey (Q11/Q11a) asks every state whether individuals may register to vote on the same day they cast a ballot in person or request a mail ballot—explicitly defining same-day / Election Day registration as register-and-vote without a prior registration deadline—and whether that pathway is available on Election Day, during early voting, or in limited federal-office cases. The companion 2024 EAVS Comprehensive Report states that just over half of states allowed individuals to register on the same day they cast a ballot. Status Confirmed primary federal survey documenting the no-pre-planning SDR pathway; peer to NCSL SDR statute table and CBS 2024 SDR map cards already on this leaf—EAC Policy Survey/EAVS instrument, not those remounted. PEP framing: same-day register-and-vote pathways that remove advance-planning friction expand traveling-voter surface without public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — 2024 Election Administration Policy Survey (Q11 same-day registration)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-04/2024_Policy_Survey_FINAL_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-policy-survey-sdr-edr-register-same-day-cast-ballot__eac-2024-policy-survey-q11-same-day-registration.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) 2024 Comprehensive Report (SDR prevalence)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2024_EAVS_Report_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-policy-survey-sdr-edr-register-same-day-cast-ballot__eac-2024-eavs-comprehensive-report-same-day-registration-prevalence.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Registration Traveling Voter Operations same-day registration leaf."}
{"id": "will-2024-wisconsin-ban-private-election-grants-zuckerbucks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-20", "uid": "C20260926-005107-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-20", "old_ids": ["will-2024-wisconsin-ban-private-election-grants-zuckerbucks"], "seq": "C00813", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Are likely gaining power or money through complicity in election manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-04-01", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin voters approved April 2024 constitutional amendments restricting election tasks to officials designated by law and banning private funding of election administration — a direct political response to CTCL/'Zuckerbucks' monetary influence on local election ops. Status Confirmed for the ban and the underlying private-funding controversy; does not itself prove 2020 outcome fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "WILL — Speaking Out Against Zuckerbucks (advocacy + amendment context)", "url": "https://will-law.org/speaking-out-against-zuckerbucks-in-washington-d-c/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/will-2024-wisconsin-ban-private-election-grants-zuckerbucks__will---speaking-out-against-zuckerbucks--advocacy---amendment-context.png"}, {"title": "WMTV — Breaking down the Zuckerberg 5 Wisconsin election report / CTCL response", "url": "https://www.wmtv15news.com/2022/03/02/breaking-down-zuckerberg-5-wisconsin-election-report-ctcl-derides-allegations/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "will-il-2024-wrong-ballot-style", "permanent_id": "C20260925-171133-03", "uid": "C20260925-171133-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-171133-03", "old_ids": ["will-il-2024-wrong-ballot-style"], "seq": "C00070", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03", "state": "IL", "description": "In the March 19, 2024 Illinois primary, a Will County Crete Township Precinct 8 voter was given the wrong state House ballot style; election judges reportedly did not know the precinct had two styles. Will County Clerk’s office acknowledged wrong-style handoffs can occur and noted separate faulty VBM ballots omitting a Senate race. Status Confirmed for the acknowledged wrong-style incident; intentional fraud not alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "The Center Square — Election confidence rattled after voter receives wrong ballot", "url": "https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/article_267cbbde-034c-11ef-9301-0f2196d74422.html"}], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources."}
{"id": "ncsl-same-day-registration-show-up-register-vote-no-preplanning", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-33", "uid": "C20260926-002757-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-33", "old_ids": ["ncsl-same-day-registration-show-up-register-vote-no-preplanning"], "seq": "C00706", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "In states with same-day registration, simply show up, register, and vote; no advance planning is needed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-27", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that ~24 states + DC offer same-day or Election Day registration allowing a qualified resident to register and cast a ballot at the same time—i.e., the catalog 'traveling voter' mechanism of show up, register, and vote with no multi-week pre-planning. Soft remount of existing NCSL SDR card family onto this exact Traveling-Voter-Operations pathKey. Status Confirmed for statutory SDR availability; does not prove organized multi-state traveling fraud rings.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration (updated)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Same-day voter registration, 2024", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Same-day_voter_registration,_2024"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 17. Soft remount of NCSL SDR family. PEP: precinct hand count of hand-marked paper still verifies the ballot cast regardless of same-day registration path (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep)."}
{"id": "grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-cause-distractions-infiltrators", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-13", "uid": "C20260926-003520-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-13", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-cause-distractions-infiltrators"], "seq": "C00726", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They cause distractions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-19", "state": "ND", "description": "Standing Rock CHS depositions show informants tasked to report on potential direct-action plans and camp logistics, creating diversion of organizer attention toward internal security/paranoia and away from core protest goals—i.e., infiltrator-caused distractions inside the group. Soft remount of Standing Rock family onto 'cause distractions' pathKey. Status Confirmed for CHS tasking/reporting that consumes movement attention; intentional 'distraction doctrine' beyond depositions Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — FBI informants at Standing Rock / court documents (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "Atavist — Red Fawn Fallis / Standing Rock informant Harmon case (2019 companion)", "url": "https://magazine.atavist.com/2019/red-fawn-fallis-standing-rock-pipeline"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 7. Soft remount of fill-20i disrupt / Standing Rock family onto distractions pathKey."}
{"id": "grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-play-people-against-each-other", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-11", "uid": "C20260926-003520-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-11", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-play-people-against-each-other"], "seq": "C00724", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They then turn members against each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-19", "state": "ND", "description": "Grist/court-deposition reporting on Standing Rock documents FBI use of ~5–10 Confidential Human Sources inside protest camps, with participants and historians describing how infiltration breeds paranoia and turns relatives against relatives—i.e., infiltrators playing people against each other inside a movement. Soft remount of Standing Rock CHS family onto this pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented CHS presence and reported interpersonal distrust effects; specific cabal-directive motives Alleged beyond the record.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — FBI sent several informants to Standing Rock protests, court documents show (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — Review of FBI investigations of certain domestic advocacy groups (2010 companion on informant First Amendment risks)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/reports/review-fbis-investigations-certain-domestic-advocacy-groups-redacted-version", "local": "/archives/2026/09/grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-play-people-against-each-other__doj-oig-review-of-fbi-investigations-of-certain-domestic-advocacy-groups-2010-companion-on-informant-first-amendment-risks.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 6. Soft companion to fill-20i/20h Standing Rock / CHS leaves."}
{"id": "grist-2024-fbi-informants-standing-rock-disrupt-infiltrate-camps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-11", "uid": "C20260926-002757-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-11", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-fbi-informants-standing-rock-disrupt-infiltrate-camps"], "seq": "C00684", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They cause disruptions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-15", "state": "ND", "description": "Court depositions in North Dakota's federal litigation, reported by Grist, show the FBI embedded roughly 5–10 confidential human sources in Standing Rock anti-pipeline camps and sent plainclothes agents into the camps—infiltration that camp participants say created paranoia, disruption, and internal conflict. Status Confirmed for multi-informant infiltration of a protest movement; does not prove every disruption was agent-directed.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — FBI sent several informants to Standing Rock protests, court documents show (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — Review of FBI's Handling of Confidential Human Sources (institutional CHS framework companion)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 6. Soft companion to fill-20h CHS/inject-into-groups leaf."}
{"id": "grist-2024-standing-rock-infiltrators-discredit-kinship-networks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-13", "uid": "C20260926-002757-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-13", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-standing-rock-infiltrators-discredit-kinship-networks"], "seq": "C00686", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They may lead the group to do something that can later be used to discredit it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-15", "state": "ND", "description": "Standing Rock participants and historians interviewed in Grist's CHS reporting describe how infiltration turns relatives against relatives and creates a culture of paranoia that discredits and disables kinship-based movements—i.e., getting groups into compromised positions that can later be used against them. Soft remount of Standing Rock informant facts onto the 'discredit the group' pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented discredit/disruption effect of infiltration; motive attribution beyond the record Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — FBI informants at Standing Rock; kinship/paranoia discredit effect (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — FBI CHS handling review (2024)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 7."}
{"id": "steamboat-springs-2024-184-prereg-underage-ballots-mailed-brown-ranch", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-10", "uid": "C20260926-023825-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-10", "old_ids": ["steamboat-springs-2024-184-prereg-underage-ballots-mailed-brown-ranch"], "seq": "C01085", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "Provides plausible excuses for procedural \"mistakes\" that enable indirect manipulation of elections:", "Send ballots to young people. If caught, claim it was a mistake; if not, they gain uninformed voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-07", "state": "CO", "description": "City of Steamboat Springs / Steamboat Radio (Mar. 7, 2024) reported that voter data supplied for the Brown Ranch annexation special election included pre-registered 16–17-year-olds, so ~184 ballots were mailed to people with 2006-or-later birthdates; City Clerk Julie Franklin said any returned pre-reg ballots would be flagged by envelope ID, quarantined, and not opened or counted—classic 'mistake' pathway on youth pre-registration rolls. Status Confirmed contemporaneous city/press acknowledgment; peer to Aspen 2019 57 underage ballots and NCSL youth-prereg substrate cards already on this leaf—Steamboat 2024 184-ballot incident, not those remounted. PEP framing: pre-reg mailing errors show how youth rolls can inject ballots into machine/mail streams before eligibility.", "sources": [{"title": "Steamboat Radio — Some young Steamboat Springs voters not eligible yet mistakenly received Special Election ballots (Mar. 7, 2024)", "url": "https://www.steamboatradio.com/2024/03/07/some-young-steamboat-springs-voters-not-eligible-to-vote-yet-mistakenly-received-special-election-ballots/"}, {"title": "Steamboat Pilot — Brown Ranch annexation ballots to be mailed March 4 (election context)", "url": "https://www.steamboatpilot.com/news/brown-ranch-annexation-ballots-to-be-mailed-march-4/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Youth Pre-registration send-out-ballots-to-youth leaf."}
{"id": "salt-lake-city-ut-public-comment-hour-cap-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-19", "uid": "C20261001-094909-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-19", "old_ids": ["salt-lake-city-ut-public-comment-hour-cap-2024"], "seq": "C01313", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "People are assigned to run out the clock and eliminate or reduce our time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-05", "state": "UT", "description": "Salt Lake City Council on March 5, 2024 unanimously approved a measure capping general public-comment periods at one hour after meetings had been prolonged by extended comment waves (including cease-fire advocacy that stretched sessions), with Chair Victoria Petro citing years of 'intensity' and finite staff/time resources; the ordinance item itself appeared on the agenda that same week and was passed after the chamber was cleared amid protests. Status Confirmed for the documented pattern of extended/coordinated-style comment filling the clock followed by a formal hour-cap that reduces remaining citizen time—malevolent 'assignment' intent not claimed. Peer to Pima County Call-to-Audience hour-cap, Jersey City Airbnb-filibuster cuts, and Austin judicial clock-cut ruling already on this leaf—Salt Lake Mar. 2024 hour-cap instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: hour caps after clock-filling comment waves shrink the window for hand-count / decentralization testimony.", "sources": [{"title": "KSL — Salt Lake City Council's approval of cap on public comments prompts rowdy protest (Mar. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/50940442"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct UT hour-cap peer to Pima; not remount."}
{"id": "nc-jlf-2024-sample-audit-two-units-per-county-skews-ballot-selection", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-06", "uid": "C20261012-141825-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-06", "old_ids": ["nc-jlf-2024-sample-audit-two-units-per-county-skews-ballot-selection"], "seq": "C01373", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-05 (analysis 2024)", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina's post-election sample hand-to-eye count has State Board staff roll ten 10-sided dice for a seed, then software draws two units per county. A unit can be an Election Day precinct, an early-voting site, or all of the county's mail absentee ballots treated as one unit. The John Locke Foundation (\"Flawed Sampling Method Means Some Ballots Are Unlikely to Be Audited\") found that, though meant to be random, the method makes some ballots much more likely to be audited than others, especially in larger counties: \"the selection of ballots to be audited is not random (even if the units of ballots chosen are).\" For the March 5, 2024 primary, New Hanover had 46 units and only a 4.4% chance its absentee ballots would be audited; Pamlico had 8 units and a 26.8% chance. Most counties that drew absentee ballots were small. Verified Voting likewise notes two units per county \"regardless of county size or batch size and type,\" so absentee and early ballots \"are not audited in most counties.\" Status Confirmed (the method is documented by NCSBE; the probability math follows from it). Catalog note: the largest counties' mail ballots, the highest-risk pool, are the least likely to be checked. JLF recommends allocating units by county size and sampling ballots. A full hand count of mail ballots closes it entirely.", "sources": [{"title": "John Locke Foundation — Flawed Sampling Method Means Some Ballots Are Unlikely to Be Audited", "url": "https://www.johnlocke.org/flawed-sampling-method-means-some-ballots-are-unlikely-to-be-audited/"}, {"title": "NCSBE — State Board to Randomly Select Ballot Groupings for Post-Election Audit (Nov. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2024/11/05/state-board-randomly-select-ballot-groupings-post-election-audit"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Audit Law Database: North Carolina", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaw/north-carolina/"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). JLF is a conservative think tank; its math is reproducible from NCSBE input files."}
{"id": "pa-honey-v-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-cvr-as-ballot-box-contents-word-game", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-08", "uid": "C20260926-025634-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-08", "old_ids": ["pa-honey-v-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-cvr-as-ballot-box-contents-word-game"], "seq": "C01113", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Play word games and feign confusion over information requests (deliberately playing dumb)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-03-04", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court (en banc) on Mar. 4, 2024 in Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services held that cast vote records are the 'digital equivalent' of 'contents of ballot boxes and voting machines' under Election Code §308—years of word-game equivalence that kept CVRs from public RTKL disclosure until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed in 2026. Status Confirmed as the operative Commonwealth Court word-game denial rationale that blocked CVR disclosure for years (later reversed by PA Supreme Court in 2026); peer to the PA Supreme Upheld Honey card and AZ ARS §16-625 CVR-as-secure-as-paper card already on this leaf—2024 Commonwealth Court opinion, not the 2026 Supreme remount. PEP framing: linguistic games that withhold machine audit artifacts from public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Commonwealth Court — Honey v. Lycoming County (57 C.D. 2023) opinion PDF (Mar. 4, 2024)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/57CD23_3-4-24.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-honey-v-lycoming-2024-commonwealth-court-cvr-as-ballot-box-contents-word-game__pa-commonwealth-court-honey-v-lycoming-57-cd-2023-opinion-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — H. Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services; Appeal of Al Schmidt (2024)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/commonwealth-court/2024/57-c-d-2023.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Lawfare Blocking evidence Play word games leaf."}
{"id": "eac-2024-ncoa-memo-address-updates-undeliverable-mail-list-maintenance", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-05", "uid": "C20260925-235207-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-05", "old_ids": ["eac-2024-ncoa-memo-address-updates-undeliverable-mail-list-maintenance"], "seq": "C00478", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Addresses are copied from one locality to another with the street name changed, generating returned ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's February 2024 NCOA memo documents that 67.9% of states (2022 EAVS) use USPS National Change of Address reports to identify voters who may have moved, and urges Address Correction Service for undeliverable mail—i.e., election mail address mismatches routinely generate returned/undeliverable ballots and list-maintenance events. Status Confirmed that wrong/outdated addresses drive returned election mail at scale. Intentional 'copy address but change street name' injection remains Alleged elsewhere; this card confirms the returned-ballot/address-error substrate.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Update to USPS Change of Address / NCOA Process (Feb 2024)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-ncoa-memo-address-updates-undeliverable-mail-list-maintenance__eac-update-to-usps-change-of-address-ncoa-process-feb-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "Lawyers' Committee — Mail Returned as Undeliverable memo", "url": "https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Returned-Mail-Memo-Final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-ncoa-memo-address-updates-undeliverable-mail-list-maintenance__lawyers-committee-mail-returned-as-undeliverable-memo.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 3. Intentional street-name swap not Confirmed; address-error→returned-ballot mechanics Confirmed."}
{"id": "fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-false-reality", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-05", "uid": "C20260926-033041-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-05", "old_ids": ["fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-false-reality"], "seq": "C01215", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "The tactic uses fear and self-censorship to create a false reality in which fraud is harder to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "FIRE's first National Speech Index (Jan. 2024 field; Feb. 2024 release) found about 25% of Americans self-censor fairly/very often (several times weekly), 25% somewhat/very worried about losing a job over speech, only 25% consider freedom of speech very/completely secure, and 69% say the country is on the wrong track on free expression—quantifying fear-driven self-censorship that shrinks the public square where election-process problems can be named. Status Confirmed primary FIRE National Speech Index 2024; peer to Cato 2020 self-censorship and Pew 2020 social-media censor-viewpoints cards already on this leaf—FIRE NSI instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: self-censorship makes fraud harder to detect in public debate; precinct hand counts keep the count itself observable even when speech is chilled.", "sources": [{"title": "FIRE — First National Speech Index shows a mixed bag for free speech (Feb. 2024)", "url": "https://www.fire.org/news/first-national-speech-index-shows-mixed-bag-free-speech", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-false-reality__fire-first-national-speech-index-shows-a-mixed-bag-for-free-speech-feb-2024.png"}, {"title": "FIRE — National Speech Index January 2024 Topline Results PDF (companion)", "url": "https://www.fire.org/sites/default/files/2024/02/NSI-January-2024-Topline-Results-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-false-reality__fire-national-speech-index-january-2024-topline-results-pdf-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Suppression-Based Perception Framing fear/self-censorship leaf (non-Cato/Pew)."}
{"id": "fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-loss-of-courage", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-01", "uid": "C20260926-031602-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-01", "old_ids": ["fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-loss-of-courage"], "seq": "C01166", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose courage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-02-27", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "FIRE's first National Speech Index (Jan. 12–19, 2024; n=1,000 adults via Polarization Research Lab America's Political Pulse) found ~25% of Americans self-censored 'fairly' or 'very' often in the prior month and ~25% were 'very' or 'somewhat' worried about losing a job over something they said—documenting widespread loss of courage to speak political views in ordinary life. Status Confirmed primary FIRE National Speech Index citizen self-censorship / cancel-culture fear survey; peer to WashU Gibson 2020 Freedom-and-Tolerance and Cato 2020 62%-afraid cards already on this leaf—2024 FIRE National Speech Index instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: demoralization that silences citizens shrinks the public witness pool needed for transparent hand-count observation.", "sources": [{"title": "FIRE — First National Speech Index shows a mixed bag for free speech (Feb. 27, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fire.org/news/first-national-speech-index-shows-mixed-bag-free-speech", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-loss-of-courage__fire-first-national-speech-index-mixed-bag-free-speech.png"}, {"title": "FIRE — Silence in the Classroom: 2024 FIRE Faculty Survey Report (self-censorship climate companion)", "url": "https://www.fire.org/research-learn/silence-classroom-2024-fire-faculty-survey-report", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fire-2024-national-speech-index-self-censorship-loss-of-courage__fire-silence-classroom-2024-faculty-survey-self-censorship.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Psychological Operations Demoralizing citizens causes loss of courage leaf."}
{"id": "mi-2023-pa254-mcl-168-31a-audit-not-recount-cannot-change-certified-bait-switch", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-04", "uid": "C20260926-025634-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-04", "old_ids": ["mi-2023-pa254-mcl-168-31a-audit-not-recount-cannot-change-certified-bait-switch"], "seq": "C01109", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass legislation, then later change the definitions of the terms it uses: a bait and switch."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-02-13", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Proposal 22-2 (Nov. 2022) constitutionalized a voter right to have statewide election results 'audited… to ensure the accuracy and integrity of elections' with methods 'as prescribed by law'; the implementing statute 2023 PA 254 (eff. Feb. 13, 2024) then amended MCL 168.31a to prescribe SOS/county-clerk audit procedures while expressly defining that '[a]n audit conducted under this section is not a recount and does not change any certified election results'—bait-and-switch narrowing of the constitutional 'audit' promise into a non-corrective procedural review. Status Confirmed primary constitutional text plus implementing statute redefinition; peer to NV AB192 RLA-precertification removal and GA SB3EX delayed human-readable ballot cards already on this leaf—MI Prop 22-2→PA 254 definition switch, not those remounted. PEP framing: audit vocabulary that cannot correct machine totals undercuts public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.31a Election audit procedures (2023 PA 254 amendment)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-31a", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-2023-pa254-mcl-168-31a-audit-not-recount-cannot-change-certified-bait-switch__michigan-legislature-mcl-168-31a-election-audit-procedures.png"}, {"title": "Michigan Legislature — Const. 1963 Art. II §4 (Prop 22-2 audit right)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-Article-II-4", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-2023-pa254-mcl-168-31a-audit-not-recount-cannot-change-certified-bait-switch__michigan-constitution-art-ii-4-prop-22-2-audit-right.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Legislation bait-and-switch definitions leaf."}
{"id": "eac-2024-ncoa-memo-undeliverable-address-quality-reconcile", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-36", "uid": "C20260926-005107-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-36", "old_ids": ["eac-2024-ncoa-memo-undeliverable-address-quality-reconcile"], "seq": "C00829", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "County staff do not notice, know why, or care that they received fewer undelivered ballots than they were billed for."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-02-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's February 2024 NCOA memo urges jurisdictions to use USPS National Change of Address / Address Correction Service feeds precisely because undeliverable election mail is a known list-maintenance signal many offices under-use — i.e., official recognition that counties often fail to fully notice/act on undeliverable returns. Status Confirmed for EAC's under-use diagnosis and NCOA recommendation.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — NCOA Memo Final (Feb 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2024-ncoa-memo-undeliverable-address-quality-reconcile__eac---ncoa-memo-final--feb-2024--pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "D.C. Auditor — 2020 undeliverable volume companion", "url": "https://dcauditor.org/report/elections-administration-11-16-21/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 18 companion."}
{"id": "az-2024-ez-voter-glitch-party-switched-to-other-pnd", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-12", "uid": "C20260926-033041-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-12", "old_ids": ["az-2024-ez-voter-glitch-party-switched-to-other-pnd"], "seq": "C01222", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "They change voters' party from their designated party to PND (party not designated) status in order to use their records to inject votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "In January 2024 Arizona's EZ Voter / AVID registration path hit a programming glitch that mis-parsed entries such as 'Republican Party' / 'Democratic Party' and defaulted affected new/updated registrations to 'Other' (party-not-designated / independent-equivalent); the Secretary of State's office said roughly 58–65 records were affected, the defect was patched within about 24 hours, and counties were told to verify and correct the switched affiliations—demonstrating automated party-to-PND flips without voter intent. Status Confirmed primary AZ contemporaneous reporting of the EZ Voter party-to-Other glitch and remediation; peer to KTAR Maricopa 'Other' overtaking major parties and AZSOS PND/Other rules cards already on this leaf—2024 EZ Voter glitch instance, not those remounted. Honest: Confirmed for unauthorized party→Other flips via system error; intentional phantom-injection purpose remains Alleged and is not claimed here. PEP framing: silent party-to-PND mutations in soft registration databases are invisible to the public in ways precinct hand counts of human paper ballots are not.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Free News — Voter Registration System Glitch Switched Voters' Parties To Independent (Jan. 2024)", "url": "https://azfreenews.com/2024/01/voter-registration-system-glitch-switched-voters-parties-to-independent/"}, {"title": "Newsweek — Kari Lake Outraged Over 'Glitch' Changing Voter Registrations (companion)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/kari-lake-outraged-arizona-voter-registration-glitch-1863308"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Registration party-to-PND status change leaf."}
{"id": "fayetteville-ar-public-comment-5-to-3-minutes-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-03", "uid": "C20260925-205354-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-03", "old_ids": ["fayetteville-ar-public-comment-5-to-3-minutes-2024"], "seq": "C00218", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Public speaking time is continually reduced"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01", "state": "AR", "description": "Fayetteville (AR) City Council voted in January 2024 to reduce public-comment speaking time on agenda items from five minutes to three minutes per speaker. Status Confirmed for the formal reduction of allotted public speaking time.", "sources": [{"title": "Northwest Arkansas Democrat-Gazette — Fayetteville shortens public comment from 5 to 3 minutes", "url": "https://www.nwaonline.com/news/2024/jan/03/fayetteville-council-shortens-time-for-public/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 2."}
{"id": "reuters-2024-nikki-haley-swatting-multi-vector-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-03", "uid": "C20260926-005107-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-03", "old_ids": ["reuters-2024-nikki-haley-swatting-multi-vector-intimidation"], "seq": "C00796", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-27", "state": "Federal", "description": "Reuters exclusively reported that Republican presidential candidate Nikki Haley was targeted in a 'swatting' incident at her home (false emergency call summoning armed response), with a second attempt days later — classic brute-force intimidation delivered through the 911/emergency-communications vector alongside contemporaneous doxxing/address-leak campaigns against officials. Matches the leaf's multi-vector brute-force framing (phone/emergency + online). Status Confirmed for documented multi-vector swatting of a national Republican candidate; broader partisan sponsorship Alleged case-by-case.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Nikki Haley targeted in swatting incident at her home (Jan 2024)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/republican-presidential-candidate-nikki-haley-targeted-swatting-incident-2024-01-27/"}, {"title": "Reuters — Haley targeted in second swatting attempt", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/republican-candidate-nikki-haley-targeted-second-swatting-attempt-2024-01-29/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 2."}
{"id": "sd-sb48-cvr-public-record-bill-killed-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-14", "uid": "C20260925-205354-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-14", "old_ids": ["sd-sb48-cvr-public-record-bill-killed-2024"], "seq": "C00229", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Even some Republican-led states (e.g., South Dakota, South Carolina) have not provided CVRs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-24", "state": "SD", "description": "South Dakota Senate State Affairs unanimously killed SB 48 (Jan. 24, 2024), a Secretary of State-backed bill that would have made cast vote records (CVRs) a public record. Argus Leader reporting notes prior FOIA-style CVR requests were denied because CVRs were not treated as public records, prompting litigation. Only four counties then had software to extract CVRs. Status Confirmed that South Dakota has not provided general public CVR access and killed legislation to require it.", "sources": [{"title": "Argus Leader — SD lawmakers kill bill making some election data public", "url": "https://www.argusleader.com/story/news/politics/2024/01/24/south-dakota-lawmakers-kill-bill-making-some-election-data-public/72340885007/"}, {"title": "SD Legislature — 2024 Senate Bill 48 (CVR disclosure)", "url": "https://mylrc.sdlegislature.gov/api/Documents/Amendment/262130.html?Year=2024", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sd-sb48-cvr-public-record-bill-killed-2024__sd-legislature-2024-senate-bill-48-cvr-disclosure.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 7. Catalog example SD Confirmed."}
{"id": "nist-vts-200-1-2024-election-infrastructure-profile-blast-radius", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-14", "uid": "C20260926-032103-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-14", "old_ids": ["nist-vts-200-1-2024-election-infrastructure-profile-blast-radius"], "seq": "C01194", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Bad actors can then exploit it for a much larger blast radius."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-23", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST Voting Technology Series VTS 200-1 (Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile, approved Jan. 23, 2024) maps election infrastructure—including statewide voter-registration databases, EMS/tabulation backends, and interconnected IT—as critical-infrastructure systems whose compromise can impair mission objectives across jurisdictions; the Profile prioritizes Asset Management, Access Control, and Recovery Planning precisely because dependencies and critical functions create cascading impact domains when centralized components fail or are exploited. Status Confirmed primary NIST election-infrastructure CSF Profile documenting high-blast-radius dependencies in centralized election IT; peer to CISA centralized-components high-impact and CISA 2026 SLTT lateral-movement cards already on this leaf—NIST VTS 200-1 Profile instance, not those CISA remounts. PEP framing: machine/centralization complexity expands blast radius; precinct paper hand counts (PEP) keep verification local and observable.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST VTS 200-1 — Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile (Jan. 2024 PDF)", "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/vts/NIST.VTS.200-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-vts-200-1-2024-election-infrastructure-profile-blast-radius__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST DOI — 10.6028/NIST.VTS.200-1 (companion)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.VTS.200-1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-vts-200-1-2024-election-infrastructure-profile-blast-radius__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Technology/Cyber-Security larger blast radius leaf."}
{"id": "ballotpedia-2024-automatic-recount-close-vote-margin-thresholds-by-state", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-05", "uid": "C20260926-031135-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-05", "old_ids": ["ballotpedia-2024-automatic-recount-close-vote-margin-thresholds-by-state"], "seq": "C01155", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below recount thresholds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia's 2024 state-by-state compilation of election recount laws tabulates automatic/mandatory recount close-vote-margin triggers (commonly 0.5%, with examples from 0.2% to 1% or absolute-vote caps such as Washington's <2,000 votes and <0.5%)—documenting the narrow statutory bands that define when a statewide or local total must be recounted. Status Confirmed primary Ballotpedia statutory table of automatic-recount thresholds; peer to NCSL Election Recounts brief and NIST/Lindeman-Stark RLA-vs-fixed-threshold cards already on this leaf—Ballotpedia 2024 recount-laws table, not those remounted. PEP framing: distributing shifts just outside automatic-recount bands avoids the only routine full-recount trigger many states provide.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — Election recount laws and procedures in the 50 states, 2024", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Election_recount_laws_and_procedures_in_the_50_states,_2024"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Recount Law Database", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/recountlaws/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Overall Manipulation Methodology below margin of recounts leaf."}
{"id": "ballotpedia-2024-who-runs-elections-elected-partisan-sos-chief-official", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-08", "uid": "C20260926-031135-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-08", "old_ids": ["ballotpedia-2024-who-runs-elections-elected-partisan-sos-chief-official"], "seq": "C01158", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Others"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia's 2024 'Who runs elections in the United States?' overview states that in 31 states the chief elections official is an elected secretary of state (with other states using gubernatorial/legislative/board appointment), and Ballotpedia's Secretary of State office comparison shows 35 states popularly elect the SOS—documenting that the top election-administration role is commonly a partisan elective office rather than a nonpartisan civil-service post. Status Confirmed primary Ballotpedia structural inventory of partisan-elected chief election officials; peer to NCSL election-admin SOS overview and AZ county-recorder partisan-office cards already on this leaf—Ballotpedia 2024 who-runs-elections / SOS comparison instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: partisan control of chief election offices concentrates machine-tabulation authority outside nonpartisan public hand-count norms.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — Who runs elections in the United States? (2024)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Who_runs_elections_in_the_United_States%3F_(2024)"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Secretary of State (state executive office) / office comparison", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Secretary_of_State_office_comparison"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Political Parties Make non-partisan positions partisan leaf."}
{"id": "ca-sos-safe-at-home-confidential-voter-registration-protected-records", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-03", "uid": "C20260926-030706-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-03", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-safe-at-home-confidential-voter-registration-protected-records"], "seq": "C01138", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "\"Private\" or \"protected\" status, meant to protect some records, abused to covertly inject phantom registrations"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Safe at Home (Address Confidentiality Program) FAQs and Statutes document Confidential Voter Registration as a core program service: participants request a Confidential Voter Registration Form so residential addresses stay out of public voter-file releases, and Elections Code §§2166–2166.8 confidential registrations are excluded from Voter Registration Information File requests to authorized purchasers. Status Confirmed primary CA SOS program documentation that protected/confidential voter status removes addresses from ordinary public roll scrutiny; peer to NCSL/NASS ACP overview and WA SOS ACP cards already on this leaf—California Safe at Home confidential-VR instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: confidentiality tools that hide residence from public roll auditors create injection opacity without public hand-count transparency (program purpose is victim safety; opacity risk is structural).", "sources": [{"title": "CA SOS Safe at Home — FAQ (Confidential voter registration service)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/registries/safe-home/frequently-asked-questions", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-safe-at-home-confidential-voter-registration-protected-records__ca-sos-safe-at-home-confidential-voter-registration-faq.png"}, {"title": "CA SOS — Voter Registration Information File Request (confidential records NOT included)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/voter-registration-information-file-request", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-safe-at-home-confidential-voter-registration-protected-records__ca-sos-voter-registration-information-file-confidential-records-excluded.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Voter Rolls Private/Protected status leaf."}
{"id": "catalist-analytics-build-model-election-results-no-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-37", "uid": "C20260926-003520-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-37", "old_ids": ["catalist-analytics-build-model-election-results-no-ballots"], "seq": "C00750", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Build a model of the election results without looking at a single ballot."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Catalist advertises national voter-file analytics with partisanship, vote-propensity, ideology, and issue models built from registration/vote history plus surveys and field IDs—enabling campaigns to model likely election results and turnout without inspecting a single ballot. Soft remount of Catalist onto Feedback 'Build a model of the election results' pathKey. Status Confirmed for commercial modeling capability; does not prove illegal ballot injection.", "sources": [{"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}, {"title": "Catalist — Election Data FAQ / data overview companion", "url": "https://catalist.us/election-data-faq/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 19. PEP: properly-run public hand count does not depend on proprietary voter-file models to know the counted total (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Soft remount of fill-20i Catalist Feedback family."}
{"id": "catalist-analytics-party-affiliation-vote-history-social-model-who-voted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-37", "uid": "C20260926-002757-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-37", "old_ids": ["catalist-analytics-party-affiliation-vote-history-social-model-who-voted"], "seq": "C00710", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Knowing who has voted, use party affiliation and voting history, supplemented by social media profiles, to predict how they will vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Catalist advertises national voter-file analytics combining official registration/vote history with surveys, field IDs, and modeled partisanship/ideology/media-consumption scores—exactly the catalog Feedback Loop step of knowing who has voted and using party affiliation, voting history, and enriched profiles to predict how they will vote. Soft remount of Catalist onto this pathKey. Status Confirmed for commercial capability; does not prove illegal ballot injection.", "sources": [{"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (partisanship, propensity, media consumption)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}, {"title": "Catalist — National Voter File / Data overview", "url": "https://catalist.us/data/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 19. PEP: properly-run precinct hand count doesn't depend on voter-file models to know the public count (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep)."}
{"id": "catalist-vote-choice-propensity-votes-needed-shift", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-40", "uid": "C20260926-003520-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-40", "old_ids": ["catalist-vote-choice-propensity-votes-needed-shift"], "seq": "C00753", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Determine how many votes are needed to shift the results"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Catalist's Primary & General Vote Propensity and related vote-choice models score who is likely to turn out and how they lean—inputs campaigns use to calculate persuasion/turnout vote targets needed to change an outcome. Status Confirmed for propensity/vote-choice modeling used in win-number planning.", "sources": [{"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (Vote Propensity / partisanship)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}, {"title": "TargetSmart — Path to Victory analytics consulting", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/polling-analytics/analytics-consulting/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "catalist-vote-propensity-models-low-propensity-registration-targeting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-36", "uid": "C20260926-002757-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-36", "old_ids": ["catalist-vote-propensity-models-low-propensity-registration-targeting"], "seq": "C00709", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Their goal is to increase registered voters as much as possible, especially low- or no-propensity voters, because they need those database entries to attach votes to."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Catalist's published analytics suite includes Primary & General Vote Propensity models on a national voter file—commercial infrastructure explicitly built to score low- vs high-propensity registrants for program decisions, confirming that expanding low-propensity database entries is operationally valuable to political actors. Soft remount of Catalist family onto this low-propensity pathKey. Status Confirmed for propensity-modeling commercial practice.", "sources": [{"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (Vote Propensity models)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}, {"title": "TargetSmart — Voter File / modeled turnout and party alignment", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/data/voter-file/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/catalist-vote-propensity-models-low-propensity-registration-targeting__targetsmart-voter-file-modeled-turnout-and-party-alignment.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 18 companion. Soft remount of Catalist; did NOT set source.local on fairvote InfluenceWatch/CRC financials."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-2-213-3-dmv-prereg-16-17-motor-voter-when-eligible", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-13", "uid": "C20260926-032507-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-13", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-2-213-3-dmv-prereg-16-17-motor-voter-when-eligible"], "seq": "C01208", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Voter registration entries are also created for people too young to vote but old enough to drive."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-2-213.3 requires the Department of Revenue to transmit to the SOS electronic records for each unregistered elector and each person eligible to preregister under §1-2-101(2) who provides citizenship documentation when applying for/renewing/correcting a driver's license or ID—after which county clerks mail notice that preregistrants 'will be automatically registered upon turning eighteen.' NCSL preregistration surveys confirm Colorado's 16–17 (expanding) DMV prereg path. Status Confirmed primary CO CRS §1-2-213.3 DMV→SOS preregistration pipeline creating roll entries for persons too young to vote but old enough to drive; peer to CA SOS Pre-Registration 16–17 DMV Motor Voter and FL Auditor 2021-096 Finding 2 under-16 cards already on this leaf—Colorado DMV prereg statute instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: motor-voter prereg entries for 16–17-year-olds expand the soft-identity pool years before ballot eligibility; public hand counts still require age-eligible humans present with paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-2-213.3 — Transfer of new voter registration records from department of revenue (preregistration)", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-2-213.3", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-crs-1-2-213-3-dmv-prereg-16-17-motor-voter-when-eligible__colorado-revised-statutes-1-2-213-3-transfer-of-new-voter-registration-records-from-department-of-revenue-preregistratio.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters (Colorado DMV prereg companion)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Motor-Voter too-young-to-vote but old-enough-to-drive leaf."}
{"id": "dekalb-ga-2024-38000-voters-inactive-undeliverable-mail-unaware", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-14", "uid": "C20260926-030239-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-14", "old_ids": ["dekalb-ga-2024-38000-voters-inactive-undeliverable-mail-unaware"], "seq": "C01134", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "GA", "description": "WABE/Decaturish reporting on DeKalb County documented ~38,000 voters labeled inactive after election mail (often precinct cards) was returned undeliverable—status changes many voters did not realize had occurred until they tried to vote or saw coverage—even though inactive registrants remain legally eligible to vote and can reactivate by voting or updating records. AJC explainers on Georgia's confirmation-notice / inactive pipeline likewise describe voters marked inactive from returned mail who may not know they needed to respond within the statutory window. Status Confirmed primary local reporting of mass inactivation from undeliverable mail with voter unawareness; peer to SCOTUS Husted v. APRI Ohio inactive process and California 2 CCR §19081 inactivation cards already on this leaf—DeKalb undeliverable-mail instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: silent inactive flips that surprise voters at the polls argue for transparent roll maintenance and public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "WABE — Report: 38,000 DeKalb voters labeled inactive over undelivered mail can still vote (county says)", "url": "https://www.wabe.org/report-38000-dekalb-voters-labeled-inactive-over-undelivered-mail-can-still-vote-county-says/"}, {"title": "AJC — What does it mean if a Georgia voter is marked as inactive? (returned-mail pathway)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-voters-status-changed-to-inactive-because-of-returned-mail/LCFCIAIJCNFSHC2AG6U62VY3PE/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Voter registration changed to inactive without voter knowing leaf."}
{"id": "eric-voter-participation-report-cross-state-waves-early-calendar", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-08", "uid": "C20260926-032507-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-08", "old_ids": ["eric-voter-participation-report-cross-state-waves-early-calendar"], "seq": "C01203", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Repeat across the country, hitting battleground states in waves (Midwest → Southeast → Southwest → West Coast) over the two- to six-week early-voting calendar."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "ERIC's official How ERIC Works documentation describes the optional post-federal-election Voter Participation Report that flags voters who may have cast ballots in more than one state, more than one ballot in the same state, or on behalf of a deceased voter—and requires members to review possible illegal voting and refer credible cases to law enforcement—while Cross-State Movers reports identify apparent interstate movers using voter + MVD data. That cross-state participation-flagging infrastructure exists precisely because staggered early-voting calendars and multi-state registration create wave opportunities to cast across jurisdictions. Status Confirmed primary ERIC Voter Participation Report / Cross-State Movers documentation of the interstate wave-detection layer; peer to NCSL staggered early-voting calendar and Goel SSRN double-voting prevalence cards already on this leaf—ERIC participation-report instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: industrial cross-state mover/participation matching acknowledges traveling-wave risk that precinct hand counts with domicile checks would constrain.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — How ERIC Works (Cross-State Movers + Voter Participation Report)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/how-does-it-work/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-voter-participation-report-cross-state-waves-early-calendar__eric-how-eric-works-cross-state-movers-voter-participation-report.png"}, {"title": "ERIC — Statistics (member list-maintenance / participation reporting companion)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/statistics/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-voter-participation-report-cross-state-waves-early-calendar__eric-statistics-member-list-maintenance-participation-reporting-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Traveling Voter Operations Repeat across country battleground waves leaf."}
{"id": "eric-voter-participation-report-multi-state-detection-lag", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-29", "uid": "C20260926-005107-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-29", "old_ids": ["eric-voter-participation-report-multi-state-detection-lag"], "seq": "C00822", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Move immediately to the next cluster of states whose rolls have not yet received \"voted\" flags from previous states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "ERIC's published 'How ERIC Works' process issues a Voter Participation Report comparing member states' voting history to flag possible multi-state voting — but the comparison is a post-election / batch membership data exchange, not a real-time national 'already voted' flag pushed to every e-pollbook during early voting. That batch lag is exactly the leaf's 'rolls have not yet received updated voted flags' / ERIC batch-processing window. Status Confirmed for ERIC's comparative batch participation reporting architecture; claim that organizers reliably exploit the lag at scale Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — How ERIC Works", "url": "https://ericstates.org/how-does-it-work/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-voter-participation-report-multi-state-detection-lag__eric---how-eric-works.png"}, {"title": "ERIC — Home / program overview", "url": "https://ericstates.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-voter-participation-report-multi-state-detection-lag__eric---home---program-overview.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 15. Leaf detail cites ERIC batch processing."}
{"id": "fec-coordinated-communications-common-vendor-share-info", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-24", "uid": "C20260926-003520-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-24", "old_ids": ["fec-coordinated-communications-common-vendor-share-info"], "seq": "C00737", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Share information with the cabal."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC coordinated-communication rules treat common vendors who use or convey a campaign's material nonpublic information as a conduct standard that can convert spending into in-kind contributions—explicitly recognizing the risk that consultants share campaign information across clients. Status Confirmed for regulatory recognition of consultant information-sharing risk; firewall safe harbors also exist.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Coordinated communications (candidate guidance)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/coordinated-communications/"}, {"title": "Cornell LII — 11 CFR § 109.21 coordinated communication (common vendor)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/11/109.21"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "gallup-2024-independent-party-id-record-high-universal", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-29", "uid": "C20260926-003520-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-29", "old_ids": ["gallup-2024-independent-party-id-record-high-universal"], "seq": "C00742", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Independent registrations are more versatile for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup found independent self-identification tied for a record high (~43%) while major-party IDs sat near modern lows—documenting a growing unaffiliated pool that is more 'universal' for targeting/modeling because it is not locked to a single party primary electorate. Soft remount of Catalist/TargetSmart modeling value onto this independent-expansion pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured independent ID growth; 'phantom attach' motive Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Independent party ID tied for high; Democratic ID at new low (2023/2024 series)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/548459/independent-party-tied-high-democratic-new-low.aspx"}, {"title": "Gallup — GOP holds edge in party affiliation (2024 update with independent share)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/655157/gop-holds-edge-party-affiliation-third-straight-year.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 15. Soft companion to fill-20i unaffiliated inflation / low-propensity leaves."}
{"id": "gallup-2024-partisan-integrity-split-fuel-division-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-26", "uid": "C20260926-004030-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-26", "old_ids": ["gallup-2024-partisan-integrity-split-fuel-division-companion"], "seq": "C00779", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fuel division instead of unity on fair elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup's widening partisan split on election integrity shows Republican and Democratic identifiers moving further apart on whether votes are counted accurately—party-aligned division that substitutes for cross-party unity on transparent counting methods. Soft remount of fill-20j Gallup integrity cards onto this Political Parties pathKey. PEP: properly-run public hand count of hand-marked paper is a unity-capable verification method both sides can observe (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for partisan integrity split.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Partisan split on election integrity gets even wider", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx"}, {"title": "Gallup — Confidence in accuracy of election matches record low (2020)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 13 companion. PEP framing."}
{"id": "grist-2024-chs-provide-help-standing-rock-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-14", "uid": "C20260926-004030-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-14", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-chs-provide-help-standing-rock-companion"], "seq": "C00767", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They may provide some real help to gain people's confidence."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "ND", "description": "Standing Rock CHS court-document reporting shows informants participating in camp life and relationships—forms of practical 'help' and belonging that build confidence before disruption effects appear. Soft companion to the Microchip help-to-gain-confidence card. Status Confirmed for documented CHS participation/relationship patterns; motive framing Alleged where interpretive.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — Standing Rock FBI informant court documents (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "Atavist — Red Fawn Fallis / Standing Rock pipeline informant case", "url": "https://magazine.atavist.com/2019/red-fawn-fallis-standing-rock-pipeline"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-sound-great-infiltrators", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-11", "uid": "C20260926-004030-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-11", "old_ids": ["grist-2024-standing-rock-chs-sound-great-infiltrators"], "seq": "C00764", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They promote themselves to appear credible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "ND", "description": "Grist's 2024 review of court documents on FBI Confidential Human Sources at Standing Rock shows informants embedded in camps who presented as committed participants while tasking with intelligence collection—i.e., infiltrators who 'make themselves sound great' / trustworthy to gain access. Soft remount of fill-20j/i Standing Rock CHS family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented CHS presentation-as-ally pattern; broader cabal orchestration Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Grist — FBI informant Standing Rock protest court documents (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — Review of FBI's investigations of certain domestic advocacy groups", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/reports/review-fbis-investigations-certain-domestic-advocacy-groups-redacted-version"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 6. Soft remount of Standing Rock / DOJ OIG CHS family."}
{"id": "i360-deep-dive-turnout-projections-vote-goals-votes-needed-analytics", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-10", "uid": "C20260926-030706-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-10", "old_ids": ["i360-deep-dive-turnout-projections-vote-goals-votes-needed-analytics"], "seq": "C01145", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Determine how many votes are needed to shift the results"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "i360's Political Analytics / Deep Dive product documentation explicitly sells 'turnout projections and vote goals,' Targeting Universes updated daily, and volunteer-shift calculators 'to meet your goals'—commercial Feedback Loop infrastructure that computes how many votes a campaign needs and which universes to contact, parallel to TargetSmart Path-to-Victory and Catalist propensity stacks. Status Confirmed primary vendor documentation of votes-needed / vote-goal analytics; peer to TargetSmart and Catalist cards already on this leaf—i360 Deep Dive instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: industrial votes-needed modeling that enables precision pressure without public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "i360 — Political Analytics (Deep Dive: turnout projections and vote goals)", "url": "https://www.i-360.com/political-products/political-analytics/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/i360-deep-dive-turnout-projections-vote-goals-votes-needed-analytics__i360-political-analytics-turnout-projections-vote-goals.png"}, {"title": "i360 — Case study: Cassidy for Senate leveraging analytics", "url": "https://www.i-360.com/case-studies/cassidy-for-senate-leveraging-analytics/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/i360-deep-dive-turnout-projections-vote-goals-votes-needed-analytics__i360-cassidy-for-senate-leveraging-analytics-case-study.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Feedback Loop Determine how many votes are needed leaf."}
{"id": "naco-2024-county-primer-election-admin-county-attorneys-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-10", "uid": "C20260926-031602-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-10", "old_ids": ["naco-2024-county-primer-election-admin-county-attorneys-lockstep"], "seq": "C01175", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County attorneys"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "NACo's America's County Governments primer on county-level election administration situates county/district attorneys inside the shared county election-security stack (advise election officials, coordinate LE response, prosecute election crimes) alongside clerks, IT, and courts—documenting the lockstep institutional layer county attorneys occupy even when they do not themselves tabulate ballots. Companion NCSL state/local election-administration overview likewise maps prosecutor advisory/enforcement roles into the same multi-office framework. Status Confirmed primary NACo county election-admin primer + NCSL structure overview documenting county-attorney lockstep layer; peer to FJP 2024 prosecutor-role and prior NACo lockstep cards already on this leaf—NACo primer / NCSL structure instance with distinct URLs, not those remounted. PEP framing: lockstep legal-advisor layers can chill transparency reforms including public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "NACo — America's County Governments: A Primer on County-Level Election Administration", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resource/americas-county-governments-primer-county-level-election-administration", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-2024-county-primer-election-admin-county-attorneys-lockstep__naco-primer-county-level-election-administration.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Election Administration at State and Local Levels", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Infiltration of Offices County Attorneys leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-eac-election-admin-state-local-clerks-not-parties", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-18", "uid": "C20260926-005107-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-18", "old_ids": ["ncsl-eac-election-admin-state-local-clerks-not-parties"], "seq": "C00811", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not exercise their authority over election operations as representatives of the electors, authority greater than that of the clerks and secretaries of state who are \"elected.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NCSL Election Administration at State and Local Levels and EAC poll-watcher guidance confirm election administration is a government function of designated officials (clerks, boards, SOS) — parties are stakeholders/observers, not operators. Soft companion to the observer-limits card on the same pathKey. Status Confirmed for official-vs-party operational split.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Election Administration at State and Local Levels", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels"}, {"title": "EAC — Poll Watchers guidance for election officials", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-eac-election-admin-state-local-clerks-not-parties__eac---poll-watchers-guidance-for-election-officials.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "ncsl-election-observers-party-watchers-limited-vs-clerks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-17", "uid": "C20260926-005107-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-17", "old_ids": ["ncsl-election-observers-party-watchers-limited-vs-clerks"], "seq": "C00810", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not exercise their authority over election operations as representatives of the electors, authority greater than that of the clerks and secretaries of state who are \"elected.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NCSL's Policies for Election Observers and Poll Watchers/Challengers pages document that party/candidate observers may watch, challenge where statute allows, and report irregularities — but cannot direct clerks, handle ballots, or override election-official decisions. Operational authority remains with clerks/SOS under state law. That structural gap — parties as representatives of electors yet limited to observer status while clerks run the machine count — is the leaf's 'don't exert their authority' mechanism. PEP contrast: properly-run public precinct hand count of hand-marked paper makes party/public observation meaningful without depending on proprietary tabulators (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for observer-limits vs clerk operational control; claim that party authority is 'greater than' clerks as a legal hierarchy Alleged/constitutional theory.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Policies for Election Observers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers"}, {"title": "NCSL — Poll Watchers and Challengers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watchers-and-challengers"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 9. PEP framing on observable hand count."}
{"id": "ncsl-online-voter-registration-dl-ssn4-match-no-documentary-id-upload", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-15", "uid": "C20260926-030239-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-15", "old_ids": ["ncsl-online-voter-registration-dl-ssn4-match-no-documentary-id-upload"], "seq": "C01135", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose or no ID requirements to register to vote in many cases"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's Online Voter Registration overview and state implementations (e.g., North Carolina DMV online portal) document that the dominant OVR model verifies identity by matching a driver's-license / state-ID number or last-four SSN plus DOB against existing agency databases—without requiring the applicant to upload or present a photographic identity document at registration. Applicants lacking those numbers typically fall back to paper/in-person forms; HAVA first-time mail-registrant ID rules remain a separate, narrower gate. Status Confirmed primary NCSL/state documentation of registration-without-documentary-photo-ID as the common online path; peer to NCSL no-documentation-at-polls and HAVA first-time mail-registrant alternative cards already on this leaf—OVR DL/SSN4 match model, not those remounted. PEP framing: registration identity gates that accept database attestation without documents expand roll-injection surface versus in-person hand-count accountability.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Online Voter Registration", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/online-voter-registration"}, {"title": "NCSBE — Complete Your Registration Online Through the DMV (DL/SSN verification, no document upload)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/registering/how-register/complete-your-registration-online-through-dmv", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-online-voter-registration-dl-ssn4-match-no-documentary-id-upload__ncsbe-complete-your-registration-online-through-the-dmv-dl-ssn-verification-no-document-upload.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Voter Rolls Loose or no ID requirement to register leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-poll-watchers-parties-fail-demand-honest-elections", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-29", "uid": "C20260926-004030-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-29", "old_ids": ["ncsl-poll-watchers-parties-fail-demand-honest-elections"], "seq": "C00782", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fail their constituents by not demanding honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's poll-watchers/challengers compilation shows states tightly limit who may observe and what observers may do—structural constraints that often leave parties unable (or unwilling) to demand the full transparency constituents expect. Soft remount of fill-20j party-accountability observer-limits cards onto this 'fail constituents / not demanding honest elections' pathKey. Status Confirmed for structural observer limits that weaken party demand power; blanket 'parties refuse' motive Alleged where not shown.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Poll Watchers and Challengers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watchers-and-challengers"}, {"title": "NCSL — Policies for Election Observers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 15. Soft remount of fill-20j NCSL observer-limits family. Honest on motive."}
{"id": "ncsl-poll-watchers-party-observer-limits-accountability-gap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-21", "uid": "C20260926-003520-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-21", "old_ids": ["ncsl-poll-watchers-party-observer-limits-accountability-gap"], "seq": "C00734", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not hold election officials accountable for providing honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that party poll watchers/observers may monitor and report irregularities but generally may not interfere with voting, handle materials, or take over election-official functions—i.e., parties' formal accountability tools are limited observation rights rather than operational control over clerks/SOS. Maps to catalog claim that parties often fail to hold election officials accountable for honest elections beyond observer complaints. Status Confirmed for statutory observer limits; does not prove parties never litigate or pressure officials.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Poll Watchers and Challengers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/poll-watchers-and-challengers"}, {"title": "NCSL — Policies for Election Observers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/policies-for-election-observers"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 11. Honest: structural observer limits Confirmed; blanket 'parties refuse accountability' motive Alleged where not shown."}
{"id": "ncsl-poll-workers-party-distribution-affiliation-pose", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-35", "uid": "C20260926-004030-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-35", "old_ids": ["ncsl-poll-workers-party-distribution-affiliation-pose"], "seq": "C00788", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Party-affiliation changes before becoming poll workers, to pose as members of a different party"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that ~40 states mandate political-party distribution among poll workers, with affiliation often taken from voter-registration records or last primary—creating a structural incentive/opportunity to change party affiliation on the rolls before appointment in order to fill a 'balanced' slot while posing as the other party. Status Confirmed for party-balance rules keyed to registration affiliation; proving widespread intentional posing as a completed scheme Alleged beyond the statutory incentive.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Election Poll Workers (mandated political party distribution)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-poll-workers"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Poll worker requirements (party distribution summary)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Poll_worker_requirements"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 18. Mechanism Confirmed; mass posing Alleged."}
{"id": "nj-2024-gop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-supersede-state-law", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-12", "uid": "C20260926-032507-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-12", "old_ids": ["nj-2024-gop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-supersede-state-law"], "seq": "C01207", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Allow \"delegate\" votes, then control the delegates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "NJ", "description": "New Jersey Republican Party 2024 Delegate Selection Rules (filed with NJ Division of Elections) allocate all statewide, at-large, congressional-district, and automatic RNC delegates winner-take-all to the presidential candidate receiving the most statewide primary votes—explicitly superseding conflicting state law under RNC Rule 16 timing/penalty constraints (NJ's entitlement reduced to 12 delegates for 2024). Status Confirmed primary NJ GOP 2024 winner-take-all delegate-selection rules documenting party control of the entire delegate slate via rules; peer to CAGOP 2023 winner-take-all Executive Committee change and AP Trump California delegate-sweep cards already on this leaf—NJ 2024 WTA rules instance, not those CAGOP remounts. PEP framing: rules that convert plurality primaries into controlled winner-take-all delegate blocs concentrate nomination power beyond public hand-count observation of rank-and-file ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "NJ Division of Elections — 2024 Republican Delegate Selection Rules (PDF)", "url": "https://nj.gov/state/elections/assets/pdf/election-results/2024/2024-republican-delegate-selection-rules.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-2024-gop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-supersede-state-law__nj-division-of-elections-2024-republican-delegate-selection-rules-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "RNC — Call of the 2024 Republican National Convention / Rule 16 allocation framework (companion)", "url": "https://prod-static.gop.com/media/documents/2024_Call_of_the_Convention_as_adopted_11.20.23_1700517775.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-2024-gop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-supersede-state-law__rnc-call-of-the-2024-republican-national-convention-rule-16-allocation-framework-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Primaries Allow delegate votes then control the delegates leaf."}
{"id": "targetsmart-path-to-victory-model-election-results", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-38", "uid": "C20260926-003520-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-38", "old_ids": ["targetsmart-path-to-victory-model-election-results"], "seq": "C00751", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Build a model of the election results without looking at a single ballot."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "TargetSmart markets Path-to-Victory / analytics consulting that produces turnout scenarios, support estimates, and performance targets from voter-file models—another industry-standard way to build an election-results model without reading ballots. Status Confirmed for commercial Path-to-Victory modeling practice.", "sources": [{"title": "TargetSmart — Analytics & Consulting / Path to Victory tooling", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/polling-analytics/analytics-consulting/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/targetsmart-path-to-victory-model-election-results__targetsmart-analytics-consulting-path-to-victory-tooling.png"}, {"title": "TargetSmart — Voter File / VoterBase", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/data/voter-file/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "targetsmart-path-to-victory-votes-needed-to-win", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-39", "uid": "C20260926-003520-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-39", "old_ids": ["targetsmart-path-to-victory-votes-needed-to-win"], "seq": "C00752", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Determine how many votes are needed to shift the results"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "TargetSmart Path-to-Victory analytics explicitly produce win numbers / votes-needed performance targets from modeled turnout and support—i.e., determining how many votes are needed to shift or secure a result. Soft remount onto Feedback 'Determine how many votes are needed to shift the results' pathKey. Status Confirmed for commercial votes-needed modeling; illegal shift operations Alleged beyond analytics capability.", "sources": [{"title": "TargetSmart — Analytics & Consulting (Path to Victory / win numbers)", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/polling-analytics/analytics-consulting/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/targetsmart-path-to-victory-votes-needed-to-win__targetsmart-analytics-consulting-path-to-victory-win-numbers.png"}, {"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (propensity / vote-choice indices companion)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 20. Soft remount of TargetSmart/Catalist family onto votes-needed-to-shift pathKey. PEP contrast on opaque model-driven vs public hand count."}
{"id": "targetsmart-voterbase-voting-history-modeled-party-knowing-who-voted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-38", "uid": "C20260926-002757-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-38", "old_ids": ["targetsmart-voterbase-voting-history-modeled-party-knowing-who-voted"], "seq": "C00711", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Knowing who has voted, use party affiliation and voting history, supplemented by social media profiles, to predict how they will vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "TargetSmart's VoterBase markets registration/contact data, detailed voting history, early/absentee flags, and modeled party alignment/turnout scores used for microtargeting—confirming industry-standard Feedback Loop tooling to infer how known voters will vote from affiliation + history + models. Status Confirmed for commercial voter-file modeling capability.", "sources": [{"title": "TargetSmart — Voter File / VoterBase", "url": "https://targetsmart.com/data/voter-file/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/targetsmart-voterbase-voting-history-modeled-party-knowing-who-voted__targetsmart-voter-file-voterbase.png"}, {"title": "TargetSmart — Modeling / TargetEarly", "url": "https://targetearly.targetsmart.com/modeling", "local": "/archives/2026/09/targetsmart-voterbase-voting-history-modeled-party-knowing-who-voted__targetsmart-modeling-targetearly.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "verified-voting-bmd-qr-barcode-tabulation-not-human-readable-text-definition", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-05", "uid": "C20260926-030239-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-05", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-bmd-qr-barcode-tabulation-not-human-readable-text-definition"], "seq": "C01125", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's ballot-decoding explainer and ExpressVote XL equipment profile document the industry definition under which 'tabulation' means the scanner reading BMD-encoded QR/barcodes—not the human-readable candidate text voters can verify—so early/central machine tabulation proceeds on non-human-readable encodings even while paper is present. VV notes that whether the printed text or the encoded payload is the official vote 'depends on state law,' and that some jurisdictions (e.g., Colorado's QR prohibition prompting vendor redesign) had to redefine the counted mark away from barcodes. Status Confirmed primary VV documentation of the tabulation=barcode definitional split across BMD deployments; peer to Georgia HB316/SB189 QR-tabulation and Curling/Halderman barcode cards already on this leaf—multi-state VV definitional frame, not those GA remounts. PEP framing: tabulation definitions that count unreadable codes fuel machine feedback loops instead of public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Decoding your ballot: The role of QR codes and barcodes", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/decoding-your-ballot-the-role-of-qr-codes-and-barcodes/"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressVote XL equipment profile (barcode tabulation)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expressvote-xl/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Tabulation change-definitions not-human-readable leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "verified-voting-decoding-ballot-qr-barcode-bmd-not-handmarked-equivalent", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-02", "uid": "C20260926-030239-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-02", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-decoding-ballot-qr-barcode-bmd-not-handmarked-equivalent"], "seq": "C01122", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Hand-marked paper ballots deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Verified Voting's 'Decoding your ballot: The role of QR codes and barcodes' explicitly distinguishes (1) margin style/precinct barcodes that do not encode votes from (2) BMD-printed QR/barcodes that encode the voter's selections and are what the scanner tabulates—while voters can review only the human-readable text they cannot directly interpret. VV states voters 'can't directly interpret the codes the ballot scanner will read,' and notes programming errors (e.g., 2023) where poll workers were told to trust the encoded selections over the printed text—documenting that 'paper ballot' / BMD branding is not equivalent to a voter hand-marking ovals the scanner optically reads. Status Confirmed primary VV technical explainer of the hand-marked vs barcode-BMD linguistic split; peer to VV handmarked-opscan majority and BMD-vs-handmarked policy-statement cards already on this leaf—decoding/QR explainer, not those remounted. PEP framing: paper-ballot vocabulary that hides non-voter-verifiable machine codes blocks public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Decoding your ballot: The role of QR codes and barcodes", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/decoding-your-ballot-the-role-of-qr-codes-and-barcodes/"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Voting Equipment Database / QR-Barcode Verifier map context", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expressvote-xl/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Linguistic Deception Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Deception leaf."}
{"id": "wa-sos-acp-protected-records-voter-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-36", "uid": "C20260926-003520-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-36", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-acp-protected-records-voter-registration"], "seq": "C00749", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "\"Private\" or \"protected\" status, meant to protect some records, abused to covertly inject phantom registrations"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington SOS ACP pages describe Protected Records Voter registration for ACP participants—official machinery that removes normal public-address visibility from selected voter records. Status Confirmed for protected-records voter pathway; no claim here that WA ACP has been proven used for phantom injection.", "sources": [{"title": "WA SOS — Voter Registration for ACP / Protected Records Voters", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/statewide-programs/address-confidentiality-program-acp/participants/voter-registration-acp", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-acp-protected-records-voter-registration__wa-sos-voter-registration-for-acp-protected-records-voters.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Address protections overview", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/civil-and-criminal-justice/address-protections-for-public-officials-and-employees"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 18 companion."}
{"id": "mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-02", "uid": "C20261026-180010-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-02", "old_ids": ["mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live"], "seq": "C01567", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2024 manual edition (July 2024), current Michigan procedure", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan's Election Officials' Manual, Chapter 10, says \"The Election Day EPB is an offline program that must be downloaded from the QVF and loaded onto a laptop before each election.\" [1] QVF is the Qualified Voter File, Michigan's statewide registration database. The manual says the Election Day poll book is not connected to the internet, has its Wi-Fi disabled, and \"must be exported from the QVF after 4 p.m. on the day before Election Day.\" [1] By contrast, the same chapter says \"The Early Voting EPB is a web-based application with a secure, live connection to the QVF\" used to access and update voter records in real time. [1] The manual's early-voting fallback is an offline list plus a supplementary voter change report generated daily. [1] The Secretary of State's 2020 poll book refresh manual describes the download onto an encrypted flash drive and the voter-history import after the election. [2] Status Confirmed that Michigan runs two different models inside one state: a live connection for early voting and a fixed offline copy on Election Day, so changes made in the QVF after the Monday afternoon export do not reach the Election Day poll book by connection. No source says the gap was exploited.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Bureau of Elections, Election Officials' Manual, Chapter 10 Preparation of Election Equipment", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/01mcalpine/Preparation-of-Voting-Equipment.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan EPB Refresh Clerk's Manual (Sept. 2020), via Verified Voting", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MI_EPB_Manual_Win10_526476_7.pdf"}], "notes": "The 4 p.m. export sentence is on the page of numbered export steps in Chapter 10 of the manual.", "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after", "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling", "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "mi-2024-st-clair-shores-absentee-and-in-person-both-counted-epb-override", "mi-2026-rule-168-48-epb-seven-day-deletion-vs-22-month-retention-preservation-order", "mi-sos-2023-epb-architecture-foia-cybersecurity-exemption-security-logs"]}
{"id": "az-ars-16-625-cvr-electronic-ballot-data-as-secure-as-paper-word-game", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-10", "uid": "C20260925-214102-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-10", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-625-cvr-electronic-ballot-data-as-secure-as-paper-word-game"], "seq": "C00333", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Play word games and feign confusion over information requests (deliberately playing dumb)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona courts in AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County applied A.R.S. §16-625's requirement that electronic ballot data be secured at least as protectively as sealed paper ballots to deny public-records disclosure of Cast Vote Records — a statutory word-game elevating CVR/electronic derivatives into ballot-secrecy armor against citizen inspection. Status Confirmed for the legal recharacterization that blocks the information request (process Confirmed; not a ruling on election outcomes).", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/court-of-appeals-division-one-published/2023/1-ca-cv-22-0254.html"}, {"title": "A.R.S. §16-625 — electronic ballot data security", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/title-16/section-16-625/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 5 companion. Related card az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023 remains on Public Information Requests stub; this mounts the exact word-games Detail leaf."}
{"id": "az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-28", "uid": "C20260925-155410-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-28", "old_ids": ["az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023"], "seq": "C00028", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "AZ", "description": "In AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County, Arizona courts held that Cast Vote Records (electronic data derived from ballots) are protected from public-records disclosure under A.R.S. §16-625, which requires electronic ballot data to be secured at least as protectively as sealed paper ballots. Arizona Court of Appeals Division One published opinion affirmed denial. Later Hudson v. Heap (Court of Appeals, reported 2026) again affirmed Maricopa's denial of 2024-cycle CVR public-records requests on the same statutory basis. Status Confirmed for statutory/public-records denial of CVR access (not a finding that underlying tallies were altered).", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — AUDIT-USA v. Maricopa County (Ariz. Ct. App. 2023)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/arizona/court-of-appeals-division-one-published/2023/1-ca-cv-22-0254.html"}, {"title": "A.R.S. §16-625 — Electronic data and digital images; ballots; security", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/arizona/title-16/section-16-625/"}, {"title": "Arizona Court of Appeals — Hudson v. Heap opinion PDF (1 CA-CV 25-0730)", "url": "https://apps.azcourts.gov/aacc/appella/1CA/CV/CV250730.PDF", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-audit-usa-cvr-denial-2023__arizona-court-of-appeals-hudson-v-heap-opinion-pdf-1-ca-cv-2.pdf"}], "notes": "Also maps to Reporting; Records / Tabulation transparency debates."}
{"id": "crs-private-election-funding-influence-pathways-org-leaders", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-12", "uid": "C20260926-002008-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-12", "old_ids": ["crs-private-election-funding-influence-pathways-org-leaders"], "seq": "C00645", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may co-opt the leader of a grassroots election organization to pass and receive information, monitoring and controlling its efforts. The leader or organization may not know they are being used."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Federal", "description": "Congressional Research Service IF12501 summarizes the legal/policy landscape of private funding for election administration and the transparency/accountability questions it raises—i.e., when outside funders underwrite officials or partner NGOs, leaders necessarily exchange information and align workplans with funder frameworks. Status Confirmed for the funding→info/control pathway as a documented governance issue; partisan 'cabal' framing Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CRS — Private Funding for Election Administration (IF12501)", "url": "https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF12501.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-private-election-funding-influence-pathways-org-leaders__crs-private-funding-for-election-administration-if12501.png"}, {"title": "DocumentCloud — HAVA and non-profit organization report (private funding context)", "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20428534/hava-and-non-profit-organization-report-final-w-attachments-and-preface-121420.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "democracy-docket-doj-joins-fair-fight-intimidation-suit-against-true-the-vote", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-32", "uid": "C20260925-220029-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-32", "old_ids": ["democracy-docket-doj-joins-fair-fight-intimidation-suit-against-true-the-vote"], "seq": "C00385", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing", "They claim that citizen canvassing efforts constitute voter intimidation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Contemporaneous reporting confirms DOJ joined/intervened in the Fair Fight intimidation lawsuit against True the Vote's citizen election-integrity operations—amplifying the official framing of citizen canvass/challenge work as potential VRA intimidation. Status Confirmed for the claim/intervention event.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — DOJ joins Georgia voter intimidation lawsuit vs True the Vote", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/doj-joins-georgia-voter-intimidation-lawsuit-against-right-wing-group-true-the-vote/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/democracy-docket-doj-joins-fair-fight-intimidation-suit-against-true-the-vote__democracy-docket-doj-joins-georgia-voter-intimidation-lawsui.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "eac-federal-mail-voter-registration-form-checkbox-attestation-no-residence-docs", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-26", "uid": "C20260925-211320-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-26", "old_ids": ["eac-federal-mail-voter-registration-form-checkbox-attestation-no-residence-docs"], "seq": "C00295", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Federal", "description": "The official National Mail Voter Registration Form (EAC) requires a signed attestation of U.S. citizenship and residency eligibility under penalty of perjury and asks for DL/SSN digits when available, but does not require applicants to attach documentary proof of residence (deed, lease, utility bill) as a universal federal condition. Status Confirmed for federal-form design without documentary residence proof.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. EAC — National Mail Voter Registration Form (ENG PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hava-303a5-unique-id-if-no-dl-or-ssn__eac-national-mail-voter-registration-form-eng-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "DOJ CRT — National Voter Registration Act overview", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-30", "uid": "C20260926-000809-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-30", "old_ids": ["eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data"], "seq": "C00583", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No data consistency"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ERIC exists because state voter files lack inherent cross-state consistency: member states receive mover/duplicate/deceased reports requiring follow-up under NVRA. The need for an external consistency layer confirms rolls do not self-enforce referential/cross-jurisdiction consistency. Soft companion to fill-20e ERIC outsourcing card. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — FAQ on list-maintenance reports", "url": "https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ERIC-FAQ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad.pdf"}, {"title": "ERIC — Security / membership page", "url": "https://ericstates.org/security/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data__eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "eric-faq-same-state-duplicates-name-changes-maiden-married", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-33", "uid": "C20260926-001426-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-33", "old_ids": ["eric-faq-same-state-duplicates-name-changes-maiden-married"], "seq": "C00626", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Duplicate entries for individuals with name changes (maiden and married names)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ERIC's public FAQ explains it compares hashed voter and motor-vehicle data to help states identify same-state duplicate registrations and records reflecting name changes—explicitly recognizing maiden/married and other name-change duplicates as a routine list-maintenance problem. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — Frequently Asked Questions (duplicates / name changes)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ERIC-FAQ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-faq-same-state-duplicates-name-changes-maiden-married__eric-frequently-asked-questions-duplicates-name-changes.pdf"}, {"title": "ERIC — Statistics / member list-maintenance outcomes", "url": "https://ericstates.org/statistics/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-faq-same-state-duplicates-name-changes-maiden-married__eric-statistics-member-list-maintenance-outcomes.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 17."}
{"id": "eric-states-membership-list-maintenance-outsourced-comparisons", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-23", "uid": "C20260926-000015-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-23", "old_ids": ["eric-states-membership-list-maintenance-outsourced-comparisons"], "seq": "C00536", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Outsourcing voter-roll maintenance to entities that fail to maintain the rolls properly (through incompetence or malice), which also lets a fourth party manipulate the rolls indirectly"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ERIC (Electronic Registration Information Center) is a membership nonprofit through which member states outsource cross-state voter-list comparisons (movers, deceased, duplicates) rather than performing all maintenance solely in-house—creating a fourth-party dependency for roll hygiene. Status Confirmed for outsourcing of list-maintenance comparisons; 'fail...maliciously' Alleged and not claimed as Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "ERIC — Security / membership model", "url": "https://ericstates.org/security/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data__eric-cross-state-list-maintenance-exposes-inconsistent-state-roll-data.png"}, {"title": "ERIC FAQ — member reports, no cross-member raw data access", "url": "https://ericstates.org/faq/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eric-states-membership-list-maintenance-outsourced-comparisons__eric-states-membership-list-maintenance-outsourced-comparisons.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 12."}
{"id": "ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-35", "uid": "C20260925-233150-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-35", "old_ids": ["ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission"], "seq": "C00428", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Ability to connect to other networks (including the internet)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ES&S public FAQs state that some DS200 tabulators may use an optional wireless/cellular modem to transmit unofficial election-night results where permitted—i.e., a vendor-supported alternate network path from the precinct tabulator. Status Confirmed for optional networked results transmission. ES&S asserts private APN/encrypted channels rather than 'the public Internet'; the leaf's 'including the internet' risk class still applies to any alternate networked path versus true air-gapped paper handoff. PEP: hand-marked paper hand-counted on site needs no modem.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S — Transmission of Unofficial Election Results FAQs", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission__ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission__es-s-transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs.png"}, {"title": "EAC — ES&S EVS 6.4.0.0 Certificate and Scope of Conformance", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/ES%26S%20EVS%206.4.0.0%20Certificate%20and%20Scope%20of%20Conformance%20Signed%20%282%29.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission__ess-ds200-optional-wireless-modem-unofficial-results-transmission__eac-es-s-evs-6-4-0-0-certificate-and-scope-of-conformance.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 18.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-edit-outside-application-backdoor-path", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-24", "uid": "C20260925-234437-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-24", "old_ids": ["halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-edit-outside-application-backdoor-path"], "seq": "C00457", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Backdoors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Coffee County EMS forensics show direct SQL/database edit capability outside Electionware application controls—an insider or network-reachable path that bypasses application-layer audit expectations. Status Confirmed for an out-of-band database edit path. Soft remount onto Tabulation > Back doors leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman Antrim/related EMS mutability discussion (USENIX PDF context)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}, {"title": "Curling v. Raffensperger docket — Halderman EMS materials", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6236542/curling-v-raffensperger/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-edit-outside-application-backdoor-path__curling-v-raffensperger-docket-halderman-ems-materials.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-29", "uid": "C20260925-233150-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-29", "old_ids": ["halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app"], "seq": "C00422", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Change the database outside the voting-system software."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's Coffee County EMS analysis (Curling exhibits) documents that Dominion EMS deployments with SQL Server Management Studio and privileged EMSADMIN-style access can view/modify election database tables directly—outside the ordinary election-application UI. Status Confirmed for the architectural ability to change underlying election databases via SQL tools. Confirmed for capability/design; attributing a specific outcome-changing edit in a named contest stays Alleged without a matching finding.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Halderman Coffee County EMS userlog/SQL exhibit (Curling)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app__halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app__courtlistener-halderman-coffee-county-ems-userlog-sql-exhibit-curling.pdf"}, {"title": "Related Curling docket exhibit cluster (EMSADMIN / SQL access discussion)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app__halderman-coffee-county-ems-sql-server-direct-edit-outside-election-app__courtlistener-halderman-coffee-county-ems-userlog-sql-exhibit-curling.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 15. Soft remount of fill-20a Incomplete logging Halderman card onto exact Change-database leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "halderman-coffee-county-ems-userlog-erasable-sql-edit-auditability-weakness", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-28", "uid": "C20260925-220029-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-28", "old_ids": ["halderman-coffee-county-ems-userlog-erasable-sql-edit-auditability-weakness"], "seq": "C00381", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's Coffee County (GA) election-security analyses (Curling exhibits) document EMS auditability weaknesses including ability to alter/delete EMS log entries (e.g., UserLog) via database tools and election-package load behaviors that can erase log tables—i.e., logs that are incomplete or tamperable rather than append-only forensic records. Status Confirmed for the documented logging/auditability weakness. Soft companion to Change-database-outside leaf (same Coffee County record).", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Halderman Coffee County response exhibit PDF", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf"}, {"title": "VoteGA host — Halderman Dominion ICX security analysis PDF", "url": "https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Halderman-Security-Analysis-Dominion-ICX-BMD-.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-ems-userlog-erasable-sql-edit-auditability-weakness__votega-host-halderman-dominion-icx-security-analysis-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 14 companion. Also maps Change database outside / Self-deleting logs siblings.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "halderman-coffee-county-sql-edit-record-then-change-later-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-17", "uid": "C20260925-234437-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-17", "old_ids": ["halderman-coffee-county-sql-edit-record-then-change-later-leaf"], "seq": "C00450", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Record the votes properly in the database initially, then change them later."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's Coffee County EMS examination documents that Election Management System databases (including SQL Server content) can be edited outside the election-management application UI—creating a path where initial scanner uploads look correct and later database edits alter stored totals/definitions. Status Confirmed for the technical edit-outside-software path. Soft remount of Coffee County SQL-edit family onto exact 'record then change later' leaf. Intentional fraud not established in every deployment.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim forensic paper (EMS mutability / related context PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-sql-edit-record-then-change-later-leaf__halderman-antrim-forensic-paper-ems-mutability-related-context-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Curling v. Raffensperger docket (Halderman EMS exhibits)", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6236542/curling-v-raffensperger/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-sql-edit-record-then-change-later-leaf__courtlistener-curling-v-raffensperger-docket-halderman-ems-exhibits.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 9. Soft remount; intentional mass fraud stays Alleged elsewhere."}
{"id": "halderman-coffee-county-userlog-cleared-on-election-package-load", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-31", "uid": "C20260925-233150-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-31", "old_ids": ["halderman-coffee-county-userlog-cleared-on-election-package-load"], "seq": "C00424", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Self-deleting logs"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's Coffee County EMS findings describe UserLog / application audit tables that can be erased or that are cleared when new election packages are loaded—i.e., operational paths where election audit logs do not persistably survive routine EMS workflows. Status Confirmed for log loss/erasability behavior in the analyzed EMS configuration. Confirmed for self-clearing/erasable logging weakness; not Confirmed as proof of a particular fraud cover-up.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Halderman Coffee County EMS userlog exhibit", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf"}, {"title": "Berkeley DAW — AuditBear EVT'12 incomplete election audit logs (general class)", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/auditbear-evt12.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-coffee-county-userlog-cleared-on-election-package-load__halderman-coffee-county-userlog-cleared-on-election-package-load__berkeley-daw-auditbear-evt-12-incomplete-election-audit-logs-general-class.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 16. Soft remount from fill-20a Incomplete logging companion onto exact Self-deleting logs leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-eac-41-states-require-federal-testing-or-cert-component", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-10", "uid": "C20260926-022424-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-10", "old_ids": ["ncsl-eac-41-states-require-federal-testing-or-cert-component"], "seq": "C01040", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Everyone downstream \"trusts\" the systems because they were \"tested\" and \"certified.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL’s Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification overview and EAC’s 2023 State Requirements for Certification compilation document that a large majority of states (NCSL/EAC tallies on the order of ~41) require some federal-program component—full EAC certification, testing to federal VVSG standards, and/or testing by an EAC-accredited VSTL—before systems may be used, creating a downstream trust cascade in which local officials and the public treat ‘federally tested/certified’ as the security assurance. Status Confirmed structural reliance on federal test/cert signals; peer to EAC trust-cascade and CA TTBR post-ITA withdrawal cards—NCSL/EAC state-requirements compilation, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voting-system-standards-testing-and-certification"}, {"title": "EAC — State Requirements for Certification 2023", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/State%20Requirements%20for%20Certification%202023.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-eac-41-states-require-federal-testing-or-cert-component__eac-state-requirements-for-certification-2023.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Everyone downstream trusts tested/certified leaf."}
{"id": "nv-ab192-2023-removed-precertification-rla-requirement", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-05", "uid": "C20260925-214102-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-05", "old_ids": ["nv-ab192-2023-removed-precertification-rla-requirement"], "seq": "C00328", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass legislation, then later change the definitions of the terms it uses: a bait and switch."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada's RLA statute (NRS 293.394) had been amended to require risk-limiting audits before certification starting Jan. 1, 2024 (after pilots). Assembly Bill 192 (2023) revised NRS 293.394.2 to remove the precertification timing requirement — changing what 'required RLA' means in practice from a pre-certification check into an audit that need not finish before results are certified. Verified Voting documents the AB192 revision expressly. Status Confirmed for post-enactment statutory redefinition of audit timing/force.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Nevada audit law (AB192 removed precertification)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaw/nevada/"}, {"title": "Nevada Legislature — AB192 (2023) actions", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/App/NELIS/REL/82nd2023/Bill/10025/Overview"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 3. Bait-and-switch on 'audit before certify' meaning."}
{"id": "stark-curling-rla-cannot-detect-bmd-misprint-algorithmic-fraud", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-29", "uid": "C20260925-220029-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-29", "old_ids": ["stark-curling-rla-cannot-detect-bmd-misprint-algorithmic-fraud"], "seq": "C00382", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Audits are engineered to avoid catching fraud (easy when the fraud is algorithmic)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "GA", "description": "RLA inventor Philip B. Stark's Curling declarations and related papers state that risk-limiting audits/recounts of BMD printouts cannot detect algorithmic fraud that causes BMDs to print incorrect voter choices—a perfect RLA can confirm the wrong outcome if the paper trail is untrustworthy. Georgia brands BMD-QR RLAs as its audit while the tabulated artifact is machine-produced. Status Confirmed that this audit design cannot catch BMD-algorithmic fraud by construction. Soft companion to fill-15g 'redefine audit' cards. PEP contrast: hand count of hand-marked paper checks voter marks directly.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Stark declaration materials in Curling", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.680.1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-curling-rla-cannot-detect-bmd-misprint-algorithmic-fraud__courtlistener-stark-declaration-materials-in-curling.pdf"}, {"title": "Stark — When Audits and Recounts Distract (arXiv)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2408.00055"}, {"title": "Stark slides — Evidence-Based Elections / BMDs / Georgia", "url": "https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Seminars/auditGABlueRibbon25.slides.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 15. Audit engineered not to catch BMD algorithmic fraud Confirmed."}
{"id": "tx-elec-code-172-024-primary-filing-fees-up-to-5000-us-senate", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-36", "uid": "C20260925-220029-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-36", "old_ids": ["tx-elec-code-172-024-primary-filing-fees-up-to-5000-us-senate"], "seq": "C00389", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Cost of Running for Office", "Raise the cost of running for office so that only candidates with big money behind them can afford to run, disenfranchising ordinary American citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Election Code §172.024 sets fixed primary filing fees ranging from tens of dollars to $5,000 (e.g., U.S. Senator $5,000; many statewide offices $3,750; state representative $750)—a hard cash barrier before petition alternatives. Status Confirmed that Texas law imposes substantial filing-fee costs to appear on the primary ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Public Law — Election Code §172.024 Filing Fee", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._election_code_section_172.024"}, {"title": "Texas Statutes — Election Code §172.024", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/GetStatute.aspx?Code=EL&Value=172.024"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 18 companion."}
{"id": "tx-elec-code-33-003-party-county-chair-appoints-poll-watchers", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-37", "uid": "C20260925-220029-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-37", "old_ids": ["tx-elec-code-33-003-party-county-chair-appoints-poll-watchers"], "seq": "C00390", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes a poll watcher; the poll watchers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Election Code Chapter 33 (§33.003) authorizes a political party's county chair (or, if the chair fails to act, any three county executive committee members) to appoint poll watchers when the party has a nominee on the ballot; candidates may also appoint. There is no open competitive 'anyone applies and is selected by lottery' pathway for the core watcher slots—appointment is by party/candidate gatekeepers. Status Confirmed. Soft companion to fill-15g Election Workers party-list cards and pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020 on Poll Watchers stub.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Statutes — Election Code Ch. 33 Watchers", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/EL/htm/EL.33.htm"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Poll Watcher's Guide PDF", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/pollwatchers-guide.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-elec-code-33-003-party-county-chair-appoints-poll-watchers__texas-sos-poll-watcher-s-guide-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Certificate of Appointment of Poll Watcher by Political Party", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/pol-sub/4-27f.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-elec-code-33-003-party-county-chair-appoints-poll-watchers__texas-sos-certificate-of-appointment-of-poll-watcher-by-poli.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 19."}
{"id": "tx-gov-code-552-103-litigation-exception-pia-withhold-pattern", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-04", "uid": "C20260925-220029-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-04", "old_ids": ["tx-gov-code-552-103-litigation-exception-pia-withhold-pattern"], "seq": "C00357", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Push citizens to the point of a lawsuit, then claim the records cannot be released because of the lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Government Code §552.103 creates a Public Information Act exception for information relating to litigation of a civil or criminal nature to which the state or a political subdivision is or may be a party—or to settlement negotiations—allowing withholdings once litigation is pending or anticipated. Status Confirmed that Texas law encodes a litigation-based withhold pathway after disputes escalate to (or toward) lawsuits. (Election-administering bodies face additional Election Code public-inspection rules that can limit this exception in some election-record contexts; the litigation-exception statute itself remains Confirmed.)", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Public Law — Gov't Code §552.103 Litigation Exception", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._gov't_code_section_552.103"}, {"title": "Texas Statutes portal — Gov't Code Ch. 552", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/GetStatute.aspx?Code=GV&Value=552"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 2 companion. Note Election Code §1.012 can constrain use for some election records."}
{"id": "usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee-companion-fill20d", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-06", "uid": "C20260925-235207-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-06", "old_ids": ["usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee-companion-fill20d"], "seq": "C00479", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Addresses are copied from one locality to another with the street name changed, generating returned ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Election Mail / UAA rules require ballot mail that cannot be delivered as addressed to be forwarded or returned—not delivered to a wrong addressee—so street-level address defects reliably produce undeliverable/returned ballot stacks rather than silent misdelivery. Status Confirmed for the postal mechanics that turn bad street addresses into returned ballots (soft companion to prior USPS UAA cards).", "sources": [{"title": "USPS/FR — Election Mail UAA handling (GovInfo 2023-25569)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-11-20/html/2023-25569.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee-companion-fill20d__usps-fr-election-mail-uaa-handling-govinfo-2023-25569.png"}, {"title": "EAC NCOA memo — ACS undeliverable mail electronic notices", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/NCOA_Memo_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee-companion-fill20d__eac-ncoa-memo-acs-undeliverable-mail-electronic-notices.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 3 companion. Prefer stronger primary if Federal Register URL drifts; ACS path in EAC memo is solid."}
{"id": "mi-early-tabulation-absent-voter-counting-boards", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-14", "uid": "C20260925-185839-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-14", "old_ids": ["mi-early-tabulation-absent-voter-counting-boards"], "seq": "C00165", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Some states claim not to tabulate during early voting, yet scanning ballots is tabulating them, and some people can see the results in real time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-2026", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan law (Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 168.765a, 168.766 as summarized by NCSL Table 16) allows jurisdictions that establish an early-tabulation absent voter counting board to scan absentee ballots beginning eight days before Election Day (population ≥5,000) or the Monday before Election Day (smaller jurisdictions), with results not released until polls close. Status Confirmed that Michigan expressly authorizes early tabulation scanning of absentees into boards/tabulators before Election Day under a sealed-results model.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL Table 16 — Michigan early tabulation absent voter counting boards", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-16-when-absentee-mail-ballot-processing-and-counting-can-begin"}, {"title": "Michigan Election Law — MCL 168.765a (absent voter counting boards)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-765a", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-early-tabulation-absent-voter-counting-boards__michigan-election-law-mcl-168-765a-absent-voter-counting-boa.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 6. Statute uses early tabulation terminology."}
{"id": "usps-dmm-507-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-fee-2-472-multiplier", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-08", "uid": "C20260926-015040-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-08", "old_ids": ["usps-dmm-507-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-fee-2-472-multiplier"], "seq": "C00896", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS bills counties for undelivered ballots, typically by weighing rather than counting them, a total loss of chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-2026", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) 507 treatment of undeliverable USPS Marketing Mail under 'Address Service Requested' / related endorsements charges a weighted (per piece) fee defined as the applicable First-Class Mail / USPS Ground Advantage–Retail / Priority Mail single-piece price (plus any nonmachinable surcharge) multiplied by 2.472, rounded up—i.e., UAA Marketing Mail returns are priced by a weight-derived formula rather than requiring piece-by-piece ballot enumeration for billing. Status Confirmed for the controlling DMM weighted-fee formula that underpins Publication 632 / Kit 600 Marketing Mail UAA return billing already on this leaf; Federal Register Ballot Mail ancillary-endorsement rules further constrain how undeliverable Ballot Mail may be treated. Not a finding that counties intentionally discarded ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Postal Explorer — DMM 507 Mailer Services (UAA / Marketing Mail weighted fee)", "url": "https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/507.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight__usps-dmm-507-mailer-services.png"}, {"title": "USPS — DMM 507 PDF archive (weighted fee = price × 2.472)", "url": "https://pe.usps.com/cpim/ftp/manuals/dmm300/507.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-dmm-507-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-fee-2-472-multiplier__usps-dmm-507-pdf-archive-weighted-fee-price-2-472.pdf"}, {"title": "Federal Register — Ballot Mail Ancillary Service Endorsements (88 FR 80593)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-11-20/html/2023-25569.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-dmm-507-marketing-mail-uaa-weighted-fee-2-472-multiplier__federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-service-endorsem.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on USPS billing undelivered ballots by weight."}
{"id": "freeman-moss-v-giuliani-2023-jury-148m-defamation-damages-trial-costs", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-11", "uid": "C20260926-024539-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-11", "old_ids": ["freeman-moss-v-giuliani-2023-jury-148m-defamation-damages-trial-costs"], "seq": "C01101", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Move cases to jury trials to increase the cost of pursuing them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-12-15", "state": "DC / Federal", "description": "On Dec. 15, 2023 a D.D.C. jury in Freeman & Moss v. Giuliani returned roughly $148.2 million in compensatory and punitive damages after a multi-day jury trial on defamation/IIED arising from 2020 election-worker fraud accusations—forcing both sides through voir dire, jury instructions, and extended trial costs that a bench damages hearing would not have required (NYT / CourtListener judgment record). Status Confirmed election-related merits case tried to a jury with massive cost/exposure; peer to GA O.C.G.A. §21-2-526 jury-demand and Lake v. Hobbs taxable-costs cards already on this leaf—Freeman/Moss Giuliani jury verdict, not those remounted. PEP framing: jury-trial cost structures that price citizens out of contesting machine narratives.", "sources": [{"title": "New York Times — Jury orders Giuliani to pay $148 million to election workers he defamed (Dec. 15, 2023)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/15/us/politics/rudy-giuliani-defamation-trial-damages.html"}, {"title": "CourtListener / RECAP — Freeman v. Giuliani post-verdict memorandum (D.D.C. 21-cv-3354)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.238720/gov.uscourts.dcd.238720.159.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/freeman-moss-v-giuliani-2023-jury-148m-defamation-damages-trial-costs__courtlistener-freeman-v-giuliani-post-verdict-memorandum-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Lawfare Cases moved to jury trials leaf."}
{"id": "votebeat-2023-eric-withdrawal-eagleai-fourth-party-outsourcing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-12", "uid": "C20260926-032103-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-12", "old_ids": ["votebeat-2023-eric-withdrawal-eagleai-fourth-party-outsourcing"], "seq": "C01192", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Outsourcing voter-roll maintenance to entities that fail to maintain the rolls properly (through incompetence or malice), which also lets a fourth party manipulate the rolls indirectly"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-12-13", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Votebeat (Dec. 13, 2023), reviewing American Oversight documents, reported that after nine Republican-led states withdrew from ERIC, replacements were piecemeal and outsourced: Virginia paid ~$29,000 for death-file matching previously obtained via ERIC; West Virginia signed bilateral MOUs; and private fourth-party vendor EagleAI—marketed as a cross-state roll-cleanup tool and used by Columbia County, GA—suffered an October denial-of-service attack that took network servers offline (CEO denied voter-data breach). Status Confirmed primary Votebeat/American Oversight documentation of post-ERIC outsourcing to private/fourth-party roll-maintenance tools with security incidents; peer to ERIC membership-outsourcing and FL Auditor 2021-096 Finding 1 cards already on this leaf—Votebeat 2023 EagleAI/ERIC-withdrawal instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: fourth-party roll vendors insert opaque intermediaries between electors and the lists machine systems use—another reason public hand counts must verify ballots independent of vendor-maintained rolls.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — States that left ERIC are struggling to maintain voter rolls; EagleAI outage (Dec. 13, 2023)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/2023/12/13/cleaning-voter-rolls-after-eric-election-security-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "American Oversight — The Scramble to Replace ERIC (companion analysis)", "url": "https://americanoversight.org/analysis/the-scramble-to-replace-eric-how-states-that-left-nonpartisan-system-have-fallen-short/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/votebeat-2023-eric-withdrawal-eagleai-fourth-party-outsourcing__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Voter Rolls Outsourcing / fourth-party manipulation leaf."}
{"id": "fl-rivernider-2023-convicted-2024-sentenced-deceased-father-ballot", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-07", "uid": "C20260926-023334-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-07", "old_ids": ["fl-rivernider-2023-convicted-2024-sentenced-deceased-father-ballot"], "seq": "C01067", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "People take names from tombstones in graveyards."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-12-05", "state": "FL", "description": "A Sumter County, Florida jury convicted Robert Henry Rivernider Jr. on Dec. 5, 2023 of forgery, fraud in connection with casting a vote, and uttering a forged instrument for signing and returning his deceased father's 2020 mail ballot; on Jan. 9, 2024 he was sentenced to 180 days in jail (Villages-News / multi-outlet contemporaneous reporting). Florida's Fifth DCA later affirmed the conviction (May 2026) while remanding sentencing. Status Confirmed state jury conviction and sentence for voting a deceased relative's ballot; peer to AZ Krista Connor sentencing and PILF deceased-registration study already on this leaf—Florida Rivernider judgment, not Connor remounted. PEP framing: deceased-roll ballots exploit mail/absentee pathways that transparent precinct hand counts with live check-in make harder.", "sources": [{"title": "Villages-News — Jury finds Rivernider guilty of vote fraud involving dead father's ballot (Dec. 5, 2023)", "url": "https://www.villages-news.com/2023/12/05/trumper-shocked-when-jury-finds-him-guilty-of-vote-fraud/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-rivernider-2023-convicted-2024-sentenced-deceased-father-ballot__villages-news-jury-finds-rivernider-guilty-of-vote-fraud-involving-dead-father-s-ballot-dec-5-2023.png"}, {"title": "Villages-News — Rivernider gets jail time in dead-father ballot case (Jan. 9, 2024)", "url": "https://www.villages-news.com/2024/01/09/trumper-gets-jail-time-in-voter-fraud-case-involving-dead-fathers-ballot/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-rivernider-2023-convicted-2024-sentenced-deceased-father-ballot__villages-news-rivernider-gets-jail-time-in-dead-father-ballo.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on tombstone/deceased-registration leaf."}
{"id": "usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-10", "uid": "C20260925-212129-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-10", "old_ids": ["usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee"], "seq": "C00307", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Postal carriers are instructed not to deliver ballots addressed to people who do not live there, so the ballots can be rerouted without revealing multiple registrations at the address."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Election Mail / Domestic Mail Manual rules: when Ballot Mail is undeliverable-as-addressed (including when the named recipient does not reside at the address), carriers do not leave it to alert household occupants of a mismatched-name ballot; Ballot Mail must be forwarded if a COA is on file or returned to the election office, and 'Change Service Requested' disposal is prohibited for ballots (2023 Federal Register clarification). Status Confirmed for carrier nondelivery + UAA return/forward path when the name does not match residents — matching the catalog's 'do not deliver / avoid alerting' mechanism. Intentional 'route elsewhere' fraud diversion is NOT Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Pub 632 — Ballot Mail forwarding/return (no discard)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632/pub632_008.htm"}, {"title": "Federal Register — Change Service Requested not valid for Ballot Mail (Nov 20, 2023)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2023-11-20/html/2023-25569.htm"}, {"title": "USPS FAQ — Undeliverable / 'Not at this address' handling", "url": "https://faq.usps.com/articles/Knowledge/How-is-Undeliverable-and-Misdelivered-Mail-Handled", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-ballot-mail-uaa-must-forward-or-return-not-deliver-wrong-addressee__usps-faq-undeliverable-not-at-this-address-handling.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 5. Confirmed UAA nondelivery/return mechanics; do not assert proven diversion-to-harvesters."}
{"id": "usps-federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-endorsements-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-33", "uid": "C20260925-184601-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-33", "old_ids": ["usps-federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-endorsements-2023"], "seq": "C00151", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "When the USPS classifies a ballot as \"undeliverable,\" it gathers those ballots in one or more facilities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Federal Register notice on Ballot Mail Ancillary Service Endorsements (88 FR 80593) and Election Mail guidance require that undeliverable outbound Ballot Mail not be discarded: pieces are forwarded when a COA exists or returned to the election office that mailed them, implying centralized UAA handling in USPS processing facilities before return. Status Confirmed for undeliverable ballot handling/aggregation under USPS rules; the sibling claim that stacks 'mysteriously decrease' remains Alleged (anecdotal to Mark Cook) and is not confirmed here.", "sources": [{"title": "Federal Register — Ballot Mail Ancillary Service Endorsements (88 FR 80593)", "url": "https://thefederalregister.org/documents/2023-25569/ballot-mail-ancillary-service-endorsements", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-endorsements-2023__federal-register-ballot-mail-ancillary-service-endorsements.png"}, {"title": "USPS — Publication 632 Election Mail User's Guide", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight__usps-publication-632-state-and-local-election-mail-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 15 companion — undeliverable gather/return path. Mysterious-decrease sibling left Alleged/empty of Confirmed instances."}
{"id": "ojai-2023-whitman-recall-insufficient-signatures-org-fail", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-10", "uid": "C20260926-032103-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-10", "old_ids": ["ojai-2023-whitman-recall-insufficient-signatures-org-fail"], "seq": "C01190", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall groups are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-30", "state": "CA", "description": "Ojai Valley News / Ventura County ROV records show the effort to recall Ojai City Councilmember Andrew Whitman failed after proponents submitted 347 signatures on Nov. 20, 2023; county verification found 38 invalid (unregistered, out-of-district, duplicates) and 11 timely withdrawals, leaving the petition short of the 333 valid signatures required for the March 2024 ballot—i.e., a recall organization that missed the qualification threshold via invalid/withdrawn signatures. Status Confirmed primary local ROV/city-clerk record of insufficient verified signatures invalidating a municipal recall; peer to LA County Gascón 2022 and Buena Park 2019 insufficient-signature cards already on this leaf—Ojai Whitman 2023 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: recall machinery that fails on signature quality illustrates how process complexity—not public hand counting of ballots—decides whether citizen accountability tools even reach the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Ojai Valley News — Attempt to recall Councilmember Whitman fails (Nov. 30, 2023)", "url": "https://www.ojaivalleynews.com/news/elections/attempt-to-recall-councilmember-whitman-fails/article_3eb2f884-8e22-11ee-be95-df54b7de0839.html"}, {"title": "VC Star — Not enough signatures for Ojai councilmember recall (companion)", "url": "https://eu.vcstar.com/story/news/2023/11/27/not-enough-signatures-for-ojai-councilmember-recall/71718191007/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Fake recall groups/orgs miss deadlines or invalidate leaf."}
{"id": "mi-2023-pa-258-preregistration-at-16-auto-registered-at-17-5", "permanent_id": "C20261026-123214-02", "uid": "C20261026-123214-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-123214-02", "old_ids": ["mi-2023-pa-258-preregistration-at-16-auto-registered-at-17-5"], "seq": "C01562", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-30 (signed; Public Act 258 of 2023)", "state": "MI", "description": "On Nov. 30, 2023, Gov. Gretchen Whitmer signed House Bill 4569, sponsored by Rep. Betsy Coffia (D-Traverse City), as Public Act 258 of 2023. The law (MCL 168.496a) lets a Michigan resident who is at least 16 but under 17 and a half preregister to vote by any registration method. Preregistrants must be marked as preregistered in the Qualified Voter File, and they automatically become registered electors at 17 and a half. The Secretary of State's office says teens are preregistered automatically when they get a graduated driver's license or state ID at a branch office unless they opt out by following instructions mailed to them later, that no parental approval is needed, and that a preregistrant may vote absentee or early in person once registered if he or she will be 18 by Election Day. Status Confirmed: enacted law and official guidance. The law itself is not a finding of fraud. Catalog point: the state's voter file now carries minors who never asked to be on it, unless they opted out, and they move onto the active rolls automatically before they can legally vote. The catalog's Aspen and Steamboat Springs cards show what happens when a list pull fails to filter such entries. Rolls kept and checked locally and in public catch such entries before ballots go out.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Legislature — Enrolled House Bill 4569, Public Act 258 of 2023", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2023-2024/publicact/pdf/2023-PA-0258.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.496a (preregistration at 16; registered elector at 17.5)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=mcl-168-496a"}, {"title": "Michigan House Fiscal Agency — HB 4569 summary as enacted (Nov. 8, 2023)", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2023-2024/billanalysis/House/pdf/2023-HLA-4569-5E939379.pdf"}, {"title": "Office of Gov. Whitmer — Governor Whitmer Signs Historic Election Bills Package (Nov. 30, 2023)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/whitmer/news/press-releases/2023/11/30/whitmer-signs-election-bills-to-ensure-every-vote-can-be-cast-and-counted"}, {"title": "Michigan Secretary of State — Preregistration", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/elections/voting/preregistration"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-26 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to ncsl-youth-preregistration-age-16-17-states on this leaf (1 -> 2). All five URLs curl 200."}
{"id": "harris-tx-2022-lunceford-contest-svc-instructed-not-compare-signatures-code-not-followed", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-12", "uid": "C20260926-030239-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-12", "old_ids": ["harris-tx-2022-lunceford-contest-svc-instructed-not-compare-signatures-code-not-followed"], "seq": "C01132", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that give people a sense of security, which proves false because the laws are not followed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-10", "state": "TX", "description": "In the 2022 Harris County judicial election contest (Lunceford), the trial court's findings—reported via the judicial ruling and Texas Tribune coverage upholding results—established that an Elections Administration staffer improperly instructed the Signature Verification Committee not to compare mail-ballot signatures with signatures on file for roughly two hours (~700 ballots processed; court estimated ~7 improper ballots), plus other counted ballots lacking required signatures or timely receipt—i.e., Texas Election Code signature-verification / mail-ballot safeguards that create a public sense of security were not followed in operation even though the court held the violations insufficient to change the outcome. Status Confirmed primary judicial findings of code-noncompliance on signature verification; peer to AL Voter Confidence Act one-shot-audit gap and AZ A.R.S. §16-449 L&A public-notice gap cards already on this leaf—Harris County SVC instruction instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: integrity statutes on paper that staff may suspend undercut trust better served by public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "DocumentCloud — Judicial ruling in GOP election lawsuit against Harris County (Lunceford contest findings)", "url": "https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24157062-judicial-ruling-in-gop-election-lawsuit-against-harris-county/"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Texas judge upholds 2022 Harris County election results, tosses lawsuits (Nov. 10, 2023)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2023/11/10/harris-county-2022-election-results-upheld/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Legislation laws-create-sense-of-security-then-not-followed leaf."}
{"id": "wa-ga-2023-fentanyl-letters-election-offices-evacuated-ballot-counting-halted", "permanent_id": "C20261019-125714-02", "uid": "C20261019-125714-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-125714-02", "old_ids": ["wa-ga-2023-fentanyl-letters-election-offices-evacuated-ballot-counting-halted"], "seq": "C01451", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Bomb threats"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-08 (WA offices evacuated); 2023-11-10 (Fulton GA letter intercepted); earlier 2023-08 primary letters", "state": "WA, GA, CA, NV, OR", "description": "On Nov. 8, 2023, the day after Washington's general election, envelopes with powdery substances were opened at the King, Pierce, Skagit and Spokane county elections offices while staff were processing ballots, and each office was evacuated. The Spokane Police Department reported that the substance at the Spokane County Elections Office tested positive for fentanyl, and Renton police said a presumptive field test on the King County powder also showed fentanyl. Pierce County's powder was baking soda, and its note read: 'End elections now. Stop giving power to the right that they don't have.' The Seattle Times reported that the letters halted ballot counting in close races in Tacoma, Spokane and King County, and that Spokane posted no results that day and sent its election workers home. The Washington Secretary of State said King and Okanogan counties had also received suspicious envelopes during the Aug. 1, 2023 primary, and that the Postal Inspection Service found trace fentanyl in the King County letter. On Nov. 10, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger said federal partners had intercepted a similar letter addressed to the Fulton County Elections Office. The FBI and Postal Inspection Service said letters went to offices in Georgia, California, Nevada, Oregon and Washington and that four of them contained fentanyl. No arrest had been reported as of this pass. Status Confirmed (state, police, and press records of the evacuations, test results and interception). Catalog note: each evacuation emptied a counting room in the middle of ballot processing. That is the distraction-and-disruption window this leaf describes, and it is the precedent for the 2026 powder letters already carded here. Precinct hand counts finished on election night in front of observers leave no multi-day central processing window to interrupt.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Secretary of State — County elections offices receive suspicious envelopes (Nov. 8, 2023; Aug. 1 primary King/Okanogan letters; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/about-office/news/2023/county-elections-offices-receive-suspicious-envelopes"}, {"title": "Spokane Police Department — SPD Investigating Suspicious Substance at County Elections Office (Nov. 8, 2023; positive for fentanyl)", "url": "https://my.spokanecity.org/police/news/2023/11/08/spd-investigating-suspicious-substance/"}, {"title": "The Seattle Times — Several WA elections offices evacuated over white powder, fentanyl (Nov. 8, 2023; counting halted)", "url": "https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/law-justice/king-county-elections-office-evacuated-over-white-powder/"}, {"title": "Atlanta News First — Letter believed to contain fentanyl sent to Fulton election office intercepted, Secretary of State says (Nov. 10, 2023; 'End elections now' text)", "url": "https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2023/11/10/letter-believed-contain-fentanyl-sent-fulton-election-office-intercepted-secretary-state-says/"}, {"title": "AP — Election offices are sent letters with fentanyl, other substances (Nov. 2023; five states; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-offices-letters-evacuations-fentanyl-threats-5d39155be4b2fcd5481b570cc109cb9c"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-19 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Earlier-cycle peer to us-2026-white-powder-letters-election-offices-oh-ok-la-evacuations (same leaf, different 2023 incident). Placed on the Bomb threats sub-leaf to match that card's existing placement for powder-letter disruptions. Sender not identified in the sources found."}
{"id": "pa-northampton-2023-expressvote-xl-retention-yes-no-printed-swapped", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-28", "uid": "C20261020-160717-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-28", "old_ids": ["pa-northampton-2023-expressvote-xl-retention-yes-no-printed-swapped"], "seq": "C01021", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the printout but encode different results in the QR code, then encrypt the QR code so humans cannot see what was done."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-07", "state": "PA", "description": "On Nov. 7, 2023, on all of Northampton County, Pennsylvania's more than 300 ES&S ExpressVote XL machines, a voter who split the retention votes for Superior Court Judges Jack Panella (D) and Victor Stabile (R), for example \"yes\" on one and \"no\" on the other, saw the printed paper summary show the opposite. County director of administration Charles Dertinger said voters' choices were properly recorded by the machines' backend and would be tabulated correctly: \"What you read and what the computer reads are two different things. The computer does not read the text that is printed out.\" The county said an ES&S employee mislabeled the two judges' names on the printed record during programming, and that pre-election logic-and-accuracy testing was incomplete and did not catch it. A county judge allowed the machines to stay in use; poll workers were told to warn voters, with inconsistent instructions through the day. A HAVA complaint (PA Fair Elections) was dismissed, and Commonwealth Court affirmed on May 28, 2025, finding the \"clerical labelling error did not affect the proper recording of the voter's intended selection.\" This is the inverse of the QR-code leaf's scenario: the human-readable printout was wrong while the machine-read record was right, which shows the two records can diverge and that a voter checking the printout cannot verify what is counted. Status Confirmed: county, vendor and court confirmed the printed text and the counted record disagreed. Catalog point: nothing here shows intent; it shows that the voter-verifiable text and the counted record are generated separately and can differ.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Voting machines in Northampton County misprinted votes on paper ballots (Nov. 7, 2023)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2023/11/07/northampton-county-voting-machines-errors/"}, {"title": "NBC10 Philadelphia (AP) — Voting machine error caused votes to flip on judicial retention question in Northampton County (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/politics/voting-machine-error-caused-votes-to-flip-on-judicial-retention-question-in-northampton-county/3689333/"}, {"title": "AP — Posts misrepresent voting machine error in Pennsylvania county as evidence of 'rigged' elections (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/fact-check-pennsylvania-election-vote-flip-545307248102"}, {"title": "Lehigh Valley Public Media — County exec 'livid' at voting machine trouble but confident in accurate count (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.lehighvalleypublicmedia.org/news/local/election-2023-widespread-voting-machine-problems-reported-in-northampton-county/"}, {"title": "Pa. Commonwealth Court — PA Fair Elections v. Commonwealth, No. 372 C.D. 2024 (May 28, 2025; PDF)", "url": "https://wwwsecure.pacourts.us/assets/opinions/Commonwealth/out/372CD24_5-28-25.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; QR/printout leaf). Archived source copies: 0 (none). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Votebeat, NBC10 Philadelphia (AP), AP, Lehigh Valley Public Media, Pa. Commonwealth Court. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote XL", "EVS 6.3.0.0"]}
{"id": "virginia-project-2023-ranks-conservatives-targeted-lt-gov", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-01", "uid": "C20260926-005107-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-01", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-2023-ranks-conservatives-targeted-lt-gov"], "seq": "C00794", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Targeting of conservative and Republican officials and activists"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-01", "state": "VA", "description": "The Virginia Project's 'Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush' newsletter (David Gordon) documents that 'the ranks of conservatives and Republicans who have been targeted' by mailing-list stuffing / inorganic intimidation 'are already considerable — they include, among others, the current Virginia Lieutenant Governor,' and that material damage to GOP electioneering operations follows. Soft remount of the corpus Virginia Project intimidation family onto this exact ranks-targeted pathKey. Status Confirmed for the Project's contemporaneous documentation naming the LG and describing the targeting pattern; independent court adjudication of every named attack Alleged case-by-case.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush (Constant Contact)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072", "local": "/archives/2026/09/virginia-project-2023-ranks-conservatives-targeted-lt-gov__virginia-project---intimidation-tactics-and-you--beating-the-zerg-rush--constant.png"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ Election Threats Task Force referrals/cases companion", "url": "https://abcnews.go.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 1. Soft remount Virginia Project family."}
{"id": "virginia-project-brute-force-multi-vector-handling-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-04", "uid": "C20260926-005107-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-04", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-brute-force-multi-vector-handling-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00797", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Project newsletter text matching this leaf verbatim: from Richmond ANTIFA attacks 'we learned how to handle brute-force intimidation through multiple communication vectors: do not react fearfully; never respond; do not read threatening communications, just record everything; and when the evidence you collect crosses the threshold of probable cause, bring in law enforcement and/or call in a lawyer.' Soft remount of Virginia Project intimidation documentation onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for the Project's published multi-vector handling doctrine derived from lived attacks; individual attacker convictions Alleged where not separately adjudicated.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics and You (brute-force multi-vector passage)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ Election Threats Task Force companion (multi-year threat referrals)", "url": "https://abcnews.go.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 2 companion. Soft remount."}
{"id": "virginia-project-gop-need-system-protect-communications", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-07", "uid": "C20260926-005107-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-07", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-gop-need-system-protect-communications"], "seq": "C00800", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Brute-force intimidation across multiple communication channels, including swatting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Project newsletter states verbatim the leaf's operational conclusion: 'As a Republican, you need this system to protect yourself from the illegal things that Democrats, as well as other enemies of the American people, will do to your communications,' and proposes rolling out hardened GOP committee sites as forensic evidence-collection / anti-interference infrastructure. Soft remount onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for the Project's published protective-system doctrine responding to documented multi-vector attacks; partisan characterization of every adversary as 'Democrats' Alleged beyond their named incidents.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics (need this system / protect communications)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}, {"title": "Reuters — Haley swatting multi-vector companion (communications/home targeting)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/republican-presidential-candidate-nikki-haley-targeted-swatting-incident-2024-01-27/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 4."}
{"id": "virginia-project-twitter-account-lockouts-exploitation-mission", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-09", "uid": "C20260926-005107-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-09", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-twitter-account-lockouts-exploitation-mission"], "seq": "C00802", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Account-lockout exploits on social media platforms"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-11-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Project documents successful denial-of-service lockout attacks against its Twitter accounts by a swarm it identifies as NAFO, states it was 'in the midst of an extended exchange with Twitter litigation on the unfair tactics that are deployed against Republicans on the platform,' and notes even personal intervention unlocking accounts 'couldn't stop the improper denial of service' — i.e., the Project positioned itself as feeding exploitation/bug evidence back to Twitter while under live attack. Matches the leaf's 'helping Twitter fix its account exploitation bugs' mission framing. Status Confirmed for the Project's published Twitter-lockout / litigation-exchange account; Twitter's internal acceptance of that 'mission' Alleged beyond the Project's narrative.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics (Twitter lockouts / litigation exchange)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}, {"title": "Fox News — Doug Collins, Mark Warner locked out of Twitter following major 2020 hack", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/media/doug-collins-mark-warner-journalists-locked-out-of-twitter-following-major-hack"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 5."}
{"id": "dcboe-2023-datanet-hosting-provider-breach-voter-roll-ransomvc", "permanent_id": "C20261005-123049-03", "uid": "C20261005-123049-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-123049-03", "old_ids": ["dcboe-2023-datanet-hosting-provider-breach-voter-roll-ransomvc"], "seq": "C01327", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Instead of handling security locally, many counties and states outsource it, which creates risk and displaces responsibility."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10", "state": "DC", "description": "On October 5, 2023 the District of Columbia Board of Elections learned that the RansomVC group claimed 600,000 lines of U.S. voter data including D.C. voter records. DCBOE said the data came through a breach of the web/database server run by DataNet Systems, its outsourced website hosting provider, and that no internal DCBOE databases or servers were directly compromised. DCBOE then reported that DataNet's breached server held a copy of the full D.C. voter roll (with partial SSNs, driver's license numbers, dates of birth, and contact details) and that DataNet could not pinpoint whether, when, or how many records were accessed. Later forensic review put confirmed affected records at fewer than 4,000 canvass-process records (Aug. 2019–Jan. 2022), and DataNet sent breach notices in December 2023. Status Confirmed for a voter-roll exposure through an outsourced provider, where the election agency had to depend on the vendor's own account of what was taken.", "sources": [{"title": "DC Board of Elections — Data Breach updates (DataNet Systems hosting server)", "url": "https://dcboe.org/data-breach"}, {"title": "BleepingComputer — D.C. Board of Elections: Hackers may have breached entire voter roll", "url": "https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/dc-board-of-elections-hackers-may-have-breached-entire-voter-roll/"}, {"title": "SecurityWeek — DC Board of Elections says full voter roll compromised in data breach (Oct. 23, 2023)", "url": "https://www.securityweek.com/dc-board-of-elections-says-full-voter-roll-compromised-in-data-breach/"}, {"title": "PR Newswire — DataNet Systems provides notice of data security incident (Dec. 22, 2023)", "url": "https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/datanet-systems-provides-notice-of-data-security-incident-302021862.html"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-05. Confirmed third-party hosting breach; thickens outsourcing leaf beyond the two CIS/CrowdStrike program cards."}
{"id": "doj-edny-2023-nancy-marks-santos-treasurer-conspiracy-plea", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-12", "uid": "C20260926-022920-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-12", "old_ids": ["doj-edny-2023-nancy-marks-santos-treasurer-conspiracy-plea"], "seq": "C01057", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "A campaign's financial manager may waste funds or break laws to compromise the candidate they claim to support."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10-05", "state": "NY", "description": "Nancy Marks, former treasurer for George Santos's congressional campaign, pleaded guilty on October 5, 2023 (EDNY) to conspiring to defraud the United States by causing false FEC reports—including fabricated family donations and a nonexistent large candidate loan—conduct that propped up the campaign's filings while violating federal campaign-finance law. DOJ/USAO EDNY press release and later sentencing coverage (probation/restitution) confirm the plea. Status Confirmed federal guilty plea by a campaign financial manager; peer to FEC MUR 7615 Phillips/Heller embezzlement and Newark treasurer $220k cases—Marks/Santos treasurer conspiracy, not those remounted. PEP framing: compromised treasurers can legally and financially damage the candidates they nominally serve.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ USAO EDNY — Congressional Campaign Treasurer Pleads Guilty to Conspiring with Congressional Candidate", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/congressional-campaign-treasurer-pleads-guilty-conspiring-congressional-candidate"}, {"title": "AP — George Santos' former treasurer Nancy Marks sentenced to probation", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/george-santos-nancy-marks-campaign-treasurer-fraud-370d642cec51d1ea8205422f14c4c8fb"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Campaign financial manager leaf."}
{"id": "ca-ab969-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-01", "uid": "C20260925-155410-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-01", "old_ids": ["ca-ab969-2023"], "seq": "C00001", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10-04", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 969 (Pellerin), signed into law Oct. 4, 2023 as Chapter 300 and effective immediately as an urgency statute, prohibits elections officials from conducting a manual (hand) vote count in most contests above specified registration thresholds (more than 1,000 registered voters on an established election date; more than 5,000 otherwise) unless under a Secretary of State–approved plan or emergency. It also requires use of certified voting systems for accessibility and tabulation, and makes termination of a certified-system contract provisional until a transition plan and new certified contract are in place. Catalog seed: \"Passing bills to eliminate hand counted ballots (e.g., AB969 in CA).\" Status Confirmed for the statute text and enactment; causal/motive claims in advocacy commentary are not adjudicated here.", "sources": [{"title": "CA Legislature — Bill Text AB-969 (Chapter 300)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB969", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab969-2023__ca-legislature-bill-text-ab-969-chapter-300.png"}, {"title": "ABC News — Bill limiting ballot hand counting becomes law", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/bill-limiting-ballot-hand-counting-california-law-county/story?id=103741610", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab969-2023__abc-news-bill-limiting-ballot-hand-counting-becomes-law.png"}], "notes": "Primary: statute. Contemporaneous reporting notes Shasta County context."}
{"id": "ca-ab969-eliminate-hand-count-semifinal-canvass-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-01", "uid": "C20260925-211320-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-01", "old_ids": ["ca-ab969-eliminate-hand-count-semifinal-canvass-2023"], "seq": "C00246", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass bills to eliminate hand-counted ballots (e.g., California AB 969)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10-04", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 969 (Pellerin), signed Oct. 4, 2023, prohibits elections officials from performing a manual (hand) vote count for the semifinal official canvass in contests with more than 1,000 registered voters on established election dates (or more than 5,000 on other dates), unless a Secretary of State–approved manual-count plan is in place. The statute responded to Shasta County's effort to replace Dominion machines with a full hand count. Status Confirmed for the enacted statutory restriction on hand counting as the primary canvass method. Contrast: PEP argues a properly run hand count is fast, reliable, inexpensive, simple, and transparent — complexity cited against hand counts is typically machine/centralized-system complexity, not proof that hand counting fails.", "sources": [{"title": "California Legislature — AB 969 bill text (Elections: voting systems)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB969"}, {"title": "ABC News — Bill limiting ballot hand counting in California becomes law", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/bill-limiting-ballot-hand-counting-california-law-county/story?id=103741610"}, {"title": "NPR — California bill responds to Shasta County ballot hand-counting", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2023/09/08/1198395036/shasta-county-hand-counting-ballots-california-legislation"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 1. Distinct id from parent-path seed ca-ab969-2023; mounts the exact eliminate-hand-count Detail leaf. PEP contrast only — do not claim PEP was used in Shasta.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "md-ola-2023-sbe-327-potential-duplicate-registrations-different-voter-ids", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-07", "uid": "C20261016-123449-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-07", "old_ids": ["md-ola-2023-sbe-327-potential-duplicate-registrations-different-voter-ids"], "seq": "C01426", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject phantom voter registrations", "Duplicate existing records with plausible deniability (ensure every duplicate can be explained away as a mistake)", "Each duplicate record has its own voter ID number, so a vote can be associated with it. If someone catches the \"duplicate,\" it can be explained as a typo."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-10 (audit report; MDVOTERS data as of 2022-12-15)", "state": "MD", "description": "Maryland's Office of Legislative Audits (Department of Legislative Services) issued its October 2023 audit report on the State Board of Elections (SBE). The auditors analyzed MDVOTERS records as of Dec. 15, 2022 for people with the same name and date of birth but different voter ID numbers, and identified 327 potential duplicate voter registrations. All five they reviewed with SBE management were confirmed duplicates. The report found that the local boards' manual duplicate review \"does not appear to detect all duplicate voters\" and recommended periodic analysis. The same audit found that for the 2020 general election SBE had identified 134 voters who successfully voted more than once (in most cases twice) and 1,371 who attempted to, but did not refer them to the State Prosecutor until April 2022, about 16 months after certification. It also found 2,426 potentially deceased people with active registrations, and that one employee programmed and distributed the electronic ballot databases to all 24 local boards without independent review. Status Confirmed (legislative audit primary report). Catalog note: duplicate records with separate voter IDs are the mechanism this leaf names. Each one can carry its own ballot, and when it is caught it looks like a clerical slip. Precinct poll books checked by people who know their neighbors make that harder.", "sources": [{"title": "Maryland Office of Legislative Audits — Audit Report: State Board of Elections (October 2023; 327 potential duplicates with different voter IDs; 134 voted more than once in 2020)", "url": "https://dls.maryland.gov/pubs/prod/NoPblTabPDF/SBE23.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. The report's cybersecurity findings were withheld by OLA under Maryland State Government Art. §2-1224(i), the auditor's own statutory redaction, not ours. Cross-leaf: Mail ballots double-vote leaf (134 multi-voters); Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (deceased); Tabulation (single-employee ballot database programming)."}
{"id": "cleveland-chris-martin-microphone-cut-public-comment-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-19", "uid": "C20260925-194013-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-19", "old_ids": ["cleveland-chris-martin-microphone-cut-public-comment-2023"], "seq": "C00203", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Microphones are shut off"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-09-25", "state": "OH", "description": "At the Sept 25, 2023 Cleveland City Council public-comment period, Council President Blaine Griffin ordered Chris Martin's microphone cut while Martin read names of council members who received Council Leadership Fund PAC money, citing rules against 'impugning' members. Martin sued under the First/Fourteenth Amendments (Case Western First Amendment Clinic); Ideastream and Signal Cleveland documented the cut and suit. The case settled in Feb 2024 with rule changes, $500 to Martin, and fee payment. Status Confirmed that officials shut off a citizen's microphone during public comment; viewpoint-discrimination claim resolved by settlement.", "sources": [{"title": "Ideastream — Cleveland resident whose microphone was cut sues City Council", "url": "https://www.ideastream.org/government-politics/2023-12-05/cleveland-resident-whose-microphone-was-cut-during-public-comment-sues-city-council"}, {"title": "Signal Cleveland — Public commenter sues for cutting his microphone", "url": "https://signalcleveland.org/public-commenter-sues-cleveland-city-council-for-cutting-his-microphone/"}, {"title": "Georgetown Free Speech Project — Cleveland amends rules, settles mic-cut lawsuit", "url": "https://freespeechproject.georgetown.edu/tracker-entries/cleveland-city-council-amends-strict-public-comment-rules-settling-federal-free-speech-lawsuit/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 9. Mic cut Confirmed; First Amendment settlement."}
{"id": "pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-02", "uid": "C20261028-134437-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-02", "old_ids": ["pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out"], "seq": "C01614", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-09-19", "state": "PA", "description": "On Sept. 19, 2023, Governor Josh Shapiro switched PennDOT voter registration from opt-in to opt-out by executive action. His office said eligible residents getting or renewing a license or ID \"will be automatically taken through the voter registration application process unless they opt out of doing so. Previously, eligible voters were required to take additional steps to opt into the voter registration process.\" [1] Votebeat reported that PennDOT's forms now say \"this application will also serve as a request to update your voter registration unless you check this box.\" [2] PennLive reported that voter registration at PennDOT \"is now opt-out instead of opt-in\" and that PennDOT says its system knows whether a person is eligible from the age and citizenship information given for the license. [3] NCSL lists Pennsylvania's system as a 2023 governor announcement with no bill, front-end opt-out at the DMV. [4] Before the switch, Pennsylvania's opt-in Motor Voter screens had registered noncitizens (linked 2017 card). Status Confirmed: official announcement and news reports.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of Governor Josh Shapiro — Governor Shapiro Implements Automatic Voter Registration in Pennsylvania (Sept. 19, 2023)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/governor/newsroom/2023-press-releases/governor-shapiro-implements-automatic-voter-registration-in-penn", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out__pa-governor-release-2023-09-19.html"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Pennsylvania adopts automatic voter registration at PennDOT (Sept. 19, 2023)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2023/9/19/23880022/automatic-voter-registration-penndot-drivers-license/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out__votebeat-2023-09-19.html"}, {"title": "PennLive — How does Pa.'s new automatic voter registration work, and what impact will it have? (Sept. 2023)", "url": "https://www.pennlive.com/news/2023/09/how-does-pas-new-automatic-voter-registration-work-and-what-impact-will-it-have.html"}, {"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration (summary and state table, updated Aug. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out__ncsl-avr-2026-08-19.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia", "pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-200k-apps-registration-voter-rolls", "ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out"]}
{"id": "opensecrets-2023-scam-pacs-suck-up-attention-fundraising-cycle", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-09", "uid": "C20260926-001426-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-09", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-2023-scam-pacs-suck-up-attention-fundraising-cycle"], "seq": "C00602", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Monopolize attention."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenSecrets identified 86 potential 'scam PACs' in the 2022 cycle (>$100k spend with ≥50% itemized fundraising spend) that dominate donor attention and inboxes with urgent partisan branding while recycling money into more fundraising rather than electoral advocacy—sucking up civic attention and donor focus. Status Confirmed for the attention-siphon fundraising pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — How Scam PACs line their pockets by deceiving political donors", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}, {"title": "FEC MUR 8248 FGCR — Campaign for a Conservative Majority scam-PAC allegations", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8248/8248_10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/opensecrets-2023-scam-pacs-suck-up-attention-fundraising-cycle__fec-mur-8248-fgcr-campaign-for-a-conservative-majority-scam-pac-allegations.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 5. Soft companion to fill-20f Fake Groups Suck up money / Claim to be on our side."}
{"id": "opensecrets-scam-pac-fundraising-fees-consultant-suck-money", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-23", "uid": "C20260926-001426-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-23", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-scam-pac-fundraising-fees-consultant-suck-money"], "seq": "C00616", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Drain campaign funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenSecrets' scam-PAC analysis shows fundraising vendors/consultants routinely capturing the majority of dollars raised (example: Law Enforcement for a Safer America PAC raised >$14M with ~87% to vague fundraising expenses)—the 'suck money' consultant/vendor pathway that drains candidate-side resources. Status Confirmed for documented fee-extraction pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — Scam PACs / fundraising-fee capture", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}, {"title": "ABC News — Trump campaign pass-through vendors ~$170M reporting controversy", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-campaign-accused-pass-vendors-obscure-170-million/story?id=72020510"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 12. Pass-through vendor story soft companion for consulting fee opacity."}
{"id": "opensecrets-scam-pacs-redirect-donors-away-from-candidate-committees", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-11", "uid": "C20260926-001426-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-11", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-scam-pacs-redirect-donors-away-from-candidate-committees"], "seq": "C00604", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Redirect citizens away from real solutions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenSecrets and CLC document that scam PACs redirect citizen energy and dollars away from actual candidate committees and issue advocacy into operator pockets and endless fundraising loops—precisely 'redirect citizens away from real solutions' (here: real electoral spending / accountability). Candidates themselves complain because the diversion siphons resources from campaigns. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — Scam PACs deceive donors / siphon from candidates", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}, {"title": "CLC — Scam PAC CCM defrauds donors of ~$480k (redirect from Trump support claim)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/document/scam-pac-campaign-conservative-majority-defrauds-donors-480000"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 6."}
{"id": "ccprosecutor-2023-saunders-ohio-florida-early-then-election-day-double", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-28", "uid": "C20260926-005107-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-28", "old_ids": ["ccprosecutor-2023-saunders-ohio-florida-early-then-election-day-double"], "seq": "C00821", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Starting with the earliest-opening states (e.g., Minnesota and South Dakota, about 46 days out; New Jersey, New York, and Virginia, about 45 days), the travelers vote in person during the early period."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-22", "state": "OH", "description": "Cuyahoga County Prosecutor: attorney James Saunders was found guilty of election fraud for voting in both Ohio and Florida in the 2020 and 2022 general elections — in 2020 casting an early in-person Ohio ballot in late October then voting in person in Florida on Election Day (and in 2022 casting a Florida mail ballot plus Ohio in-person). Adjudicated early-period-then-travel/second-state pattern. Status Confirmed for this traveling double-vote conviction; organized wave crews Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Cuyahoga County Prosecutor — James Saunders guilty voting more than once 2020/2022", "url": "https://www.ccprosecutor.us/ohio-attorney-found-guilty-voting-more-than-once-general-elections/"}, {"title": "Justia — State v. Saunders (Ohio 8th Dist. 2024) opinion page", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/ohio/eighth-district-court-of-appeals/2024/113207.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "ccprosecutor-saunders-low-propensity-risk-real-person-showed-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-40", "uid": "C20260926-005107-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-40", "old_ids": ["ccprosecutor-saunders-low-propensity-risk-real-person-showed-companion"], "seq": "C00833", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Low-propensity voters: riskier, because these voters may actually show up."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-22", "state": "OH", "description": "Saunders double-voting conviction shows the detection risk when a real, living registrant (not a phantom) is associated with an extra ballot — cross-state participation matching and signature comparison caught him precisely because the underlying records belonged to an actual person who voted. Illustrates why low-propensity/real records are 'more risky' than pure phantoms for illicit association. Status Confirmed for detection via real-person multi-vote; does not prove a cabal preference algorithm.", "sources": [{"title": "Cuyahoga County Prosecutor — Saunders guilty multi-state voting", "url": "https://www.ccprosecutor.us/ohio-attorney-found-guilty-voting-more-than-once-general-elections/"}, {"title": "ERIC — How ERIC Works (participation matching detects real multi-voters)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/how-does-it-work/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "opensecrets-2022-86-potential-scam-pacs-majority-fundraising-spend", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-12", "uid": "C20260926-000809-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-12", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-2022-86-potential-scam-pacs-majority-fundraising-spend"], "seq": "C00565", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Drain donors' money."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenSecrets identified 86 potential scam PACs in the 2022 cycle that spent >$100k with ≥50% of itemized expenses classified as fundraising—systematic 'suck up money' economics. SDNY/FBI also announced 2023 indictments of PAC operators in telemarketing fraud schemes. Status Confirmed for widespread fundraising-first PAC pattern; each PAC's criminality is separate.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — 86 potential scam PACs in 2022 cycle", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}, {"title": "CLC update — recent scam PAC prison sentences cited (context)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-uncovers-two-scam-pacs-defrauding-donors"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "opensecrets-scam-pacs-claim-conservative-cause-identity-deceive-donors", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-10", "uid": "C20260926-000809-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-10", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-scam-pacs-claim-conservative-cause-identity-deceive-donors"], "seq": "C00563", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Claim to be on our side."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenSecrets (2023) documents 'scam PACs' that brand as conservative/law-enforcement/disability-cause allies—'our side' identity marketing—while diverting most funds to fundraising vendors rather than electoral advocacy. Example: Law Enforcement for a Safer America raised >$14M with ~87% fundraising spend. Status Confirmed that fake/misleading groups claim ally identity; criminal guilt is case-specific.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — How scam PACs deceive political donors (2023)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}, {"title": "Campaign Legal Center — Two scam PACs defrauding donors (PAL/CCM 2024)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-uncovers-two-scam-pacs-defrauding-donors"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 5 companion. Soft maps to leaf 6 suck-up-money family."}
{"id": "pa-columbia-2023-oor-anoia-cvr-request-denied-system-cannot-produce-cvrs", "permanent_id": "C20261028-123022-03", "uid": "C20261028-123022-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-123022-03", "old_ids": ["pa-columbia-2023-oor-anoia-cvr-request-denied-system-cannot-produce-cvrs"], "seq": "C01595", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-18 (request); 2023-10-31 (OOR final determination)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Aug. 18, 2023, Dean Anoia asked Columbia County, Pennsylvania, under the Right-to-Know Law for the cast vote records of the 2022 general election. The county denied the request, and on Oct. 31, 2023, the Pennsylvania Office of Open Records denied his appeal (Docket AP 2023-2009). The county argued that an identical request for 2020 cast vote records had already been denied, when the Office of Open Records accepted that CVRs are the \"contents of ballot boxes\" under the Election Code and therefore not public (Anoia v. Columbia County, AP 2022-1998). It also stated through an attestation that its voting system cannot produce cast vote records, that enabling them would require an upgrade the Commonwealth had not approved, and that even after an upgrade it could not produce them for past elections. The Office of Open Records found the county had shown it did not possess the records and held that it was not required to create them. Catalog point: the ballot-level record that lets citizens check a machine count was withheld first as secret and then as nonexistent, because the certified system was set up not to generate it.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Office of Open Records — Final Determination, Anoia v. Columbia County, AP 2023-2009 (Oct. 31, 2023)", "url": "https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/Appeals/DocketGetFile.cfm?id=140570"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-28 (open web, zero X API). Peer to pa-lycoming-2021-2026-honey-cvr-request-denied-until-supreme-court on this leaf. OOR PDF curl 200; text read with pdftotext. The determination does not name the vendor, so no vendor tag. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "sdny-2023-piaro-zeitlin-scam-pac-fundraising-suck-money-indictment", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-09", "uid": "C20260926-031135-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-09", "old_ids": ["sdny-2023-piaro-zeitlin-scam-pac-fundraising-suck-money-indictment"], "seq": "C01159", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Drain campaign funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-17", "state": "Federal / NY", "description": "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York announced Aug. 17, 2023 indictments of PAC treasurer Robert Piaro and telemarketing fundraiser Richard Zeitlin for multi-year schemes that raised tens of millions from donors under false PAC-mission pretenses while routing the vast majority of funds into fundraising/consulting vendors rather than candidate or issue advocacy—classic suck-money consultant/vendor capture. OpenSecrets' contemporaneous scam-PAC analysis documented the same pattern (majority fundraising spend; vendor self-dealing) across dozens of 2022-cycle PACs and highlighted the SDNY charges. Status Confirmed primary SDNY charging of scam-PAC fundraising/vendor siphon; peer to prior OpenSecrets scam-PAC fees and ABC pass-through vendor cards already on this leaf—SDNY Piaro/Zeitlin indictment instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: consultant/PAC fundraising that consumes donor dollars without contested-campaign transparency starves citizen candidates.", "sources": [{"title": "USAO-SDNY — PAC Fundraiser And PAC Treasurer Charged With Multi-Year Schemes To Defraud Donors (Aug. 17, 2023)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/pac-fundraiser-and-pac-treasurer-charged-multi-year-schemes-defraud-donors"}, {"title": "OpenSecrets — How 'Scam PACs' line their pockets by deceiving political donors (Aug. 18, 2023; Piaro/Zeitlin)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Campaign Consultants Suck money leaf."}
{"id": "wi-2020-malnar-wi-in-person-mi-absentee-convicted", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-09", "uid": "C20261009-105430-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-09", "old_ids": ["wi-2020-malnar-wi-in-person-mi-absentee-convicted"], "seq": "C01342", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-17", "state": "WI / MI", "description": "Edward A. Malnar, 75, of Fond du Lac, was charged in 2022 (Fond du Lac Co. Case 2022CF000818) with voting more than once in the Nov. 3, 2020 election. The complaint says records showed an in-person Wisconsin vote plus absentee ballots: a Wisconsin absentee was recorded, and a Michigan absentee was cast at a former address. He pleaded guilty to felony election fraud (voting more than once) and misdemeanor obstructing an officer, and on Aug. 17, 2023 was sentenced to 15 days in jail and a $3,500 fine. The cross-state ballot was caught only after the election, through records comparison. Wisconsin rule then and as of 2026: §6.86(6) bars in-person voting after a returned absentee ballot. Status Confirmed (court record and conviction), upgraded from Alleged on research recheck.", "sources": [{"title": "Fond du Lac County — Criminal complaint, State v. Malnar, 2022CF000818 (PDF via FOX 11)", "url": "https://fox11digital.com/news/PDFs/Criminal%20Complaint_1%20-%20Malnar%2C%20Edward%20A%3B%202022CF000818%3B%20Malnar%2C%20Edward%20A._2584663_1.pdf"}, {"title": "Fond du Lac Reporter — Fond du Lac man convicted of election fraud in 2020 election (Aug. 18, 2023)", "url": "https://eu.fdlreporter.com/story/news/crime/2023/08/18/fond-du-lac-man-convicted-of-election-fraud-in-2020-election/70619993007/"}, {"title": "WKOW — Wisconsin man charged with voting twice in 2020 election", "url": "https://www.wkow.com/news/wisconsin-man-charged-with-voting-twice-in-2020-election/article_bea27694-547d-11ed-97e4-978e83a8ef87.html"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Also relevant to 5 > Traveling Voter Operations (cross-state)."}
{"id": "az-ag-mayes-2023-counties-lack-authority-full-manual-count-vs-tabulators", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-13", "uid": "C20260926-020046-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-13", "old_ids": ["az-ag-mayes-2023-counties-lack-authority-full-manual-count-vs-tabulators"], "seq": "C00931", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass bills to eliminate hand-counted ballots (e.g., California AB 969)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Attorney General Kris Mayes's Aug. 11, 2023 letter/press advisory to all 15 county attorneys states counties **lack authority** to count **all ballots manually instead of using automatic tabulating equipment**; SCR 1037 is a nonbinding resolution with no force of law; and full manual counting is in most instances impracticable, costlier, and harmful to timeliness/accuracy. Status Confirmed that Arizona's chief law officer directed counties against replacing machine tabulation with full hand counts—peer to California AB 969 eliminating hand-count semifinal canvass and Nevada AB 242's (vetoed) mechanical-count mandate.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ AG — Press release: Mayes advises county attorneys on manual ballot counting (Aug. 11, 2023)", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/press-release/attorney-general-mayes-advises-county-attorneys-manual-ballot-counting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ag-mayes-2023-counties-lack-authority-full-manual-count-vs-tabulators__az-ag-press-release-mayes-advises-county-attorneys-on-m.png"}, {"title": "AZ AG — Correspondence to county attorneys re counting ballots manually instead of by tabulating equipment", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/media/interest/correspondence-attorney-general-mayes-county-attorneys-re-counting-ballots-manually", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ag-mayes-2023-counties-lack-authority-full-manual-count-vs-tabulators__az-ag-correspondence-to-county-attorneys-re-counting-ba.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on bills/directives eliminating or blocking hand-count canvass options leaf."}
{"id": "democratic-data-exchange-ddx-voter-file-interaction-party-history-microtargeting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-04", "uid": "C20260926-030239-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-04", "old_ids": ["democratic-data-exchange-ddx-voter-file-interaction-party-history-microtargeting"], "seq": "C01124", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Knowing who has voted, use party affiliation and voting history, supplemented by social media profiles, to predict how they will vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Democratic Data Exchange (DDx) is the left-of-center real-time voter-contact exchange: Axios (Aug. 10, 2023) reports a database covering ~90% of U.S. voters fed by hundreds of Democratic-aligned campaigns/parties/PACs/nonprofits, matching anonymized exchange IDs to public voter-file records so participants can share contact outcomes, hostility/persuadability signals, language, and related behavioral fields; DDx API docs accept TargetSmart voterbase_id / Catalist dwid / SmartVAN / VoteBuilder identifiers—exactly the Feedback Loop stack of knowing who has voted, party/vote-history models, and enriched profiles for targeting. Status Confirmed primary industry/press documentation of the DDx who-voted + modeled-party enrichment layer; peer to Catalist analytics and TargetSmart VoterBase cards already on this leaf—DDx exchange instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: industrial who-voted modeling that enables selective pressure without public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Axios — Biden, Democrats boost their data game for 2024 (DDx, Aug. 10, 2023)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/2023/08/10/biden-democrats-boost-their-data-game-for-2024"}, {"title": "DDx API Docs — Tech Partners: DDx Exchange as a Destination (voterbase_id / dwid / VAN IDs)", "url": "https://apidocs.demexchange.com/docs/tech-partners-detailed-guide-integrating-with-ddx-exchange", "local": "/archives/2026/09/democratic-data-exchange-ddx-voter-file-interaction-party-history-microtargeting__ddx-api-docs-tech-partners-ddx-exchange-as-a-destination-voterbase-id-dwid-van-ids.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Feedback Loop Knowing who has voted leaf."}
{"id": "richmond-va-2023-electoral-board-special-aug4-meeting-after-early-voting-site-cut", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-14", "uid": "C20260926-024539-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-14", "old_ids": ["richmond-va-2023-electoral-board-special-aug4-meeting-after-early-voting-site-cut"], "seq": "C01104", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Meetings are rescheduled to create conflicts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-04", "state": "VA", "description": "After the Richmond Electoral Board's July 25, 2023 vote cut early-voting satellite sites from three to one, city officials and the mayor threatened litigation and demanded reversal; the election office then announced a special/emergency board meeting for Aug. 4, 2023 at 10 a.m. to 'discuss early voting at the satellite locations'—Virginia Mercury (July 27) contemporaneously documents the short-fuse reschedule that forced advocates, council, and the public to reorganize around a new conflict window. Status Confirmed election-board meeting rescheduled/special-called after a contested vote, creating public-comment conflicts; peer to GA SEB July 12 short-notice and NCSBE postponed-hearing cards already on this leaf—Richmond Aug. 4 special, not those remounted. PEP framing: meeting churn that exhausts citizens watching election process changes without adding hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Mercury — GOP electoral board's move to cut Richmond early voting sites may have been illegal (July 27, 2023)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2023/07/27/gop-electoral-boards-move-to-cut-richmond-early-voting-sites-may-have-been-illegal/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/richmond-va-2023-electoral-board-special-aug4-meeting-after-early-voting-site-cut__virginia-mercury-richmond-early-voting-sites-illegal-july-27-2023.png"}, {"title": "City of Richmond — Electoral Board Aug. 4, 2023 meeting agenda (satellite early voting)", "url": "https://www.rva.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Board%20Meeting%20Agenda%20-%20August%204%202023.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/richmond-va-2023-electoral-board-special-aug4-meeting-after-early-voting-site-cut__city-of-richmond-electoral-board-august-4-2023-agenda-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Public Meetings rescheduled-to-cause-conflicts leaf."}
{"id": "ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits", "permanent_id": "C20261020-165133-04", "uid": "C20261020-165133-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-165133-04", "old_ids": ["ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits"], "seq": "C01471", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the printout but encode different results in the QR code, then encrypt the QR code so humans cannot see what was done."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-02 to 2026-05-11", "state": "NY", "description": "On Aug. 2, 2023, the New York State Board of Elections approved the ES&S ExpressVote XL (system EVS 6.3.0.1), a full-face touchscreen that prints a summary card with a barcode that the scanner counts and a text list that the voter reads, for purchase by New York City and every county outside it. On Nov. 28, 2023, Common Cause New York, the Black Institute and five voters petitioned in Albany County Supreme Court to rescind the approval, because Election Law § 7-202(1)(e) requires that a voter be able to verify the vote before it is cast and no voter can read the barcode. Their petition cited Northampton County, Pennsylvania, where on Nov. 7, 2023 ExpressVote XL summary cards printed judicial-retention choices that did not match the voters' selections, and argued that a barcode-side error of that kind \"likely would not have been detected.\" On April 18, 2024, Justice Kimberly O'Connor dismissed the petition for lack of standing, and ES&S was allowed to intervene. On Aug. 14, 2025, the Appellate Division, Third Department, reversed in a split decision. The court held that the harm \"occurs immediately upon the use of the machine by any voter\" and that standing \"is not to be denied simply because many people suffer the same injury.\" It also noted ES&S's statement that one county had decided to buy the XL and was held back only by the lawsuit. On remand, on May 11, 2026, the same trial court denied the petition on the merits. It held that the Board's approval was rational and stated that the Northampton mismatch \"occurred outside of the administrative record\" and \"merely speculates about a potential mismatch,\" because New York's testing and regulatory processes \"are unique to New York.\" Status Confirmed: the approval, the petition, all three rulings and the cited Northampton failure are in official records. The 2026 ruling turned away a confirmed mismatch on the same machine model because it happened in another state.", "sources": [{"title": "NY Supreme Court, Albany County — Decision and Order/Judgment, Matter of Common Cause New York v. Kosinski, Index No. 911452-23 (May 11, 2026; Democracy Docket copy)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/2026-05-11-Decision.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__albany-sup-2026-05-11.pdf"}, {"title": "NY Appellate Division, Third Department — Matter of Common Cause N.Y. v. Kosinski, CV-24-1549 (Aug. 14, 2025)", "url": "https://decisions.courts.state.ny.us/ad3/Decisions/2025/CV-24-1549.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__ad3-cv-24-1549-2025-08-14.pdf"}, {"title": "NY Supreme Court, Albany County — Matter of Common Cause N.Y. v. Kosinski, 2024 NY Slip Op 24134, 84 Misc 3d 453 (Apr. 18, 2024)", "url": "https://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2024/2024_24134.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__nyslipop-2024-24134.html"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — New York Touch Screen Voting Machines Challenge, Common Cause New York v. Kosinski (case page; updated May 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/new-york-touch-screen-voting-machines-challenge/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__democracydocket-case.html"}, {"title": "New York Law Journal — In Split Decision, Appellate Court Reinstates Claim Aimed at Banning Barcode Voting Machines in New York State (Aug. 14, 2025)", "url": "https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2025/08/14/in-split-decision-appellate-court-reinstates-claim-aimed-at-banning-barcode-voting-machines-in-new-york-state/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__nylj-2025-08-14.html"}, {"title": "New York State Board of Elections — Election Systems & Software (ES&S) certified-system page", "url": "https://elections.ny.gov/election-systems-software-ess"}, {"title": "SmartElections — Hybrid voting problems (lead cited by Lulu Friesdat in the Gab archive)", "url": "https://smartelections.us/hybrid-voting-problems", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__smartelections-hybrid.html"}, {"title": "Gab — NC ForGab (@nc4gab), \"Welcome to blink/once\" link hub for New York Citizens Audit / United Sovereign Americans material (first posted May 21, 2023; revised May 26, 2026) — lead source only", "url": "https://gab.com/nc4gab/posts/110409012711518164", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-2026-common-cause-v-kosinski-expressvote-xl-barcode-standing-then-merits__gab-nc4gab-hub.json"}], "notes": "nc4gab Gab archive review (2026-10-20). The lead came from the archive's Lulu Friesdat / SmartElections thread on problematic New York voting machines; the case itself was brought by Common Cause New York. Vendor tag from the court records (ES&S, ExpressVote XL, EVS 6.3.0.1). The May 11, 2026 ruling is flagged for EMon. The NYS BOE page returned a bot check to the box and is linked only. Companion card: pa-northampton-2023-expressvote-xl-retention-yes-no-printed-swapped. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote XL", "EVS 6.3.0.1"]}
{"id": "eac-2023-poll-worker-compendium-az-party-affiliation-switch-bar-pose-as-party", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-15", "uid": "C20260926-030706-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-15", "old_ids": ["eac-2023-poll-worker-compendium-az-party-affiliation-switch-bar-pose-as-party"], "seq": "C01150", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Party-affiliation changes before becoming poll workers, to pose as members of a different party"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-08-01", "state": "AZ / Multi-state", "description": "The EAC's 2023 Complete Poll Worker Compendium (and related AZ materials) documents that Arizona bars election-board inspectors, marshals, and judges from changing party or 'no party preference' affiliation after the preceding general election, and requires opposing major-party representation among key precinct officers—statutory recognition that poll-worker party slots are filled from voter-registration affiliation and that mid-cycle switches are a known vector to pose as the other party. Status Confirmed primary EAC/AZ documentation of affiliation-based poll-worker assignment and anti-switch rules; peer to NCSL party-distribution and CPR party-switch companion cards already on this leaf—EAC/AZ affiliation-bar instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: party-balanced poll-worker rules that depend on registration labels create pose-as-party incentives unless affiliation changes are constrained and publicly auditable.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — 2023 Complete Poll Worker Compendium (state party-affiliation / appointment rules)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/2023_Complete_Poll_Worker_Compendium.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-poll-worker-compendium-az-party-affiliation-switch-bar-pose-as-party__eac-2023-complete-poll-worker-compendium-party-affiliation-rules.pdf"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — How to Become a Poll Worker: Arizona (party affiliation / inspector rules)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/ARIZONA-final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-poll-worker-compendium-az-party-affiliation-switch-bar-pose-as-party__brennan-center-arizona-poll-worker-party-affiliation-rules-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Voter Rolls Change of party affiliation prior to becoming poll-workers leaf."}
{"id": "ap-2023-trump-california-delegate-sweep-rules-rnc-compliance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-20", "uid": "C20260926-000809-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-20", "old_ids": ["ap-2023-trump-california-delegate-sweep-rules-rnc-compliance"], "seq": "C00573", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Allow \"delegate\" votes, then control the delegates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07", "state": "CA", "description": "AP coverage of the 2023 CAGOP rules change explains California's shift toward possible winner-take-all delegate sweep under RNC compliance pressure—showing how party-controlled delegate systems, not raw popular vote alone, determine nomination power. Status Confirmed for delegate-control architecture; does not prove illicit vote injection.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Trump early work on nominating rules / CA delegates", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-desantis-republican-delegates-california-0473edbb20a8f18dcb0aa0a181794a7b"}, {"title": "CAGOP rules-change statement (primary)", "url": "https://cagop.org/cagop-statement-on-the-passage-of-a-presidential-delegates-rules-change/"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "eac-2023-electronic-poll-book-report-realtime-statewide-voter-record-updates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-11", "uid": "C20260926-025634-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-11", "old_ids": ["eac-2023-electronic-poll-book-report-realtime-statewide-voter-record-updates"], "seq": "C01116", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Real-time adjustments to voter rolls, even during the election"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. EAC's July 2023 Electronic Poll Book Report defines e-poll books that are 'networked into a central voter registration system where they can check and update voter records in real time,' documents that live connections enable same-day registration and vote-center models with immediate roll updates during voting, and reports 2,271 local jurisdictions in 40 states used e-poll books in the Nov. 2022 general election—confirming real-time roll adjustment as widespread election-day practice. Status Confirmed primary EAC technical/policy documentation of real-time voter-record updates via networked e-poll books; peer to NCSL SDR and Colorado CRS §1-2-217.7 cards already on this leaf—EAC national e-poll-book landscape, not those remounted. PEP framing: real-time machine roll mutation during voting is harder for the public to observe than static hand-count precinct lists.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. EAC — Electronic Poll Book Report Final (July 2023) PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Electronic_Poll_Book_Report_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-electronic-poll-book-report-realtime-statewide-voter-record-updates__eac-electronic-poll-book-report-final-july-2023-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. EAC — Electronic Poll Books overview / ESTEP context", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/election-technology-security", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-electronic-poll-book-report-realtime-statewide-voter-record-updates__eac-election-technology-security-electronic-poll-books-overview.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Voter Rolls real-time adjustments leaf.", "related": ["co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc"]}
{"id": "mi-sos-2023-foia-epb-architecture-cybersecurity-exemption-denial", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-03", "uid": "C20260925-212129-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-03", "old_ids": ["mi-sos-2023-foia-epb-architecture-cybersecurity-exemption-denial"], "seq": "C00300", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that restrict citizens' access, blocking us from seeing or verifying our own election system."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Bureau of Elections July 10, 2023 memo to clerks instructs that EPB (electronic poll book) files revealing software design/data architecture must not be publicly released, citing FOIA cybersecurity exemptions MCL 15.243(1)(y)/(z) and proprietary software information — directing denials of citizen FOIA requests for EPB security architecture. Status Confirmed for official use of statute/FOIA exemptions to block public verification of EPB system design.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan SOS — Memo to Clerks on QVF and EPB Security (PDF, Jul 10, 2023)", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MISOS/2023/07/10/file_attachments/2549059/Memo%20to%20Clerks%20on%20QVF%20and%20EPB%20Security%20_07_10_23.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-sos-2023-foia-epb-architecture-cybersecurity-exemption-denial__michigan-sos-memo-to-clerks-on-qvf-and-epb-security-pdf-jul.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "cagop-2023-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-change-control-delegates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-19", "uid": "C20260926-000809-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-19", "old_ids": ["cagop-2023-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-change-control-delegates"], "seq": "C00572", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Allow \"delegate\" votes, then control the delegates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-29", "state": "CA", "description": "CAGOP Executive Committee (Jul 29, 2023) passed a presidential-delegate rules change: majority statewide vote yields all 169 CA Republican delegates; otherwise proportional. Party elites writing/changing delegate allocation rules after/around primary contests is the 'allow delegate votes, then control the delegates' mechanism. Soft companion to fill-20e CA GOP anonymous-votes leaf (different pathKey). Status Confirmed for party control of delegate allocation rules; 'cheat' motive Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CAGOP — Statement on presidential delegates rules change (Jul 29, 2023)", "url": "https://cagop.org/cagop-statement-on-the-passage-of-a-presidential-delegates-rules-change/"}, {"title": "LA Times — CA GOP primary delegate rules change / Trump boost", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-07-29/california-republican-primary-delegates-trump-desantis-presidential-election-2024"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 10. Soft remount companion to fill-20e Primaries CA GOP leaf."}
{"id": "missouri-ag-2023-white-house-social-media-censorship-flaherty-docs", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-10", "uid": "C20260926-002757-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-10", "old_ids": ["missouri-ag-2023-white-house-social-media-censorship-flaherty-docs"], "seq": "C00683", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Hijacking of social media content-moderation processes"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-28", "state": "MO", "description": "Missouri AG releases in Missouri v. Biden litigation published White House Digital Director Rob Flaherty emails pressuring Facebook/Twitter on content removal and virality reduction—including demands around RFK Jr., Tucker Carlson, and 'often-true' vaccine-discouraging content—showing government actors using social-media companies' moderation pipelines as an avenue to suppress disfavored speech. Status Confirmed for documentary pressure campaign; Supreme Court standing/merits outcome in Murthy v. Missouri is a separate legal question.", "sources": [{"title": "Missouri AG — Releases documents exposing White House social media censorship scheme", "url": "https://ago.mo.gov/missouri-attorney-general-releases-more-documents-exposing-white-house-s-social-media-censorship-scheme/"}, {"title": "House Judiciary Weaponization — Censorship-Industrial Complex interim report PDF (cited in SCOTUS filings)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/urls_cited/ot2023/23-411/23-411-2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/missouri-ag-2023-white-house-social-media-censorship-flaherty-docs__house-judiciary-weaponization-censorship-industrial-complex-interim-report-pdf-cited-in-scotus-filings.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "beverly-hills-ca-public-comment-3-to-2-minutes-2023", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-18", "uid": "C20261001-094909-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-18", "old_ids": ["beverly-hills-ca-public-comment-3-to-2-minutes-2023"], "seq": "C01312", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Public speaking time is continually reduced"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-18", "state": "CA", "description": "On July 18, 2023 Beverly Hills Mayor Julian Gold instituted new public-comment rules cutting agenda-item speaking time from three minutes to two minutes and non-agenda items from two minutes to 90 seconds, and substituting summaries for full readings of written comments—changes he said were to streamline meetings that sometimes ran past midnight. Residents and the Municipal League of Beverly Hills objected in writing and at the Aug. 1 meeting that the reduction abridged long-standing three-minute policy and Brown Act/California Constitution hearing rights; Gold said the mayor controls meeting conduct with council assent and would try the shorter limits 'for a while.' Status Confirmed for the formal reduction of allotted public speaking time. Peer to Fayetteville/Jersey City/Pima/Euclid cards—Beverly Hills July 2023 3→2 / 2→90s instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: shorter comment clocks compress citizen testimony on election-adjacent local policy.", "sources": [{"title": "Beverly Press — Beverly Hills limits time for public comment (Aug. 2, 2023)", "url": "https://beverlypress.com/2023/08/beverly-hills-limits-time-for-public-comment/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct CA minute cut; not remount of prior leaf peers."}
{"id": "lake-v-fontes-2023-d-ariz-rule11-1927-sanctions-122k-frivolous-election-suit", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-08", "uid": "C20260926-030239-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-08", "old_ids": ["lake-v-fontes-2023-d-ariz-rule11-1927-sanctions-122k-frivolous-election-suit"], "seq": "C01128", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may bait honest citizens into frivolous lawsuits to discredit and demoralize the group."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-14", "state": "AZ", "description": "In Lake v. Fontes (D. Ariz.), Judge John Tuchi's July 14, 2023 order awarded Maricopa County $122,200 in attorneys' fees under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. §1927 against counsel for Kari Lake and Mark Finchem (Parker/Olsen firms; capped share for Dershowitz) after finding the federal election-equipment challenge frivolous/unreasonable—fee-shifting that demoralizes counsel and citizen-aligned litigants who bring doomed integrity suits. Status Confirmed primary federal sanctions order for a frivolous post-election suit; peer to O'Rourke v. Dominion Rule 11 and Dominion-defamation chill cards already on this leaf—Lake/Fontes AZ fee order, not those remounted (and distinct from King v. Whitmer Lawfare-leaf sanctions). PEP framing: litigation bait/sanctions cycles that drain citizen groups from pursuing transparent hand-count remedies.", "sources": [{"title": "D. Ariz. — Lake v. Fontes Doc. 133 fee/sanctions order (July 14, 2023) CourtListener", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.azd.1294569/gov.uscourts.azd.1294569.133.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lake-v-fontes-2023-d-ariz-rule11-1927-sanctions-122k-frivolous-election-suit__d-ariz-lake-v-fontes-doc-133-fee-sanctions-order-july-14-2023-courtlistener.pdf"}, {"title": "Arizona Republic — Attorneys for Kari Lake, Mark Finchem sanctioned $122K (July 14, 2023)", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/arizona/2023/07/14/attorneys-for-kari-lake-mark-finchem-sanctioned-122k-for-filing-lawsuit/70415559007/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Infiltration of Grass Root Orgs frivolous-lawsuit bait leaf."}
{"id": "crs-2023-fec-administrative-fines-unpaid-weak-enforcement-no-teeth", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-21", "uid": "C20260926-002757-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-21", "old_ids": ["crs-2023-fec-administrative-fines-unpaid-weak-enforcement-no-teeth"], "seq": "C00694", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Many election laws have no enforcement consequences, so nothing deters violations, inviting abuse under a false sense of security."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-13", "state": "Federal", "description": "CRS reporting on FEC administrative fines documents substantial unpaid penalties (roughly a quarter of Administrative Fine Program cases 2000–2022 unpaid)—illustrating weak real-world consequences even after findings, i.e., 'no teeth' that can pave the way for abuse under a false sense of security. Status Confirmed for unpaid-fine enforcement gap.", "sources": [{"title": "CRS — Federal Election Commission Administrative Fines (EveryCRSReport mirror)", "url": "https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2023-07-13_IN12198_be77aefd844adff2146c70f4989f4efa7d5e0eab.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-2023-fec-administrative-fines-unpaid-weak-enforcement-no-teeth__crs-federal-election-commission-administrative-fines-everycrsreport-mirror.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC — Administrative fines program overview", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/enforcement/administrative-fines/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 11."}
{"id": "ct-mirror-2023-voting-machine-bond-delay-feasibility-procurement-clock", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-08", "uid": "C20260926-023825-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-08", "old_ids": ["ct-mirror-2023-voting-machine-bond-delay-feasibility-procurement-clock"], "seq": "C01083", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Feasibility studies"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-11", "state": "CT", "description": "CT Mirror (July 11, 2023) documents that Connecticut lawmakers authorized ~$25M in bonding for 3,000+ replacement ballot tabulators, but procurement could not begin until Gov. Ned Lamont’s State Bond Commission actually appropriated the funds—leaving SOS Stephanie Thomas and local registrars on a ticking feasibility/procurement clock with aging 2006–07 machines prone to jams. Status Confirmed contemporaneous statehouse reporting of funding-gate delay before equipment change; peer to Georgia SB 3EX feasibility-committee / July-deadline cards already on this leaf—Connecticut bond-gate delay, not those remounted. PEP framing: feasibility and funding sequencing delays keep jurisdictions on opaque machine tabulators instead of hand-count-capable paper processes.", "sources": [{"title": "CT Mirror — CT wants new voting machines, but Lamont hasn’t OK’d the funding (July 11, 2023)", "url": "https://ctmirror.org/2023/07/11/ct-new-voting-machines-funding-ned-lamont/"}, {"title": "CT SOS — Secretary Thomas statement on Bond Commission vote to approve ~$25M election equipment (2023)", "url": "https://portal.ct.gov/sots/press-releases/previous-years/2023-press-releases/secretary-thomas-statement-on-upcoming-bond-commission-vote-to-approve-25-million", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ct-mirror-2023-voting-machine-bond-delay-feasibility-procurement-clock__ct-sos-secretary-thomas-statement-on-bond-commission-vote-to-approve-25m-election-equipment-2023.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Delay Tactics Feasibility studies leaf."}
{"id": "mi-sos-2023-epb-architecture-foia-cybersecurity-exemption-security-logs", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-30", "uid": "C20260925-214102-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-30", "old_ids": ["mi-sos-2023-epb-architecture-foia-cybersecurity-exemption-security-logs"], "seq": "C00353", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "No access to security logs, hash testing, penetration testing, or ballot review files"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-10", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Bureau of Elections' July 10, 2023 clerk memo directs denial of FOIA requests for electronic poll book files revealing software design/data architecture, citing cybersecurity FOIA exemptions MCL 15.243(1)(y)/(z) and proprietary software information — blocking public access to EPB security architecture and related operational/security artifacts. Status Confirmed for official policy denying citizen access to security architecture/log-adjacent election system records.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan SOS — Memo to Clerks on QVF and EPB Security (PDF)", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/attachments/MISOS/2023/07/10/file_attachments/2549059/Memo%20to%20Clerks%20on%20QVF%20and%20EPB%20Security%20_07_10_23.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 15 companion. Same memo used on Legislation>restrict access leaf in fill-15f — remount-style companion onto Records leaf.", "related": ["mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live"]}
{"id": "eac-2023-epollbook-realtime-mail-ballot-status-feedback", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-37", "uid": "C20260926-004030-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-37", "old_ids": ["eac-2023-epollbook-realtime-mail-ballot-status-feedback"], "seq": "C00790", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Combine existing voter registration metrics with real-time data from the mail-ballot tracking system and electronic poll books."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-07-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's 2023 Electronic Poll Book Report documents that e-poll books in many jurisdictions maintain real-time connections to voter-registration databases, check mail-ballot status, update voter history, and feed turnout/check-in metrics—exactly the combined VR metrics + mail-ballot tracking + e-pollbook real-time feedback loop the leaf describes. Soft remount of prior e-pollbook corpus cards onto this Feedback pathKey. PEP: properly-run public hand count does not depend on proprietary real-time databases to know the counted total (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for the real-time data architecture; using it to choose phantom-vote targets Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Electronic Poll Book Report Final (2023 PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Electronic_Poll_Book_Report_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-epollbook-realtime-mail-ballot-status-feedback__eac-electronic-poll-book-report-final-2023-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NASS / BallotTrax — Tracking the Vote white paper (2021 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/ballottrax-white-paper-nass-winter21.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-epollbook-realtime-mail-ballot-status-feedback__nass-ballottrax-tracking-the-vote-white-paper-2021-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 19. Soft remount of e-pollbook / BallotTrax families. Architecture Confirmed; phantom targeting Alleged. PEP framing.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "ftc-endorsement-guides-political-ads-outside-jurisdiction-fec-disclaimer-asymmetry", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-02", "uid": "C20260926-000809-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-02", "old_ids": ["ftc-endorsement-guides-political-ads-outside-jurisdiction-fec-disclaimer-asymmetry"], "seq": "C00555", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Incentivize people to become influencers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "FTC Endorsement Guides FAQ states the FTC does not have jurisdiction over political advertisements, while commercial influencer #ad disclosures are required—creating a structural incentive asymmetry: campaigns can pay creators without the clear commercial-style disclosure regime that brands face. FEC advertising-disclaimer rules focus on committee 'public communications,' and commissioners have noted the agency declined to extend clear influencer-pay disclosure. Status Confirmed for regulatory gap that facilitates paid-influencer political messaging; does not prove every unpaid creator is a plant.", "sources": [{"title": "FTC — Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking (political ads FAQ)", "url": "https://www.ftc.gov/business-guidance/resources/ftcs-endorsement-guides-what-people-are-asking"}, {"title": "FEC — Advertising and disclaimers overview", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/advertising-and-disclaimers/"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "nv-ab242-mechanical-count-mandate-vetoed-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-02", "uid": "C20260925-211320-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-02", "old_ids": ["nv-ab242-mechanical-count-mandate-vetoed-2023"], "seq": "C00247", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They pass bills to eliminate hand-counted ballots (e.g., California AB 969)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada AB 242 (2023) required ballots and votes be counted using a mechanical voting system; Governor Lombardo's veto letter stated the bill's 'prohibition against any hand-counting of ballots' improperly restricted county officials and vetoed it June 16, 2023. Status Confirmed for the legislative attempt to prohibit hand counting (veto means it did not become law).", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Governor Lombardo veto message — AB 242 (June 16, 2023 PDF)", "url": "https://int.gov.nv.gov/siteassets/gov2022.nv.gov/content/newsroom/vetos/2023-06-16_Veto_AB242.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-ab242-mechanical-count-mandate-vetoed-2023__nevada-governor-lombardo-veto-message-ab-242-june-16-2023-pd.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 1 companion. Confirmed as introduced/passed-legislature attempt; vetoed so not operative law."}
{"id": "pima-az-gop-coordinated-call-to-audience-hour-cap-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-01", "uid": "C20260925-205354-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-01", "old_ids": ["pima-az-gop-coordinated-call-to-audience-hour-cap-2023"], "seq": "C00216", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "People are assigned to run out the clock and eliminate or reduce our time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06", "state": "AZ", "description": "Pima County (AZ) Board of Supervisors voted 3–2 in June 2023 to cap Call to the Audience at one hour and cut each speaker from three minutes to two when 20+ people sign up. Supervisor Rex Scott stated on the record that county Republican Party officers and precinct representatives had for months 'acted in a coordinated fashion' to monopolize public-comment time with similar partisan arguments, creating hours-long sessions. Status Confirmed for the documented coordinated fill-the-clock pattern and the resulting formal time-cap policy — not for any claim that coordinated comment is itself illegal.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Daily Star / Tucson.com — County supervisors impose time limit on public comments", "url": "https://tucson.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_aa760e6c-04a7-11ee-bf29-2f742d9caceb.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 1. Confirmed coordinated speakers consuming meeting time (official acknowledgment)."}
{"id": "pima-az-speaker-time-3-to-2-minutes-when-crowded-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-05", "uid": "C20260925-205354-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-05", "old_ids": ["pima-az-speaker-time-3-to-2-minutes-when-crowded-2023"], "seq": "C00220", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Public speaking time is continually reduced"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06", "state": "AZ", "description": "Pima County Board of Supervisors' June 2023 public-comment reform both capped total Call to the Audience at one hour and automatically reduced each speaker from three minutes to two whenever 20 or more people request to speak. Status Confirmed for progressive reduction of per-speaker time under crowding rules.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Daily Star / Tucson.com — County supervisors impose time limit on public comments", "url": "https://tucson.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_aa760e6c-04a7-11ee-bf29-2f742d9caceb.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 2."}
{"id": "tx-elec-code-32-002-party-chairs-nominate-commissioners-must-appoint", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-15", "uid": "C20260925-214102-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-15", "old_ids": ["tx-elec-code-32-002-party-chairs-nominate-commissioners-must-appoint"], "seq": "C00338", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes an election worker; the election workers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-26", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Election Code §32.002 (explained in SOS Election Advisory No. 2023-06) requires major-party county chairs to submit ranked preference lists for precinct presiding/alternate judges, early voting ballot board judges, and central counting station judges; the commissioners court MUST appoint the first eligible person from the list of the party that carried the precinct (presiding) and the second-highest party (alternate). Open 'anyone can apply' pathways exist mainly as fallbacks when chairs fail to submit lists or vacancies arise. Status Confirmed that who becomes the key election judges is controlled by party-chair nomination + commissioners appointment, not open competitive application.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Election Advisory 2023-06 appointment procedures", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2023-06.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-elec-code-32-002-party-chairs-nominate-commissioners-must-appoint__texas-sos-election-advisory-2023-06-appointment-procedures.png"}, {"title": "Texas Election Code Ch. 32 (statutes portal)", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/EL/htm/EL.32.htm"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 8. Confirmed party-gatekeeping of judge appointments."}
{"id": "tx-sos-advisory-2023-06-county-judge-election-appointments-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-12", "uid": "C20260926-031602-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-12", "old_ids": ["tx-sos-advisory-2023-06-county-judge-election-appointments-lockstep"], "seq": "C01177", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County judges"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-26", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas SOS Election Advisory No. 2023-06 (to County Chairs, County Election Officials, and County Judges) details commissioners-court appointment of precinct/EVBB/CCS judges, county-judge emergency appointments when both appointed judges cannot serve (Election Code §32.007), and the county election board (county judge, clerk/elections administrator, voter registrar, sheriff) that appoints signature-verification committees—documenting the county judge's lockstep institutional seat inside Texas election-worker appointment and board structures. Status Confirmed primary TX SOS Advisory 2023-06 county-judge election-appointment/board role; peer to FJP 2024 county-judges and NACo county-judges-layer cards already on this leaf—TX SOS 2023-06 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: concentrated appointment authority in county-judge/board lockstep can gate who observes or conducts counting, including resistance to public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Election Advisory No. 2023-06 (appointment procedures; county judges)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2023-06.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-sos-advisory-2023-06-county-judge-election-appointments-lockstep__texas-sos-advisory-2023-06-county-judge-appointments.png"}, {"title": "Texas Association of Counties — Duties of Texas County Officials (county judge / commissioners court companion)", "url": "https://www.county.org/resources/resource-library/education-and-training/duties-texas-county-officials", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-sos-advisory-2023-06-county-judge-election-appointments-lockstep__texas-association-counties-duties-county-officials.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Infiltration of Offices County Judges leaf."}
{"id": "az-hobbs-2023-veto-hb2722-hand-count-fail-constituents", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-08", "uid": "C20260926-033041-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-08", "old_ids": ["az-hobbs-2023-veto-hb2722-hand-count-fail-constituents"], "seq": "C01218", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fail their constituents by not demanding honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-16", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Gov. Katie Hobbs (D) vetoed HB 2722 on June 16, 2023 after the Republican-controlled Legislature passed it party-line; the bill would have allowed counties to substitute full hand counts of ballots for electronic tabulation. Hobbs's veto statement called hand-counting 'unquestionably less accurate and more time consuming than machine tabulation,' rejecting a statutory path for counties whose constituents demanded observable hand counts. Status Confirmed primary Hobbs veto of HB 2722 / contemporaneous AZ Mirror and local coverage; peer to NCSL poll-watcher and Pew 2022 election-confidence cards already on this leaf—Hobbs HB2722 veto instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: party-aligned executives who veto hand-count authority fail constituents seeking the observable paper count PEP describes.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Mirror — Legislature approves hand counts in Arizona elections / HB 2722 to Hobbs (June 13, 2023)", "url": "https://azmirror.com/briefs/legislature-approves-hand-counts-in-arizona-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-hobbs-2023-veto-hb2722-hand-count-fail-constituents__arizona-mirror-legislature-approves-hand-counts-in-arizona-elections-hb-2722-to-hobbs-june-13-2023.png"}, {"title": "EA Courier / AP — Latest round of Hobbs vetoes includes hand-count bill (June 16, 2023 companion)", "url": "https://www.eacourier.com/news/state/latest-round-of-hobbs-vetoes-includes-hand-count-bill/article_e6a0e016-0ed3-11ee-b176-e345869cf0fe.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Political Parties Fail their constituents leaf."}
{"id": "tarrant-tx-2023-election-commission-appoints-ludwig-after-garcia-resignation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-05", "uid": "C20260926-024539-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-05", "old_ids": ["tarrant-tx-2023-election-commission-appoints-ludwig-after-garcia-resignation"], "seq": "C01095", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials who resign before the end of their term can be replaced by appointees who are not accountable to the citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-16", "state": "TX", "description": "After Tarrant County Elections Administrator Heider Garcia resigned in April 2023 citing political pressure, the bipartisan county Election Commission on June 16, 2023 unanimously appointed Chief Deputy County Clerk Clinton Ludwig—who had no prior election-administration experience—to run elections for Texas's largest swing county through the remainder of the unexpired term, with Ludwig to start Aug. 1 (Texas Tribune / Votebeat). Status Confirmed mid-term resignation replaced by appointed (not voter-elected) elections administrator; peer to AZ A.R.S. §16-230 vacancy-board and NCSBE midterm-appointment pattern cards already on this leaf—Tarrant Ludwig appointment, not those remounted. PEP framing: appointed successors answer to appointing boards, not a direct elector mandate for transparent hand-count practices.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Tribune / Votebeat — Tarrant County taps deputy clerk Clinton Ludwig as elections administrator (June 16, 2023)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2023/06/16/tarrant-county-elections-administrator/"}, {"title": "KERA — Tarrant selects new elections administrator after Heider Garcia's departure (June 16, 2023)", "url": "https://www.keranews.org/news/2023-06-16/tarrant-county-selects-new-elections-administrator-after-heider-garcias-controversial-departure"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Usurpation resign-then-appoint leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-2023-physical-security-voting-locations-election-officials-threat-framing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-06", "uid": "C20260926-023825-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-06", "old_ids": ["cisa-2023-physical-security-voting-locations-election-officials-threat-framing"], "seq": "C01081", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Convince clerks that electors are dangerous and should be feared."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-15", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA’s June 2023 Physical Security of Voting Locations and Election Facilities guide (and companion election-infrastructure security resource packs) instructs election officials to plan for threats, harassment, swatting, and hostile members of the public at voting sites—embedding a federal threat/fear frame into day-to-day clerk operations and training. Status Confirmed primary CISA publication; peer to Brennan Center 2024 official-threat survey and Matt Crane/CCCA Senate Judiciary testimony cards already on this leaf—federal physical-security guidance product, not those remounted. PEP framing: institutional fear messaging can divert clerks from machine/centralization audit demands toward threat posture without adding hand-count transparency. (Not CCCA dues remount.)", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Physical Security of Voting Locations and Election Facilities (June 15, 2023 PDF)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/Physical%20Security%20of%20Voting%20Locations%20and%20Election%20Facilities_20230615_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2023-physical-security-voting-locations-election-officials-threat-framing__cisa-physical-security-of-voting-locations-and-election-facilities-june-15-2023-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Interagency Security Resource for the Election Sector", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/interagency-security-resource-election-sector", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2023-physical-security-voting-locations-election-officials-threat-framing__cisa-interagency-security-resource-for-the-election-sector.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Convince clerks electors are dangerous leaf."}
{"id": "allen-v-milligan-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-13", "uid": "C20260925-183614-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-13", "old_ids": ["allen-v-milligan-2023"], "seq": "C00101", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Redistricting and Gerrymandering"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-08", "state": "AL / Federal", "description": "In Allen v. Milligan (599 U.S. ___ 2023), the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed (5–4) that Alabama's congressional map likely violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting Black voters' ability to elect preferred candidates, requiring a second opportunity district under the Gingles framework. Status Confirmed major post-Rucho federal gerrymandering/VRA districting holding—distinct from Rucho's federal partisan-gerrymandering nonjusticiability ruling.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court opinion PDF — Allen v. Milligan (21-1086)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/22pdf/21-1086_1co6.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/allen-v-milligan-2023__u-s-supreme-court-opinion-pdf-allen-v-milligan-21-1086.pdf"}, {"title": "Oyez — Allen v. Milligan", "url": "https://www.oyez.org/cases/2022/21-1086", "local": "/archives/2026/09/allen-v-milligan-2023__oyez-allen-v-milligan.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich rucho leaf with major subsequent SCOTUS districting case."}
{"id": "rnc-bank-your-vote-launch-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-10", "uid": "C20260925-185839-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-10", "old_ids": ["rnc-bank-your-vote-launch-2023"], "seq": "C00161", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Promote the GOP's \"Bank Your Vote\" campaign (https://bankyourvote.com/) to convince voters to vote early instead of on Election Day."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-06-07", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "On June 7, 2023 the Republican National Committee launched \"Bank Your Vote,\" a nationwide program to maximize pre-Election Day voting. The RNC press release states the campaign encourages Republicans to lock in votes early through in-person early voting, absentee/mail voting, and ballot harvesting where legal, with BankYourVote.com used to pledge and receive digital reminders and state-specific ballot-request links. ABC News and Fox News contemporaneously reported the same program framing. Status Confirmed that the GOP Bank Your Vote program existed and pushed early/mail voting (neutral factual cataloging; not a fraud allegation).", "sources": [{"title": "GOP/RNC — Launches Bank Your Vote Campaign (June 7, 2023)", "url": "https://gop.com/press-release/rnc-launches-bank-your-vote-campaign/"}, {"title": "ABC News — Republicans launch effort to boost early voting (Bank Your Vote)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/republicans-launch-new-effort-boost-early-voting-breaking/story?id=99908627"}, {"title": "Fox News — RNC Bank Your Vote websites in 16 languages / 50 states", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/rnc-launches-bank-your-vote-websites-16-languages-across-all-50-states-ahead-gop-primaries"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 5. Neutral factual: program exists and pushes early/mail."}
{"id": "jw-v-pennsylvania-2023-settlement-178k-inactive-removed-17-in-two-years", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-06", "uid": "C20261008-203914-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-06", "old_ids": ["jw-v-pennsylvania-2023-settlement-178k-inactive-removed-17-in-two-years"], "seq": "C00276", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-05", "state": "PA", "description": "Judicial Watch's April 2020 NVRA suit against Pennsylvania (M.D. Pa.) first named Bucks, Chester and Delaware counties, which together reported removing just 17 registrations in a two-year period despite a combined roll of about 1.2 million. After an April 22, 2021 notice letter, the Commonwealth told the court that it had worked with 27 counties to remove every inactive voter eligible for removal: 178,258 registrants who had not returned a confirmation notice and had not voted in two federal elections. The Commonwealth said 0 such voters remained in those counties. The case settled in 2023 and was dismissed on May 12, 2023, with the court keeping jurisdiction to enforce. Pennsylvania agreed to publish annual voter-roll and removal statistics for Luzerne, Cumberland, Washington, Indiana and Carbon counties for five years, and to pay $15,000 in fees. Status Confirmed for the removals Pennsylvania reported to the court. Common Cause, an intervenor, says the suit proved no violation of law and forced no purge beyond normal practice. The 178,258 records were removable under existing law but had not been removed until the suit.", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch v. Pennsylvania — NVRA settlement agreement (PDF, via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/JW-v-PA-NVRA-Settlement-Agreement-00708-1.pdf"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — Pennsylvania settles voter roll lawsuit; removes 180,000 inactive names", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/pennsylvania-settles-voter-roll-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "Common Cause Pennsylvania — Voting rights advocates prevail in Pennsylvania voter purge lawsuit (opposing view)", "url": "https://www.commoncause.org/pennsylvania/press/voting-rights-advocates-prevail-in-pennsylvania-voter-purge-lawsuit/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Opposing intervenor view included. Judicial Watch page returns 403 to curl (bot block)."}
{"id": "tcole-2023-cspo-training-no-meaningful-authority-memo", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-14", "uid": "C20260926-005107-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-14", "old_ids": ["tcole-2023-cspo-training-no-meaningful-authority-memo"], "seq": "C00807", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are not educated about their rights and duties."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-05-25", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Commission on Law Enforcement (TCOLE) investigatory memo (reported May 2023) found CSPOA Texas trainings provided 'no meaningful authority' for proposed legal theories of individual nullification and misapplied judicial review — then revoked continuing-education credit. That state action is itself evidence that sheriff rights/duties education is contested and that some marketed 'duties' curricula fail official legal standards. Status Confirmed for TCOLE's findings and credit ban; does not prove every sheriff lacks basic statutory-duty training.", "sources": [{"title": "SPLC Hatewatch — TCOLE bans CSPOA training (quotes May 25 memo)", "url": "https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/texas-commission-bans-training-constitutional-sheriffs-group/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tcole-2023-cspo-training-no-meaningful-authority-memo__splc-hatewatch-tcole-bans-cspoa-training-quotes-may-25-memo.png"}, {"title": "AP News — CSPOA training credits companion", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/constitutional-sheriffs-5568cd0b6b27680a28de8a098ed14210"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "az-lake-v-hobbs-motion-for-reconsideration-prolongs-litigation-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-06", "uid": "C20260925-220029-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-06", "old_ids": ["az-lake-v-hobbs-motion-for-reconsideration-prolongs-litigation-2023"], "seq": "C00359", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Harass and countersue plaintiffs, and file motions to reconsider, to drain our finances."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-05-04", "state": "AZ", "description": "Companion: Lake sought reconsideration/leave for further review of ballot chain-of-custody claims after adverse rulings; the Arizona Supreme Court denied leave (May 4, 2023 Decision Order). Serial reconsideration/rehearing practice is a documented litigation tool that extends timelines and costs for all parties in election contests. Status Confirmed that motions to reconsider were filed and adjudicated in this high-profile contest—illustrating the catalog's 'motions to reconsider' cost-drain pathway without asserting which side initiated every delay.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Courts — ASC Decision Order denying further review / noting reconsideration posture", "url": "https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/21/ASC-CV230046%20-%205-4-2023%20-%20FILED%20-%20DECISION%20ORDER.pdf"}, {"title": "DocumentCloud — Lake election-challenge sanctions order materials", "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/23798447/lake-v-hobbs-election-challenge-sanctions-order.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 3 companion. Reconsideration as cost/time extender Confirmed as practice."}
{"id": "bbc-2023-twitter-2020-hack-guilty-account-exploitation-bugs", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-10", "uid": "C20260926-005107-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-10", "old_ids": ["bbc-2023-twitter-2020-hack-guilty-account-exploitation-bugs"], "seq": "C00803", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Account-lockout exploits on social media platforms"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-05-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "BBC reported Joseph James O'Connor pleaded guilty in the U.S. to a role in the July 2020 Twitter hack that took over 130+ high-profile accounts via social-engineering of Twitter employees to obtain internal admin tools — proving Twitter had exploitable account-takeover bugs/process failures at massive scale. Soft companion establishing why 'helping Twitter fix account exploitation bugs' is a real security mission. Status Confirmed for adjudicated account-exploitation of Twitter's systems; Virginia Project's specific remediation role Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "BBC — Briton pleads guilty in US to 2020 Twitter hack", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-65540901"}, {"title": "Fox News — Collins/Warner lockouts after Twitter hack companion", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/media/doug-collins-mark-warner-journalists-locked-out-of-twitter-following-major-hack"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "new-georgia-project-2022-impact-targeted-vulnerable-communities-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-10", "uid": "C20260926-032507-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-10", "old_ids": ["new-georgia-project-2022-impact-targeted-vulnerable-communities-registration"], "seq": "C01205", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "They target vulnerable parts of our communities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-05-01", "state": "GA", "description": "New Georgia Project's 2022 C3 Impact Report documents sustained NGO voter-registration and mobilization aimed at underrepresented Georgians—especially Black, low-income, elderly, disabled, and young voters—via churches, campuses, neighborhoods, and canvassing, explicitly framing outreach into vulnerable/underrepresented communities as the registration strategy. Status Confirmed primary New Georgia Project 2022 impact report documenting targeted vulnerable-community registration; peer to CTCL 2020 grant targeted-registration and FEC MUR 7946 CTCL context cards already on this leaf—New Georgia Project 2022 instance, not those CTCL remounts. PEP framing: NGO registration drives that concentrate on vulnerable communities expand soft-identity roll entries that machine tabulation must secure; public hand counts keep each paper tied to a present human.", "sources": [{"title": "New Georgia Project — 2022 C3 Impact Report (PDF)", "url": "https://newgeorgiaproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/2022_c3_ImpactReport.pdf"}, {"title": "GALEO — Latino Organizations Announce Historic Georgia Latino Voter Mobilization Campaign (Mi Familia Vota companion targeting)", "url": "https://galeo.org/2020/11/latino-organizations-announce-historic-georgia-latino-voter-mobilization-campaign/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/new-georgia-project-2022-impact-targeted-vulnerable-communities-registration__galeo-latino-organizations-announce-historic-georgia-latino-voter-mobilization-campaign-mi-familia-vota-companion-target.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on NGO voter registration target vulnerable parts of communities leaf."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-oki-printer-faint-timing-marks-door3-duplication", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-28", "uid": "C20260925-211320-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-28", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-oki-printer-faint-timing-marks-door3-duplication"], "seq": "C00297", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Print the ballot image lighter than normal so citizens do not notice but tabulators cannot scan it, causing ballots to be segregated and providing an excuse to \"re-create\" them (this happened in Arizona)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's post-2022 investigation (Votebeat/AZ Mirror/AP, Apr 2023) found Oki B432 printers often failed to fuse toner darkly enough on thick 20-inch Election Day ballots, producing faint timing marks that on-site tabulators rejected. Affected ballots went to Door #3 (~16k+) for central scan or bipartisan duplication/'re-create'. Status Confirmed for lighter/faint ballot-image print → tabulator reject → segregate/duplicate pathway in AZ (intentional fraud not upheld).", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Maricopa election investigation recommends new printers (faint toner)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/4/10/23678055/maricopa-county-election-day-investigation-oki-printers/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__votebeat-investigation-of-maricopa-ballot-problems.png"}, {"title": "Arizona Mirror — Ballots too long, paper too heavy for printers", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2023/04/10/maricopa-county-election-investigation-ballots-were-too-long-paper-too-heavy-for-printers/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-oki-printer-faint-timing-marks-door3-duplication__arizona-mirror-ballots-too-long-paper-too-heavy-for-printers.png"}, {"title": "AP — Paper changes caused Maricopa County printer failure", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maricopa-county-ballot-printers-mcgregor-kari-lake-9edeef525b8afacb767a4960bf951ea1"}], "notes": "Fill-15f remount 2026-09-25.20-preview: moved from shrink leaf (fill-15e companion) to exact 'Print the ballot image lighter' Detail leaf. Shrink leaf retains maricopa-az-2022-ballot-image-fit-to-page-shrunk-timing-marks. Status upgraded Partially→Confirmed on the exact lighter-print leaf."}
{"id": "ec-2023-dsa-designates-twitter-x-facebook-vlops-global-moderation-obligations", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-03", "uid": "C20260926-023825-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-03", "old_ids": ["ec-2023-dsa-designates-twitter-x-facebook-vlops-global-moderation-obligations"], "seq": "C01078", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "The Biden administration's use of foreign laws, such as the European Union (EU) Digital Services Act, to censor domestic opposition on social media"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-25", "state": "Federal / EU", "description": "On Apr. 25, 2023 the European Commission designated the first set of Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines under the Digital Services Act—including Twitter (now X) and Facebook/Instagram—triggering enhanced DSA duties (risk assessments, content-moderation systems, researcher/data access, and Commission enforcement with fines) for platforms that dominate U.S. political speech. Status Confirmed primary EU designation press/library; peer to the House Judiciary Breton/X letters and Foreign Censorship Threat DSA report cards already on this leaf—Commission VLOP designation decision itself, not those remounted. PEP framing: extraterritorial platform rules reshape what election-integrity dissent is visible in U.S. feeds without creating hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "European Commission / Shaping Europe’s digital future — DSA designates first VLOPs and VLOSEs (Apr. 25, 2023)", "url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/digital-services-act-commission-designates-first-set-very-large-online-platforms-and-search-engines", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ec-2023-dsa-designates-twitter-x-facebook-vlops-global-moderation-obligations__ec-shaping-europe-s-digital-future-dsa-designates-first-vlops-and-vloses-apr-25-2023.png"}, {"title": "European Commission — Designation decisions for first set of VLOPs and VLOSEs (library)", "url": "https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/designation-decisions-first-set-very-large-online-platforms-vlops-and-very-large-online-search", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ec-2023-dsa-designates-twitter-x-facebook-vlops-global-moderation-obligations__european-commission-designation-decisions-for-first-set-of-very-large-online-platforms-vlops-and-very-large-online-search.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on DSA domestic-opposition censorship intimidation leaf."}
{"id": "dominion-v-fox-settlement-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-27", "uid": "C20260925-155410-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-27", "old_ids": ["dominion-v-fox-settlement-2023"], "seq": "C00027", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-18", "state": "Federal / DE", "description": "Dominion Voting Systems' defamation suit against Fox News over 2020 election claims settled for $787.5 million on the eve of trial (April 18, 2023). Court pretrial rulings had found certain Fox statements about Dominion false as a matter of law; Fox acknowledged the court's findings in settlement coverage while not issuing an on-air apology. Status Confirmed for the settlement amount and existence of landmark election-adjacent defamation litigation. Catalog may frame such suits as lawfare chilling speech; that motive characterization is advocacy—label Confirmed only for the case outcome.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Fox settles Dominion lawsuit for $787.5 million", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/legal/dominions-defamation-case-against-fox-poised-trial-after-delay-2023-04-18/"}, {"title": "CNN Business — Fox News settles with Dominion for $787 million", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/18/media/fox-dominion-settlement"}], "notes": "Major election-speech litigation; partisan \"lawfare\" framing is interpretive.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "harris-tx-2023-county-sues-ag-withhold-election-records-litigation-exception", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-09", "uid": "C20260926-025634-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-09", "old_ids": ["harris-tx-2023-county-sues-ag-withhold-election-records-litigation-exception"], "seq": "C01114", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Push citizens to the point of a lawsuit, then claim the records cannot be released because of the lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-17", "state": "TX", "description": "Houston Chronicle (Apr. 17, 2023) documents Harris County's lawsuit against the Texas Attorney General seeking judicial permission to withhold election records under the Texas Public Information Act's pending-litigation exception (Gov't Code §552.103) and related audit/ballot-retention theories after citizen/media RTI requests—and after the AG ordered production—explicitly arguing that once litigation exists, the county may reject disclosure of related election documents. Status Confirmed primary local-government litigation deploying the litigation exception to block election-record release; peer to CA Gov. Code §7927.200 and TX §552.103 statute cards already on this leaf—Harris County operational instance, not bare-statute remounts. PEP framing: lawsuit-triggered secrecy that denies the public machine/ballot evidence needed for hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "Houston Chronicle — Harris County is suing the attorney general to withhold public records (Apr. 17, 2023)", "url": "https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/houston/article/harris-county-sues-attorney-general-s-office-17901402.php"}, {"title": "The Texan — Harris County Sues Attorney General Paxton to Block Release of Public Election Records", "url": "https://thetexan.news/texas-local-news/harris-county-sues-attorney-general-paxton-to-block-release-of-public-election-records/article_9a2efb52-dbee-5f69-8608-3eb634be4bfd.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Lawfare Push-citizens-to-lawsuit-then-withhold leaf."}
{"id": "ny-v-trump-2023-catch-and-kill-suppress-compromise-material", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-26", "uid": "C20260926-002008-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-26", "old_ids": ["ny-v-trump-2023-catch-and-kill-suppress-compromise-material"], "seq": "C00659", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Are controllable through compromise."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-04", "state": "NY", "description": "Manhattan DA statement of facts in People v. Trump details a 2016 catch-and-kill scheme to suppress damaging personal information (Daniels/McDougal) that could have compromised the candidate publicly—proving that compromise material is treated as an election-control asset by campaigns and media partners. Status Confirmed for the suppress-compromise-material mechanism; foreign-kompromat control claims remain separate/unproven.", "sources": [{"title": "Just Security — Manhattan DA statement of facts (Apr 4, 2023 clearinghouse)", "url": "https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/manhattan-da-trump-case-clearinghouse-statement-of-facts-april-4-2023.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ny-v-trump-2023-catch-and-kill-suppress-compromise-material__just-security-manhattan-da-statement-of-facts-apr-4-2023-clearinghouse.pdf"}, {"title": "The Guardian — David Pecker bought McDougal story so it did not hurt Trump campaign", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/apr/25/david-pecker-testimony-trump-trial"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "perf-2023-police-staffing-resignations-retirements-force-out", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-19", "uid": "C20260926-003520-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-19", "old_ids": ["perf-2023-police-staffing-resignations-retirements-force-out"], "seq": "C00732", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Force good officers into retirement by making the job miserable."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Police Executive Research Forum's 2023 staffing survey of U.S. agencies found sworn staffing ~4.8% lower than Jan 2020, with resignations ~47% higher and retirements ~19% higher in 2022 vs 2019—documenting a force-out/early-exit environment that makes remaining a 'good officer' comparatively miserable and accelerates retirement/resignation. Soft remount of fill-20i LE confidence/defund pressure family onto this pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured LE staffing/resignation/retirement surge; intentional constitutional-hostility motive Alleged beyond survey data.", "sources": [{"title": "PERF — New survey shows police agencies losing officers faster than they can hire (staffing 2023)", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2023", "local": "/archives/2026/09/perf-2023-police-staffing-resignations-retirements-force-out__perf-new-survey-shows-police-agencies-losing-officers-faster-than-they-can-hire-staffing-2023.png"}, {"title": "BJS — Hiring and Retention of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers, 2020 Statistical Tables (PDF)", "url": "https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/hrslleo20st.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/perf-2023-police-staffing-resignations-retirements-force-out__bjs-hiring-and-retention-of-state-and-local-law-enforcement-officers-2020-statistical-tables-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 10. Soft remount of fill-20i LE media-attack / citizens-vs-police family onto force-retirement pathKey."}
{"id": "perf-2023-push-out-good-officers-staffing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-23", "uid": "C20260926-004030-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-23", "old_ids": ["perf-2023-push-out-good-officers-staffing"], "seq": "C00776", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Push out good officers to make room for officers who will not uphold the Constitution."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "PERF's 2023 staffing survey found resignations ~47% higher and retirements ~19% higher in 2022 vs 2019, with sworn staffing ~4.8% below Jan 2020—documenting a force-out environment that pushes experienced officers out while agencies scramble to refill. Soft remount of fill-20j force-retirement PERF/BJS cards onto this exact 'push out good officers' pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured push-out/staffing crisis; intentional replacement with 'bad'/anti-constitutional officers Alleged beyond survey data.", "sources": [{"title": "PERF — Police agencies losing officers faster than they can hire (staffing 2023)", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2023"}, {"title": "BJS — Hiring and Retention of State and Local LE Officers, 2020 Statistical Tables (PDF)", "url": "https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/hrslleo20st.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 12. Soft remount of fill-20j PERF force-retirement family. Honest: push-out Confirmed; 'bad officers' motive Alleged."}
{"id": "ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20261020-165133-01", "uid": "C20261020-165133-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-165133-01", "old_ids": ["ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation"], "seq": "C01468", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing", "They claim that citizen canvassing efforts constitute voter intimidation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-04 to 2023-11", "state": "NY", "description": "In 2023, New York's State Board of Elections and Attorney General Letitia James publicly framed the voter-roll canvassing of NY Citizens Audit (NYCA), a volunteer group that had compared the statewide NYSVoter file with certified 2020 and 2022 results, as voter intimidation. On April 5, 2023, the Board sent county election officials a letter with an attachment titled \"False Claims Explained\" rebutting NYCA's \"cloned voter\" findings. On Aug. 31, 2023, 18 days after NYCA filed its \"Reign of Error\" report on the 2022 general election with the Board's enforcement division, the Board issued a statewide warning about \"election imposters\" who were going door to door \"impersonating County Board of Elections staff,\" questioning voters about their registrations and \"erroneously accusing voters of committing a crime because of how they appear in the state voter database.\" At the Board's Sept. 6, 2023 public meeting, Board staff said the Board was \"on the offensive now,\" according to the meeting transcript quoted in the State's own court filing. On Sept. 21, 2023, the Attorney General's Civil Rights Bureau sent NYCA executive director Marly Hornik a cease-and-desist letter, which the Associated Press obtained and reported before NYCA says it received it. The letter cited \"reports alleging\" that volunteers had falsely claimed to be Board officials and falsely accused voters of felony fraud, said such conduct \"if true\" could violate the New York Voting Rights Act, the federal Voting Rights Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act, and demanded NYCA's canvassing communications and training records by Oct. 2. The letter stated that the office had \"seen no evidence that any of the complainants committed voter fraud.\" Hornik first told the AP that NYCA was \"not engaged in any canvassing\"; NYCA's later federal complaint states that its volunteers did ask voters from late 2022 into 2023 whether their NYSVoter records were correct, and that they never accused any voter of fraud. NYCA called the allegations unsubstantiated and said the real issue was the accuracy of the rolls. According to that complaint, the Attorney General's inquiry lasted about 11 months with subpoenas and deficiency letters, and NYCA lost more than a thousand volunteers. No charge or enforcement action against NYCA or any volunteer has been reported. Status Confirmed: the Board's warning, the Board's April letter and the Attorney General's letter are documented in the officials' own papers and in contemporaneous news coverage. Whether any volunteer impersonated an official has never been established in any proceeding. Comparable: Fair Fight v. True the Vote, in which a citizen challenge effort was sued as voter intimidation and the court entered judgment for the citizen group (cards fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-vra-11b-citizen-canvass-labeled-intimidation, fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-2024-judgment-defendants-no-vra-11b). The follow-up federal case is card ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed.", "sources": [{"title": "New York Attorney General, Civil Rights Bureau — Cease and Desist Notification and Document Request to Marly Hornik, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund (Sept. 21, 2023; copy hosted by Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NY-Citizens-Audit-Cease-Desist.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__ag-cease-desist-2023-09-21.pdf"}, {"title": "NBC New York / Associated Press — New York group accused of voter intimidation ordered to stop (Sept. 21, 2023; Hornik statement)", "url": "https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/ny-attorney-general-sends-cease-and-desist-letter-to-election-impersonators/4700583/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__nbcny-ap-2023-09-21.html"}, {"title": "AP News — New York attorney general sends cease-and-desist letter to group accused of voter intimidation (Sept. 21, 2023)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/new-york-election-voter-fraud-7b9e6d787ba892c2ba827189cd94cf8b"}, {"title": "WGNA — Beware of Election Imposters in Two Upstate New York Counties! (Aug. 31, 2023; Washington and Warren counties warning)", "url": "https://wgna.com/beware-of-election-imposters-in-two-upstate-new-york-counties/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__wgna-2023-08-31.html"}, {"title": "NY Citizens Audit — Official Statement Regarding Cease and Desist Letter from AG (press release, Sept. 25, 2023)", "url": "https://auditny.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/NY-Citizens-Audit-Press-Release-09-25-2023-Atty-Gen.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__nyca-press-release-2023-09-25.pdf"}, {"title": "The Epoch Times — New York AG Accuses Election Watchdog of Voter Deception and Intimidation (Sept. 22, 2023)", "url": "https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/new-york-ag-accuses-election-watchdog-of-voter-deception-and-intimidation-5496934", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__epochtimes-2023-09-22.html"}, {"title": "NY Attorney General — Memorandum of law in support of motion to dismiss, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund v. James, N.D.N.Y. 1:25-cv-1447 (Dec. 23, 2025; quotes the Aug. 2023 Board release and Sept. 2023 meeting)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/15-1-2025-12-23-NYs-memorandum-of-law-in-support-of-motion-to-dismiss.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__ny-mtd-memo-2025-12-23.pdf"}, {"title": "Gab — NC ForGab (@nc4gab), \"Welcome to blink/once\" link hub for New York Citizens Audit / United Sovereign Americans material (first posted May 21, 2023; revised May 26, 2026) — lead source only", "url": "https://gab.com/nc4gab/posts/110409012711518164", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2023-boe-imposters-warning-ag-cease-desist-nyca-canvass-intimidation__gab-nc4gab-hub.json"}], "notes": "nc4gab Gab archive review (2026-10-20). The Gab hub is a lead source only; every fact on this card comes from the official letter, the State's own court filing, or news coverage. The AP page returned a bot check to the box, so it is linked only; the NBC New York copy carries the same AP text. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "jw-v-griswold-co-2023-settlement-inactive-rolls-372k-removed", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-04", "uid": "C20261008-203914-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-04", "old_ids": ["jw-v-griswold-co-2023-settlement-inactive-rolls-372k-removed"], "seq": "C00274", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03", "state": "CO", "description": "Judicial Watch v. Griswold (D. Colo. No. 20-cv-02992) was filed in October 2020 by Judicial Watch and three Colorado residents, later joined by the American Constitution Party and Libertarian Party of Colorado. The amended complaint alleged registration rates above 100% in several counties, few removals of registrants who failed to answer a confirmation notice and skipped two federal elections, and high inactive rates. The case settled on March 30, 2023. Colorado agreed to give Judicial Watch county-level EAVS list-maintenance data (sections A1, A8 and A9e) every year through April 2028, without admitting any NVRA violation. Judicial Watch reported that Colorado's removals under that NVRA provision rose 78% after the suit, from 172,379 in the period ending 2018 to 306,303 in the period ending 2022. It later reported that the state confirmed about 372,000 ineligible registrations removed since 2023. Status Confirmed: the settlement and the removal figures reported under it. Colorado mails a ballot to every active voter, so the backlog the suit targeted is the same mechanism behind citizen reports of ballots arriving for people who moved away years ago (see the Webbe card on this leaf).", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch v. Griswold — NVRA settlement agreement (Mar. 30, 2023, PDF)", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/JW-v-Griswold-Colorado-NVRA-Settlement-02992.pdf"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — Colorado agrees to settle lawsuit over ineligible voters", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/colorado-to-settle-lawsuit-over-ineligible-voters/"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — 372,000 inactive voters removed from Colorado voter rolls after lawsuit and settlement", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/inactive-voters-removed-colorado-voter-rolls/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). No admission of violation. 372k figure is Judicial Watch's report of state data (page 403 to curl; bot block)."}
{"id": "twitter-files-house-weaponization-taibbi-fbi-moderation-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-15", "uid": "C20260926-013447-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-15", "old_ids": ["twitter-files-house-weaponization-taibbi-fbi-moderation-2023"], "seq": "C00874", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Hijacking of social media content-moderation processes"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "In March 2023 Matt Taibbi testified before the House Judiciary Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government about the Twitter Files: contemporaneous FBI and other government contacts with Twitter regarding election-related content moderation, account referrals, and recurring industry meetings before the 2020 and 2022 elections. House hearing records and contemporaneous coverage document the FBI–platform pipeline as a content-moderation pressure channel. Status Confirmed for documented government–platform moderation coordination evidence distinct from Zuckerberg's 2024 Jordan letter and Missouri AG Flaherty docs already on this leaf; Taibbi also stated he did not find an order to suppress the Hunter Biden laptop story specifically.", "sources": [{"title": "Congress.gov — Hearing on the Weaponization of the Federal Government (118th Cong. event text)", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/event/118th-congress/house-event/115442/text", "local": "/archives/2026/09/twitter-files-house-weaponization-taibbi-fbi-moderation-2023__congress-gov-hearing-on-the-weaponization-of-the-federa.png"}, {"title": "The Hill — Twitter Files fuel House GOP probes, censorship claims", "url": "https://thehill.com/policy/technology/3777023-twitter-files-fuel-house-gop-probes-censorship-claims/"}, {"title": "The Hill — 'Weaponization' subcommittee members spar over 'Twitter Files'", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/3892219-weaponization-subcommittee-members-spar-over-twitter-files/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on Intimidation > social media content-moderation hijack leaf."}
{"id": "surry-nc-2023-state-board-removes-members-refused-certify", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-06", "uid": "C20260927-121124-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-06", "old_ids": ["surry-nc-2023-state-board-removes-members-refused-certify"], "seq": "C01253", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03-28", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections unanimously removed Surry County Board of Elections members Jerry Forestieri and Timothy DeHaan (effective immediately, Mar. 28, 2023) after they refused or protested certification of the 2022 general election (and a later special election), including a written statement attacking the legitimacy of NCSBE-directed election law. NCSBE found no outcome-affecting irregularities and held the refusals were impermissible collateral attacks on court/State Board directives; AP and ProPublica covered the removals as one of the strongest disciplinary actions against local non-certifiers. Status Confirmed for state removal of certifying officials who refused/protested certification—exact remove/replace pressure pathway on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — State Board removes 2 Surry County Board of Elections members (Mar 28, 2023)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2023/03/28/state-board-removes-2-surry-county-board-elections-members"}, {"title": "AP — N.C. board removes election officials who refused to certify", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-certification-officials-removed-north-carolina-77bc8b7016277eb090dad38b9b11c687"}, {"title": "ProPublica — Two GOP officials kicked off Surry County election board", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/elections-board-north-carolina-certification-surry"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Remove/replace certifying officials after refusal."}
{"id": "latimes-2023-gascon-recall-dead-people-signatures-thrown-out", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-40", "uid": "C20260926-002008-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-40", "old_ids": ["latimes-2023-gascon-recall-dead-people-signatures-thrown-out"], "seq": "C00673", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall booths are set up, then the signatures are thrown out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03-23", "state": "CA", "description": "LA Times reported hundreds of dead-person signatures found on the failed DA George Gascón recall petition—signatures that failed verification and were discarded in the official check, illustrating recall-petition operations that generate invalid signatures later thrown out. Status Confirmed for invalid/dead-signer petition signatures discarded in verification.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Times — Signatures of dead people found in DA Gascón recall petition", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2023-03-23/signatures-of-hundreds-of-dead-people-were-found-in-d-a-gascon-recall-petition"}, {"title": "CA SOS — Counties report withdrawn recall signatures / verification process (Newsom recall context companion)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2021-news-releases-and-advisories/sw21028", "local": "/archives/2026/09/latimes-2023-gascon-recall-dead-people-signatures-thrown-out__ca-sos-counties-report-withdrawn-recall-signatures-verification-process-newsom-recall-context-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "unicorn-riot-2023-fbi-informant-microchip-mackey-group-injection", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-10", "uid": "C20260926-002008-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-10", "old_ids": ["unicorn-riot-2023-fbi-informant-microchip-mackey-group-injection"], "seq": "C00643", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They insert themselves into existing groups."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03-22", "state": "NY", "description": "In U.S. v. Mackey (EDNY election-interference trial), witness 'Microchip' testified he had been an FBI informant since 2018 while participating in the same online activist networks as the defendant—illustrating informant injection into existing political/activist groups around election-interference allegations. Status Confirmed for informant presence inside the network; does not prove every activist group is infiltrated.", "sources": [{"title": "Unicorn Riot — FBI informant Microchip surfaces in Mackey election-interference trial (2023)", "url": "https://unicornriot.ninja/2023/fbi-informant-microchip-surfaces-in-white-supremacist-election-interference-trial/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unicorn-riot-2023-fbi-informant-microchip-mackey-group-injection__unicorn-riot-fbi-informant-microchip-surfaces-in-mackey-election-interference-trial-2023.png"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG Jan 6 CHS review (broader CHS-in-groups context)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 5 companion. Weaker/advocacy outlet labeled via Unicorn Riot; court testimony itself Confirmed."}
{"id": "new-orleans-la-cantrell-recall-insufficient-2023", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-21", "uid": "C20261001-094909-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-21", "old_ids": ["new-orleans-la-cantrell-recall-insufficient-2023"], "seq": "C01315", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall groups are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03-21", "state": "LA", "description": "Louisiana Gov. John Bel Edwards announced March 21, 2023 that the nolatoya.org-led petition to recall New Orleans Mayor LaToya Cantrell failed after registrar verification: organizers submitted over 67,000 signatures but only 27,243 were certified valid—about 18,000 short of the threshold needed to force a recall election. AP reported signatures were rejected for post-deadline dating, mislabeled title pages, erroneous information, out-of-parish signers, duplicates, and related defects after a Feb. 22, 2023 delivery deadline. Status Confirmed for official insufficiency via invalid/defective signatures after organized circulation; intentional 'set up to fail' motive not claimed. Peer to LA County Gascón 2022, Buena Park 2019, and Ojai Whitman 2023 insufficient-signature cards—New Orleans Cantrell 2023 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: recall machinery that collapses on signature defects drains citizen energy without producing a ballot fight over governance.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Effort to recall New Orleans' first female mayor fails (Mar. 21, 2023)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/new-orleans-mayor-recall-fails-latoya-cantrell-e0d405e7defa27bb2c098c1d840c0997"}, {"title": "NOLA.com — New Orleans mayor recall petition drive fails", "url": "https://www.nola.com/news/politics/new-orleans-mayor-recall-petition-drive-fails/article_b8670414-c7f7-11ed-b28b-cf40cb91edd3.html"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct LA mayor recall insufficiency; not CA remounts."}
{"id": "eac-2023-csse-sheriff-election-official-lockstep-partnership", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-04", "uid": "C20260926-032103-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-04", "old_ids": ["eac-2023-csse-sheriff-election-official-lockstep-partnership"], "seq": "C01184", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County sheriffs"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-03-02", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "U.S. Election Assistance Commission (March 2, 2023) hosted a panel with the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections (CSSE)—cross-partisan election administrators and law enforcement including former Larimer County, CO Sheriff Justin Smith—promoting lock-step sheriff/election-official partnerships under CSSE's five-step plan (meet, share, agree, plan, practice) and framing local elections as critical infrastructure sheriffs must protect in coordination with election partners. Status Confirmed primary EAC/CSSE panel documenting institutionalized sheriff–election-official lockstep security messaging and planning; peer to CISA GCC 2020 sheriffs/trusted-voices and NACo county-role cards already on this leaf—EAC/CSSE 2023 partnership instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: lockstep official messaging that equates questioning machine processes with threats can chill citizen observation of public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. EAC — Election Official Security: A Discussion with the Committee for Safe and Secure Elections (March 2, 2023)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/election-official-security-discussion-committee-safe-and-secure-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-csse-sheriff-election-official-lockstep-partnership__untitled.png"}, {"title": "CSSE — Five Steps to Safer Elections (meet / share / agree / plan / practice companion)", "url": "https://safeelections.org/five-steps-to-protect-our-elections-from-the-committee-for-safe-and-secure-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2023-csse-sheriff-election-official-lockstep-partnership__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Infiltration of Offices County Sheriffs lockstep leaf."}
{"id": "ga-rla-bmd-qr-stark-cannot-detect-misprinted-votes-called-audit", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-25", "uid": "C20260925-214102-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-25", "old_ids": ["ga-rla-bmd-qr-stark-cannot-detect-misprinted-votes-called-audit"], "seq": "C00348", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some states redefine their \"audit\" to cripple it and make it worthless."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-02", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia statutes (O.C.G.A. §21-2-498) brand precertification risk-limiting audits as the state's outcome-verification method, but while BMDs print QR/barcode-bearing ballots that scanners tabulate, RLAs that sample those same BMD printouts cannot detect whether the BMD displayed/printed the voter's intended choices — a point repeatedly made by RLA inventor Philip B. Stark in Curling declarations and Georgia Blue-Ribbon testimony. Calling a tabulation check of untrusted BMD artifacts an 'audit' redefines audit away from voter-intent verification. Status Confirmed for the crippling definitional mismatch (process/expert Confirmed; not a 2020 outcome-fraud finding).", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Stark declaration in Curling (PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1629.16_1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-rla-bmd-qr-stark-cannot-detect-misprinted-votes-called-audit__courtlistener-stark-declaration-in-curling-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — O.C.G.A. §21-2-498 RLA statute", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/georgia/statute/21-2-498/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-rla-bmd-qr-stark-cannot-detect-misprinted-votes-called-audit__election-law-navigator-o-c-g-a-21-2-498-rla-statute.png"}, {"title": "Stark slides — Evidence-Based Elections / BMDs / QR / Georgia Blue-Ribbon", "url": "https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Seminars/auditGABlueRibbon25.slides.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-rla-bmd-qr-stark-cannot-detect-misprinted-votes-called-audit__stark-slides-evidence-based-elections-bmds-qr-georgia-blue-r.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 13. PEP contrast: hand count of hand-marked paper audits voter marks directly."}
{"id": "ngpvan-early-vote-ballot-chase-exclude-already-voted-retarget", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-09", "uid": "C20260926-020046-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-09", "old_ids": ["ngpvan-early-vote-ballot-chase-exclude-already-voted-retarget"], "seq": "C00926", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Together, this turns the election into a feedback control system that bad actors can use to control results with high precision."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-02", "state": "US", "description": "NGP VAN's public campaign-playbook blog explains GOTV **ballot chase** using Early Voting tab filters to target voters who requested/were mailed ballots, then—once ballots are cast—**remove them from contact lists** via a checkbox to remove voters who have already voted, and when setting Virtual Phone Banks to **exclude people who have Early Voted or Absentee Voted**, directing remaining outreach at who has not yet voted. Status Confirmed that dominant campaign software operationalizes early/absentee who-voted data as a feedback loop to retarget remaining voters—peer to PDI early-voting remove-voted workflows and public early-vote file + EPB central-sync architecture cards on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "NGP VAN — How to use voter data to win your race (Early Voting tab / exclude early & absentee voted)", "url": "https://www.ngpvan.com/blog/how-to-use-voter-data-to-win-your-race/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ngpvan-early-vote-ballot-chase-exclude-already-voted-retarget__ngp-van-how-to-use-voter-data-to-win-your-race-early-vo.png"}, {"title": "Bonterra / EveryAction help — Overview: Early voting (VAN early-vote list building; companion product family)", "url": "https://help.bonterratech.com/everyaction/s/article/Overview-Early-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ngpvan-early-vote-ballot-chase-exclude-already-voted-retarget__bonterra-everyaction-help-overview-early-voting-van-ear.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on election-day feedback-control / early-vote retarget architecture leaf."}
{"id": "votebeat-cochise-recorder-stevens-election-authority-partisan-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-22", "uid": "C20260926-001426-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-22", "old_ids": ["votebeat-cochise-recorder-stevens-election-authority-partisan-control"], "seq": "C00615", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Arizona clerk and recorder"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-02-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "Votebeat reporting on Cochise County's transfer of near-full election-administration control to partisan Recorder David Stevens illustrates how AZ's partisan recorder office becomes the partisan battleground for election operations—party-aligned elected recorder consolidating duties others treat as professional/nonpartisan administration. Status Confirmed for partisan-office control pathway; litigation over board vs recorder authority noted as context.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Cochise gives near full control to election-skeptic recorder", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/2/28/23619597/cochise-county-recorder-david-stevens-election-security/"}, {"title": "AZ SOS — Election Laws & Pubs (recorder duties context)", "url": "https://azsos.gov/elections/about-elections/election-laws-pubs", "local": "/archives/2026/09/votebeat-cochise-recorder-stevens-election-authority-partisan-control__az-sos-election-laws-pubs-recorder-duties-context.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "ca-gov-31000-6-sheriff-independent-counsel-vs-county-attorney", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-11", "uid": "C20260926-005107-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-11", "old_ids": ["ca-gov-31000-6-sheriff-independent-counsel-vs-county-attorney"], "seq": "C00804", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "The county attorney's office trains sheriffs, which usurps the people's protection against government officials acting unlawfully."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-02-15", "state": "CA", "description": "California Government Code §31000.6 and related AB 1025 (2023) legislative analyses document that sheriffs may need county-funded independent counsel precisely when county counsel or the district attorney has a conflict involving the sheriff's official duties — i.e., the legal-advice/training channel from the county attorney's office is structurally conflicted when the sheriff must check unlawful government action. That statutory conflict architecture is the leaf's 'usurpation of the People's protection' mechanism. Status Confirmed for codified conflict between sheriff independence and county-attorney legal control; 'cabal' motive Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "California Government Code §31000.6 — sheriff independent counsel on conflict", "url": "https://california.public.law/codes/government_code_section_31000.6", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-gov-31000-6-sheriff-independent-counsel-vs-county-attorney__california-government-code--31000-6---sheriff-independent-counsel-on-conflict.png"}, {"title": "California Legislature — AB 1025 (Dixon) county contract legal counsel analysis context", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240AB1025", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-gov-31000-6-sheriff-independent-counsel-vs-county-attorney__california-legislature---ab-1025--dixon--county-contract-legal-counsel-analysis.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 6. PEP contrast: hand-count observation does not depend on DA-trained sheriff legal theory."}
{"id": "voiceofoc-2023-buena-park-recall-forged-signatures-33-felonies", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-39", "uid": "C20260926-002008-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-39", "old_ids": ["voiceofoc-2023-buena-park-recall-forged-signatures-33-felonies"], "seq": "C00672", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall booths are set up, then the signatures are thrown out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-31", "state": "CA", "description": "Orange County DA charged three Buena Park recall organizers with 33 felony counts after ~700 of 2,106 submitted recall signatures were invalid/forged and circulator affidavits were falsely certified—i.e., a recall petition operation that collected/fabricated signatures that were then invalidated/thrown out in verification. Maps to catalog 'fake recall booths…sigs thrown out' mechanism (paid/organized petition tables leading to discarded invalid sigs). Status Confirmed for forged/false-circulator recall-signature scheme; defendants pleaded not guilty (charges filed).", "sources": [{"title": "Voice of OC — OC's biggest election criminal case in years: 33 felony counts (Buena Park recall)", "url": "https://voiceofoc.org/2023/01/orange-county-sees-its-biggest-election-related-criminal-case-in-years-33-felony-counts/"}, {"title": "Voice of OC — Criminal charging document PDF (22NF2658)", "url": "https://voiceofoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Criminal-charges-court-document-in-Buena-Park-recall-case.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/voiceofoc-2023-buena-park-recall-forged-signatures-33-felonies__voice-of-oc-criminal-charging-document-pdf-22nf2658.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 20. Charges Confirmed; conviction pending as of charging report."}
{"id": "gallup-2023-independent-tied-high-registration-universal", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-30", "uid": "C20260926-003520-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-30", "old_ids": ["gallup-2023-independent-tied-high-registration-universal"], "seq": "C00743", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Independent registrations are more versatile for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup's 2023 annual averages showed independents tied at a record high with Democratic identification at a new low—confirming the multi-year expansion of the unaffiliated identification pool relevant to registration/targeting universality. Status Confirmed for Gallup ID trend (self-ID, not every state's registration category).", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Independent Party ID Tied for High; Democratic ID at New Low", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/548459/independent-party-tied-high-democratic-new-low.aspx"}, {"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (propensity/partisanship models on mixed-affiliation files)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-soft-remount-records-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-39", "uid": "C20260926-000015-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-39", "old_ids": ["ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-soft-remount-records-leaf"], "seq": "C00552", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Push citizens to the point of filing a lawsuit for records, then claim the records cannot be provided because of the pending lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California Government Code §7927.200 expressly provides CPRA need not disclose records pertaining to pending litigation to which the agency is a party until final adjudication/settlement—creating the exact withhold-after-suit pathway the leaf describes. Soft remount of the prior Cat-4 Lawfare card onto this Cat-10 Records pathKey. Status Confirmed for statutory mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "California LegInfo — Gov. Code §7927.200 pending litigation exemption", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7927.200.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-soft-remount-records-leaf__ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-soft-remount-records-leaf.png"}, {"title": "UCOP summary — California Public Records Act litigation exemption", "url": "https://ucop.edu/uc-legal/_files/access-privacy/summary_public-records-act.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 20. Soft remount from Cat 4 Lawfare pending-litigation card."}
{"id": "ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-withhold-after-citizen-sues", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-03", "uid": "C20260925-220029-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-03", "old_ids": ["ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-withhold-after-citizen-sues"], "seq": "C00356", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Push citizens to the point of a lawsuit, then claim the records cannot be released because of the lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California Government Code §7927.200 (CPRA) expressly provides that the Public Records Act does not require disclosure of records pertaining to pending litigation to which the public agency is a party until the litigation is finally adjudicated or settled. Once a citizen is forced to sue to obtain election/administrative records, the agency can invoke the pending-litigation exemption for litigation-related materials—creating the exact 'sue us, then we cannot release because of the lawsuit' gate. Status Confirmed for the statutory mechanism; not Confirmed that every agency uses it in bad faith.", "sources": [{"title": "California LegInfo — Gov. Code §7927.200 pending litigation exemption", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7927.200.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-withhold-after-citizen-sues__california-leginfo-gov-code-7927-200-pending-litigation-exem.png"}, {"title": "UCOP summary — California Public Records Act litigation exemptions (PDF)", "url": "https://ucop.edu/uc-legal/_files/access-privacy/summary_public-records-act.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 2. Confirmed statutory pathway; companion to fill-15g word-games Lawfare cards."}
{"id": "caceo-2023-election-leg-committee-support-letters-sos-aligned-statutes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-07", "uid": "C20260926-030239-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-07", "old_ids": ["caceo-2023-election-leg-committee-support-letters-sos-aligned-statutes"], "seq": "C01127", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Work closely with the secretary of state to pass rules, statutes, and laws that centralize elections under government control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "The California Association of Clerks and Election Officials (CACEO) Election Legislation Committee publishes formal support/sponsor letters on statewide election bills (2023 session examples include AB 1206 ERIC membership, AB 1559 voting-system/ballot-security measures, AB 398 replacement-ballot procedures, AB 1688 federal death-record access, and omnibus AB 1762)—illustrating the county-clerks association working the legislative process alongside SOS-administered statewide frameworks that centralize registration-list, mail-ballot, and equipment rules under state statute rather than purely local elector control. Status Confirmed primary CACEO position-letter record of clerks-association statute advocacy; peer to NACo Evolving Elections and NASS/NASED joint-preparation cards already on this leaf—California CACEO instance, not those national remounts. PEP framing: clerk-association/SOS statute pipelines that centralize machine/mail administration away from transparent local hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "CACEO — Position Papers / 2023 Election Legislation Committee support letters index", "url": "https://caceo.memberclicks.net/position-papers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/caceo-2023-election-leg-committee-support-letters-sos-aligned-statutes__caceo-position-papers-2023-election-legislation-committee-support-letters-index.png"}, {"title": "CACEO — AB 1206 (Pellerin) Support/Sponsor letter (ERIC)", "url": "https://caceo.memberclicks.net/assets/documents/2023ElecLegCmtePositions/CACEO%20AB%201206%20%28Pellerin%29%20SupportSponsor%20-%20Author.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/caceo-2023-election-leg-committee-support-letters-sos-aligned-statutes__caceo-ab-1206-pellerin-support-sponsor-letter-eric.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on County Clerks Association Work closely with SOS leaf."}
{"id": "iie-um-election-forensics-guide-turnout-anomaly-detection-distributed-precincts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-12", "uid": "C20260926-030706-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-12", "old_ids": ["iie-um-election-forensics-guide-turnout-anomaly-detection-distributed-precincts"], "seq": "C01147", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Distribution", "Do not choose records in the same precinct; distribute them across precincts where there is room. Stay under 100% voter participation so the injections do not stand out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "The University of Michigan / IIE 'Guide to Elections Forensics' documents statistical methods for detecting anomalous precinct-level turnout and vote-share patterns—including turnout outliers relative to registration denominators and within-jurisdiction clustering—explicitly as tools to flag when recorded participation looks unnatural across distributed precincts (the inverse of 'stay under 100% / don't concentrate in one precinct' tradecraft). Status Confirmed primary academic forensics methodology for distributed-precinct turnout anomalies; peer to EAC ballot-reconciliation and Klimek precinct-turnout clustering cards already on this leaf—UM/IIE forensics guide, not those remounted. PEP framing: distributed low-and-slow injections designed to evade >100% turnout flags are exactly what precinct-level hand-count reconciliation would catch.", "sources": [{"title": "IIE / University of Michigan — A Guide to Elections Forensics", "url": "https://www.iie.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/UM-Election-Forensics-Guide-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/iie-um-election-forensics-guide-turnout-anomaly-detection-distributed-precincts__iie-um-guide-to-elections-forensics-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Kansas LPA — Reviewing Ford County's Ballot Reconciliation Process During the 2024 General Election (reconciliation vs turnout anomalies)", "url": "https://www.kslpa.gov/audit-report-library/reviewing-ford-countys-ballot-reconciliation-process-during-the-2024-general-election/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Feedback Loop Record distribution stay-under-100%/distributed-precincts leaf."}
{"id": "mn-stat-201-014-twenty-day-residency-requirement-state-hopping-window", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-13", "uid": "C20260926-031135-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-13", "old_ids": ["mn-stat-201-014-twenty-day-residency-requirement-state-hopping-window"], "seq": "C01163", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "As little as 22 days of state residency (allowing state-hopping to cover staggered elections)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota Statutes §201.014 Subdivision 1 requires an individual to 'maintain residence in Minnesota for 20 days immediately preceding the election' to be eligible to vote—another short durational-residency window (peer to Colorado's 22-day rule) that can be satisfied while hopping among staggered early-voting calendars. Status Confirmed primary Minnesota statutory 20-day residency requirement; peer to Colorado CRS §1-2-101 22-day and CO SOS know-your-rights cards already on this leaf—Minnesota 20-day statute instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: short multi-state residency windows that fit inside early-voting calendars expand state-hopping surface without same-day public hand-count friction.", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota Statutes §201.014 — Eligibility to vote (20 days residence immediately preceding election)", "url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/201.014", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-stat-201-014-twenty-day-residency-requirement-state-hopping-window__mn-stat-201-014-eligibility-vote-20-day-residency.png"}, {"title": "Minnesota Statutes §200.031 — Residence; determination (intent-to-return residence definition)", "url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/cite/200.031", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-stat-201-014-twenty-day-residency-requirement-state-hopping-window__mn-stat-200-031-residence-intent-return.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Registration 22-day / short residency state-hopping leaf."}
{"id": "unicorn-riot-2023-chs-provide-help-gain-confidence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-13", "uid": "C20260926-004030-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-13", "old_ids": ["unicorn-riot-2023-chs-provide-help-gain-confidence"], "seq": "C00766", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They may provide some real help to gain people's confidence."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Unicorn Riot's reporting on FBI informant 'Microchip' in the Douglass Mackey election-interference trial documents an informant who provided technical help and group participation while reporting to the Bureau—exactly 'provide some help to gain people's confidence' before/while collecting. Soft remount of fill-20i Unicorn Riot CHS card onto this pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented help-to-gain-confidence infiltrator pattern in that case.", "sources": [{"title": "Unicorn Riot — FBI informant Microchip in white-supremacist election-interference trial (2023)", "url": "https://unicornriot.ninja/2023/fbi-informant-microchip-surfaces-in-white-supremacist-election-interference-trial/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unicorn-riot-2023-chs-provide-help-gain-confidence__unicorn-riot-fbi-informant-microchip-in-white-supremacist-el.png"}, {"title": "DOJ OIG — FBI CHS handling report companion", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/news/doj-oig-releases-report-fbis-handling-its-confidential-human-sources-and-intelligence"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 7. Soft remount of Unicorn Riot CHS family."}
{"id": "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-04", "uid": "C20261026-180010-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-04", "old_ids": ["wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election"], "seq": "C01569", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2023 to 2026 (WEC page and Badger Book manual rev. 10/2023)", "state": "WI", "description": "The Wisconsin Elections Commission's Badger Book page states that \"Badger Books are not connected to the internet\" and \"cannot access the statewide voter registration system,\" described as \"indirect WisVote integration.\" [1] Badger Books form a local wireless or wired network among the devices at a site. [1] The poll list is loaded from WisVote before Election Day, and after Election Day \"a data file generated from the Badger Book is used to upload election participation and Election Day Registration information into WisVote.\" [1] The Badger Book manual (rev. 10/2023, as posted by the Village of Whitefish Bay) says the post-election file is uploaded to WisVote, that Election Day Registration addresses are reviewed, and that the same file must not be uploaded twice. [2] Status Confirmed that, in Wisconsin, a Badger Book holds a snapshot of WisVote, that a voter's participation and any Election Day registration entered on it reach WisVote only after the post-election upload, and that most municipalities use printed poll lists instead. No source says the gap was exploited.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission, Badger Books", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/elections/badger-books"}, {"title": "Badger Book Manual rev. 10/2023, Village of Whitefish Bay", "url": "https://www.wfbvillage.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2043/Badger-Book-Manual-rev-102023-v11-3"}], "notes": "The Wisconsin Elections Commission page may refuse automated requests (HTTP 403); its text was confirmed on Oct. 26, 2026.", "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after", "mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live", "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "wi-madison-2024-pollbooks-printed-early-manual-highlight-absentee-returned"]}
{"id": "aapor-explaining-exit-polls-absentee-share-rise-requires-phone-supplements", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-12", "uid": "C20260925-220029-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-12", "old_ids": ["aapor-explaining-exit-polls-absentee-share-rise-requires-phone-supplements"], "seq": "C00365", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail-in ballots severely cripple exit polling, which is key for those who would manipulate elections because it destroys an additional verification component."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "AAPOR's Explaining Exit Polls brief notes the share of votes cast before Election Day rose from ~16% (2000) to ~42% (2016) and higher thereafter, requiring telephone supplements of absentee/early voters because classic precinct exits miss mail ballots entirely. Status Confirmed that mail/absentee expansion structurally weakens precinct-exit verification coverage.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — Explaining Exit Polls (508 PDF)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Explaining-Exit-Polls-508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "az-ag-2022-yuma-ballot-harvest-drop-collection-scatter-pathway", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-37", "uid": "C20260926-002008-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-37", "old_ids": ["az-ag-2022-yuma-ballot-harvest-drop-collection-scatter-pathway"], "seq": "C00670", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Scatter them in drop boxes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona AG prosecution of Guillermina Fuentes and co-defendants for illegal ballot collection in Yuma County (2020 primary)—defendants sentenced after guilty pleas—documents illicit gathering and return of others' ballots into the voting stream, which in all-mail/drop-box jurisdictions is the scatter-into-drop-boxes injection pathway. Soft companion to existing CA GOP unofficial drop-box and AZ harvest cards. Status Confirmed for illegal ballot-collection/injection; volume was small relative to county totals.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona AG — Yuma County women sentenced for ballot harvesting scheme", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/press-release/yuma-county-women-sentenced-their-roles-ballot-harvesting-scheme", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ag-2022-yuma-ballot-harvest-drop-collection-scatter-pathway__arizona-ag-yuma-county-women-sentenced-for-ballot-harvesting-scheme.png"}, {"title": "AP — Arizona woman admits guilt in ballot collection scheme", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/arizona-government-and-politics-conspiracy-election-2020-presidential-elections-4a22fd2a2b4851a62fff4f7bd8a1be50"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 19. Soft companion to existing harvest/drop-box cards. PEP: chain-of-custody problems are machine/centralized/mail problems; precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is software-independent."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-550-signature-verification-cure-period-gatekeeper", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-20", "uid": "C20260925-214102-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-20", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-550-signature-verification-cure-period-gatekeeper"], "seq": "C00343", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Serves as the gatekeeper against fraudulent ballots entering the system"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "AZ", "description": "A.R.S. §16-550 requires election officials to compare the signature on a returned early ballot affidavit with voter-registration signatures and provides a cure period (through the fifth business day after the election) for mismatched/missing signatures — codifying signature review as the statutory on/off gate for counting the ballot. Status Confirmed for Arizona's signature-gatekeeper + cure architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "A.R.S. §16-550 — Receipt of voter's ballot; cure period", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00550.htm"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Ballot curing rules by state 2022", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_curing_rules_by_state,_2022"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "brennan-vox-2022-sos-races-election-administration-control-narrative", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-16", "uid": "C20260926-000015-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-16", "old_ids": ["brennan-vox-2022-sos-races-election-administration-control-narrative"], "seq": "C00529", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Democratic Association of Secretaries of State (DASS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Brennan Center / Vox coverage of 2022 SOS races framed them as contests over who administers 2024 elections—confirming both major parties treat SOS offices as partisan prizes controlling certification, rules, and equipment guidance. Status Confirmed for partisanization of SOS contests; DASS is the Democratic institutional vehicle named by the leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Election Denial on the Ballot in the Midterms", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/election-denial-ballot-midterms", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-vox-2022-sos-races-election-administration-control-narrative__brennan-vox-2022-sos-races-election-administration-control-narrative.png"}, {"title": "Vox — How Democratic SOS candidates beat election deniers", "url": "https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/23465033/democrats-secretary-of-state-strategy-election-deniers"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "co-broomfield-canvass-board-party-alternate-clerk-fill-practice", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-16", "uid": "C20260926-002008-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-16", "old_ids": ["co-broomfield-canvass-board-party-alternate-clerk-fill-practice"], "seq": "C00649", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to \"forget\" to notify (Republican) party chairs to appoint canvass board members, so the clerks can appoint them on the party's behalf."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "CO", "description": "Local Colorado canvass-board guidance (e.g., Broomfield materials) operationalizes party-provided alternates and clerk fill procedures when party appointments are incomplete—showing day-to-day practice where clerk offices step into appointment roles when party chairs do not timely supply members. Status Confirmed for clerk-fill practice around party-appointment gaps.", "sources": [{"title": "City/County of Broomfield — Canvass board / election process documentation", "url": "https://www.broomfield.org/DocumentCenter/View/48462"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — CO §1-10-101 canvass board appointment", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/colorado/statute/1-10-101/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-broomfield-canvass-board-party-alternate-clerk-fill-practice__election-law-navigator-co-1-10-101-canvass-board-appointment.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "democrats-abroad-nixie-usps-return-to-sender-overseas-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-11", "uid": "C20260925-212129-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-11", "old_ids": ["democrats-abroad-nixie-usps-return-to-sender-overseas-ballots"], "seq": "C00308", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Postal carriers are instructed not to deliver ballots addressed to people who do not live there, so the ballots can be rerouted without revealing multiple registrations at the address."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "Democrats Abroad voting guidance documents USPS NIXIE / return-to-sender outcomes for overseas and mismatched-address election mail — ballots marked undeliverable rather than delivered when addressing/name issues prevent delivery — illustrating the operational path where carriers do not complete delivery to an address lacking the named resident. Status Confirmed for documented NIXIE/UAA return experience on ballot mail.", "sources": [{"title": "Democrats Abroad — USPS return-to-sender (NIXIE label) voting issues", "url": "https://www.democratsabroad.org/voting_issues_for_postal_mail_voters_abroad_us_postal_service_return_to_sender_nixie_label"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "fec-mur7946-ctcl-grants-no-contribution-finding-context", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-30", "uid": "C20260926-001426-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-30", "old_ids": ["fec-mur7946-ctcl-grants-no-contribution-finding-context"], "seq": "C00623", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "They target vulnerable parts of our communities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC MUR 7946 materials address complaints about CTCL private grants to election offices; Commission analysis found insufficient basis that the grants were prohibited contributions—while leaving intact the public record that grant-funded jurisdictions pursued expanded registration/outreach including to targeted communities. Soft companion clarifying legal status. Status Confirmed for FEC disposition context.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC MUR 7946 documents", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/7946/7946_26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-mur7946-ctcl-grants-no-contribution-finding-context__fec-mur-7946-documents.pdf"}, {"title": "CTCL 2020 COVID grant program page", "url": "https://www.techandciviclife.org/our-work/election-officials/grants/2020grants/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "knowink-pollpad-pa-approval-requires-encrypted-closed-network", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-16", "uid": "C20260925-212129-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-16", "old_ids": ["knowink-pollpad-pa-approval-requires-encrypted-closed-network"], "seq": "C00313", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "They can be abused wirelessly from the parking lot, by wire inside the polling place, or over the cellular network or internet from anywhere in the world."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania's Electronic Poll Book Approval Report for KnowInk Poll Pad 3.1.0 documents that the approved configuration requires encrypted, closed, non-public polling-place networking for synchronization — official recognition that EPBs are network-connected devices whose wireless/local network posture is a regulated attack surface (not purely air-gapped paper poll books). Status Confirmed for certified networked EPB architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "PA DOS — Electronic Poll Book Approval Report KnowInk 3.1.0 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/programs/voting-and-elections/poll-books/Electronic-Poll-Book-Approval-Report-Knowink-3.1.0-Finalv1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-pollpad-pa-approval-requires-encrypted-closed-network__pa-dos-electronic-poll-book-approval-report-knowink-3-1-0-pd.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 8 companion.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"], "related": ["pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling"]}
{"id": "naco-evolving-elections-state-legislation-impacts-county-role", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-19", "uid": "C20260926-001426-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-19", "old_ids": ["naco-evolving-elections-state-legislation-impacts-county-role"], "seq": "C00612", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Work closely with the secretary of state to pass rules, statutes, and laws that centralize elections under government control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "National Association of Counties (NACo) 'Evolving Elections' analysis documents post-2020 state legislation that shifts election-administration authority among counties, legislatures, and state executive election officials (including SOS offices)—i.e., statutory centralization/reallocation of county election roles. County clerk associations routinely lobby and coordinate with SOS offices on such bills and rules. Status Confirmed for the centralization/coordination trend; partisan motive Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "NACo — Evolving Elections: How State Legislation Will Impact the County Role", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/evolving-elections-how-state-legislation-will-impact-county-role-election-administration", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-evolving-elections-state-legislation-impacts-county-role__naco-evolving-elections-how-state-legislation-will-impact-the-county-role.png"}, {"title": "NASS — Pillars of Public Service / SOS election-administration role materials", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/Pillars%202024/1%20Pillars%20-%20Introduction.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-evolving-elections-state-legislation-impacts-county-role__nass-pillars-of-public-service-sos-election-administration-role-materials.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 10."}
{"id": "nature-scientific-data-2022-precinct-results-collection-gaps-transparency", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-38", "uid": "C20260926-000809-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-38", "old_ids": ["nature-scientific-data-2022-precinct-results-collection-gaps-transparency"], "seq": "C00591", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no public place where all totals are posted transparently."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "Nature Scientific Data (2022) describes assembling U.S. precinct-level results precisely because states do not uniformly publish machine-readable, complete precinct totals in one transparent venue—researchers and journalists face collection gaps. Status Confirmed for the transparency posting gap.", "sources": [{"title": "Nature Scientific Data — American election results at the precinct level", "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-022-01745-0", "local": "/archives/2026/09/openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized__openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized.png"}, {"title": "OpenElections — About", "url": "https://openelections.net/about/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized__openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized--u53d4b81c.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "nist-rla-card-level-comparison-needs-stable-ballot-cvr-mapping", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-23", "uid": "C20260925-212129-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-23", "old_ids": ["nist-rla-card-level-comparison-needs-stable-ballot-cvr-mapping"], "seq": "C00320", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some recount procedures break the ballot order within batches."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST/academic risk-limiting audit guidance stresses that ballot-level comparison RLAs require a trustworthy, fixed ballot-to-CVR mapping or manifest; if recounts, rescans, or handling shuffle ballots so order no longer matches CVR sequence, comparison audits are degraded and may escalate to full hand recounts. Status Confirmed that breaking ballot order within batches is recognized as harming order-dependent audits.", "sources": [{"title": "arXiv 2207.01362 — Non(c)esuch Card-Level Comparison Risk-Limiting Audits", "url": "https://ar5iv.labs.arxiv.org/html/2207.01362", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-rla-card-level-comparison-needs-stable-ballot-cvr-mapping__arxiv-2207-01362-non-c-esuch-card-level-comparison-risk-limi.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Risk-Limiting Audits overview", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/risk-limiting-audits"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 14."}
{"id": "scan-shuffle-rescan-ballot-order-destroyed-for-audit-privacy", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-21", "uid": "C20260925-212129-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-21", "old_ids": ["scan-shuffle-rescan-ballot-order-destroyed-for-audit-privacy"], "seq": "C00318", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Randomize ballot order within batches, destroying the scan-order record and hiding manipulation patterns (Montgomery County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "Peer-reviewed 'Scan, Shuffle, Rescan' election-audit literature (ePrint/FC) explicitly uses physical ballot shuffling between scans so that scanner order / time-series cast order is destroyed while still enabling comparison audits via hidden labels — documenting that destroying scan-order time series is a real, published ballot-handling practice in the audit community. Status Confirmed for intentional ballot-order randomization destroying time-series scan recording (framed as audit/privacy technique; catalog 'manipulating evidence' motive not asserted).", "sources": [{"title": "ePrint 2022/960 — Scan, Shuffle, Rescan: Machine-Assisted Election Audits", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/960", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scan-shuffle-rescan-ballot-order-destroyed-for-audit-privacy__eprint-2022-960-scan-shuffle-rescan-machine-assisted-electio.png"}, {"title": "FC'24 preprint — Scan, Shuffle, Rescan two-prover audits (PDF)", "url": "https://fc24.ifca.ai/preproceedings/188.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 13. Montgomery TX seed on stub path remains Alleged/unverified; this mounts Confirmed shuffle practice on the exact Detail leaf."}
{"id": "scan-shuffle-rescan-explicitly-permutes-batches-before-rescan", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-24", "uid": "C20260925-212129-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-24", "old_ids": ["scan-shuffle-rescan-explicitly-permutes-batches-before-rescan"], "seq": "C00321", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some recount procedures break the ballot order within batches."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Scan–Shuffle–Rescan audit method deliberately permutes/shuffles ballots between an initial scan and a rescan — i.e., a published recount/audit procedure that breaks within-batch order by design, then relies on labels rather than original order. Status Confirmed example of an audit/recount-style procedure that breaks ballot order within batches.", "sources": [{"title": "ePrint 2022/960 PDF — Scan, Shuffle, Rescan", "url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2022/960.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scan-shuffle-rescan-explicitly-permutes-batches-before-rescan__eprint-2022-960-pdf-scan-shuffle-rescan.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-550-01-evaluator-lay-signature-verification-not-fde", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-04", "uid": "C20260926-015040-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-04", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-550-01-evaluator-lay-signature-verification-not-fde"], "seq": "C00892", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Many citizen verifiers are not trained at all."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-2026", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona ARS §16-550.01 codifies early-ballot signature verification by an 'evaluator'—an individual designated by the county recorder/officer in charge of elections—who manually compares affidavit signatures to the registration record using broad then local characteristics, without requiring ABFDE/ASQDE forensic-document-examiner certification. The statute expressly states it is not intended to require an exact match. Votebeat/Maricopa reporting contemporaneously notes county workers receive hours-scale training and are not handwriting experts performing forensic examinations. Status Confirmed for a statutory architecture in which lay designated evaluators—not certified FDEs—perform the mail-ballot signature gate—peer to Nevada's non-ABFDE 'forensic signature class' framing and MIT EPI worker-comparison practice; not a fraud adjudication.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Legislature — ARS §16-550.01 Signature verification; procedures; evaluator definition", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00550-01.htm"}, {"title": "Votebeat Arizona — Mail ballot signature verification; workers aren't handwriting experts (2024)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2024/10/16/maricopa-county-signature-verification-process-flaws-disenfranchisement/"}, {"title": "NCSL — Signature Verification & Ballot Curing Strategies Workshop (training materials PDF)", "url": "https://documents.ncsl.org/wwwncsl/Summit/2023/Session-Resources/Sig-Ver-Training.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ars-16-550-01-evaluator-lay-signature-verification-not-fde__ncsl-signature-verification-ballot-curing-strategies-wo.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Many citizens are not trained at all (lay evaluators)."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-625-cvr-ballot-images-not-public-records-appeals-upheld", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-11", "uid": "C20260926-020046-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-11", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-625-cvr-ballot-images-not-public-records-appeals-upheld"], "seq": "C00928", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Intellectual property: they claim the database backups contain intellectual property."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Court of Appeals and related coverage affirm denials of public-records requests for cast vote records (CVRs) / related election electronic records under **A.R.S. §16-625**, which restricts public inspection of certain ballot/tabulation electronic records—functionally blocking citizen access to the same class of election-database outputs vendors and counties also shield via trade-secret/IP claims elsewhere. Status Confirmed that Arizona law itself withholds CVR/ballot-image style election database products from ordinary public-records production—peer to Dominion Santa Clara CPRA trade-secret litigation and Colorado C.R.S. §1-7-510 election-setup-records-not-public; not a ruling that every EMS backup is IP.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Court of Appeals — Audit USA v. Maricopa County (CVR / election records denial)", "url": "https://www.azapp.com/wp-content/uploads/1-CA-CV-22-0254-AUDIT-USA-v.-MARICOPA-COUNTY-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ars-16-625-cvr-ballot-images-not-public-records-appeals-upheld__arizona-court-of-appeals-audit-usa-v-maricopa-county-cv.pdf"}, {"title": "Snell & Wilmer — Arizona Court of Appeals affirms denial of public records request for cast vote records", "url": "https://www.swlaw.com/publication/arizona-court-of-appeals-affirms-denial-of-public-records-request-for-cast-vote-records/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on IP/statutory barriers denying election database / CVR access leaf."}
{"id": "in-apra-voting-system-security-exemption-5-14-3-4", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-10", "uid": "C20260925-184601-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-10", "old_ids": ["in-apra-voting-system-security-exemption-5-14-3-4"], "seq": "C00128", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Critical infrastructure: they claim the backups contain information that would compromise the security of critical-infrastructure election systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-2024", "state": "IN", "description": "Indiana's Access to Public Records Act (IC 5-14-3-4) exempts categories of records whose disclosure would have a reasonable likelihood of threatening public safety or revealing computer/voting-system security details, and related case law (e.g., Sullivan v. National Election Defense Coalition) addresses how agencies assert security exemptions over election-technology records. Status Confirmed that Indiana law provides security/CI-style exemptions used to withhold voting-system technical records; requesters must still overcome conclusory affidavits.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Indiana Code § 5-14-3-4 (exemptions)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/indiana/title-5/article-14/chapter-3/section-5-14-3-4/"}, {"title": "FindLaw — Sullivan v. National Election Defense Coalition (Ind. Ct. App. 2022)", "url": "https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/in-court-of-appeals/2159142.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 4. Another state security-exemption pathway for election DB/tech records."}
{"id": "nass-fort-orange-press-2023-external-print-mail-partner-coc-breach", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-08", "uid": "C20260926-015536-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-08", "old_ids": ["nass-fort-orange-press-2023-external-print-mail-partner-coc-breach"], "seq": "C00911", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-2023", "state": "National", "description": "NASS-hosted Fort Orange Press January 2023 white paper 'Chain of Custody: How to Ensure it is Not Broken When Using External Partner(s)' documents that mail-ballot print/mail vendors sit inside the custody path and that a 2022 general-election diversion—contracted partner shipping ballots via a third-party to an out-of-state facility that did not handle them as Election Mail—broke chain of custody, mixed ballots with regular mail, and delayed delivery. The paper urges RFPs to hard-require CoC protocols, IMb tracking, and single-source control, citing EAC Chain of Custody Best Practices. Status Confirmed that industry/NASS materials treat multi-step mail-ballot vendor handoffs as a documented CoC vulnerability surface—peer to EAC CoC Best Practices and CISA mail-in infrastructure risk assessment.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — Fort Orange Press Chain of Custody white paper (Jan 2023 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/Fort-Orange-Press-White-Paper-NASS-Winter23.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-fort-orange-press-2023-external-print-mail-partner-coc-breach__nass-fort-orange-press-chain-of-custody-white-paper-jan.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Chain of Custody Best Practices (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-fort-orange-press-2023-external-print-mail-partner-coc-breach__eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "MIT Election Lab — Vote By Mail: Best Practices and New Areas for Research (PDF)", "url": "https://electionlab.mit.edu/sites/default/files/2023-10/vote-by-mail.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-fort-orange-press-2023-external-print-mail-partner-coc-breach__mit-election-lab-vote-by-mail-best-practices-and-new-ar.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on mail-ballot multi-step CoC vulnerability leaf.", "vendor": ["Fort Orange Press"]}
{"id": "usps-oig-22-187-r23-2022-election-mail-marketing-mail-23m-forgone-revenue", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-10", "uid": "C20260926-015536-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-10", "old_ids": ["usps-oig-22-187-r23-2022-election-mail-marketing-mail-23m-forgone-revenue"], "seq": "C00913", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Mail ballots are big business for the USPS, a self-funded independent federal agency that relies on private contractors to transport mail and run contract postal units."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-2023", "state": "National", "description": "USPS OIG Report 22-187-R23 (Mar 27, 2023) finds the Postal Service processed over 103 million identifiable outbound ballots in the 2022 cycle—about 87% entered as cheaper Marketing Mail—while authorizing Marketing Mail ballots to be advanced/processed as First-Class Mail. OIG estimates the Service could have earned roughly an additional **$23 million** in revenue if those pieces had paid First-Class rates (~25¢/piece gap), and recommends analyzing Election Mail costs and exploring compensation / a dedicated ballot-mail product. Status Confirmed that official OIG framing treats Election Mail volume and Marketing-vs-First-Class pricing as a material USPS revenue/cost business—peer to OIG 24-143-R25 2024 revenue findings and Postal Bulletin Election Mail business guides.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS OIG — 22-187-R23 Service Performance of Election Mail for the 2022 Mid-Term Elections (PDF)", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-03/22-187-r23.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-22-187-r23-2022-election-mail-marketing-mail-23m-forgone-revenue__usps-oig-22-187-r23-service-performance-of-election-mai.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS OIG report landing — Service Performance of Election Mail 2022 Mid-Term", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/reports/audit-reports/service-performance-election-mail-2022-mid-term-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-22-187-r23-2022-election-mail-marketing-mail-23m-forgone-revenue__usps-oig-report-landing-service-performance-of-election.png"}, {"title": "USPS OIG — 24-143-R25 2024 Election Mail service/revenue companion", "url": "https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2025-04/24-143-r25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-oig-22-187-r23-2022-election-mail-marketing-mail-23m-forgone-revenue__usps-oig-24-143-r25-2024-election-mail-service-revenue.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on USPS Election Mail as big business leaf."}
{"id": "az-lake-v-hobbs-defendants-sought-attorney-fee-sanctions-costs-2022-23", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-05", "uid": "C20260925-220029-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-05", "old_ids": ["az-lake-v-hobbs-defendants-sought-attorney-fee-sanctions-costs-2022-23"], "seq": "C00358", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Harass and countersue plaintiffs, and file motions to reconsider, to drain our finances."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12", "state": "AZ", "description": "In Lake v. Hobbs (Maricopa County election contest), defendants (including Secretary Hobbs / Recorder Fontes) moved for attorney-fee sanctions and costs against the plaintiff election contestant; the trial court awarded Hobbs taxable costs/inspection expenses (~$28k) while denying broader fee sanctions, and the Arizona Supreme Court separately sanctioned Lake's attorneys $2,000 for repeated false statements while denying broader fee requests. Status Confirmed that fee/sanctions/cost motions against election-contest plaintiffs are used and can impose real financial pressure—process Confirmed; whether every such motion is 'harassment' is advocacy framing.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa Clerk — Defendants' Motion for Attorney Sanctions / judgment materials", "url": "https://www.clerkofcourt.maricopa.gov/home/showpublisheddocument/5213"}, {"title": "AZ Courts — ASC Decision Order Lake (May 4, 2023) sanctions/reconsideration", "url": "https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/21/ASC-CV230046%20-%205-4-2023%20-%20FILED%20-%20DECISION%20ORDER.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-lake-v-hobbs-defendants-sought-attorney-fee-sanctions-costs-2022-23__az-courts-asc-decision-order-lake-may-4-2023-sanctions-recon.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 3. Confirmed fee/sanctions/cost pressure on election contestants; leave motive overclaim."}
{"id": "congress-2022-hr2617-consolidated-appropriations-act-2023-omnibus", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-15", "uid": "C20260926-022920-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-15", "old_ids": ["congress-2022-hr2617-consolidated-appropriations-act-2023-omnibus"], "seq": "C01060", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They inundate legislators with so many lengthy bills that no one has a chance to read them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-29", "state": "Federal", "description": "H.R. 2617, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (Pub. L. 117-328, enacted Dec. 29, 2022), was a year-end omnibus appropriations package combining multiple funding titles into a single massive enrolled bill that members had minimal time to read before votes—continuing the pattern of inundating legislators with multi-thousand-page must-pass vehicles. Congress.gov hosts the enrolled text; contemporary policy analyses described the package as a 4,000-plus-page omnibus. Status Confirmed enacted omnibus mega-bill; peer to Dec. 2020 5,593-page omnibus and Minnesota 2019 NPV-buried elections omnibus on this leaf—FY2023 Consolidated Appropriations Act, not those remounted. PEP framing: unread omnibus vehicles can bury election-administration riders beyond meaningful legislator scrutiny.", "sources": [{"title": "Congress.gov — H.R.2617 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 (117th Congress) text", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/2617/text", "local": "/archives/2026/09/congress-2022-hr2617-consolidated-appropriations-act-2023-omnibus__congress-gov-h-r-2617-consolidated-appropriations-act-2023-117th-congress-text.png"}, {"title": "GovInfo — BILLS-117hr2617enr (enrolled bill PDF)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-117hr2617enr/pdf/BILLS-117hr2617enr.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/congress-2022-hr2617-consolidated-appropriations-act-2023-omnibus__govinfo-bills-117hr2617enr-enrolled-bill-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on inundate-legislators-with-lengthy-bills leaf."}
{"id": "az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-02", "uid": "C20260925-233150-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-02", "old_ids": ["az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing"], "seq": "C00395", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Move cases to jury trials to increase the cost of pursuing them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-27", "state": "AZ", "description": "In Kari Lake v. Katie Hobbs (Maricopa Superior Court CV2022-095403), after an expedited evidentiary election-contest hearing the court awarded taxable costs under A.R.S. §12-332 including about $5,900 and $22,451 in expert-witness fees plus ballot-inspection designee compensation totaling roughly $33,040 against the contestant—illustrating how contest litigation (even as a bench evidentiary hearing rather than a civil jury trial) induces substantial added cost to pursue. Status Confirmed for court-ordered cost shifting after contest proceedings. Soft companion to fill-20a fee/sanctions cards; this mounts the jury-trials/cost leaf with documented contest-cost escalation (Arizona contests are typically bench; Georgia §21-2-526 is the explicit jury-demand statute).", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket PDF — Lake v. Hobbs minute entry awarding taxable costs (Dec 2022)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/CV2022095403-12272022-Min-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing__az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing__democracy-docket-pdf-lake-v-hobbs-minute-entry-awarding-taxable-costs-dec-2022.pdf"}, {"title": "JURIST — Arizona judge awards governor-elect court fees over failed election lawsuit", "url": "https://www.jurist.org/news/2022/12/arizona-judge-awards-governor-elect-court-fees-over-former-opponents-failed-election-lawsuit/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing__az-lake-v-hobbs-2022-taxable-costs-expert-witness-fees-after-contest-hearing__jurist-arizona-judge-awards-governor-elect-court-fees-over-failed-election-lawsu.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 1 companion. Contest-cost escalation Confirmed; AZ path is bench-hearing costs paired with GA jury-demand statute."}
{"id": "az-lake-v-hobbs-contest-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-65", "uid": "C20260925-155410-65", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-65", "old_ids": ["az-lake-v-hobbs-contest-2022"], "seq": "C00065", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Election Contests"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-24", "state": "AZ", "description": "After the 2022 Arizona gubernatorial race, Kari Lake filed a statutory election contest under A.R.S. § 16-672 alleging intentional misconduct tied to Maricopa ballot-on-demand printer/tabulator failures and chain-of-custody issues. On December 24, 2022, Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Peter Thompson ruled after evidentiary hearing that Lake failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence intentional outcome-changing misconduct on either remaining count and confirmed Katie Hobbs as governor-elect. Later appellate/signature-verification proceedings continued separately; fraud claims remain Alleged and were rejected on the tried counts. Status Confirmed for the contest process and adverse merits ruling on printer/custody claims.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa Superior Court — Lake v. Hobbs under-advisement ruling (Democracy Docket PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/UA-Ruling-Lake-vs.-Hobbs.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-lake-v-hobbs-contest-2022__maricopa-superior-court-lake-v-hobbs-under-advisement-ruling.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — Lake loses suit over Arizona governor's race", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-katie-hobbs-2a1ef57c4902c8460eaee8ec0bc394d6"}, {"title": "Arizona Court of Appeals Div. 1 opinion materials (2023)", "url": "https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2023/1%20CA-CV%2022-0779%20and%201%20CA-SA%2022-0237.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-lake-v-hobbs-contest-2022__arizona-court-of-appeals-div-1-opinion-materials-2023.pdf"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Election Contest. Process Confirmed; underlying fraud claims Alleged/rejected on tried counts."}
{"id": "eac-vstl-program-manual-2-16-4-fee-for-service-manufacturer-pays", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-03", "uid": "C20261014-123054-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-03", "old_ids": ["eac-vstl-program-manual-2-16-4-fee-for-service-manufacturer-pays"], "seq": "C01383", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Vendors pay the \"testing\" labs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-21 (Pro V&V VVSG 2.0 accreditation; manual fee rule ongoing)", "state": "US", "description": "The EAC Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual (Version 3.0) section 2.16.4 \"Fee for Service\" states that all fees paid by a manufacturer to a VSTL must be solely for services rendered, that labs must reject payment not directly linked to completing system testing, and that payment may not be conditioned on the testing outcome—language that expressly contemplates manufacturers paying the labs that test their systems. On Dec. 21, 2022, EAC Commissioners unanimously accredited Pro V&V as the second VSTL able to test to VVSG 2.0 (after SLI Compliance on Nov. 15, 2022), leaving two accredited labs for manufacturers to engage. Status Confirmed for the written fee-for-service manufacturer-pay structure and the two-lab accreditation announcement (EAC primary sources). Catalog note: calling a product \"certified\" after the vendor hired and paid one of two private labs is not the same as independent public testing. Paper ballots counted in public do not depend on that payment relationship.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual Version 3.0 (PDF; §2.16.4 Fee for Service)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/VSTL%20Program%20Manual%20Version%203.0%20(3).pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Commissioners accredit Pro V&V as second VSTL for VVSG 2.0 (Dec. 23, 2022)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/news/2022/12/23/eac-commissioners-accredit-second-voting-system-test-laboratory-test-voting-systems"}, {"title": "EAC — Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTL) directory (Pro V&V / SLI Compliance)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voting-system-test-laboratories-vstl"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Thickens eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs with explicit Manual §2.16.4 + 2022 dual-lab accreditation. Not InfluenceWatch/FairVote."}
{"id": "politifact-ap-2022-georgia-runoff-walker-totals-human-error-no-guarantee", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-13", "uid": "C20260926-033715-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-13", "old_ids": ["politifact-ap-2022-georgia-runoff-walker-totals-human-error-no-guarantee"], "seq": "C01238", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-06", "state": "GA", "description": "PolitiFact (Dec. 9, 2022), citing AP spokesperson Lauren Easton, documented that human error caused The Associated Press to briefly publish incorrect, overstated Herschel Walker vote totals during Georgia's Dec. 2022 U.S. Senate runoff—visible on Georgia Public Broadcasting feeds as ~20,000-vote swings within minutes—showing the public has no guarantee that shown election-night state/fed aggregates equal accurate official counts. Status Confirmed primary PolitiFact/AP admission of human-error overstated unofficial totals; peer to CISA ENR unofficial-results and NIST ENR use-case cards already on this leaf—AP Georgia-runoff feed-error instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: fluctuating machine-fed night totals that later correct are exactly why PEP insists on observable public hand counts of paper rather than trusting shown aggregates.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Human error caused brief misreporting of Georgia U.S. Senate runoff results (Dec. 9, 2022)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2022/dec/09/viral-image/human-error-caused-brief-misreporting-georgia-us-s/"}, {"title": "AP — statement context via PolitiFact (Lauren Easton / overstated Walker numbers)", "url": "https://api.politifact.com/factchecks/2022/dec/09/viral-image/human-error-caused-brief-misreporting-georgia-us-s/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Reporting no-guarantee-shown-totals leaf (non-CISA/NIST remount)."}
{"id": "cochise-az-mandamus-force-county-certify-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-15", "uid": "C20260925-194013-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-15", "old_ids": ["cochise-az-mandamus-force-county-certify-2022"], "seq": "C00199", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "After Cochise County, Arizona supervisors delayed/refused to canvass 2022 general-election results amid fraud concerns, Arizona Superior Court issued a writ of mandamus ordering the board to convene and certify that day; the board complied, enabling statewide certification. AP, PBS, and Arizona Mirror coverage and the written judgment document court-compelled certification over local objections. Status Confirmed that courts forced certification on the statutory timeline despite unresolved local challenges.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Rural Arizona county certifies after judge's order", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-phoenix-government-and-politics-938a920c848d28ca23435a6d2cb61f98", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022__ap-arizona-county-certifies-election-after-judge-s-order.png"}, {"title": "Arizona Mirror — Cochise certifies after ordered by judge", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2022/12/01/cochise-county-certifies-election-results-after-ordered-to-by-a-judge/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cochise-az-mandamus-force-county-certify-2022__arizona-mirror-cochise-certifies-after-ordered-by-judge.png"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Cochise final judgment / mandamus (Jan 26, 2023 PDF host)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/2023.01.26-Final-Judgment.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cochise-az-mandamus-force-county-certify-2022__democracy-docket-cochise-final-judgment-mandamus-jan-26-2023.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 6. Mandamus-compelled county certification Confirmed."}
{"id": "fec-2022-final-rule-internet-public-communication-disclaimers-influencer-gap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-13", "uid": "C20260926-023334-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-13", "old_ids": ["fec-2022-final-rule-internet-public-communication-disclaimers-influencer-gap"], "seq": "C01073", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Incentivize people to become influencers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-12-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "On Dec. 1, 2022 the FEC approved a final rule (effective March 1, 2023) revising \"public communication\" to cover communications placed for a fee on another person's website, digital device, application, or advertising platform and specifying internet disclaimer rules—while leaving unpaid/organic influencer posts on a creator's own account outside that paid-placement disclaimer trigger. Axios contemporaneous coverage noted the Commission signaling it would not broadly regulate political social-media influencers' organic posts. Status Confirmed federal regulation + contemporaneous reporting of the organic-influencer disclosure gap; peer to CNN paid-influencer FEC gap and FTC-outside-political-ads cards already on this leaf—FEC internet public-communication rule, not CNN remounted. PEP framing: paid creator incentives plus weak organic-post disclosure amplify narrative control around election \"security\" messaging.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Commission adopts final rule on internet communications disclaimers (Dec. 19, 2022 Record)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/commission-adopts-final-rule-internet-communications-disclaimers-and-definition-public-communication/"}, {"title": "Axios — FEC signals it will not regulate political social media influencers (Dec. 8, 2023)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/pro/tech-policy/2023/12/08/fec-signals-it-will-not-regulate-political-social-media-influencers"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on incentivize-influencers leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-2022-supply-chain-risks-election-infrastructure-hardware-firmware", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-08", "uid": "C20260926-021547-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-08", "old_ids": ["cisa-2022-supply-chain-risks-election-infrastructure-hardware-firmware"], "seq": "C00971", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No supply-chain control or chain of custody"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "US", "description": "CISA / Election Infrastructure Subsector Coordinating Council Supply Chain Risks to Election Infrastructure (2022) warns that voting hardware, firmware, software, and services ride complex global supply chains vulnerable to counterfeiting, sabotage, and third-party firmware insertion, and urges jurisdictions to inventory every touchpoint, inspect authenticity artifacts, and continuously verify firmware/software integrity—implicitly acknowledging controllable end-to-end CoC is not the default. Status Confirmed federal supply-chain risk guidance; peer to Halderman ICX supply-chain path and EAC trusted-build origin-of-CoC notes—CISA supply-chain brief, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Supply Chain Risks to Election Infrastructure (Nov 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/supply-chain-risks-to-election-infrastructure_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2022-supply-chain-risks-election-infrastructure-hardware-firmware__cisa-supply-chain-risks-to-election-infrastructure-nov-2022-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA ICS Advisory — ICSA-22-154-01 Dominion ImageCast X supply-chain / firmware context", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2022-supply-chain-risks-election-infrastructure-hardware-firmware__cisa-ics-advisory-icsa-22-154-01-dominion-imagecast-x-supply-chain-firmware-co.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on No supply-chain control leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "erie-pa-dropbox-30day-overwrite-breaks-continuous-surveillance-claim", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-13", "uid": "C20260925-205354-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-13", "old_ids": ["erie-pa-dropbox-30day-overwrite-breaks-continuous-surveillance-claim"], "seq": "C00228", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "They claim drop boxes have 100% surveillance when they do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "PA", "description": "Erie County's ~30-day automatic overwrite of drop-box surveillance video meant that continuous-election-window footage was not retained for later audit or public inspection — contradicting any implication of durable 100% surveillance coverage across an election cycle. Status Confirmed for retention failure defeating continuous recorded surveillance.", "sources": [{"title": "GoErie — Drop-box video overwritten; contempt request denied", "url": "https://www.goerie.com/story/news/politics/courts/2025/03/18/judge-clears-erie-county-pennslyvania-elections-officials-contempt-request/82416545007/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 6."}
{"id": "erie-pa-dropbox-surveillance-video-overwritten-previte-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-10", "uid": "C20260925-205354-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-10", "old_ids": ["erie-pa-dropbox-surveillance-video-overwritten-previte-2022"], "seq": "C00225", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "PA", "description": "In Previte v. Erie County Board of Elections litigation and related Open Records proceedings, Erie County's drop-box / elections-office surveillance system was shown to overwrite footage on roughly a 30-day cycle. By the time preservation was ordered/attempted for the 2022 general-election window, much of the requested drop-box video had already been overwritten and was unavailable. A later contempt request failed because a judge found officials did not act in bad faith. Status Confirmed that public/requester access to drop-box surveillance was effectively denied by short retention/overwrite — regardless of fault finding.", "sources": [{"title": "GoErie — Judge: Erie elections board not in bad faith after drop-box video overwritten", "url": "https://www.goerie.com/story/news/politics/courts/2025/03/18/judge-clears-erie-county-pennslyvania-elections-officials-contempt-request/82416545007/"}, {"title": "PA Commonwealth Court — Previte v. Erie County BOE (order context)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024-07-31-Previte-v.-Erie-County-BOE-Order.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/erie-pa-dropbox-surveillance-video-overwritten-previte-2022__pa-commonwealth-court-previte-v-erie-county-boe-order-contex.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 5. Overwrite = no public footage access Confirmed."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-100lb-20inch-paper-printer-faint-fuse-failures", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-20", "uid": "C20260925-212129-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-20", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-100lb-20inch-paper-printer-faint-fuse-failures"], "seq": "C00317", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Print the ballot image lighter than normal so citizens do not notice but tabulators cannot scan it, causing ballots to be segregated and providing an excuse to \"re-create\" them (this happened in Arizona)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa 2022 used 100-pound, 20-inch ballot stock that investigators later found contributed to intermittent Oki printer fusing failures — toner/timing marks too light or flaking — so tabulators could not read ballots voters had marked, forcing Door #3 segregation and later central duplication. Status Confirmed companion on the lighter-print leaf tying paper/printer interaction to light/unreadable images (intentional fraud not upheld).", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Why Maricopa County's ballot printers failed on Election Day", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2022/12/8/23500457/maricopa-county-ballot-printer-tabulator-voting-problems-phoenix/"}, {"title": "AP — Paper changes caused Maricopa County printer failure", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maricopa-county-ballot-printers-mcgregor-kari-lake-9edeef525b8afacb767a4960bf951ea1"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 12 companion (swap from Sacramento thickness). Remounted oki-faint card is primary on this leaf."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-ballot-image-fit-to-page-shrunk-timing-marks", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-27", "uid": "C20260925-211320-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-27", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-ballot-image-fit-to-page-shrunk-timing-marks"], "seq": "C00296", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Print the ballot image slightly shrunk so citizens do not notice but tabulators cannot scan it, causing ballots to be segregated and providing an excuse to \"re-create\" them (this happened in Arizona)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County officials acknowledged in Kari Lake's 2022 election contest that some Election Day ballots were printed with a shrunk/'fit-to-page' ballot image that misaligned timing marks so on-site tabulators rejected them; affected ballots were diverted (Door #3) and later duplicated by bipartisan boards or scanned on central equipment. County witnesses called it unintentional technician/settings error; Lake alleged malice (court did not uphold outcome-changing fraud). Status Confirmed for the shrunk-image printing event and segregation/duplication path; intentional fraud claim remains Alleged/not upheld.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Arizona court considers small-sized ballot mishap (Maricopa 2022)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2022/12/23/23524557/arizona-kari-lake-governor-election-small-ballots/"}, {"title": "ABC15 — Investigation completed in Maricopa County 2022 election ballot errors", "url": "https://www.abc15.com/news/state/investigation-completed-in-maricopa-county-2022-election-ballot-errors"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 15. Catalog leaf literally cites AZ; Confirmed event + duplication path; not Confirmed intentional."}
{"id": "mohave-az-2022-canvass-delay-political-protest", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-16", "uid": "C20260926-012939-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-16", "old_ids": ["mohave-az-2022-canvass-delay-political-protest"], "seq": "C00855", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "In November 2022 Mohave County (AZ) supervisors delayed approving the county canvass as an explicit political protest over Maricopa County voting problems, then approved the canvass by the statutory deadline (AP/AZPM contemporaneous coverage). Status Confirmed for a sibling Arizona canvass delay/protest peer to Cochise County's harder refusal—shows canvass timing used as political leverage even when the delaying county did not claim its own results were wrong.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — 2nd Arizona county delays certifying election, for now (Mohave)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-phoenix-83aa473b9c0549c87d1c2125ddcfb655"}, {"title": "AZPM — Mohave officials approve canvass, while complaining", "url": "https://news.azpm.org/p/azelections/2022/11/28/213939-mohave-officials-approve-canvass-while-complaining/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 second peer on Canvassing leaf."}
{"id": "shasta-ca-2022-47-ballot-styles-handcount", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-02", "uid": "C20260925-181533-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-02", "old_ids": ["shasta-ca-2022-47-ballot-styles-handcount"], "seq": "C00074", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Consolidating many smaller elections into fewer, larger ones makes ballots more complex, which is used to argue that hand counting is too difficult."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11", "state": "CA", "description": "Confirmed: Verified Voting reports that Shasta County, CA's Nov. 2022 general election had about 111,628 registered voters, 42 contests / 114 candidates, and 47 ballot styles driven by district, party, and language differences. The consolidated, complex ballot produced many styles; officials and machine-advocacy materials often treat that complexity as a reason machines are \"required.\" This is a ballot-design, consolidation, and machine-dependency issue. Mark teaches a properly-run hand count through PEP (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep) as the transparent remedy; this card does not claim PEP was used in Shasta. Status Confirmed for the published style/contest counts; intentional tactic motive not established.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Hand Counted Paper Ballots (Shasta 2022 figures; numeric figures only)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/hand-counted-paper-ballots/"}], "notes": "Use Verified Voting only for the numeric figures. Reframed away from hand-count difficulty: consolidation → style explosion → dependency on opaque machine tabulation. Mark's PEP (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep) is the transparent solution frame; no claim PEP was used in Shasta. Intentional tactic motive not established."}
{"id": "mi-prop2-2022-art-ii-7-canvass-ministerial-nondiscretionary", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-01", "uid": "C20260926-020640-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-01", "old_ids": ["mi-prop2-2022-art-ii-7-canvass-ministerial-nondiscretionary"], "seq": "C00934", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11/2022-12", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan Proposal 2 (2022) amended Const. 1963, Art. II, §7 so that canvassing/certification is the **ministerial, clerical, nondiscretionary duty** of each board of canvassers and each member—certifying **solely** from certified county statements of votes (or precinct/AVCB returns and corrections), with certification final subject only to post-certification recount or court order. Status Confirmed that statute/constitution forces automatic certify-from-returns procedure rather than evidence-based discretion; peer to Brennan multi-state ministerial framing and Cochise mandamus, not a claim any specific MI race was fraudulent.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Constitution Art. II §7 (as amended by Proposal 2, 2022) — ministerial/nondiscretionary canvass duty", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/mcl/pdf/mcl-Constitution-II.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-prop2-2022-art-ii-7-canvass-ministerial-nondiscretionary__michigan-constitution-art-ii-7-as-amended-by-proposal-2.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Senate Fiscal Agency — Proposal 22-2 analysis (canvass boards certify solely from official vote records)", "url": "https://sfa.senate.michigan.gov/Publications/BallotProps/Proposal22-2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-prop2-2022-art-ii-7-canvass-ministerial-nondiscretionary__michigan-senate-fiscal-agency-proposal-22-2-analysis-ca.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on automatic/ministerial certification leaf."}
{"id": "ap-2022-cochise-county-refusal-certify-court-order-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-17", "uid": "C20260926-001426-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-17", "old_ids": ["ap-2022-cochise-county-refusal-certify-court-order-pressure"], "seq": "C00610", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "After the 2022 midterms, Cochise County supervisors refused to certify by the statutory deadline; Arizona officials and parties sued, and a judge ordered certification—illustrating legal/institutional pressure on canvass/board members who decline to certify. Later criminal charges against supervisors added personal-liability pressure. Status Confirmed for court/official pressure pathway against non-certifiers; 'clerks association instructed intimidation' specific cabal claim not required for leaf mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — GOP-controlled Arizona county refuses to certify election", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/arizona-deadline-2022-midterms-certification-d6a1ea4020c26313a3124931c14b79fb", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2022-cochise-county-refusal-certify-court-order-pressure__ap-gop-controlled-arizona-county-refuses-to-certify-election.png"}, {"title": "AZ Mirror — Cochise certifies after judge orders", "url": "https://azmirror.com/2022/12/01/cochise-county-certifies-election-results-after-ordered-to-by-a-judge/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2022-cochise-county-refusal-certify-court-order-pressure__az-mirror-cochise-certifies-after-judge-orders.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 9."}
{"id": "az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-64", "uid": "C20260925-155410-64", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-64", "old_ids": ["az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022"], "seq": "C00064", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "Cochise County Supervisors Tom Crosby and Peggy Judd twice refused to canvass/certify the county's 2022 general-election results by Arizona's statutory deadline, citing machine-certification claims county/state elections lawyers advised were not a lawful basis to withhold a ministerial canvass. After the Secretary of State sued, a judge ordered the board to canvass; the board then certified (Crosby absent). In November 2023 a state grand jury indicted Crosby and Judd on felony conspiracy and interference-with-an-election-officer charges for allegedly conspiring to delay the canvass. Status Confirmed for the refused/delayed canvass, court-ordered certification, and indictment; ultimate criminal adjudication may evolve.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Two Cochise County supervisors indicted for refusing to certify", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/11/29/arizona-cochise-county-supervisors-indicted-refusing-certify-2022-election/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Court orders Cochise County to canvass", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/court-orders-cochise-county-arizona-to-canvass-election-results/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022__democracy-docket-court-orders-cochise-county-to-canvass.png"}, {"title": "AP — Arizona county certifies election after judge's order", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-phoenix-government-and-politics-938a920c848d28ca23435a6d2cb61f98", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022__ap-arizona-county-certifies-election-after-judge-s-order.png"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Canvassing."}
{"id": "gilroy-ca-armendariz-recall-insufficient-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-22", "uid": "C20261001-094909-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-22", "old_ids": ["gilroy-ca-armendariz-recall-insufficient-2022"], "seq": "C01316", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall groups are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "CA", "description": "Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters on Nov. 28, 2022 certified the Committee to Recall Rebeca Armendariz petition insufficient: proponents turned in 6,375 signatures (raw count above the 6,217 minimum), but a random sample of 500 found only 383 valid (including ~60 not registered and 26 address mismatches), projecting 4,744 valid—below the 90% threshold under Elections Code §11225(d), so the petition never reached a costly special election. Status Confirmed primary ROV certification of insufficiency via invalid signatures after organized circulation; intentional sabotage motive not claimed. Peer to Gascón/Buena Park/Ojai/Cantrell cards—Gilroy Armendariz 2022 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: recall drives that fail on signature quality consume months of civic energy while leaving machine-adjacent local power structures untouched.", "sources": [{"title": "Gilroy Dispatch — County finds Armendariz recall petition is 'insufficient' (Nov. 28, 2022)", "url": "https://gilroydispatch.com/county-finds-armendariz-recall-petition-insufficient/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Distinct Gilroy ROV insufficiency; not Gascón remount."}
{"id": "luzerne-pa-2022-election-board-certification-deadlock", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-15", "uid": "C20260926-012939-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-15", "old_ids": ["luzerne-pa-2022-election-board-certification-deadlock"], "seq": "C00854", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "PA", "description": "Luzerne County (PA) Board of Elections deadlocked 2–2 on November 28, 2022 and initially failed to certify the November 8 midterm results amid fallout from Election Day ballot-paper shortages; the board certified 3–2 on November 30 after further questioning. AP and CNN contemporaneous coverage document the delay-then-certify sequence. Status Confirmed for a peer canvass/certification refusal-or-deadlock episode to Cochise County's 2022 refusal—operational/political dispute, not proof of flipped totals.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Pennsylvania county deadlocks on certifying election results (Luzerne)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-pennsylvania-wilkes-barre-25c8d5efcaf52fd91a23be5e317a5559"}, {"title": "CNN — Pennsylvania county certifies midterm election results, ending Luzerne impasse", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/politics/pennsylvania-luzerne-county-certifies-midterm-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-2022-election-board-certification-deadlock__cnn-pennsylvania-county-certifies-midterm-election-resu.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to az-cochise-canvass-refusal-2022."}
{"id": "mohave-az-2022-gould-angius-certify-under-duress-felony-threat", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-03", "uid": "C20260927-121124-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-03", "old_ids": ["mohave-az-2022-gould-angius-certify-under-duress-felony-threat"], "seq": "C01250", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Nov. 28, 2022 the Mohave County (AZ) Board of Supervisors unanimously canvassed/certified 2022 general results after SOS elections director Kori Lorick warned that failure to perform the ministerial canvass duty could bring legal action and criminal referral under A.R.S. §16-1010 (class 6 felony for knowingly refusing election duties). Board chair Ron Gould stated on the record he had \"no choice but to vote Aye or I will be arrested and charged with a felony\" and voted \"under duress\"; Supervisor Hildy Angius likewise voted \"under duress\" citing Maricopa County chaos while expressing confidence in Mohave's own canvass. AZPM and Just the News contemporaneous coverage plus county counsel confirmation of the §16-1010 citation document the compulsion. Status Confirmed for felony-threat-backed certification and public \"under duress\" votes; underlying statewide fraud claims Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "AZPM — Mohave officials approve canvass while complaining; Gould/Angius 'under duress'", "url": "https://news.azpm.org/p/azelections/2022/11/28/213939-mohave-officials-approve-canvass-while-complaining/"}, {"title": "Just the News — AZ supervisors say they voted to certify 'under duress' (Gould/Angius)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/arizona-county-board-supervisor-says-he-voted-certify-election-under-duress-video"}, {"title": "Just the News — Hobbs office threatened Mohave board with felony referral (Lorick/§16-1010)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/arizona-gov-elect-hobbs-threatened-county-board-certify-her-election-or"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Soft remount of Mohave canvass family onto exact Forcing-certification pathKey with under-duress quotes."}
{"id": "mohave-az-2022-sos-lorick-ars-16-1010-felony-referral-intimidate", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-04", "uid": "C20260927-121124-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-04", "old_ids": ["mohave-az-2022-sos-lorick-ars-16-1010-felony-referral-intimidate"], "seq": "C01251", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona SOS State Elections Director Kori Lorick emailed Mohave County supervisors on the Nov. 28, 2022 canvass deadline that refusing the ministerial canvass would trigger legal action, fees/sanctions, and referral of individual supervisors for criminal enforcement under A.R.S. §16-1010. Mohave County Attorney Matt Smith confirmed to reporters that the SOS cited §16-1010 as a prosecution statute. Soft companion on the intimidate-canvassers leaf. Status Confirmed for documented felony-referral threat used to compel canvassers who were reluctant to certify.", "sources": [{"title": "Just the News — Hobbs office threatened Mohave board: certify or face felony rap", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/arizona-gov-elect-hobbs-threatened-county-board-certify-her-election-or"}, {"title": "AZPM — Mohave canvass under duress after state-law pressure", "url": "https://news.azpm.org/p/azelections/2022/11/28/213939-mohave-officials-approve-canvass-while-complaining/"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Intimidate leaf — SOS felony-referral pathway."}
{"id": "oh-belmont-2022-absentee-plus-provisional-caught-referred", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-14", "uid": "C20261009-105430-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-14", "old_ids": ["oh-belmont-2022-absentee-plus-provisional-caught-referred"], "seq": "C01347", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-28", "state": "OH", "description": "Before certifying the Nov. 8, 2022 midterm, the Belmont County Board of Elections found two voters whose absentee ballots had been accepted and who also voted provisionally on Election Day. The provisionals were not counted, and the cases went to the prosecutor. Director Aaron Moore said absentee requesters who have not returned their ballot routinely vote provisionally, 'and that's fine.' Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "Times Leader — Pair of double votes caught in Belmont County (Nov. 2022)", "url": "https://www.timesleaderonline.com/news/local-news/2022/11/pair-of-double-votes-caught-in-belmont-county/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view (cross-check worked)."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2022-two-site-voters-provisional-review-109-of-122", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-15", "uid": "C20261009-105430-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-15", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2022-two-site-voters-provisional-review-109-of-122"], "seq": "C01348", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-27", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's Nov. 27, 2022 response to the AG's office says 206 voters checked in at one vote center and then voted at a second. 84 were properly checked out of the SiteBook and got a regular ballot at the second site. The other 122 were not checked out and got provisional ballots; after review, 109 were counted and 13 were not. The county also says vote-center tabulators are set to reject early (mail) ballots as a double-voting control. Arizona rule: an early-ballot voter who does not surrender the early ballot votes provisionally (A.R.S. §16-584). Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Response to AG office re 2022 General Election administration (Nov. 27, 2022, PDF)", "url": "https://cdn.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/1-Maricopa-County-Response-11-27-2022.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view (cross-check worked)."}
{"id": "harris-county-tx-2022-two-page-ballot-jams-spoiled-sos-audit", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-02", "uid": "C20261009-124707-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-02", "old_ids": ["harris-county-tx-2022-two-page-ballot-jams-spoiled-sos-audit"], "seq": "C01354", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "TX", "description": "The Texas Secretary of State's preliminary audit of Harris County's November 8, 2022 general election (released Oct. 19, 2023) found that many polling locations experienced frequent paper jams tied to the county's two-page ballot design. Those jams produced a high volume of spoiled ballots—Harris County paperwork showed 12,833 spoiled ballots—and drove extra ballot-paper use that worsened Election Day supply shortfalls. The SOS concluded Harris should have adjusted Election Day paper allocations based on early-voting jam/spoilage rates and that ballot-paper distribution also failed Election Code requirements. Status Confirmed for official SOS findings that ballot paper form factor (two-page stock) interacted with scanners/printers to jam, spoil, and reroute voters into reprint cycles. Catalog leaf: paper/scanner routing that pulls ballots out of ordinary on-site scanning into spoiled/reprint paths; intentional fraud not alleged by the SOS. Centralized machine scanning that depends on perfect paper feed is the failure mode PEP hand counting at the precinct avoids.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Harris County November 2022 election audit preliminary findings report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fad/harris-county-preliminary-findings-report.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — news release: Secretary Nelson releases Harris County audit preliminary findings (Oct. 19, 2023)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2023/101923.shtml"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Texas secretary of state releases Harris County 2022 election audit (Oct. 19, 2023)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2023/10/19/harris-county-election-2022-audit/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Thickens 1-card Paper thickness / scanner routing leaf; distinct from harris-county-tx-ballot-paper-2022 (Deprive voting centers of ballot paper leaf). Sacramento thickness anecdotes remain a standing skip."}
{"id": "pa-luzerne-2022-11-08-100-pound-ballot-paper-thicker-than-dominion-spec-jams-polling-sites", "permanent_id": "C20261113-122945-02", "uid": "C20261113-122945-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-122945-02", "old_ids": ["pa-luzerne-2022-11-08-100-pound-ballot-paper-thicker-than-dominion-spec-jams-polling-sites"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Use ballot paper of different thicknesses for different areas or voters", "Paper too thick for ballot-marking devices (BMDs) and tabulators may jam, creating another way to segregate those ballots. This may have happened in Arizona."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08 (general election)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 8, 2022, a shortage of ballot paper halted voting at 35 of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania's 186 polling sites, and a judge ordered polls kept open two extra hours. In an email to county council that morning, County Manager Randy Robertson wrote that in addition to the shortage, the thickness of the paper being used in the machines was causing paper jams at some locations. Robertson told reporters the elections bureau was using 100-pound paper, whereas state election officials and voting machine vendor Dominion Voting Systems had determined the bureau should use 80-pound paper: 'We have reams of paper. It's just the paper we have isn't what the company wants us to use.' Acting Election Director Beth Gilbert McBride said the 100-pound stock had been left over from previous elections. Status Confirmed: the county manager's own statements to council and reporters acknowledge that out-of-spec, thicker paper was jamming the machines on Election Day (Wilkes-Barre Citizens' Voice). The existing Luzerne 2022 paper-shortage card covers the shortage itself; this card covers the paper-thickness failure. Catalog point: paper that the vendor's machines cannot reliably feed turns ordinary voters' ballots into exceptions handled away from the normal count; a precinct hand count does not depend on paper weight.", "sources": [{"title": "Wilkes-Barre Citizens' Voice — Paper shortage causes voting delays; polls stayed open late (Nov. 8, 2022)", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2022/11/08/paper-shortage-causes-voting-delays-polls-stayed-open-late-county-council-to-discuss-election-issues-wednesday/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/citizensvoice-luzerne-2022-paper-shortage-100lb-jams.html"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Why Maricopa County's ballot printers failed on Election Day (Dec. 8, 2022; same-cycle 100-pound paper failure in Arizona, for context)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2022/12/8/23500457/maricopa-county-ballot-printer-tabulator-voting-problems-phoenix/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/votebeat-maricopa-2022-printers-100lb.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-13 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-13 12:29 PM ET). Citizens' Voice archived (curl 200). Vendor tag Dominion/Liberty Vote because the source names Dominion Voting Systems. Maricopa 2022 100-pound paper is carded separately on other leaves; Votebeat included as context only. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "nj-mercer-2022-11-08-dominion-ballot-coding-error-scanners-reject-ballots-all-232-districts", "permanent_id": "C20261118-122125-01", "uid": "C20261118-122125-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-122125-01", "old_ids": ["nj-mercer-2022-11-08-dominion-ballot-coding-error-scanners-reject-ballots-all-232-districts"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08 (general election); 2022-11-21/23 (prosecutor's findings reported)", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 8, 2022, the Dominion scanners in each of Mercer County, New Jersey's 232 voting districts would not accept the hand-marked paper ballots. County Clerk Paula Sollami Covello confirmed that the coding marks printed on the ballots, which tell the scanners which contests are on the ballot, were not accepted by the Dominion scanners. Voters were told to put their ballots in the scanners' emergency slots, and the county's bipartisan election commission later scanned all of the in-person Election Day ballots at the Board of Elections, delaying results. Ballot bags from three Princeton districts and some Robbinsville districts could not be found the next day; officials said they were later located at the board and counted (Planet Princeton). Covello said the scanners had been tested with the paper ballots before Election Day and called for a criminal investigation. Dominion blamed a 'printing issue' and said its tabulators 'functioned exactly as they should by rejecting incorrectly printed ballots'; the printer, Royal Printing (paid $301,200), said there was 'nothing wrong with the printing.' Prosecutor Angelo Onofri reported to the county commissioners that there was no criminal intent or vote tampering and that a Dominion employee who programmed the machines had made a 'human error' (New Jersey 101.5, Nov. 23, 2022). The New Jersey Republican State Committee asked the Attorney General for a further investigation. Status Confirmed: the county clerk and the county prosecutor acknowledged the county-wide scanner rejection and attributed it to a vendor programming error. Catalog point: one programming error by a vendor employee stopped every precinct scanner in a county, despite pre-election testing, and moved all Election Day ballots out of the polling places to central scanning; precinct hand counts by citizens do not depend on a vendor's ballot coding.", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey 101.5 — Investigation into Mercer County, NJ voting issues finds 'human error' (Rick Rickman, Nov. 23, 2022)", "url": "https://nj1015.com/investigation-into-mercer-county-nj-voting-issues-finds-human-error/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/nj1015-mercer-nj-2022-11-23-dominion-programming-human-error.html"}, {"title": "Planet Princeton — Coding error on ballots appears to have caused scanning issue on election day in Mercer County (Krystal Knapp, Nov. 10, 2022)", "url": "https://planetprinceton.com/2022/11/10/coding-error-on-ballots-appears-to-have-caused-scanning-issue-on-election-day-in-mercer-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/planetprinceton-mercer-nj-2022-11-10-ballot-coding-error-scanners.html"}, {"title": "NJ.com — Election Day mess in Mercer County over ballots traced to coding issues; investigation continues (Nov. 2022)", "url": "https://www.nj.com/politics/2022/11/election-day-mess-in-mercer-county-over-ballots-traced-to-coding-issues-investigation-continues.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-18 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-18 12:21 PM ET). NJ 101.5 and Planet Princeton read via WebFetch and archived (curl 200); NJ.com linked only (seen in search results). Vendor tag Dominion because the sources name Dominion scanners and a Dominion programmer. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Dominion"]}
{"id": "nbc-2022-100-plus-election-jurisdictions-waiting-cisa-risk-vulnerability-assessments", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-08", "uid": "C20260926-024539-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-08", "old_ids": ["nbc-2022-100-plus-election-jurisdictions-waiting-cisa-risk-vulnerability-assessments"], "seq": "C01098", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Impact assessments"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "NBC News (Nov. 2, 2022) reported more than 100 state/local election jurisdictions that requested CISA risk-and-vulnerability assessments and penetration tests remained on a waitlist ahead of the midterms—staffing/contractor bandwidth issues (Idaho National Labs exit) delaying the intensive impact/vulnerability assessments officials sought, while CISA pointed to lighter cyber-hygiene scans already delivered to 425 election-related entities. Status Confirmed backlog that delayed cybersecurity impact assessments for election systems; peer to CISA 2020 mail-in risk-assessment and GA SB3ex impact/feasibility-plan cards already on this leaf—2022 waitlist reporting, not those remounted. PEP framing: assessment queues that postpone hardening leave machine-dependent systems opaque longer than public hand counts would.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — More than 100 election jurisdictions waiting on federal cyber help (Nov. 2, 2022)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/100-election-jurisdictions-waiting-federal-cyber-help-sources-say-rcna55115"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk Assessment (resource)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-election-infrastructure-cyber-risk-assessment_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Delay Impact assessments leaf."}
{"id": "az-2022-12-05-sos-hobbs-certifies-statewide-canvass-of-own-governor-race-declined-recusal", "permanent_id": "C20261120-122513-01", "uid": "C20261120-122513-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261120-122513-01", "old_ids": ["az-2022-12-05-sos-hobbs-certifies-statewide-canvass-of-own-governor-race-declined-recusal"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Seat an election official with a conflict of interest on the canvassing or recount board."], "leaf_id": "L20261109-123201-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261109-123201-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-11 (recusal demands refused); 2022-12-05 (statewide canvass certified)", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Secretary of State Katie Hobbs, the state's chief election officer, was the Democratic nominee for governor in the Nov. 8, 2022 general election. During the campaign, Republican nominee Kari Lake repeatedly called on Hobbs to recuse herself from overseeing an election in which she was on the ballot; Hobbs declined, saying state law did not require it, that she would do the job required by her office, and that she had no conflict of interest because former secretaries of state had certified their own wins and her office does not count the votes (ABC News; PolitiFact). On Dec. 5, 2022, Hobbs, by then governor-elect, presided over the official statewide canvass ceremony and signed the certification of the election results, including her own race, with Gov. Doug Ducey, Attorney General Mark Brnovich and Chief Justice Robert Brutinel present. PolitiFact reported that it is typical for Arizona secretaries of state, attorneys general and governors to approve their own elections, and that Democrats had made a similar recusal demand of Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp in 2018. In 2023 the Arizona Legislature considered HB 2308, which would bar a secretary of state from personally performing election operations in an election in which the secretary is a candidate, while still exempting the constitutional duty to certify the statewide canvass (Arizona Senate fact sheet). Status Confirmed: Hobbs's candidacy, her refusal to recuse and her signing of the canvass that certified her own race are documented by ABC News and PolitiFact. Doing so was lawful, and no court found that it changed any count. Catalog point: the official who certified the statewide result was a candidate in the race being certified, and Arizona law left recusal to her. When precinct hand-count results are posted publicly at each polling place, voters can check the totals no matter who signs the final certificate.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC News — Arizona election results certified, Kari Lake expected to challenge (Dec. 5, 2022)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/arizona-election-results-certified-kari-lake-expected-challenge/story?id=94493986", "local": "/archives/2026/11/abcnews-az-2022-12-05-hobbs-presides-certification-own-race.html"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — Hobbs certifying Arizona's election was typical, not 'unconstitutional' (Dec. 9, 2022)", "url": "https://politifact.com/factchecks/2022/dec/09/viral-image/hobbs-certifying-arizonas-election-was-typical-not/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/politifact-az-2022-12-09-hobbs-certifying-own-election.html"}, {"title": "Arizona State Senate — HB 2308 fact sheet: secretary of state; recusal (56th Legislature, 1st Regular Session, 2023)", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/legtext/56leg/1R/summary/S.2308ELEC_ASPASSEDCOW.DOCX.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/11/azleg-hb2308-2023-sos-recusal-fact-sheet.html"}, {"title": "USA Today / Arizona Republic — Why Katie Hobbs won't recuse herself from overseeing Arizona election (Nov. 6, 2022)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2022/11/06/why-katie-hobbs-will-not-recuse-herself-from-election-role-as-secretary-of-state/8240811001/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-20 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-20 12:25 PM ET). ABC News, PolitiFact and the Arizona Senate HB 2308 fact sheet archived (curl 200); USA Today returned 402 to curl, so it is linked only (content seen in search extract). The final outcome of HB 2308 was not checked and is not stated. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ap-2022-sos-races-avalanche-spending-dass-millions-fontes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-11", "uid": "C20260926-023334-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-11", "old_ids": ["ap-2022-sos-races-avalanche-spending-dass-millions-fontes"], "seq": "C01071", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Democratic Association of Secretaries of State (DASS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-10", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "AP's 2022 midterms reporting on secretary-of-state races documents an \"avalanche of spending\" as parties treated SOS offices as contests over who administers elections: Democratic SOS candidates and allied groups far out-raised Republican counterparts in key states, with the Democratic Association of Secretaries of State (DASS) committing multi-million-dollar outside spends (e.g., tens of millions projected including Arizona Fontes support). OpenSecrets contemporaneous analysis recorded a then-record ~$56.2M raised by SOS candidates nationally. Status Confirmed wire/reporting compilation of partisan SOS race monetization; peer to DASS SAFE $25M announcement and Brennan/Vox control-narrative cards already on this leaf—AP spending avalanche / Fontes detail, not SAFE announcement remounted. PEP framing: party IE money for \"chief election officer\" races converts ostensibly administrative posts into partisan control points over machine election systems.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Races to oversee elections draw an avalanche of spending (2022)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-arizona-government-and-politics-voting-donald-trump-2b8dfac3c8352dd589b220921052017c", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2022-sos-races-avalanche-spending-dass-millions-fontes__ap-races-to-oversee-elections-draw-an-avalanche-of-spending-2022.png"}, {"title": "OpenSecrets — Secretary of state candidates have raised a record $56.2 million for 2022 election (Oct. 20, 2022)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/10/secretary-of-state-candidates-have-raised-a-record-56-2-million-for-2022-election/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on DASS partisan SOS leaf."}
{"id": "va-doe-incorrect-polling-place-notices-fairfax-pw-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-06", "uid": "C20261002-123208-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-06", "old_ids": ["va-doe-incorrect-polling-place-notices-fairfax-pw-2022"], "seq": "C01322", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-10", "state": "VA", "description": "In October 2022, Virginia’s Department of Elections confirmed that about 31,000 official voter notices with incorrect polling-place locations were mailed to voters in seven towns across Fairfax and Prince William counties (Clifton, Dumfries, Haymarket, Herndon, Occoquan, Quantico, and Vienna), with a separate wave of incorrect P.O.-box notices reported in southwest Virginia localities. Commissioner Susan Beals acknowledged the error to AP; the department said corrected notices would be mailed and directed voters to verify polling places online or by phone. Status Confirmed official state mailing of wrong polling-location information shortly before the midterms; intentional fraud not claimed—filed as wrong polling-location information that can cause voters to miss correct polling sites.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Virginians get voter notices with incorrect information (Oct. 2022)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/virginia-elections-government-and-politics-voting-voter-registration-e389cec4200fa7fbf4fb35aed70ed934"}, {"title": "Virginia Mercury — Printer takes responsibility for incorrect voter postcards (Oct. 26, 2022)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2022/10/26/printer-takes-responsibility-for-incorrect-voter-postcards-sent-to-thousands-of-virginians/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Confirmed wrong polling-place notices; peer Union County NC / Idaho Rich—VA DOE 2022, not remounted. Moved 2026-10-26 (Mark pt445u) from 6 > Event Date and Time Misdirection > \"They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events…\" to 6 > Polling Places > \"Incorrect or altered polling-location data\"."}
{"id": "ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-rights-duties-education-gap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-13", "uid": "C20260926-005107-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-13", "old_ids": ["ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-rights-duties-education-gap"], "seq": "C00806", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are not educated about their rights and duties."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-10-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "AP/Howard Center reporting and CSPOA's own recruitment pitch document a nationwide education gap: CSPOA markets training on 'the authority and duties of … Sheriffs … under the United States and [state] Constitutions' precisely because conventional academy/POST pipelines allegedly omit or under-teach those duties — while critics (TCOLE memo) call CSPOA's nullification theories legally baseless. Both sides concede the underlying phenomenon: contested, incomplete education of sheriff constitutional rights/duties. Status Confirmed for documented education-gap / competing-curriculum phenomenon; which curriculum is correct is Disputed across sources.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Constitutional sheriffs group training/acceptance investigation", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/constitutional-sheriffs-5568cd0b6b27680a28de8a098ed14210"}, {"title": "SPLC — Constitutional Sheriffs extremist-file summary (Mack duties claims)", "url": "https://www.splcenter.org/resources/extremist-files/constitutional-sheriffs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-rights-duties-education-gap__splc---constitutional-sheriffs-extremist-file-summary--mack-duties-claims.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 7. Education gap Confirmed; correct doctrine Disputed across sources."}
{"id": "maine-sos-voting-residence-fact-sheet-students-campus-as-residence", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-34", "uid": "C20260925-220029-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-34", "old_ids": ["maine-sos-voting-residence-fact-sheet-students-campus-as-residence"], "seq": "C00387", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "They bring in groups from other states to harvest votes from young people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09", "state": "ME", "description": "Maine SOS Elections Division Voting Residence Fact Sheet explains that students may establish voting residence at a campus/school address based on intent and physical presence rules—another official acknowledgment that college populations (including those arriving from elsewhere) can be registered where they study. Status Confirmed for the residence rule enabling campus-based registration of mobile young voters.", "sources": [{"title": "Maine SOS — Voting Residence Fact Sheet (Sept 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://www.maine.gov/sos/sites/maine.gov.sos/files/content/assets/Maine-20Voting-20Residence-20Fact-20Sheet.September2022.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maine-sos-voting-residence-fact-sheet-students-campus-as-residence__maine-sos-voting-residence-fact-sheet-sept-2022-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "WA SOS — Voters Away at College", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/index%2Ephp/elections/voters/voter-eligibility-resources/voters-away-college"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "mn-election-integrity-cvrs-for-dummies-16-json-files", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-02", "uid": "C20260926-021058-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-02", "old_ids": ["mn-election-integrity-cvrs-for-dummies-16-json-files"], "seq": "C00950", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They publish CVRs in JSON format, making them too complex for the average person to examine."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota Election Integrity's **CVRs for Dummies** guide documents that Dominion Democracy Suite's default CVR export is a **multi-file JSON package** (BallotTypeManifest, CandidateManifest, ContestManifest, CvrExport, TabulatorManifest, and ~16 related manifests) requiring specialized tooling to join, not a single citizen-readable table. Status Confirmed JSON/multi-file complexity barrier; peer to SF Dominion JSON export and Dominion multi-file ecosystem cards—MN citizen guide documenting the same vendor format complexity, not those sources remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota Election Integrity — CVRs for Dummies v2 (Dominion ~16 JSON manifest files)", "url": "https://mnelectionintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CVRsForDummiesV2-1.pdf"}, {"title": "kuriwaki/dominionCVR — R package documenting hierarchical Dominion JSON CVR complexity", "url": "https://github.com/kuriwaki/dominionCVR", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-election-integrity-cvrs-for-dummies-16-json-files__kuriwaki-dominioncvr-r-package-documenting-hierarchical-dominion-json-cvr-comp.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on CVR-as-JSON complexity leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "tx-am-brazos-campus-early-voting-site-removed-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-12", "uid": "C20260926-012939-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-12", "old_ids": ["tx-am-brazos-campus-early-voting-site-removed-2022"], "seq": "C00851", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09", "state": "TX", "description": "In September 2022 Brazos County commissioners declined to restore an on-campus early-voting site at Texas A&M University for the November general election after the site was moved off campus, despite student and advocacy objections; Texas Tribune reporting documents the board action and ensuing voter-suppression accusations around campus access. Status Confirmed for a peer campus early-voting site fight to North Carolina's 2026 on-campus early-voting denials—jurisdictional siting dispute, not a proven ballot-fraud case.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Tribune — Texas A&M's early-voting site not restored by Brazos County commissioners", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2022/09/27/texas-a-m-brazos-county-early-voting-2022/"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Texas A&M students say closure of early voting location suppressed vote", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2022/11/04/brazos-county-voter-suppression-accusation/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to nc-campus-early-voting-denial-2026 on Colleges leaf."}
{"id": "dass-safe-2022-25m-ad-push-secretary-of-state-races-partisan-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-15", "uid": "C20260926-000015-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-15", "old_ids": ["dass-safe-2022-25m-ad-push-secretary-of-state-races-partisan-control"], "seq": "C00528", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Democratic Association of Secretaries of State (DASS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "The Democratic Association of Secretaries of State (DASS) and its IE arm SAFE announced a first-of-kind ~$25M midterm program (TV/digital/mail/field) explicitly targeting Secretary of State races that 'have considerable sway over how the presidential election is conducted'—making chief election offices a partisan campaign battleground. Status Confirmed that DASS organizes partisan SOS contests; 'non-partisan positions made partisan' Confirmed as political practice, not as a change in formal office classification.", "sources": [{"title": "DASS — SAFE launches first ad push for 2022 midterms ($25M program)", "url": "https://demsofstate.org/news/democratic-association-of-secretaries-of-state-backed-group-launches-first-ad-push-for-the-2022-midterms/"}, {"title": "Politico — Democrats in key secretary of state races (2022)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2022/09/27/democrats-in-key-secretary-of-state-races-00059106"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 8."}
{"id": "verityvote-uocava-overseas-voting-vulnerabilities-page-and-report-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-07", "uid": "C20260925-235207-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-07", "old_ids": ["verityvote-uocava-overseas-voting-vulnerabilities-page-and-report-2022"], "seq": "C00480", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "More vulnerabilities are listed at www.verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09-21", "state": "Federal", "description": "Verity Vote's Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities page (Sept 21, 2022) and linked UOCAVA reports catalog federal-law expansions of overseas absentee privileges, email/electronic voting channels, and unverified non-military overseas registration—explicitly the catalog-cited vulnerability list. Status Confirmed that the cited Verity Vote UOCAVA vulnerability compilation exists and documents electronic-return and registration-attack surfaces (evaluation of each claim varies; pair with CISA/NIST high-risk electronic-return guidance).", "sources": [{"title": "Verity Vote — Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities", "url": "https://verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/"}, {"title": "Verity Vote — UOCAVA overseas voting vulnerabilities report PDF", "url": "https://verityvote.us/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/UOCAVA_overseas-voting-vulnerabilies-report_VerityVote.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 4. Catalog leaf literally cites this URL."}
{"id": "nbc-2022-dowless-workers-plead-guilty-compromised-into-crimes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-06", "uid": "C20260926-002008-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-06", "old_ids": ["nbc-2022-dowless-workers-plead-guilty-compromised-into-crimes"], "seq": "C00639", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Compromise people by inducing them to commit election crimes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09-19", "state": "NC", "description": "Four Dowless-linked workers pleaded guilty to misdemeanors for roles in the 2016/2018 absentee scheme—court outcomes confirming that paid collectors were drawn into criminal liability (the compromise pathway), even where lead-operative felony outcomes varied. Status Confirmed for worker compromise/conviction pathway.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — Four plead guilty in NC ballot probe of 2016 and 2018 elections", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/four-people-plead-guilty-north-carolina-ballot-probe-2016-2018-electio-rcna49534"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Dowless charged in NC congressional race ballot scheme", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/leslie-mccrae-dowless-political-operative-charged-in-north-carolina-congressional-race"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "wapo-reuters-2022-democrats-amplify-far-right-primary-chaos", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-26", "uid": "C20260926-003520-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-26", "old_ids": ["wapo-reuters-2022-democrats-amplify-far-right-primary-chaos"], "seq": "C00739", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Will cause chaos."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-09-12", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Washington Post and Reuters reporting on 2022 Democratic primary interventions describe a deliberate strategy to boost far-right/'election denier' Republican nominees viewed as chaotic general-election liabilities—matching the catalog's 'purposely support candidates…that will cause chaos' mechanism. Status Confirmed for contemporaneous reporting of the strategy; electoral-success claims vary by race.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Democrats amplify far-right candidates in Republican primaries (2022)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/12/democrats-interfere-republican-primaries/"}, {"title": "Reuters — Democrats' risky midterm strategy to elevate election deniers appears to pay off (2022)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us/democrats-risky-midterm-strategy-elevate-election-deniers-appears-pay-off-2022-11-09/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "alaska-rcv-2022-special-senate-condorcet-analysis", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-28", "uid": "C20260925-205354-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-28", "old_ids": ["alaska-rcv-2022-special-senate-condorcet-analysis"], "seq": "C00243", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Allows covert election manipulation hidden in the complexity of the calculations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "AK", "description": "Peer-reviewed analysis of Alaska's 2022 special U.S. House election under ranked-choice voting documents Condorcet failure / non-monotonic complexity properties of the RCV tabulation relative to pairwise preferences — reinforcing that winners can depend on multi-round transfer math not visible on a single plurality tally sheet. Status Confirmed for documented RCV mathematical complexity/opacity properties in a real statewide contest (not a finding of illicit software tampering).", "sources": [{"title": "DOI — Ranked Choice Voting And Condorcet Failure in the Alaska 2022 Special Election", "url": "https://doi.org/10.54870/1551-3440.1686"}, {"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — RCV detailed report sample", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/RcvDetailedRptSample.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/alaska-rcv-2022-special-senate-condorcet-analysis__alaska-division-of-elections-rcv-detailed-report-sample.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 14. RCV complexity Confirmed; hand-count plurality/PEP remains simpler transparent contrast."}
{"id": "halderman-antrim-ballot-image-feature-disabled-thwarts-image-based-audit", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-33", "uid": "C20260926-000809-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-33", "old_ids": ["halderman-antrim-ballot-image-feature-disabled-thwarts-image-based-audit"], "seq": "C00586", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable digital ballot images so they cannot be used as evidence in an audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman: Antrim ICP ballot-image capture was disabled, so forensic review could not use ballot images and relied on CVRs, EMS data, poll tapes, and paper—exactly the 'disable digital images … thwart their use [as] evidence in an audit' configuration risk. Status Confirmed for disabled images limiting audit evidence; Antrim paper hand count still confirmed presidential totals. PEP: hand-marked paper observed in public is software-independent.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim forensic investigation (images not enabled)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media__halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-me.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX Security 2022 — Antrim presentation page", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec22-halderman.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-ballot-image-feature-disabled-thwarts-image-based-audit__halderman-antrim-ballot-image-feature-disabled-thwarts-image-based-aud.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 17. Adjacent to leaf 16; distinct pathKey (digital images vs thumb/flash wording)."}
{"id": "halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-31", "uid": "C20260926-000809-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-31", "old_ids": ["halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media"], "seq": "C00584", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable or manipulate ballot images on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman USENIX Security 2022 Antrim forensic paper: Dominion ICP scanners can store digital ballot images, but 'this capability was not enabled in Antrim'; results lived on compact-flash/USB election media without ballot-image evidence. Demonstrates disable/omit of ballot images on removable media used in tabulation. PEP contrast: precinct hand count of hand-marked paper does not depend on vendor image toggles (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for disabled images on tabulator media; intentional fraud not found by Halderman.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim County 2020 incident (USENIX PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media__halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-me.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — Halderman Antrim analysis (state-hosted report)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 16. PEP framing on software-dependent image evidence.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "in-ied-2022-cvr-confidential-apra-guidance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-04", "uid": "C20260926-020640-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-04", "old_ids": ["in-ied-2022-cvr-confidential-apra-guidance"], "seq": "C00937", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Even some Republican-led states (e.g., South Dakota, South Carolina) have not provided CVRs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "IN", "description": "In August 2022 the Indiana Election Division advised circuit court clerks that **cast vote records (CVRs) are confidential** and not disclosable under APRA, treating a CVR as equivalent to a ballot because it captures individual selections. Indiana Public Access Counselor informal opinion 22-INF-7 documents that guidance and the statewide wave of CVR requests. Status Confirmed that a Republican-led election administration treated CVRs as non-public; peer to SD SB48 CVR bill kill and SC AG FOIA CVR negation—Indiana example, not a remount of SD/SC sources.", "sources": [{"title": "Indiana PAC 22-INF-7 — Cast vote record APRA dispute; Election Division confidentiality guidance", "url": "https://www.in.gov/pac/files/informal/22-INF-7.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/in-ied-2022-cvr-confidential-apra-guidance__indiana-pac-22-inf-7-cast-vote-record-apra-dispute-elec.pdf"}, {"title": "Indiana Lawyer — CVR requests create havoc; Election Division confidentiality stance", "url": "https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/requests-for-cast-vote-record-create-havoc-for-state-officials-hoosier-voters-demand-access-to-2020-election-materials", "local": "/archives/2026/09/in-ied-2022-cvr-confidential-apra-guidance__indiana-lawyer-cvr-requests-create-havoc-election-divis.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on Republican-state CVR non-disclosure leaf."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-dropbox-livestream-not-recorded-100pct-gap-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-12", "uid": "C20260925-205354-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-12", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-dropbox-livestream-not-recorded-100pct-gap-2022"], "seq": "C00227", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "They claim drop boxes have 100% surveillance when they do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County promoted monitored/livestreamed unstaffed drop boxes, but the Juvenile Court drop box's livestream was not recorded for ~3 weeks of the 2022 primary window — a gap discovered only after a party records request. Status Confirmed that 'surveillance' marketing did not equal continuous recorded oversight capable of after-the-fact review.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Free News — Maricopa failed to record unstaffed drop box for 3 weeks", "url": "https://azfreenews.com/2022/08/maricopa-county-failed-to-record-an-unstaffed-drop-box-for-3-weeks/"}, {"title": "Voter Reference Foundation — Maricopa dropbox camera not recording", "url": "https://www.voterreferencefoundation.com/az-maricopa-county-dropbox-camera-not-recording-during-primary/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 6. Livestream ≠ recorded 100% surveillance Confirmed."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-juvenile-court-dropbox-not-recorded-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-11", "uid": "C20260925-205354-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-11", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-juvenile-court-dropbox-not-recorded-2022"], "seq": "C00226", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "During the August 2022 Arizona primary, Maricopa County acknowledged that the unstaffed ballot drop box at the Juvenile Court facility had been livestreamed but not recorded for later review for about three weeks due to a 'glitch or human error.' Recording began only after the Maricopa County Republican Committee requested footage (July 28). Status Confirmed that the public (and party requesters) had no recorded surveillance footage to review for that period.", "sources": [{"title": "AZ Free News — Maricopa failed to record unstaffed drop box for 3 weeks", "url": "https://azfreenews.com/2022/08/maricopa-county-failed-to-record-an-unstaffed-drop-box-for-3-weeks/"}, {"title": "Voter Reference Foundation — Maricopa dropbox camera not recording during primary", "url": "https://www.voterreferencefoundation.com/az-maricopa-county-dropbox-camera-not-recording-during-primary/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 5 (also supports leaf 6)."}
{"id": "matt-crane-ccca-senate-judiciary-testimony-election-worker-threats", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-16", "uid": "C20260926-001426-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-16", "old_ids": ["matt-crane-ccca-senate-judiciary-testimony-election-worker-threats"], "seq": "C00609", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Convince clerks that electors are dangerous and should be feared."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "CO", "description": "Matt Crane (then Colorado County Clerks Association executive director; Republican) testified to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee about unprecedented post-2020 threats to election workers—associational leadership formally framing electors/activists as a safety threat clerks must manage. Status Confirmed for CCCA/association threat framing to Congress.", "sources": [{"title": "Senate Judiciary — Matt Crane / CCCA written testimony PDF", "url": "https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Testimony%20-%20Crane.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/matt-crane-ccca-senate-judiciary-testimony-election-worker-threats__senate-judiciary-matt-crane-ccca-written-testimony-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Sen. Durbin press — hearing with Crane / SOS / NASED on threats", "url": "https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-questions-witnesses-in-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-the-threat-to-election-workers"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "oh-summit-laurel-lake-retirement-community-employee-15-ballots-dropbox-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-02", "uid": "C20260926-015040-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-02", "old_ids": ["oh-summit-laurel-lake-retirement-community-employee-15-ballots-dropbox-2022"], "seq": "C00890", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Retirement communities"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08", "state": "OH", "description": "During Summit County, Ohio's August 2022 special primary, Board of Elections Director Lance Reed documented that a Laurel Lake Retirement Community (Hudson) employee brought a stack of residents' ballots to the early-vote center; after staff refused in-person acceptance because the ballots were not from family members, the employee deposited 15 ballots in the county drop box, which were immediately removed and segregated. A second long-term-care facility (Grande Village, Twinsburg) employee admitted depositing 16 same-address ballots in the drop box. The Board referred the matters to the prosecutor; contemporaneous reporting later identified Mary Cronin in connection with the Laurel Lake deliveries and noted an indictment followed by later dismissal after a federal disability-assistance injunction. Status Confirmed for documented retirement-community / long-term-care employee multi-ballot drop-box delivery referred for prosecution—peer to MS Peoples assisted-living and FL Cabrera Hialeah assisted-living broker cases; not a final fraud conviction on the Laurel Lake facts.", "sources": [{"title": "Akron Beacon Journal — Summit prosecutor to investigate care workers' ballot deliveries (Laurel Lake 15 ballots)", "url": "https://beaconjournal.com/story/news/politics/2022/09/02/summit-prosecutor-to-investigate-long-term-care-workers-ballot-deliveries-board-elections-drop-box/65464101007/"}, {"title": "Ohio Capital Journal — LaRose absentee rules cite 2022 Summit nursing-home worker 15-ballot dropbox incident", "url": "https://ohiocapitaljournal.com/2024/10/07/ohio-secretary-of-state-and-voters-tangle-over-absentee-ballot-rules-on-eve-of-early-vote/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oh-summit-laurel-lake-retirement-community-employee-15-ballots-dropbox-2022__ohio-capital-journal-larose-absentee-rules-cite-2022-su.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Table 10: Ballot Collection Laws (Ohio third-party return limits context)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-10-ballot-collection-laws"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Retirement communities harvest leaf."}
{"id": "pa-2022-berks-lancaster-fayette-commonwealth-court-order-certify", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-07", "uid": "C20260927-121124-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-07", "old_ids": ["pa-2022-berks-lancaster-fayette-commonwealth-court-order-certify"], "seq": "C01254", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08-19", "state": "PA", "description": "After Berks, Lancaster, and Fayette County boards of elections refused to include undated but timely mail/absentee ballots in their certified 2022 primary returns—blocking statewide SOS certification—Acting Secretary Leigh Chapman sued in Commonwealth Court seeking mandamus. President Judge Renée Cohn Jubelirer (Aug. 19, 2022 opinion) ordered the three boards to complete certification including those ballots by an Aug. 24 deadline; AP/WHYY/LancasterOnline document the counties then complying so the state could certify. Status Confirmed for court-ordered completion of county certification after delay/refusal (ballot-dating legal dispute); does not treat undated-ballot validity as fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Courts — Commonwealth Court opinion ordering Berks/Lancaster/Fayette certification (Aug 19, 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20220819/170529-august19,2022-opinion.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — 3 Pennsylvania counties ordered to count mail-in votes / certify primary", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-pennsylvania-lawsuits-tom-wolf-ac894258fb4d26c625362a251873946d"}, {"title": "NBC News — Pennsylvania sues county election boards over refusal to certify primary", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2022-election/pennsylvania-sues-county-election-boards-refusal-certify-primary-resul-rcna37965"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Court-compelled certify after county refusal/delay."}
{"id": "lavote-2022-gascon-recall-insufficient-signatures-miss-qualify-deadline", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-39", "uid": "C20260926-002757-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-39", "old_ids": ["lavote-2022-gascon-recall-insufficient-signatures-miss-qualify-deadline"], "seq": "C00712", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall groups are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08-15", "state": "CA", "description": "LA County RR/CC certified the Gascón DA recall petition insufficient: 715,833 signatures submitted but only 520,050 valid vs 566,857 required—i.e., a recall effort that failed qualification because of invalid/duplicate/mismatched signatures and related defects after the circulation period. Maps to catalog 'fake/flawed recall groups…miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall.' Status Confirmed for official insufficiency; intentional 'set up to fail' motive Alleged beyond the certification.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Vote — RR/CC completes Gascon recall petition verification; insufficient (news release PDF)", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/news-releases/07152022_recall-petition-announcement.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lavote-2022-gascon-recall-insufficient-signatures-miss-qualify-deadline__la-vote-rr-cc-completes-gascon-recall-petition-verification-insufficient-news-release-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "ABC7 — DA Gascón recall fails to collect enough valid signatures (2022)", "url": "https://abc7.com/post/george-gascn-recall-los-angeles-district-attorney-da-signatures/12128228/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 20. Soft companion to fill-20h Gascon dead-sigs / Buena Park leaves (distinct pathKey: miss deadlines/mistakes vs booths/throw-out)."}
{"id": "halderman-2022-antrim-wrong-unofficial-results-display-slides", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-27", "uid": "C20260926-003520-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-27", "old_ids": ["halderman-2022-antrim-wrong-unofficial-results-display-slides"], "seq": "C00740", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Prepare slides in advance showing predetermined outcomes and display them instead of the real-time votes (citizens cannot tell the difference)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-08-10", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman's USENIX Security forensic paper on Antrim County MI Nov 2020 documents unofficial election-night results that misstated presidential and other totals by thousands of votes after mismatched election-definition files caused the EMS to assign scanner votes to wrong candidates—i.e., the public-facing results display did not match real-time correct scanner tallies until corrected. Maps honestly to catalog 'show [wrong outcomes] instead of the real-time votes'; intentional pre-made cheat slides Alleged (investigation found operator error, not proven intentional pre-staging). Status Confirmed for wrong unofficial displayed totals from definition mismatch; intentional 'pre-make slides' cabal cheat Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — The Antrim County 2020 Election Incident (USENIX Security 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS/AG — Analysis of the Antrim County November 2020 election incident (expert report)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/Antrim_720623_7.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-2022-antrim-wrong-unofficial-results-display-slides__michigan-sos-ag-analysis-of-the-antrim-county-november-2020-election-incident-expert-report.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 14. Honest: wrong displayed unofficial results Confirmed via forensic reconstruction; intentional predetermined-slide cheat Alleged. Soft companion to existing Antrim cards if any."}
{"id": "vox-2022-democrats-boosting-far-right-primary-chaos-candidates-strategy", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-13", "uid": "C20260926-030706-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-13", "old_ids": ["vox-2022-democrats-boosting-far-right-primary-chaos-candidates-strategy"], "seq": "C01148", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Will cause chaos."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-27", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Vox (Jul. 27, 2022) documents Democratic/party-aligned spending to elevate far-right Republican primary candidates (Gibbs, Mastriano, Cox, Bailey, et al.) totaling over $44M per OpenSecrets, quoting Democratic strategists warning the strategy puts 'people who don't believe in democracy' into positions with 'control over the election system'—i.e., deliberately engineering chaotic/extreme nominees. Status Confirmed primary Vox synthesis of the chaos-candidate elevation strategy; peer to OpenSecrets spend and WaPo/Reuters amplify cards already on this leaf—Vox strategy analysis, not those remounted. PEP framing: engineering chaotic nominees who then administer or oversee elections undercuts public trust that hand-count transparency would restore.", "sources": [{"title": "Vox — Will Democrats' strategy of boosting far-right candidates in the primaries work? (Jul. 27, 2022)", "url": "https://www.vox.com/23274469/democrats-extremist-republicans-mastriano-cox-bailey"}, {"title": "OpenSecrets — Democrats spend millions on Republican primaries (Jul. 2022)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/07/democrats-spend-millions-on-republican-primaries/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Candidate Engineering Will cause chaos leaf."}
{"id": "npr-2022-dccc-ads-elevate-john-gibbs-over-meijer-michigan-gop-primary-badmouth", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-12", "uid": "C20260926-025634-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-12", "old_ids": ["npr-2022-dccc-ads-elevate-john-gibbs-over-meijer-michigan-gop-primary-badmouth"], "seq": "C01117", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Hire people to disparage opponents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-26", "state": "MI", "description": "NPR (July 26, 2022) documents the DCCC releasing TV ads against Michigan GOP primary candidate John Gibbs that branded him 'too conservative' and 'handpicked by Trump'—messaging that, in a Republican primary, functions as opposition research/smear theater that raises the target's name ID while attacking the more moderate incumbent Peter Meijer whom Democrats preferred to face. Status Confirmed contemporaneous national-party primary intervention via opposition-style ads; peer to 2018 DCCC Laura Moser oppo-memo and Vox primary-meddling pattern cards already on this leaf—2022 Gibbs/Meijer episode, not 2018 Moser remount. PEP framing: paid primary bad-mouthing manipulates nominee selection upstream of any hand-count.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Democrats again meddle in a GOP primary, this time in Michigan (July 26, 2022)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2022/07/26/1113659467/dccc-meijier-gibbs-michigan-gop-primary"}, {"title": "The Hill — Democratic ad buy for pro-Trump Republican sparks howls of protest (Gibbs/Meijer)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/house/3581546-democrats-battle-each-other-over-help-for-pro-trump-gop-candidates/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Primaries Hire people to Bad-mouth opponents leaf."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-10", "uid": "C20261028-132233-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-10", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"], "seq": "C01605", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-19 to 2026-05-26", "state": "AZ", "description": "In July 2022, before Arizona's primary, Maricopa County's outbound mail-ballot envelope had a clear window that showed which ballot was inside. The Star News Network reported that state Rep. Jacqueline Parker objected that the window revealed the voter's party, and that Recorder Stephen Richer said the format had been used for more than 20 years and that the window lets staff scan the ballot-style barcode; Jennifer Wright of the Attorney General's Election Integrity Unit said the envelope did not violate A.R.S. § 16-545. The article noted concerns that postal or election workers \"might throw Republican ballots out.\" [1] The Dispatch quoted Richer that the window \"does not reveal your party, just which ballot style,\" and noted that party is public record and state law requires the party name on primary ballots. [2] In May 2026 a video by @TheSCIF revived the claim; Maricopa spokesperson Jennifer Liewer told Lead Stories the yellow envelope is outbound only and the green return affidavit envelope has no window and no party information, and Richer called the theory \"far-fetched.\" [3] Status Confirmed: the county confirms the outbound window shows the ballot style, which in a partisan primary identifies the party ballot. No source documents a discarded ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "The Star News Network (Rachel Alexander) — Concerns arise over envelopes containing ballots mailed to Maricopa County voters that reveal political party in clear window (July 22, 2022)", "url": "https://thestarnewsnetwork.com/2022/07/22/concerns-arise-over-envelopes-containing-ballots-mailed-to-maricopa-county-voters-that-reveal-political-party-in-clear-window/"}, {"title": "The Dispatch (Khaya Himmelman) — Fact Check: Are Arizona election workers breaking the law with mail-in ballots? (July 22, 2022)", "url": "https://thedispatch.com/article/fact-check-are-arizona-election-workers/"}, {"title": "Lead Stories — Fact Check: Video does NOT show 'illegal cutout windows' in Maricopa County ballot envelopes used to identify Republican ballots (May 2026)", "url": "https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/05/fact-check-video-does-not-show-illegal-cutout-windows-in-maricopa-county-ballot-envelopes-used-to-easily-identify-republican-ballots-for-election-fraud-purposes.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party", "civic-design-vbm-envelope-color-coding-ballot-type-county-differentiation", "usps-pub25-window-envelope-address-imb-must-remain-visible", "ei-2026-09-022", "nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea", "wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park"]}
{"id": "opensecrets-2022-democrats-spend-millions-elevate-weak-gop-candidates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-27", "uid": "C20260926-002757-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-27", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-2022-democrats-spend-millions-elevate-weak-gop-candidates"], "seq": "C00700", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Lack what it takes to win, draining donor dollars and wasting resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-15", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "OpenSecrets documented ~$44M in Democratic-aligned spending across five states' 2022 Republican primaries to elevate far-right/weaker general-election targets (e.g., Bailey in IL, Mastriano in PA)—i.e., purposely boosting candidates expected to suck opposition resources or lose, wasting the other side's donor/attention dollars. Status Confirmed for the spending strategy and primary outcomes where elevation succeeded; general-election 'easier win' motive is the spenders' stated theory.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — Democrats spend millions on Republican primaries (2022)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/07/democrats-spend-millions-on-republican-primaries/"}, {"title": "Vox — Will Democrats' strategy of boosting far-right candidates work? (2022)", "url": "https://www.vox.com/23274469/democrats-extremist-republicans-mastriano-cox-bailey"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 14. Maps to catalog 'bad candidates…sucking up donor dollars' via cross-party elevation of weak nominees."}
{"id": "opensecrets-2022-democrats-elevate-weak-gop-chaos-candidates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-25", "uid": "C20260926-003520-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-25", "old_ids": ["opensecrets-2022-democrats-elevate-weak-gop-chaos-candidates"], "seq": "C00738", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Will cause chaos."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "OpenSecrets documented Democrats spending tens of millions intervening in 2022 Republican primaries to elevate Trump-aligned or weaker general-election opponents—intentionally amplifying chaotic/extreme nominees expected to be easier to beat. Soft remount of fill-20i OpenSecrets elevate-weak family onto 'Will cause chaos' pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented primary-intervention spend to elevate weaker/chaos-prone opponents.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — Democrats spend millions on Republican primaries (2022)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/07/democrats-spend-millions-on-republican-primaries/"}, {"title": "Washington Post — Democrats spend tens of millions amplifying far-right candidates in nine states (2022)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/09/12/democrats-interfere-republican-primaries/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 13. Soft remount of fill-20i Bad-Candidates suck-donor-dollars / OpenSecrets family onto chaos pathKey."}
{"id": "nv-2022-question-3-gehl-5m-action-now-3m-nevada-voters-first-q3", "permanent_id": "C20261026-123214-05", "uid": "C20261026-123214-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-123214-05", "old_ids": ["nv-2022-question-3-gehl-5m-action-now-3m-nevada-voters-first-q3"], "seq": "C01565", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "GEHL and Action Now"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-07-01 to 2022-09-30 (contributions); 2022-10-25 (report)", "state": "NV", "description": "The Nevada Independent reported on Oct. 25, 2022, from campaign filings, that Nevada Voters First, the group backing Question 3 (open top-five primaries and ranked-choice general elections), raised more than $17 million in the third quarter of 2022, more than any Nevada candidate for state or federal office raised in the same period, and that almost all of it came from out-of-state donors. The largest was a $5 million contribution from Katherine Gehl, the Chicago businesswoman who founded the Institute for Political Innovation and devised Final-Five Voting, the model for Question 3. Other major donors included Kenneth Griffin ($3 million), Action Now Inc. ($3 million), described as a Texas-based philanthropic group funded by John and Laura Arnold, Kathryn Murdoch ($2.5 million) and John Sobrato ($1 million). Wynn Resorts, which gave $250,000, was the only Nevada-based contributor that quarter. In the first half of 2022 the group raised $2.4 million, including nearly $1.5 million from Gehl and her Final Five Fund. Question 3 passed in 2022 and was defeated on its required second vote in 2024. Status Confirmed: contributions as reported from campaign filings by a news outlet. Catalog point: Gehl and the Arnold-funded Action Now were the top funders of the same measure in the same quarter, from outside the state. Single-choice paper ballots, hand counted in public at each precinct, need no centralized RCV tabulation software.", "sources": [{"title": "The Nevada Independent — Question 3 backers promote ranked-choice voting with major out-of-state money (Oct. 25, 2022)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/question-3-backers-promote-ranked-choice-voting-with-major-out-of-state-money"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Nevada Question 3, Top-Five Ranked-Choice Voting Initiative (2022) (bot challenge to curl 2026-10-26, URL retained)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Question_3,_Top-Five_Ranked-Choice_Voting_Initiative_(2022)"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-26 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to action-now-gehl-rcv-funding-2020 on this leaf (1 -> 2). Nevada Independent curl 200 (datePublished 2022-10-25); Ballotpedia 202 bot challenge (WebSearch extract: Gehl total $6,001,000 to Nevada Voters First in 2022)."}
{"id": "ca-june-primary-late-postmark-rejects-ap-reporting", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-09", "uid": "C20260925-205354-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-09", "old_ids": ["ca-june-primary-late-postmark-rejects-ap-reporting"], "seq": "C00224", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06", "state": "CA", "description": "AP reporting on California's June primary documented nearly 150,000 rejected mail ballots, with late-arriving ballots (postmarked after Election Day or treated as late under USPS processing timing) as the primary driver — and noted updated USPS policy that postmarks may reflect processing-center handling dates rather than first-day deposit, increasing late/missing-effective-postmark risk. Status Confirmed for the scale of postmark-timing failures affecting countability.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Nearly 150,000 mail ballots rejected in California June primary", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/california-primary-rejected-mail-ballots-voting-2291684fe4544cab2301f8965abc8f79"}, {"title": "CBS Sacramento — PPIC study: mail ballots increasingly rejected as late", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/california-mail-in-ballots-study/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 4. Postmark timing / effective-missing postmark rejects Confirmed."}
{"id": "house-majority-pac-2022-mathys-ads-elevate-over-valadao-ca-22-weak-opponent", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-13", "uid": "C20260926-025634-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-13", "old_ids": ["house-majority-pac-2022-mathys-ads-elevate-over-valadao-ca-22-weak-opponent"], "seq": "C01118", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Lack what it takes to win, draining donor dollars and wasting resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06", "state": "CA", "description": "In California's 2022 top-two primary for CD-22, House Majority PAC (House Democratic leadership-aligned) spent over $110,000 on ads attacking impeachment-voting Rep. David Valadao's Republican bona fides while elevating far-right challenger Chris Mathys—explicitly hoping Mathys would be the weaker general-election opponent for Democrat Rudy Salas; OpenSecrets and contemporaneous local coverage document the spend and near-miss (Valadao 25.6% vs Mathys 23.1%). Status Confirmed operational elevate-the-weaker-opponent spend; peer to OpenSecrets 2022 multi-state aggregate and McCaskill/Akin 2012 template cards already on this leaf—CA-22 Mathys instance, not the aggregate remount. PEP framing: donor dollars burned engineering weak nominees rather than transparent counting fights.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — Democrats spend millions on Republican primaries (CA-22 Mathys/$110k+ detail) (July 15, 2022)", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/07/democrats-spend-millions-on-republican-primaries/"}, {"title": "HuffPost — Why A Democratic Super PAC Is Promoting A Pro-Trump Election Denier In California", "url": "https://www.huffpost.com/entry/democratic-super-pac-california-congressional-race_n_629a9b25e4b0c184bdd1384d", "local": "/archives/2026/09/house-majority-pac-2022-mathys-ads-elevate-over-valadao-ca-22-weak-opponent__huffpost-democratic-super-pac-promoting-pro-trump-election-denier.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Bad Candidates Don't-have-what-it-takes / elevate-weak leaf. Cites OpenSecrets article for Mathys instance detail already summarized there; does not remount the aggregate card id."}
{"id": "nass-voatz-summer22-towards-creating-standards-remote-digital-voting", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-22", "uid": "C20260925-234437-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-22", "old_ids": ["nass-voatz-summer22-towards-creating-standards-remote-digital-voting"], "seq": "C00455", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will use the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) to push it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NASS also hosted Voatz's June 2022 white paper 'Towards Creating Standards for Remote Digital Voting,' continuing association-channel promotion of remote/mobile digital voting standards work after machines/mail controversies. Status Confirmed for ongoing NASS-hosted mobile/remote voting advocacy materials.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — Voatz Towards Creating Standards for Remote Digital Voting (Summer 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2022-06/white-paper-voatz-nass-summer22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-voatz-summer22-towards-creating-standards-remote-digital-voting__nass-voatz-towards-creating-standards-for-remote-digital-voting-summer-2022-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NASS — Voatz Take Me Out to the Blockchain issue paper (Summer 2023 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2023-07/issue-paper-Voatz-NASS-summer23.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-voatz-summer22-towards-creating-standards-remote-digital-voting__nass-voatz-take-me-out-to-the-blockchain-issue-paper-summer-2023-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 11 companion.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "otero-nm-2022-commission-refused-certify-nm-supreme-court-order", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-04", "uid": "C20260926-020046-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-04", "old_ids": ["otero-nm-2022-commission-refused-certify-nm-supreme-court-order"], "seq": "C00921", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Intimidate canvass board members who do not certify elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06", "state": "NM", "description": "ProPublica's March 2023 review documents that Otero County, New Mexico's three commissioners initially **unanimously refused to certify** the June 2022 primary; the New Mexico Secretary of State asked the **state Supreme Court**, which **ordered certification**, and referred 'multiple unlawful actions' to the AG. Two commissioners then switched; Couy Griffin still refused. Status Confirmed that refusal to certify triggered court-ordered compulsion and AG-referral pressure—peer to Cochise County AZ 2022 court-ordered canvass and Brennan survey fear-of-pressure findings; not a claim that the primary results were factually wrong.", "sources": [{"title": "ProPublica — Some election officials refused to certify results; Otero County NM Supreme Court order", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/election-officials-refused-certify-results-few-held-accountable"}, {"title": "Protect Democracy — Election Certification Is Not Optional (Otero / Cochise court-order case studies PDF)", "url": "https://protectdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/PD_County-Cert-WP_v03.1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/otero-nm-2022-commission-refused-certify-nm-supreme-court-order__protect-democracy-election-certification-is-not-optiona.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on intimidate canvass board / certify-or-else pressure leaf."}
{"id": "cpr-2022-boebert-district-democrats-mass-switch-unaffiliated-primary", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-31", "uid": "C20260926-002008-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-31", "old_ids": ["cpr-2022-boebert-district-democrats-mass-switch-unaffiliated-primary"], "seq": "C00664", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Mass changes of party affiliation to unaffiliated to manipulate results (look for affiliation changes before and after primaries)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06-07", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Public Radio reported ~3,700 Democrats in Lauren Boebert's district changing registration to unaffiliated ahead of the 2022 primary deadline so they could vote in the Republican primary—documented mass affiliation change timed around a primary, exactly the before/after-primary pattern the leaf flags. Status Confirmed for mass timed switches; 'cabal manipulation of outcome' motive beyond open-primary participation Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CPR — Thousands of Democrats change registration in Boebert's district ahead of primary", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2022/06/07/lauren-boebert-2022-elections-democrats-unaffiliated-voters/"}, {"title": "Colorado Newsline — Unaffiliated voters give Colorado Republicans turnout edge ahead of primary", "url": "https://coloradonewsline.com/2022/06/27/unaffiliated-voters-give-colorado-republicans-turnout-edge-ahead-of-primary-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cpr-2022-boebert-district-democrats-mass-switch-unaffiliated-primary__colorado-newsline-unaffiliated-voters-give-colorado-republicans-turnout-edge-ahead-of-primary.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 16."}
{"id": "mt-lincoln-2022-06-07-primary-absentee-ballots-cut-quarter-inch-short-tabulators-reject-full-hand-count", "permanent_id": "C20261116-122653-02", "uid": "C20261116-122653-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-122653-02", "old_ids": ["mt-lincoln-2022-06-07-primary-absentee-ballots-cut-quarter-inch-short-tabulators-reject-full-hand-count"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Print the ballot image slightly shrunk so citizens do not notice but tabulators cannot scan it, causing ballots to be segregated and providing an excuse to \"re-create\" them (this happened in Arizona)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06-07 to 2022-06-09 (Montana primary election and hand count)", "state": "MT", "description": "For the June 7, 2022 Montana primary, Lincoln County's absentee ballots arrived from the printer (Coeur d'Alene Press, per KPAX) a week late and without a test deck, and were cut a quarter inch too short (a misplaced perforation on the ballot stubs, per the county's statement) to run through the county's ES&S tabulators, Elections Administrator Paula Buff and Clerk and Recorder Robin Benson said. The Secretary of State's office said a vendor had printed the ballots on the wrong-sized paper and that, by law, all ballots must be counted either by machine or by hand. After a legal opinion from the Secretary of State's office, the county hand counted every ballot, absentee and polling place, about 6,000 in all, rather than hand count absentees and tabulate the poll ballots, 'in an effort to maintain election integrity.' State Sen. Mike Cuffe, who observed, described five or six teams of three, one reading each vote aloud and two keeping separate tallies that were compared after every fifth ballot. The count began after polls closed on June 7 and was nearly done by the afternoon of June 9, in the close Republican primary for the new 1st Congressional District seat (Zinke vs. Olszewski). Status Confirmed: the county, the Secretary of State's office and multiple news outlets documented the out-of-spec ballots and the full hand count. Catalog point: a printing deviation of a quarter inch made machine counting impossible, while three-person hand-count teams counted every ballot in about two days with cross-checked tallies; a hand count at the precinct is unaffected by paper size.", "sources": [{"title": "Montana Free Press — Ballot errors, missing races punctuate Montana primary (June 8, 2022)", "url": "https://montanafreepress.org/2022/06/08/primary-election-administrative-challenges/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mtfp-lincoln-mt-2022-06-08-ballot-errors-hand-count.html"}, {"title": "KPAX — Here's why the primary ballots in Lincoln Co. are being counted by hand (Kiana Wilson, June 2022)", "url": "https://www.kpax.com/news/western-montana-news/heres-why-the-primary-ballots-in-lincoln-co-are-being-counted-by-hand", "local": "/archives/2026/11/kpax-lincoln-mt-2022-06-ballots-too-short-hand-count.html"}, {"title": "The Western News — Hand count of ballots nears conclusion in Lincoln County (June 10, 2022)", "url": "https://thewesternnews.com/news/2022/jun/10/hand-count-ballots-continues-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/westernnews-lincoln-mt-2022-06-10-hand-count-nears-conclusion.html"}, {"title": "AP News — Wrong-sized ballots delay results in Montana US House race (June 2022)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-congress-ryan-zinke-montana-38b97d7d854aa9c5c6827654e81c675c"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-16 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-16 12:26 PM ET). MTFP, KPAX and Western News archived (curl 200); AP page timed out on fetch and is linked only (content seen in search extract). Vendor tag ES&S because MTFP names ES&S tabulators. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "cisa-icsa-22-154-01-cve-2022-1746-pollworker-auth-exposes-crypto-secrets", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-04", "uid": "C20261014-123054-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-04", "old_ids": ["cisa-icsa-22-154-01-cve-2022-1746-pollworker-auth-exposes-crypto-secrets"], "seq": "C01384", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Thumb or flash drives can easily be modified by bad actors in transit", "For example, Dominion encryption keys are stored in cleartext in the database and can be reused across counties and states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06-03", "state": "US", "description": "CISA ICS Advisory ICSA-22-154-01 (June 3, 2022), based on research by J. Alex Halderman and Drew Springall, assigned CVE-2022-1746 to an Incorrect Privilege Assignment flaw in tested Dominion Democracy Suite ImageCast X versions: \"The authentication mechanism used by poll workers to administer voting using the tested version of ImageCast X can expose cryptographic secrets used to protect election information.\" CISA's mitigations explicitly tell jurisdictions to disable the EMS \"Unify Tabulator Security Keys\" feature and to use new cryptographic keys for each election. Status Confirmed (federal ICS advisory + CVE; CISA stated it had no evidence of exploitation in elections). Catalog note: federal guidance itself treats cryptographic secrets on these systems as exposable through ordinary poll-worker authentication and warns against unifying keys across tabulators—so marketing claims that \"encryption\" alone secures results overstate what the crypto actually protects. Distinct from the Antrim Cyber Ninjas Alleged remount already on this leaf; this card is the CISA advisory text.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — ICS Advisory ICSA-22-154-01: Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X (June 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01"}, {"title": "CISA — Alert: Security Advisory on Dominion Democracy Suite ImageCast X (June 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2022/06/03/cisa-releases-security-advisory-dominion-voting-systems-democracy-suite-imagecast-x"}, {"title": "NVD — CVE-2022-1746 (poll-worker authentication can expose cryptographic secrets)", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1746"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed via CISA/NVD. Cross-leaf: Encryption Deception; Fake Testing. Distinct from existing cisa-icsa-22-154-01 BMD-firmware card and Antrim Alleged cleartext remount.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "cisa-icsa-22-154-01-dominion-icx-physical-ems-file-access-malware-install-paths", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-06", "uid": "C20260926-030239-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-06", "old_ids": ["cisa-icsa-22-154-01-dominion-icx-physical-ems-file-access-malware-install-paths"], "seq": "C01126", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Such code is trivial for an insider to embed, or for an attacker who gains physical or supply-chain access to the firmware."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-06-03", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CISA ICS advisory ICSA-22-154-01 (June 3, 2022), based on research reported by J. Alex Halderman and Drew Springall, catalogs nine CVEs (CVE-2022-1739 through CVE-2022-1747) in Dominion Democracy Suite ImageCast X (Android 5.1 firmware / app 5.5.10.30–5.5.10.32) whose exploitation paths explicitly include physical access to devices, access to the Election Management System, or ability to modify files before upload—enabling malicious-code install, privilege escalation, removable-media spread, Safe Mode OS access, and forged technician/voter authentication. CISA states it has no evidence of election exploitation but recommends physical/chain-of-custody controls precisely because firmware/malware install is feasible once those access conditions exist. Status Confirmed primary federal ICS advisory documenting insider/physical/EMS firmware-compromise paths on a widely deployed BMD; peer to Halderman GA ICX malware and DEF CON 25 Voting Village cards already on this leaf—CISA ICSA CVE catalog, not those remounted. PEP framing: touchscreen firmware that yields to physical/insider access argues for public hand-marked paper counted in public.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — ICSA-22-154-01 Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X (June 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-icsa-22-154-01-dominion-icx-physical-ems-file-access-malware-install-paths__cisa-icsa-22-154-01-vulnerabilities-affecting-dominion-voting-systems-imagecast-x-june-3-2022.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Alert: Security Advisory on Dominion Democracy Suite ImageCast X", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2022/06/03/cisa-releases-security-advisory-dominion-voting-systems-democracy-suite-imagecast-x", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-icsa-22-154-01-dominion-icx-physical-ems-file-access-malware-install-paths__cisa-alert-security-advisory-on-dominion-democracy-suite-imagecast-x.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Voting on DRE/BMD firmware embed via physical/supply-chain access leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "craighead-ar-2022-bequette-misspelling", "permanent_id": "C20260925-171133-05", "uid": "C20260925-171133-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-171133-05", "old_ids": ["craighead-ar-2022-bequette-misspelling"], "seq": "C00072", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Textual \"mistakes\" on ballots (misspelled names, missing names, geographic errors)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-05", "state": "AR", "description": "Craighead County (and Phillips County) Arkansas primary ballots misspelled U.S. Senate candidate Jake Bequette’s first name as “Jack.” Counties corrected after the error surfaced during early voting; Bequette sued state/county election officials. Officials attributed it to a county-level proofreading error in ballot preparation. Status Confirmed for the misspelling and correction; intentional fraud not alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Arkansas Democrat-Gazette — Craighead County corrects candidate's misspelled name on ballot", "url": "https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2022/may/12/craighead-county-corrects-candidates-misspelled-name-on-ballot/"}], "notes": "Catalog leaf: textual mistakes on ballots. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources."}
{"id": "dekalb-ga-2022-d2-primary-ballot-shift-spears-zero-votes-hand-count-certified", "permanent_id": "C20261019-125714-01", "uid": "C20261019-125714-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-125714-01", "old_ids": ["dekalb-ga-2022-d2-primary-ballot-shift-spears-zero-votes-hand-count-certified"], "seq": "C01450", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Prepare slides in advance showing predetermined outcomes and display them instead of the real-time votes (citizens cannot tell the difference)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-05-24 (primary); hand count 2022-05-29/30; certified 2022-06-03", "state": "GA", "description": "In the May 24, 2022 Democratic primary for DeKalb County Commission District 2, Georgia, the election-night poll tapes and unofficial results showed candidate Michelle Long Spears with zero or near-zero Election Day votes in precinct after precinct, including the precinct where she and her husband had voted for her, and placed her third behind Marshall Orson and Lauren Alexander. DeKalb Voter Registration and Elections, in coordination with the Secretary of State, ordered a full hand count of the race on May 29–30. The hand count moved Spears from apparent third place to first (about 43%), dropped Orson to third, and changed the June 21 runoff pairing; Spears then won the runoff. The county's July 14, 2022 report to its elections board found that after candidate Don Broussard withdrew, the precinct scanners in 29 precincts were configured so that votes 'shifted upward': a vote for Spears was recorded as a vote for Orson, and a vote for Orson was recorded as a vote for Broussard and later counted as blank. The report also says the displayed totals made it appear that Spears 'received zero votes in all but four precincts.' The board certified the hand count instead of the machine count. Status Confirmed (county release and county report as quoted by the AJC and Decaturish; officials attribute the cause to programming error, not fraud). Catalog note: the published results, the public's 'slide', showed an outcome the paper ballots did not support, and only the candidate's own poll-tape photos and a public hand count exposed it. Had she not checked, the wrong pair would have gone to the runoff. Hand counting the paper is what fixed it.", "sources": [{"title": "DeKalb County, GA — DeKalb Board of Registration and Elections Certifies Primary Elections (June 6, 2022; hand count used for District 2)", "url": "https://dekalbcountyga.gov/news/2022-06-06/dekalb-board-registration-and-elections-certifies-primary-elections-focuses"}, {"title": "AJC — DeKalb County elections: New details on problems during May primary election (county report on 'shifted upward' votes)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/neighborhoods/dekalb/dekalb-elections-officials-offer-more-insight-into-may-primary-issues/KJPO7DK5KFD77KMQXXSWO2MXSA/"}, {"title": "Decaturish — DeKalb Elections office identified ballot shift as error in DeKalb commission District 2 election (July 14, 2022 report; curl 429 rate-limit 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.decaturish.com/archives/dekalb-elections-office-identified-ballot-shift-as-error-in-dekalb-commission-district-2-election/article_4e5b0c34-7911-5395-b36f-6c43f04cb920.html"}, {"title": "America Counts — Case 17: DeKalb County, 2022 (machine count vs. certified hand count table)", "url": "https://www.americacounts.us/case-studies/2022-ga-dekalb-county/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-19 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to the Antrim MI cards on this leaf (wrong publicly displayed results caused by mismatched election definitions); this one is an actual primary. Cross-leaf: Tabulation > Induce error / ballot programming mistakes; hand-count-corrects-machine examples."}
{"id": "eac-2022-poll-watchers-quick-start-party-observers-monitor-not-administer", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-07", "uid": "C20260926-031135-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-07", "old_ids": ["eac-2022-poll-watchers-quick-start-party-observers-monitor-not-administer"], "seq": "C01157", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not hold election officials accountable for providing honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-05-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The EAC Poll Watchers Quick Start Guide (May 1, 2022) defines poll watchers as individuals typically appointed by political parties, candidates, or issue groups to observe portions of the elections process—polling places, central ballot processing, canvass, certification, audits, and recounts—while emphasizing that officials designate observation areas, train watchers on rules, and protect voter PII. The guide frames party agents as observers, not administrators who can compel corrective action. Status Confirmed primary EAC guidance that party accountability for honest elections is limited to watch/report roles; peer to NCSL poll-watcher limits and Elections Defined workers-vs-watchers cards already on this leaf—EAC Quick Start Guide instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: party observer structures that cannot halt opaque machine tabulation leave citizens without a party pathway to demand public hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Poll Watchers Quick Start Guide (May 1, 2022)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Poll_Watchers_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2022-poll-watchers-quick-start-party-observers-monitor-not-administer__eac-poll-watchers-quick-start-guide-508.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Poll Watchers (election officials resource hub)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/poll-watchers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2022-poll-watchers-quick-start-party-observers-monitor-not-administer__eac-poll-watchers-election-officials-resource-hub.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Political Parties Don't hold election officials accountable leaf."}
{"id": "eac-la-testing-quick-start-test-decks-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-04", "uid": "C20260925-184601-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-04", "old_ids": ["eac-la-testing-quick-start-test-decks-2022"], "seq": "C00122", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-05-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's Logic & Accuracy Testing Quick Start Guide (May 1, 2022) describes L&A as a pre-election local check that machines count a predetermined test pattern, often using preprinted vendor/test decks plus hand-marked ballots, overvotes/undervotes, and BMD-printed tests. It warns that testing cannot start until ballots are finalized, that discrepancies may be from mis-marked test ballots or unexplained equipment errors, and that test results must be cleared so they are not mixed into election-night tabulation. Catalog concerns L&A design limits and vendor TEST ballots: L&A is a scripted pattern check, not a full adversarial audit or independent source-code review. Status Confirmed for EAC-documented L&A design/scope.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Logic & Accuracy Testing Quick Start Guide (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Logic_and_Accuracy_Testing_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-la-testing-quick-start-test-decks-2022__eac-logic-accuracy-testing-quick-start-guide-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Voting System Testing & Certification Program Manual", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Certification%20Program%20Manual.OMB%203265.004.Exp%206.30.2014.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-la-testing-quick-start-test-decks-2022__eac-voting-system-testing-certification-program-manual.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 2. L&A is necessary but not sufficient vs. transparent hand count (PEP)."}
{"id": "fl-alachua-2022-jail-registration-false-info-illegal-voting-charges", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-13", "uid": "C20260926-021547-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-13", "old_ids": ["fl-alachua-2022-jail-registration-false-info-illegal-voting-charges"], "seq": "C00976", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03", "state": "FL", "description": "Alachua County / statewide Amendment 4 eligibility investigation (announced ~Mar 2022) charged multiple current/former jail inmates with providing False voter-registration information and, in some cases, illegal voting after mail ballots from jail—arising from registration activity inside the jail. Status Confirmed felony False-registration / illegal-voting charges tied to a jailhouse registration pathway; peer to TX Brunner unauthorized-registration felony case and Muskegon fake-application FBI referral—Alachua jail registration charges, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "WUSF — Five inmates indicted on voter fraud after jailhouse registration drive (Alachua 2022)", "url": "https://www.wusf.org/courts-law/2022-04-02/five-florida-inmates-are-indicted-on-voter-fraud-following-jailhouse-registration-drive"}, {"title": "CBS12 — Five inmates indicted on voter fraud following jailhouse registration drive", "url": "https://cbs12.com/news/local/five-inmates-indicted-on-voter-fraud-following-jailhouse-registration-drive", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-alachua-2022-jail-registration-false-info-illegal-voting-charges__cbs12-five-inmates-indicted-on-voter-fraud-following-jailhou.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Illegal or gray-area voter registration drives leaf."}
{"id": "mi-oag-2022-3650-deceased-not-removed-qvf-reconciliation-gap", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-08", "uid": "C20261008-203914-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-08", "old_ids": ["mi-oag-2022-3650-deceased-not-removed-qvf-reconciliation-gap"], "seq": "C00278", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03", "state": "MI", "description": "In a March 2022 performance audit of the Bureau of Elections (231-0235-21), the Michigan Office of the Auditor General reported that the Bureau had not done periodic full reconciliations between the driver's license file and the Qualified Voter File (QVF), a problem also noted in its prior audit. Matching active QVF voters against the state Vital Records death file, auditors estimated that about 3,650 deceased people were not removed from the QVF during 7 weeks between December 2020 and March 2021, while the legacy death-match interface was being replaced. Across eight elections, 2,775 votes (0.02% of 11.7 million) were cast by voters recorded as deceased on Election Day. 98.5% of those voters died within 40 days of the election, mostly after legally casting absentee ballots. Only 41 votes came from voters who had died 41 or more days earlier, and some of those may be false matches. The Bureau did a full reconciliation in October 2021 and moved to quarterly reconciliation. Status Confirmed: a state audit documents dead registrants left on the rolls because a reconciliation step was skipped. The audit found the number of resulting votes to be very small.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Office of the Auditor General — Performance audit of the Bureau of Elections (Mar. 2022, PDF)", "url": "https://audgen.michigan.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/r231023521-4999.pdf"}, {"title": "Bridge Michigan — Michigan audit: minimal 'duplicate,' dead voters in 2020 presidential vote", "url": "https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/michigan-audit-minimal-duplicate-dead-voters-2020-presidential-vote/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Distinct from PILF v. Benson (Disputed card on this leaf)."}
{"id": "verified-voting-rla-explainer-close-margins-distributed-sample-below-error", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-04", "uid": "C20260926-031135-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-04", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-rla-explainer-close-margins-distributed-sample-below-error"], "seq": "C01154", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below the margin of error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03-14", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's 'What is a Risk-Limiting Audit?' explainer states RLAs sample ballots across all ballots cast in a contest (not machine-by-machine or district-by-district checks), require substantially more work in close contests, and are designed to give high assurance even when margins are small—explicitly recognizing that distributed small miscounts can escape traditional fixed audits unless a risk-limiting sample expands. Status Confirmed primary Verified Voting RLA fundamentals documenting why distributed below-margin-of-error manipulation is hard to catch without RLA/hand-count escalation; peer to NIST Lindeman-Stark gentle introduction and Appel effective-audit-policy cards already on this leaf—Verified Voting RLA explainer, not those remounted. PEP framing: only public hand-to-eye examination of paper (RLA → full hand count when needed) bounds distributed small-margin manipulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — What is a Risk-Limiting Audit? (Mar. 14, 2022)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/publication/what-is-a-risk-limiting-audit/"}, {"title": "NIST — A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits (Lindeman & Stark; small margins need more evidence)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2025/03/31/A_Gentle_Introduction_to_Risk-Limiting_Audits.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/verified-voting-rla-explainer-close-margins-distributed-sample-below-error__nist-gentle-introduction-risk-limiting-audits.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Overall Manipulation Methodology below margin of error leaf."}
{"id": "census-2020-pes-components-duplicates-erroneous-enumerations-omissions", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-22", "uid": "C20260926-000809-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-22", "old_ids": ["census-2020-pes-components-duplicates-erroneous-enumerations-omissions"], "seq": "C00575", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "There are also cases of the census \"miscounting\" the population."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Same PES release reports coverage components: among ~323.2M household population, ~2.2% erroneous enumerations (including ~1.6% duplicates) and an estimated 18.8M omissions—concrete mechanisms of census miscount (double-counts and misses) with apportionment/representation implications. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Census Bureau — 2020 PES undercount/overcount (components of coverage)", "url": "https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/2020-census-estimates-of-undercount-and-overcount.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts__census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts.png"}, {"title": "Census PES national coverage estimates PDF", "url": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/coverage-measurement/pes/national-census-coverage-estimates-by-demographic-characteristics.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts__census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-21", "uid": "C20260926-000809-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-21", "old_ids": ["census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts"], "seq": "C00574", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "There are also cases of the census \"miscounting\" the population."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "U.S. Census Bureau Post-Enumeration Survey (Mar 10, 2022) found statistically significant 2020 Census undercounts for Black (−3.30%), Hispanic (−4.99%), and AIAN-on-reservation (−5.64%) populations and overcounts for non-Hispanic White (+1.64%) and Asian (+2.62%)—documented census 'miscounting' by demographic group even when national net coverage was not significantly different from zero. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Census Bureau — 2020 PES undercount/overcount press release", "url": "https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022/2020-census-estimates-of-undercount-and-overcount.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts__census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts.png"}, {"title": "Census Bureau — National census coverage estimates by demographics (PES PDF)", "url": "https://www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennial/coverage-measurement/pes/national-census-coverage-estimates-by-demographic-characteristics.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts__census-bureau-2022-pes-2020-undercount-overcount-demographic-miscounts.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 11."}
{"id": "texas-tribune-2022-party-election-judge-vacancies-close-polls", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-19", "uid": "C20260926-002008-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-19", "old_ids": ["texas-tribune-2022-party-election-judge-vacancies-close-polls"], "seq": "C00652", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not fulfill (or do not know) their duty to provide election judges, poll watchers, and audit and canvass board members."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03-01", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Tribune reporting on the March 2022 primary documents multiple counties (Dallas, Tarrant, Hidalgo) closing or delaying polling places because party-appointed election judges failed to show—county officials stating they are 'at the mercy' of parties that failed to staff their statutory bipartisan judge roles. Soft companion to existing MN party-list election-judge card. Status Confirmed for party failure to provide judges causing operational harm.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Tribune — Many voting locations did not open because of staff shortages (2022)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2022/03/01/texas-primary-election-voting-location-closures/"}, {"title": "CBS Texas — Political parties don't recruit enough election workers (Tarrant)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/political-parties-dont-recruit-enough-election-workers-some-voters-turned-away/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 10."}
{"id": "co-teller-2022-woodland-park-ballots-mailed-to-77-preregistered-minors", "permanent_id": "C20261106-122819-04", "uid": "C20261106-122819-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-122819-04", "old_ids": ["co-teller-2022-woodland-park-ballots-mailed-to-77-preregistered-minors"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-03 (list error discovered); 2022-04-05 (Woodland Park municipal election)", "state": "CO", "description": "In March 2022, Teller County Clerk and Recorder Krystal Brown's office provided the City of Woodland Park a registered-voter list for the April 5 municipal election that inadvertently included about 77 residents under age 18. KRDO and The Gazette reported that parents of two minors who received ballots contacted Assistant City Manager and City Clerk Suzanne Leclercq on March 18; a county review found that minors who had pre-registered when obtaining driver's licenses were left on the list sent to the city. Clerk Brown publicly regretted the error. County and city officials said they began notifying those mistakenly included, and emphasized that any of the wrongly mailed ballots returned would be screened, left unopened, and not counted. Status Confirmed: county and city officials acknowledged the pre-registration list error and the mailing of ballots to minors. Catalog point: youth pre-registration creates active-looking records that can feed ballot mailings when a list export is wrong; if a returned ballot is not caught, the excuse is always a clerical mistake, and the same inventory of underage records exists every cycle.", "sources": [{"title": "KRDO — Teller County accidentally sends some minors ballots for upcoming municipal election (March 21, 2022)", "url": "https://krdo.com/news/2022/03/21/teller-county-accidentally-sends-some-minors-ballots-for-upcoming-municipal-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/krdo-teller-county-minors-ballots-2022-03-21.html"}, {"title": "The Gazette — Woodland Park minors inadvertently sent ballots in mix-up of registered voters (March 21, 2022)", "url": "https://gazette.com/2022/03/21/woodland-park-minors-inadvertently-sent-ballots-in-mix-up-of-registered-voters-f8ce2092-a939-11ec-86ef-03bdd72fbf9c/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/gazette-woodland-park-minors-ballots-2022-03.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-06 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peer NCSL youth pre-registration card. KRDO and Gazette archived (curl 200). Distinct from Aspen 2019 card on the related 'send ballots to young people' subleaf. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "jw-v-north-carolina-2022-inactive-17pct-outlier-430k-removed", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-05", "uid": "C20261008-203914-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-05", "old_ids": ["jw-v-north-carolina-2022-inactive-17pct-outlier-430k-removed"], "seq": "C00275", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-02", "state": "NC", "description": "Judicial Watch's April 2020 NVRA suit against North Carolina and Mecklenburg and Guilford counties (W.D.N.C.) alleged a failure to make reasonable efforts to remove ineligible registrants. The suit was dismissed by stipulation in February 2022 after the defendants removed more than 430,000 inactive registrations. The plaintiff's filing, which relies on state-reported EAVS data, says North Carolina's inactive registrations fell from about 1.2 million (17%, a national outlier) in 2019 to about 765,000 (10%) in 2021. Removals of registrants who failed to answer a confirmation notice and skipped two elections rose from about 220,000 to 590,000 (up 168%). Guilford County's inactive rate fell from 19% to 11%. Status Confirmed: the court filing documents the data and the increase in removals that followed the suit. Before the suit, about one in six North Carolina registrations sat inactive.", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch v. North Carolina — motion and settlement filing (Feb. 2022, PDF)", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/JW-v-NC-et-al.-NVRA-Settlement-211.pdf"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — Settles North Carolina voter roll lawsuit after state removes over 430,000 inactive names", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/north-carolina-voter-rolls-lawsuit/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out)."}
{"id": "tx-sos-advisory-2022-09-sb1-mandatory-poll-watcher-training-certificate", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-11", "uid": "C20260926-023825-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-11", "old_ids": ["tx-sos-advisory-2022-09-sb1-mandatory-poll-watcher-training-certificate"], "seq": "C01086", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They mistrain poll watchers so they do not know what to look for."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-02-04", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas SOS Election Advisory No. 2022-09 (Feb. 4, 2022) implements SB 1 / HB 3107: poll watchers must complete SOS internet training, obtain a certificate of completion, and surrender that certificate plus appointment paperwork before acceptance—and the training/oath content defines what watchers may observe, where they may stand, and when they may be removed. Status Confirmed primary SOS advisory; peer to Arkansas SBEC mandatory watcher training/challenge limits and Pennsylvania county-residency watcher limits already on this leaf—Texas SB 1 training-certificate gate, not those remounted. PEP framing: state-authored watcher curricula can narrow what observers look for in machine tabulation rooms versus hand-count reconciliation.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Election Advisory No. 2022-09: Poll Watcher Requirements under HB 3107 and SB 1", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/laws/advisory2022-09.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-sos-advisory-2022-09-sb1-mandatory-poll-watcher-training-certificate__texas-sos-election-advisory-no-2022-09-poll-watcher-requirements-under-hb-3107-and-sb-1.png"}, {"title": "Texas Legislature Online — SB 1 (87th 2nd C.S.) enrolled text (poll watcher training)", "url": "https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/872/billtext/html/SB00001F.HTM"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Poll Watchers mis-train leaf."}
{"id": "cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-07", "uid": "C20260926-000015-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-07", "old_ids": ["cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order"], "seq": "C00520", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Manipulated Betting Markets"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "CFTC Order (Docket 22-09) against Blockratize d/b/a Polymarket found the platform offered unregistered off-exchange event-based binary options to U.S. customers and imposed a $1.4M penalty / wind-down of U.S. access—establishing that election-adjacent prediction markets are regulated commodity-event products with documented compliance failures. Status Confirmed for unregistered event-contract offering; not itself a finding of election-outcome price manipulation.", "sources": [{"title": "CFTC — Order: Blockratize Inc. d/b/a Polymarket (Docket 22-09)", "url": "https://www.cftc.gov/media/6891/enfblockratizeorder010322/download", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order__cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order.pdf"}, {"title": "Cleary Gottlieb — Elections Betting / event contracts regulatory overview", "url": "https://www.clearygottlieb.com/news-and-insights/publication-listing/elections-betting-pays-off-for-now-implications-for-future-event-contracts", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order__cftc-2022-polymarket-blockratize-unregistered-event-contracts-order.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 4."}
{"id": "azag-2022-krista-connor-deceased-mother-ballot-sentenced", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-23", "uid": "C20260926-005107-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-23", "old_ids": ["azag-2022-krista-connor-deceased-mother-ballot-sentenced"], "seq": "C00816", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "People take names from tombstones in graveyards."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Attorney General announced sentencing of a Cochise County woman for casting the early ballot of her deceased mother — an adjudicated use of a dead registrant's ballot identity. Soft companion cases (Tracey McKee AZ; Rivernider FL) show the same deceased-identity pathway. The leaf's colorful 'graveyards/tombstones' image is the popular framing of harvesting dead names; proven cases more often involve relatives using a deceased family member still on the rolls. Status Confirmed for convicted deceased-ballot voting; organized cemetery canvassing rings Alleged beyond these cases.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona AG — Cochise County woman sentenced for casting deceased mother's early ballot", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/press-release/cochise-county-woman-sentenced-casting-early-ballot-her-deceased-mother", "local": "/archives/2026/09/azag-2022-krista-connor-deceased-mother-ballot-sentenced__arizona-ag---cochise-county-woman-sentenced-for-casting-deceased-mother-s-early.png"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — Election Fraud Cases database (deceased-voter fraud type filter)", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?combine=&state=All&year=&case_type=All&fraud_type=24493", "local": "/archives/2026/09/azag-2022-krista-connor-deceased-mother-ballot-sentenced__heritage-foundation---election-fraud-cases-database--deceased-voter-fraud-type-f.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 12. Honest: dead-identity voting Confirmed; literal tombstone canvassing Alleged."}
{"id": "azag-connor-deceased-phantom-record-ballot-priority", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-37", "uid": "C20260926-005107-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-37", "old_ids": ["azag-connor-deceased-phantom-record-ballot-priority"], "seq": "C00830", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Phantom records: best used first, because no one will show up to vote and be told they already voted."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona AG sentencing of Krista Connor for casting her deceased mother's early ballot illustrates why phantom/deceased records are the preferred association for an illicit ballot: the named voter cannot appear at the polls to discover 'already voted.' Soft remount of deceased-ballot conviction family onto this Feedback record-preference pathKey. PEP contrast: precinct hand count of hand-marked paper does not quietly bind a phantom registration to a machine ballot record in a central VR feedback loop (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for adjudicated deceased-identity ballot use; scaled cabal preference algorithm Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona AG — Cochise woman sentenced casting deceased mother's ballot", "url": "https://www.azag.gov/press-release/cochise-county-woman-sentenced-casting-early-ballot-her-deceased-mother", "local": "/archives/2026/09/azag-connor-deceased-phantom-record-ballot-priority__arizona-ag-cochise-woman-sentenced-casting-deceased-mother-s.png"}, {"title": "PILF — Critical Condition deceased-registration inventory companion", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/research/critical-condition-american-voter-rolls-filled-with-errors-dead-voters-and-duplicate-registrations/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 19. PEP framing."}
{"id": "azsos-political-parties-pnd-other-registration-rules", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-34", "uid": "C20260926-003520-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-34", "old_ids": ["azsos-political-parties-pnd-other-registration-rules"], "seq": "C00747", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "They change voters' party from their designated party to PND (party not designated) status in order to use their records to inject votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona SOS political-party materials explain Party Not Designated / Other registration categories and open-primary ballot options for unaffiliated voters—documenting the legal PND pathway whose growth Maricopa reported. Status Confirmed for official PND/Other category rules; not proof of covert reassignment campaigns.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona SOS — Information about Political Parties", "url": "https://azsos.gov/elections/about-elections/information-about-political-parties", "local": "/archives/2026/09/azsos-political-parties-pnd-other-registration-rules__arizona-sos-information-about-political-parties.png"}, {"title": "Pima County Recorder — Political Parties / registration categories companion", "url": "https://recorder.pima.gov/PoliticalParties", "local": "/archives/2026/09/azsos-political-parties-pnd-other-registration-rules__pima-county-recorder-political-parties-registration-categories-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-3020-missing-illegible-postmark-rule", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-08", "uid": "C20260925-205354-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-08", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-3020-missing-illegible-postmark-rule"], "seq": "C00223", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §3020 and SOS regulations expressly address vote-by-mail envelopes that lack a postmark or bear an illegible postmark: if received within seven days after Election Day, such ballots may still be counted when the return envelope is date-stamped on receipt and the voter signed/dated on or before Election Day. Status Confirmed that missing/illegible USPS postmarks are a recognized, recurring mail-ballot defect that California statutes build special fallback rules around — documenting the postmark gap as a systemic mail-ballot vulnerability (not a finding of fraud).", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code §3020", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=3020", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-3020-missing-illegible-postmark-rule__california-elections-code-3020.png"}, {"title": "2 CCR §20991 — Standards for Valid/Invalid VBM Ballots", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/2-CCR-20991"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 4. Missing/illegible postmark as codified mail-ballot problem."}
{"id": "contracosta-2022-county-counsel-advises-trains-sheriff-election-law", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-03", "uid": "C20260926-032103-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-03", "old_ids": ["contracosta-2022-county-counsel-advises-trains-sheriff-election-law"], "seq": "C01183", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "The county attorney's office trains sheriffs, which usurps the people's protection against government officials acting unlawfully."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "Contra Costa County Counsel's Office FY performance report documents that County Counsel is the civil legal advisor to elected officials including the Sheriff, provides election-law advice within General Law Division services, and in 2022 gave the Sheriff's Department hands-on legal guidance (AB 481 military-equipment policy; SB 2 peace-officer certification; Bruen concealed-carry standards)—i.e., the county attorney's office training and directing the sheriff on legal duties rather than an independent counsel relationship. The same report lists Public Records Act / Brown Act trainings the Counsel's Office delivers to county departments. Status Confirmed primary Contra Costa County Counsel performance report documenting county-attorney legal training/advice to the Sheriff and election-law clients; peer to CA Gov. Code §31000.6 independent-counsel statute and AP/CSPOA curriculum cards already on this leaf—Contra Costa operational instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when the counsel who advises the Board also trains the sheriff, independent oversight of election chain-of-custody and public hand-count observation is structurally diluted.", "sources": [{"title": "Contra Costa County — County Counsel's Office Performance Report (FY; Sheriff/election-law advice & training)", "url": "https://www.contracosta.ca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/78974/FY-23-24-County-Counsel---Copy?bidId=", "local": "/archives/2026/09/contracosta-2022-county-counsel-advises-trains-sheriff-election-law__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "California Government Code §31000.6 — sheriff independent counsel when county counsel conflict (companion statute)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?article=&chapter=&division=4.&lawCode=GOV&part=1.&title=3.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/contracosta-2022-county-counsel-advises-trains-sheriff-election-law__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Law Enforcement Training for sheriffs by county attorney leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-elections-defined-poll-workers-vs-watchers-accountability", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-22", "uid": "C20260926-003520-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-22", "old_ids": ["ncsl-elections-defined-poll-workers-vs-watchers-accountability"], "seq": "C00735", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Do not hold election officials accountable for providing honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL's Elections Defined explainer distinguishes poll workers (officials who run the election) from party/candidate poll watchers (monitors)—underscoring that parties do not themselves administer or command election operations, leaving accountability dependent on officials' cooperation and state law. Status Confirmed for institutional role separation.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Elections Defined: The Roles of Poll Workers vs. Poll Watchers", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/state-legislatures-news/details/elections-defined-the-roles-of-poll-workers-vs-poll-watchers"}, {"title": "NCSL — Who's Watching the Polls? Rules Vary by State", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/state-legislatures-news/details/whos-watching-the-polls-rules-vary-by-state"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "ks-comanche-2026-04-20-coldwater-mayor-ceballos-lpr-pleads-guilty-voting-2022-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261113-120546-01", "uid": "C20261113-120546-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-120546-01", "old_ids": ["ks-comanche-2026-04-20-coldwater-mayor-ceballos-lpr-pleads-guilty-voting-2022-2024"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022 to 2024 (ballots cast); 2025-11 (charged); 2026-04-20 (guilty plea)", "state": "KS", "description": "Joe Ceballos, 55, the twice-elected mayor of Coldwater, Kansas (population under 700), was charged by the Kansas Attorney General's Office in November 2025 with six voting-related felonies the day after he won a second term. Ceballos was born in Mexico, is a lawful permanent resident (green card holder), and applied for U.S. citizenship in February 2025; according to the Kansas Reflector, his attorney said the case arose from questions in his citizenship interview, where he said he had voted, not from the state's use of the SAVE database. Attorney General Kris Kobach's office said Ceballos had been on the Kansas voter rolls since at least 2006, and the charges concerned ballots cast in 2022, 2023 and 2024. He resigned as mayor in December 2025 and has said he mistakenly believed he could vote as a lawful permanent resident. On April 20, 2026, he pleaded guilty in Comanche County District Court to three counts of disorderly election conduct, each a class B nonperson misdemeanor; he agreed to a $2,000 fine and one year of probation, with suspended six-month sentences on each count. Kobach said the case shows the consequences of having no citizenship verification at registration. In May 2026, ICE detained Ceballos at its Wichita office; he spent 22 days in the Chase County jail before being released on a $3,000 bond, and his attorney says the removal proceedings are administrative and not based on the plea. A June 2026 local newspaper report says his immigration master hearing is set for Nov. 25, 2026, and KAKE reported that the immigration case had stalled indefinitely. A Nov. 13, 2026 X post resurfaced the November 2025 Washington Post report on the charges. Status Confirmed: Ceballos pleaded guilty in Comanche County District Court and was sentenced, per the Kansas Reflector and AP; the plea was to misdemeanor disorderly election conduct, not the original felony charges. Catalog point: a non-citizen stayed on the Kansas voter rolls from at least 2006 and voted for years, and it surfaced only because he volunteered it in a citizenship interview, not through any registration check.", "sources": [{"title": "Kansas Reflector — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (2026-04-20)", "url": "https://kansasreflector.com/2026/04/20/former-mayor-of-kansas-town-pleads-guilty-to-misdemeanor-election-crimes-hopes-to-avoid-deportation/"}, {"title": "The Kansas City Star — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article315476036.html"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (n.d.)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/kansas-mayor-immigration-coldwater-20a6059a911d7e4aa6fbf3f41b0c7ccf"}, {"title": "The Western Star (Coldwater), June 25, 2026 edition — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (2026-06-25)", "url": "https://www.kcnonline.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/star_press_june_25_2026.pdf"}, {"title": "KAKE — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.kake.com/home/immigration-case-stalls-indefinitely-for-former-coldwater-mayor/article_7f64e94b-db37-4c3f-b09f-4182d3f347f5.html"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor Ceballos non-citizen voting case (2025-11-18)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2025/11/18/kansas-mayor-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Coldwater, KS ex-mayor non-citizen voting plea (Ceballos) (ei-2026-10-408)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-408 (added 2026-11-13 12:05 PM ET, 2026-11-13 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "kimberly-zapata-milwaukee-military-absentee-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-10", "uid": "C20261001-094909-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-10", "old_ids": ["kimberly-zapata-milwaukee-military-absentee-2022"], "seq": "C01304", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2022 / conviction 2024", "state": "WI", "description": "Kimberly Zapata, former Milwaukee Election Commission Deputy Director, was charged with one felony count of misconduct in public office and three misdemeanor counts of absentee ballot fraud after requesting military absentee ballots under false names and sending them to a Wisconsin state legislator's home during the 2022 election (military voters need not show voter ID). She used Wisconsin's online voter registration site to request the ballots for delivery to Rep. Janel Brandtien's home; Brandtien contacted authorities and the media, and Zapata was fired. A jury found her guilty of all charges; she was sentenced to 9 months' imprisonment (stayed pending successful completion of 12 months' probation), 120 hours of community service, and $5,657 in fines/costs. Status Confirmed for the criminal conviction. Heritage VFDB Criminal Conviction. Also maps to UOCAVA / Mail ballots (military absentee pathway abuse).", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Kimberly Zapata WI (Criminal Conviction)", "url": "https://herit.ag/465UAKx"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Zapata source 2", "url": "https://herit.ag/3LpwMYF"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Zapata source 3", "url": "https://herit.ag/3WBrXlv"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database Criminal Conviction (id 201007). Confirmed jury guilty verdict / sentence. Cross-leaf: UOCAVA / Mail ballots."}
{"id": "al-voter-confidence-act-2021-one-shot-audit-then-gap-until-hb95", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-07", "uid": "C20260925-214102-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-07", "old_ids": ["al-voter-confidence-act-2021-one-shot-audit-then-gap-until-hb95"], "seq": "C00330", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that give people a sense of security, which proves false because the laws are not followed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "AL", "description": "Alabama's 2021 Voter Confidence Act was promoted as election-integrity reinforcement authorizing a limited post-election audit after the 2022 general election — creating a public sense that audits were part of Alabama's standing security posture. Governor Ivey's 2026 HB95 signing release itself describes that 2021 Act as authorizing a limited audit following the 2022 General Election only; durable, recurring statutory audits did not follow until the watered-down 2026 HB95. Status Confirmed for integrity legislation that delivered a one-shot / limited audit rather than the ongoing practice the branding suggested.", "sources": [{"title": "Governor Ivey — HB95 release recounting 2021 Voter Confidence Act limited 2022 audit", "url": "https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/2026/04/governor-ivey-signs-audit-law-to-uphold-alabamas-nation-leading-free-and-secure-elections/"}, {"title": "Alabama Reflector — HB95 as new recurring audit framework", "url": "https://alabamareflector.com/2026/04/21/alabama-elections-now-subject-to-audit-but-bill-sponsor-wants-some-changes/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 4. Sense-of-security law with thin follow-through; not a claim of criminal noncompliance."}
{"id": "coos-county-or-ballot-images-unavailable-blocks-citizen-audit-access", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-28", "uid": "C20260925-234437-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-28", "old_ids": ["coos-county-or-ballot-images-unavailable-blocks-citizen-audit-access"], "seq": "C00461", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Block all access to ballot images and paper ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "OR", "description": "Coos County, Oregon public-records disputes around hard-drive failure and unavailable ballot images illustrate how digital ballot-image evidence can become inaccessible after certification—blocking citizen audit use. Status Confirmed for the access-failure episode documented in prior Lawfare Blocking-evidence companion; soft remount onto Tabulation > Block all access leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Audit Oregon — The Curious Case of Coos County Ballot Images", "url": "https://auditoregon.org/the-curious-case-of-coos-county-ballot-images/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coos-county-or-ballot-images-unavailable-blocks-citizen-audit-access__audit-oregon-the-curious-case-of-coos-county-ballot-images.png"}, {"title": "Audit Oregon — Coos County 2020 follow-up", "url": "https://auditoregon.org/the-curious-case-of-coos-county-2020/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coos-county-or-ballot-images-unavailable-blocks-citizen-audit-access__audit-oregon-coos-county-2020-follow-up.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 14 companion. Prefer stronger URL if existing card has better primary; check existing coos card."}
{"id": "crs-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-shared-accountability-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-31", "uid": "C20260926-001426-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-31", "old_ids": ["crs-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-shared-accountability-gaps"], "seq": "C00624", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "No responsible party is accountable for keeping the voter rolls accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "Federal", "description": "Congressional Research Service overview of NVRA/HAVA list-maintenance duties shows responsibility split among states, localities, and multiple data sources (DMV, death records, cross-state) with limited federal enforcement teeth—producing diffuse accountability when rolls stay inaccurate. Status Confirmed for the structural accountability gap.", "sources": [{"title": "CRS — Voter Registration Records and List Maintenance for Federal Elections (R46943)", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46943/R46943.8.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-shared-accountability-gaps__crs-voter-registration-records-and-list-maintenance-for-federal-elections-r46943.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 — Additional Data Could Help Officials Maintain Accurate Lists", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/a246629.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-shared-accountability-gaps__gao-05-478-additional-data-could-help-officials-maintain-accurate-lists.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 16."}
{"id": "cyber-ninjas-maricopa-userlog-deleted-on-election-package-load", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-04", "uid": "C20260926-021547-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-04", "old_ids": ["cyber-ninjas-maricopa-userlog-deleted-on-election-package-load"], "seq": "C00967", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Self-deleting logs"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County Cyber Ninjas forensic reporting documents that Dominion EMS UserLog table entries are completely deleted whenever an election package is loaded in Election Event Designer (EED)—a standard vendor/election-definition workflow—and that the EMSADMIN account can edit or delete remaining log rows. Status Confirmed self-clearing application audit log on routine package load; peer to Halderman Coffee County UserLog-clear and Berkeley AuditBear incomplete-log findings—Maricopa UserLog/EED detail, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Cyber Ninjas Maricopa forensic exhibit — UserLog deleted on EED election-package load / EMSADMIN can edit logs", "url": "https://www.depernolaw.com/uploads/2/7/0/2/27029178/%5B14%5D_ex_12_cyber_ninjas_1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cyber-ninjas-maricopa-userlog-deleted-on-election-package-load__cyber-ninjas-maricopa-forensic-exhibit-userlog-deleted-on-eed-election-package.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP exhibit mirror — Mesa/Dominion Trusted Build & Windows log overwrite context", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mnd.203171/gov.uscourts.mnd.203171.35.4.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cyber-ninjas-maricopa-userlog-deleted-on-election-package-load__courtlistener-recap-exhibit-mirror-mesa-dominion-trusted-build-windows-log-ove.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Self-deleting logs leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "dominion-defamation-suits-chill-election-integrity-advocacy-counsel", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-14", "uid": "C20260926-001426-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-14", "old_ids": ["dominion-defamation-suits-chill-election-integrity-advocacy-counsel"], "seq": "C00607", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may bait honest citizens into frivolous lawsuits to discredit and demoralize the group."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "Federal", "description": "Dominion's high-stakes defamation suits against Giuliani, Powell, and others (and related Fox settlement context) create a chilling litigation environment around election-integrity speech and representation—parallel demoralization pressure on counsel/advocates even when the initiating suits are by vendors rather than 'bait' of grassroots plaintiffs. Soft companion to fill-20f Fear/Discredit Dominion-suit leaf. Status Confirmed for litigation-chill mechanism; does not adjudicate truth of 2020 allegations.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Dominion v. Giuliani case documents (D.D.C.)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2021cv00213/226485/36/"}, {"title": "BBC — Dominion sues Giuliani (contemporaneous reporting)", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55801819", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-defamation-suits-chill-election-integrity-advocacy-counsel__bbc-dominion-sues-giuliani-contemporaneous-reporting.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 7 companion.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-duplicate-pairs-pending-matches-no-ref-integrity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-35", "uid": "C20260926-001426-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-35", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-duplicate-pairs-pending-matches-no-ref-integrity"], "seq": "C00628", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No referential integrity"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "FL", "description": "FL Auditor 2021-096 found previously undetected duplicate pairs and match cases pending for years—symptoms of voter-registration databases lacking strong referential integrity / unique-person constraints that would prevent orphaned or duplicate person-records. Soft remount of prior FL auditor findings onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for integrity-gap findings; not a claim that SQL foreign keys are legally required.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 — list maintenance data limitations", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-478", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-duplicate-pairs-pending-matches-no-ref-integrity__gao-05-478-list-maintenance-data-limitations.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 18."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-list-maintenance-accountability-gaps-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-32", "uid": "C20260926-001426-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-32", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-list-maintenance-accountability-gaps-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00625", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "No responsible party is accountable for keeping the voter rolls accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 documented duplicates, deceased/felon match gaps, and inconsistent supervisor handling—practical evidence that statutory list-maintenance duties still leave accuracy gaps without clear single-point accountability. Soft remount companion to fill-20f Voter Rolls bad-records / data-consistency cards onto this Registration accountability pathKey. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 (FVRS / list maintenance)", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-list-maintenance-accountability-gaps-soft-remount__fl-auditor-general-report-2021-096-fvrs-list-maintenance.pdf"}, {"title": "CRS R46943 — NVRA/HAVA list maintenance overview", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R46943/R46943.8.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-list-maintenance-accountability-gaps-soft-remount__crs-r46943-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-overview.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "fl-stat-101-131-party-candidate-designate-poll-watchers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-10", "uid": "C20260926-022920-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-10", "old_ids": ["fl-stat-101-131-party-candidate-designate-poll-watchers"], "seq": "C01055", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes a poll watcher; the poll watchers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Statutes §101.131 provides that each political party, each candidate, and certain issue committees may have poll watchers, but designations must be made in writing by the county party executive committee chair, political committee chair, or the candidate (on Division-prescribed forms, with deadlines before Election Day/early voting); the supervisor of elections approves the list. Ordinary citizens cannot simply \"apply\" independently—appointment authority is gated to party/candidate choosers. Status Confirmed statute text; peer to Texas Election Code §33.003 and Pennsylvania DOS party/candidate appointment guidance—Florida designation statute, not those remounted. PEP framing: watcher access is a controlled political appointment, not open citizen oversight of counting.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Senate — Fla. Stat. §101.131 Watchers at polls (2026)", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/101.131", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-101-131-party-candidate-designate-poll-watchers__florida-senate-fla-stat-101-131-watchers-at-polls-2026.png"}, {"title": "Online Sunshine — Fla. Stat. §101.131 Watchers at polls", "url": "https://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199%2F0101%2FSections%2F0101.131.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-101-131-party-candidate-designate-poll-watchers__online-sunshine-fla-stat-101-131-watchers-at-polls.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Poll Watchers appointment-gated leaf."}
{"id": "halderman-2021-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-15", "uid": "C20260925-234437-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-15", "old_ids": ["halderman-2021-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text"], "seq": "C00448", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the screen and the printout, but record the votes however you like in the database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "GA", "description": "Prof. J. Alex Halderman's Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X BMDs (Curling litigation) documents that scanners tabulate the QR/barcode payload rather than the human-readable contest text on the printout—so malware can make the barcode disagree with what the voter saw on screen and on the printed summary. Status Confirmed for the show-one-thing / record-another mechanism on BMD+barcode architectures. Soft companion to existing ga-bmd-qr / halderman-icx cards; mounts exact EVM leaf. PEP: hand-marked paper counted in public audits the marks voters made.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Halderman ICX security analysis (Curling docket PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1681.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-2021-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text__courtlistener-halderman-icx-security-analysis-curling-docket-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Halderman / VoterGA overview of Dominion ICX BMD flaws", "url": "https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Halderman-Dominion-ICX-BMD-Security-Analysis-Overview-.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-2021-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text__halderman-voterga-overview-of-dominion-icx-bmd-flaws.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 8.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "halderman-ga-icx-malware-can-be-installed-via-supply-chain-or-insider", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-33", "uid": "C20260925-234437-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-33", "old_ids": ["halderman-ga-icx-malware-can-be-installed-via-supply-chain-or-insider"], "seq": "C00466", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Such code is trivial for an insider to embed, or for an attacker who gains physical or supply-chain access to the firmware."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's ICX BMD analysis shows that once an attacker obtains physical or supply-chain access, malware can be installed that alters barcode payloads while presenting normal UI/printouts—matching the catalog claim that such code is trivial to embed by an insider or after physical/supply-chain access. Status Confirmed for the embed-after-access mechanism on fielded BMDs. Soft companion to existing Halderman ICX cards; mounts exact firmware-embed grandchild.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Halderman Security Analysis of Georgia ICX BMDs (PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1681.0.pdf"}, {"title": "VoterGA — Halderman Dominion ICX BMD Security Analysis Overview", "url": "https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/Halderman-Dominion-ICX-BMD-Security-Analysis-Overview-.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 17.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "halderman-icx-hp-laserjet-printer-firmware-alter-printed-ballot-qr-soft-remount-dots-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-14", "uid": "C20260925-235207-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-14", "old_ids": ["halderman-icx-hp-laserjet-printer-firmware-alter-printed-ballot-qr-soft-remount-dots-leaf"], "seq": "C00487", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "If the QR-code scheme is discovered, use what appear to be random dots on the page, which the programming watches for and acts on."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's ICX analysis shows an attacker who compromises the attached HP LaserJet (firmware/USB) can arbitrarily change what the BMD printer prints—including QR codes—illustrating that post-QR-detection attacks migrate into the print path where machine-readable marks (barcodes or other encoded patterns) drive tabulation. Status Confirmed for printer-path vote alteration after QR scrutiny; pairs with EFF yellow-dot steganography as the 'what appears as random dots' print-channel class.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman ICX analysis — printer compromise alters ballot QR/printout", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1591.1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-icx-hp-laserjet-printer-firmware-alter-printed-ballot-qr-soft-remount-dots-leaf__halderman-icx-analysis-printer-compromise-alters-ballot-qr-p.pdf"}, {"title": "EFF printer tracking dots project page", "url": "https://www.eff.org/pages/list-printers-which-do-or-do-not-display-tracking-dots", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-icx-hp-laserjet-printer-firmware-alter-printed-ballot-qr-soft-remount-dots-leaf__eff-printer-tracking-dots-project-page.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "halderman-icx-supply-chain-or-insider-malware-soft-remount-no-malicious-embedded-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-11", "uid": "C20260925-235207-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-11", "old_ids": ["halderman-icx-supply-chain-or-insider-malware-soft-remount-no-malicious-embedded-leaf"], "seq": "C00484", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That it has no malicious programming embedded in it"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman's ICX security analysis (Curling litigation) shows malware can be installed via supply chain or insider access and that hash validation and other ICX protections can be subverted—i.e., officials relying on black-box systems cannot independently assure absence of malicious embedded code without deep inspection they are not afforded. Status Confirmed for the demonstrated install/subversion path; not Confirmed as proof of live election malware deployment.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X BMDs (court/RECAP)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1591.1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-icx-supply-chain-or-insider-malware-soft-remount-no-malicious-embedded-leaf__halderman-security-analysis-of-georgia-s-imagecast-x-bmds-court-recap.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC trusted-build blog — VSTL source review (local officials do not)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted-build-and-why-it-used"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 6. Soft remount of existing Halderman supply-chain card onto exact empty pathKey.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "halderman-icx-supply-chain-printer-usb-malware-install-path-tabulation-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-27", "uid": "C20260925-235207-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-27", "old_ids": ["halderman-icx-supply-chain-printer-usb-malware-install-path-tabulation-leaf"], "seq": "C00500", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No supply-chain control or chain of custody"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "GA", "description": "Halderman documents ICX/printer compromise paths including supply-chain or storage/transport insertion of malicious hardware/firmware—counties lack end-to-end controllable CoC over vendor hardware, COTS printers, and USB components used in tabulation. Status Confirmed for demonstrated supply-chain attack surface on tabulation/BMD stacks.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman ICX — supply-chain/insider malware install", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1591.1.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Chain of Custody Best Practices", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/chain-custody-best-practices", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-icx-supply-chain-printer-usb-malware-install-path-tabulation-leaf__cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 14. Soft remount of existing supply-chain card onto exact Tabulation leaf."}
{"id": "nv-nac-r106-21-two-hour-hands-on-substitute-when-insufficient-time-for-approved-class", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-02", "uid": "C20260925-235207-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-02", "old_ids": ["nv-nac-r106-21-two-hour-hands-on-substitute-when-insufficient-time-for-approved-class"], "seq": "C00475", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Citizens who are trained are not trained properly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada's R106-21 implementing NRS 293.877 lets a clerk who determines staff lack time for an approved forensic signature class authorize another trained staffer to give the person at least two hours of hands-on signature-checking training instead. Status Confirmed that Nevada expressly contemplates a two-hour on-the-job substitute for the SOS-approved forensic class—again far below certified FDE schooling—supporting 'trained but not properly trained.'", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Register R106-21P — forensic signature class; 2-hour hands-on substitute", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Register/2021Register/R106-21P.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-nac-r106-21-two-hour-hands-on-substitute-when-insufficient-time-for-approved-class__nevada-register-r106-21p-forensic-signature-class-2-hour-hands-on-substitute.pdf"}, {"title": "NRS 293.877 — annual forensic signature verification training class", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-293.html#NRS293Sec877"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "nv-nrs-293-877-forensic-sig-class-not-abfde-certified-fde", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-01", "uid": "C20260925-234437-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-01", "old_ids": ["nv-nrs-293-877-forensic-sig-class-not-abfde-certified-fde"], "seq": "C00434", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Many citizen verifiers are not trained at all."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada NRS 293.877 requires county/city clerks and election staff whose duties include administering an election to complete an annual Secretary of State-approved 'forensic signature verification' training class (with a written test), and NAC regulations allow a clerk to authorize as little as about two hours of hands-on training by a previously trained staffer when a temporary worker lacks time for the full approved class before checking signatures. Status Confirmed that Nevada's statutory signature-verification workforce is trained via short SOS-approved classes—not via multi-year ABFDE forensic document examiner certification. Confirmed for the training-gap mechanism relative to professional FDE standards; not Confirmed that every verifier is 'untrained' in the colloquial sense.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Legislature — NRS 293.877 Training on forensic signature verification", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/NRS-293.html#NRS293Sec877"}, {"title": "Nevada Register — R106-21P proposed regulation on approved forensic signature classes / 2-hour hands-on exception (PDF)", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Register/2021Register/R106-21P.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-nrs-293-877-forensic-sig-class-not-abfde-certified-fde__nevada-register-r106-21p-proposed-regulation-on-approved-forensic-signature-clas.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 1. Soft companion to existing ga-signature-match / mit-epi / az-ars-16-550 cards on Signature Verification parent."}
{"id": "co-sos-rule10-canvass-board-clerk-fills-when-party-fails-appoint", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-14", "uid": "C20260926-021547-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-14", "old_ids": ["co-sos-rule10-canvass-board-clerk-fills-when-party-fails-appoint"], "seq": "C00977", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to \"forget\" to notify (Republican) party chairs to appoint canvass board members, so the clerks can appoint them on the party's behalf."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021/2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Secretary of State Election Rule 10 (8 CCR 1505-1) operationalizes C.R.S. §1-10-101 canvass-board appointment: major-party chairs certify nominees, and when a party fails to certify or a vacancy remains, the county clerk (or deputy) sits on / fills the board pathway—creating the statutory/regulatory opening for clerk-side appointment when party notification/appointment does not occur. Status Confirmed SOS rule encoding clerk fill-when-party-fails pathway; peer to CRS §1-10-101 notify/vacancy text and Broomfield local practice cards—Rule 10 detail, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Election Rule 10 Canvass (8 CCR 1505-1) PDF", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/Rule10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-rule10-canvass-board-clerk-fills-when-party-fails-appoint__colorado-sos-election-rule-10-canvass-8-ccr-1505-1-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "C.R.S. §1-10-101 — Canvass board appointment; party chair notify; clerk fill vacancy pathway", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/general-primary-recall-and-congressional-vacancy-elections/article-10/part-1/section-1-10-101/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Instruct clerks to forget to notify party chairs canvass leaf."}
{"id": "il-10-ilcs-5-19-6-drop-box-cameras-not-required-by-statute", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-12", "uid": "C20260926-013447-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-12", "old_ids": ["il-10-ilcs-5-19-6-drop-box-cameras-not-required-by-statute"], "seq": "C00871", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Many boxes required to have surveillance cameras do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-2026", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois 10 ILCS 5/19-6 authorizes election authorities to maintain secure vote-by-mail collection sites locked so only election-authority personnel can open them, and directs the State Board of Elections to establish additional security guidelines—but the statute itself does not mandate 24-hour video cameras on drop boxes. Board guidance and local practice often recommend or voluntarily deploy surveillance (e.g., some counties advertise cameras), yet the legal floor remains locks plus Board guidelines. Status Confirmed for Illinois as a peer jurisdiction where drop-box cameras are not statutorily mandatory—alongside California's 'if feasible' language and OR/WA non-mandate patterns on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Illinois General Assembly — 10 ILCS 5/19-6 (collection sites; locks; Board guidelines; no camera mandate)", "url": "https://ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/001000050K19-6.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-19-6-drop-box-cameras-not-required-by-statute__illinois-general-assembly-10-ilcs-5-19-6-collection-sit.png"}, {"title": "FindLaw — Illinois Statutes 10 ILCS 5/19-6", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/il/chapter-10-elections/il-st-sect-10-5-19-6/"}, {"title": "WBEZ — Everything You Need To Know About Voting Drop Boxes In Illinois (security practice context)", "url": "https://www.wbez.org/politics/2020/10/16/everything-you-need-to-know-about-voting-drop-boxes-in-illinois", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-19-6-drop-box-cameras-not-required-by-statute__wbez-everything-you-need-to-know-about-voting-drop-boxe.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on drop-box cameras not mandated leaf."}
{"id": "nv-nrs-mail-ballot-receipt-fourth-day-after-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-11", "uid": "C20260926-013447-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-11", "old_ids": ["nv-nrs-mail-ballot-receipt-fourth-day-after-election-day"], "seq": "C00870", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting after Election Day lets bad actors make final adjustments to the results by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-2026", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada law (NRS ch. 293 mail-ballot provisions, as implemented by county clerks including Clark County) treats mailed ballots as timely if postmarked by Election Day and received by 5 p.m. on the fourth day after Election Day; related regulations create a receipt presumption when the postmark is missing/undeterminable if the ballot arrives by 5 p.m. on the third day after Election Day. Status Confirmed for a standing statutory/regulatory post-Election Day receipt window—peer to Pennsylvania's 2020 three-day court extension and North Carolina's 2020 board extension, but as ongoing Nevada code practice rather than a one-off COVID order. Catalog claim that after-ED receipt enables last-minute injection remains a risk framing, not a proven 2026 fraud event.", "sources": [{"title": "Clark County Elections — Mail Ballots (receipt/postmark practice)", "url": "https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/departments/elections/services/mb", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-nrs-mail-ballot-receipt-fourth-day-after-election-day__clark-county-elections-mail-ballots-receipt-postmark-pr.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Table 11: Receipt and Postmark Deadlines for Absentee/Mail Ballots", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-11-receipt-and-postmark-deadlines-for-absentee-mail-ballots"}, {"title": "Nevada Legislature — NRS Chapter 293 Elections (mail ballot provisions)", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Division/Legal/LawLibrary/nrs/NRS-293.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on Election 'Day' after-ED mail receipt leaf."}
{"id": "doj-garland-election-threats-task-force-2000-plus-referrals", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-14", "uid": "C20260926-022920-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-14", "old_ids": ["doj-garland-election-threats-task-force-2000-plus-referrals"], "seq": "C01059", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit attorneys, election officials, legislators, judges, and others to dissuade them and anyone else from getting involved."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ's Election Threats Task Force (convened mid-2021; Attorney General Garland remarks and DOJ updates through 2024) was created to address surging threats, harassment, and intimidation against election officials, workers, and related justice-system actors—reporting review of roughly 2,000+ threat referrals with a smaller set of federal prosecutions—documenting a sustained targeting climate that deters participation. Status Confirmed DOJ program + published threat-volume reporting; peer to ETF creation card and Reuters U.S. Marshals judicial-threat surge on this leaf—referral-volume/update metrics, not those remounted. PEP framing: intimidation of officials and attorneys shrinks the pool willing to defend transparent counting reforms.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Delivers Remarks at the Election Threats Task Force Meeting", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/speech/attorney-general-merrick-b-garland-delivers-remarks-election-threats-task-force-meeting"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ task force, formed in 2021 to fight election threats, has brought only 20 cases (referral volume reporting)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Target/attack attorneys/officials leaf."}
{"id": "fl-stat-101-131-poll-watcher-county-residency", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-04", "uid": "C20261009-124707-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-04", "old_ids": ["fl-stat-101-131-poll-watcher-county-residency"], "seq": "C01356", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-2024", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Statutes § 101.131 (Watchers at polls) states that each poll watcher \"shall be a qualified and registered elector of the county in which he or she serves,\" while allowing designated watchers to observe polling rooms and early-voting areas within that county subject to numerical and conduct limits. Parties, issue committees, and candidates designate watchers on prescribed forms by statutory deadlines; supervisors approve the lists. Status Confirmed for Florida's county-elector residency requirement for poll watchers—another state-level gate that confines trained observers to their home county and reduces cross-county watcher mobility. Soft companion to PA and NY residency cards on the Poll Watchers stub.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Statutes § 101.131 — Watchers at polls (Florida Senate 2024)", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/laws/statutes/2024/101.131"}, {"title": "Online Sunshine — Fla. Stat. § 101.131", "url": "https://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100-0199%2F0101%2FSections%2F0101.131.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Thickens Poll Watchers stub with a third-state residency statute (primary code)."}
{"id": "mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-absentee-rejection-reason-gatekeeper", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-19", "uid": "C20260925-214102-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-19", "old_ids": ["mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-absentee-rejection-reason-gatekeeper"], "seq": "C00342", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Serves as the gatekeeper against fraudulent ballots entering the system"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-12-16", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "MIT Election Lab / Elections Performance Index analysis of 2020 EAVS data shows signature problems are a primary gate on which returned absentee/mail ballots enter the counted set: in signature-only verification states, signature mismatch accounted for ~39% of categorized rejections (~0.30% of returned absentees). Curing statutes sharply change the gate's selectivity (curing states 0.67% rejection vs 1.10% without). Status Confirmed that signature verification is the operational gatekeeper deciding which mail ballots count — without asserting that every rejection is fraudulent or every acceptance is clean.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT EPI — Deep Dive into Absentee Ballot Rejection 2020", "url": "https://elections-blog.mit.edu/articles/deep-dive-absentee-ballot-rejection-2020-general-election"}, {"title": "MIT/Healthy Elections — Signature Verification overview PDF", "url": "https://web.mit.edu/healthyelections/www/sites/default/files/2021-06/Signature_Verification.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/Research/2020EAVS.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-absentee-rejection-reason-gatekeeper__eac-2020-election-administration-and-voting-survey.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 10. Gatekeeper Confirmed as process; fraud throughput not Confirmed."}
{"id": "king-v-whitmer-attorney-fee-sanctions-chill-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-25", "uid": "C20260925-194013-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-25", "old_ids": ["king-v-whitmer-attorney-fee-sanctions-chill-2021"], "seq": "C00209", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Out-lawyer citizens so they cannot afford representation to fight on equal terms."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-12-02", "state": "MI / Federal", "description": "In King v. Whitmer (E.D. Mich.), the district court sanctioned plaintiffs' counsel after the 2020 Michigan election challenge, ordering payment of roughly $22k to state defendants and ~$153k to the City of Detroit (later reduced on Sixth Circuit appeal but largely affirmed as to amounts against most counsel). Large fee awards against election-challenge counsel raise the cost and chill availability of representation for citizen challenges. Status Confirmed for six-figure fee sanctions in an election challenge; merits of the underlying fraud claims are not re-litigated here.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — King v. Whitmer sanctions opinion/order (ECF 179)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.350905/gov.uscourts.mied.350905.179.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-attorney-fee-sanctions-chill-2021__courtlistener-king-v-whitmer-sanctions-opinion-order-ecf-179.pdf"}, {"title": "Sixth Circuit — King v. Whitmer fee appeal disposition (ECF 207 host)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.350905/gov.uscourts.mied.350905.207.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-attorney-fee-sanctions-chill-2021__sixth-circuit-king-v-whitmer-fee-appeal-disposition-ecf-207.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 12. Fee sanctions Confirmed cost chill on election counsel."}
{"id": "brick-nj-ocean-county-dropbox-30day-overwrite-2021", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-02", "uid": "C20261002-123208-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-02", "old_ids": ["brick-nj-ocean-county-dropbox-30day-overwrite-2021"], "seq": "C01318", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11", "state": "NJ", "description": "After the Nov. 2, 2021 general election, Ocean County officials acknowledged that surveillance footage of the Brick Township municipal-building vote-by-mail drop box could not be produced for OPRA requesters because Brick’s municipal camera system was set to a ~30-day overwrite cycle (after hard-drive replacements defaulted retention). County Administrator Carl Block told Patch that the county first contacted Brick about obtaining the Nov. 2 footage on Jan. 14, 2022—well after the 30-day window—so Election Day drop-box video was gone; Ocean County said its other 18 drop-box sites retained footage under county control. Status Confirmed for the official admission that Brick drop-box surveillance was overwritten/unavailable for public inspection; intentional fraud not claimed.", "sources": [{"title": "Patch — Brick Ballot Drop Box Video Complaint Unfounded: County Official (Mar. 30, 2022)", "url": "https://patch.com/new-jersey/brick/brick-ballot-drop-box-video-complaint-unfounded-county-official"}, {"title": "Asbury Park Press / NorthJersey coverage of Brick drop-box surveillance loss (Mar. 2022)", "url": "https://www.northjersey.com/story/news/local/ocean-county/2022/03/24/ballot-box-election-integrity-question-brick-nj-surveillance-lost/7087473001/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Confirmed overwrite gap; peer Sayreville/Erie—Brick Ocean County, not remounted."}
{"id": "mit-election-lab-2021-national-election-results-archive-precinct-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-15", "uid": "C20260926-021547-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-15", "old_ids": ["mit-election-lab-2021-national-election-results-archive-precinct-gaps"], "seq": "C00978", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no public place where all totals are posted transparently."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11", "state": "US", "description": "MIT Election Lab / Stephanie Singer (ESRA 2021) It's Time for a US National Election Results Archive documents that the U.S. still has no single free official archive of candidate vote totals at precinct granularity—researchers must scrape heterogeneous state/local publications, often from PDFs—because jurisdictions publish in whatever format they choose. Status Confirmed absence of a transparent national precinct-results posting place; peer to OpenElections and Nature Scientific Data precinct-collection gap papers—MIT Election Lab archive call, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT Election Lab — It's Time for a US National Election Results Archive (Singer 2021)", "url": "https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/its-time-us-national-election-results-archive", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-election-lab-2021-national-election-results-archive-precinct-gaps__mit-election-lab-it-s-time-for-a-us-national-election-results-archive-singer-2.png"}, {"title": "MIT Election Lab — Mismatched: The Trouble with Making a National Precinct Return Shapefile", "url": "https://electionlab.mit.edu/articles/mismatched-trouble-making-national-precinct-return-shapefile", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-election-lab-2021-national-election-results-archive-precinct-gaps__mit-election-lab-mismatched-the-trouble-with-making-a-national-precinct-return.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on No public place that all totals are transparently posted leaf."}
{"id": "watchung-nj-miller-dropbox-footage-30day-destroyed-2021", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-03", "uid": "C20261002-123208-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-03", "old_ids": ["watchung-nj-miller-dropbox-footage-30day-destroyed-2021"], "seq": "C01319", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11", "state": "NJ", "description": "In Miller v. Borough of Watchung (N.J. GRC Complaint No. 2022-241, Administrative Disposition), the Custodian certified that no responsive drop-box/election camera footage existed for the requester’s OPRA: cameras were not installed for all but the 2021 general election, and the only 2021 general-election footage (covering roughly Oct. 3–Nov. 3, 2021) had been destroyed on a thirty-day overwrite cycle well before the May 23, 2022 OPRA request. The GRC dismissed the complaint because no responsive records existed at the time of the request. Status Confirmed for official certification that Watchung drop-box/election camera footage was destroyed on a short retention cycle (and cameras were not always present)—leaving the public with no later access; does not prove ballot stuffing.", "sources": [{"title": "N.J. GRC — Miller v. Borough of Watchung (Somerset), 2022-241 (AD) PDF", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/grc/decisions/pdf/2022-241.pdf"}, {"title": "N.J. GRC Decisions Search (Complaint No. 2022-241)", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/cgi-bin/dca/grc/decisionsearch.pl"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Confirmed 30-day destruction / no-footage response; peer Brick/Sayreville—Watchung GRC AD, not remounted."}
{"id": "eac-ballot-reconciliation-ballots-cast-vs-voters-checked-in", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-03", "uid": "C20260926-010219-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-03", "old_ids": ["eac-ballot-reconciliation-ballots-cast-vs-voters-checked-in"], "seq": "C00836", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Distribution", "Do not choose records in the same precinct; distribute them across precincts where there is room. Stay under 100% voter participation so the injections do not stand out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC Quick Start Guide on Election Day Ballot Reconciliation instructs officials to compare total ballots cast to total voters checked in (accounting for provisionals), document mismatches, and reconcile before certification — making precincts where ballots/credited voters approach or exceed available participation room stick out in canvass. Directly underwrites the leaf's 'STAY UNDER 100% VOTER PARTICIPATION so the injections don't stick out' operational constraint. Status Confirmed for the official reconciliation rule that detects over-participation; does not prove any specific cabal injection scheme.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Ballot Reconciliation: Election Day Quick Start Guide (Nov 2021)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Ballot_Reconciliation_Election%20Day_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-ballot-reconciliation-ballots-cast-vs-voters-checked-in__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Guide to the Canvass (post-election reconciliation companion)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/postelection/Guide_to_the_Canvass_EAC.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-ballot-reconciliation-ballots-cast-vs-voters-checked-in__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 2. Official reconciliation = why >100% / no-room precincts stick out."}
{"id": "orourke-v-dominion-fielder-walker-rule11-sanctions-frivolous", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-13", "uid": "C20260926-001426-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-13", "old_ids": ["orourke-v-dominion-fielder-walker-rule11-sanctions-frivolous"], "seq": "C00606", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may bait honest citizens into frivolous lawsuits to discredit and demoralize the group."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-22", "state": "CO", "description": "In O'Rourke v. Dominion (D. Colo.), attorneys Gary Fielder and Ernest Walker were ordered to pay substantial Rule 11 / fee sanctions (Dominion, Facebook, CTCL, state defendants; later affirmed by 10th Cir. 2022; SCOTUS denied review 2023) after a sprawling post-2020 election suit was found frivolous—illustrating how election-integrity lawsuits can end in fee awards that financially demoralize counsel and chill similar grassroots litigation. Status Confirmed for sanctions outcome; does not adjudicate every 2020 claim.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — O'Rourke fee/sanctions order (D. Colo.)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.cod.203235/gov.uscourts.cod.203235.169.0_1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/orourke-v-dominion-fielder-walker-rule11-sanctions-frivolous__courtlistener-recap-o-rourke-fee-sanctions-order-d-colo.pdf"}, {"title": "10th Circuit opinion affirming sanctions (Dec 13, 2022)", "url": "https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca10/21-1442/21-1442-2022-12-13.pdf?ts=1670951008", "local": "/archives/2026/09/orourke-v-dominion-fielder-walker-rule11-sanctions-frivolous__10th-circuit-opinion-affirming-sanctions-dec-13-2022.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 7. Honest: sanctions Confirmed; 'bait by cabal' motive Alleged beyond court findings.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "dc-auditor-2021-undeliverable-mail-ballots-11pct4-vs-national", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-34", "uid": "C20260926-005107-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-34", "old_ids": ["dc-auditor-2021-undeliverable-mail-ballots-11pct4-vs-national"], "seq": "C00827", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS then returns far fewer undelivered ballots to the county, and the county typically reports that smaller number."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-16", "state": "DC", "description": "D.C. Auditor's 2020 election administration audit found 48,018 of 421,791 mail ballots (11.4%) returned as undeliverable — more than eight times the ~1.4% national EAVS average — and those figures appeared in the official audit/report to the city. Demonstrates that when undeliverable volume is large, it is the returned-to-jurisdiction count that jurisdictions report. Status Confirmed for audited undeliverable volume reflected in official reporting.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of the D.C. Auditor — 2020 Election Administration report landing", "url": "https://dcauditor.org/report/elections-administration-11-16-21/"}, {"title": "NPR — Audit finds high number of D.C. mail ballots returned as undeliverable in 2020", "url": "https://www.npr.org/local/2021/11/17/1056487637/audit-finds-high-number-of-d-c-mail-ballots-returned-as-undeliverable-in-2020"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "cis-crowdstrike-ei-isac-endpoint-security-sltt-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-26", "uid": "C20260925-185839-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-26", "old_ids": ["cis-crowdstrike-ei-isac-endpoint-security-sltt-2021"], "seq": "C00177", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Instead of handling security locally, many counties and states outsource it, which creates risk and displaces responsibility."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-04", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CrowdStrike's Nov. 4, 2021 press release announces CIS selected CrowdStrike as premier partner for endpoint security, offering fully managed CIS Endpoint Security Services powered by CrowdStrike Falcon to U.S. state, local, tribal, and territorial governments—including expansion of protections previously used for the Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC) and MS-ISAC members (press materials cite 12,000+ members / millions of endpoints). Local election offices thus outsource 24/7 managed detection/response rather than operating purely local SOCs. Status Confirmed for widespread outsourcing of election-adjacent government cybersecurity to CIS/CrowdStrike managed services (typically administrative networks, not ballot scanners).", "sources": [{"title": "CrowdStrike — CIS selects CrowdStrike as premier endpoint security partner", "url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/en-us/press-releases/center-for-internet-security-selects-crowdstrike-as-premier-endpoint-security-partner/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-crowdstrike-ei-isac-endpoint-security-sltt-2021__crowdstrike-cis-selects-crowdstrike-as-premier-endpoint-secu.png"}, {"title": "CIS — Election Security Tools & Resources / EI-ISAC", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-crowdstrike-ei-isac-endpoint-security-sltt-2021__cis-election-security-tools-resources-ei-isac.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 12. Outsourcing Confirmed."}
{"id": "oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-04", "uid": "C20261009-105430-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-04", "old_ids": ["oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes"], "seq": "C01337", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-02", "state": "OH", "description": "In Ohio's Nov. 2, 2021 election, Franklin County's e-pollbook vendor 'failed to include (updated) absentee voter history data from approximately 13,604 voters,' affecting about 20 of 323 polling places. A voter who had voted early went to the polls with a spouse to check that their votes were recorded. The e-pollbook showed no early vote for one of them, so that voter was allowed to vote again on a regular ballot instead of a provisional. The voter reported it to the Secretary of State, whose investigation found three people had each cast two ballots. The SOS placed the board under administrative oversight; a remediation plan after 2020 e-pollbook problems had not prevented a repeat. Ohio rule: an absentee requester at the polls must vote provisional, so the failure came from bad pollbook data plus a regular ballot being issued. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Columbus Dispatch — Franklin County allowed three voters to vote twice (Nov. 4, 2021)", "url": "https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/politics/2021/11/04/ohio-elections-franklin-county-allowed-three-voters-vote-twice/6291242001/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Moved 2026-10-26 to 9 > Electronic Poll Books > Database gap exploitation because the source places the failure in the e-pollbook absentee voter-history data load.", "related": ["ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb", "wi-madison-2024-pollbooks-printed-early-manual-highlight-absentee-returned", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered"]}
{"id": "utah-slco-rcv-certified-software-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-02", "uid": "C20260925-183614-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-02", "old_ids": ["utah-slco-rcv-certified-software-2021"], "seq": "C00090", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "RCV is a bad idea for many reasons. One is that it is so complicated that it requires computer tabulation and locks us into it; that alone is reason to reject it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-11-02", "state": "UT", "description": "Salt Lake County Clerk Sherrie Swensen told KUTV that for Utah's municipal ranked-choice pilot (nine cities in the 2021 general, later expanded), the county tabulated RCV with newly deployed EAC-certified election software that applies an algorithm across ranked choices—distinct from simple first-preference precinct hand counts. Utah County Clerk Aaron Davidson similarly confirmed county RCV tabulation for Lehi under the state pilot statute (bottoms-up primary vs majority general methods). Status Confirmed that Utah pilot RCV rounds are administered via certified computer tabulation software at the county level. RCV complexity (multi-round elimination / multi-seat methods) locks jurisdictions into machine tabulation; PEP transparent full hand count is the contrast, not a claim that hand counts cannot work.", "sources": [{"title": "KUTV/KJZZ — How rank choice votes are counted (Salt Lake County certified software)", "url": "https://kjzz.com/news/how-rank-choice-votes-are-counted"}, {"title": "Lehi Free Press — City discovers RCV tabulation oversight; Utah County Clerk performs RCV", "url": "https://lehifreepress.com/2023/08/10/city-discovers-rcv-tabulation-oversight-in-primary-vs-general-elections/"}, {"title": "KUER — Utah RCV pilot cities 2023 (12 cities including Salt Lake City)", "url": "https://www.kuer.org/politics-government/2023-11-01/new-to-ranked-choice-voting-heres-how-it-works"}], "notes": "Part A enrich me-ak-rcv leaf. Utah county-administered RCV via certified software."}
{"id": "pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-16", "uid": "C20261028-132233-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-16", "old_ids": ["pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots"], "seq": "C01611", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Covertly link \"secret\" ballots back to voters through serialization and tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-10-21", "state": "PA", "description": "Allegheny County said on Oct. 21, 2021, that a \"vendor calibration issue\" printed the voter barcode on the inner secrecy envelope instead of the outer declaration envelope for some mail ballots; the issue had been found in 30 of 36,000 returned ballots (0.08 percent). [1] The county said: \"The vendor, NPC Inc. of Claysburg, PA, advised that the ballot packet is collated by a machine,\" and the barcode carried a nine-digit number and the voter's name. The county sought legal remedies to count the affected ballots while preserving voter privacy. [1] Status Confirmed: county statement.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Pittsburgh — Allegheny County voter envelope error: barcode printed on secrecy envelope (Oct. 21, 2021)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/allegheny-county-voter-envelope-error/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. Vendor tag NPC (NPC Inc. of Claysburg, PA, ballot-packet printer named in the county statement; Mark t485u, 2026-10-28: envelope and mail-ballot vendors are tagged when a source names them).", "vendor": ["NPC"], "related": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "pa-westmoreland-2026-10-157-duplicate-mail-ballots-npc-vendor-delay"]}
{"id": "pa-lycoming-2021-2026-honey-cvr-request-denied-until-supreme-court", "permanent_id": "C20261026-123214-01", "uid": "C20261026-123214-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-123214-01", "old_ids": ["pa-lycoming-2021-2026-honey-cvr-request-denied-until-supreme-court"], "seq": "C01561", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-10-20 (request); 2022-12-16 (trial court orders release); 2024 (Commonwealth Court en banc reverses); 2026-04-28 (Pa. Supreme Court holds CVRs public)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Oct. 20, 2021, Heather Honey asked the Lycoming County Office of Voter Services under Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know Law for a digital copy of the cast vote record (CVR) file from every precinct tabulator and the central tabulator used in the 2020 general election. Lycoming County runs the ClearVote election-management system, and its CVR is a spreadsheet of the raw data recorded for each ballot. Voter Services denied the request, saying the CVRs were the \"contents\" of ballot boxes and voting machines that Section 308 of the Election Code (25 P.S. 2648) keeps from public view. Its election director, Forrest Lehman, told the Office of Open Records that \"reviewing a CVR is the digital equivalent of inspecting the contents of a ballot box, one ballot at a time,\" and the OOR denied Honey's appeal. The Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas then held on Dec. 16, 2022, that the CVRs were public records and ordered their release, but the Secretary of the Commonwealth, Al Schmidt, appealed, and in 2024 a divided en banc panel of the Commonwealth Court reversed and kept the records closed (Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services, 312 A.3d 942). On April 28, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding that CVRs are not the contents of ballot boxes or voting machines and must be open to inspection by qualified electors under the Election Code. Status Confirmed: the request, the denial and each ruling are recited in the Supreme Court's opinion. Catalog point: the record that would let citizens check the machine count ballot by ballot was kept from the public for four and a half years after the request, through the 2022 and 2024 elections. Paper ballots hand counted in public at each precinct produce their tally sheets the same night, with nothing to request.", "sources": [{"title": "Supreme Court of Pennsylvania — Honey v. Lycoming County Offices of Voter Services, No. 79 MAP 2024, majority opinion (J-45-2025; via Office of Open Records docket)", "url": "https://www.openrecords.pa.gov/Appeals/DocketGetFile.cfm?id=269953"}, {"title": "Justia — Honey v. Lycoming Co. Offices of Voter Svcs. (Pa. 2026)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2026/79-map-2024.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-26 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to az-hudson-cvr-reporting-2024 on this CVR-access leaf (1 -> 2). Same case is carded on the 'feign confusion over information requests' leaf (pa-honey-v-lycoming-2024-... and pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-...) for the definitional argument; this card documents the four-year block on CVR access itself. Vendor not tagged (ClearVote named only as the county's system). OOR opinion PDF and Justia curl 200; facts checked against the opinion text.", "vendor": ["Clear Ballot"], "vendor_models": ["Clear Ballot ClearVote"]}
{"id": "nsba-2021-letter-garland-memo-parents-targeted-ranks-conservatives", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-06", "uid": "C20260926-034259-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-06", "old_ids": ["nsba-2021-letter-garland-memo-parents-targeted-ranks-conservatives"], "seq": "C01246", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Targeting of conservative and Republican officials and activists"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-10-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "NSBA's Sept. 29, 2021 letter to President Biden asked federal intervention against school-board protesters and characterized some incidents as potentially 'domestic terrorism' / hate crimes under the PATRIOT Act; five days later (Oct. 4) AG Garland's DOJ memo directed FBI and U.S. Attorneys to convene district meetings and open threat-reporting channels regarding threats against school administrators/board members—documenting a federalized targeting pathway that swept in parents (often conservative/Republican) opposing curriculum policies. NSBA later apologized (Oct. 22). Status Confirmed primary NSBA letter + Garland memo sequence. Peer to Virginia Project ranks-targeted and Loudoun 'Anti-Racist Parents' hit-list cards already on this leaf—NSBA/DOJ federal-framing instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: intimidation that chills parent/citizen oversight of institutions is the opposite of open precinct hand counts anyone can watch.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — AG Garland memo on threats against school administrators/board members (Oct. 4, 2021)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/d9/pages/attachments/2021/10/04/partnership_among_federal_state_local_tribal_and_territorial_law_enforcement_to_address_threats_against_school_administrators_board_members_teachers_and_staff_0_0.pdf"}, {"title": "Defending Education — NSBA Sept. 29, 2021 letter to President Biden (archived PDF correspondence)", "url": "https://defendinged.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Email-Correspondence_NSBA-Letter-to-President-Biden_Redacted.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nsba-2021-letter-garland-memo-parents-targeted-ranks-conservatives__defending-education-nsba-sept-29-2021-letter-to-president-biden-archived-pdf-correspondence.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Intimidation ranks-targeted leaf (non-VP/non-Loudoun hit-list)."}
{"id": "ca-ab37-2021-permanent-vbm-branded-strengthening-elections-integrity", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-03", "uid": "C20260925-214102-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-03", "old_ids": ["ca-ab37-2021-permanent-vbm-branded-strengthening-elections-integrity"], "seq": "C00326", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They disguise bills that contain Trojan horses."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-09-27", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 37 (Berman), signed Sept. 27, 2021, permanently requires counties to mail a vote-by-mail ballot to every active registered voter. The Governor's official signing release headlines the measure as 'Strengthening Elections Integrity' while the operative change is permanent universal mail-ballot distribution — packaging a major voting-method expansion inside integrity/transparency branding alongside other bills in the same package. Status Confirmed for integrity-branded packaging of a structural mail-ballot expansion (not a claim that every cosponsor acted in bad faith).", "sources": [{"title": "CA Governor — AB37 permanent VBM; headline 'Strengthening Elections Integrity'", "url": "https://www.gov.ca.gov/2021/09/27/governor-newsom-signs-landmark-elections-legislation-making-vote-by-mail-ballots-permanent-for-every-registered-voter-strengthening-elections-integrity/"}, {"title": "California Legislature — AB 37 bill information", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220AB37", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab37-2021-permanent-vbm-branded-strengthening-elections-integrity__california-legislature-ab-37-bill-information.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 2. Trojan/disguise = integrity branding wrapping permanent VBM; PEP notes mail expansion increases machine/consolidation dependency."}
{"id": "bakala-v-krupa-crowds-on-demand-astroturf-court-findings", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-04", "uid": "C20260926-001426-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-04", "old_ids": ["bakala-v-krupa-crowds-on-demand-astroturf-court-findings"], "seq": "C00597", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Artificial crowd generation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-09-20", "state": "SC", "description": "In Bakala v. Krupa (D.S.C. 9:18-cv-02590), court findings describe Crowds on Demand LLC as an 'astroturfing' company hired to organize paid-actor protests and smear campaigns meant to appear grassroots—including protests near a home and children's school. Status Confirmed for judicial recognition of paid artificial-crowd / astroturf protest capability in US litigation.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Bakala v. Krupa findings (Crowds on Demand astroturf)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.scd.245575/gov.uscourts.scd.245575.210.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/bakala-v-krupa-crowds-on-demand-astroturf-court-findings__courtlistener-recap-bakala-v-krupa-findings-crowds-on-demand-astroturf.pdf"}, {"title": "LA Times — Crowds on Demand paid protesters / extortion suit reporting", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-crowds-extortion-20181021-story.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "eac-trusted-build-blog-officials-verify-hashes-not-inspect-source-under-hood", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-09", "uid": "C20260925-235207-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-09", "old_ids": ["eac-trusted-build-blog-officials-verify-hashes-not-inspect-source-under-hood"], "seq": "C00482", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That the software running on their systems is what was originally tested"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-09-16", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's trusted-build explainer states VSTLs—not local officials—review manufacturer source code, witness the trusted build, and produce hashes so officials can later verify that deployed software matches the certified version. Local officials are not given public source inspection; they rely on hash/system-ID tools against VSTL-known-good hashes. Status Confirmed that the certification model deliberately keeps 'under the hood' source review at the VSTL tier while locals only hash-match to the originally tested build.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — What is a trusted build and why is it used?", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted-build-and-why-it-used", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-trusted-build-blog-officials-verify-hashes-not-inspect-source-under-hood__eac-what-is-a-trusted-build-and-why-is-it-used.png"}, {"title": "EAC NOC 12-02 — System ID tool hashes vs known/good (for officials)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/NOC12-02-Clarification%20of%20System%20ID%20Tool%20Functionality%20FINAL%204.19.12.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-trusted-build-blog-officials-verify-hashes-not-inspect-source-under-hood__eac-noc-12-02-system-id-tool-hashes-vs-known-good-for-officials.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 5. Soft companion to fill-20c trusted-build / VSTL cards on adjacent Software leaves."}
{"id": "eac-trusted-build-origin-of-software-coc-locals-inherit-vendor-vstl-chain", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-28", "uid": "C20260925-235207-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-28", "old_ids": ["eac-trusted-build-origin-of-software-coc-locals-inherit-vendor-vstl-chain"], "seq": "C00501", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No supply-chain control or chain of custody"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-09-16", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC states the trusted build is 'the origin of the chain of custody for software components'—meaning local jurisdictions inherit CoC from manufacturer→VSTL→EAC rather than controlling the full software/hardware supply chain themselves. Status Confirmed that counties do not independently control the upstream supply chain for certified tabulation software.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — trusted build as origin of software CoC", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted-build-and-why-it-used"}, {"title": "EAC NOC 16-02 Trusted Build", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/NOC.1602.TrustedBuild.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-trusted-build-origin-of-software-coc-locals-inherit-vendor-vstl-chain__eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "dominion-santa-clara-cpra-trade-secret-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-06", "uid": "C20260925-184601-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-06", "old_ids": ["dominion-santa-clara-cpra-trade-secret-2021"], "seq": "C00124", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Intellectual property: they claim the database backups contain intellectual property."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-08", "state": "CA", "description": "In August 2021 Dominion Voting Systems sued Santa Clara County in Superior Court seeking a writ to block CPRA release of materials Dominion marked confidential/proprietary—including audited financial statements and proprietary technical/functional voting-system information—invoking California trade-secret / commercial-confidentiality exemptions. Status Confirmed that the vendor used IP/trade-secret claims to resist public-records disclosure of voting-system-related materials; the leaf's broader 'database backups' framing is adjacent (same IP-excuse pattern used against election-system records).", "sources": [{"title": "Courthouse News — Dominion sues Santa Clara to block public records", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/dominion-voting-systems-sues-santa-clara-county-to-block-release-of-public-records/"}, {"title": "Complaint PDF (Courthouse News mirror)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Dominion.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-santa-clara-cpra-trade-secret-2021__complaint-pdf-courthouse-news-mirror.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 3. Vendor IP/trade-secret denial pattern.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "eac-eavs-2020-undeliverable-1pct4-county-reports", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-33", "uid": "C20260926-005107-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-33", "old_ids": ["eac-eavs-2020-undeliverable-1pct4-county-reports"], "seq": "C00826", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS then returns far fewer undelivered ballots to the county, and the county typically reports that smaller number."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-08-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report states that of domestic civilian mailed ballots transmitted, about 1.4% were returned to election officials as undeliverable — i.e., counties' official EAVS figures reflect the undeliverable volume USPS returns to them. Soft remount of UAA/undeliverable corpus family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for EAVS-reported undeliverable rates that counties report; leaf's implication that USPS secretly withholds a larger true undeliverable pile Alleged beyond the EAVS record.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — 2020 EAVS Comprehensive Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-eavs-2020-undeliverable-1pct4-county-reports__eac---2020-eavs-comprehensive-report--pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS Pub 632 — State and Local Election Mail User's Guide (UAA/return handling)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-eavs-2020-undeliverable-1pct4-county-reports__usps-pub-632---state-and-local-election-mail-user-s-guide--uaa-return-handling.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 17. Standing skip Mark USPS worker anecdotes NOT used."}
{"id": "ca-placer-2021-09-14-recall-return-envelope-hole-no-oval-visible-registrar-acknowledged", "permanent_id": "C20261113-122945-01", "uid": "C20261113-122945-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-122945-01", "old_ids": ["ca-placer-2021-09-14-recall-return-envelope-hole-no-oval-visible-registrar-acknowledged"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-08 to 2021-09-14 (California gubernatorial recall election, vote-by-mail period)", "state": "CA", "description": "For the Sept. 14, 2021 California gubernatorial recall election, the Placer County Elections Office (Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of Voters Ryan Ronco) publicly acknowledged that the recall ballot 'can be inserted into the return envelope in such a way that the oval associated with a NO vote can be seen through a hole punched in the envelope.' The office called it 'an unfortunate and truly random coincidence,' told voters to insert the ballot in an orientation that does not align the NO oval with the pre-punched hole, to fold the ballot in reverse, to put a piece of paper between the ballot and the envelope, or to vote in person, and said it would consider making the hole smaller or adjusting ballot production in future elections. The office explained that the hole exists so staff can show observers that every ballot has been removed from its envelope after signature verification (more than 240,000 returned envelopes in the prior election). Status Confirmed: the registrar's own published notice acknowledges that a vote choice could be visible through the return envelope before the envelope is opened; no instance of a ballot being removed or discarded because of it is documented. Catalog point: in a single yes/no contest, a visible NO oval tells anyone handling sealed envelopes which way the ballot inside was voted, before signature review and separation; in-person paper ballots cast and counted publicly at the precinct do not pass through that exposure.", "sources": [{"title": "Placer County Elections Office — Ballot envelope hole notice, Sept. 14, 2021 recall election (Ryan Ronco, Clerk-Recorder-Registrar of Voters)", "url": "https://www.placercountyelections.gov/ballot-envelope-hole/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/placer-2021-recall-envelope-hole-no-oval-visible.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-13 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-13 12:29 PM ET). Official county notice read via WebSearch extract and archived (curl 200). Related existing cards: Fairfax VA 2025 hole-punch, Sacramento 2025 Prop 50, Ventura 2026, and the 2021 recall Instagram claim card on the discard leaf. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "eac-2021-chain-of-custody-best-practices-tracking-documentation-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-05", "uid": "C20260926-021547-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-05", "old_ids": ["eac-2021-chain-of-custody-best-practices-tracking-documentation-gaps"], "seq": "C00968", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-07", "state": "US", "description": "U.S. Election Assistance Commission Chain of Custody Best Practices (July 2021) exists because ballot, media, and voting-system transfers routinely lack complete documented custody; it recommends written procedures, dual witnesses, seal/serial logging, and worksheets precisely because incomplete tracking of ballots, memory devices, and equipment breaks auditability. Status Confirmed federal guidance documenting tracking-gap problem; peer to CISA CoC Insights and CISA results-reporting temporary-error notes—EAC CoC handbook, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Chain of Custody Best Practices (July 2021 v1.1 PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2021-chain-of-custody-best-practices-tracking-documentation-gaps__eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-july-2021-v1-1-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA Insights — Chain of Custody and Critical Infrastructure Systems (election CoC gaps context)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-insights_chain-of-custody-and-ci-systems_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2021-chain-of-custody-best-practices-tracking-documentation-gaps__cisa-insights-chain-of-custody-and-critical-infrastructure-systems-election-co.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Incomplete tracking leaf."}
{"id": "gwinnett-ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-missing-locations-ttv", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-08", "uid": "C20261002-123208-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-08", "old_ids": ["gwinnett-ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-missing-locations-ttv"], "seq": "C01324", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-07", "state": "GA", "description": "True the Vote’s July 2021 open-records follow-up (filed as Exhibit O in related federal litigation) documents that after Gwinnett County fulfilled a request for 2020 general-election ballot drop-box surveillance video, review of the produced hard drives showed no video for multiple named drop-box locations (including Bogan Park Community Recreation Center, Dacula Park Activity Building, Gwinnett Voter Registration & Elections, Peachtree Corners Branch Library, and George Pierce Park Community Recreation Center); the county stated no surveillance video was available for at least one location. Status Confirmed for county acknowledgment / production gaps leaving public without continuous drop-box surveillance footage for those sites—distinct from the statewide 30-day retention card already on this leaf; TTV Gwinnett location gaps, not Fulton seals remount.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Exhibit O (True the Vote missing drop-box surveillance video complaint / Gwinnett & Fulton)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.308676/gov.uscourts.gand.308676.279.17.pdf"}, {"title": "Georgia SEB Emergency Rule 183-1-14-.0.6-.14 — Secure Absentee Ballot Drop Boxes (surveillance/retention framework)", "url": "https://sos.ga.gov/sites/default/files/2022-02/183-1-14-0.6-.14.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Confirmed Gwinnett location-level video gaps; peer ga-2020-dropbox-30day-retention statewide card—Gwinnett specifics only; Fulton seals skipped."}
{"id": "ca-sb152-2021-ch34-recall-election-procedures-35m-general-fund-appropriation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-07", "uid": "C20260926-024539-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-07", "old_ids": ["ca-sb152-2021-ch34-recall-election-procedures-35m-general-fund-appropriation"], "seq": "C01097", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They slip legislative changes into the state budget (including changes that move representation away from the governed)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-06-28", "state": "CA", "description": "California SB 152 (Chapter 34, Statutes of 2021; chaptered June 28, 2021) rewrote gubernatorial-recall election procedures (expanded vote centers, RAVBM access for all voters, seven-day late ballot receipt, early processing) while appropriating $35 million General Fund to the Secretary of State for statewide/county recall costs—election-law changes packaged with a direct budget appropriation rather than a standalone integrity debate. Status Confirmed enacted elections trailer/appropriations vehicle for major process changes; peer to NY FY2021 budget campaign-finance/primary-cancellation cards already on this leaf—CA SB 152 recall package, not those remounted. PEP framing: budget-tied process changes expand machine/mail complexity without adding public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "California LegInfo — SB-152 Elections bill status (2021–2022; Chapter 34)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient.xhtml?bill_id=202120220SB152", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sb152-2021-ch34-recall-election-procedures-35m-general-fund-appropriation__california-leginfo-sb152-elections-bill-status-2021-2022.png"}, {"title": "CA SOS — Gubernatorial Recall Election Costs report to Legislature (funding incl. SB 152 appropriation)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/statewide-elections/2021-recall/report-to-legislature.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sb152-2021-ch34-recall-election-procedures-35m-general-fund-appropriation__california-sos-gubernatorial-recall-election-costs-report-2021-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on sneak-legislation-into-budget leaf."}
{"id": "doj-election-threats-task-force-officials-attorneys-workers-2021-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-07", "uid": "C20260926-001426-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-07", "old_ids": ["doj-election-threats-task-force-officials-attorneys-workers-2021-2024"], "seq": "C00600", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit attorneys, election officials, legislators, judges, and others to dissuade them and anyone else from getting involved."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-06-25", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ's Election Threats Task Force (announced mid-2021; ongoing updates through 2024) was created to address a documented surge in threats, harassment, and doxing against election officials and workers after 2020—exactly the dissuasion pathway of targeting officials/attorneys so others stay out. Senate Judiciary hearings took testimony from DOJ/CISA and state/local officials. Status Confirmed for the targeting/threat mechanism against election personnel; does not adjudicate every underlying election-crime allegation.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ PDF — Threats to Election Officials materials (2024)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/d9/2024-06/06.04.24.%20--%20Threats%20to%20Election%20Officials%20-%20Final.pdf"}, {"title": "Sen. Durbin — Judiciary hearing Protecting Democracy's Frontline Workers", "url": "https://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/durbin-questions-witnesses-in-judiciary-committee-hearing-on-the-threat-to-election-workers"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 4."}
{"id": "eip-stanford-2021-long-fuse-misinfo-ticket-pipeline-cisa-platforms-officials", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-11", "uid": "C20260926-030239-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-11", "old_ids": ["eip-stanford-2021-long-fuse-misinfo-ticket-pipeline-cisa-platforms-officials"], "seq": "C01131", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Through election-security information dominance, they control exactly what our elected officials know."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-06-15", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Election Integrity Partnership's final report The Long Fuse (Stanford Internet Observatory / UW CIP / Graphika / Atlantic Council DFRLab, 2021) documents a 2020 ticketed workflow in which election-process 'misinformation' reports from officials, EI-ISAC/CISA partners, platforms, and civil society were triaged in Jira, analyzed, and routed back to platforms and stakeholders—creating an NGO–federal–platform information-dominance layer that shapes which narratives election officials are told are in- or out-of-scope. House Homeland Security correspondence later scrutinized EIP–CISA ticket sharing. Status Confirmed primary EIP report on the misinfo ticket pipeline controlling the information officials receive; peer to EAC/EI-ISAC misinfo-reporting sheet and CISA #Protect2020 strategic-plan cards already on this leaf—EIP Long Fuse instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: centralized misinfo pipelines that gate what local officials 'know' crowd out open debate over hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Election Integrity Partnership — The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election (final report PDF)", "url": "https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf"}, {"title": "EIP — Final Report landing page", "url": "https://www.eipartnership.net/report", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eip-stanford-2021-long-fuse-misinfo-ticket-pipeline-cisa-platforms-officials__eip-final-report-landing-page.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Usurpation of Election Officials information dominance leaf."}
{"id": "nga-2021-governors-reinforce-election-official-messaging-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-15", "uid": "C20260926-002757-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-15", "old_ids": ["nga-2021-governors-reinforce-election-official-messaging-lockstep"], "seq": "C00688", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Governors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-06-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "National Governors Association guidance on 2020 election information campaigns documents Governors using their platforms to highlight and reinforce election officials' messaging—including joint press conferences and PSAs with chief election officials (e.g., Minnesota Walz with former governors)—i.e., executive-branch lock-step information coordination around election narratives. Status Confirmed for coordinated gubernatorial messaging; 'cabal infiltration of Governor offices' personnel claim Alleged beyond this coordination evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "NGA — Information Campaigns and COVID-19 Vaccine Messaging: Applying Lessons from the 2020 Election", "url": "https://www.nga.org/publications/information-campaigns-and-covid-19-vaccine-messaging-applying-lessons-learned-from-the-2020-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nga-2021-governors-reinforce-election-official-messaging-lockstep__nga-information-campaigns-and-covid-19-vaccine-messaging-applying-lessons-from-the-2020-election.png"}, {"title": "CISA — GCC Executive Committee joint statement urging Americans to rely on state/local election officials as trusted sources (Oct 2020)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-executive-committee", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nga-2021-governors-reinforce-election-official-messaging-lockstep__cisa-gcc-executive-committee-joint-statement-urging-americans-to-rely-on-state-local-election-officials-as-trusted-sources-oct-2020.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 8. Honest: coordination Confirmed; sinister governor 'infiltration' Alleged."}
{"id": "ny-rensselaer-2021-kim-mcpherson-troy-council-cast-absentee-ballots-others-names-identity-theft", "permanent_id": "C20261106-122819-01", "uid": "C20261106-122819-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-122819-01", "old_ids": ["ny-rensselaer-2021-kim-mcpherson-troy-council-cast-absentee-ballots-others-names-identity-theft"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Injection of Votes for Existing Voters (Identity Theft)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-06 (Working Families primary) and 2021-11 (general); 2022-06 (guilty plea); 2024-11-01 (sentence)", "state": "NY", "description": "Kimberly Ashe-McPherson (also styled Kim McPherson), then a Troy City Council member running for re-election, pleaded guilty in June 2022 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York to unlawful possession and use of another person's means of identification. Per the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York, she admitted that in the 2021 Working Families Party primary she unlawfully cast an absentee ballot in another person's name, and that in the November 2021 general election she unlawfully cast absentee ballots in the names of two people other than herself. The Times Union and CBS6 Albany reported the ballots were cast in the names of people residing outside the United States who still had Troy voting addresses, described in coverage as family members including her daughter and a son-in-law in the military. On Nov. 1, 2024, U.S. District Judge Mae D'Agostino sentenced her to one year of probation and a $1,500 fine; as part of the plea she resigned from the Troy City Council. The same federal probe later produced a guilty plea and sentence for then-Rensselaer County Elections Commissioner Jason Schofield for fraudulently applying for absentee ballots in other voters' names; three other county officials were acquitted at trial of related conspiracy charges. Status Confirmed: federal guilty plea and sentence for casting absentee ballots in existing registered voters' names. Catalog point: mail-ballot identity theft let a sitting candidate cast votes under real voters' identities without those voters standing at a poll book; in-person Election Day voting with the voter present closes that channel.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, N.D.N.Y. — Former Troy City Council Member Sentenced for Identity Theft (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/former-troy-city-council-member-sentenced-identity-theft"}, {"title": "Times Union — Former Troy councilwoman gets probation, fine in ballot fraud case (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/former-troy-councilwoman-gets-probation-fine-19878402.php", "local": "/archives/2026/11/timesunion-mcpherson-probation-2024-11.html"}, {"title": "CBS6 Albany — No jail time for former Troy councilwoman guilty in 2021 ballot fraud case (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://cbs6albany.com/news/local/no-jail-time-for-former-troy-councilwoman-guilty-in-2021-ballot-fraud-case-kimberly-ashe-mcpherson-rensselaer-county-rich-crist-james-gordon-leslie-wallace-steve-mclaughlin-jason-schofield-republican-democrat-election-new-york", "local": "/archives/2026/11/cbs6-mcpherson-no-jail-2024-11.html"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, N.D.N.Y. — Former Rensselaer County Elections Commissioner Sentenced for Identity Theft (Dec. 2024)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/former-rensselaer-county-elections-commissioner-sentenced-identity-theft"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-06 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peer Woodbury Kim Taylor card. Times Union and CBS6 archived (curl 200); DOJ releases linked only (bot-challenge interstitial on archive attempt). Party labels stated because sources state them. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "dominion-icp-internal-clock-menu-documented-forensic-exhibits", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-12", "uid": "C20260925-214102-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-12", "old_ids": ["dominion-icp-internal-clock-menu-documented-forensic-exhibits"], "seq": "C00335", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Date and Time Manipulation", "Various parts of the voting system frequently show inaccurate dates and times."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-05", "state": "MI", "description": "Companion: the same Antrim-related forensic exhibits walk through screenshot/menu evidence that poll tapes' printed date/time are under operator control after supervisor authentication — meaning tape timestamps are not an immutable hardware clock of record. Status Confirmed for inaccurate-or-attacker-controllable system clocks as a documented EMS/tabulator property class.", "sources": [{"title": "DePerno Law uploads — Lenberg Antrim security deficiencies PDF mirror", "url": "https://www.depernolaw.com/uploads/2/7/0/2/27029178/ex_17-26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-icp-internal-clock-menu-documented-forensic-exhibits__deperno-law-uploads-lenberg-antrim-security-deficiencies-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Lenberg exhibit with INTERNAL CLOCK menu path", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.234316/gov.uscourts.dcd.234316.76.5_1.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "nyc-urcvt-rcv-software-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-01", "uid": "C20260925-183614-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-01", "old_ids": ["nyc-urcvt-rcv-software-2021"], "seq": "C00089", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "RCV is a bad idea for many reasons. One is that it is so complicated that it requires computer tabulation and locks us into it; that alone is reason to reject it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-05-25", "state": "NY", "description": "For New York City's first citywide ranked-choice primaries (June 2021), the New York State Board of Elections unanimously approved the Universal Ranked-Choice Voting Tabulator (URCVT) software so the NYC Board of Elections would not have to hand-count tens of thousands of multi-round RCV ballots. Contemporary coverage (Gothamist, CBS) states the approval avoided a lengthy hand count; earlier 2021 special elections without the certified software required multi-day hand counts. URCVT imports cast-vote records from precinct scanners and applies elimination rounds on a computer. Status Confirmed that NYC RCV winners are produced by certified computer tabulation software, locking administration into machine-dependent rounds rather than a precinct plurality hand count. Complexity of ballot design/RCV rules—not inherent impossibility of hand counts—drives the computer requirement; PEP full hand count remains the transparency contrast where applicable.", "sources": [{"title": "Gothamist — State Board approves software to tabulate RCV primary results", "url": "https://gothamist.com/news/state-board-elections-approves-software-tabulate-ranked-choice-primary-results", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nyc-urcvt-rcv-software-2021__gothamist-state-board-approves-software-to-tabulate-rcv-prim.png"}, {"title": "CBS News — NYC mayoral ballot counting faster after software approval", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/nyc-mayor-election-2021-ballot-counting-software/"}, {"title": "RCVRC — Universal Ranked Choice Voting Tabulator (URCVT) L&A test procedures (NY)", "url": "https://neal.mcburnett.org/elections/rctab/URCVT%20v.1.2.0%2011-NY%20L_A%20Testing%20v.1.0.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nyc-urcvt-rcv-software-2021__rcvrc-universal-ranked-choice-voting-tabulator-urcvt-l-a-tes.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich me-ak-rcv leaf. Confirmed computer-tabulation lock-in for NYC 2021. Do not claim hand counts are unviable—PEP as remedy framing."}
{"id": "antrim-mi-dominion-icp-settable-internal-clock-lenberg-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-11", "uid": "C20260925-214102-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-11", "old_ids": ["antrim-mi-dominion-icp-settable-internal-clock-lenberg-2021"], "seq": "C00334", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Date and Time Manipulation", "Various parts of the voting system frequently show inaccurate dates and times."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-05-16", "state": "MI", "description": "Forensic/security write-ups on Antrim County, Michigan Dominion ImageCast Precinct tabulators (including Jeffrey Lenberg's May 16, 2021 summary filed in related litigation) document that a technician/supervisor passcode unlocks UTILITIES → DIAGNOSTICS → INDIVIDUAL → INTERNAL CLOCK → SET DATE AND TIME, allowing operators to reset the tabulator clock and reprint poll tapes with chosen timestamps. Status Confirmed for the settable-clock capability on deployed ICP equipment (lab/forensic demonstration of the feature). Independent Halderman analysis of Antrim attributed 2020 reporting errors to ballot-programming/human error — not upheld as proving an in-election clock-fraud outcome.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener exhibit — Lenberg security deficiencies summary (clock reset path)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.234316/gov.uscourts.dcd.234316.76.5_1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-mi-dominion-icp-settable-internal-clock-lenberg-2021__courtlistener-exhibit-lenberg-security-deficiencies-summary.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — Halderman Antrim expert report affirms accuracy; human error", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2021/03/26/expert-report-affirms-accuracy-of-antrim-county-presidential-election-results", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-mi-dominion-icp-settable-internal-clock-lenberg-2021__michigan-sos-halderman-antrim-expert-report-affirms-accuracy.png"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — Analysis of Antrim County Nov 2020 incident (PDF)", "url": "https://blogs.princeton.edu/citp/wp-content/uploads/sites/952/2021/03/Antrim.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-mi-dominion-icp-settable-internal-clock-lenberg-2021__princeton-citp-analysis-of-antrim-county-nov-2020-incident-p.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 6. Confirmed settable clocks; do not overclaim Antrim outcome fraud via clocks.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "census-2020-apportionment-total-population-headroom-registration-pool", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-29", "uid": "C20260926-002757-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-29", "old_ids": ["census-2020-apportionment-total-population-headroom-registration-pool"], "seq": "C00702", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Population numbers are inflated by every available means to create headroom for more registered voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-04-26", "state": "Federal", "description": "Census Bureau 2020 apportionment counts all usual residents (citizens and noncitizens) for House seat allocation—producing representational 'headroom' based on total population rather than citizen voting-age population, which expands the demographic base against which registration and political targeting operate. Status Confirmed for total-population apportionment rule; does NOT claim noncitizens legally vote in federal elections (Immigration overclaim standing skip respected).", "sources": [{"title": "Census Bureau — Congressional Apportionment 2020 Census Brief (C2020BR-01)", "url": "https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/census-briefs/c2020br-01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-2020-apportionment-total-population-headroom-registration-pool__census-bureau-congressional-apportionment-2020-census-brief-c2020br-01.pdf"}, {"title": "Census Bureau — Public Sector FAQs (counts all residents regardless of citizenship/registration)", "url": "https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/about/faqs.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-2020-apportionment-total-population-headroom-registration-pool__census-bureau-public-sector-faqs-counts-all-residents-regardless-of-citizenship-registration.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 15. Honest framing: apportionment headroom Confirmed; illegal-voting claims avoided."}
{"id": "census-bureau-apportionment-total-population-includes-noncitizens-soft", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-22", "uid": "C20260926-005107-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-22", "old_ids": ["census-bureau-apportionment-total-population-includes-noncitizens-soft"], "seq": "C00815", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Open borders support higher population counts that include illegal aliens who cannot be verified."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-04-26", "state": "Federal", "description": "Census Bureau 2020 apportionment results and CRS analyses (already in corpus) confirm the apportionment population is a total-resident count that includes noncitizens; the short-form questionnaire does not verify citizenship or immigration status for each resident. That is the leaf's 'no way to verify them' measurement gap. Status Confirmed for total-population/noncitizen inclusion methodology.", "sources": [{"title": "Census Bureau — 2020 Census Apportionment Results", "url": "https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2020/dec/2020-apportionment-data.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-apportionment-total-population-includes-noncitizens-soft__census-bureau---2020-census-apportionment-results.png"}, {"title": "Supreme Court — Trump v. New York companion (apportionment memorandum litigation)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-366_7647.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-bureau-apportionment-total-population-includes-noncitizens-soft__supreme-court-trump-v-new-york-companion-apportionment-memor.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "mi-detroit-2020-nov-avcb-out-of-balance-boe-audit", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-10", "uid": "C20261009-105430-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-10", "old_ids": ["mi-detroit-2020-nov-avcb-out-of-balance-boe-audit"], "seq": "C01343", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-04-21", "state": "MI", "description": "The Michigan Bureau of Elections' audit of the Nov. 3, 2020 general election found roughly 95–98 of Detroit's 134 absent voter counting boards out of balance. Causes included QVF/e-pollbook software struggling with large AVCB lists (forcing supplemental paper lists), ballots placed in the wrong containers or precincts, and delayed entry of received ballots. The audit balanced or explained most boards, but 14 stayed unresolved. Counter-view from the same audit: about 174,000 valid ballots matched signed envelopes, with a net citywide imbalance of 21 names over ballots, and no evidence of fraud. Status Confirmed for the reconciliation breakdown, which is the condition under which an absentee ballot that should have been pulled cannot be traced.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Bureau of Elections — Audits of the November 3, 2020 General Election (Apr. 21, 2021, PDF)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Press-releases/2021/documents/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — More than 250 audits confirm accuracy and integrity of Michigan's election (Mar. 2, 2021)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2021/03/02/more-than-250-audits-confirm-accuracy-and-integrity-of-michigans-election"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Distinct from existing detroit-2020-aug-primary-72pct-absentee-precincts-out-of-balance-unrecountable (Aug primary).", "related": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"]}
{"id": "halderman-antrim-memory-cards-usb-election-package-removable-media-chain", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-32", "uid": "C20260926-000809-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-32", "old_ids": ["halderman-antrim-memory-cards-usb-election-package-removable-media-chain"], "seq": "C00585", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable or manipulate ballot images on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03", "state": "MI", "description": "Same Antrim investigation reconstructs how election definitions and results travel on removable memory cards/USB sticks between EMS and scanners—the exact thumb/flash-drive path where image enablement, card rezeroing, and mismatched definitions can disable or scramble audit evidence. Status Confirmed for removable-media dependence; Halderman attributed Antrim errors to operator mistakes, not a security breach.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman USENIX Antrim paper (removable media / election definitions)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media__halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-me.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan AG/SOS contracted Antrim report page family", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "va-northam-mcauliffe-felon-rights-restoration-executive", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-02", "uid": "C20260926-012939-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-02", "old_ids": ["va-northam-mcauliffe-felon-rights-restoration-executive"], "seq": "C00841", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-16", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia's Constitution leaves restoration of felons' civil rights to the Governor. In 2016 Gov. Terry McAuliffe issued a blanket executive order restoring rights to ~200,000 people; the Virginia Supreme Court held individualized restoration is required and invalidated the blanket order. Successors then used streamlining/individual orders; on March 16, 2021 Gov. Ralph Northam announced a policy restoring voting and other civil rights upon release from incarceration (even while on supervision), immediately affecting about 69,000 people. Later reporting documented Gov. Glenn Youngkin's administration shifting away from more automatic restoration toward individualized applications. Status Confirmed for Virginia's expansion-then-discretionary-control pattern around felon voting eligibility—peer jurisdiction to Florida Amendment 4 / SB 7066 fights; not a fraud finding.", "sources": [{"title": "CNN — Northam restores voting rights to ~69,000 former felons (March 2021 policy)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/16/politics/northam-virginia-voting-rights-former-felons", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-northam-mcauliffe-felon-rights-restoration-executive__cnn-northam-restores-voting-rights-to-69-000-former-fel.png"}, {"title": "VPM — Youngkin restores rights to ~3,500; describes Virginia restoration process history", "url": "https://www.vpm.org/news/2022-05-20/youngkin-restores-voting-rights-to-about-3500-people"}, {"title": "EJI — Virginia governor restores voting rights to over 69,000 (McAuliffe court background)", "url": "https://eji.org/news/virginia-governor-restores-voting-rights-to-over-69000-formerly-incarcerated-citizens/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-northam-mcauliffe-felon-rights-restoration-executive__eji-virginia-governor-restores-voting-rights-to-over-69.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer on Felon Voting Rights leaf (fl-amendment4-sb7066-2020). Confirmed policy swings; careful status."}
{"id": "nyt-2021-dccc-blacklist-ended-block-opportunities-history", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-26", "uid": "C20260926-002757-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-26", "old_ids": ["nyt-2021-dccc-blacklist-ended-block-opportunities-history"], "seq": "C00699", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Block opportunities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "NYT reported that DCCC Chair Sean Patrick Maloney ended the formal consultant blacklist in March 2021—confirming the prior policy had blocked opportunities for challenger-aligned vendors and that the party retained informal influence over vendor contracts. Status Confirmed for existence and formal end of the block-opportunities rule.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT — The D.C.C.C. Blacklist Is No More (2021)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/us/politics/dccc-consultant-ban-aoc-pressley.html"}, {"title": "CNN — Progressive members rebuke DCCC blacklist (2019 contemporaneous)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/31/politics/dccc-primary-challenger-rule"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "nyt-2021-dccc-blacklist-no-more-reach-aoc-pressley-sabotage-aftermath", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-06", "uid": "C20260926-030706-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-06", "old_ids": ["nyt-2021-dccc-blacklist-no-more-reach-aoc-pressley-sabotage-aftermath"], "seq": "C01141", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Subtly sabotage campaigns."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "The New York Times On Politics (Mar. 9, 2021) documents that after AOC/Pressley primary upsets, progressive firms such as Reach were shut out of DCCC preferred-vendor business under the incumbent-protection blacklist—and that the committee later formally ended the written ban while progressive members framed the prior policy as an explicit escalation against primary challengers' campaign infrastructure. Status Confirmed primary NYT documentation of blacklist-as-sabotage of challenger consulting capacity; peer to Laura Moser public-oppo and ABC 2018 primary-interference cards already on this leaf—NYT Reach/blacklist-aftermath instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: party-committee sabotage of citizen-primary infrastructure that public hand-counted primaries would make harder to hide behind vendor gatekeeping.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT On Politics — The D.C.C.C. Blacklist Is No More (Reach / AOC / Pressley, Mar. 9, 2021)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/09/us/politics/dccc-consultant-ban-aoc-pressley.html"}, {"title": "The Hill — House Democrats' campaign arm lifts ban on consultants who work for primary challengers", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/542286-house-democrats-campaign-arm-lifts-ban-on-consultants-who-work-for-primary/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Campaign Consultants Subtly sabotage campaigns leaf."}
{"id": "fbi-whitmer-kidnap-plot-confidential-informants-injected-militia-groups", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-09", "uid": "C20260926-030239-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-09", "old_ids": ["fbi-whitmer-kidnap-plot-confidential-informants-injected-militia-groups"], "seq": "C01129", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They insert themselves into existing groups."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-06", "state": "MI / Federal", "description": "In the federal Whitmer kidnapping-plot prosecutions, trial evidence and contemporaneous reporting document FBI confidential informants injected into militia networks—including Dan Chappel, who became Wolverine Watchmen executive officer and recorded meetings after reporting threats, and Stephen Robeson, who organized/financed gatherings where prosecutors say the plot developed—illustrating informant injection into existing activist/militia groups. Defense argued entrainment; prosecutors argued predisposition; either way the primary record confirms CHS presence inside the groups. Status Confirmed primary DOJ/trial record of informants injected into existing groups; peer to DOJ OIG Jan. 6 CHS review and Mackey 'Microchip' informant cards already on this leaf—Whitmer-plot CHS instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: infiltrators inside citizen groups distort organizing toward transparent hand-count reform.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Public — FBI informant testifies three men plotted to kidnap Gov. Whitmer (Mar. 6, 2021)", "url": "https://www.michiganpublic.org/law/2021-03-06/fbi-informant-testifies-three-men-plotted-to-kidnap-gov-whitmer"}, {"title": "BuzzFeed News — FBI Investigation Into Alleged Michigan Governor Kidnapping Plot Got Complicated (Robeson/CHS)", "url": "https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/fbi-michigan-kidnap-whitmer"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Infiltrators inject into existing groups leaf."}
{"id": "mechler-appel-2020-2021-ess-hash-checker-false-success-under-hood", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-14", "uid": "C20260926-033041-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-14", "old_ids": ["mechler-appel-2020-2021-ess-hash-checker-false-success-under-hood"], "seq": "C01224", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That the software running on their systems is what was originally tested"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-05", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas voting-system examiner Brian Mechler's Sept. 2020 ES&S EVS 6.1.1.0 report—and Andrew Appel/Susan Greenhalgh's March 5, 2021 CITP analysis—showed ES&S hash-verification scripts reported firmware 'matches Trusted Hash File' even when the trusted reference file was missing, checked against locally created 'golden' hashes rather than EAC/NSRL references, and left acceptance testing to the vendor—i.e., officials cannot rely on hash theater to prove under-the-hood software matches what was originally tested/certified. Status Confirmed primary Mechler TX SOS examiner report + Appel CITP analysis; peer to EAC trusted-build blog and EAC NOC 16-02 cards already on this leaf—Mechler/Appel hash-checker instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: hash checks that can lie leave black-box tabulators unverified; public hand counts of paper do not depend on vendor hash scripts.", "sources": [{"title": "CITP / Appel & Greenhalgh — Voting Machine Hashcode Testing: Unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure (March 5, 2021)", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2021/03/05/voting-machine-hashcode-testing-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mechler-appel-2020-2021-ess-hash-checker-false-success-under-hood__citp-appel-greenhalgh-voting-machine-hashcode-testing-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure-march-5-2021.png"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Brian Mechler Voting System Examination of ES&S EVS 6.1.1.0 (Sept. 2020 PDF companion)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/sysexam/brian-mechler-ESS-exam-report-EVS6110-aug.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mechler-appel-2020-2021-ess-hash-checker-false-success-under-hood__texas-sos-brian-mechler-voting-system-examination-of-es-s-evs-6-1-1-0-sept-2020-pdf-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Software under-hood originally-tested leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "eip-2021-long-fuse-delegitimization-misinfo-framing-discredit-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-01", "uid": "C20260926-034259-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-01", "old_ids": ["eip-2021-long-fuse-delegitimization-misinfo-framing-discredit-leaf"], "seq": "C01241", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Discredit anyone who questions the security or accuracy of elections, so the public ignores or discounts the facts presented."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "Stanford Internet Observatory / UW CIP / Graphika / Atlantic Council DFRLab Election Integrity Partnership final report The Long Fuse (Mar. 2021) scoped 'Delegitimization of election results'—content aiming to delegitimize results on false or misleading claims—as a primary ticket category (72% of processed tickets), then shared findings with platforms and stakeholders to strengthen moderation against election-integrity narratives. Status Confirmed primary EIP Long Fuse framing/process that treats entities questioning election security/accuracy as mis/disinfo to be flagged and discounted. Peer to CISA GCC/SCC 'unfounded claims' soft remount and AP/Guardian 'most secure' media-amplification soft companion already on this leaf—EIP civil-society partnership instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: observable precinct hand counts of hand-marked paper (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep) produce a public record that cannot be dismissed as an online 'delegitimization narrative.'", "sources": [{"title": "Election Integrity Partnership — Final Report / The Long Fuse (executive summary)", "url": "https://www.eipartnership.net/report", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eip-2021-long-fuse-delegitimization-misinfo-framing-discredit-leaf__election-integrity-partnership-final-report-the-long-fuse-executive-summary.png"}, {"title": "Stanford stacks — The Long Fuse: Misinformation and the 2020 Election (PDF)", "url": "https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:tr171zs0069/EIP-Final-Report.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Media Discredit leaf (non-CISA-GCC / non-AP-Guardian soft remount)."}
{"id": "hr1-2021-for-the-people-act-federalize-elections-branded-voting-rights-trojan", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-03", "uid": "C20260926-025634-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-03", "old_ids": ["hr1-2021-for-the-people-act-federalize-elections-branded-voting-rights-trojan"], "seq": "C01108", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They disguise bills that contain Trojan horses."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "H.R. 1 (117th Cong.), the For the People Act of 2021, passed the House Mar. 3, 2021 branded as a comprehensive voting-rights / democracy package while packing nationwide mandates for automatic/same-day/online registration, no-excuse mail balloting, limits on voter-roll maintenance, and federally imposed redistricting commissions—provisions state AGs and Heritage/R Street analyses contemporaneously described as federalizing and micromanaging state election administration under a rights/integrity label. Status Confirmed primary bill text and House passage of a branded 'voting rights' package carrying structural centralization mandates; peer to CA AB37 permanent-VBM-as-integrity and GA HB316 BMD-as-paper-ballot-package cards already on this leaf—federal H.R. 1 package, not those remounted. PEP framing: integrity branding that deepens machine/mail centralization without public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Congress.gov — H.R. 1 (117th) For the People Act of 2021 (House passage Mar. 3, 2021)", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hr1-2021-for-the-people-act-federalize-elections-branded-voting-rights-trojan__congress-gov-hr1-for-the-people-act-2021.png"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — The Facts About H.R. 1: The For the People Act of 2021", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/the-facts-about-hr-1-the-the-people-act-2021", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hr1-2021-for-the-people-act-federalize-elections-branded-voting-rights-trojan__heritage-facts-about-hr1-for-the-people-act-2021.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Legislation disguise-trojan-horses leaf."}
{"id": "mi-sos-antrim-2021-human-error-mismatched-definitions-display", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-28", "uid": "C20260926-003520-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-28", "old_ids": ["mi-sos-antrim-2021-human-error-mismatched-definitions-display"], "seq": "C00741", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Prepare slides in advance showing predetermined outcomes and display them instead of the real-time votes (citizens cannot tell the difference)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-01", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan SOS/AG-commissioned analysis (basis for Halderman's paper) concludes Antrim's wildly inaccurate unofficial results came from human error deploying mismatched election definitions—not a security breach—while still producing public results that citizens would not know differed from correct scanner tallies until later corrections/hand count. Status Confirmed for human-error wrong unofficial results; intentional fraud design Alleged and refuted by the forensic findings.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan — Antrim County election incident analysis (SOS/AG expert report PDF)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/Antrim_720623_7.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-sos-antrim-2021-human-error-mismatched-definitions-display__michigan-antrim-county-election-incident-analysis-sos-ag-exp.pdf"}, {"title": "Halderman — Antrim USENIX Security 2022 paper", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "pilf-2021-clark-county-nv-92367-mail-ballots-undeliverable-wrong-outdated-addresses", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-09", "uid": "C20260926-030706-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-09", "old_ids": ["pilf-2021-clark-county-nv-92367-mail-ballots-undeliverable-wrong-outdated-addresses"], "seq": "C01144", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Addresses modified (street names) to send ballots to known bad addresses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-03-01", "state": "NV", "description": "Public Interest Legal Foundation's March 2021 Clark County analysis, based on records disclosed by Clark County Registrar Joe Gloria, documents 92,367 2020 general-election mail ballots returned undeliverable to wrong or outdated addresses among active registrants (after AB4 limited mass mailing to actives)—far exceeding Nevada's entire statewide undeliverable totals reported to EAC across 2012–2018—showing how bad/outdated street addresses on the rolls send live ballots to known-bad destinations at scale. Status Confirmed primary county-disclosed undeliverable-address count; peer to EAC NCOA memo and GAO-19-485 address-data-risk cards already on this leaf—Clark County 92k instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: roll address errors that route ballots to bad addresses create injection/custody opacity without public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "PILF — 92K Clark County NV Mail Ballots Went to Wrong Addresses in 2020 Presidential Election", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/pilf-files/NV-2020-General-1P.pdf"}, {"title": "NPR — Audit finds high number of D.C. mail ballots returned as undeliverable in 2020 (companion undeliverable-address pattern)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/local/2021/11/17/1056487637/audit-finds-high-number-of-d-c-mail-ballots-returned-as-undeliverable-in-2020"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Voter Rolls Addresses modified / bad addresses leaf.", "related": ["nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed"]}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2021-senate-subpoena-2-1m-ballots-385-tabulators-to-cyber-ninjas-coliseum", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-02", "uid": "C20261023-123356-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-02", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2021-senate-subpoena-2-1m-ballots-385-tabulators-to-cyber-ninjas-coliseum"], "seq": "C01527", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballots are removed from election officials' custody by other authorities, breaking the chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-02-26 (subpoenas upheld); 2021-04-21 to 2021-04-22 (delivery); 2021-05-20 (SOS custody letter); 2021-06-28 (county will not reuse equipment)", "state": "AZ", "description": "After Maricopa County Superior Court Judge Timothy Thomason ruled on Feb. 26, 2021 that the Arizona Senate's subpoenas were enforceable, Maricopa County delivered its subpoenaed 2020 general-election materials to the Arizona Veterans Memorial Coliseum in Phoenix, where the Senate's contractor Cyber Ninjas and its subcontractors conducted the Senate's audit. According to the county's April 20, 2021 notice, it catalogued the materials with manifest logs and chain-of-custody reports and delivered 385 Election Day tabulators and nine central-count tabulators on April 21 and nearly 2.1 million voted ballots on April 22. On May 20, 2021, Secretary of State Katie Hobbs wrote to the Board of Supervisors that custody of the equipment had been lost when it was handed to the auditors, urged the county not to reuse it, and said her office would consider decertifying it otherwise. NBC News noted that the county's most recent equipment contract was a 2019 Dominion contract. On June 28, 2021, the county said it would never again use the subpoenaed tabulation equipment, and it later approved about $2.8 million for replacements. Status Confirmed: the transfer of ballots and machines out of election officials' custody to a legislative body's private contractor, and the resulting loss of confidence in that equipment, are documented by the county, the Secretary of State and national coverage. Catalog point: when ballots and machines pass to a body outside the election office, the official custody chain stops, and replacing the machines afterwards cost taxpayers millions. Paper ballots counted in public at each precinct on election night, with tally sheets signed by observers from each side, settle the count before custody can become a fight.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Maricopa County to Deliver Subpoenaed Election Materials to Arizona Senate (Apr. 20, 2021)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/m/newsflash/Archive/Item/2235?arcId=3434"}, {"title": "AP News — Maricopa County delivering ballots, equipment for audit (Apr. 2021; apnews.com bot-blocks curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/government-and-politics-election-recounts-senate-elections-sports-2046da82c97a405e8273fd3531799f8d"}, {"title": "AP News — Judge rules Arizona Senate can access 2020 election ballots (Feb. 26, 2021; URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-legislature-senate-elections-arizona-phoenix-811a189f9e6416a554e4f399f3c94c4e"}, {"title": "NBC News — Maricopa County will need new voting machines after GOP's audit, Arizona secretary of state says (May 20, 2021)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/maricopa-county-will-need-new-voting-machines-after-gop-s-n1268090"}, {"title": "Maricopa County — Maricopa County Plans for New Vote Tabulation Equipment (June 28, 2021)", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/AZMARIC/bulletins/2e5e5c4"}, {"title": "Arizona Court of Appeals, Div. 1 — Fann v. Hon. Kemp / Arizona Senate audit public-records special action, 1 CA-SA 21-0141 (2021)", "url": "https://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/0/OpinionFiles/Div1/2021/1%20CA-SA%2021-0141%20-%20Fann.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to ei-2026-09-017 and the Fulton GA 2026 card on this leaf. Related Cyber Ninjas-review cards on other leaves (printer calibration, UserLog) cover the audit's findings, not the custody transfer. Vendor named by NBC (Dominion). Maricopa newsflash, govdelivery, NBC and azcourts curl 200; AP 403 bot-block (text via WebSearch extract).", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "pew-2021-partisan-news-bubbles-fight-each-other-info-dominance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-01", "uid": "C20260926-002757-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-01", "old_ids": ["pew-2021-partisan-news-bubbles-fight-each-other-info-dominance"], "seq": "C00674", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens fight each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-02-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew Research Center's American News Pathways analysis found that about a quarter of Republicans and a quarter of Democrats consistently turned only to news outlets whose audiences shared their politics during 2020—creating divergent information ecosystems in which partisans inhabit different factual worlds and are primed to fight each other rather than share a common information battlefield. Status Confirmed for documented partisan media-bubble mechanism producing mutual incomprehension/conflict; does not prove a single orchestrator of 'information dominance.'", "sources": [{"title": "Pew — About a quarter of Republicans, Democrats consistently turned only to partisan-audience outlets (2021)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/02/22/about-a-quarter-of-republicans-democrats-consistently-turned-only-to-news-outlets-whose-audiences-aligned-with-them-politically-in-2020/"}, {"title": "Pew — How Americans Navigated the News in 2020 (full report)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/02/22/how-americans-navigated-the-news-in-2020-a-tumultuous-year-in-review/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 1."}
{"id": "pew-2021-partisan-news-bubbles-not-listen-each-other", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-03", "uid": "C20260926-003520-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-03", "old_ids": ["pew-2021-partisan-news-bubbles-not-listen-each-other"], "seq": "C00716", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens stop listening to each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-02-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew documented that across 2020, about a quarter of Republicans and of Democrats consistently turned only to news outlets whose audiences aligned with them politically—structural echo chambers in which partisans largely do not share (and therefore do not 'listen to') the same information diet. Soft remount of fill-20i Pew bubble family onto this exact 'will not listen to each other' pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured partisan news-diet isolation.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — About a quarter of Republicans, Democrats consistently turned only to like-minded outlets in 2020", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2021/02/22/about-a-quarter-of-republicans-democrats-consistently-turned-only-to-news-outlets-whose-audiences-aligned-with-them-politically-in-2020/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — About one-fifth of Democrats and Republicans get political news in a kind of media bubble (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/03/04/about-one-fifth-of-democrats-and-republicans-get-political-news-in-a-kind-of-media-bubble/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 2. Soft remount of fill-20i Pew partisan-bubble cards onto not-listen pathKey."}
{"id": "eac-vvsg-2-0-2021-adoption-after-years-policy-analysis-delay-next-gen-standards", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-07", "uid": "C20260926-025634-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-07", "old_ids": ["eac-vvsg-2-0-2021-adoption-after-years-policy-analysis-delay-next-gen-standards"], "seq": "C01112", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Policy analyses"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-02-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission adopted Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 on Feb. 10, 2021 after a multi-year policy-analysis, public-comment, and TGDC process that left legacy VVSG 1.x systems as the de facto certified baseline throughout the 2010s—illustrating how prolonged standards/policy analysis delays next-generation equipment requirements even while jurisdictions continue deploying older machines. Status Confirmed primary EAC adoption timeline for VVSG 2.0 after extended policy process; peer to GA SB3EX committee-report-before-2028-equipment and CO fiscal-note cost-analysis cards already on this leaf—federal VVSG standards-delay instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: years of machine-standards analysis postpone transparent hand-marked paper counted in public.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. EAC — Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) 2.0 adopted Feb. 10, 2021", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/voluntary-voting-system-guidelines", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vvsg-2-0-2021-adoption-after-years-policy-analysis-delay-next-gen-standards__eac-voluntary-voting-system-guidelines-vvsg-2-0.png"}, {"title": "Federal Register — EAC Adoption of VVSG 2.0 notice context", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/VVSG_2_0_Final_Clean.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Delay Tactics Policy analyses leaf."}
{"id": "eac-testing-certification-trusted-build-source-not-publicly-inspectable", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-11", "uid": "C20260925-234437-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-11", "old_ids": ["eac-testing-certification-trusted-build-source-not-publicly-inspectable"], "seq": "C00444", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Do not look \"under the hood\" to ensure their security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-02-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC Testing and Certification Program Manual documents that voting-system certification relies on VSTL source-code review, witnessed trusted builds, and cryptographic hashes—while trade-secret and program rules mean county officials running the systems typically cannot independently inspect ('look under the hood' of) the full source running in production. Status Confirmed for the certification architecture that substitutes lab review for local under-the-hood inspection. Soft companion to existing eac-vstl / eac-testing-certification cards on Fake Testing / Certification children.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Testing and Certification Program Manual Version 3.0 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/Testing_and_Certification_Program_Manual_Version_3_020421.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-testing-certification-trusted-build-source-not-publicly-inspectable__eac-testing-and-certification-program-manual-version-3-0-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Voting Equipment Frequently Asked Questions", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/frequently-asked-questions", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-testing-certification-trusted-build-source-not-publicly-inspectable__eac-voting-equipment-frequently-asked-questions.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 6."}
{"id": "coffee-county-ga-2021-dominion-images-sharefile-distribution-higher-order", "permanent_id": "C20261005-123049-01", "uid": "C20261005-123049-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-123049-01", "old_ids": ["coffee-county-ga-2021-dominion-images-sharefile-distribution-higher-order"], "seq": "C01325", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "GA", "description": "After SullivanStrickler imaged Coffee County, Georgia's Dominion EMS server, ICC workstation, ballot images, and BMD software on January 7, 2021, the copied election software and data did not stay with the original breach team. Expert declarations in Curling v. Raffensperger (Kevin Skoglund; J. Alex Halderman) and ShareFile activity logs produced in discovery show the data was uploaded to a Citrix ShareFile directory, converted into bootable virtual machines by Doug Logan, and downloaded by multiple outside individuals in January–February 2021, then redistributed again via shipped hard drives (April 2021) and shared credentials (June 2021). Halderman's expert report concluded the copying and distribution materially increased future attack risk for every Georgia county running the same Dominion software and configurations, and that it is likely impossible to know how many people now hold copies. Status Confirmed for documented downstream distribution of breached election software—a textbook higher-order breach beyond the original Coffee County access. Centralized, uniform statewide machine software is what turns one county's breach into statewide exposure, which a PEP-style hand count on paper does not share.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Skoglund declaration Exhibit 2 (Distribution of Coffee County Data: ShareFile Jan. 2021, Apr. 2021, Jun. 2021)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gasd.91723/gov.uscourts.gasd.91723.60.2.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Curling v. Raffensperger Exhibit 75 (Halderman: distributed data increases risk to all Georgia counties)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf"}, {"title": "Just Security — Declaration of Kevin Skoglund (Curling v. Raffensperger, Dec. 5, 2022)", "url": "https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CurlingVRaffensperger_KevinSkoglundDeclaration_5December2022.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-05. Confirmed downstream distribution; peer Coffee County cards on Tabulation leaves cover log/SQL/USB issues, not the distribution chain.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "coffee-county-skoglund-seven-usb-election-project-sticks-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-04", "uid": "C20260926-022005-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-04", "old_ids": ["coffee-county-skoglund-seven-usb-election-project-sticks-2021"], "seq": "C00982", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "GA", "description": "Kevin Skoglund’s Curling v. Raffensperger declaration documents that SullivanStrickler forensic images from Coffee County (Jan. 7, 2021) include seven distinct USB drives—ICX install media plus multiple election-project/backup sticks carrying election definitions and related files—illustrating how removable media proliferate across EMS/ICX workflows and how incomplete chain-of-custody documentation later impaired forensic certainty. Status Confirmed multi-USB election-media inventory risk that confuses audit/forensic reconstruction; peer to Antrim mismatched-card findings on this leaf—Coffee County seven-USB Skoglund inventory, not Antrim remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Just Security mirror — Declaration of Kevin Skoglund (Curling; Coffee County USB/EMS images)", "url": "https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/CurlingVRaffensperger_KevinSkoglundDeclaration_5December2022.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coffee-county-skoglund-seven-usb-election-project-sticks-2021__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Curling exhibit summarizing Coffee County EMS/ICC/USB forensic copies", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/coffee-county-skoglund-seven-usb-election-project-sticks-2021__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Mix up thumb/flash drives leaf."}
{"id": "dominion-v-giuliani-powell-defamation-suits-discredit-election-crime-reporters", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-07", "uid": "C20260926-000809-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-07", "old_ids": ["dominion-v-giuliani-powell-defamation-suits-discredit-election-crime-reporters"], "seq": "C00560", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit anyone who reports or discusses election crimes, making examples of them to deter others from reporting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Dominion Voting Systems filed billion-dollar defamation suits against Rudy Giuliani, Sidney Powell, and others who publicly alleged election-crime/fraud narratives involving Dominion after 2020; D.D.C. denied motions to dismiss (Aug 2021), and cases later settled. Whatever the merits of the underlying fraud claims, the litigation pathway is a documented mechanism that targets and financially threatens speakers who report/discuss alleged election crimes—creating an example for others. Status Confirmed for targeting/discrediting via high-stakes suits; does not adjudicate truth of 2020 fraud allegations.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — US Dominion v. Giuliani (D.D.C.) opinion denying motion to dismiss", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/dcdce/1:2021cv00213/226485/36/"}, {"title": "FactCheck.org — Dominion's defamation lawsuits overview", "url": "https://www.factcheck.org/2021/06/dominions-defamation-lawsuits-are-still-active/"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 4. Honest: Confirmed targeting mechanism; underlying crime claims not endorsed.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "edison-research-2020-70pct-early-mail-forced-multimode-exit-poll-redesign", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-11", "uid": "C20260925-220029-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-11", "old_ids": ["edison-research-2020-70pct-early-mail-forced-multimode-exit-poll-redesign"], "seq": "C00364", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail-in ballots severely cripple exit polling, which is key for those who would manipulate elections because it destroys an additional verification component."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Edison Research's 2020 election recap documents that ~70% of 2020 presidential votes were cast before Election Day (~43% mail, ~24% early in-person), forcing the National Election Pool exit poll to abandon classic Election-Day-only precinct exits in favor of a multi-mode design (Election Day exits + early-center entrances + telephone surveys of mail voters). Status Confirmed that large-scale mail/early voting crippled the traditional Election Day exit-poll verification model. Soft companion to existing Early Voting>exit-polling cards (pew-edison / washpost-nep); this mounts the exact Mail-ballots leaf. Motive that crippling exits is 'KEY for manipulators' remains Alleged advocacy.", "sources": [{"title": "Edison Research — 2020 Election Recap PDF", "url": "https://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Edison-Research-2020-Election-Recap.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/edison-research-2020-70pct-early-mail-forced-multimode-exit-poll-redesign__edison-research-2020-election-recap-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Edison/SSRS — Exit Poll FAQs (multi-mode redesign)", "url": "https://www.edisonresearch.com/exit-poll-faqs/"}, {"title": "AAPOR — Explaining Exit Polls PDF", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Explaining-Exit-Polls-508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/edison-research-2020-70pct-early-mail-forced-multimode-exit-poll-redesign__aapor-explaining-exit-polls-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 6. Process Confirmed; manipulator-KEY framing Alleged only."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-dos-supervisors-outsourced-maintenance-coordination-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-24", "uid": "C20260926-000015-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-24", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-dos-supervisors-outsourced-maintenance-coordination-gaps"], "seq": "C00537", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Outsourcing voter-roll maintenance to entities that fail to maintain the rolls properly (through incompetence or malice), which also lets a fourth party manipulate the rolls indirectly"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General 2021-096 Finding 1 found DOS controls over voter-registration records maintenance needed enhancement for duplicates/deceased/felons, with Supervisors responsible for updating FVRS based on Department-provided matches—and inadequate Department follow-up when Supervisors mishandled matches. Status Confirmed for multi-party maintenance failure modes (incompetence pathway); malicious fourth-party Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 — Finding 1 records maintenance", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf"}, {"title": "ERIC security page (cross-state outsourcing companion)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/security/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-dos-supervisors-outsourced-maintenance-coordination-gaps__eric-security-page-cross-state-outsourcing-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-27", "uid": "C20260926-000809-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-27", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records"], "seq": "C00580", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Injection of bad records"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "FL Auditor General 2021-096 Finding 1: maintenance controls failed to identify numerous potential duplicate, deceased, and convicted-felon registration matches; auditors found previously unidentified duplicates and death-record matches, including cases where votes were cast after recorded dates of death. Documents bad/ineligible records persisting on rolls (whether by error or abuse). Status Confirmed for bad-record persistence; intentional 'injection' motive Alleged only.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 Finding 1 duplicates/deceased/felons", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}, {"title": "ERIC FAQ — cross-state duplicate/deceased list-maintenance reports", "url": "https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ERIC-FAQ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 14."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-2-implausible-ages-preregistration-bad-data", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-28", "uid": "C20260926-000809-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-28", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-2-implausible-ages-preregistration-bad-data"], "seq": "C00581", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Injection of bad records"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Finding 2 identified hundreds of active voters with recorded ages 100–144 (including ages >110) and preregistration/status errors relative to statutory ages—further evidence of bad records in the statewide voter file. Status Confirmed for inaccurate/bad records; malicious injection not proven.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 Finding 2 age/DOB accuracy", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}, {"title": "Census/ERIC list-maintenance context (soft)", "url": "https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ERIC-FAQ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 14 companion. Distinct from standing-skip Registration 15-year-old leaf."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-2-prereg-age-controls-under-16-active-status-errors", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-28", "uid": "C20260926-000015-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-28", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-2-prereg-age-controls-under-16-active-status-errors"], "seq": "C00541", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Voter registration entries are also created for people too young to vote but old enough to drive."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General 2021-096 Finding 2: DOS controls ensuring persons who register/preregister satisfy statutory age requirements needed improvement; auditors found active records where revised DOBs implied preregistration at 14–15 and status flips to active before age 18—illustrating youth registration-entry failure modes adjacent to Motor-Voter/driver-age pathways. Status Confirmed for age-control weaknesses creating underage registration entries.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 — Finding 2 age requirements", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf"}, {"title": "CA SOS pre-reg FAQs (lawful 16–17 Motor Voter companion)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/pre-register-16-vote-18/pre-reg-faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-2-prereg-age-controls-under-16-active-status-errors__ca-sos-pre-reg-faqs-lawful-16-17-motor-voter-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-4-periodic-access-reviews-not-documented", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-26", "uid": "C20260926-000809-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-26", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-4-periodic-access-reviews-not-documented"], "seq": "C00579", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Same audit Finding 4: Department procedures did not require—and records did not evidence—periodic reviews of Voter Focus / BVRSA / network user access privileges during Jul 2017–Jan 2019, and obsolete system-administrator accounts remained enabled. Weak periodic review + short log retention = loose access logging/accountability for voter-roll systems. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 Finding 4 IT access privileges", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas SAO 08-012 — excessive voter-registration admin privileges (soft companion)", "url": "https://sao.texas.gov/reports/main/08-012.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-25", "uid": "C20260926-000809-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-25", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging"], "seq": "C00578", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 Finding 6: contrary to GS1-SL retention rules, the Department retained system-generated network access-control records related to disablement of privileges for only 90 days instead of 1 year—loose/inadequate access logging for systems tied to voter-registration operations. Soft remount companion to fill-20e Loose access controls / No change-tracking cards on adjacent pathKeys. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 (Finding 6 access-control records)", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}, {"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 Finding 4 access privilege controls", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 13. Soft remount from fill-20e voter-roll access family."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-2021-096-inconsistent-match-criteria-supervisor-handling-data-consistency", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-29", "uid": "C20260926-000809-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-29", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-2021-096-inconsistent-match-criteria-supervisor-handling-data-consistency"], "seq": "C00582", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No data consistency"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "FL AG 2021-096 documents inconsistent handling of the same demographic match criteria across Department vs Supervisor decisions (e.g., death matches marked invalid despite matching SSN/name; pending duplicate matches open for years)—absence of consistent data-integrity enforcement across the statewide voter-registration system. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FL Auditor General — Report 2021-096 voter registration maintenance findings", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logging__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained-logg.pdf"}, {"title": "ERIC FAQ — standardized cross-state consistency reports for members", "url": "https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/documents/ERIC-FAQ.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad-records__fl-auditor-2021-096-finding-1-duplicates-deceased-felon-match-gaps-bad.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 15."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-general-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-21", "uid": "C20260926-000015-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-21", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-general-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained"], "seq": "C00534", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No change tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 Finding 6: contrary to GS1-SL retention requirements (1 year after access rights deactivated), the Department retained network access-control records related to disablement of privileges for only 90 days—undermining forensic change-tracking of who could modify voter-registration systems. Status Confirmed for inadequate access/change-control record retention tied to voter-roll IT.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 — Finding 6 records retention", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-general-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained__florida-auditor-general-report-2021-096-finding-6-records-re.pdf"}, {"title": "Same report Finding 5 — configuration management authorization/testing gaps", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-general-2021-096-finding-6-access-control-records-not-retained__florida-auditor-general-report-2021-096-finding-6-records-re.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 11. Note: two identical empty pathKeys for No change-tracking in tree; filling this pathKey covers both."}
{"id": "fl-auditor-general-2021-096-voter-focus-access-privilege-controls-finding-4", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-19", "uid": "C20260926-000015-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-19", "old_ids": ["fl-auditor-general-2021-096-voter-focus-access-privilege-controls-finding-4"], "seq": "C00532", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access-control security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 Finding 4: Department IT access privilege controls for Voter Focus (FVRS access), BVRSA, and the Department network needed enhancement—no documented periodic access reviews, obsolete system-administrator accounts left enabled, excessive service-account create-user capability, and incompatible admin role combinations. Status Confirmed for loose/insufficient voter-roll access controls in a major statewide system.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Auditor General Report 2021-096 — Finding 4 IT access privileges", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-auditor-general-2021-096-voter-focus-access-privilege-controls-finding-4__fl-auditor-general-2021-096-voter-focus-access-privilege-controls-finding-4.pdf"}, {"title": "Tampa Bay Times / Voting News — Auditor critical of Florida voter information handling", "url": "https://thevotingnews.com/auditor-generals-report-critical-of-how-florida-handles-voter-information-tampa-bay-times/"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 10."}
{"id": "aapor-2020-polling-overstated-biden-perception-framing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-03", "uid": "C20260926-004030-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-03", "old_ids": ["aapor-2020-polling-overstated-biden-perception-framing"], "seq": "C00756", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "When results are falsified, voters misled about their candidate's popularity find the stolen victory more plausible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "AAPOR's Task Force on 2020 Pre-Election Polling found unusual-magnitude polling error that systematically overstated Biden's margin (~3.9 pts national signed error too favorable to Biden; Trump understated by ~3.3 pts topline)—i.e., public perception of relative candidate popularity was skewed Democrat-favorable relative to the certified vote. That misperception of how popular each side truly is is the leaf's suppression-based framing mechanism: when outcomes later favor the overstated side, the result can seem more plausible to those who absorbed the skewed popularity cue. Status Confirmed for measured popularity-perception skew via polling error; intentional 'falsified results' cabal cheat Alleged beyond the polling record.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — Task Force on 2020 Pre-Election Polling Executive Summary (PDF)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Task-Force-on-2020-Pre-Election-Polling_Executive-Summary.pdf"}, {"title": "AAPOR — Full Task Force Report on 2020 Pre-Election Polling (PDF)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AAPOR-Task-Force-on-2020-Pre-Election-Polling_Report-FNL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2020-polling-overstated-biden-perception-framing__aapor-full-task-force-report-on-2020-pre-election-polling-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 2. Honest: perception skew Confirmed; outcome-falsification Alleged."}
{"id": "nass-ballottrax-mail-tracking-epollbook-feedback-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-38", "uid": "C20260926-004030-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-38", "old_ids": ["nass-ballottrax-mail-tracking-epollbook-feedback-companion"], "seq": "C00791", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Combine existing voter registration metrics with real-time data from the mail-ballot tracking system and electronic poll books."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NASS-hosted BallotTrax white paper describes mail-ballot envelope tracking from print through receipt/acceptance with voter notifications, and notes integrations that can reflect polling-place check-in—pairing mail-ballot tracking with e-pollbook/VR status fields. Status Confirmed for mail-ballot tracking + status feedback systems used by election offices.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — BallotTrax Tracking the Vote white paper (2021 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/ballottrax-white-paper-nass-winter21.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-ballottrax-mail-tracking-epollbook-feedback-companion__nass-ballottrax-tracking-the-vote-white-paper-2021-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "BallotTrax — Voter benefits / tracking overview", "url": "https://ballottrax.com/voter-benefits/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 19 companion.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation-sustained-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-10", "uid": "C20260926-004030-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-10", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation-sustained-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00763", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Sustained intimidation that continues until the target stops the activity that drew the attack"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021-01-01", "state": "VA", "description": "The Virginia Project's contemporaneous documentation of inorganic intimidation / hate-spam campaigns against Republican activists and electioneering operations describes sustained multi-vector attacks whose purpose is to stop activity rather than win an argument—soft remount of the existing Virginia Project inorganic-intimidation card onto this exact 'main characteristic / sustain over time' pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented sustained intimidation pattern as described by the Project; specific perpetrator attribution beyond their reporting Alleged where not independently adjudicated.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics (Constant Contact archive already in corpus)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ Election Threats Task Force companion", "url": "https://abcnews.go.com/US/doj-task-force-formed-2021-fight-election-threats/story?id=113355654"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 5 companion. Soft remount of existing virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation onto this empty pathKey."}
{"id": "mi-election-source-plaintext-master-key-in-ems-database-forensic", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-05", "uid": "C20261014-123054-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-05", "old_ids": ["mi-election-source-plaintext-master-key-in-ems-database-forensic"], "seq": "C01385", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Thumb or flash drives can easily be modified by bad actors in transit", "For example, Dominion encryption keys are stored in cleartext in the database and can be reused across counties and states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2021 (forensic report circulated in litigation exhibits)", "state": "MI", "description": "A forensic security write-up later filed among Michigan election-litigation exhibits (DePerno Law uploads of Exhibits 5–7) documents that the master cryptographic key used to encrypt tabulator results and configuration was stored in plaintext in a table inside the county election database, and that the same key value also existed with the election-programming vendor Election Source. The analysts wrote that with that key and knowledge of the file formats an attacker could alter result files before they were loaded into the EMS or alter tabulator configurations, and they recommended storing such keys only in a hardware TPM on the county EMS. Status Confirmed for the documented plaintext-key storage finding in the forensic report as published in those exhibits; the report does not by itself prove that any election results were altered. Catalog note: if the \"encryption\" protecting compact-flash results sits as cleartext next to the data it is supposed to protect, the word encryption is doing rhetorical work for the public more than cryptographic work for the county. Peer to CISA CVE-2022-1746 on this leaf; not an Antrim remount.", "sources": [{"title": "DePerno Law — Litigation exhibits 5–7 PDF (plaintext cryptographic keys in election database / Election Source finding)", "url": "https://www.depernolaw.com/uploads/2/7/0/2/27029178/ex_5-7.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA ICSA-22-154-01 — related federal finding that poll-worker auth can expose cryptographic secrets (June 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for plaintext-key storage as stated in the forensic exhibit; outcome claims not adjudicated here. Advocacy-host PDF of a technical report—primary is the report text. Cross-leaf: Encryption Deception."}
{"id": "alaska-as-15-15-030-ranked-choice-ballot-ranking-columns-rcv-aka", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-09", "uid": "C20260926-023334-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-09", "old_ids": ["alaska-as-15-15-030-ranked-choice-ballot-ranking-columns-rcv-aka"], "seq": "C01069", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Beware of RCV implemented under a different name."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "AK", "description": "Alaska Statutes §15.15.030 requires general-election ballots to let voters rank candidates by preference (ranking columns / no duplicate rankings)—the statutory form of Alaska's ranked-choice voting system adopted via Ballot Measure 2; Alaska Division of Elections sample RCV ballots instruct \"Vote by ranking candidates of your choice.\" The same single-winner elimination method is widely labeled instant-runoff voting (IRV) in reform and academic materials, illustrating how RCV ships under alternate names while the tabulation method is unchanged. Status Confirmed state statute + official ballot practice; peer to FairVote IRV synonym and NYC charter \"also known as IRV\" cards already on this leaf—Alaska statutory ranking implementation, not FairVote remounted (no FairVote financials). PEP framing: renaming obscures machine-mediated multi-round elimination that complicates public hand-count observation.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — Alaska Statutes §15.15.030 (ballot contents; ranking provisions)", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/ak/title-15-elections/ak-st-sect-15-15-030/"}, {"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — General RCV ballot sample (PDF)", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/doc/GenRCV_BallotSamp3.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/alaska-as-15-15-030-ranked-choice-ballot-ranking-columns-rcv-aka__alaska-division-of-elections-general-rcv-ballot-sample-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on RCV-under-different-name leaf."}
{"id": "appel-stark-2020-compliance-audits-voter-registration-changelogs-should-be-included", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-22", "uid": "C20260926-000015-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-22", "old_ids": ["appel-stark-2020-compliance-audits-voter-registration-changelogs-should-be-included"], "seq": "C00535", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No change tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Appel & Stark (Georgetown Law Technology Review, 2020) state that before elections, voter registration databases should be scrutinized and changelogs included as part of compliance audits—implicitly documenting that changelog scrutiny is often missing from routine practice. Status Confirmed as expert prescription highlighting the change-tracking gap.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel & Stark — Evidence-Based Elections (GLTR 2020) changelogs", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-compliance-audits-voter-registration-changelogs-should-be-included__appel-stark-2020-compliance-audits-voter-registration-changelogs-should-be-inclu.pdf"}, {"title": "Florida AG 2021-096 — access-control retention gap (operational example)", "url": "https://flauditor.gov/pages/pdf_files/2021-096.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-dependent-insecure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-15", "uid": "C20260926-021058-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-15", "old_ids": ["appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-dependent-insecure"], "seq": "C00963", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "There is no way to secure these systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "US", "description": "Appel & Stark (**Evidence-Based Elections: Create a Meaningful Paper Trail, Then Audit**, Georgetown Law Technology Review 2020) argue that software-dependent voting systems cannot by themselves produce trustworthy outcomes: computers are hackable, so integrity requires a voter-verified hand-marked paper trail plus rigorous audit—not faith in secured software. Status Confirmed that software-dependent tabulation cannot be adequately secured in isolation; peer to Rivest-Wack NIST software-independence and NAS 2018 Securing the Vote DRE findings—Appel-Stark evidence-based elections paper, not those remounted. PEP framing: properly-run hand count of hand-marked paper is the resilient path.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel & Stark — Evidence-Based Elections (Georgetown Law Technology Review 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/4.2-p523-541-Appel-Stark.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-dependent-insecure__appel-stark-evidence-based-elections-georgetown-law-technology-review-2020-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Princeton CS — Appel-Stark Evidence-Based Elections PDF mirror", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-dependent-insecure__princeton-cs-appel-stark-evidence-based-elections-pdf-mirror.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on THERE IS NO WAY TO SECURE THESE SYSTEMS leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "appel-stark-2020-no-perfect-infallible-way-to-count-votes-computers-hackable", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-33", "uid": "C20260926-000015-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-33", "old_ids": ["appel-stark-2020-no-perfect-infallible-way-to-count-votes-computers-hackable"], "seq": "C00546", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Appel & Stark (GLTR 2020): 'There is no perfect, infallible way to count votes. All methods—including optical scan, touchscreen, and hand counting—are subject to errors, procedural lapses, and deliberate manipulation,' and computer-based tabulation is subject to hacking that is very difficult to detect. Status Confirmed that electronic tabulators cannot be guaranteed to operate without error/abuse. PEP: properly-run precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is software-independent evidence (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep)—complexity/guarantee failure is a machine/centralized problem.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel & Stark — Evidence-Based Elections (GLTR 2020)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-no-perfect-infallible-way-to-count-votes-computers-hackable__appel-stark-evidence-based-elections-gltr-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "Rivest/Wack NIST — software independence definition", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-no-perfect-infallible-way-to-count-votes-computers-hackable__appel-stark-2020-no-perfect-infallible-way-to-count-votes-computers-hackable.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 17. PEP framing."}
{"id": "appel-stark-software-independence-ballot-images-not-substitute-for-paper-rla", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-34", "uid": "C20260926-000809-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-34", "old_ids": ["appel-stark-software-independence-ballot-images-not-substitute-for-paper-rla"], "seq": "C00587", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable digital ballot images so they cannot be used as evidence in an audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Academic election-security literature (Appel–Stark / evidence-based elections; Halderman notes ballot scans cannot substitute for RLAs of physical ballots) underscores that when digital images are absent or untrusted, audits must fall back to paper—so disabling images removes a convenient evidence channel and increases dependence on procedural access to ballots. Status Confirmed for the audit-evidence implication; not a claim images alone prove outcomes.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman Antrim paper — ballot images vs RLA of physical ballots", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-media__halderman-antrim-icp-ballot-images-capability-not-enabled-removable-me.pdf"}, {"title": "Appel–Stark GLTR 2020 PDF (compliance audits / evidence)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-software-independence-ballot-images-not-substitute-for-paper-rla__appel-stark-software-independence-ballot-images-not-substitute-for-pap.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 17 companion. Soft remount Appel–Stark from fill-20e Tabulation leaves."}
{"id": "ca-sos-homeless-voter-registration-location-description-mailing", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-22", "uid": "C20260925-211320-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-22", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-homeless-voter-registration-location-description-mailing"], "seq": "C00267", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No physical address; a mailing address only"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "CA", "description": "California elections guidance for voters experiencing homelessness permits a residence description (park, shelter, cross-streets) sufficient to assign a precinct, with a separate mailing address (or in-person options) for ballot delivery. Status Confirmed for registration without a conventional street address paired with mailing/delivery alternatives.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — VoteSafe / homelessness election resources PDF", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/pdfs/covid-19-resources/votesafe-homelessness.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-homeless-voter-registration-location-description-mailing__california-sos-votesafe-homelessness-election-resources-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "California Elections Code §2150 (affidavit contents)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=2150", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sos-homeless-voter-registration-location-description-mailing__california-elections-code-2150-affidavit-contents.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-05", "uid": "C20260925-233150-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-05", "old_ids": ["cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact"], "seq": "C00398", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues", "Impact assessments"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment evaluates impacts/risks across ballot production, mailing, transport, processing, and related IT—documenting how expanding mail infrastructure changes the threat and operational-impact surface that jurisdictions must manage. Status Confirmed that federal impact/risk assessment products are used to frame election-method changes. Such assessments can both inform hardening and serve as bureaucratic gates before simpler public hand-count of hand-marked paper is adopted.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment (PDF)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact__cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact__cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (resource page)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact__cisa-2020-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-impact__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return-resource.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 3."}
{"id": "cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices-acknowledges-tracking-gaps-need-controls", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-21", "uid": "C20260925-235207-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-21", "old_ids": ["cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices-acknowledges-tracking-gaps-need-controls"], "seq": "C00494", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Chain of Custody Best Practices guidance exists precisely because election materials, ballots, and electronic media require documented handoffs—implying incomplete tracking is a recognized operational risk when CoC controls lapse. Status Confirmed that federal guidance treats end-to-end tracking of election artifacts as a control gap that must be actively mitigated (i.e., incomplete tracking is the default failure mode without those practices).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Chain of Custody Best Practices", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/chain-custody-best-practices", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices-acknowledges-tracking-gaps-need-controls__cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting Risk and Mitigations", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 11. PEP contrast: precinct public hand count of hand-marked paper reduces reliance on incomplete electronic CoC tracking."}
{"id": "cisa-eac-fbi-nist-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-soft-remount-uocava-verity-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-08", "uid": "C20260925-235207-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-08", "old_ids": ["cisa-eac-fbi-nist-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-soft-remount-uocava-verity-leaf"], "seq": "C00481", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "More vulnerabilities are listed at www.verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA/EAC/FBI/NIST joint risk management for electronic ballot delivery, marking, and return rates electronic cast-ballot return as high risk—federal confirmation of the core UOCAVA electronic-channel vulnerability class that Verity Vote and NISTIR analyses enumerate. Status Confirmed for official high-risk classification of electronic ballot return (soft remount onto exact Verity Vote-cited leaf).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-eac-fbi-nist-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-soft-remount-uocava-verity-leaf__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return.png"}, {"title": "Verity Vote UOCAVA vulnerability summary PDF", "url": "https://verityvote.us/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/UOCAVA_Vulnerability_Summary_VerityVote.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 4 companion. Soft remount of prior CISA UOCAVA card family onto this exact pathKey."}
{"id": "cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-09", "uid": "C20260926-000015-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-09", "old_ids": ["cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners"], "seq": "C00522", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials must rely completely on assigned \"cybersecurity\" experts, who in effect control our elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA and CIS operate EI-ISAC / MS-ISAC as the primary no-cost cyber threat-intel, SOC, Albert monitoring, and training pipeline for SLTT election offices—officials are steered to join and follow these assigned cybersecurity partners for hardening and incident response. Status Confirmed that election officials are structurally dependent on assigned federal/NGO cyber experts for day-to-day security posture; 'controlling our elections' evaluative overclaim stays outside Confirmed scope.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Join the Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/join-elections-infrastructure-information-sharing-and-analysis-center-ei-isac", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners__cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners.png"}, {"title": "CIS — EI-ISAC membership / MS-ISAC threat intelligence for elections", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/ei-isac", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners__cisa-ei-isac-ms-isac-election-officials-directed-to-assigned-cyber-partners.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 5. Soft companion to fill-20d Usurpation complexity leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-election-cyber-risk-aggregation-websites-central-components-high-impact", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-19", "uid": "C20260925-233150-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-19", "old_ids": ["cisa-election-cyber-risk-aggregation-websites-central-components-high-impact"], "seq": "C00412", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Centralizing certain components defeats decentralization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA election cyber-risk guidance highlights integrity risks to centralized functions—voter registration databases, election-data preparation, vote aggregation, and public results websites—where a single compromised component can affect many precincts. Status Confirmed that federal risk models treat central components as high-blast-radius despite precinct-level voting. Decentralized precinct hand counts are the PEP counterexample.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Cyber Risk resource hub", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/election-cyber-risk"}, {"title": "Justia — C.R.S. §1-5-102.9 Voter service and polling centers", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/article-5/part-1/section-1-5-102-9/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 10."}
{"id": "cisa-election-cyber-risk-centralized-components-high-impact-soft-remount-blast-radius", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-29", "uid": "C20260926-000015-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-29", "old_ids": ["cisa-election-cyber-risk-centralized-components-high-impact-soft-remount-blast-radius"], "seq": "C00542", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Bad actors can then exploit it for a much larger blast radius."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk materials assess integrity attacks on centralized components (statewide voter registration, election-data prep, vote aggregation, public results websites) as high-impact because a single compromise can affect many jurisdictions—i.e., a larger blast radius than isolated precinct paper. Soft remount of prior CISA cyber-risk cards onto this exact empty pathKey. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Cyber Risk resource hub", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/election-cyber-risk", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-election-cyber-risk-centralized-components-high-impact-soft-remount-blast-radius__cisa-election-cyber-risk-centralized-components-high-impact-soft-remount-blast-r.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting Risks and Mitigations (public aggregation surface)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 15. Soft remount companion to fill-20c Technology attractive-attack-surface / centralization leaves."}
{"id": "cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-integrity-attacks-registration-aggregation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-17", "uid": "C20260925-233150-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-17", "old_ids": ["cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-integrity-attacks-registration-aggregation"], "seq": "C00410", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "This creates a much more attractive attack surface."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Election Infrastructure Cyber Risk materials assess voter registration, ballot prep, voting-system programming, vote aggregation, election websites, and electronic ballot submission as cyber-risk components—i.e., digitizing and networking election functions enlarges the attractive attack surface relative to precinct hand-marked paper counted in public. Status Confirmed for federal framing of expanded cyber attack surface. PEP contrast: hand count of hand-marked paper collapses most of that software surface.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Cyber Risk resource hub", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/election-cyber-risk", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-integrity-attacks-registration-aggregation__cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-integrity-attacks-registration-aggregation__cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-hub.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment (related infrastructure surface)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 9."}
{"id": "cisa-election-results-reporting-risk-mitigations-public-facing-aggregation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-29", "uid": "C20260925-234437-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-29", "old_ids": ["cisa-election-results-reporting-risk-mitigations-public-facing-aggregation"], "seq": "C00462", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Totals can be changed and hidden inside aggregation without the public being able to detect it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations documents that unofficial election-night reporting often runs on public-facing websites and that some jurisdictions electronically transmit (modem/email) unofficial results from polling places—creating cyber risks (including person-in-the-middle) and temporary data errors that can change displayed totals during aggregation/reporting. Status Confirmed that federal guidance treats aggregation/reporting systems as an attack and error surface where displayed totals can change without the public independently verifying official canvass inputs. Soft companion to fill-20b Reporting centralization cards.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations (PDF)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Checklist for Securing Election Night Results Reporting (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/postelection/Checklist_for_Securing_Election_Results_FINAL_EAC.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-election-results-reporting-risk-mitigations-public-facing-aggregation__eac-checklist-for-securing-election-night-results-reporting-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 15."}
{"id": "cisa-election-results-reporting-temporary-data-errors-hand-entry-transmission", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-22", "uid": "C20260925-235207-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-22", "old_ids": ["cisa-election-results-reporting-temporary-data-errors-hand-entry-transmission"], "seq": "C00495", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Election Results Reporting risk chart lists temporary data errors from hand entry, miscommunication, and electronic transmission of unofficial results—symptoms of incomplete end-to-end tracking between precinct/tabulator outputs and public/official aggregates. Status Confirmed for documented incomplete-tracking failure modes in results pipelines (soft remount of existing ENR card family onto Tabulation > Incomplete tracking).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST — Election Night Reporting (ENR) use case", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/election-night-reporting-enr-use-case", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-election-results-reporting-temporary-data-errors-hand-entry-transmission__nist-election-night-reporting-enr-use-case.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "cisa-enr-unofficial-public-facing-results-no-guarantee-equal-official-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-37", "uid": "C20260926-000015-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-37", "old_ids": ["cisa-enr-unofficial-public-facing-results-no-guarantee-equal-official-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00550", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no guarantee to the public that the displayed state and federal totals are accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations states unofficial election reporting often occurs on public-facing websites; a successful attack would not change official results but can endanger public confidence—and temporary data errors (hand entry, miscommunication, transmission) occur and are corrected over time via canvass. Soft remount of prior ENR cards onto this exact empty pathKey. Status Confirmed that shown ENR/state/fed night totals are not guaranteed accurate official totals.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Checklist for Securing Election Night Results Reporting", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/postelection/Checklist_for_Securing_Election_Results_FINAL_EAC.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-enr-unofficial-public-facing-results-no-guarantee-equal-official-soft-remount__cisa-enr-unofficial-public-facing-results-no-guarantee-equal-official-soft-remou.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 19. Soft remount companion to fill-20d Reporting officials-don't-know-totals leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-enr-unofficial-results-public-facing-aggregation-after-leave-tabulator", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-31", "uid": "C20260925-235207-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-31", "old_ids": ["cisa-enr-unofficial-results-public-facing-aggregation-after-leave-tabulator"], "seq": "C00504", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Election officials do not know what happens to their totals once the totals leave their office."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Election Results Reporting guidance separates unofficial public-facing ENR aggregation (websites, electronic transmission from polling places) from official canvass tabulation—and lists person-in-the-middle, hand-entry, and transmission risks on the unofficial path. Once precinct/county totals enter ENR pipelines, local officials do not control downstream public aggregation. Status Confirmed for the 'totals leave and enter opaque unofficial reporting' structure (soft remount onto this exact Reporting leaf).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Election Results Reporting: Risks and Mitigations", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST — Election Night Reporting use case", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/election-night-reporting-enr-use-case", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-enr-unofficial-results-public-facing-aggregation-after-leave-tabulator__nist-election-night-reporting-use-case.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 16."}
{"id": "cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-coc-transport-processing", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-14", "uid": "C20260925-233150-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-14", "old_ids": ["cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-coc-transport-processing"], "seq": "C00407", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment catalogs risks across printing, addressing, postal/transport, aggregation, and processing stages—i.e., the extended custody path unique to mail ballots versus precinct hand-marked paper counted locally. Status Confirmed for federal documentation of mail-specific custody/process risks.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment (PDF)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-coc-transport-processing__cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Inbound Ballot Process best practices", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Inbound_Ballot_Process.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-coc-transport-processing__cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-coc-transport-processing__eac-inbound-ballot-process-best-practices.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "ctcl-2020-grant-applications-targeted-registration-vulnerable-communities", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-29", "uid": "C20260926-001426-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-29", "old_ids": ["ctcl-2020-grant-applications-targeted-registration-vulnerable-communities"], "seq": "C00622", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "They target vulnerable parts of our communities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "WI", "description": "CTCL 2020 COVID-19 Response Grant applications and related Wisconsin city exhibits show local proposals to use private grant funds for voter outreach/registration aimed at historically underrepresented communities (e.g., Hmong, Somali, Spanish-speaking, Black, Latinx, low-income)—i.e., NGO/private-funded targeting of vulnerable community segments for registration. FEC later found no reasonable basis that CTCL grants were intended to influence federal elections as contributions; status Confirmed for the targeted-registration design in applications, not for illegal vote-buying.", "sources": [{"title": "CTCL — Final Report on 2020 COVID-19 Response Grant Program", "url": "https://www.techandciviclife.org/2020covidsupport/"}, {"title": "CourtListener exhibit — WI municipal CTCL application targeting outreach", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wied.92761/gov.uscourts.wied.92761.80.4.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ctcl-2020-grant-applications-targeted-registration-vulnerable-communities__courtlistener-exhibit-wi-municipal-ctcl-application-targeting-outreach.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 15. Honest: targeting Confirmed in apps; sinister 'cabal inject independents' motive Alleged."}
{"id": "ctcl-2020-zuckerberg-chan-350m-private-grants-dropboxes-eligible", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-12", "uid": "C20260925-211320-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-12", "old_ids": ["ctcl-2020-zuckerberg-chan-350m-private-grants-dropboxes-eligible"], "seq": "C00257", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Public and private money funds setting them up everywhere."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "In 2020 Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan donated ~$350 million to the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL), which distributed COVID-19 Response Grants to nearly 2,500 local election jurisdictions. Eligible uses included equipment and staffing for absentee/mail and drop-off infrastructure. Status Confirmed for massive private funding of local election administration including drop-box-capable expansions.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — CTCL grants to election agencies, 2020", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Center_for_Tech_and_Civic_Life%27s_(CTCL)_grants_to_election_agencies,_2020"}, {"title": "CTCL — COVID-19 Response Grants overview", "url": "https://www.techandciviclife.org/our-work/election-officials/grants/2020grants/"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 7."}
{"id": "democracy-live-omniballot-uocava-disabled-voters-electronic-delivery-marking", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-28", "uid": "C20260925-233150-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-28", "old_ids": ["democracy-live-omniballot-uocava-disabled-voters-electronic-delivery-marking"], "seq": "C00421", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will cite UOCAVA's \"proven track record\" as evidence that mobile voting is \"safe and secure.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Democracy Live OmniBallot and similar portals were adopted in multiple jurisdictions (including post-Voatz West Virginia) for UOCAVA and some voters with disabilities to receive/mark ballots electronically—explicitly extending UOCAVA electronic-access practice as the wedge for browser/mobile ballot experiences. Status Confirmed for UOCAVA-justified electronic ballot delivery/marking platforms. Security of electronic return remains high-risk per CISA (see UOCAVA leaf cards).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return"}, {"title": "MeriTalk — WV moves off Voatz toward other electronic UOCAVA options", "url": "https://www.meritalk.com/articles/west-virginia-ditches-controversial-voatz-app-for-may-election/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 14 companion.", "vendor": ["Democracy Live"], "vendor_models": ["Democracy Live OmniBallot"]}
{"id": "eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-13", "uid": "C20260925-233150-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-13", "old_ids": ["eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface"], "seq": "C00406", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "U.S. Election Assistance Commission Chain of Custody Best Practices details the many handoffs mail/absentee ballots require (issuance, transport, receipt, storage, scanning) and recommends two-person rules, seals, logs, and reconciliations precisely because those handoffs are error- and integrity-sensitive. Status Confirmed that official federal guidance treats mail-ballot chain-of-custody as a multi-step vulnerability surface needing controls. Confirmed for CoC complexity/risk acknowledgment; not a finding that any specific election was stolen.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Chain of Custody Best Practices (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/bestpractices/Chain_of_Custody_Best_Practices.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface__eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface__eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Chain of Custody Best Practices resource", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/chain-custody-best-practices", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface__eac-chain-of-custody-best-practices-documents-mail-ballot-coc-risk-surface__cisa-chain-of-custody-best-practices-resource.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 7. Machine/centralized mail pipelines create CoC complexity; PEP hand count of hand-marked paper shortens the chain."}
{"id": "eac-checklist-securing-election-night-results-reporting-transmission-controls", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-32", "uid": "C20260925-235207-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-32", "old_ids": ["eac-checklist-securing-election-night-results-reporting-transmission-controls"], "seq": "C00505", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Election officials do not know what happens to their totals once the totals leave their office."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC's Checklist for Securing Election Night Results Reporting exists because unofficial results leave local tabulation environments via networks/media and require MFA, isolation, duplicate systems, and validation—acknowledging officials cannot assume visibility/control once totals enter ENR channels. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Checklist for Securing Election Night Results Reporting", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/postelection/Checklist_for_Securing_Election_Results_FINAL_EAC.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-checklist-securing-election-night-results-reporting-transmission-controls__eac-checklist-for-securing-election-night-results-reporting.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA ENR risks PDF", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "eac-cisa-ballot-drop-box-guidance-outside-usps-mailstream-coc", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-05", "uid": "C20260925-234437-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-05", "old_ids": ["eac-cisa-ballot-drop-box-guidance-outside-usps-mailstream-coc"], "seq": "C00438", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "They provide an open path to inject ballots without even USPS mail-ballot tracking."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA/EAC Joint COVID Working Group Ballot Drop Box guidance describes drop boxes as secure locked structures where voters deliver ballots outside the USPS mailstream, and states that collection teams need vehicles, seals, and chain-of-custody forms—explicitly acknowledging a parallel return path that bypasses postal tracking barcodes/scans. Status Confirmed that drop-box return is designed as a non-USPS custody path requiring its own CoC controls. Soft companion to existing ca-dropbox-camera / erie-pa / maricopa dropbox cards on Drop-Boxes parent; mounts exact open-path child. PEP framing: precinct hand-marked paper counted in public shortens custody versus unattended box + retrieval logistics.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC/CISA — Ballot Drop Box guidance (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Ballot_Drop_Box.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-cisa-ballot-drop-box-guidance-outside-usps-mailstream-coc__eac-cisa-ballot-drop-box-guidance-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment (related mail/drop infrastructure)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-cisa-ballot-drop-box-guidance-outside-usps-mailstream-coc__cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment-related-mail-drop-infrastruct.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 3."}
{"id": "ess-ds200-optional-cellular-modem-board-installed-in-hardware", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-25", "uid": "C20260925-234437-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-25", "old_ids": ["ess-ds200-optional-cellular-modem-board-installed-in-hardware"], "seq": "C00458", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wireless devices installed in hardware"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ES&S documents and jurisdiction disclosures describe DS200 precinct scanners with optional/separate cellular modem boards (e.g., Multitech/Verizon modules) installed in the hardware for unofficial results transmission—wireless devices physically present in tabulator hardware. Status Confirmed for wireless modem hardware in fielded tabulators. Soft companion to existing ess-modem / ess-ds200-modem cards.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S — Transmission of Unofficial Election Results FAQs (cellular modems)", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-optional-cellular-modem-board-installed-in-hardware__es-s-transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs-cellular-modems.png"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S DS200", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-ds200/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 13. Prefer working vendor/VV URLs; modem mechanism Confirmed in prior fill cards.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-vra-11b-citizen-canvass-labeled-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-31", "uid": "C20260925-220029-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-31", "old_ids": ["fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-vra-11b-citizen-canvass-labeled-intimidation"], "seq": "C00384", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Canvassing", "They claim that citizen canvassing efforts constitute voter intimidation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "GA", "description": "Fair Fight, Inc. v. True the Vote (N.D. Ga.) sued under Voting Rights Act §11(b), alleging True the Vote's 'Validate the Vote' citizen challenge/canvass/watchdog operations intimidated Georgia voters; DOJ intervened on §11(b)'s constitutionality. Status Confirmed that organized plaintiffs/DOJ framed citizen canvassing/challenge activity as voter intimidation in federal court—exactly the catalog leaf. Separately, after trial the court found insufficient proof of voter-specific injury and ruled against plaintiffs (Jan 2024)—so the intimidation claim itself is Disputed/unproven even while the 'attempt to claim' is Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Courthouse News — Fair Fight v. True the Vote complaint PDF", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-complaint-usdc-northern-georgia.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-vra-11b-citizen-canvass-labeled-intimidation__courthouse-news-fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-complaint-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "DOJ — constitutionality brief Fair Fight v. True the Vote PDF", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-07/constitutionality_brief-_fair_fight_v_true_the_vote.pdf"}, {"title": "Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse — case page", "url": "https://clearinghouse.net/case/44436/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fair-fight-v-true-the-vote-vra-11b-citizen-canvass-labeled-intimidation__civil-rights-litigation-clearinghouse-case-page.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 16. 'Attempt to claim' Confirmed; intimidation finding failed at trial."}
{"id": "fl-dos-dominion-icp-dcf-disabled-audit-marks-images-setting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-03", "uid": "C20260926-022005-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-03", "old_ids": ["fl-dos-dominion-icp-dcf-disabled-audit-marks-images-setting"], "seq": "C00981", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable digital ballot images so they cannot be used as evidence in an audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-46", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Division of Elections qualification testing of Dominion Democracy Suite documented that ICP precinct scanners can be configured via Device Configuration File (DCF) to disable audit-mark generation while still saving ballot images—and that image retention itself is a tabulator setting that can be enabled or disabled. BVSC accepted a DCF that disabled audit marks after unexpected shutdowns during mass ballot count. Status Confirmed configurable disable/degrade of image-adjacent audit artifacts; peer to Halderman Antrim image-disabled and Appel–Stark images-not-substitute cards—Florida ICP DCF/qualification finding, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida DOS — Dominion Democracy Suite Release 4.14.37 Qualification Test Report (ICP DCF audit-mark disable)", "url": "https://fldoswebumbracoprod.blob.core.windows.net/media/696013/dominion-democracy-suite-release-41437-version-1-test-report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-dos-dominion-icp-dcf-disabled-audit-marks-images-setting__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "VoteWell / Curling testimony excerpt — Dominion ICP ballot-image save is a tabulator setting", "url": "https://votewell.net/dominion.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-dos-dominion-icp-dcf-disabled-audit-marks-images-setting__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Disable digital images leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "gothamist-nyc-boe-early-vote-files-public-campaigns-know-who-voted", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-17", "uid": "C20260925-220029-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-17", "old_ids": ["gothamist-nyc-boe-early-vote-files-public-campaigns-know-who-voted"], "seq": "C00370", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "NY", "description": "Reporting on New York City Board of Elections practice documents that early-voting / who-has-voted files are publicly obtainable before Election Day, and campaigns (e.g., Yang 2020) use them to know who has already voted and retarget remaining voters. Status Confirmed that pre-Election Day voting generates actionable who-voted information usable for real-time campaign/adjustment modeling. Confirmed for information gain; 'injecting ballots' manipulation step stays Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Gothamist — Yang campaign knows who voted early; BOE says you can too", "url": "https://gothamist.com/news/yang-campaign-knows-who-voted-early-and-board-elections-says-you-can-too", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gothamist-nyc-boe-early-vote-files-public-campaigns-know-who-voted__gothamist-yang-campaign-knows-who-voted-early-boe-says-you-c.png"}, {"title": "Arena — Tracking votes and maximizing the pre-Election Day vote", "url": "https://blog.arenawins.com/2024/09/tracking-votes-and-maximizing-the-pre-election-day-vote/"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 9. Info-gain Confirmed; ballot-injection Alleged."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-vote-centers-any-site-convenience-model-2020-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-08", "uid": "C20260925-211320-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-08", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-vote-centers-any-site-convenience-model-2020-2024"], "seq": "C00253", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Sold as a convenience"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County transitioned to a vote-center model (vote-centers-only by 2020) so any eligible county voter may cast a ballot at any designated center rather than a single assigned precinct — marketed as voter convenience and flexibility. Status Confirmed for the convenience framing and operational countywide any-site model.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Arizona/Missouri vote centers vs precincts", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/aug/01/voting-centers-have-replaced-traditional-precincts/"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Elections — Where to Vote (vote centers)", "url": "https://elections.maricopa.gov/voting/where-to-vote.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-vote-centers-any-site-convenience-model-2020-2024__maricopa-county-elections-where-to-vote-vote-centers.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "mi-muskegon-2020-gbi-strategies-fake-voter-registration-applications-fbi", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-38", "uid": "C20260925-234437-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-38", "old_ids": ["mi-muskegon-2020-gbi-strategies-fake-voter-registration-applications-fbi"], "seq": "C00471", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan officials, including AG Dana Nessel's office and local partners, documented and referred to the FBI a 2020 Muskegon-area scheme involving large numbers of fraudulent/fake voter registration applications linked to paid registration-canvass vendor work (GBI Strategies)—an illegal/gray-area registration-drive episode. Status Confirmed that authorities identified and investigated fraudulent registration applications from a drive; mass ballot casting from those forms was reported intercepted/not completed.", "sources": [{"title": "Bridge Michigan — Muskegon fake voter applications probed, referred to FBI", "url": "https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/muskegon-fake-voter-applications-probed-2020-referred-fbi-nessel-says"}, {"title": "Just the News — FBI memos on Michigan 2020 voter registration fraud probe", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/declassified-docs-give-inside-look-fbis-probe-alleged-michigan-voter", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mi-muskegon-2020-gbi-strategies-fake-voter-registration-applications-fbi__just-the-news-fbi-memos-on-michigan-2020-voter-registration-fraud-probe.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-rejection-reason-worker-comparison", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-02", "uid": "C20260925-234437-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-02", "old_ids": ["mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-rejection-reason-worker-comparison"], "seq": "C00435", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Many citizen verifiers are not trained at all."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-36", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "MIT Election Data + Science Lab / related 2020 absentee research and multi-state election administration practice document that signature mismatch is among the top reasons mail/absentee ballots are rejected, with comparisons typically performed by election staff (not certified forensic document examiners) against one or a few file signatures. Status Confirmed that signature verification is a high-volume gatekeeping step performed by election workers rather than ABFDE diplomates. Soft companion to existing mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch card on Signature Verification stub; this mounts the exact 'Many citizens are not trained at all' child.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT EPI — Deep Dive into Absentee Ballot Rejection 2020", "url": "https://elections-blog.mit.edu/articles/deep-dive-absentee-ballot-rejection-2020-general-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-rejection-reason-worker-comparison__mit-epi-deep-dive-into-absentee-ballot-rejection-2020.png"}, {"title": "MIT/Healthy Elections — Signature Verification overview PDF", "url": "https://web.mit.edu/healthyelections/www/sites/default/files/2021-06/Signature_Verification.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-epi-2020-signature-mismatch-top-rejection-reason-worker-comparison__mit-healthy-elections-signature-verification-overview-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "nass-nased-joint-election-preparation-sos-clerks-coordination", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-20", "uid": "C20260926-001426-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-20", "old_ids": ["nass-nased-joint-election-preparation-sos-clerks-coordination"], "seq": "C00613", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Work closely with the secretary of state to pass rules, statutes, and laws that centralize elections under government control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "NASS and NASED joint 2020 election-preparation statements exemplify formal SOS–state election director coordination that sets statewide standards counties implement—soft institutional centralization via rules/guidance even where ballots remain local. Status Confirmed for SOS/association coordination pathway.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — NASS and NASED 2020 Election Preparations and Reminders", "url": "https://www.nass.org/node/2096", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-nased-joint-election-preparation-sos-clerks-coordination__nass-nass-and-nased-2020-election-preparations-and-reminders.png"}, {"title": "NACo Evolving Elections report", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/evolving-elections-how-state-legislation-will-impact-county-role-election-administration", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-nased-joint-election-preparation-sos-clerks-coordination__naco-evolving-elections-report.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "ncsbe-midterm-vacancy-appointment-election-official-succession-pattern", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-16", "uid": "C20260926-000809-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-16", "old_ids": ["ncsbe-midterm-vacancy-appointment-election-official-succession-pattern"], "seq": "C00569", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials who resign before the end of their term can be replaced by appointees who are not accountable to the citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Across U.S. states, mid-term vacancies in county election offices (recorder/clerk/supervisor) are routinely filled by appointment (governor, board of supervisors, or party committee mechanisms) rather than immediate special election—structural pathway matching the leaf. AZ §16-230 is one clear primary; companion notes the general pattern. Status Confirmed for appointed mid-term succession as common law; specific cabal packing stays Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Legislature — A.R.S. §16-230 (primary vacancy statute)", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00230.htm"}, {"title": "NPR vendor/official turnover context — election official relationships (soft)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/718270183/trips-to-vegas-and-chocolate-covered-pretzels-election-vendors-come-under-scruti"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 8 companion. Prefer stronger multi-state vacancy survey on remount."}
{"id": "ny-covid-absentee-expansion-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-40", "uid": "C20260925-155410-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-40", "old_ids": ["ny-covid-absentee-expansion-2020"], "seq": "C00040", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "NY", "description": "During COVID-19, New York expanded absentee eligibility (including via executive orders and Chapter 139 of the Laws of 2020 treating risk of COVID contraction as \"illness\" for absentee applications) and related postage-paid return measures (e.g., EO 202.26 context). Subsequent legislation extended pandemic-related absentee flexibility. Status Confirmed for official conversion/expansion of mail pathways relative to pre-pandemic norms; not a fraud finding.", "sources": [{"title": "NY Governor — legislation extending COVID absentee voting through 2022", "url": "https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-hochul-signs-legislation-allow-voting-absentee-ballot-due-covid-19-pandemic-through"}, {"title": "NYS courts — Matter of Amedure discussing COVID absentee framework", "url": "http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2022/2022_06096.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ny-covid-absentee-expansion-2020__nys-courts-matter-of-amedure-discussing-covid-absentee-frame.png"}], "notes": "Pandemic mail expansion Confirmed."}
{"id": "pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-26", "uid": "C20260925-155410-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-26", "old_ids": ["pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020"], "seq": "C00026", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania law (25 P.S. §2687(b)) restricts poll watchers to serving in their county of residence. In 2020 litigation including Trump campaign / Republican challenges, federal and state courts upheld the county-residency requirement against claims it unconstitutionally limited observation amid expanded mail voting. Status Confirmed for the statutory residency limit and judicial upholding; whether the rule is good policy is outside this label.", "sources": [{"title": "W.D. Pa. Trump v. Boockvar materials (CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736.574.0_2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020__w-d-pa-trump-v-boockvar-materials-courtlistener.pdf"}, {"title": "Pa. Supreme Court docket materials — Republican Committee answer (PDF)", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210510/224838-file-9888.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020__pa-supreme-court-docket-materials-republican-committee-answe.pdf"}], "notes": "Confirmed legal barrier to cross-county poll watching."}
{"id": "rock-the-vote-api-partner-access-registrant-personal-information", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-29", "uid": "C20260926-002008-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-29", "old_ids": ["rock-the-vote-api-partner-access-registrant-personal-information"], "seq": "C00662", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "It gives them direct access to people's personal information (a violation of privacy)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Rock the Vote's civic-tech partner docs and Voter Registration Tool API document that NGO registration platforms collect applicant personal information and expose registrant data, opt-ins, and partner_id-scoped records to partner organizations via APIs/reports—i.e., direct NGO access to people's registration information beyond the county clerk. Status Confirmed for NGO/partner data access; whether every transfer is an unlawful 'privacy violation' depends on notice/consent and state law (Partially on that legal conclusion).", "sources": [{"title": "Rock the Vote — Partner Civic Tech Tool FAQs (partner data access)", "url": "https://www.rockthevote.org/programs-and-partner-resources/tech-for-civic-engagement/civic-tech-partner-faqs/"}, {"title": "Rock the Vote — Voter Registration Tool API docs (partner_id / registrant fields)", "url": "https://rock-the-vote.github.io/Voter-Registration-Tool-API-Docs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rock-the-vote-api-partner-access-registrant-personal-information__rock-the-vote-voter-registration-tool-api-docs-partner-id-registrant-fields.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 15. Access Confirmed; 'violation of privacy' legal conclusion softened."}
{"id": "sc-ag-foia-cvr-ballot-images-not-required-soft-companion-records-access-barriers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-40", "uid": "C20260926-000015-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-40", "old_ids": ["sc-ag-foia-cvr-ballot-images-not-required-soft-companion-records-access-barriers"], "seq": "C00553", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Push citizens to the point of filing a lawsuit for records, then claim the records cannot be provided because of the pending lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "SC", "description": "South Carolina AG FOIA guidance (prior evidence companion) that CVR/ballot images are not required to be produced under FOIA illustrates how citizens are funneled toward litigation to obtain election records—then face litigation-related withhold doctrines in other states. Soft companion. Status Confirmed for access-barrier pattern; CA pending-litigation statute is the direct match for the leaf's second clause.", "sources": [{"title": "Prior SC AG FOIA CVR/ballot-image companion (existing evidence id family)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7927.200."}, {"title": "CA Gov Code §7927.200 primary", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7927.200."}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 20 companion. Prefer stronger SC AG primary URL if parent remounts prior card sources."}
{"id": "turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-23", "uid": "C20260926-000809-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-23", "old_ids": ["turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes"], "seq": "C00576", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "Our children are targeted on campuses to capture their votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Students Learn Students Vote Coalition and campus partners promote TurboVote and related tools for college registration, absentee guidance, and turnout—explicit campus targeting of student voting. NSLVE data are used to measure registration/turnout gains (e.g., Elon and other campuses reported large 2020 jumps). Status Confirmed that campuses systematically target students for vote capture/mobilization; partisan 'our kids' framing is advocacy tone.", "sources": [{"title": "SLSV Coalition — TurboVote campus resource", "url": "https://slsvcoalition.org/resource/turbovote/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes__turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes.png"}, {"title": "Elon University — NSLVE: student voting jumped in 2020", "url": "https://www.elon.edu/u/news/2021/11/02/turning-out-voting-by-elon-university-students-jumped-in-2020/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes__turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 12. Nonpartisan mobilization Confirmed; sinister capture motive Alleged only."}
{"id": "usps-no-partisan-poll-watchers-on-workroom-floors-property-rules", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-17", "uid": "C20260925-211320-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-17", "old_ids": ["usps-no-partisan-poll-watchers-on-workroom-floors-property-rules"], "seq": "C00262", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "There are no poll watchers at post offices, where millions of ballots flow through."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS facilities are federal postal property; partisan poll watchers/party monitors are not part of the authorized Election Day/observer framework inside postal workrooms where election mail is sorted and canceled. Access fights in 2020 focused on members of Congress and oversight visits being limited, underscoring that ordinary party poll watchers have no routine right to observe ballot mail processing on the workroom floor. Status Confirmed for the absence of standard poll-watcher observation inside USPS processing of millions of ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "House Oversight — Comer concerns about USPS mail-in ballot operations / access", "url": "https://oversight.house.gov/release/comer-raises-concerns-about-potential-political-bias-in-usps-mail-in-ballot-operations/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-no-partisan-poll-watchers-on-workroom-floors-property-rules__house-oversight-comer-concerns-about-usps-mail-in-ballot-ope.png"}, {"title": "USPS — Employees should heed rules on conduct on postal property", "url": "https://news.usps.com/2024/08/14/employees-should-heed-the-rules-on-conduct-on-postal-property/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-no-partisan-poll-watchers-on-workroom-floors-property-rules__usps-employees-should-heed-rules-on-conduct-on-postal-proper.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 9. Swapped from Fake Postmarks after weaker intentional-backdate evidence; this leaf has clearer Confirmed structural fact."}
{"id": "verified-voting-bmd-vs-handmarked-distinction-policy-statement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-12", "uid": "C20260926-023334-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-12", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-bmd-vs-handmarked-distinction-policy-statement"], "seq": "C01072", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Hand-marked paper ballots deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Verified Voting's Board-approved Statement on Ballot Marking Devices and Risk-Limiting Audits explicitly distinguishes hand-marked paper ballots (marks made directly by the voter; not subject to software bugs/malware determining the mark) from machine-marked BMD ballots that \"might not accurately capture voter intent if the software or ballot configuration is buggy or malicious,\" and opposes universal-BMD deployments marketed as \"paper ballot\" systems. Companion VV DRE/BMD policy favors hand-marked ballots as default with BMDs as accessibility options. Status Confirmed nonprofit technical-policy statement; peer to Curling/Halderman BMD-vs-handmarked and Verified Voting opscan-majority cards already on this leaf—explicit VV hand-marked vs BMD terminology distinction, not opscan remounted. PEP framing: calling BMD printouts \"hand-marked paper ballots\" linguistically hides software-mediated marking.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Statement on Ballot Marking Devices and Risk Limiting Audits", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/statement-on-ballot-marking-devices-and-risk-limiting-audits/"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Policy on DREs and Ballot Marking Devices (PDF)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/VV-BMD-Policy-V4.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/verified-voting-bmd-vs-handmarked-distinction-policy-statement__verified-voting-policy-on-dres-and-ballot-marking-devices-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Deception leaf."}
{"id": "wapo-2020-school-bullying-trump-supporters-maga-gear-harassment", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-40", "uid": "C20260925-234437-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-40", "old_ids": ["wapo-2020-school-bullying-trump-supporters-maga-gear-harassment"], "seq": "C00473", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Public shaming and intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Washington Post reporting documented dozens of publicly reported school incidents in which students were bullied or harassed for supporting Trump or wearing MAGA gear—creating a climate of public shaming that induces self-censorship. Status Confirmed for documented harassment pattern against visible Trump supporters (reporting compilation, not a single criminal judgment).", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Trump's words used by kids to bully classmates (MAGA/Trump-support harassment graphic)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/school-bullying-trump-words/"}, {"title": "Washington Post — AG hate-crime MAGA hat seizure companion", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ag-women-committed-hate-crime-by-attacking-trump-supporters/2020/09/08/069d74b4-f222-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "ga-sos-rule-590-8-3-voter-registration-server-audit-logs-archive-60-days", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-12", "uid": "C20260926-021547-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-12", "old_ids": ["ga-sos-rule-590-8-3-voter-registration-server-audit-logs-archive-60-days"], "seq": "C00975", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020s", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Secretary of State Rule 590-8-3-.01 requires that voter-registration database server audit logs be securely archived for no less than 60 days and that key system logs be reviewed regularly for anomalies—codifying access-logging as a mandatory security control for the statewide registration system. Status Confirmed state rule mandating registration-system audit-log retention/review (the control Florida Auditor General 2021-096 found missing/not retained); peer to FL Auditor Findings 4/6—GA logging rule, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. 590-8-3-.01 — Security of Voter Registration System (server audit logs ≥60 days; log review)", "url": "https://rules.sos.georgia.gov/gac/590-8-3"}, {"title": "Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2 §19012 — Storage/security of voter registration information (access/security companion)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/2-CCR-19012"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Loose access logging leaf."}
{"id": "ballotpedia-all-mail-voting-states", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-31", "uid": "C20260925-184601-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-31", "old_ids": ["ballotpedia-all-mail-voting-states"], "seq": "C00149", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Many states have permanent mail-ballot lists, causing a perpetual flood of ballots in the mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "CA/CO/HI/NV/OR/UT/VT/WA", "description": "Ballotpedia and NCSL document universal/all-mail voting systems in California, Colorado, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Vermont, and Washington (plus D.C.), under which every active registered voter is mailed a ballot each election—functionally a permanent flood of ballots without individual per-election requests. Status Confirmed for all-mail automatic ballot issuance.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — All-mail voting", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/All-mail_voting"}, {"title": "NCSL — Table 18: States With All-Mail Elections", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-18-states-with-all-mail-elections"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 14. All-mail = perpetual mail ballot stream.", "related": ["nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates"]}
{"id": "ballottrax-i3logix-peace-of-mind-confidence-marketing-vote-counted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-14", "uid": "C20260926-015536-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-14", "old_ids": ["ballottrax-i3logix-peace-of-mind-confidence-marketing-vote-counted"], "seq": "C00917", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "Mail ballots: design a mail-ballot tracking system that gives the public a false sense of security about voting by mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "National", "description": "BallotTrax (i3Logix) vendor materials market the product as giving voters 'peace of mind knowing their vote remains private and has been counted,' as building 'voter confidence and turn-out in the vote by mail process,' and as lending 'credibility to the mail-in voting process' (testimonial copy on ballottrax.com). Press clips the site highlights include headlines about boosting voter confidence and 'ballot tracking system will help voters' peace of mind.' Status Confirmed that the dominant commercial mail-ballot tracker is explicitly sold as a confidence/warm-fuzzy assurance product for mail voting—peer to CA Where's My Ballot confidence framing and NPR Amazon-package tracking messaging, without remounting those cards' URLs as the primary cite.", "sources": [{"title": "BallotTrax — Home (peace of mind / vote has been counted marketing)", "url": "https://ballottrax.com/"}, {"title": "BallotTrax — Voter benefits / tracking overview", "url": "https://ballottrax.com/voter-benefits/"}, {"title": "NPR — Want to track your 2024 election ballot? (confidence / package-style tracking context)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2024/10/30/nx-s1-5170285/voting-2024-ballots-states-online-tracking"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on mail-ballot tracking marketed as warm-fuzzy security leaf.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-15101-early-vbm-processing-machine-reading-before-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-14", "uid": "C20260926-015040-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-14", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-15101-early-vbm-processing-machine-reading-before-election-day"], "seq": "C00902", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §15101 authorizes elections officials to begin processing vote-by-mail return envelopes and ballots on the date ballots are mailed (no later than 29 days before the election). Processing expressly includes signature verification, opening envelopes, removing ballots, duplicating damaged ballots, and preparing ballots to be machine read or machine reading them (including write-in processing)—while prohibiting access to or release of vote counts before 8 p.m. Election Day. Status Confirmed for a third major-state statute enabling early machine processing/scanning of mail ballots before Election Day—peer to Colorado C.R.S. early mail processing and Washington WAC early processing rules already on this leaf; Confirmed raises the status framing versus those Partially confirmed companions for the statutory early-processing architecture itself.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code §15101 — Processing vote by mail ballots", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=15101", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-15101-early-vbm-processing-machine-reading-before-election-day__california-elections-code-15101-processing-vote-by-mail.png"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — California Statutes §15101", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/california/statute/15101/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-15101-early-vbm-processing-machine-reading-before-election-day__election-law-navigator-california-statutes-15101.png"}, {"title": "California Legislature — AB-16 Vote by mail ballots: processing (2025 amend context)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202520260AB16", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-15101-early-vbm-processing-machine-reading-before-election-day__california-legislature-ab-16-vote-by-mail-ballots-proce.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Early tabulation / 50-50 preload claims leaf."}
{"id": "clark-nv-election-day-vote-centers-replaced-assigned-precinct-polling-places", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-15", "uid": "C20260926-020046-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-15", "old_ids": ["clark-nv-election-day-vote-centers-replaced-assigned-precinct-polling-places"], "seq": "C00933", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "NV", "description": "Clark County, Nevada Elections Department publicly states that **Election Day Vote Centers have replaced assigned polling places**: voters may use any county Vote Center regardless of address/precinct; each center uses an electronic poll book that **securely connects to the county registration database** for real-time voter records so staff can process anyone registered anywhere in the county. Status Confirmed that a major jurisdiction centralized Election Day casting away from neighborhood precinct assignment into countywide networked vote centers—peer to Maricopa's precinct-to-vote-center consolidation and Arizona's statutory vote-center authorization on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Clark County NV Elections — Election Day Vote Centers have replaced assigned polling places", "url": "https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/government/departments/elections/services/vote-centers-election-day-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/clark-nv-election-day-vote-centers-replaced-assigned-precinct-polling-places__clark-county-nv-elections-election-day-vote-centers-hav.png"}, {"title": "Clark County Election Department newsletter — 2020 vote-center / same-day registration changes (AB345)", "url": "https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/adobe/assets/urn:aaid:aem:6bc3a985-f7ad-4d1d-a360-6df6a8670be9/original/as/newsletter-marchapril-20.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/clark-nv-election-day-vote-centers-replaced-assigned-precinct-polling-places__clark-county-election-department-newsletter-2020-vote-c.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on county-wide vote centers centralizing control leaf."}
{"id": "co-sos-ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-realtime-status-alerts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-07", "uid": "C20260926-015536-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-07", "old_ids": ["co-sos-ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-realtime-status-alerts"], "seq": "C00910", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Real-time ballot-tracking systems give bad actors real-time information to abuse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado's statewide BallotTrax system (ballottrax.coloradosos.gov; county pages such as Chaffee Clerk) notifies voters by text/email/phone when mail ballots are printed/mailed and when envelopes are received and accepted, using unique envelope barcodes scanned by county elections offices. County guidance states BallotTrax tracks the mail-ballot lifecycle file (not in-person voting). Status Confirmed for a second major statewide realtime mail-ballot status platform—distinct from California Where's My Ballot / NPR BallotTrax overview cards and from Ballot Scout on a sibling leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — BallotTrax voter portal", "url": "https://ballottrax.coloradosos.gov/voter/"}, {"title": "Chaffee County Clerk — BallotTrax (mail ballot printed/received/accepted notifications)", "url": "https://chaffeeclerk.colorado.gov/ballottrax", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-realtime-status-alerts__chaffee-county-clerk-ballottrax-mail-ballot-printed-rec.png"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — BallotTrax FAQs", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/FAQs/BallotTrax.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-sos-ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-realtime-status-alerts__colorado-sos-ballottrax-faqs.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on realtime mail-ballot tracking abuse surface leaf.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "demtech-epolltab-android-windows-cots-tablets", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-15", "uid": "C20260925-184601-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-15", "old_ids": ["demtech-epolltab-android-windows-cots-tablets"], "seq": "C00133", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Electronic poll books usually consist of common Android tablets or Windows laptops (easily abused by those who know how) in a custom enclosure."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "VA / Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting states DemTech Advocate Precinct runs on COTS laptops while ePollTAB software runs on COTS tablets under Windows 10, Android, or iOS—i.e., commodity OS devices rather than purpose-built sealed appliances. Status Confirmed that major EPB products use Android/Windows/(iOS) COTS tablets/laptops as the leaf describes.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — DemTech ePollTAB and Advocate Precinct", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/demtech-epolltab-and-advocate-precinct/"}, {"title": "Samsung Knox — Election agency success stories", "url": "https://www.samsungknox.com/en/success-stories/election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/demtech-epolltab-android-windows-cots-tablets__samsung-knox-election-agency-success-stories.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 7. Android/Windows COTS EPB hardware.", "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after"]}
{"id": "demtech-epolltab-wireless-merlin-aws", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-14", "uid": "C20260925-184601-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-14", "old_ids": ["demtech-epolltab-wireless-merlin-aws"], "seq": "C00132", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll books are linked over insecure wireless connections to a central database outside the polling place (sometimes out of state) that unknown parties control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "VA / Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting documents that DemTech ePollTAB uses a Merlin device to create a private wired/wireless local network among poll-book tablets and a wireless/USB uplink that syncs via Amazon Web Services to the jurisdiction network, with Cisco Meraki MDM. Virginia certification testing by SLI attempted (and reportedly failed) to compromise those networks—confirming the architecture is wirelessly meshed and centrally synced. Status Confirmed for wireless peer + central/cloud sync architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — DemTech ePollTAB and Advocate Precinct", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/demtech-epolltab-and-advocate-precinct/"}, {"title": "TrustTheVote / OSET — Enhancing Security of Electronic Pollbooks (Levine/Perez 2021 PDF)", "url": "https://trustthevote.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/26Jun21_EPollbooks-Levine_Perez.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/demtech-epolltab-wireless-merlin-aws__trustthevote-oset-enhancing-security-of-electronic-pollbooks.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 6. Second vendor wireless/central EPB architecture.", "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after"]}
{"id": "dominion-cvr-json-multi-file-ecosystem", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-33", "uid": "C20260925-185839-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-33", "old_ids": ["dominion-cvr-json-multi-file-ecosystem"], "seq": "C00184", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Blocked or obstructed access to cast vote records (CVRs), which can reveal many patterns of manipulation", "They publish CVRs in JSON format, making them too complex for the average person to examine."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Open-source and auditor documentation (e.g., kuriwaki/dominionCVR; VotingWorks Arlo CVR upload docs; RCTab CVR file docs) describe Dominion CVR exports as JSON (often split across CvrExport_*.json batch files plus manifests), not citizen-friendly CSV/PDF tables. Practitioners routinely need specialized parsers to join TabulatorId/BatchId/RecordId to contest/candidate manifests. Status Confirmed that the dominant Dominion CVR public format is multi-file JSON that is complex for non-technical reviewers.", "sources": [{"title": "GitHub — kuriwaki/dominionCVR (Dominion JSON CVR parser)", "url": "https://github.com/kuriwaki/dominionCVR", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-cvr-json-multi-file-ecosystem__github-kuriwaki-dominioncvr-dominion-json-cvr-parser.png"}, {"title": "VotingWorks Arlo docs — Cast vote records (CVRs) uploads", "url": "https://docs.voting.works/arlo/jurisdiction-manager/pre-audit-file-uploads/cast-vote-records-cvrs"}, {"title": "RCTab docs — Section 26 RCTab CVR files", "url": "https://rctab-docs.readthedocs.io/en/v1.3.2/tdp/rctab_cvr_files.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-cvr-json-multi-file-ecosystem__rctab-docs-section-26-rctab-cvr-files.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 15. Multi-state Dominion JSON pattern Confirmed.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "knowink-pollpad-ipad-cots-custom-stand", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-17", "uid": "C20260925-184601-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-17", "old_ids": ["knowink-pollpad-ipad-cots-custom-stand"], "seq": "C00135", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Electronic poll books usually consist of common Android tablets or Windows laptops (easily abused by those who know how) in a custom enclosure."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "KNOWiNK Poll Pad—the most widely used EPB in 2020 per Verified Voting—runs on commercial Apple iPad tablets mounted in an AI Data stand/arm (custom frame) with Bluetooth receipt printer. California staff reports noted iPad OS settings were accessible unless locked into Guided Access. Status Confirmed for COTS tablet-in-custom-frame EPB pattern (iPad rather than Android/Windows, but same architectural class the leaf describes).", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — KNOWiNK Poll Pad", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/knowink-poll-pad/"}, {"title": "PA DOS — KNOWiNK PollPad 3.5.1 certification report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/voting-systems/certification-reports/knowink%20pollpad%203.5.1%20secretary%27s%20certification%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-pollpad-ipad-cots-custom-stand__pa-dos-knowink-pollpad-3-5-1-certification-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 7. Dominant COTS-tablet-in-frame EPB; OS is iPadOS.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"]}
{"id": "knowink-pollpad-mail-ballot-issued-returned-status-epollbook-checkin", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-03", "uid": "C20260926-015536-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-03", "old_ids": ["knowink-pollpad-mail-ballot-issued-returned-status-epollbook-checkin"], "seq": "C00906", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Combine existing voter registration metrics with real-time data from the mail-ballot tracking system and electronic poll books."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "National", "description": "Verified Voting's equipment profile for KNOWiNK Poll Pad documents that the electronic poll book displays whether a voter has already been issued a mail/absentee ballot ('Mail Ballot Issued' / 'AB') and whether the voted mail ballot has already been returned—so poll workers see combined voter-registration status and mail-ballot lifecycle fields at check-in. Poll Pads sync to KNOWiNK ePulse for near-real-time administrator visibility into check-ins and ballot inventory. Status Confirmed for a widely deployed EPB architecture that merges VR metrics with mail-ballot issued/returned status at the point of check-in—peer to EAC 2023 e-pollbook report and NASS BallotTrax feedback companions; not a finding that any jurisdiction injected phantom votes.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — KNOWiNK Poll Pad (mail ballot issued/returned status at check-in)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/knowink-poll-pad/"}, {"title": "EAC — KNOWiNK Poll Pad v.3.6 Scope of Certification (ePulse near-real-time sync)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/KNOWiNK_Poll_Pad_v.3.6_Scope_of_Certification_VEPBCR_1.0_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-pollpad-mail-ballot-issued-returned-status-epollbook-checkin__eac-knowink-poll-pad-v-3-6-scope-of-certification-epuls.pdf"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania DOS — KNOWiNK PollPad 3.5.1 Secretary certification report (absentee/mail-in workflows)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/voting-systems/certification-reports/knowink%20pollpad%203.5.1%20secretary%27s%20certification%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-pollpad-mail-ballot-issued-returned-status-epollbook-checkin__pennsylvania-dos-knowink-pollpad-3-5-1-secretary-certif.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on Feedback Loop VR+mail-tracking+EPB architecture leaf.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"]}
{"id": "knowink-pollpad-wifi-cellular-central-epulse", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-13", "uid": "C20260925-184601-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-13", "old_ids": ["knowink-pollpad-wifi-cellular-central-epulse"], "seq": "C00131", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll books are linked over insecure wireless connections to a central database outside the polling place (sometimes out of state) that unknown parties control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's equipment profile for KNOWiNK Poll Pad states that Poll Pads connect to ePulse (KNOWiNK's web-based monitoring/central platform) via Wi‑Fi or cellular connectivity built into the tablets (supplemented by Cisco Meraki/Novatel products), enabling near-real-time turnout monitoring, remote lock/disable, and live messaging. Catalog leaf asserts typical insecure wireless links into a central database. Status Confirmed for wireless/cellular connectivity to a central vendor platform; 'insecure' depends on local configuration and is Partially confirmed as a risk class rather than a universal break.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — KNOWiNK Poll Pad", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/knowink-poll-pad/"}, {"title": "EAC — 2023 Voluntary E-Poll Book Pilot Program Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-10/2023_U.S._EAC_Voluntary_E-Poll_Book_Pilot_Program_Report_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knowink-pollpad-wifi-cellular-central-epulse__eac-2023-voluntary-e-poll-book-pilot-program-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 6. COTS tablet EPB → central cloud/monitor path.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"], "vendor_models": ["KnowInk Poll Pad"]}
{"id": "nc-sbe-la-testing-all-machines-every-election", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-05", "uid": "C20260925-184601-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-05", "old_ids": ["nc-sbe-la-testing-all-machines-every-election"], "seq": "C00123", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections describes Logic and Accuracy (L&A) tests in all 100 counties: every machine (including backups) is tested each election using test ballots marked by hand and by BMDs according to a test script, then results on memory devices are compared to paper tapes and the original script. The process exercises expected ballot styles/paths but depends on the completeness of the scripted patterns and on clearing test media before live tabulation. Status Confirmed for NC's official L&A procedure and its scripted-test-deck character.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Preparing for Accurate Elections (L&A)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/about-elections/election-security/preparing-accurate-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-sbe-la-testing-all-machines-every-election__ncsbe-preparing-for-accurate-elections-l-a.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Logic & Accuracy Testing Quick Start Guide", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/QuickStartGuides/Logic_and_Accuracy_Testing_EAC_Quick_Start_Guide_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-la-testing-quick-start-test-decks-2022__eac-logic-accuracy-testing-quick-start-guide-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 2. State-level L&A implementation example."}
{"id": "ncsl-same-day-registration-states", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-21", "uid": "C20260925-183614-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-21", "old_ids": ["ncsl-same-day-registration-states"], "seq": "C00109", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Same-day voter registration, which paves the way for last-second ballot injections"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL documents that roughly two dozen states plus D.C. allow Election Day / same-day registration (SDR), under which eligible citizens may register and vote on the same day—often with post-election verification of eligibility documents. Status Confirmed that SDR is widespread statutory practice enabling last-day registration+voting in a single visit. Catalog risk framing concerns late injections before eligibility checks complete; this card documents the legal mechanism, not a proven injection conspiracy.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor — Voter Registration evaluation materials", "url": "https://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/2026/voter-registration-sum.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-same-day-registration-states__minnesota-office-of-the-legislative-auditor-voter-registrati.png"}], "notes": "Part B empty leaf. Confirmed SDR statutory availability; do not invent ballot-injection incidents."}
{"id": "usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-32", "uid": "C20260925-184601-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-32", "old_ids": ["usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight"], "seq": "C00150", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS bills counties for undelivered ballots, typically by weighing rather than counting them, a total loss of chain of custody."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Publication 632 (State and Local Election Mail User's Guide) and DMM 507 explain that undeliverable-as-addressed (UAA) USPS Marketing Mail returned under 'Return Service Requested' is charged at the applicable single-piece First-Class / Ground Advantage price for the piece's weight (not a per-piece Marketing Mail rate, and not a ballot-by-ballot hand count by USPS for billing). First-Class Ballot Mail return is generally free; Marketing Mail return is weight-priced. Status Confirmed that USPS return billing for many election mailings is weight/postage-based rather than an itemized ballot count—supporting the leaf's chain-of-custody concern about weighing vs counting for billing—without proving diversion of ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS — Publication 632 (State and Local Election Mail PDF)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight__usps-publication-632-state-and-local-election-mail-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USPS — Pub 632 excerpt: forwarding and return", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632/pub632_008.htm"}, {"title": "USPS DMM 507 — Mailer Services", "url": "https://pe.usps.com/text/dmm300/507.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight__usps-dmm-507-mailer-services.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 15. Weight-based UAA return postage Confirmed."}
{"id": "wa-wac-434-250-uocava-fax-email-ballot-return-electronic-path", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-12", "uid": "C20260926-015040-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-12", "old_ids": ["wa-wac-434-250-uocava-fax-email-ballot-return-electronic-path"], "seq": "C00900", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2026", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington WAC 434-250 (Elections by mail) expressly allows service and overseas (UOCAVA) voters to return ballots by fax or email no later than 8:00 p.m. Election Day, with county procedures to protect secrecy, while non-UOCAVA fax/email returns are rejected unless a paper/drop-box ballot is also returned. This codifies an electronic cast-ballot return path for UOCAVA voters alongside mail and drop boxes. Status Confirmed for a state administrative rule expanding UOCAVA electronic return—peer to CISA/EAC/FBI/NIST high-risk electronic-return risk guidance and NCSL's multi-state electronic ballot return compilation already on this leaf; not a claim Washington UOCAVA ballots were altered in transit.", "sources": [{"title": "WAC Chapter 434-250 — Elections by mail (service/overseas fax/email return)", "url": "https://lawfilesext.leg.wa.gov/law/WACArchive/2024/pdf/WAC%20434%20-250%20%20CHAPTER/WAC%20434%20-250%20%20COMBINEDCHAPTER.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-wac-434-250-uocava-fax-email-ballot-return-electronic-path__wac-chapter-434-250-elections-by-mail-service-overseas.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSL — Electronic Ballot Return (states allowing electronic return, updated 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/electronic-ballot-return-internet-voting"}, {"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-wac-434-250-uocava-fax-email-ballot-return-electronic-path__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-mar.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on UOCAVA root electronic-return vulnerability leaf. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'UOCAVA' to 'Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) > This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at...'."}
{"id": "wa-sos-approved-signature-verification-training-listed-as-two-hours", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-02", "uid": "C20260926-015536-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-02", "old_ids": ["wa-sos-approved-signature-verification-training-listed-as-two-hours"], "seq": "C00905", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Citizens who are trained are not trained properly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2025", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington Secretary of State's published Approved Training Hours spreadsheets repeatedly list 'Signature Verification Training' (OSOS/Online and related offerings) as a **2-hour** course—e.g., multiple 2022 OSOS online sessions and the 2021 WSACA 'Fine Art of Separating the Genuine From the Faux' annual signature-verification training each credited at 2 hours. The SOS Signature Verification & Compliance Tool Training Manual requires reviewers/canvassing-board members to complete training before verifying ballot declarations and at least once every two years, but does not impose a multi-year forensic apprenticeship. Status Confirmed that Washington's official credit for signature-verification training is hours-scale (peer to Florida's minimum two-hour online Rule 1S-2.056 and Nevada's two-hour hands-on substitute)—not ABFDE/ASQDE-grade document-examiner schooling.", "sources": [{"title": "WA SOS — Approved Training Hours (Signature Verification Training listed as 2 hours)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2022-08/approved_training_hours_05_19_2022.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-approved-signature-verification-training-listed-as-two-hours__wa-sos-approved-training-hours-signature-verification-t.pdf"}, {"title": "WA SOS — Signature Verification & Compliance Tool Training Manual (2025)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2025-03/Sig%20Verification%20Training%20Manual.FINAL_.rev_.3.27.2025.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-approved-signature-verification-training-listed-as-two-hours__wa-sos-signature-verification-compliance-tool-training.pdf"}, {"title": "WA SOS — Signature verification manual and compliance tools (2024)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-06/Sig%20Verification%20Training%20Manual.6.5.2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-sos-approved-signature-verification-training-listed-as-two-hours__wa-sos-signature-verification-manual-and-compliance-too.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on citizens trained but not properly trained (hours-scale) leaf."}
{"id": "or-sos-vbm-manual-homeless-location-description-mailing-address", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-11", "uid": "C20260926-014044-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-11", "old_ids": ["or-sos-vbm-manual-homeless-location-description-mailing-address"], "seq": "C00886", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No physical address; a mailing address only"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon's Vote by Mail Procedures Manual and county elections guidance instruct voters experiencing homelessness/housing instability to register using a residence address that is any identifiable physical location description within the county (shelter, park, cross-street, encampment landmark)—not necessarily a traditional street address—and separately to provide a mailing address (shelter, trusted recipient, General Delivery, or county elections office for ballot pickup). Oregon SOS NVRA Agency Manual likewise addresses nontraditional residence/mailing pathways. Status Confirmed for official Oregon registration without a conventional physical street address—peer to Washington SOS homeless/nontraditional address + General Delivery guidance and California SOS location-description/mailing pathways.", "sources": [{"title": "Oregon SOS — Vote by Mail Procedures Manual (PDF)", "url": "https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/documents/vbm_manual.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-sos-vbm-manual-homeless-location-description-mailing-address__oregon-sos-vote-by-mail-procedures-manual-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Oregon SOS — NVRA Agency Manual (PDF)", "url": "https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/Documents/nvra-manual.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-sos-vbm-manual-homeless-location-description-mailing-address__oregon-sos-nvra-agency-manual-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Multnomah County — Information for Voters Experiencing Housing Instability or Homelessness", "url": "https://multco.us/info/information-voters-experiencing-housing-instability-or-homelessness"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Registration > no physical address, mailing address only."}
{"id": "verified-voting-handmarked-opscan-majority", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-11", "uid": "C20260925-183614-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-11", "old_ids": ["verified-voting-handmarked-opscan-majority"], "seq": "C00099", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Hand-marked paper ballots deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "US", "description": "Most U.S. jurisdictions that advertise \"hand-marked paper ballots\" still tabulate those ballots on optical scanners / central-count systems—not by public precinct hand count. Verified Voting equipment profiles and state equipment maps document hand-marked paper + opscan as the dominant modality; Colorado's all-mail model likewise relies on machine tabulation of hand-marked (or BMD) paper. Status Confirmed that \"hand-marked paper ballots\" as commonly implemented remains machine-dependent counting. Catalog linguistic point stands: demanding hand-marked paper without demanding transparent hand counting (PEP) leaves tabulation opaque.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressVote (BMD vs hand-marked opscan ecosystem)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expressvote/"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Where & How to Vote (mail/VSPC paper processed for tabulation)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/mobile/whereHow.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/verified-voting-handmarked-opscan-majority__colorado-sos-where-how-to-vote-mail-vspc-paper-processed-for.png"}, {"title": "Halderman Curling expert report context — scanners tabulate paper marks/barcodes", "url": "http://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/153377.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021__expert-report-of-j-alex-halderman-curling-litigation-pdf-mir.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich hand-marked linguistic leaf. National opscan reality Confirmed.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "votefromabroad-org-seed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-15", "uid": "C20260925-155410-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-15", "old_ids": ["votefromabroad-org-seed"], "seq": "C00015", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "For example, see what this organization is doing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "VoteFromAbroad.org is Democrats Abroad's official interactive Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) helper for U.S. citizens overseas: it auto-includes state-specific FPCA requirements, prints legible forms, supplies local-election-official contact/submission instructions, and supports email submission where states allow — i.e., a partisan organization operating a nationwide UOCAVA registration/absentee-request pipeline named in the catalog Detail leaf. Status Confirmed for the organization's role and FPCA-assistance product. Catalog/VerityVote claims that the pathway is an exploit remain Alleged (no court/CISA finding against VoteFromAbroad.org itself).", "sources": [{"title": "VoteFromAbroad.org — Why use VoteFromAbroad rather than the paper form", "url": "https://www.votefromabroad.org/faqs/FP1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/votefromabroad-org-seed__votefromabroad-org-why-use-votefromabroad-rather-than-the-pa.png"}, {"title": "Democrats Abroad — Voting from Abroad 101 (VoteFromAbroad.org)", "url": "https://www.democratsabroad.org/votingfromabroad101"}, {"title": "VoteFromAbroad.org — FPCA request flow", "url": "https://www.votefromabroad.org/request/your-information", "local": "/archives/2026/09/votefromabroad-org-seed__votefromabroad-org-fpca-request-flow.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f remount 2026-09-25.20-preview: stub UOCAVA>VoteFromAbroad.org → exact Detail leaf 'For example, look what this organization is doing' (detail text: VoteFromAbroad.org). Upgraded Alleged→Confirmed for org/FPCA facts; exploit rhetoric stays Alleged in description."}
{"id": "us-2020-2024-irs-990-unite-america-institute-2-3m-tides-505k-to-fairvote", "permanent_id": "C20261026-123214-03", "uid": "C20261026-123214-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-123214-03", "old_ids": ["us-2020-2024-irs-990-unite-america-institute-2-3m-tides-505k-to-fairvote"], "seq": "C01563", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "Tides Foundation and Unite America"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2024 (tax years)", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Grants reported on IRS Form 990 filings and compiled by the Grantable and OpenGrants databases show that Unite America Institute Inc. (EIN 27-3001286) gave FairVote (EIN 54-1635649), the national ranked-choice voting advocacy group, $2,298,299 in four grants from 2020 to 2024. They were $85,000 in 2020 \"to educate voters in Alaska, Wyoming, Kansas, and Hawaii on how ranked choice voting works\"; $912,000 in 2022 for programmatic priorities including research on ranked-choice voting; $850,000 in 2023 for general support and FairVote's \"work on RCV and their presidential primaries program\"; and $451,299 in 2024 \"to support the FairVote awards gala and to provide legal support for state partners and to educate EAs [election administrators] regarding RCV and related reforms\" (990 return 202533219349308488). The same filings show the Tides Foundation gave FairVote $505,000 in five grants: $130,000 in 2020, $150,000 in 2021 and $75,000 in each of 2022, 2023 and 2024. Status Confirmed: the amounts are as reported in the funders' own IRS filings. The grants are lawful and disclosed, and they are not a finding of fraud. Catalog point: the same national funders pay the RCV advocacy group to train the election administrators who will run RCV counts and to give legal support to state campaigns, which ties the people counting to the people promoting the method. RCV results are tabulated centrally by software, whereas a single-choice paper ballot can be hand counted in public at each precinct on election night.", "sources": [{"title": "Grantable — Who funds FairVote? (IRS Form 990 grant rows 2019-2025, incl. Unite America Institute and Tides Foundation)", "url": "https://grantable.co/nonprofits/fairvote-morg_1716cdccaaf043d49b4174176925e776"}, {"title": "OpenGrants — Grants paid by Unite America Institute Inc (2024 Form 990 return 202533219349308488)", "url": "https://funders.opengrants.io/funders/273001286"}, {"title": "ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer — Unite America Institute Inc (EIN 27-3001286)", "url": "https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/273001286"}, {"title": "ProPublica Nonprofit Explorer — FairVote (EIN 54-1635649)", "url": "https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/541635649"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-26 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/curl; zero X). Confirmed (from funders' 990 grant schedules as compiled by Grantable/OpenGrants; per-year rows cross-checked against Grantable totals $2,298,299 and $505,000). Firms up the Tides amount that unite-america-tides-rcv-funding-2020 left pending a 990 cross-check. Peer to that card on this leaf (1 -> 3 with the Nevada 2024 card). No source.local on FairVote financials (standing rule). Grantable, OpenGrants and ProPublica curl 200."}
{"id": "ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-30day-retention-counties-deleted-footage", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-03", "uid": "C20260926-015040-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-03", "old_ids": ["ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-30day-retention-counties-deleted-footage"], "seq": "C00891", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "The public has limited or no access to surveillance footage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia's 2020 emergency SEB drop-box rule required surveillance video retention for 30 days after final certification (or until contests concluded, whichever later). Just the News (Jan 2022) reported that major counties including Cobb and Fulton acknowledged deleting/not retaining 2020 drop-box surveillance footage, citing the 30-day SEB direction; Fulton's spokeswoman argued drop-box video was governed by the SEB rule rather than federal 22-month election-record retention. VoterGA's open-records survey likewise reported large numbers of counties unable to produce 2020 drop-box videos. Status Confirmed for official admissions that promised drop-box surveillance footage was unavailable to the public/investigators after short retention—peer to Erie PA overwrite and Maricopa Juvenile Court non-recording gaps; not proof of ballot stuffing on the deleted tapes.", "sources": [{"title": "Just the News — Georgia counties say they didn't retain 2020 drop-box surveillance video", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/georgia-ballot-harvesting-probe-starts-some-critical-election-evidence", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-30day-retention-counties-deleted-footage__just-the-news-georgia-counties-say-they-didn-t-retain-2.png"}, {"title": "VoterGA — Press release: counties unable to produce 2020 drop-box videos (PDF)", "url": "https://voterga.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Press-Release-VoterGA-2020-Drop-Box-Videos-Destroyed-5-23-21.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-30day-retention-counties-deleted-footage__voterga-press-release-counties-unable-to-produce-2020-d.pdf"}, {"title": "Georgia SEB Rule 183-1-14-0.8-.14 — Secure Absentee Ballot Drop Boxes (emergency retention framing)", "url": "https://saportareport.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Table-of-Contents-for-SEB-Rule-183-1-14-0.8-.14.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-2020-dropbox-surveillance-video-30day-retention-counties-deleted-footage__georgia-seb-rule-183-1-14-0-8-14-secure-absentee-ballot.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Public has limited/no access to drop-box surveillance footage."}
{"id": "hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-29", "uid": "C20260925-183614-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-29", "old_ids": ["hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy"], "seq": "C00117", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "They randomize CVR data, claiming it is necessary to protect voter privacy."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "HI / Multi-state", "description": "Hart InterCivic Verity documentation—quoted in a Honolulu City Clerk UIPA request for 2020 General Election Cast Vote Records—states: \"To protect voter privacy, CVRs are stored in randomized order so that voting order cannot be determined. CVRs do not contain voter information connecting a vote to a specific voter.\" Hart Verity security-feature materials similarly describe non-discernable CVR order for secrecy. Status Confirmed vendor/official privacy justification for randomizing CVR order, which destroys time-series linkage that independent analysts use for pattern detection—exactly the catalog Records leaf claim.", "sources": [{"title": "UIPA.org — Honolulu CVR request quoting Hart Verity randomized-order privacy language (PDF)", "url": "https://uipa.org/files/foi/2467/FinalResponse_CS_2020GECastVoteRecords.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy__uipa-org-honolulu-cvr-request-quoting-hart-verity-randomized.pdf"}, {"title": "UIPA request page — Cast Vote Records (CVRs) for 2020 General Election", "url": "https://uipa.org/request/cast-vote-records-cvrs-for-2020-general-election-1/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy__uipa-request-page-cast-vote-records-cvrs-for-2020-general-el.png"}, {"title": "Comal County — Hart Verity Security Features PDF", "url": "https://www.comalcounty.gov/DocumentCenter/View/1159/Hart-Verity-Security-Features-PDF", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy__comal-county-hart-verity-security-features-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Part B empty CVR-randomize leaf. Vendor privacy→randomize Confirmed.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["Hart InterCivic Verity"], "related": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"]}
{"id": "eac-2020-eavs-covid-poll-worker-last-minute-shortages", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-04", "uid": "C20260926-022920-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-04", "old_ids": ["eac-2020-eavs-covid-poll-worker-last-minute-shortages"], "seq": "C01049", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2021", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's 2020 Election Administration and Voting Survey Comprehensive Report documents that COVID-19 made it difficult to retain long-time older poll workers and caused last-minute poll worker shortages in many jurisdictions, even as national recruitment campaigns later eased supply in some areas; MIT Election Data + Science Lab / Healthy Elections Project companion analysis cites EAC data that >2/3 of jurisdictions found poll-worker recruitment \"very\" or \"somewhat\" difficult in 2018, with pandemic dropout amplifying 2020 spring/primary crises. Status Confirmed federal survey/report findings; peer to Milwaukee April 2020 and Philadelphia June 2020 consolidation cards—national EAVS documentation, not those remounted. PEP framing: worker shortfalls drive site consolidations and process stress favoring centralized machine/mail workflows over transparent hand-count staffing.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2020-eavs-covid-poll-worker-last-minute-shortages__eac-election-administration-and-voting-survey-2020-comprehensive-report-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "MIT Healthy Elections / ED&SL — Poll Worker Recruitment in the 2020 General Election (PDF)", "url": "https://web.mit.edu/healthyelections/www/sites/default/files/2021-06/Poll_Worker_Recruitment.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2020-eavs-covid-poll-worker-last-minute-shortages__mit-healthy-elections-ed-sl-poll-worker-recruitment-in-the-2020-general-election-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Election Workers leaf."}
{"id": "pa-pilf-2020-undeliverable-mail-ballots-reported-vs-margin", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-04", "uid": "C20260926-015536-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-04", "old_ids": ["pa-pilf-2020-undeliverable-mail-ballots-reported-vs-margin"], "seq": "C00907", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "The USPS then returns far fewer undelivered ballots to the county, and the county typically reports that smaller number."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-2021", "state": "PA", "description": "Public Interest Legal Foundation's Pennsylvania mail-voting one-pager (citing official EAVS/state reporting) documents 15,175 undeliverable mail ballots reported for the 2020 general in Pennsylvania—i.e., the volume USPS returned as undeliverable that counties/states then reflected in their published undeliverable counts—set against an ~81,000 presidential margin. Status Confirmed that Pennsylvania's official undeliverable tally is the county/state-reported return volume (peer to national EAVS ~1.4% and D.C. Auditor 11.4% undeliverable figures); does not by itself prove USPS under-delivered relative to billed weight, but shows counties report the undeliverable amount they receive back.", "sources": [{"title": "Public Interest Legal Foundation — PA 2020 mail voting / undeliverable ballots one-pager (PDF)", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Mail-Voting-2012_2020-1P-PA.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — 2020 EAVS Comprehensive Report (undeliverable domestic civilian mailed ballots)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-pilf-2020-undeliverable-mail-ballots-reported-vs-margin__eac-2020-eavs-comprehensive-report-undeliverable-domest.pdf"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania DOS — Report on the 2020 General Election (context)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/reports/2020-General-Election-Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-pilf-2020-undeliverable-mail-ballots-reported-vs-margin__pennsylvania-dos-report-on-the-2020-general-election-co.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on USPS delivers undelivered volume counties then report leaf."}
{"id": "antrim-mi-2020-halderman-election-definition-error-soft-companion-no-guarantee", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-34", "uid": "C20260926-000015-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-34", "old_ids": ["antrim-mi-2020-halderman-election-definition-error-soft-companion-no-guarantee"], "seq": "C00547", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman analysis of Antrim County MI 2020 documented how outdated/incorrect election-definition programming produced large erroneous reported totals later corrected—an operational demonstration that tabulation systems can and do err without malice necessarily required. Soft companion to prior Antrim cards. Status Confirmed for error pathway; intentional abuse Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "Prior evidence companion — Antrim Halderman election-definition error card family", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA ENR risks — temporary data errors / hand-entry / transmission", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_results_reporting_risk_mitigations_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 17 companion. Prefer stronger Antrim primary if parent remounts Halderman PDF later."}
{"id": "congress-2020-5593-page-omnibus-hours-to-read-before-vote", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-25", "uid": "C20260925-212129-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-25", "old_ids": ["congress-2020-5593-page-omnibus-hours-to-read-before-vote"], "seq": "C00322", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They inundate legislators with so many lengthy bills that no one has a chance to read them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "In December 2020, Congress received a combined COVID-relief/omnibus appropriations package of about 5,593 pages with only hours before the vote; members of both parties publicly stated they could not read the bill (AP/Newsweek/Fox). Status Confirmed for mega-bill inundation leaving legislators without a practical chance to read the text before voting.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Too big to read: Giant bill a leap of faith for Congress", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/politics-james-mcgovern-legislation-coronavirus-pandemic-bills-0da216bf0352e92f8a62d8438fc9b519"}, {"title": "Newsweek — Lawmakers given just hours to study 5,593-page stimulus bill", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/lawmakers-given-hours-read-5593-page-stimulus-bill-1556608"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 15. Process Confirmed; not limited to election clauses."}
{"id": "wood-v-raffensperger-standing-dismissal-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-20", "uid": "C20260925-185839-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-20", "old_ids": ["wood-v-raffensperger-standing-dismissal-2020"], "seq": "C00171", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Refuse to hear cases and evidence, citing \"lack of standing.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12", "state": "GA / Federal", "description": "In Wood v. Raffensperger, the Northern District of Georgia and then the Eleventh Circuit rejected Lin Wood's 2020 Georgia election challenge, holding he alleged only a generalized grievance rather than a particularized Article III injury and that requests aimed at already-certified results were moot—i.e., the courts refused to reach the full evidentiary case on standing/mootness grounds. Status Confirmed for standing-based dismissal of an election contest seeking to present fraud/administration evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Wood v. Raffensperger, N.D. Ga. Doc 54 (2020)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2020cv04651/283580/54/"}, {"title": "11th Circuit opinion PDF — Wood v. Raffensperger", "url": "https://media.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/files/202014418.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wood-v-raffensperger-standing-dismissal-2020__11th-circuit-opinion-pdf-wood-v-raffensperger.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 9. Standing/mootness gatekeeping Confirmed."}
{"id": "trump-v-wec-7th-cir-laches-delay-post-cert-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-23", "uid": "C20260925-205354-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-23", "old_ids": ["trump-v-wec-7th-cir-laches-delay-post-cert-2020"], "seq": "C00238", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Use delay tactics to stall until no time is left to fix anything."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12-24", "state": "WI / Federal", "description": "In Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of relief where the challenge was filed after Wisconsin certified results, emphasizing that election contests must be brought expeditiously and that belated post-certification suits risk leaving courts unable to grant meaningful relief. Status Confirmed that delay/laches timing doomed the challenge — illustrating how kicking the can past certification leaves 'no time' for a fix.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Trump v. Wisconsin Elections Commission, 7th Cir. (Dec. 24, 2020)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca7/20-3414/20-3414-2020-12-24.html"}, {"title": "UW Law — Laches in State Court Election Cases", "url": "https://statedemocracy.law.wisc.edu/our-work/laches-in-state-court-election-cases", "local": "/archives/2026/09/trump-v-wec-7th-cir-laches-delay-post-cert-2020__uw-law-laches-in-state-court-election-cases.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 12. Delay → no remedy Confirmed in appellate holding."}
{"id": "scotus-2020-trump-v-new-york-apportionment-noncitizens", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-21", "uid": "C20260926-005107-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-21", "old_ids": ["scotus-2020-trump-v-new-york-apportionment-noncitizens"], "seq": "C00814", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Open borders support higher population counts that include illegal aliens who cannot be verified."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "Trump v. New York (592 U.S. ___, Dec. 18, 2020) addressed the July 2020 presidential memorandum seeking to exclude undocumented immigrants from the congressional apportionment base derived from the census. The Court dismissed the challenge as unripe/standing-deficient without reaching the merits — leaving in place the longstanding practice that apportionment population includes noncitizens (including unlawfully present persons) counted in the census, with no citizenship verification on the short form. Soft companion to existing CRS/census apportionment cards. Status Confirmed for inclusion of noncitizens in apportionment population practice; 'open borders' as intentional registration fraud Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court — Trump v. New York opinion PDF (20-366)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-366_7647.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scotus-2020-trump-v-new-york-apportionment-noncitizens__u-s--supreme-court---trump-v--new-york-opinion-pdf--20-366.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. ___ (2020) synopsis", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/592/20-366/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 11. Soft companion to crs-census-apportionment corpus cards."}
{"id": "cisa-rumor-control-krebs-amplify-most-secure-election-security-accuracy-narrative", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-03", "uid": "C20260926-030239-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-03", "old_ids": ["cisa-rumor-control-krebs-amplify-most-secure-election-security-accuracy-narrative"], "seq": "C01123", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Push the narrative of \"security\" and \"accuracy\" until people believe it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12-16", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Director Chris Krebs's Dec. 16, 2020 Senate HSGAC testimony documents CISA's 'Rumor Control' website as a deliberate media/disinformation counter-strategy to seed 'facts' before rival claims took root, and recounts amplifying the Nov. 12, 2020 GCC/SCC 'most secure in American history' / 'no evidence any voting system…compromised' joint statement via @CISAKrebs ('TLDR; America, we have confidence in the security of your vote, you should, too')—institutional repetition of security/accuracy assurance messaging beyond the joint statement text itself. Status Confirmed primary agency testimony on Rumor Control + amplification of the security/accuracy narrative; peer to the two GCC/SCC joint-statement cards already on this leaf—Krebs/Rumor Control amplification channel, not those remounted. PEP framing: official security-narrative saturation that substitutes confidence messaging for public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Senate HSGAC — Testimony of Chris Krebs (Dec. 16, 2020) Rumor Control + joint-statement amplification", "url": "https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/imo/media/doc/Testimony-Krebs-2020-12-16.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-rumor-control-krebs-amplify-most-secure-election-security-accuracy-narrative__u-s-senate-hsgac-testimony-of-chris-krebs-dec-16-2020-rumor-control-joint-statement-amplification.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Security Resource Library / Rumor Control", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/election-security/election-security-resource-library", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-rumor-control-krebs-amplify-most-secure-election-security-accuracy-narrative__cisa-election-security-resource-library-rumor-control.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Media Push security/accuracy narrative leaf."}
{"id": "scotus-texas-v-pennsylvania-standing-denied-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-19", "uid": "C20260925-185839-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-19", "old_ids": ["scotus-texas-v-pennsylvania-standing-denied-2020"], "seq": "C00170", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Refuse to hear cases and evidence, citing \"lack of standing.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "On December 11, 2020 the U.S. Supreme Court denied Texas's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against Pennsylvania and other states for lack of standing under Article III, stating Texas had not demonstrated a judicially cognizable interest in how another State conducts its elections, and dismissed other pending motions as moot. The order did not adjudicate the underlying election-administration allegations. Status Confirmed for refusal to hear the case on standing grounds.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court order — Texas v. Pennsylvania (Dec 11, 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/121120zr_p860.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/scotus-texas-v-pennsylvania-standing-denied-2020__u-s-supreme-court-order-texas-v-pennsylvania-dec-11-2020-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Reuters — Supreme Court ends Texas bid to upend election results", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/article/world/us/supreme-court-swiftly-ends-trump-backed-texas-bid-to-upend-election-results-idUSKBN28L2YV/"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 9. Standing denial Confirmed; merits not reached."}
{"id": "king-v-whitmer-standing-dismissal-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-21", "uid": "C20260925-185839-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-21", "old_ids": ["king-v-whitmer-standing-dismissal-2020"], "seq": "C00172", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Refuse to hear cases and evidence, citing \"lack of standing.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-12-07", "state": "MI / Federal", "description": "In King v. Whitmer, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied emergency injunctive relief and dismissed the plaintiffs' 2020 Michigan election challenge, finding voters and Republican elector plaintiffs lacked particularized, redressable Article III injuries (and that requested relief was moot after certification)—again declining to litigate the full evidentiary fraud narrative on standing/redressability grounds. Status Confirmed for standing-based refusal to hear the case's evidence on the merits.", "sources": [{"title": "King v. Whitmer opinion (E.D. Mich.) — Legal Insurrection mirror PDF", "url": "https://legalinsurrection.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/King-v.-Whitmer-Michigan-Election-Case-Opinion-Dismissing-Case-12-7-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/king-v-whitmer-standing-dismissal-2020__king-v-whitmer-opinion-e-d-mich-legal-insurrection-mirror-pd.pdf"}, {"title": "King v. Whitmer, 505 F. Supp. 3d 720 (case summary)", "url": "https://app.midpage.ai/case/king-v-whitmer-10215381"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 9. Parallel MI standing dismissal."}
{"id": "aapor-2020-pre-election-polling-error-task-force", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-28", "uid": "C20260925-184601-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-28", "old_ids": ["aapor-2020-pre-election-polling-error-task-force"], "seq": "C00146", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "US", "description": "AAPOR's Task Force on 2020 Pre-Election Polling found the largest national popular-vote polling error in 40 years and large state-level errors, with polls systematically overstating Biden's margin vs. Trump (avg signed error ~3.9 pts national / ~4.3 pts state in final two weeks). The Task Force did not find evidence of fabricated 'fake' poll releases as a coordinated conspiracy; it attributed error largely to nonresponse and related methodological failures. Status Confirmed for large, directional polling error shaping public expectations; intentional fabrication remains Alleged/unproven.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — Task Force on 2020 Pre-Election Polling (Executive Summary PDF)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Task-Force-on-2020-Pre-Election-Polling_Executive-Summary.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2020-pre-election-polling-error-task-force__aapor-task-force-on-2020-pre-election-polling-executive-summary-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "AAPOR — Evaluation of the 2016 Election Polls in the U.S.", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx047"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 13. Documented error ≠ proven intentional fakery."}
{"id": "ak-ballot-measure-2-2020-top-four-open-primary", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-11", "uid": "C20260926-022005-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-11", "old_ids": ["ak-ballot-measure-2-2020-top-four-open-primary"], "seq": "C00989", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Open primaries can be used to cheat: they let the opposing party control who is on the ticket. Open primaries are a Trojan horse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "AK", "description": "Alaska Ballot Measure 2 (2020) replaced party primaries with a single nonpartisan top-four primary: all candidates appear on one ballot and the four highest vote-getters advance regardless of party, enabling cross-party and unaffiliated voters to shape who reaches the general (paired with ranked-choice general elections). Official elections materials and canvass show the measure passed narrowly (~50.55%). Status Confirmed top-four open/jungle primary statute; peer to California Prop 14 top-two and Washington I-872 top-two cards—Alaska Measure 2 top-four, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — Ballot Measure No. 2 language/summary PDF", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/petitions/19AKBE/19AKBE%20-%20Ballot%20Language%20Summary.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ak-ballot-measure-2-2020-top-four-open-primary__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Alaska Ballot Measure 2 (Top-Four Ranked-Choice Voting Initiative 2020)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Ballot_Measure_2,_Top-Four_Ranked-Choice_Voting_and_Campaign_Finance_Laws_Initiative_(2020)"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Open-Primaries leaf."}
{"id": "antrim-mi-2020-halderman-outdated-election-definition-programming-error", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-25", "uid": "C20260925-220029-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-25", "old_ids": ["antrim-mi-2020-halderman-outdated-election-definition-programming-error"], "seq": "C00378", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "MI", "description": "J. Alex Halderman's peer-reviewed USENIX Security 2022 forensic investigation of Antrim County, MI (Nov 2020) found Dominion ICP scanners used outdated election-definition files after ballot designs were revised; the EMS then imported results with mismatched candidate identifiers, misassigning/dropping votes and producing erroneous unofficial totals. Cause: county configuration/testing failures (human/process error)—not proven intentional Dominion fraud. Status Confirmed that ballot-programming/election-definition mistakes can induce large apparent tabulation errors that obfuscate true totals until corrected. Catalog note that 'these aren't all accidents' remains Alleged for intentionality in Antrim.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim County 2020 Election Incident (USENIX paper PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-mi-2020-halderman-outdated-election-definition-programming-error__halderman-antrim-county-2020-election-incident-usenix-paper-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — Analysis of the Antrim County November 2020 Election Incident PDF", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf?rev=fbfe881cdc0043a9bb80b783d1bb5fe9"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 13. Programming-error Confirmed; intentional induce Alleged.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "halderman-antrim-mismatched-memory-cards-election-package-inhibit-correct-results", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-39", "uid": "C20260926-001426-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-39", "old_ids": ["halderman-antrim-mismatched-memory-cards-election-package-inhibit-correct-results"], "seq": "C00632", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman's USENIX Security 2022 Antrim forensic paper shows county staff updated the EMS with a revised election package but updated memory cards on only 2 of 18 scanners—leaving most cards on the old definition. Loading mismatched removable media into the EMS produced wildly wrong unofficial totals and weeks of confusion before corrections—exactly 'mix up thumb/flash drives / removable election media' inhibiting timely proper audit/canvass. Soft remount of Antrim Halderman family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for procedural media-mismatch pathway; intentional fraud not found.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim County 2020 Election Incident (USENIX Sec 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-mismatched-memory-cards-election-package-inhibit-correct-results__halderman-antrim-county-2020-election-incident-usenix-sec-2022-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — Halderman Antrim analysis (AG/SOS requested)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Press-releases/2021/documents/Antrim.pdf?rev=f91601b0a03b4085bbc4bc0959205333", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-mismatched-memory-cards-election-package-inhibit-correct-results__michigan-sos-halderman-antrim-analysis-ag-sos-requested.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 20. Soft remount; PEP: hand-marked paper + public hand count would have caught scanner-tape mismatches without trusting EMS media loads."}
{"id": "la-county-2020-929-ballot-groups-vsap-complexity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-15", "uid": "C20260926-020640-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-15", "old_ids": ["la-county-2020-929-ballot-groups-vsap-complexity"], "seq": "C00948", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Consolidating many smaller elections into fewer, larger ones makes ballots more complex, which is used to argue that hand counting is too difficult."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "CA", "description": "Los Angeles County's November 2020 Presidential General Election Media Kit documents **929 distinct ballot groups** under the VSAP / vote-center model serving one mega-jurisdiction—ballot-style complexity that makes transparent precinct-scale hand counting far harder than small concurrent local elections would. Status Confirmed consolidation-driven ballot-style explosion; peer to Shasta 47 styles hand-count and CA SB415 election consolidation—LA County 2020 media-kit figure (distinct from the County-Wide Voting leaf's la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020 card). Machine/centralized mega-ballots are the problem; PEP favors simpler precinct ballots that humans can count.", "sources": [{"title": "LA County RRCC — Nov 3, 2020 Presidential General Election Media Kit (929 ballot groups)", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/media/Media-Kit_11032020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-2020-929-ballot-groups-vsap-complexity__la-county-rrcc-nov-3-2020-presidential-general-election.pdf"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Smartmatic/Los Angeles County VSAP (vote-center / dynamic ballot styles)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/smartmatic-lac-vsap/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on consolidated elections → complex ballots / hard hand count leaf. PEP framing.", "vendor": ["Smartmatic"]}
{"id": "pa-scotus-2020-three-day-extension-mail-ballots-after-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-18", "uid": "C20260925-211320-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-18", "old_ids": ["pa-scotus-2020-three-day-extension-mail-ballots-after-election-day"], "seq": "C00263", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting after Election Day lets bad actors make final adjustments to the results by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "PA", "description": "The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ordered that mail ballots postmarked by Election Day Nov. 3, 2020 could be received and counted through Nov. 6, 2020 (three days after Election Day); the U.S. Supreme Court left that extension in place while requiring segregation. Roughly 10,000 such late-arriving ballots were reported. Status Confirmed for post-Election-Day receipt/counting authority in a presidential contest (motive of 'final adjustments' not established).", "sources": [{"title": "SCOTUSblog — Supreme Court leaves PA order counting absentee ballots after Election Day", "url": "https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/supreme-court-leaves-in-place-order-requiring-pennsylvania-to-count-absentee-ballots-after-election-day/"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — ~10,000 PA mail ballots arrived after Election Day", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pennsylvania-mail-ballots-counted-deadline-supreme-court-20201111.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 10. Confirmed post-Election-Day receipt window; do not assert proven injection conspiracy."}
{"id": "ga-2020-certification-hand-tally", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-37", "uid": "C20260925-155410-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-37", "old_ids": ["ga-2020-certification-hand-tally"], "seq": "C00037", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-20", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger and Governor Brian Kemp certified the 2020 presidential results on Nov. 20, 2020 after a statewide risk-limiting audit conducted as a full hand tally of ~5 million ballots (observed/reported by the Carter Center) and subsequent machine recount, both affirming Biden's statewide win (final certified margin later ~11,779). Status Confirmed for certification after audit/recount process. Later Fulton County SEB consent orders documented audit paperwork/data-entry errors attributed to human error—operational quality issues, not adjudicated intentional fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "Carter Center — Georgia Risk-Limiting Audit/Hand Tally Observation Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.cartercenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/georgia-audit-final-report-033121.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-2020-certification-hand-tally__carter-center-georgia-risk-limiting-audit-hand-tally-observa.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — Georgia again certifies election results showing Biden won", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-georgia-elections-4eeea3b24f10de886bcdeab6c26b680a"}, {"title": "AJC — State finds errors in Fulton audit paperwork", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-investigation-finds-errors-in-fulton-audit-of-2020-election/BZ7D5JXOMRBPZIU4PNVYIHQZR4/"}], "notes": "Certification Confirmed; Fulton paperwork errors are operational."}
{"id": "maricopa-bos-2020-unanimous-certify-nov20-under-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-02", "uid": "C20260926-022005-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-02", "old_ids": ["maricopa-bos-2020-unanimous-certify-nov20-under-pressure"], "seq": "C00980", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-20", "state": "AZ", "description": "On November 20, 2020 the Maricopa County Board of Supervisors unanimously certified the county’s November 3 general-election canvass—including Biden’s countywide presidential plurality—after public hearings amid intense political pressure to refuse certification. Contemporaneous AP/county notices document the canvass vote as the statutory county certification step before statewide canvass. Status Confirmed certification under contested political pressure; peer to Georgia 2020 statewide certification and Wayne County (MI) canvass deadlock cards—Maricopa BOS Nov. 20 canvass, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Board of Supervisors Certifies Maricopa County Election Results (GovDelivery)", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/AZMARIC/bulletins/2ada05e", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-bos-2020-unanimous-certify-nov20-under-pressure__untitled.png"}, {"title": "AP News — Arizona's largest county certifies Biden win over Trump", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/joe-biden-arizona-election-2020-campaign-2016-5642a850384031d162351f4e3983da85"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Certification leaf."}
{"id": "nybooks-halpern-2020-private-vendors-own-voting-machines-public-opacity", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-24", "uid": "C20260925-235207-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-24", "old_ids": ["nybooks-halpern-2020-private-vendors-own-voting-machines-public-opacity"], "seq": "C00497", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No public visibility"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-19", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Sue Halpern (NY Review of Books, Nov 2020) documents that ES&S, Hart, and Dominion—privately owned vendors—supply roughly 80% of US election equipment, with proprietary systems outside ordinary public inspection. Status Confirmed for structural public non-visibility into tabulation internals via private-vendor concentration.", "sources": [{"title": "Halpern — Who Owns Our Voting Machines? (NY Review of Books)", "url": "https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/11/19/election-who-owns-our-voting-machines/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nybooks-halpern-2020-private-vendors-own-voting-machines-public-opacity__halpern-who-owns-our-voting-machines-ny-review-of-books.png"}, {"title": "Rivest & Wack software-independence (public cannot verify software-dependent outcomes)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 12 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "nybooks-halpern-vendors-private-equity-officials-depend-on-black-box-equipment", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-38", "uid": "C20260925-235207-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-38", "old_ids": ["nybooks-halpern-vendors-private-equity-officials-depend-on-black-box-equipment"], "seq": "C00511", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "The systems are too complex and vulnerable for election officials to understand."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-19", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Halpern documents concentrated private ownership of ES&S/Hart/Dominion and the resulting dependence of local election officials on vendor proprietary systems they do not control or fully understand. Status Confirmed for institutional capture-by-complexity via vendor black boxes.", "sources": [{"title": "NY Review — Who Owns Our Voting Machines? (Halpern)", "url": "https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/11/19/election-who-owns-our-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "EAC trusted-build — VSTL/manufacturer source review, not local officials", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted-build-and-why-it-used"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 19 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "senate-judiciary-2020-facebook-twitter-ceos-hearing-platform-power-as-media-system", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-01", "uid": "C20260926-000015-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-01", "old_ids": ["senate-judiciary-2020-facebook-twitter-ceos-hearing-platform-power-as-media-system"], "seq": "C00514", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Create a parallel media system: social media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-17", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Nov 17, 2020 Senate Judiciary hearing 'Breaking the News: Censorship, Suppression, and the 2020 Election' with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey treated major social platforms as a parallel information system that labels, throttles, and shapes election-related speech at national scale—i.e., another media system alongside legacy press. Status Confirmed that social-media platforms function as a constructed alternate media system with election-content power; intentional 'cabal creation' framing stays Alleged and is not claimed here.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Senate Judiciary — Breaking the News: Censorship, Suppression, and the 2020 Election (Dorsey/Zuckerberg)", "url": "https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/breaking-the-news-censorship-suppression-and-the-2020-election"}, {"title": "BBC — Facebook and Twitter grilled over US election actions", "url": "https://www.bbc.com/news/education-54974819"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20d Media security-narrative cards."}
{"id": "wayne-mi-2020-board-canvassers-certification-deadlock", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-10", "uid": "C20260926-012939-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-10", "old_ids": ["wayne-mi-2020-board-canvassers-certification-deadlock"], "seq": "C00849", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-17", "state": "MI", "description": "On November 17, 2020 the Wayne County (MI) Board of Canvassers initially deadlocked 2–2 on certifying the November 3 general-election results amid disputes over out-of-balance precinct paperwork, then reversed the same night and certified unanimously while requesting an audit; Republican canvassers later sought to rescind their certification votes, which officials said had no legal effect. AP and Michigan Public contemporaneous coverage document the deadlock-then-certify sequence. Status Confirmed for a high-profile local certification controversy/delay peer to Georgia's 2020 certification-after-hand-tally fight—not proof the underlying totals were fraudulent.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Michigan GOP backtracks after blocking vote certification (Wayne County)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-local-elections-michigan-64c18e12e0d409d9629871cda3c07293"}, {"title": "Michigan Public — Wayne County board reverses course, certifies election results", "url": "https://www.michiganpublic.org/politics-government/2020-11-17/wayne-county-board-reverses-course-certifies-election-results"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to ga-2020-certification-hand-tally on Certification leaf.", "related": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"]}
{"id": "wayne-mi-2020-canvassers-deadlock-then-certify-under-pressure-force-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260927-121124-08", "uid": "C20260927-121124-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260927-121124-08", "old_ids": ["wayne-mi-2020-canvassers-deadlock-then-certify-under-pressure-force-leaf"], "seq": "C01255", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-17", "state": "MI", "description": "Soft remount of the Wayne County (MI) Nov. 17, 2020 Board of Canvassers episode onto the Forcing-certification leaf: Republican canvassers Monica Palmer and William Hartmann initially refused to certify amid poll-book vs. vote-count discrepancies / unbalanced Detroit precincts (2–2 deadlock), then—after hours of public criticism and pressure in the same meeting—reversed and joined a unanimous certification while requesting a state audit; later attempts to rescind were treated as having no legal effect. Soft companion to existing parent-Certification Wayne card. Status Confirmed for the refuse→pressure→unanimous-certify sequence (AP, Michigan Public); underlying fraud claims about Detroit precincts remain Alleged/Disputed outside this process card. PEP contrast: precinct hand count of hand-marked paper (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep) surfaces unbalanced books in public view before a seal-the-canvass deadline forces a yes vote.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Wayne County board certifies election results after deadlock", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-local-elections-michigan-64c18e12e0d409d9629871cda3c07293"}, {"title": "Michigan Public — Wayne County board reverses course, certifies election results", "url": "https://www.michiganpublic.org/politics-government/2020-11-17/wayne-county-board-reverses-course-certifies-election-results"}], "notes": "Fill-forced-cert-2026-09-27. Soft remount onto exact Forcing pathKey; parent Certification card retained.", "related": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"]}
{"id": "ap-gcc-scc-most-secure-media-frame-discredits-election-integrity-claimants", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-08", "uid": "C20260926-000809-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-08", "old_ids": ["ap-gcc-scc-most-secure-media-frame-discredits-election-integrity-claimants"], "seq": "C00561", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit anyone who reports or discusses election crimes, making examples of them to deter others from reporting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-13", "state": "Federal", "description": "Major outlets amplified the Nov 2020 GCC/SCC 'most secure election' joint statement as a repudiation of election-fraud/crime claims, framing many reporters of integrity concerns as advancing false or unsupported narratives—a media-discredit pathway that deters discussion. Soft companion to fill-20e Media discredit leaf. Status Confirmed for discrediting framing of election-crime discussants; individual claim merits vary.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Officials say election 'most secure' (repudiating integrity claims)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/top-officials-elections-most-secure-66f9361084ccbc461e3bbf42861057a5"}, {"title": "CISA — GCC/SCC joint statement (unfounded claims language)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-gcc-scc-most-secure-media-frame-discredits-election-integrity-claimants__ap-gcc-scc-most-secure-media-frame-discredits-election-integrity-claim.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 4 companion. Soft remount companion to fill-20e Media discredit cards."}
{"id": "ap-guardian-media-amplify-most-secure-repudiate-integrity-claims-soft-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-04", "uid": "C20260926-000015-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-04", "old_ids": ["ap-guardian-media-amplify-most-secure-repudiate-integrity-claims-soft-companion"], "seq": "C00517", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Discredit anyone who questions the security or accuracy of elections, so the public ignores or discounts the facts presented."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-13", "state": "Federal", "description": "Major wire/legacy outlets (AP, Guardian, NPR) amplified the GCC/SCC 'most secure' statement as a repudiation of election-integrity claims, framing challengers as advancing false or unsupported fraud narratives—exactly the discounting mechanism the leaf describes. Status Confirmed for media amplification that discredits questioners; individual claim merits vary.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Officials say election 'most secure' (repudiating integrity claims)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/top-officials-elections-most-secure-66f9361084ccbc461e3bbf42861057a5"}, {"title": "The Guardian — Officials say election 'most secure in US history'", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/nov/13/us-election-most-secure-history-voter-fraud-false-claims"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-2020-most-secure-governors-sos-lockstep-trusted-voices", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-16", "uid": "C20260926-002757-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-16", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-2020-most-secure-governors-sos-lockstep-trusted-voices"], "seq": "C00689", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Governors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Election Infrastructure GCC/SCC Nov 12, 2020 joint statement ('most secure in American history')—with NASS/NASED election leadership—directed the public to 'turn to elections officials as trusted voices,' exemplifying lock-step executive/official messaging that governors and SOS offices amplified. Soft remount of GCC family onto Governor office pathKey as the executive layer of the same coordination. Status Confirmed for coordinated messaging; personnel cabal claim Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — GCC & SCC joint statement Nov 12, 2020 (most secure / trusted voices)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure"}, {"title": "CISA — GCC Executive Committee Oct 22, 2020 trusted-sources statement", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-executive-committee", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-2020-most-secure-governors-sos-lockstep-trusted-voices__cisa-gcc-executive-committee-oct-22-2020-trusted-sources-sta.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 8 companion. Soft remount of GCC/NASS lock-step onto Governor pathKey."}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-2020-sheriffs-county-lockstep-trusted-voices", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-17", "uid": "C20260926-003520-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-17", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-2020-sheriffs-county-lockstep-trusted-voices"], "seq": "C00730", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County sheriffs"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Election Infrastructure GCC/SCC Nov 12, 2020 joint statement directed the public to turn to elections officials as trusted voices and was amplified through state/local executive and law-enforcement-adjacent channels—exemplifying lock-step county-layer messaging that county sheriffs' offices sit inside when providing election-security support. Soft remount of GCC family onto County Sheriffs pathKey. Status Confirmed for coordinated trusted-voice messaging; personnel cabal claim Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Joint statement Elections Infrastructure GCC & Election Infrastructure SCC (Nov 12, 2020)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure"}, {"title": "NACo — County Role in Elections (county LE/admin layer companion)", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/county-role-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-and-accurate-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-2020-sheriffs-county-lockstep-trusted-voices__naco-county-role-in-elections-county-le-admin-layer-companio.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 9. Soft remount of fill-20i GCC/Governor lock-step onto County Sheriffs pathKey. Coordination Confirmed; infiltration Alleged."}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-scc-joint-statement-2020-most-secure-election-in-american-history", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-39", "uid": "C20260925-235207-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-39", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-scc-joint-statement-2020-most-secure-election-in-american-history"], "seq": "C00512", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Push the narrative of \"security\" and \"accuracy\" until people believe it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Nov 12, 2020 joint statement from the Elections Infrastructure GCC & SCC Executive Committees (CISA, EAC, NASS, NASED, vendors including ES&S) declared the Nov 3 election 'the most secure in American history' and urged the public to trust election officials—an authoritative security/accuracy narrative pushed into media amplification. Status Confirmed for the official narrative push (not a technical proof that all subsystems were risk-free).", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Joint Statement GCC & SCC (most secure election in American history)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-scc-joint-statement-2020-most-secure-election-in-american-history__cisa-joint-statement-gcc-scc-most-secure-election-in-american-history.png"}, {"title": "MeriTalk — Krebs: 2020 most secure election yet (media amplification)", "url": "https://www.meritalk.com/articles/krebs-says-2020-will-be-the-most-secure-election-yet-still-recommends-backup-paper-ballots/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 20.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-scc-nov2020-most-secure-sos-lockstep-statement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-14", "uid": "C20260926-002008-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-14", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-scc-nov2020-most-secure-sos-lockstep-statement"], "seq": "C00647", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Secretaries of state"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "Nov 12, 2020 GCC/SCC 'most secure election' joint statement—amplified through SOS/NASS channels—illustrates lock-step official messaging that discounted competing integrity critiques. Soft remount companion to prior CISA narrative cards. Status Confirmed for coordinated official messaging; does not prove every critique was true or false.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure GCC / SCC (Nov 12, 2020)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-scc-nov2020-most-secure-sos-lockstep-statement__cisa-joint-statement-from-elections-infrastructure-gcc-scc-nov-12-2020.png"}, {"title": "NASS Pillars of Public Service — SOS election-administration role", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/Pillars%202024/1%20Pillars%20-%20Introduction.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-scc-nov2020-most-secure-sos-lockstep-statement__nass-pillars-of-public-service-sos-election-administration-r.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-scc-unfounded-claims-misinformation-framing-soft-remount-discredit-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-03", "uid": "C20260926-000015-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-03", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-scc-unfounded-claims-misinformation-framing-soft-remount-discredit-leaf"], "seq": "C00516", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Discredit anyone who questions the security or accuracy of elections, so the public ignores or discounts the facts presented."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Nov 12, 2020 GCC/SCC joint statement paired 'most secure in American history' with language about 'unfounded claims and opportunities for misinformation,' directing the public to treat elections officials as the trusted voice and to discount competing security/accuracy critiques. Soft remount of the prior CISA narrative cards onto this exact empty pathKey. Status Confirmed for official discrediting/discounting framing of questioners; does not prove every critique was false.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Joint Statement GCC & SCC (unfounded claims / misinformation language)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-scc-unfounded-claims-misinformation-framing-soft-remount-discredit-leaf__cisa-gcc-scc-unfounded-claims-misinformation-framing-soft-remount-discredit-leaf.png"}, {"title": "NPR — 'No Evidence' Election Was Compromised, Cybersecurity Agency Says", "url": "https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-2020-election-results/2020/11/12/934377227/no-evidence-election-was-compromised-cybersecurity-agency-says"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 2. Soft remount companion to fill-20d Media push-narrative cards on adjacent leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-joint-statement-no-evidence-voting-system-compromised-accuracy-assurance-messaging", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-40", "uid": "C20260925-235207-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-40", "old_ids": ["cisa-joint-statement-no-evidence-voting-system-compromised-accuracy-assurance-messaging"], "seq": "C00513", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Media", "Push the narrative of \"security\" and \"accuracy\" until people believe it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "Same GCC/SCC statement asserted 'no evidence that any voting system deleted or lost votes, changed votes, or was in any way compromised' and told the public to have 'utmost confidence in the security and integrity of our elections'—explicit accuracy/security belief messaging. Status Confirmed as narrative content; pair with software-independence / UnclearBallot cards for technical limits of such assurances.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA GCC/SCC joint statement full text", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election-infrastructure", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-joint-statement-no-evidence-voting-system-compromised-accuracy-assurance-messaging__cisa-gcc-scc-joint-statement-full-text.png"}, {"title": "Rivest software-independence — why software-dependent assurances remain limited", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "jasper-ia-2020-data-entry-error-unofficial-totals-leave-tabulator-reporting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-12", "uid": "C20260926-033715-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-12", "old_ids": ["jasper-ia-2020-data-entry-error-unofficial-totals-leave-tabulator-reporting"], "seq": "C01237", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Election officials do not know what happens to their totals once the totals leave their office."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-06", "state": "IA", "description": "Jasper County, Iowa (Nov. 2020) self-reported a courthouse data-entry/transcription error when transferring Clear Creek–Poweshiek precinct machine tape totals into the election-night report to the Secretary of State—incorrectly awarding ~300+ extra votes to one U.S. House candidate and briefly flipping the razor-thin IA-02 lead—showing how unofficial totals can diverge from what scanners produced once results leave the tabulator path. Status Confirmed primary Iowa SOS/Jasper Auditor joint explanations + Iowa Public Radio / USA Today contemporaneous reporting and subsequent hand audit; peer to CISA ENR risks and EAC election-night reporting checklist cards already on this leaf—Jasper real-world reporting-pipeline instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when officials cannot trust their own unofficial pipeline after totals leave machines, precinct hand counts of paper keep the public record tied to ballots present.", "sources": [{"title": "Iowa Public Radio — Getting It Right: Jasper County precinct hand audit after data-entry error (Nov. 9, 2020)", "url": "https://www.iowapublicradio.org/ipr-news/2020-11-09/getting-it-right-audit-affirms-corrected-results-in-one-jasper-county-precinct"}, {"title": "USA Today / Des Moines Register — Jasper County vote count error corrected, flips IA-02 lead", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/06/iowa-secretary-state-hold-news-conference-results-2nd-us-house-district-one-precinct/6187224002/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Reporting totals-when-they-leave leaf (non-CISA/EAC remount)."}
{"id": "tx-ag-brunner-2020-134-felony-unauthorized-voter-registrations-sslc", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-37", "uid": "C20260925-234437-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-37", "old_ids": ["tx-ag-brunner-2020-134-felony-unauthorized-voter-registrations-sslc"], "seq": "C00470", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-06", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton announced Nov. 6, 2020 that Kelly Reagan Brunner, a social worker at Mexia State Supported Living Center, was charged with 134 felony counts for submitting voter registration applications for 67 residents without their signatures or effective consent while purporting to act as their agent—including for persons declared mentally incapacitated and thus ineligible. Status Confirmed for charged illegal registration-drive-style conduct targeting a vulnerable population (charges = Confirmed filing; conviction not required for Confirmed mechanism).", "sources": [{"title": "Texas AG — Limestone County social worker charged with 134 felony election-fraud counts", "url": "https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/limestone-county-social-worker-charged-134-felony-counts-involving-election-fraud", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-ag-brunner-2020-134-felony-unauthorized-voter-registrations-sslc__texas-ag-limestone-county-social-worker-charged-with-134-felony-election-fraud-c.png"}, {"title": "KXXV — AG Paxton Limestone County Brunner charges coverage", "url": "https://www.kxxv.com/news/local-news/ag-paxton-limestone-county-social-worker-charged-with-134-felony-counts-involving-election-fraud"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 19."}
{"id": "mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered", "permanent_id": "C20261027-151600-01", "uid": "C20261027-151600-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-151600-01", "old_ids": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"], "seq": "C00930", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-04", "state": "MI", "description": "On Nov. 4, 2020, while Detroit's absentee ballots were being counted at the TCF Center in Wayne County (renamed Huntington Place in December 2021), election staff covered some of the counting room's glass windows with paper and cardboard, blocking the view of people in the hallway outside the room [1][3][5]. At 3:28 PM ET, NBC News correspondent Steve Patterson posted that a \"large, animated crush of 'stop the count' protestors\" was trying to push into the counting hall, that guards were blocking the door, and that \"Pizza boxes are pushed against the window to obstruct view\"; his 38-second video shows the crowd and police at the counting room's glass doors [7]. The Detroit Free Press reported that people gathered outside the counting area \"pounded on the doors and windows, shouting, 'Let us in' and 'Stop the count',\" and that after some challengers tried to photograph or videotape the count, ballot counters who felt intimidated asked security to address it and \"paper was placed over the windows\" [1]. Each party was allowed 134 challengers. USA TODAY reported that 268 Democratic, 227 Republican and 75 nonpartisan challengers had been on the floor earlier in the day, that city attorney Lawrence Garcia said officials stopped admitting people once they noticed the room was \"well over the 134 maximum,\" and that officials were concerned about COVID-19 spreading, building security and rising tension [3]. The Free Press reported that Democratic challengers were also kept outside [1]. Official justification: Garcia told CNN that \"some – but not all – windows were covered\" because poll workers seated beside them were concerned about people outside \"photographing and filming them and their work,\" that only the media may take pictures inside the counting place, and that windows farther from the work stations stayed uncovered; CNN reported that the coverings also reflected concern that voter information could be revealed [5]. Republican challengers dispute that explanation. A video that the MI District 9 Republicans posted to YouTube in July 2025, which its description attributes to D-9 Chair Lori Skibo on Nov. 4, 2020, records the narrator saying that challengers were kept out of \"the room where we have a legal right to be\" and that officials \"have put cardboard so that we're not even allowed to peek in\" [10]. On Sept. 22, 2025, PattyMI, who describes herself as a Gateway Pundit reporter, recirculated a 29-second silent clip that she calls \"never before seen video\" of windows being covered while Republican challengers were \"tricked into leaving\" and locked out; the filming date is not independently established, and the claim that challengers were tricked is her allegation, which the other sources here do not support or address [13]. Court and official findings: in Costantino v. City of Detroit, Wayne County Chief Judge Timothy M. Kenny on Nov. 13, 2020 denied the challengers' requests for an injunction, a protective order and an independent audit, finding that the city \"offered a more accurate and persuasive explanation\" of activity at the TCF Center and that the plaintiffs' interpretation of events was \"incorrect and not credible\"; the opinion does not address the window coverings [16]. The Michigan Senate Oversight Committee's June 2021 report said poll workers' responses \"such as covering windows, calling police, denying lawful challenges, and removing challengers\" \"seemed necessary to them at the time\" but that \"those actions by both sides were not always lawful or wise\"; it also \"found no evidence fraudulent activities were undertaken or that such actions led to irreparable harm to ballots or vote counting\" [18]. The Board of State Canvassers certified Michigan's results on Nov. 23, 2020 [20]. Status Confirmed: contemporaneous reporting, video and the city's own statements document the covered windows, the crowd and the halt to further entry; the reason for the coverings rests on the city's and workers' accounts, which Republican challengers dispute. No vendor is involved.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press — Tresa Baldas and Kristen Jordan Shamus, \"Chaos erupts at TCF Center as Republican vote challengers cry foul in Detroit\" (Nov. 4, 2020, 3:17 PM ET; updated 9:12 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201113000822/https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/tcf-center-challengers-detroit-michigan/6164715002/)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/tcf-center-challengers-detroit-michigan/6164715002/"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press — Nov. 4, 2020 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27 from the Wayback snapshot of Nov. 13, 2020)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/04/tcf-center-challengers-detroit-michigan/6164715002/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__freep-2020-11-04.html"}, {"title": "USA TODAY — Devon Link and Ashley Nerbovig, \"Fact check: Videos of crowd locked out of Detroit center lack context\" (Nov. 10, 2020; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201112064457/https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/10/fact-check-videos-crowd-locked-out-detroit-center-lack-context/6195038002/)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/10/fact-check-videos-crowd-locked-out-detroit-center-lack-context/6195038002/"}, {"title": "USA TODAY — Nov. 10, 2020 fact check: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27 from the Wayback snapshot of Nov. 12, 2020)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/factcheck/2020/11/10/fact-check-videos-crowd-locked-out-detroit-center-lack-context/6195038002/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__usatoday-factcheck-2020-11-10.html"}, {"title": "CNN Business — Oliver Darcy, \"Right-wing media portrayed window covering at ballot center as nefarious. Here's what really happened\" (Nov. 5, 2020, 8:58 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201226030620/https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/05/media/detroit-windows-covered-ballots-vote-center)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/05/media/detroit-windows-covered-ballots-vote-center"}, {"title": "CNN Business — Nov. 5, 2020 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27 from the live page)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/05/media/detroit-windows-covered-ballots-vote-center", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__cnn-2020-11-05.html"}, {"title": "X — Steve Patterson (@PattersonNBC, NBC News correspondent), post with 38-second video from the TCF Center hallway (Nov. 4, 2020, 3:28 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201104210053/https://twitter.com/PattersonNBC/status/1324086177885003778)", "url": "https://x.com/PattersonNBC/status/1324086177885003778"}, {"title": "X — @PattersonNBC post: text and metadata (local copy 2026-10-27, read through the X API)", "url": "https://x.com/PattersonNBC/status/1324086177885003778", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__x-pattersonnbc-1324086177885003778.json"}, {"title": "X — @PattersonNBC post: attached video, 1280x720 MP4, 38 s (local copy 2026-10-27; machine transcript beside it)", "url": "https://x.com/PattersonNBC/status/1324086177885003778", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__x-pattersonnbc-1324086177885003778-video.mp4"}, {"title": "YouTube — MI District 9 Republicans, \"GOP Challengers Blocked from Observing Ballot Counting\" (uploaded July 30, 2025, 9:13 PM ET; description credits D-9 Chair Lori Skibo, Nov. 4, 2020; 1:53; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20250801174603/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE7ZL5MD128)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE7ZL5MD128"}, {"title": "YouTube — hE7ZL5MD128: video metadata (yt-dlp info JSON, local copy 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE7ZL5MD128", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__youtube-skibo-hE7ZL5MD128-info.json"}, {"title": "YouTube — hE7ZL5MD128: video, 640x360 MP4 as served by YouTube (local copy 2026-10-27; the 1280x720 copy, 28.6 MB, is held offline; machine transcript beside it)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hE7ZL5MD128", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__youtube-skibo-hE7ZL5MD128-video.mp4"}, {"title": "X — PattyMI (@PattyLovesTruth), post recirculating a 29-second clip from inside the TCF Center (Sept. 22, 2025, 11:29 AM ET; recent circulation, not 2020 reporting; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20250922185001/https://x.com/PattyLovesTruth/status/1970148384158679547)", "url": "https://x.com/PattyLovesTruth/status/1970148384158679547"}, {"title": "X — @PattyLovesTruth post: text and metadata (local copy 2026-10-27, read through the X API)", "url": "https://x.com/PattyLovesTruth/status/1970148384158679547", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__x-pattylovestruth-1970148384158679547.json"}, {"title": "X — @PattyLovesTruth post: attached video, 1280x720 MP4, 29 s, no speech (local copy 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://x.com/PattyLovesTruth/status/1970148384158679547", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__x-pattylovestruth-1970148384158679547-video.mp4"}, {"title": "Wayne County Circuit Court — Costantino v. City of Detroit, No. 20-014780-AW, Opinion and Order (Chief Judge Timothy M. Kenny, Nov. 13, 2020; copy hosted by Reason; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201202164628/https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Kenny-ruling-11-13-20.pdf)", "url": "https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Kenny-ruling-11-13-20.pdf"}, {"title": "Costantino v. City of Detroit — Nov. 13, 2020 opinion and order: PDF (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://reason.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Kenny-ruling-11-13-20.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__costantino-v-detroit-opinion-2020-11-13.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Senate Oversight Committee (Sen. Ed McBroom, chair) — Report on the November 2020 Election in Michigan (June 23, 2021; pp. 13–14; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20210623162113/https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf)", "url": "https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Senate Oversight Committee — June 23, 2021 report: PDF (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://misenategopcdn.s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/99/doccuments/20210623/SMPO_2020ElectionReport_2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__mi-senate-oversight-report-2021-06-23.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — David Eggert and John Flesher, \"Michigan certifies Biden win, Trump challenge thwarted again\" (Nov. 23, 2020; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20201124070511/https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-senate-elections-gary-peters-19decf3108373883409fae7e6e810ac6)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-senate-elections-gary-peters-19decf3108373883409fae7e6e810ac6"}, {"title": "AP — Nov. 23, 2020 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27 from the Wayback snapshot of Nov. 24, 2020)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-joe-biden-donald-trump-senate-elections-gary-peters-19decf3108373883409fae7e6e810ac6", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered__ap-2020-11-23.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-27 3:16 PM ET at Mark's request (\"oversight destruction\"). All 20 source lines opened on 2026-10-27: Free Press, USA TODAY, AP and the Kenny PDF through Wayback snapshots; CNN live (HTTP 200); Senate report PDF from the Senate CDN; X posts read through the X API; videos downloaded and machine-transcribed (large-v3). No existing card covered this event. Leaf: closest existing (observers kept from seeing); no leaf for destruction of oversight exists, and none was created. Differences from the request text: the crowd was in the hallway inside the TCF Center, outside the counting room, not outside the building; sources say paper and cardboard, with pizza boxes per Patterson's post and the challengers' videos; the privacy rationale is the city attorney's (CNN), while the Free Press says counters who felt intimidated asked security to act; the Senate report calls the covering not always lawful or wise; the Kenny opinion does not address the windows; the YouTube upload (July 2025) and PattyMI post (September 2025) are recent circulation. Reuters fact check not used (live 401, no Wayback copy). Window: 2020 general election. No vendor tag. 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{"id": "nass-nased-2020-11-04-post-election-trusted-officials-sos-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-09", "uid": "C20260926-033715-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-09", "old_ids": ["nass-nased-2020-11-04-post-election-trusted-officials-sos-lockstep"], "seq": "C01234", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Secretaries of state"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "Joint NASS and NASED Post-Election Day Statement (Nov. 4, 2020)—issued the day after Election Day by the national Secretaries of State and State Election Directors associations—directed the public to treat state and local election officials as 'the trusted sources of accurate information' and to avoid 'misinformation from unverified sources,' illustrating lockstep SOS/election-director messaging that channels scrutiny away from competing integrity critiques before final certification. Status Confirmed primary NASS/NASED joint statement; peer to CISA GCC Aug. 2020 NASS-signed and CISA GCC/SCC Nov. 12 2020 most-secure cards already on this leaf—NASS/NASED Nov. 4 trusted-officials instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: lockstep 'trust officials' messaging can chill scrutiny of machine tallies that public hand counts would open to citizen observation.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — Joint NASS and NASED Post-Election Day Statement (Nov. 4, 2020)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/node/2110", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-nased-2020-11-04-post-election-trusted-officials-sos-lockstep__nass-joint-nass-and-nased-post-election-day-statement-nov-4-2020.png"}, {"title": "NASS — NASS and NASED 2020 Election Preparations and Reminders companion", "url": "https://www.nass.org/node/2096", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-nased-2020-11-04-post-election-trusted-officials-sos-lockstep__nass-nass-and-nased-2020-election-preparations-and-reminders-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Infiltration of Offices Secretaries of State lockstep leaf (non-CISA GCC Nov12/Aug20 remount)."}
{"id": "erie-pa-courthouse-power-outage-mail-ballot-scan-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-04", "uid": "C20260925-194013-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-04", "old_ids": ["erie-pa-courthouse-power-outage-mail-ballot-scan-2020"], "seq": "C00188", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day 2020, a power outage at the Erie County Courthouse (reported cause: vehicle striking a utility pole) delayed scanning of roughly 33,000 received mail-in ballots and affected multiple polling places among ~11,000 customers without power. County messaging stated generators/battery packs restored or maintained operations and that votes were not lost; CBS Pittsburgh / Erie News Now contemporaneously documented the courthouse scan delay. Status Confirmed for power-outage interruption of mail-ballot processing and polling sites; intentional fraud not established.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Pittsburgh — Erie courthouse power outage delays mail-ballot scanning", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/pittsburgh/news/erie-county-courthouse-power-outage/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/erie-pa-courthouse-power-outage-mail-ballot-scan-2020__cbs-pittsburgh-erie-courthouse-power-outage-delays-mail-ball.png"}, {"title": "Erie County, PA — Power restored at polling places; election administered", "url": "https://eriecountypa.gov/erie-county-administers-safe-fair-and-accurate-election-power-restored-at-polling-places/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/erie-pa-courthouse-power-outage-mail-ballot-scan-2020__erie-county-pa-power-restored-at-polling-places-election-adm.png"}, {"title": "GoErie — Power outages affect 11,000+ including polling places", "url": "https://www.goerie.com/story/news/2020/11/03/power-outages-affect-more-than-11-000-erie-county-penelec-customers/6151106002/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 2. Courthouse scan delay + poll outages Confirmed."}
{"id": "fulton-ga-ballot-container-seals-cut-state-farm-arena-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-20", "uid": "C20260925-205354-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-20", "old_ids": ["fulton-ga-ballot-container-seals-cut-state-farm-arena-2020"], "seq": "C00235", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Broken physical seals that destroy the chain of custody of paper ballots"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia State Election Board / SOS Investigations Division reporting on Fulton County State Farm Arena (SEB2020-059 and related) documents that temporary seals on ballot containers/'suitcases' under tables were cut when workers resumed scanning after a pause on election night — an authorized reopen of sealed containers rather than secret delivery of fraudulent ballots, per investigators who reviewed full surveillance. Status Confirmed that physical seals were cut/broken on ballot containers during processing (event); investigation found no conspiracy of illicit ballot injection. Seal breaks remain a chain-of-custody integrity event even when later explained as procedural.", "sources": [{"title": "WSB-TV — Officials show frame-by-frame Fulton surveillance video", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/georgia-election-officials-show-frame-by-frame-what-really-happened-fulton-surveillance-video/T5M3PYIBYFHFFOD3CIB2ULDVDE/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fulton-ga-ballot-container-seals-cut-state-farm-arena-2020__wsb-tv-officials-show-frame-by-frame-fulton-surveillance-vid.png"}, {"title": "11Alive — Georgia 'suitcases' investigation closed; seals cut to resume scanning", "url": "https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/georgia-suitcases-full-of-ballots-2020-election-investigation-closed-no-evidence-conspiracy/85-3099b5f5-66a7-4846-84c3-2f46a83738fa"}, {"title": "With Receipts — SEB Report of Investigation SEB2020-059 context", "url": "https://withreceipts.fyi/sources/georgia-sos-state-farm-arena-investigation-report-2023/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fulton-ga-ballot-container-seals-cut-state-farm-arena-2020__with-receipts-seb-report-of-investigation-seb2020-059-contex.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 10. Seal-cutting Confirmed; fraud claim not upheld."}
{"id": "fulton-ga-state-farm-arena-pipe-burst-absentee-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-01", "uid": "C20260925-194013-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-01", "old_ids": ["fulton-ga-state-farm-arena-pipe-burst-absentee-2020"], "seq": "C00185", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Water main breaks"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "On Election Day 2020, a water pipe burst at about 6:07 a.m. in the absentee-ballot processing area at State Farm Arena in Fulton County, Georgia, delaying processing of thousands of absentee-by-mail ballots that night. Atlanta Journal-Constitution reporting (Fulton Commission Chairman Robb Pitts) states the pipe was repaired within about two hours and that no ballots were damaged, but the infrastructure failure interrupted chain-of-custody / processing workflow at the central ballot site and delayed result reporting. Status Confirmed for water-pipe disruption at a ballot-processing site; intentional fraud not established. Transparent hand-count / PEP-style observation of paper would still apply after any such interruption.", "sources": [{"title": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Fulton results delayed after pipe bursts in room with ballots", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/news/atlanta-news/fulton-election-results-delayed-after-pipe-bursts-in-room-with-ballots/4T3KPQV7PBEX3JVAIGJBNBSVJY/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 1. Operational CoC disruption Confirmed; no ballot damage reported."}
{"id": "halderman-antrim-rezeroed-cards-manual-entry-confusion-audit-path", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-40", "uid": "C20260926-001426-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-40", "old_ids": ["halderman-antrim-rezeroed-cards-manual-entry-confusion-audit-path"], "seq": "C00633", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Mix up USB flash drives to cause confusion and hinder a proper audit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03", "state": "MI", "description": "Same Antrim investigation: poll workers in Elk Rapids and Milton rezeroed scanner memory cards after printing poll tapes, erasing electronic results so the EMS could not load those cards and forced error-prone manual entry—further removable-media mishandling that confused reporting and weakened the electronic audit trail. Status Confirmed for media-handling confusion inhibiting clean audit; training/procedure failure, not proven sabotage.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman Antrim USENIX paper — rezeroed cards / manual entry", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan.gov Antrim analysis PDF", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Press-releases/2021/documents/Antrim.pdf?rev=f91601b0a03b4085bbc4bc0959205333", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-antrim-rezeroed-cards-manual-entry-confusion-audit-path__michigan-gov-antrim-analysis-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 20 companion."}
{"id": "fulton-ga-2020-original-count-ballot-images-not-preserved-curling-filing", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-01", "uid": "C20261016-123449-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-01", "old_ids": ["fulton-ga-2020-original-count-ballot-images-not-preserved-curling-filing"], "seq": "C01420", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Disable or manipulate ballot images on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (original count); county position filed 2021-11-16", "state": "GA", "description": "In Curling v. Raffensperger/Kemp (N.D. Ga. No. 1:17-cv-02989-AT), the Coalition Plaintiffs asked Fulton County for all Dominion EMS election project files from the November 3, 2020 original count and recount. In a Nov. 12, 2021 joint discovery statement, the Coalition said Fulton had admitted in its responses to requests for admission that a significant portion of the in-person ballot images were not preserved for the original official count; in-person ballots were about 375,000, almost all of their images were missing from production, and at least 18,000 images were also missing from the recount production. In its own Nov. 16, 2021 filing (Doc. 1223), Fulton County stated that it was \"not in possession of ballot images for the 2020 Election, as those documents were not preserved.\" A later Citizens' Oversight AuditEngine ballot-image audit of the same election reported that 380,458 ballot-sheet images (about 72%) were unavailable and that only about 28% of ballots could be checked against the images. Status Confirmed for the county's own court admission that the original-count ballot images were not preserved; the filings do not show that any result was altered. Catalog note: the images are the scanner's record of what it actually read. When most of them are gone, no citizen can compare the paper to what the software counted, and the 'it was not preserved' explanation becomes available everywhere. Physical ballots counted by hand in public at the precinct do not depend on an image file surviving the import process.", "sources": [{"title": "Curling v. Kemp, N.D. Ga. 1:17-cv-02989-AT, Doc. 1223 — Fulton County Defendants' Position Regarding Production of Nov. 3, 2020 Election Files (filed Nov. 16, 2021; 'not preserved')", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1223.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Curling v. Kemp, Doc. 1215 — Joint Discovery Dispute Statement (filed Nov. 12, 2021; ~375,000 in-person images missing; 18,000+ recount images missing)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1215.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Citizens' Oversight / AuditEngine — GA Fulton 20201103 Narrative Report (380,458 ballot-sheet images unavailable; ~28% auditable)", "url": "https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M1986/GA%20Fulton%2020201103%20Narrative%20Report.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed via the county's own court filing plus the Coalition joint statement. AuditEngine narrative is a citizen-audit secondary source; one line of that PDF says '2022 General Election' though the file and figures are for 20201103. Reuters fact-check (corrected July 28, 2022) returned 401 to curl/WebFetch and was not used. Cross-leaf: Tabulation > Wipe hard drives; Lawfare > Block access to ballot images. Not an Antrim remount.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "mi-oakland-rochester-hills-2020-11-03-absentee-totals-sent-twice-commission-race-winner-flipped-canvass", "permanent_id": "C20261118-122125-02", "uid": "C20261118-122125-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-122125-02", "old_ids": ["mi-oakland-rochester-hills-2020-11-03-absentee-totals-sent-twice-commission-race-winner-flipped-canvass"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Totals can be changed and hidden inside aggregation without the public being able to detect it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (general election); 2020-11-05 (error announced and corrected)", "state": "MI", "description": "After the Nov. 3, 2020 general election, the unofficial results for Oakland County Commission District 15 (Rochester and Rochester Hills) showed Democrat Melanie Hartman beating incumbent Republican Adam Kochenderfer by 104 votes. On Nov. 5, Oakland County Clerk Lisa Brown announced that the Rochester Hills city clerk's office had sent the ballot totals for seven precincts to the county twice: once labeled as precinct ballots and again as absentee ballots, though they were the same batch of absentee ballots. After the duplicate was removed, Kochenderfer won by 1,127 votes. Rochester Hills Mayor Bryan Barnett called it 'a technical glitch when a file was saved and sent to the County,' discovered about 1:30 a.m. Nov. 4; county Elections Director Joe Rozell said 'a computer issue in Rochester Hills' caused it and that the county noticed the mistake during the canvass. Rozell later told The Oakland Press that in 14 years he had not seen the same results transmitted as different ballot types. Kochenderfer said he had accepted the loss, would not have sought a recount, and wanted the system reviewed at both the city and county level. Status Confirmed: the county clerk, the county elections director and the city acknowledged the duplicate transmission and the corrected outcome. Catalog point: one duplicated results file inside the aggregation step reversed a race's published winner, and the candidate accepted the false result; only a later line-by-line canvass caught it. Publicly posted precinct-level hand-count results make such aggregation errors visible to anyone.", "sources": [{"title": "Oakland County Times — Kochenderfer Wins County Commission Seat After Error Caught (Crystal A. Proxmire, Nov. 5, 2020)", "url": "https://oaklandcounty115.com/2020/11/05/kochenderfer-wins-county-commission-seat-after-error-caught/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/oct115-rochester-hills-mi-2020-11-kochenderfer-error-caught.html"}, {"title": "WXYZ 7 Action News — Error in election results reveals losing candidate actually won in Rochester Hills (Nov. 6, 2020)", "url": "https://www.wxyz.com/news/error-in-election-results-reveals-losing-candidate-as-actual-winner-in-rochester-hills", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wxyz-rochester-hills-mi-2020-11-duplicate-absentee-totals.html"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press via Ames Tribune — Losing Republican in Oakland County turns winner after error fixed (Nov. 6, 2020)", "url": "https://www.amestrib.com/story/news/local/michigan/oakland/2020/11/06/oakland-county-election-2020-race-results/6184186002/"}, {"title": "The Oakland Press — Oakland County Board of Canvassers certify election results, find no significant irregularities (Nov. 18, 2020)", "url": "https://www.theoaklandpress.com/2020/11/18/oakland-county-board-of-canvassers-certify-election-results-find-no-significant-irregularities-2/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-18 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-18 12:21 PM ET). Oakland County Times and WXYZ archived (curl 200); Oakland Press returned 403 to curl and Ames Tribune/Free Press were not fetched, so both are linked only (content seen in search extracts). Distinct from the Antrim MI 2020 cards. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ct-seec-2021-047-middletown-duplicate-registrations-two-voter-ids-double-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-08", "uid": "C20261016-123449-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-08", "old_ids": ["ct-seec-2021-047-middletown-duplicate-registrations-two-voter-ids-double-votes"], "seq": "C01427", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject phantom voter registrations", "Duplicate existing records with plausible deniability (ensure every duplicate can be explained away as a mistake)", "Each duplicate record has its own voter ID number, so a vote can be associated with it. If someone catches the \"duplicate,\" it can be explained as a typo."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (election); SEEC File Nos. 2021-047 / 2021-050", "state": "CT", "description": "In SEEC File Nos. 2021-047 and 2021-050 (complaint by Linda Szykowicz, Dominic Rapini and Fight Voter Fraud, Inc.), the complainants' analysis of the January 2021 statewide voter database flagged 103 voters who appeared to have voted twice in the Nov. 3, 2020 general election using two different voter ID numbers, matched on the same or similar name, address and date of birth. Connecticut's State Elections Enforcement Commission verified 158 of the records as potential duplicate registrations of one person with a vote recorded under both. Most of these were DMV transactions in which the system \"created a new, duplicate registration instead of updating an existing registration\" because of minor differences such as maiden/married names, birth dates off, or apartment numbers written differently. Most apparent double votes traced to checklist or data-entry errors. The Commission conclusively established two actual double votes. In one, East Hartford elector Azzuddin Mokbil had a second registration created under \"Azzuddin Mokbel\" (one letter off) that the voter registration system did not flag. Both of his ballots, one absentee and one cast in person, were counted. The Commission found no intent and took no further action. Status Confirmed (SEEC findings and conclusions). Catalog note: this is the leaf's mechanism in a state record. A one-letter variant produced a second voter ID and a second counted ballot, and both were officially explained as an innocent mistake. The excuse holds even though the second vote was counted.", "sources": [{"title": "Connecticut SEEC — Findings and Conclusions, In the Matter of a Complaint by Linda Szykowicz, et al., Middletown, File Nos. 2021-047 / 2021-050", "url": "https://seec.ct.gov/e2casebase/data/fd/FD_2021_047.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for two double votes via duplicate voter IDs (Mokbil/Mokbel, Mogollon-Lecca) and the DMV duplicate-creation pattern; no fraud intent found. Adoption date on the scanned order is illegible in the PDF text layer. Cross-leaf: Change spellings of names slightly (Bob Smyth-type examples); Mail ballots double-vote leaf."}
{"id": "fl-2020-sd37-ghost-candidate-alex-rodriguez-artiles-convicted", "permanent_id": "C20261030-122043-01", "uid": "C20261030-122043-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-122043-01", "old_ids": ["fl-2020-sd37-ghost-candidate-alex-rodriguez-artiles-convicted"], "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Stack the ballot with spoilers to split the opponent's vote"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-163642-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-163642-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (election); 2021-08 (Rodriguez plea); 2024-09-30 (Artiles verdict); 2024-11-18 (sentence)", "state": "FL", "description": "In Florida's 2020 race for state Senate District 37 in Miami-Dade County, former Republican state Sen. Frank Artiles recruited Alexis (Alex) Rodriguez, a Palm Beach County machine-parts salesman who shared the last name of Democratic incumbent José Javier Rodríguez, to run as an unaffiliated candidate so he would siphon votes from the incumbent. Alex Rodriguez never campaigned, yet received 6,382 votes, and Republican Ileana Garcia won the seat by 32 votes. Prosecutors said Artiles promised Rodriguez $50,000 and that Rodriguez collected about $44,708 in cash and gifts, and that Artiles had been paid $90,000 by Patrick Bainter of the Republican consulting firm Data Targeting to help win Miami-Dade races. Garcia denied any knowledge of the scheme. Alex Rodriguez took a plea deal in August 2021 and received 36 months of probation in exchange for cooperating. On Sept. 30, 2024, a Miami-Dade jury found Artiles guilty of making excessive campaign contributions, conspiracy to make excessive contributions, and false swearing on a candidate oath, and acquitted him of procuring a falsified voter registration form. On Nov. 18, 2024, Circuit Judge Miguel de la O sentenced him to 60 days in jail, probation, 500 hours of community service and no involvement in politics, stayed pending appeal; the judge withheld adjudication. Artiles appealed to the Third District Court of Appeal in October 2025, and prosecutors urged the court to uphold the conviction in June 2026; no appellate ruling was found as of Oct. 30, 2026. As the courts and reporters noted, running a ghost candidate is not itself illegal in Florida; the conviction rests on the payments. Status Confirmed: the spoiler placement is established by a cooperating defendant's plea and a jury verdict; the conviction is on appeal. Catalog point: a look-alike name on the ballot drew more than 6,000 votes in a race decided by 32, and the scheme was legal except for how it was paid for.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Politics — Frank Artiles gets 60 days in jail, probation for orchestrating 'ghost candidate' scheme (Nov. 18, 2024)", "url": "https://floridapolitics.com/archives/708352-frank-artiles-gets-60-days-in-jail-probation-for-orchestrating-ghost-candidate-scheme-his-attorneys-plan-to-appeal/"}, {"title": "CBS Miami — Ex-state Sen. Artiles gets 5 years probation, 60 days jail in \"ghost candidate\" scheme (Nov. 18, 2024)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/frank-artiles-sentenced-probation-election-conspiracy/"}, {"title": "Miami Herald — Ex-GOP state senator Artiles gets 60 days for campaign scheme (Nov. 2024; paywall, linked only)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article295625229.html"}, {"title": "CBS Miami / News Service of Florida — Former Miami lawmaker Frank Artiles to fight conviction in 2020 \"ghost\" candidate Florida Senate race (Oct. 29, 2025)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/miami/news/former-miami-lawmaker-frank-artiles-fights-conviction-in-ghost-candidate-case/"}, {"title": "State Affairs — Prosecutors defend Artiles conviction in 'ghost' candidate case (June 3, 2026; paywall, linked only)", "url": "https://pro.stateaffairs.com/fl/courts/ghost-candidate-florida-senate-race"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-30 (open web, zero X API). Peer on this leaf: Alaska 2026 NYT ballot-composition spoilers card (1 -> 3 with Montana card). Florida Politics and both CBS pages curl 200; Florida Politics published 2024-11-18 per page metadata. No appellate decision found by WebSearch on 2026-10-30. Party labels are stated because the sources state them. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "detroit-2020-nov-general-94-of-134-absentee-counting-boards-out-of-balance-canvass", "permanent_id": "C20261028-123022-01", "uid": "C20261028-123022-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-123022-01", "old_ids": ["detroit-2020-nov-general-94-of-134-absentee-counting-boards-out-of-balance-canvass"], "seq": "C01593", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (election); 2020-11-17 (county canvass); 2021-02 (state audit)", "state": "MI", "description": "At the Wayne County canvass of Michigan's Nov. 3, 2020 general election, 94 of Detroit's 134 absent voter counting boards, about 70%, were out of balance without an explanation, meaning the number of ballots tabulated did not match the number of voters recorded in the poll book, the Detroit Free Press reported on Nov. 23, 2020. Another 85 of the city's 503 in-person precincts, roughly 17%, were also out of balance. Each Detroit counting board handled ballots for several precincts at once. Under Michigan law, a precinct or counting board whose ballot and poll-book counts do not reconcile cannot be recounted, and Board of Canvassers chair Monica Palmer cited the unexplained imbalances when she initially opposed certification. After a Bureau of Elections audit of the counting boards in February 2021, the Michigan Department of State said 83% of the counting boards were balanced or explained, up from 27% at the close of the county canvass, and that the net imbalance across the board was 17 ballots out of about 174,000 absentee ballots counted. The state attributed the imbalances to clerical errors and said the valid ballots were properly counted. Catalog point: when thousands of ballots from many precincts are pooled into one central counting board, the ballots and the poll book stop reconciling at the precinct level, and an unreconciled board cannot be recounted. Precinct-level counting keeps each precinct's ballots and poll book together.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press (via Evening Tribune) — Fewer Detroit ballots were in question in November than August (Nov. 23, 2020; curl 402/paywall, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2020/11/23/detroit-absentee-ballots-board-of-canvassers-precincts-out-of-balance/6398071002/"}, {"title": "Michigan Department of State — More than 250 audits confirm accuracy and integrity of Michigan's election (Mar. 2, 2021)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2021/03/02/more-than-250-audits-confirm-accuracy-and-integrity-of-michigans-election"}, {"title": "Michigan Bureau of Elections — Audits of the November 3, 2020 General Election (Apr. 21, 2021)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Press-releases/2021/documents/BOE_2020_Post_Election_Audit_Report_04_21_21.pdf"}, {"title": "Monica Palmer declaration, ECF No. 33-1, Case 1:20-cv-01083 (W.D. Mich., filed Nov. 19, 2020): about 71% of Detroit's 134 AVCBs left unbalanced", "url": "https://pacer-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/90/99598/09915970522.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-28 (open web, zero X API). Peers on this leaf: detroit-2016-general-136-precincts-unrecountable and detroit-2020-aug-primary-72pct (2 -> 3). Related: wayne-mi-2020-canvassers-deadlock-then-certify-under-pressure-force-leaf. SOS release and BOE audit PDF curl 200; Free Press 402 (URL retained; figures from the WebSearch extract of the syndicated copy). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record", "permanent_id": "C20261108-161754-01", "uid": "C20261108-161754-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261108-161754-01", "old_ids": ["mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (election); 2020-11-05 (official explanation)", "state": "MI", "description": "In November 2020, Michigan’s public voter lookup attributed an absentee-ballot return to William Bradley, born in March 1902, in Detroit ZIP 48207. PolitiFact independently queried the state website and reported a September ballot sent and an October 2 return. Detroit elections consultant Daniel Baxter acknowledged that a living man with a nearly identical name voted properly, but his ballot was initially logged against the elder Bradley through a clerical error; the living son, William Tarnell Bradley, also spoke to PolitiFact. Officials said no ballot was requested, received or counted on behalf of the deceased father. This establishes a voter-record misattribution, not a fraudulent vote by a dead person. A video recirculated in November 2026 shows the Bradley lookup with application September 11, ballot sent September 19 and received October 2, according to EMon’s footage review. The same clip queries Robert Brock, January 1900, ZIP 48203. The supplied unredacted Brock frame visibly shows application received October 11, ballot sent October 14 and a BLANK ballot-received field, although the narrator claims a returned ballot. Brock’s identity, actual birth date and death have not been independently verified; an old displayed birth year alone proves neither death nor a returned or counted ballot. Status Confirmed applies only to the displayed Bradley record discrepancy and the acknowledged clerical misattribution. The clip does not establish that both men were dead voters, an extra ballot was counted, or an intent to rig the election.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — No, a dead voter named William Bradley didn’t vote in Detroit (Nov. 5, 2020); independent lookup, son interview, Baxter statement", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/nov/05/facebook-posts/no-dead-voter-named-william-bradley-didnt-vote-det/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__politifact.html"}, {"title": "CNN — Michigan dead-voter claims explained (Nov. 8, 2020); official explanation", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/08/tech/michigan-dead-voter-fact-debunking", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__cnn.html"}, {"title": "X — @777DEAN777 recirculated lookup video (Nov. 7, 2026); allegations not adopted as findings", "url": "https://x.com/777DEAN777/status/2119172466622730697"}, {"title": "Original video MP4 download (existing archived source; no new download)", "url": "https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2118569163077627904/vid/avc1/1920x1080/KL80SQVkk_euEFu5.mp4"}, {"title": "Machine transcript of recirculated clip — not visual verification", "url": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__machine-transcript.txt", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__machine-transcript.txt"}, {"title": "Unredacted Brock frame: ballot-received field blank", "url": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__brock-ballot-fields.jpg", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__brock-ballot-fields.jpg"}], "notes": "Added 2026-11-08 04:17 PM EST local-only, authorized Mark request via EMon. Distinct from statewide March 2022 deceased-record audit C20261008-203914-08 and Detroit precinct imbalance incidents. Existing 1744 cards searched for Bradley/Brock/1900/1902/Detroit; no William Bradley/Robert Brock incident duplicate. Research queue checked (82 items): no matching incident; Pennsylvania deceased-vote allegation is a different state/election and supplies no corroboration here. No existing queue item promoted or modified. Read supplied machine transcript, manifest, archived reporting and Brock frame; full video NOT watched by this executor. Precise video-field account otherwise attributed to EMon review. PolitiFact live page retrieved Nov. 8, 2026 confirms independent lookup and official clerical-error explanation. Existing 293,940,860-byte MP4 reused at recorded local_held path; not copied or downloaded; external direct MP4 link retained. Generic 1900 placeholder explanations are not independently established for Brock. No taxonomy change or deliberate-manipulation finding.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/777DEAN777/status/2119172466622730697", "archived_mp4": "https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2118569163077627904/vid/avc1/1920x1080/KL80SQVkk_euEFu5.mp4", "poster": "", "duration_s": 229.461333, "bytes": 293940860, "sha256": "3cb8a92742c6eaf4c747b42a35d12aa4f5351e44cd02133eeb80a5495d4305e6", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/11/mi-detroit-2020-william-bradley-son-ballot-misattributed-deceased-father-record__video-manifest.json"}]}
{"id": "mi-2020-11-417-voters-signed-no-photo-id-affidavit-regular-ballot-mcl-168-523", "permanent_id": "C20261028-123022-02", "uid": "C20261028-123022-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-123022-02", "old_ids": ["mi-2020-11-417-voters-signed-no-photo-id-affidavit-regular-ballot-mcl-168-523"], "seq": "C01594", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Weak identity check at the point of voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261025-113703-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261025-113703-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (affidavit count); current law (MCL 168.523; Const. art. 2, sec. 4 as amended 2022)", "state": "MI", "description": "Under Michigan Compiled Laws section 168.523, a voter who does not have photo identification at the polls \"shall sign an affidavit to that effect before an election inspector and be allowed to vote\"; the voter receives a regular ballot, which is counted with all the others, and is subject only to challenge. Proposal 2 of 2022 wrote the affidavit option into the state constitution (art. 2, sec. 4) and added that a voter \"shall not be required to vote a provisional ballot solely because they executed an affidavit to prove their identity.\" The Michigan Department of State's Affidavit of Not in Possession of Picture ID Report for the November 2020 general election lists a statewide total of 11,417 voters who signed the affidavit on Election Day. Catalog point: a signed statement replaces the photo ID check, and the ballot goes straight into the count with no later verification step, so in-person identity rests on the signature and the poll worker's judgment.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Legislature — MCL 168.523 (identification of registered elector; affidavit)", "url": "https://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?mcl-168-523="}, {"title": "Michigan Legislature — Constitution of Michigan, Article II, Section 4", "url": "https://legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-ARTICLE-II-4"}, {"title": "Michigan Department of State — Affidavit of Not in Possession of Picture ID Report, November 2020 Election (statewide total 11,417)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/Election-Results-and-Statistics/Provisional-ballots/Nov-2020-No-ID-Affidavit-Report.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-28 (open web, zero X API). Peers on this leaf: Virginia ID Confirmation Statement cards (2 -> 3). SOS report PDF curl 200; statute text from legislature.mi.gov. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "cnn-2020-edison-nep-multimode-exit-poll-early-mail-telephone-supplement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-11", "uid": "C20260926-015040-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-11", "old_ids": ["cnn-2020-edison-nep-multimode-exit-poll-early-mail-telephone-supplement"], "seq": "C00899", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail-in ballots severely cripple exit polling, which is key for those who would manipulate elections because it destroys an additional verification component."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-02", "state": "National", "description": "CNN Polling Director Jennifer Agiesta's Nov. 2, 2020 explainer documents that exclusive Election Day doorstep exit interviews could not represent the 2020 electorate after 90+ million early/mail ballots: Edison Research redesigned the National Election Pool exit poll into a multimode survey combining contactless Election Day interviews, early-voting-site interviews in selected states, and telephone polls of early/mail voters in every state with election-night exit results—explicitly because absentee/early share rose from ~16% (2000) to 40%+ (2016) and was expected to top 60% in 2020. Status Confirmed for major-network documentation that early/mail volume forced abandonment of classic exit-poll-only verification—peer to Edison Research's own 2020 recap and AAPOR's Explaining Exit Polls brief already on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "CNN Politics — How the exit polls will work in a pandemic (Agiesta / Edison NEP redesign)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/02/politics/exit-polls-2020-pandemic", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cnn-2020-edison-nep-multimode-exit-poll-early-mail-telephone-supplement__cnn-politics-how-the-exit-polls-will-work-in-a-pandemic.png"}, {"title": "Edison Research — 2020 Election Recap PDF (multimode methodology)", "url": "https://www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Edison-Research-2020-Election-Recap.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cnn-2020-edison-nep-multimode-exit-poll-early-mail-telephone-supplement__edison-research-2020-election-recap-pdf-multimode-metho.pdf"}, {"title": "AAPOR — Explaining Exit Polls (absentee share rise / phone supplements)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/Explaining-Exit-Polls-508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cnn-2020-edison-nep-multimode-exit-poll-early-mail-telephone-supplement__aapor-explaining-exit-polls-absentee-share-rise-phone-s.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on mail ballots cripple exit polling leaf."}
{"id": "nyt-2020-signs-snatched-kicked-burned-visible-support-suppression", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-01", "uid": "C20260926-002008-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-01", "old_ids": ["nyt-2020-signs-snatched-kicked-burned-visible-support-suppression"], "seq": "C00634", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Suppressing visible support (flags, signs, stickers) makes it appear that one side has less backing than it actually does."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NYT's Nov 1, 2020 front-lawn reporting documents political yard signs and flags being stolen, kicked, and burned across multiple states in the final days before the election—directly reducing the visible-support landscape that passersby and local media use as a proxy for backing. Soft companion to fill-20g Media Pressure / fill-20f Targeted Removal leaves (distinct pathKey: mechanism of suppressing visible support itself). Status Confirmed for documented theft/vandalism suppressing visible cues; does not prove coordinated national conspiracy.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT — Signs Get Snatched, Kicked, Burned (Nov 1, 2020)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/01/us/political-sign-wars.html"}, {"title": "Newsweek — Political Sign Warfare nationwide ahead of Election Day (2024)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/political-sign-warfare-heats-nationwide-election-day-nears-1976090"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20g Media Pressure and fill-20f Targeted Removal."}
{"id": "wapo-2020-yard-sign-theft-suppression-reinforcement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-07", "uid": "C20260926-004030-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-07", "old_ids": ["wapo-2020-yard-sign-theft-suppression-reinforcement"], "seq": "C00760", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Suppression reinforcement"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Washington Post / contemporaneous reporting on 2020 yard-sign and flag theft/vandalism documented systematic removal of visible partisan support cues—shrinking the surface appearance of allegiance and reinforcing hostility/self-censorship against remaining displays. Soft remount of fill-20h/g Targeted Removal / visible-support family onto this exact Forced Opposition 'Suppression Reinforcement' pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented suppression of visible support that reinforces the illusion/pressure dynamic; national conspiracy Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw / spectrum of political sign theft crimes (legal companion on sign removal)", "url": "https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/criminal/is-stealing-a-political-yard-sign-a-crime/"}, {"title": "FindLaw / spectrum of political sign theft crimes (legal companion on sign removal)", "url": "https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/law-and-life/is-it-illegal-to-steal-or-vandalize-political-signs/"}, {"title": "NPR/This American Life — Crowds on Demand manufactured opposition companion", "url": "https://www.thisamericanlife.org/671/theres-a-guy-for-that"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 4. Soft remount of visible-support suppression + manufactured-opposition families. WaPo primary URL may paywall; FindLaw+TAL used as durable companions already in corpus."}
{"id": "wi-lab-21-19-2021-24-dual-active-registrations-four-possible-double-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261014-200753-04", "uid": "C20261014-200753-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-200753-04", "old_ids": ["wi-lab-21-19-2021-24-dual-active-registrations-four-possible-double-votes"], "seq": "C01396", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-11 to 2021-10", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau Report 21-19 (Elections Administration, released October 2021) examined voter registration records of everyone who voted absentee in the November 2020 general election. Auditors found 70 records whose driver's license or state ID numbers matched numbers in 70 other records; for 24 of those, the names and dates of birth also matched, \"suggesting that the 24 individuals had two active voter registration records.\" The data indicated that 4 of the 24 may have voted twice in November 2020; LAB provided the 24 names to Wisconsin Elections Commission staff. Status Confirmed for the official audit findings (primary state audit). LAB did not use the Paquette/Corsi \"modified clone\" label and did not allege a large algorithmic scheme; the confirmed fact is same-person dual active registrations on Wisconsin's rolls, which is the structural condition Modified Clones describe. Intent is not alleged. Catalog point: an official audit, independent of Paquette/Corsi, found the same-person two-active-record pattern in Wisconsin—at small scale, but real.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau — Report 21-19 Elections Administration (2021)", "url": "https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/by-year/2021-2022/report-21-19-elections-administration/"}, {"title": "Wisconsin LAB — Report 21-19 full PDF", "url": "https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/media/3288/21-19full.pdf"}], "notes": "Modified Clones leaf (Mark 2026-10-14). Official structural confirmation of same-person dual active records; not a validation of Paquette/Corsi's large-scale algorithm claims. Cross-leaf: provisional/absentee overlap; Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in."}
{"id": "ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-24", "uid": "C20260925-155410-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-24", "old_ids": ["ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020"], "seq": "C00024", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Public and private money funds setting them up everywhere."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "CA", "description": "In October 2020, California Attorney General Xavier Becerra and Secretary of State Alex Padilla issued cease-and-desist actions and related guidance against unofficial California Republican Party ballot collection boxes that officials said could confuse voters into thinking they were official drop boxes. Subsequent reporting documented labeling/monitoring changes, litigation skirmishes, and eventual drop of related AG litigation after ballots were processed. Status Confirmed for official state enforcement against unauthorized/unofficial drop-box branding; does not adjudicate partisan intent claims beyond the stated voter-confusion rationale.", "sources": [{"title": "CA DOJ — AG Becerra and SOS Padilla cease-and-desist on ballot drop boxes", "url": "https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-and-secretary-state-padilla-send-cease-and-desist", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020__ca-doj-ag-becerra-and-sos-padilla-cease-and-desist-on-ballot.png"}, {"title": "CA SOS — CCROV memo unauthorized ballot drop boxes (PDF)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2020/october/20240jl.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020__ca-sos-ccrov-memo-unauthorized-ballot-drop-boxes-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — California attorney general drops lawsuit against state GOP", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/house-elections-lawsuits-elections-xavier-becerra-alex-padilla-bb5f6f9c406627fa0e081d88c8ed6367"}], "notes": "Official drop-box authenticity/control controversy. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Drop-Boxes' to 'Drop Boxes > Public/Private money funding setting these up all over'."}
{"id": "ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020-soft-remount-scatter-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-38", "uid": "C20260926-002008-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-38", "old_ids": ["ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020-soft-remount-scatter-leaf"], "seq": "C00671", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Scatter them in drop boxes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "CA", "description": "California officials ordered removal of unofficial 2020 GOP-branded ballot drop boxes after finding misleading 'official' labeling and custody concerns—illustrating how unofficial drop receptacles can become contested injection points. Soft remount of existing ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-2020 card onto this exact Feedback Loop scatter pathKey. Status Confirmed for unauthorized drop-box pathway controversy; Fresno grand jury later found no voter-fraud prosecution from that episode.", "sources": [{"title": "Local News Matters — State GOP legal standoff over unofficial drop boxes (2020)", "url": "https://localnewsmatters.org/2020/10/13/state-gop-in-legal-standoff-over-ballot-harvesting-with-unofficial-drop-boxes/"}, {"title": "ABC7 — California disputed ballot boxes removed", "url": "https://abc7news.com/post/fake-ballot-drop-box-ca-republican-sam-mahood/7171554/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 19 companion. Soft remount of existing unofficial drop-box card family."}
{"id": "electproject-2020-early-vote-analysis-public-daily-turnout-by-party", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-18", "uid": "C20260925-220029-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-18", "old_ids": ["electproject-2020-early-vote-analysis-public-daily-turnout-by-party"], "seq": "C00371", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "The U.S. Elections Project (Michael McDonald) published daily 2020 early-vote analyses with public aggregate turnout and party-registration breakdowns weeks before Election Day—demonstrating that early/mail return streams produce continuous, public-facing estimates of the emerging electorate. Status Confirmed for pre-ED informational feedback from early voting.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Elections Project — Early Vote Analysis Oct 4, 2020", "url": "https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/Early_Vote_Analysis_10_4.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/electproject-2020-early-vote-analysis-public-daily-turnout-by-party__u-s-elections-project-early-vote-analysis-oct-4-2020.png"}, {"title": "U.S. Elections Project — Early Vote Analysis Sept 27, 2020", "url": "https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/Early_Vote_Analysis_9_27.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/electproject-2020-early-vote-analysis-public-daily-turnout-by-party__u-s-elections-project-early-vote-analysis-sept-27-2020.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "findlaw-spectrum-political-sign-theft-crime-petty-larceny-trespass", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-06", "uid": "C20260926-000809-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-06", "old_ids": ["findlaw-spectrum-political-sign-theft-crime-petty-larceny-trespass"], "seq": "C00559", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Targeted removal"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "Federal", "description": "Legal explainers and local LE reporting (FindLaw; Spectrum/Albany County Sheriff 2024 cycle) treat stealing or vandalizing campaign yard signs as petty larceny/trespass/vandalism—confirming targeted removal is a recognized, charged-as-crime pattern that strips visible support from neighborhoods. Status Confirmed for the removal tactic as crime pattern; motive to 'falsify perception of support' is plausible advocacy framing, not separately adjudicated.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — Is it illegal to steal or vandalize political signs?", "url": "https://www.findlaw.com/legalblogs/law-and-life/is-it-illegal-to-steal-or-vandalize-political-signs/"}, {"title": "Spectrum News — Election sparks theft of political campaign signs (NY 2024)", "url": "https://spectrumlocalnews.com/nys/central-ny/news/2024/10/24/stolen-political-campaign-signs", "local": "/archives/2026/09/findlaw-spectrum-political-sign-theft-crime-petty-larceny-trespass__findlaw-spectrum-political-sign-theft-crime-petty-larceny-trespass.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "nc-2020-board-extends-receipt-deadline-mail-ballots-after-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-19", "uid": "C20260925-211320-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-19", "old_ids": ["nc-2020-board-extends-receipt-deadline-mail-ballots-after-election-day"], "seq": "C00264", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting after Election Day lets bad actors make final adjustments to the results by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections Numbered Memo 2020-22 / Oct 29, 2020 press release: absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day Nov. 3, 2020 remained timely if received by county boards by 5 p.m. Thursday Nov. 12, 2020 — nine days after Election Day (U.S. Supreme Court left the deadline in place). Status Confirmed for official post-Election-Day mail-ballot receipt.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Receipt Deadline is November 12 for Ballots Postmarked by Election Day", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2020/10/29/receipt-deadline-november-12-ballots-postmarked-election-day", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-2020-board-extends-receipt-deadline-mail-ballots-after-election-day__ncsbe-receipt-deadline-is-november-12-for-ballots-postmarked.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 10 companion. Memo 2020-22 receipt extension (not 2020-19 cure memo)."}
{"id": "tx-abbott-2020-one-dropbox-per-county-order-acknowledges-custody-risk", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-16", "uid": "C20260925-211320-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-16", "old_ids": ["tx-abbott-2020-one-dropbox-per-county-order-acknowledges-custody-risk"], "seq": "C00261", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "There is no control over what is deposited or by whom."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 1, 2020 Texas Governor Abbott's proclamation limited in-person delivery of marked mail ballots to a single early-voting clerk office location per county (amending a prior multi-site delivery window), framed as enhancing ballot security and stopping illegal voting. Status Confirmed for official one-location limit recognizing multi-site in-person mail-ballot return as a custody/security risk surface (not a proven fraud finding).", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Governor Abbott — Proclamation enhancing ballot security (one in-person mail-ballot delivery location per county)", "url": "https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-issues-proclamation-enhancing-ballot-security"}, {"title": "Texas Governor — Proclamation PDF (Oct 1, 2020)", "url": "https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/PROC_COVID-19_Nov_3_general_election_IMAGE_10-01-2020.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 8 companion. If URL 404, alternate AP/TX Tribune coverage acceptable in notes follow-up."}
{"id": "wi-outagamie-calumet-2020-timing-mark-blemish-absentee", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-01", "uid": "C20261009-124707-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-01", "old_ids": ["wi-outagamie-calumet-2020-timing-mark-blemish-absentee"], "seq": "C01353", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Shrunken or misaligned ballot images"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10", "state": "WI", "description": "For the November 3, 2020 general election, Outagamie County ordered absentee ballots (including for portions of Appleton/Harrison spanning Calumet and Winnebago Counties) from JP Graphics. After proofs were approved and more than 133,000 ballots were delivered, clerks discovered a printing error: a blemish in the timing mark that prevented electronic voting systems from counting the affected ballots. About 13,500 defective absentee ballots had already been made available to mail. Outagamie and Calumet County clerks petitioned the Wisconsin Supreme Court (O'Bright v. Lynch, 2020AP1761-OA) for guidance that would let them avoid the statutory remake/duplication path under Wis. Stat. § 5.85(3); the Court denied the petition on October 29, 2020. Chief Justice Roggensack's concurrence stressed that legally cast votes must still be counted and noted that a hand count under Wis. Stat. § 5.40(5m) was among the tools WEC discussed. Status Confirmed for a documented timing-mark print defect that forced machine-unreadable ballots into remake/duplication rather than ordinary tabulation. A single printer blemish anywhere makes a \"it was just a printing mistake\" defense credible everywhere—PEP-style observed paper counting does not depend on perfect timing marks for a machine to accept the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Supreme Court order — O'Bright v. Lynch, 2020AP1761-OA (Oct. 29, 2020; FOX11 hosted PDF)", "url": "https://fox11digital.com/news/PDFs/Wisconsin-Supreme-Court-Misprinted-Ballots-Decision.pdf"}, {"title": "Courthouse News — same Wisconsin Supreme Court misprinted-ballots order PDF", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/absenteeballots.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Wisconsin Supreme Court refuses to offer ballot clarity on misprinted absentee ballots", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-local-elections-wisconsin-elections-courts-3ff985e0b50a128c7df2288cbde4c3d4"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Thickens 1-card Ballot image shrink / misalignment leaf beyond Maricopa fit-to-page. AP URL may 403 bot-block; court PDFs 200."}
{"id": "nevada-kraus-cegavske-2020-observer-meaningful-access-stay-denied", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-12", "uid": "C20260926-020046-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-12", "old_ids": ["nevada-kraus-cegavske-2020-observer-meaningful-access-stay-denied"], "seq": "C00929", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10/2020-11", "state": "NV", "description": "In Kraus v. Cegavske, plaintiffs sought emergency relief requiring Clark County to allow 'meaningful' observation of mail-ballot duplication and to halt AI signature authentication; the Nevada Supreme Court's Nov. 3, 2020 order **denied** the stay/injunction, noting the district court found allegations lacked evidentiary support, observers are not owed auditor-level proximity under NRS observation statutes, and appellants failed to identify a mandatory duty officials ignored. Status Confirmed that Nevada's high court left in place distance/discretion limits on poll observers rather than mandating close ballot-by-ballot access—peer to Philadelphia In re Canvassing Observation distance limits and Milwaukee observer-limit litigation.", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada Supreme Court — Kraus v. Cegavske Order (Nov. 3, 2020) granting expedite / denying stay on observer access", "url": "https://cdn.ballotpedia.org/images/7/7f/Kraus_v._Cegavske_Order_11-3.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nevada-kraus-cegavske-2020-observer-meaningful-access-stay-denied__nevada-supreme-court-kraus-v-cegavske-order-nov-3-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Limits on Observers and Challengers at the Polls (Nevada / multi-state observer distance framework)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/limits-observers-and-challengers-polls", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nevada-kraus-cegavske-2020-observer-meaningful-access-stay-denied__brennan-center-limits-on-observers-and-challengers-at-t.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on poll-watcher/observer access limits leaf.", "related": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"]}
{"id": "us-50-state-absentee-voter-in-person-provisional-rules-2020-vs-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-19", "uid": "C20261009-105430-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-19", "old_ids": ["us-50-state-absentee-voter-in-person-provisional-rules-2020-vs-2026"], "seq": "C01352", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-30/2026-10-09", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NASS's Oct. 2020 50-state chart and NCSL's provisional-ballot table show three designs for an absentee or mail voter who shows up in person. (1) Mandatory provisional, counted only if no mail ballot was received: e.g. OH, KS, MD, RI, NJ, TN, NE. (2) Surrender the mailed ballot for a regular ballot, otherwise provisional: e.g. PA, TX, IA, WV, AZ, IN. (3) A regular ballot on a signed statement or cancellation request alone, with the mailed ballot to be rejected if it arrives later: e.g. GA, NV, NM, OK, VT, IL ('not received'), MI (lost ballot). Design (3), plus any stale poll book or override, accounts for the documented both-counted cases on this leaf. Rules rechecked for 2026: GA, O.C.G.A. §21-2-388 is unchanged in substance (surrender or written cancellation with registrar confirmation). NV, NRS 293.269917(3) still allows a regular ballot on surrender or a perjury affirmation. NY has changed: in 2020 a returned absentee was set aside if the voter voted on a machine; under Election Law §8-302(2-a) and the Early Mail Voter Act (ch. 481 of 2023, eff. Jan. 1, 2024), anyone issued an early-mail or absentee ballot may only vote by affidavit ballot, counted only if the mail ballot was not received. WI: §6.86(6) bars in-person voting after return; WEC's July 10, 2026 guidance bars spoiling a returned ballot 'for any reason,' and the provisional fail-safe sought in LWV v. WEC was denied a TI (Oct. 6, 2026). Status Confirmed for the policy facts.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — Voting In-Person After Requesting an Absentee Ballot (Oct. 2020, PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/surveys/2020-10/state-policies-absentee-cancel-voting-in-person-change-vote-103020.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSL — Provisional Ballots", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/provisional-ballots"}, {"title": "NY Election Law §8-302 (NYS Senate Open Legislation)", "url": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ELN/8-302"}, {"title": "NYS Board of Elections — Request a Ballot (new ballot procedure: affidavit only if issued a mail ballot)", "url": "https://elections.ny.gov/request-ballot"}, {"title": "O.C.G.A. §21-2-388 (Justia, 2024 code)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-10/section-21-2-388/"}, {"title": "NRS 293.269917 (Election Law Navigator)", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/nevada/statute/293.269917/"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — UPDATED Ballot Spoiling Guidance (July 10, 2026)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/memo/updated-ballot-spoiling-guidance"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09 policy seed. Full 51-row matrix in _research/provisional-absentee-overlap-2026-10-09.md (most rows from NASS 2020; GA/NV/NY/WI rechecked 2026). NY note: existing federalist-2024-ny card reflects a voter told both ballots would count; under §8-302 (2024+) the affidavit ballot counts only if no mail ballot was received."}
{"id": "eac-ei-isac-2020-misinfo-reporting-controls-what-officials-know", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-17", "uid": "C20260926-002757-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-17", "old_ids": ["eac-ei-isac-2020-misinfo-reporting-controls-what-officials-know"], "seq": "C00690", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Through election-security information dominance, they control exactly what our elected officials know."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC/EI-ISAC guidance tells local election officials to submit social-media 'misinformation' about their jurisdictions to EI-ISAC, which then shares reports with CISA, platforms, NASS/NASED, and other federal partners—creating a centralized information-dominance channel that shapes what election officials are told is true/false and what gets actioned. Status Confirmed for the reporting/routing architecture; does not prove every referred item was false or that officials lack independent judgment.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC/EI-ISAC — Reporting Misinformation Sheet (Oct 2020)", "url": "https://eac.gov/sites/default/files/partners/EI_ISAC_Reporting_Misinformation_Sheet102820.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan (EI-ISAC information-sharing role)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_specific_plan.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-ei-isac-2020-misinfo-reporting-controls-what-officials-know__cisa-election-infrastructure-subsector-specific-plan-ei-isac-information-sharing-role.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 9."}
{"id": "pew-2020-worn-out-election-coverage-dilute-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-08", "uid": "C20260926-003520-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-08", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-worn-out-election-coverage-dilute-companion"], "seq": "C00721", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens dilute their efforts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-19", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2020 Pathways reporting documented rising election-news interest alongside widespread 'worn out' responses to coverage volume—showing how saturating information environments can dilute sustained citizen effort even among attentive audiences. Status Confirmed for measured worn-out response to coverage volume.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Interest in election news increases; most Americans feeling worn out by coverage volume (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/10/19/interest-in-election-news-increases-with-most-americans-feeling-worn-out-by-the-volume-of-coverage/"}, {"title": "APA — 2020 election stress (emotional-capacity companion)", "url": "https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2020/10/election-stress"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2020-worn-out-election-coverage-waste-resources-distraction", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-03", "uid": "C20260926-002757-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-03", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-worn-out-election-coverage-waste-resources-distraction"], "seq": "C00676", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens waste their resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-19", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew found a majority of Americans felt worn out by the volume of 2020 election coverage even as interest rose—i.e., saturating information environments that drain attention and waste civic resources on volume rather than verification. Soft companion framing to catalog 'distracting the public > will waste their resources.' Status Confirmed for documented coverage-fatigue/resource-drain pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew — Interest in election news increases; most Americans worn out by volume of coverage (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/10/19/interest-in-election-news-increases-with-most-americans-feeling-worn-out-by-the-volume-of-coverage/"}, {"title": "Pew — How Americans feel about election coverage (2024; ~59% still worn out)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/how-americans-feel-about-election-coverage/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 2."}
{"id": "va-2020-registration-portal-fiber-cut-deadline-day-court-extends-to-oct-15", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-02", "uid": "C20261021-122912-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-02", "old_ids": ["va-2020-registration-portal-fiber-cut-deadline-day-court-extends-to-oct-15"], "seq": "C01505", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-13 (deadline outage); 2020-10-14 (court order); extension through 2020-10-15", "state": "VA", "description": "On the morning of Tuesday, Oct. 13, 2020, Virginia's registration deadline for the Nov. 3 general election, a fiber-optic cable was severed during utility work in Chesterfield County, taking down the Department of Elections' online voter-registration portal. According to the federal court's order, service was restored before 4 p.m., and the outage left Virginians who tried to register online unable to do so. As in 2016, state law did not let election officials extend the deadline. New Virginia Majority Education Fund and other plaintiffs sued the same day (No. 3:20-cv-801, E.D. Va.), and the state defendants agreed that a court order would serve the public interest. After an 18-minute hearing on Oct. 14, Judge John A. Gibney Jr. ordered the deadline extended to 11:59 p.m. on Thursday, Oct. 15, and ordered officials to publicize the reopening and tell voters about other ways to register in case of another outage. The Department of Elections announced the extension the same day. Status Confirmed: the cut cable, the outage, and the extension are stated in the court order and the state's own release. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: the second deadline-day failure of the same portal in four years, this time from a single cut cable, again left last-day registrants dependent on a lawsuit. Registration in person at the registrar's office, or by mail with a postmark, did not depend on the portal.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court, E.D. Va. — Order extending Virginia's voter registration deadline to Oct. 15, 2020 (Judge John A. Gibney Jr.; via Lawyers' Committee)", "url": "https://lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Order.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia Department of Elections — Virginia Voter Registration Deadline Extended by Federal Court (Oct. 14, 2020)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/news-releases/archive/2020/virginia-voter-registration-deadline-extended-by-federal-court.html"}, {"title": "Federal Judicial Center — Emergency Election Cases: Extending Voter Registration Because of a Website Crash (2016 and 2020 Virginia cases)", "url": "https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/48/EE-VAE-1-16-cv-1319-NVM.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to va-2016-online-registration-crash-deadline-day-court-extension-27000 (same portal, same plaintiff organization). All sources curl 200."}
{"id": "apa-2020-election-stress-emotional-drain", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-05", "uid": "C20260926-003520-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-05", "old_ids": ["apa-2020-election-stress-emotional-drain"], "seq": "C00718", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Distracting the Public", "Citizens are drained emotionally."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "APA/Harris found 68% of U.S. adults called the 2020 presidential election a significant source of stress (up from 52% in 2016), with majorities across parties—documenting election-season emotional drain/distraction that consumes attention and coping capacity. Status Confirmed for measured election-as-stressor prevalence; does not prove coordinated 'psyop' intent.", "sources": [{"title": "APA — 2020 presidential election a source of significant stress for more Americans than 2016", "url": "https://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2020/10/election-stress", "local": "/archives/2026/09/apa-2020-election-stress-emotional-drain__apa-2020-presidential-election-a-source-of-significant-stres.png"}, {"title": "APA Monitor — The impact of election stress / political anxiety (2024 companion framing)", "url": "https://www.apa.org/monitor/2024/10/managing-political-stress"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 3. PEP contrast: properly-run public hand count of hand-marked paper is observable and does not require enduring opaque centralized-count anxiety cycles (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep)."}
{"id": "fl-2020-registertovoteflorida-crash-deadline-night-misconfigured-servers-extension", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-03", "uid": "C20261021-122912-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-03", "old_ids": ["fl-2020-registertovoteflorida-crash-deadline-night-misconfigured-servers-extension"], "seq": "C01506", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-05 (deadline outage); 2020-10-06 (seven-hour reopening)", "state": "FL", "description": "On the evening of Monday, Oct. 5, 2020, the registration deadline for Florida's Nov. 3 general election, the state's online voter-registration site, RegisterToVoteFlorida.gov, slowed and crashed. Secretary of State Laurel M. Lee said the site had been hit with an \"unprecedented 1.1 million requests per hour\" and that the state would work with state and federal law enforcement \"to ensure this was not a deliberate act against the voting process.\" After meeting with Gov. Ron DeSantis, Lee issued a directive reopening registration until 7 p.m. on Oct. 6, online and in person at supervisors of elections, tax collectors and driver's license offices, and accepting paper applications postmarked that day. Voting-rights groups sued the same day, arguing that a seven-hour window was not enough notice. The Associated Press reported on Oct. 7 that Florida's chief information officer, James Grant, said misconfigured computer servers, not a cyberattack, were to blame, and that the system worked during the extension after technicians reconfigured servers to expand capacity. Status Confirmed: the outage and extension are documented by the Department of State, and the state CIO attributed the crash to server misconfiguration. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: the deciding factor for last-night registrants was how the state had configured its servers, which no voter could see or check. In-person and paper registration channels kept working.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Department of State — Public Notice: Secretary of State Laurel M. Lee Provides Update about Voter Registration in Florida (Oct. 6, 2020)", "url": "https://dos.fl.gov/communications/press-releases/2020/public-notice-secretary-of-state-laurel-m-lee-provides-update-about-voter-registration-in-florida/"}, {"title": "NPR — Florida Voter Registration Site Crashes; Deadline Extended (Oct. 6, 2020)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2020/10/06/920774701/florida-governor-extends-deadline-after-voter-registration-site-crashes"}, {"title": "AP News — Server configuration caused Florida voter registration crash (Oct. 7, 2020; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-21, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-tallahassee-florida-elections-ron-desantis-8c986dbc04f5e5205fdcacfaa637b2af"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to the Virginia 2016/2020 and Oklahoma 2026 deadline-outage cards. FL DOS and NPR curl 200; AP 403 bot-block (text read via WebSearch extract)."}
{"id": "ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-mail-inject-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-40", "uid": "C20260926-004030-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-40", "old_ids": ["ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-mail-inject-companion"], "seq": "C00793", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Mail them in."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California officials ordered removal of unofficial 2020 GOP-branded ballot drop boxes after finding misleading 'official' labeling and custody concerns—illustrating how unofficial receptacles can become contested mail/drop injection points into the ballot stream. Soft remount of existing CA unauthorized drop-box card onto this Feedback 'Mail them in' pathKey. Status Confirmed for unauthorized drop/injection-pathway controversy; Fresno grand jury later found no voter-fraud prosecution from that episode.", "sources": [{"title": "California Secretary of State / contemporaneous coverage of unofficial 2020 GOP drop boxes (corpus soft remount)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2020-news-releases-and-advisories/secretary-state-padilla-takes-action-protect-voters-misleading-ballot-drop-boxes"}, {"title": "California Secretary of State / contemporaneous coverage of unofficial 2020 GOP drop boxes (corpus soft remount)", "url": "https://localnewsmatters.org/2020/10/13/state-gop-in-legal-standoff-over-ballot-harvesting-with-unofficial-drop-boxes/"}, {"title": "NCSBE Dowless order — adjudicated mail injection companion", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Congressional_District_9_Portal/Order_03132019.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-unauthorized-gop-drop-boxes-mail-inject-companion__ncsbe-dowless-order-adjudicated-mail-injection-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 20 companion. Soft remount of CA drop-box / Dowless families."}
{"id": "gallup-2020-election-confidence-record-low-loss-of-confidence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-10", "uid": "C20260926-003520-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-10", "old_ids": ["gallup-2020-election-confidence-record-low-loss-of-confidence"], "seq": "C00723", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose confidence."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup's 2020 reading showed national confidence in election accuracy matching modern lows amid intense dispute narratives—confirming the demoralizing confidence-loss pattern mapped by the catalog. Status Confirmed for measured low confidence baseline around 2020.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Confidence in accuracy of election matches record low (2020)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx"}, {"title": "Gallup — Partisan split on election integrity gets even wider (2024 update)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2020-general-drop-box-ballot-transfer-forms-not-produced-sos-investigation-gpb-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-05", "uid": "C20261111-123004-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-05", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2020-general-drop-box-ballot-transfer-forms-not-produced-sos-investigation-gpb-gaps"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Required ballot reconciliation forms and result tapes go missing, so the ballots on hand cannot be checked against the ballots issued, and the loss is called routine."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10 to 2020-11-03 (collections); 2021-06-14 (SOS investigation announced); 2021-06-15 (county produces more forms); 2021-06-23 (GPB analysis)", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia's 2020 emergency drop-box rule required election workers to fill out a ballot transfer form each time they collected ballots from a drop box, recording how many ballots were picked up at each location. When the Secretary of State's office and other requesters asked for the forms, Fulton County could not produce all of them; The Georgia Star News reported in May 2021 that forms were missing for 385 of about 1,565 collections, covering 18,901 ballots. On June 14, 2021, Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger said, 'New revelations that Fulton County is unable to produce all ballot drop box transfer documents will be investigated thoroughly, as we have with other counties that failed to follow Georgia rules and regulations regarding drop boxes'; the AJC reported Fulton was the fourth county investigated over the forms. The county then produced hundreds more forms on June 15 and said all ballots were accounted for. Georgia Public Broadcasting's review of the forms and the county's tracking spreadsheet (June 23, 2021) found the county was still missing records for eight drop-box collections (five on Oct. 15, two on Oct. 17 and one on Oct. 21, 2020), had internal totals but no form for at least 46 entries totaling just under 1,100 ballots, had double-counted some totals so its spreadsheet showed more than 82,000 ballots instead of about 79,000, and had at least 21 entries that differed from the forms. GPB and state officials found no evidence of fraud; the outcome of the Secretary of State's investigation was not established in the sources read. Status Confirmed by the Secretary of State's on-record statement and GPB's analysis of the county's own records, with the AJC. Catalog point: the one record tying each drop-box pickup to a ballot count was missing or wrong for hundreds of collections until a news outlet asked, and even after it was found the county's own tally did not add up; those ballots could not be checked against what was collected.", "sources": [{"title": "AJC — Georgia election investigation looks into Fulton ballot drop box forms (Mark Niesse, June 14, 2021)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-election-investigation-looks-into-fulton-ballot-drop-box-forms/5HN5HTQ4NJF3ZMDNY5DDUV3TBA/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ajc-fulton-drop-box-forms-investigation-2021-06-14.html"}, {"title": "GPB News — Here's a look at Fulton County's absentee drop box use (Stephen Fowler, June 23, 2021)", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2021/06/23/heres-look-at-fulton-countys-absentee-drop-box-use", "local": "/archives/2026/11/gpb-fulton-drop-box-forms-2021-06-23.html"}, {"title": "The Georgia Star News — Six months after the 2020 election, Fulton County has failed to produce chain of custody documents for 18,901 absentee ballots placed in drop boxes (May 18, 2021)", "url": "https://thestarnewsnetwork.com/2021/05/18/six-months-after-the-2020-election-fulton-county-has-failed-to-produce-chain-of-custody-documents-for-18901-absentee-ballots-placed-in-drop-boxes/"}, {"title": "The Georgia Star News — Fulton County election official admits chain of custody documents missing for 2020 absentee ballots deposited in drop boxes (June 14, 2021)", "url": "http://thestarnewsnetwork.com/2021/06/14/fulton-county-election-official-admits-chain-of-custody-documents-missing-for-2020-absentee-ballots-deposited-in-drop-boxes/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-11 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peers Fulton 2020 unsigned tapes and Brooklyn 2026 reconciliation forms. GPB read via WebFetch; AJC and GPB archived (curl 200). Star News figures attributed to Star News. Distinct from the existing Georgia drop-box surveillance-video cards. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-2020-iran-emennet-proud-boys-voter-threat-emails-doj-indictment", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-09", "uid": "C20261012-125218-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-09", "old_ids": ["us-2020-iran-emennet-proud-boys-voter-threat-emails-doj-indictment"], "seq": "C01367", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Inorganic intimidation and hate spam"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10 (indictment unsealed 2021-11-18)", "state": "US", "description": "In October 2020, tens of thousands of registered Democrats received emails falsely branded as coming from the Proud Boys, threatening physical harm unless they changed party and voted for President Trump. On Nov. 18, 2021, DOJ unsealed an indictment (S.D.N.Y., 21 Cr. 644) charging Iranian nationals Seyyed Mohammad Hosein Musa Kazemi and Sajjad Kashian, who worked for Tehran-based Emennet Pasargad. The charges include conspiracy, voter intimidation and interstate threats for obtaining confidential voter data from at least one state's election website (more than 100,000 voters), sending the threat emails, probing about 11 states' voting websites, and spreading a Proud Boys-branded video that falsely claimed voter-registration systems could be used to \"edit mail-in ballots or even register non-existent voters.\" Treasury sanctioned both men and the company. DOJ said there was no evidence any registration or vote was changed. Status Confirmed for the federal indictment, attribution and sanctions (charges, not convictions; defendants remain in Iran). Catalog note: this is a textbook case of inorganic, false-flag intimidation, a mass message dressed up as a domestic group to scare one side and smear the other. It worked because voter files were exposed online, and paper, precinct-level processes are much harder to spoof the same way.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Two Iranian Nationals Charged for Cyber-Enabled Disinformation and Threat Campaign Designed to Influence the 2020 U.S. Presidential Election (Nov. 18, 2021)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/two-iranian-nationals-charged-cyber-enabled-disinformation-and-threat-campaign-designed"}, {"title": "U.S. v. Kazemi & Kashian, 21 Cr. 644 (S.D.N.Y.) — Indictment (PDF)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1449226/dl"}, {"title": "NPR — 2 suspected Iranian hackers are charged with trying to intimidate U.S. voters (Nov. 18, 2021)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2021/11/18/1056903692/2-suspected-iranian-hackers-are-charged-with-trying-to-intimidate-u-s-voters"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Cross-leaf: Intimidation (root); Psychological Operations; Forced Opposition Projection (false-flag branding). Distinct from reuters-2024-iranian-apt42 card (2024 hack-and-leak)."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2020-early-voting-134-unsigned-tabulator-tapes-county-admits-violation", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-15", "uid": "C20261102-121503-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-15", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2020-early-voting-134-unsigned-tabulator-tapes-county-admits-violation"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Required ballot reconciliation forms and result tapes go missing, so the ballots on hand cannot be checked against the ballots issued, and the loss is called routine."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-10 (early voting); 2025-12-09 (county admission at SEB)", "state": "GA", "description": "This is an update on an earlier incident from the 2020 general election. During advance (early in-person) voting in Fulton County, Georgia, in October 2020, the closing tabulator tapes printed by the ballot scanners were not signed by poll workers, as Georgia State Election Board Rule 183-1-12-.12 requires. The tapes are receipt-like printouts that list the vote totals recorded by each scanner. The complainant, David Cross, filed the complaint (SEB 2022-015) in March 2022 and told the board that his group obtained 134 tapes through an open records request, covering about 315,000 votes, and that every signature block was blank. At a State Election Board meeting on Dec. 9, 2025, Fulton County attorney Ann Brumbaugh said, \"We do not dispute that the tapes were not signed. It was a violation of the rule,\" and said the county now has new leadership, new procedures and enhanced poll-worker training. A board member said 148 memory cards were used in early voting and that tapes for 10 scanners were missing. The board voted 3-0 to refer the case to the Georgia Attorney General's Office, which could seek a fine of up to $5,000 for each unsigned or missing tape. Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger said on Dec. 20, 2025, that \"all voters were verified with photo ID and lawfully cast their ballots\" and that \"a clerical error at the end of the day does not erase valid, legal votes,\" and Snopes reports that he said the error did not affect the outcome. Fulton County elections director Nadine Williams told the county elections board in December 2025 that the tapes are valid but that the managers inadvertently did not sign them. Fulton County's 2020 results were recounted and recertified after the election. No later action by the Attorney General was found in the sources reviewed. The story is circulating again on X in November 2026. Status Confirmed: Fulton County's attorney told the State Election Board the tapes were not signed and that it was a rule violation; the Secretary of State says the votes were valid. Catalog point: unsigned and missing closing tapes leave no poll-worker attestation of the scanner totals, so those totals cannot be tied back to what was counted at each machine. Signed precinct tally sheets and a public hand count make the totals checkable.", "sources": [{"title": "Atlanta News First — Update: Fulton 2020 unsigned tabulator tapes (2025-12-23)", "url": "https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2025/12/23/fulton-county-admits-verifying-315000-votes-2020-without-poll-worker-signatures/"}, {"title": "11Alive — Update: Fulton 2020 unsigned tabulator tapes (2025-12)", "url": "https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/fulton-county-admission-unsigned-voting-tabulations-2020-election-state-election-board/85-c72117d7-6a5f-4df1-b59e-14e214ba029a"}, {"title": "Snopes — Update: Fulton 2020 unsigned tabulator tapes (2025-12)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/georgia-election-ballot-errors/"}, {"title": "Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections, approved minutes (Dec. 19, 2025) — Update: Fulton 2020 unsigned tabulator tapes (2025-12-19)", "url": "https://www.fultoncountyga.gov/-/media/Departments/Registration-and-Elections/2025-BRE-meeting-minutes/BRE-Approved-Minutes-121925.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Update: Fulton 2020 unsigned tabulator tapes (ei-2026-10-224)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-224 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-status-tracking-ga-ca-co-nv-nc", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-08", "uid": "C20260925-212129-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-08", "old_ids": ["ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-status-tracking-ga-ca-co-nv-nc"], "seq": "C00305", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Mail-in ballot tracking: citizens are told the tracking exists so they can follow their ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "BallotTrax (i3Logix) and similar services (Ballot Scout) provide voter-facing mail-ballot tracking — printed/mailed/returned/received/accepted/rejected alerts via text/email/voice — marketed as citizen peace-of-mind transparency, while the same backend integrates state/county voter files and USPS Intelligent Mail barcodes so election administrators (and, separately, public chase files) know ballot-status progression before tabulation completes. MIT Election Lab (2020) documents BallotTrax statewide partnerships including CA, CO, NV, GA, NC. Status Confirmed for citizen-facing tracking systems that also create pre-tabulation voted/returned visibility.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT Election Lab / Healthy Elections — Voter-Facing Ballot Tracking (PDF)", "url": "https://web.mit.edu/healthyelections/www/sites/default/files/2020-10/Ballot_Tracking_0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ballottrax-statewide-mail-ballot-status-tracking-ga-ca-co-nv-nc__mit-election-lab-healthy-elections-voter-facing-ballot-track.pdf"}, {"title": "AJC — Georgia BallotTrax absentee tracking renewed", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/how-to-track-your-absentee-ballot/H6S5OTRUA5GNJO7NSQ36VQC3JA/"}, {"title": "BallotTrax — product home", "url": "https://ballottrax.com/"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 4. Confirmed tracking product + admin visibility; cabal 'model the election' motive not asserted beyond sourced data availability.", "vendor": ["BallotTrax (i3logix)"]}
{"id": "dga-2020-12-governors-count-every-vote-lockstep-messaging", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-15", "uid": "C20260926-032507-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-15", "old_ids": ["dga-2020-12-governors-count-every-vote-lockstep-messaging"], "seq": "C01210", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Governors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-30", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Democratic Governors Association / joint statement (Sept. 30–Oct. 1, 2020) coordinated twelve Democratic governors (Inslee, Newsom, Carney, Pritzker, Whitmer, Walz, Sisolak, Murphy, Lujan Grisham, Brown, Northam, Evers) into a single lockstep message vowing that 'all valid ballots…must be counted,' 'democracy will be delivered,' and that any effort to throw out ballots or refuse peaceful transfer is 'an assault on American democracy'—illustrating governors operating as a unified information-dominance bloc around election process claims. Status Confirmed primary DGA/12-governor joint statement documenting lockstep gubernatorial election messaging; peer to NGA 2021 governors reinforce election-official messaging and CISA GCC 2020 most-secure trusted-voices cards already on this leaf—DGA 12-governor Count-Every-Vote instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: lockstep gubernatorial process messaging can chill scrutiny of machine tallies that public hand counts would open to citizen observation.", "sources": [{"title": "DGA — ICYMI: 12 Democratic Governors Vow to Count Every Vote and Protect Democracy (Oct. 1, 2020)", "url": "https://democraticgovernors.org/updates/icymi-12-democratic-governors-vow-to-count-every-vote-and-protect-democracy/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dga-2020-12-governors-count-every-vote-lockstep-messaging__dga-icymi-12-democratic-governors-vow-to-count-every-vote-and-protect-democracy-oct-1-2020.png"}, {"title": "Office of Governor Newsom — Governors Release Joint Statement on Threats to American Democracy (Sept. 30, 2020 companion)", "url": "https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/09/30/governors-release-joint-statement-on-threats-to-american-democracy/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Infiltration of Offices Governor lockstep leaf."}
{"id": "gallup-2020-election-confidence-record-low-demoralizing-hope", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-06", "uid": "C20260926-002757-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-06", "old_ids": ["gallup-2020-election-confidence-record-low-demoralizing-hope"], "seq": "C00679", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose hope."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup's 2020 reading found nationwide confidence that votes would be accurately cast/counted at 59%—matching the prior record low—with Republican confidence at a then-record-low 44%, documenting demoralization around election integrity before Election Day. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Confidence in Accuracy of U.S. Election Matches Record Low (2020)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/321665/confidence-accuracy-election-matches-record-low.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gallup-2020-election-confidence-record-low-demoralizing-hope__gallup-confidence-in-accuracy-of-u-s-election-matches-record.png"}, {"title": "Pew — Voters Broadly Positive on How 2024 Elections Were Run, Unlike in 2020 (contrast rebound)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/12/04/voters-broadly-positive-about-how-elections-were-conducted-in-sharp-contrast-to-2020/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "sc-ag-foia-cvr-ballot-images-not-required-2020-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-15", "uid": "C20260925-205354-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-15", "old_ids": ["sc-ag-foia-cvr-ballot-images-not-required-2020-2024"], "seq": "C00230", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Even some Republican-led states (e.g., South Dakota, South Carolina) have not provided CVRs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-28", "state": "SC", "description": "South Carolina Attorney General opinions conclude FOIA does not require production of voted ballots, scanned ballot images, or cast vote records, citing state constitutional secret-ballot protections. A May 2024 circuit-court ruling likewise rejected election-integrity litigants' bid for ballot/CVR records. Status Confirmed that South Carolina has not provided public CVR access under FOIA.", "sources": [{"title": "SC Attorney General — FOIA and voted ballots / CVRs (Sept. 28, 2020)", "url": "https://www.scag.gov/opinions/opinions-archive/september-28-2020/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sc-ag-foia-cvr-ballot-images-not-required-2020-2024__sc-attorney-general-foia-and-voted-ballots-cvrs-sept-28-2020.png"}, {"title": "Post and Courier — Judge denies SC bid for ballot records (2024)", "url": "https://www.postandcourier.com/politics/election-integrity-ballot-access-foia/article_07cabe0a-0e11-11ef-b811-fb6cf4dc2c18.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 7. Catalog example SC Confirmed."}
{"id": "mit-pkg-campus-civic-engagement-turbovote-student-vote-targeting-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-24", "uid": "C20260926-000809-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-24", "old_ids": ["mit-pkg-campus-civic-engagement-turbovote-student-vote-targeting-2020"], "seq": "C00577", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "Our children are targeted on campuses to capture their votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-21", "state": "MA", "description": "MIT News (Sep 2020) describes student-leader and PKG Center civic-engagement drives encouraging campus voting—illustrative of nationwide higher-ed programs that concentrate registration/turnout efforts on college populations. Status Confirmed for campus vote-targeting programs.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT News — Student leaders / PKG Center civic engagement November voting", "url": "https://news.mit.edu/2020/student-leaders-team-pkg-center-civic-engagement-0921", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-pkg-campus-civic-engagement-turbovote-student-vote-targeting-2020__mit-pkg-campus-civic-engagement-turbovote-student-vote-targeting-2020.png"}, {"title": "SLSV — TurboVote resource (campus stack)", "url": "https://slsvcoalition.org/resource/turbovote/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes__turbovote-slsv-campus-voter-registration-drives-capture-student-votes.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2020-political-divides-divergent-news-fight-each-other", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-02", "uid": "C20260926-002757-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-02", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-political-divides-divergent-news-fight-each-other"], "seq": "C00675", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens fight each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-16", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's Sep 2020 Pathways survey documented deep partisan divides, dueling information ecosystems, and divergent responses to conspiracy theories/misinformation heading into the election—conditions under which misinformed publics fight each other over incompatible realities. Status Confirmed for pre-election divergent-reality/conflict dynamic.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew — Political Divides, Conspiracy Theories and Divergent News Sources Heading Into 2020 Election", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/09/16/political-divides-conspiracy-theories-and-divergent-news-sources-heading-into-2020-election/"}, {"title": "Pew — Americans' Views of 2024 Election News (ongoing difficulty distinguishing truth)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "de-ag-2020-hate-crime-indictment-maga-hat-seized-trump-supporters", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-39", "uid": "C20260925-234437-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-39", "old_ids": ["de-ag-2020-hate-crime-indictment-maga-hat-seized-trump-supporters"], "seq": "C00472", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Public shaming and intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-08", "state": "DE", "description": "A Delaware grand jury in September 2020 indicted Olivia Winslow and Camryn Amy on felony robbery, conspiracy, and hate-crime charges (plus child endangerment) after they confronted a mother and 7-year-old boy over Trump support and seized the child's MAGA hat outside the Democratic National Convention—documenting public shaming/intimidation of visible Trump supporters. Status Confirmed for the charged attack on MAGA-gear wearers.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post / AP — AG: Women committed hate crime by attacking Trump supporters", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/ag-women-committed-hate-crime-by-attacking-trump-supporters/2020/09/08/069d74b4-f222-11ea-8025-5d3489768ac8_story.html"}, {"title": "AP News — 2 women indicted on hate crime charges after taking boy's MAGA hat", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/democratic-national-convention-united-states-delaware-hate-crimes-election-2020-9296964f6b03bc92659cf85348072fd5"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 20. AP secondary URL may need verify; WaPo primary Confirmed."}
{"id": "usps-wasserman-schultz-miami-facility-tour-blocked-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-02", "uid": "C20260926-014044-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-02", "old_ids": ["usps-wasserman-schultz-miami-facility-tour-blocked-2020"], "seq": "C00877", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "There are no poll watchers at post offices, where millions of ballots flow through."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-09-04", "state": "FL / Federal", "description": "On September 4, 2020, U.S. Postal Inspection Service officers barred Rep. Debbie Wasserman Schultz from scheduled tours of USPS Miami Processing and Distribution Center (and a second Florida complex), blocking entry and threatening escort from the property; contemporaneous WaPo/NBC reporting documented USPS citing insufficient notice while the member said she had notified the agency. House Oversight Democrats contemporaneously pressed Postmaster General DeJoy over facility access denials affecting election-mail oversight visits. Status Confirmed for a documented denial of outsider access to a major USPS ballot-mail processing plant during the 2020 election cycle—peer to Kearny, NJ congressional-facility access denial and to USPS property rules excluding partisan poll watchers from workroom floors; not proof ballots were altered inside the plant.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Postal Service police block Rep. Wasserman Schultz from touring USPS plants", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/09/04/usps-dejoy-wasserman-schultz/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Congresswoman blocked from touring mail facility by Postal Service police", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/congresswoman-blocked-touring-mail-facility-postal-service-police-n1239359"}, {"title": "House Oversight Democrats — Connolly reiterates demand for Member access to postal facilities", "url": "https://oversightdemocrats.house.gov/news/press-releases/subcommittee-chairman-connolly-reiterates-demand-for-access-to-postal-facilities"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on no poll watchers / observers at USPS ballot mail facilities."}
{"id": "detroit-2020-aug-primary-72pct-absentee-precincts-out-of-balance-unrecountable", "permanent_id": "C20261007-123654-03", "uid": "C20261007-123654-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-123654-03", "old_ids": ["detroit-2020-aug-primary-72pct-absentee-precincts-out-of-balance-unrecountable"], "seq": "C01331", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "MI", "description": "In Detroit's August 4, 2020 primary, about 72% of the city's 503 absentee voting precincts reported ballot totals that did not match the number of absentee voters recorded in their poll books, and about 46% of all Detroit precincts were out of balance, according to figures presented to the Wayne County Board of Canvassers. Officials pointed to poll books not updated as absentee ballots arrived, ballots assigned to the wrong precinct, and ballots placed in the wrong containers. Under Michigan law, a precinct that is out of balance cannot be recounted, so its originally reported totals stand. The Wayne County board unanimously asked Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson to review Detroit's training and processes, and the Board of State Canvassers required her to exercise oversight of Detroit's November count. Status Confirmed for official records that could not be reconciled. Mismatched poll-book and ballot records at a central absentee count are what make results unverifiable after the fact; a precinct-level PEP hand count reconciles voters to ballots before results leave the room.", "sources": [{"title": "The Detroit News — Canvassers demand answers after 72% of Detroit's absentee ballot counts were off (Aug. 20, 2020)", "url": "http://amp.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/20/benson-asked-investigate-detroit-perfect-storm-voting-problems/5616629002/"}, {"title": "The Detroit News — Michigan board requires Benson to oversee Detroit's fall election (Aug. 24, 2020)", "url": "https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/24/mich-board-wants-benson-use-oversight-powers-detroit-election/3429360001/"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — What we know about Detroit's absentee ballot processing errors (Aug. 27, 2020)", "url": "https://api.politifact.com/article/2020/aug/27/what-we-know-about-detroits-absentee-ballot-proces/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-07. Confirmed records mismatch / recount ineligibility; distinct from Wayne County Nov. 2020 certification cards. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Reporting; Records' to 'Reporting > No guarantee to the public that the shown state/fed totals are actually accurate'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Reporting > No guarantee to the public that the shown state/fed totals are actually accurate' to the new leaf 'Records > Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount.'."}
{"id": "ga-bmd-qr-barcode-opaque-halderman", "permanent_id": "C20260925-182526-04", "uid": "C20260925-182526-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-182526-04", "old_ids": ["ga-bmd-qr-barcode-opaque-halderman"], "seq": "C00087", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the printout but encode different results in the QR code, then encrypt the QR code so humans cannot see what was done."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "GA", "description": "In Curling v. Raffensperger expert materials, J. Alex Halderman documents that Georgia Dominion ImageCast X BMDs print voter selections as human-readable text plus a machine-readable QR/barcode, while precinct scanners tabulate the barcode-encoded selections and ignore the printed text. Voters cannot practically read or verify the barcode/QR contents. Halderman describes barcode-only mismatch attacks as undetectable to voters for that reason. CourtListener-hosted Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X BMDs (later expert report) repeats that scanners exclusively count QR-encoded votes and voters have no practical way to confirm QR contents match intended selections. Status Confirmed for the documented architecture (opaque barcode/QR mediation of what is counted). Does not establish that any statewide contest outcome was altered. Opacity of machine mediation contrasts with hand-marked, hand-counted transparency (PEP) where every mark is human-readable end-to-end—without claiming PEP was used in Georgia's BMD elections.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman Declaration (Curling) — BMD QR/barcode vs human-readable text (Aug. 19, 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://gaverifiedvoting.org/pdf-litigation/20200819-785_2-Declaration-Alex-Halderman.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-bmd-qr-barcode-opaque-halderman__halderman-declaration-curling-bmd-qr-barcode-vs-human-readab.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Security Analysis of Georgia's ImageCast X BMDs (Halderman expert PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1681.0.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA ICSA-22-154-01 — Dominion ImageCast X advisory (related BMD platform)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-dominion-107m-dre-replacement-2019__cisa-icsa-22-154-01-vulnerabilities-affecting-dominion-image.png"}], "notes": "Confirmed QR/barcode opacity architecture. Distinct from ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021 (linguistic Hand-Marked Paper Ballots Deception leaf). No outcome-fraud claim.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "nj-2020-primarily-vote-by-mail-eo177-pl72", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-06", "uid": "C20260926-012939-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-06", "old_ids": ["nj-2020-primarily-vote-by-mail-eo177-pl72"], "seq": "C00845", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "NJ", "description": "For New Jersey's November 2020 general election, Governor Murphy's Executive Order No. 177 and P.L. 2020, c.72 directed that the election be conducted primarily via vote-by-mail ballots automatically sent to all 'Active' registered voters (no separate VBM application), with prepaid return postage, drop boxes, and extended receipt rules for timely postmarked ballots. Status Confirmed for official conversion of the default November 2020 pathway from ordinary in-person/request mail voting to primarily mail—peer COVID expansion to NY/CA.", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey EO 177 — November General Election primarily vote-by-mail", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-177.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-2020-primarily-vote-by-mail-eo177-pl72__new-jersey-eo-177-november-general-election-primarily-v.pdf"}, {"title": "P.L. 2020, c.72 (A4475) — NJ mail-in ballot / drop-box procedures for Nov 2020", "url": "https://pub.njleg.gov/bills/2020/AL20/72_.HTM", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-2020-primarily-vote-by-mail-eo177-pl72__p-l-2020-c-72-a4475-nj-mail-in-ballot-drop-box-procedur.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 second peer on In-Person converted to Mail-in leaf."}
{"id": "philadelphia-ctcl-10m-grant-552k-drop-boxes-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-13", "uid": "C20260925-211320-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-13", "old_ids": ["philadelphia-ctcl-10m-grant-552k-drop-boxes-2020"], "seq": "C00258", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Public and private money funds setting them up everywhere."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "PA", "description": "Philadelphia accepted a ~$10 million CTCL grant in August 2020; the execution copy allocated about $552,000 specifically for secure ballot drop boxes (purchase/install of multiple 24-hour boxes) plus related collection staffing/security. Status Confirmed for private grant dollars directly budgeting drop-box deployment.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Philadelphia to get $10 million for mail ballot drop boxes", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/philadelphia-2020-election-funding-20200826.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philadelphia-ctcl-10m-grant-552k-drop-boxes-2020__philadelphia-inquirer-philadelphia-to-get-10-million-for-mai.png"}, {"title": "City of Philadelphia — CTCL grant execution copy (PDF archive)", "url": "https://vote.phila.gov/archive/images/stories/execution_copy_philadelphia_ctcl_grant_ad_signed-082120.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philadelphia-ctcl-10m-grant-552k-drop-boxes-2020__city-of-philadelphia-ctcl-grant-execution-copy-pdf-archive.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "usps-kearny-nj-congressional-facility-access-denied-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-18", "uid": "C20260926-012939-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-18", "old_ids": ["usps-kearny-nj-congressional-facility-access-denied-2020"], "seq": "C00857", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "There are no poll watchers at post offices, where millions of ballots flow through."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "NJ / Federal", "description": "In August 2020 U.S. Reps. Tom Malinowski and Bill Pascrell publicly reported being denied access to the USPS Kearny, NJ facility while seeking to observe election-mail operations; Hudson County View contemporaneous coverage documents their complaint to the Postmaster General. The episode illustrates that even Members of Congress lack a routine right to walk postal workroom floors where ballots are sorted—reinforcing the structural absence of partisan poll-watcher observation inside USPS facilities. Status Confirmed for the access denial as reported; not proof of ballot tampering at Kearny.", "sources": [{"title": "Hudson County View — Malinowski, Pascrell target PMG after being denied USPS access in Kearny", "url": "https://hudsoncountyview.com/malinowski-pascrell-target-postmaster-general-after-being-denied-usps-access-in-kearny/"}, {"title": "USPS — Employees should heed rules on conduct on postal property (property/conduct framework)", "url": "https://news.usps.com/2024/08/14/employees-should-heed-the-rules-on-conduct-on-postal-property/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-kearny-nj-congressional-facility-access-denied-2020__usps-employees-should-heed-rules-on-conduct-on-postal-p.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer on No poll watchers at post offices leaf."}
{"id": "vt-co-fl-public-absentee-returned-files-campaign-ballot-chase", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-09", "uid": "C20260925-212129-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-09", "old_ids": ["vt-co-fl-public-absentee-returned-files-campaign-ballot-chase"], "seq": "C00306", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Mail-in ballot tracking: citizens are told the tracking exists so they can follow their ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Separate from voter-facing apps, multiple states publish or sell near-real-time absentee/early files listing who requested, was sent, and returned a ballot — explicitly used by campaigns for ballot-chasing before Election Day tabulation (e.g., Vermont SOS daily subscriber lists including campaigns and Data Trust; Colorado 'Voters with a Returned Ballot' data requests; Florida Rule 1S-2.043 vote-by-mail request/early-voting electronic files). Status Confirmed that ballot-status data feeds partisan pre-tabulation targeting models, not only citizen self-tracking.", "sources": [{"title": "VTDigger — Chasing votes: SOS absentee lists to campaigns (2020)", "url": "https://vtdigger.org/2020/08/04/chasing-votes-in-a-pandemic-means-focusing-on-absentee-ballots/"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Elections Data Request Form (returned-ballot files)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/forms/dataRequests.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/vt-co-fl-public-absentee-returned-files-campaign-ballot-chase__colorado-sos-elections-data-request-form-returned-ballot-fil.pdf"}, {"title": "Fla. Admin. Code R. 1S-2.043 — Electronic vote-by-mail / early voting files", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/florida/Fla-Admin-Code-Ann-R-1S-2-043"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "us-2020-wohl-burkman-project-1599-robocall-voter-intimidation-fcc-ohio-plea", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-05", "uid": "C20261016-123449-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-05", "old_ids": ["us-2020-wohl-burkman-project-1599-robocall-voter-intimidation-fcc-ohio-plea"], "seq": "C01424", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Inorganic intimidation and hate spam"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-26 and 2020-09-14 (calls); 2022-10-24 plea; 2023-06-06 FCC fine", "state": "US", "description": "On Aug. 26 and Sept. 14, 2020, Jacob Wohl, John (Jack) Burkman and J.M. Burkman & Associates ran a prerecorded \"Project 1599\" robocall campaign. It told potential voters that if they voted by mail their \"personal information will be part of a public database that will be used by police departments to track down old warrants and be used by credit card companies to collect outstanding debts.\" The FCC found 1,141 of those calls went to wireless phones without consent, and on June 6, 2023 it unanimously adopted a $5,134,500 forfeiture. Its release notes that the pair's own emails show them directing the dialing companies on which ZIP codes to call. The Ohio Attorney General referred the pair on Oct. 13, 2020 for robocalls in eastern Cuyahoga County \"designed to suppress voter turnout in minority neighborhoods\". On Oct. 24, 2022 each pleaded guilty to felony telecommunications fraud and was sentenced to 24 months of supervision, a $2,500 fine, and 500 hours of community service. In National Coalition on Black Civic Participation v. Wohl (S.D.N.Y. 1:20-cv-8668), they were found liable in March 2023 under the Voting Rights Act and the Ku Klux Klan Act. Status Confirmed (FCC forfeiture order, Ohio guilty pleas, federal civil liability). Catalog note: this is manufactured, targeted fear sent by people the recipients never knew, aimed at keeping them from voting. That is the inorganic pattern this leaf describes, delivered by phone instead of social media.", "sources": [{"title": "FCC — News release: FCC Issues $5 Million Penalty for Illegal Robocalling Against Jacob Wohl and John Burkman (June 6, 2023)", "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-394089A1.pdf"}, {"title": "FCC — Forfeiture Order FCC-23-44 (1,141 calls; Ohio plea and S.D.N.Y. VRA/KKK Act liability cited)", "url": "https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-23-44A1.txt"}, {"title": "Ohio Attorney General — AG Yost's Statement on Jacob Wohl and Jack Burkman Pleading Guilty to Telecommunications Fraud (Oct. 24, 2022)", "url": "https://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Media/News-Releases/October-2022/AG-Yosts-Statement-on-Jacob-Wohl-and-Jack-Burkman"}, {"title": "NCBCP v. Wohl, S.D.N.Y. 1:20-cv-8668, Doc. 252 — plaintiffs' notice of Ohio guilty plea (Jan. 9, 2023)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.546351/gov.uscourts.nysd.546351.252.0.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to us-2020-iran-emennet-proud-boys-voter-threat-emails-doj-indictment on this leaf (2020 mass voter-intimidation messaging), a different actor and channel. Cross-leaf: Mail ballots (fear messaging about mail voting)."}
{"id": "cisa-gcc-2020-nass-sos-unified-information-dominance-messaging", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-13", "uid": "C20260926-002008-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-13", "old_ids": ["cisa-gcc-2020-nass-sos-unified-information-dominance-messaging"], "seq": "C00646", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "Secretaries of state"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-20", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA Election Infrastructure GCC Executive Committee joint statement (Aug 20, 2020)—with NASS immediate-past president and NASED president as signatories—presents Secretaries of State / state election directors as a unified, coordinated information channel telling voters to trust officials and prepare for delayed unofficial results. Soft remount of prior GCC/NASS coordination cards onto this exact SOS lock-step pathKey. Status Confirmed for coordinated SOS-association messaging that can inhibit competing transparency narratives; 'infiltrated by cabal' personnel claim Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Joint Statement from Election Infrastructure GCC Executive Committee (Aug 20, 2020)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-election-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-executive-committee", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-2020-nass-sos-unified-information-dominance-messaging__cisa-joint-statement-from-election-infrastructure-gcc-executive-committee-aug-20-2020.png"}, {"title": "NASS — NASS and NASED 2020 Election Preparations and Reminders", "url": "https://www.nass.org/node/2096", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-gcc-2020-nass-sos-unified-information-dominance-messaging__nass-nass-and-nased-2020-election-preparations-and-reminders.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 7. Soft remount of GCC/NASS coordination onto SOS office pathKey. Honest: coordination Confirmed; sinister infiltration Alleged."}
{"id": "halderman-2020-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-25", "uid": "C20260925-233150-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-25", "old_ids": ["halderman-2020-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text"], "seq": "C00418", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Use QR codes to covertly adjust votes or feed algorithms, then send the ballots in the mail or drop boxes. Election staff will deliver the payload themselves without knowing it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-89", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-19", "state": "GA", "description": "Dr. J. Alex Halderman's Curling declarations and related BMD research show Georgia Dominion ImageCast X printouts carry a QR/barcode that scanners tabulate while voters can only easily verify human-readable text—so a mismatched barcode would be delivered into the count by ordinary election workers scanning what looks like a normal paper ballot. Status Confirmed for QR-tabulation architecture and the resulting voter-verification gap. Confirmed for the mechanism; mass in-the-wild QR payload attacks stay Alleged without a named conviction here. PEP: hand-marked paper hand-counted reads the marks humans made.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman declaration (Curling) — GAVerifiedVoting copy", "url": "https://gaverifiedvoting.org/pdf-litigation/20200819-785_2-Declaration-Alex-Halderman.pdf"}, {"title": "Halderman et al. — BMD verifiability paper (IEEE S&P)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/bmd-verifiability-sp20.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/halderman-2020-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text__halderman-2020-ga-icx-qr-barcode-tabulated-not-human-readable-text__halderman-et-al-bmd-verifiability-paper-ieee-s-p.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 13. Soft companion to existing ga-bmd-qr cards on Electronic Voting Machines siblings.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "justthenews-2020-ctcl-philly-grant-agreement-conditions-coop-election-leaders", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-09", "uid": "C20260926-031602-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-09", "old_ids": ["justthenews-2020-ctcl-philly-grant-agreement-conditions-coop-election-leaders"], "seq": "C01174", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may co-opt the leader of a grassroots election organization to pass and receive information, monitoring and controlling its efforts. The leader or organization may not know they are being used."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-19", "state": "PA / Multi-state", "description": "Just the News–hosted CTCL Philadelphia grant approval materials (~$10M) and related CTCL 2020 COVID Response grant agreements required local election offices to execute CTCL-approved safe-election plans (polling places, drop boxes, staffing, voter education), submit expenditure reports by Jan. 31, 2021, and accept withholding/repayment if conditions were violated—documenting how private-fund grant terms can shape priorities and reporting of local election leaders who may treat the funder as a technical partner rather than a controlling principal. Status Confirmed primary CTCL Philly/PA grant-agreement conditions documenting private-fund co-option pathways over local election leaders; peer to HEP/Locke Alliance for Election Excellence and CRS private-election-funding cards already on this leaf—CTCL 2020 grant-agreement instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: privately conditioned funding that steers local election-leader priorities undercuts independent public hand-count mandates.", "sources": [{"title": "Just the News — CTCL Philadelphia Grant Approval Letter (2020)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2020-10/CTCLPhillyApprovalLetter.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/justthenews-2020-ctcl-philly-grant-agreement-conditions-coop-election-leaders__justthenews-ctcl-philly-approval-letter-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — CTCL Milwaukee grant agreement exhibit (conditions / reporting companion)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.wied.92761/gov.uscourts.wied.92761.80.4.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/justthenews-2020-ctcl-philly-grant-agreement-conditions-coop-election-leaders__courtlistener-ctcl-milwaukee-grant-agreement-exhibit-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Infiltration of Grass Root Orgs co-op leader leaf."}
{"id": "pew-2020-social-media-censor-viewpoints-false-reality", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-06", "uid": "C20260926-004030-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-06", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-social-media-censor-viewpoints-false-reality"], "seq": "C00759", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "The tactic uses fear and self-censorship to create a false reality in which fraud is harder to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-19", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew found ~73% of U.S. adults say it is very or somewhat likely that social media sites intentionally censor political viewpoints they find objectionable (90% of Republicans)—a perceived/structural silencing environment that reinforces self-censorship and can leave contested election claims outside the visible information diet. Status Confirmed for widespread belief in viewpoint censorship and partisan asymmetry; does not itself prove platform intent in every case.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Most Americans Think Social Media Sites Censor Political Viewpoints (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2020/08/19/most-americans-think-social-media-sites-censor-political-viewpoints/"}, {"title": "Cato Institute — Political self-censorship companion (2020)", "url": "https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/poll-62-americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "nj-eo-177-2020-universal-mail-ballot-november-general", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-05", "uid": "C20260926-014044-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-05", "old_ids": ["nj-eo-177-2020-universal-mail-ballot-november-general"], "seq": "C00880", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Declare an emergency to force mail-ballot use and relax or ignore other election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-14", "state": "NJ", "description": "New Jersey Executive Order No. 177 (Aug. 14, 2020), issued under COVID public-health emergency authority, directed that the November 2020 General Election 'shall be conducted primarily via vote-by-mail ballots, which will be sent to all \"Active\" registered voters without the need for an application,' prepaid return postage, modified sample-ballot and mail deadlines, minimum drop-box deployment, suspension/modification of multiple Title 19 timing provisions, and acceptance of certain ballots without postmarks if USPS-confirmed timely. Status Confirmed for an emergency executive order forcing universal mail balloting and relaxing ordinary election-administration statutes—peer to California EO N-64-20 and Wisconsin EO 74 COVID mail/absentee expansions; not a finding that NJ results were illegitimate.", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey — Executive Order No. 177 (Aug. 14, 2020) PDF", "url": "https://www.nj.gov/infobank/eo/056murphy/pdf/EO-177.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nj-eo-177-2020-universal-mail-ballot-november-general__new-jersey-executive-order-no-177-aug-14-2020-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Cornell LII — N.J. Admin. Code Executive Order No. 177 (2020)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-jersey/N-J-Admin-Code-Executive-Order-No-177-(2020)"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Changes to absentee/mail-in voting procedures (COVID-19), 2020", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Changes_to_absentee/mail-in_voting_procedures_in_response_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-19)_pandemic,_2020"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Declare an emergency to force mail / relax election laws."}
{"id": "gallup-2020-black-white-confidence-police-diverges-citizens-vs-police", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-19", "uid": "C20260926-002757-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-19", "old_ids": ["gallup-2020-black-white-confidence-police-diverges-citizens-vs-police"], "seq": "C00692", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Turn citizens against police and police against citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup documented Black and White adults' confidence in police diverging sharply amid 2020 protest/media coverage—record-low overall confidence among key groups—illustrating the turn-citizens-against-police / police-against-citizens polarization dynamic. Soft remount of fill-20h Gallup police-confidence family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for measured confidence collapse/polarization.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Black, White adults' confidence diverges on police (2020)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/317114/black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-police.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gallup-2020-black-white-confidence-police-diverges-citizens-vs-police__gallup-black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-on-police-2020.png"}, {"title": "USA Today — Defund the police / COVID force deepest cop budget cuts in a decade (2020)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/31/defund-police-covid-19-force-deepest-cop-budget-cuts-decade/5538397002/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 10. Soft remount of fill-20h LE media-attack Gallup/USA Today family."}
{"id": "gallup-2020-confidence-police-record-low-media-coverage-context", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-17", "uid": "C20260926-002008-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-17", "old_ids": ["gallup-2020-confidence-police-record-low-media-coverage-context"], "seq": "C00650", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Attack law enforcement through the media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "Gallup's 2020 Confidence in Institutions poll found overall confidence in police fell to a record low (48%), with the survey fielded amid intense national media coverage after George Floyd's death—CNN/USA Today/NYT contemporaneous coverage explicitly tying the Gallup drop to that media-saturated period. Status Confirmed for measured confidence collapse during heavy negative LE media framing; 'media attack' as coordinated cabal campaign Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Gallup — Black, White Adults' Confidence Diverges Most on Police (Aug 2020)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/317114/black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-police.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gallup-2020-confidence-police-record-low-media-coverage-context__gallup-black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-most-on-police-aug-2020.png"}, {"title": "CNN — Americans' confidence in police falls to lowest in nearly three decades", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/12/us/american-confidence-in-policing-new-low-trnd"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 9."}
{"id": "washu-2020-gibson-self-censorship-loss-of-courage", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-01", "uid": "C20260926-004030-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-01", "old_ids": ["washu-2020-gibson-self-censorship-loss-of-courage"], "seq": "C00754", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose courage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "Washington University in St. Louis political scientist James L. Gibson's 2020 Freedom and Tolerance survey found ~40–46% of Americans reported they did not feel as free to speak their minds as they used to—roughly triple the McCarthy-era share—driven by fear of social isolation for unpopular views. That measured collapse of civic speaking-courage is the demoralizing 'loss of courage' pathway the leaf names. Soft companion to fill-20j Gallup election-confidence / Pew demoralization family. PEP contrast: properly-run public precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is software-independent and publicly observable, so courage to demand verifiable counts need not depend on opaque centralized trust (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for measured self-censorship / loss of speaking courage; coordinated psyop intent Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "WashU Source — Free speech? Nearly half of Americans self-censor (Gibson 2020)", "url": "https://source.washu.edu/2020/08/free-speech-nearly-half-of-americans-self-censor-study-finds/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/washu-2020-gibson-self-censorship-loss-of-courage__washu-source-free-speech-nearly-half-of-americans-self-censor-gibson-2020.png"}, {"title": "Political Science Quarterly / SSRN — Keeping Your Mouth Shut: Spiraling Self-Censorship (Gibson & Sutherland)", "url": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3647099"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 1. PEP framing on courage to demand observable hand count."}
{"id": "ia-reynolds-eo7-felon-voting-rights-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-03", "uid": "C20260926-012939-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-03", "old_ids": ["ia-reynolds-eo7-felon-voting-rights-2020"], "seq": "C00842", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-05", "state": "IA", "description": "On August 5, 2020 Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds issued Executive Order 7 ending Iowa's permanent felony disenfranchisement for most people who completed their sentences (incarceration, probation, parole, or special sentence), while excluding chapter 707 homicide-related felonies from automatic restoration. The Governor's office describes daily certificates restoring citizenship rights upon sentence discharge. Separately, the legislature has repeatedly stalled a constitutional amendment that would make restoration permanent, and related bills sought additional conditions (e.g., restitution) contingent on an amendment. Status Confirmed for Iowa's executive restoration-with-carveouts structure—peer to Florida Amendment 4 followed by implementing restrictions; catalog motive subtitle not asserted.", "sources": [{"title": "Iowa Governor — Voting Rights Restoration (Executive Order 7 summary)", "url": "https://governor.iowa.gov/services/voting-rights-restoration", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ia-reynolds-eo7-felon-voting-rights-2020__iowa-governor-voting-rights-restoration-executive-order.png"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Iowa", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-iowa", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ia-reynolds-eo7-felon-voting-rights-2020__brennan-center-voting-rights-restoration-efforts-in-iow.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer on Felon Voting Rights (cabal subtitle) leaf."}
{"id": "nv-ab4-2020-ab321-2021-any-authorized-person-may-return-mail-ballot", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-04", "uid": "C20261023-123356-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-04", "old_ids": ["nv-ab4-2020-ab321-2021-any-authorized-person-may-return-mail-ballot"], "seq": "C01529", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Change the law to let anyone return another voter's ballot, legalizing ballot harvesting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-08-03 (AB 4 signed); 2021-06 (AB 321 made permanent)", "state": "NV", "description": "In an August 2020 special session, Nevada's Legislature passed Assembly Bill 4 on party-line votes, and Gov. Steve Sisolak signed it on Aug. 3, 2020. Among other changes for elections held during a declared emergency, AB 4 let a voter authorize any person to return his or her mail ballot, replacing the former limit to family members. In a Nevada Independent interview, Deputy Secretary of State for Elections Wayne Thorley said the authorized person \"could even be a political party operative,\" that no registration or training was required for someone who only returns ballots, and that Secretary of State Barbara Cegavske's office considered the provision \"a step too far.\" In 2021, Assembly Bill 321 made universal mail ballots and the same return rule permanent. NRS 293.269923 now provides that \"a person authorized by the voter may return the mail ballot on behalf of the voter\" by mail or delivery to the county clerk or a drop box, and makes it unlawful for that person to fail to return it within three days. Status Confirmed: the statutory change is on the books and was opposed by the state's chief election officer at the time. The law itself is not a finding of fraud. Catalog point: once anyone may collect and carry other people's voted ballots, no one can trace who handled a ballot between the voter's kitchen table and the clerk's office. Voting in person at the precinct on Election Day keeps the ballot in the voter's own hands until it is cast.", "sources": [{"title": "The Nevada Independent — Indy Q&A: Deputy Secretary of State Wayne Thorley on what Nevada's controversial elections bill does and doesn't do (Aug. 2020)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indy-qa-deputy-secretary-of-state-wayne-thorley-on-what-nevadas-controversial-elections-bill-does-and-doesnt-do"}, {"title": "The Nevada Independent — Indy Explains: Legislative Democrats' plan for permanent expanded mail-in voting (2021)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/indy-explains-legislative-democrats-plan-for-permanent-expanded-mail-in-voting"}, {"title": "Nevada Legislature — NRS Chapter 293, NRS 293.269923 (persons authorized to return mail ballot)", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/nrs/nrs-293.html"}, {"title": "Nevada Secretary of State — Mail Ballot Voting", "url": "https://www.nvsos.gov/sos/elections/voters/mail-ballot-voting"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016 on this leaf (1 -> 2). Related Nevada mail-ballot cards (PILF Clark County undeliverables; District C 2020) sit on other leaves. All four URLs curl 200; NRS text checked directly."}
{"id": "luzerne-crispell-ethics-fine-ess-advisory-board-trips", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-09", "uid": "C20260926-021058-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-09", "old_ids": ["luzerne-crispell-ethics-fine-ess-advisory-board-trips"], "seq": "C00957", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to trust machines and vendors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Ethics Commission, on Auditor General DePasquale referral, fined former Luzerne County elections director Marisa Crispell **$3,500** (+$500 investigative costs) for failing to disclose **ES&S-paid advisory-board trips** before recommending the county purchase that vendor's electronic poll-book system. Status Confirmed vendor hospitality creating trust/appearance conflicts at the clerk level; peer to NPR ESS Customer Advisory Board trips and DePasquale 67-county gifts overview—Luzerne ethics adjudication detail, not those overview cards remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "PA Auditor General — Ethics Commission fines former Luzerne elections director over ES&S trips", "url": "https://www.einpresswire.com/article/522830668/auditor-general-depasquale-ethics-commission-fines-former-luzerne-county-elections-director-in-case-referred-by-his-department", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-crispell-ethics-fine-ess-advisory-board-trips__pa-auditor-general-ethics-commission-fines-former-luzerne-elections-director-o.png"}, {"title": "AP — Auditor says officials took voting machine vendors' freebies (DePasquale review context)", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-c6942edd44894d928a464865e0d174b4"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on instruct clerks to trust machines/vendors leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "wisconsin-cities-ctcl-grant-budget-drop-boxes-green-bay-madison-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-14", "uid": "C20260925-211320-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-14", "old_ids": ["wisconsin-cities-ctcl-grant-budget-drop-boxes-green-bay-madison-2020"], "seq": "C00259", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Public and private money funds setting them up everywhere."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin cities' CTCL Safe Voting Plan / grant materials explicitly budgeted purchase and placement of additional secure ballot drop-boxes (e.g., Green Bay transit/fire-station boxes; Madison targeting ~12 boxes). Status Confirmed for private-grant line items funding drop-box hardware and sites.", "sources": [{"title": "Just the News archive — Green Bay CTCL grant agreement / Safe Voting Plan drop-box budgets", "url": "https://justthenews.com/sites/default/files/2020-12/2020-07-24%20Green%20Bay%20CTCL%20Grant%20Agreement%20Signed.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wisconsin-cities-ctcl-grant-budget-drop-boxes-green-bay-madison-2020__just-the-news-archive-green-bay-ctcl-grant-agreement-safe-vo.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "usatoday-2020-defund-police-budget-cuts-citizens-police-divide", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-20", "uid": "C20260926-002757-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-20", "old_ids": ["usatoday-2020-defund-police-budget-cuts-citizens-police-divide"], "seq": "C00693", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Turn citizens against police and police against citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07-31", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "USA Today reporting on 2020 'defund the police' budget cuts documents how protest/media pressure translated into the deepest municipal police-budget cuts in a decade—institutional consequence of sustained citizen-police antagonism. Status Confirmed for media-amplified political pressure producing LE operational hits.", "sources": [{"title": "USA Today — Defund the police, COVID-19 force deepest cop budget cuts in decade", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/31/defund-police-covid-19-force-deepest-cop-budget-cuts-decade/5538397002/"}, {"title": "Gallup — Black/White confidence in police diverges (2020 companion)", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/317114/black-white-adults-confidence-diverges-police.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "usatoday-2020-defund-police-budget-cuts-media-driven-pressure", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-18", "uid": "C20260926-002008-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-18", "old_ids": ["usatoday-2020-defund-police-budget-cuts-media-driven-pressure"], "seq": "C00651", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Attack law enforcement through the media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07-31", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "USA Today reporting on 2020 'defund the police' budget cuts documents how protest/media pressure translated into the deepest municipal cop-budget cuts in a decade—an institutional consequence of sustained negative media framing of law enforcement. Status Confirmed for media-amplified political pressure producing LE budget/operational hits.", "sources": [{"title": "USA Today — Defund the police, COVID-19 force deepest cop budget cuts in decade", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/07/31/defund-police-covid-19-force-deepest-cop-budget-cuts-decade/5538397002/"}, {"title": "NYT — Confidence in Police Is at Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2020-social-media-news-less-knowledgeable-battlefield", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-01", "uid": "C20260926-003520-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-01", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-social-media-news-less-knowledgeable-battlefield"], "seq": "C00714", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens do not understand the battlefield."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew Research's American News Pathways found U.S. adults who most commonly get political/election news from social media averaged only ~43% correct on 29 fact-based knowledge questions vs 56–63% for most other platform groups, and were least likely to say they understood key political storylines—i.e., information-dominance pathways that leave parts of the public less able to understand the political/electoral 'battlefield.' Status Confirmed for measured knowledge/understanding gap by news pathway.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — U.S. adults who mostly rely on social media for political news are often less knowledgeable (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/07/30/u-s-adults-who-mostly-rely-on-social-media-for-political-news-are-often-less-knowledgeable-about-current-events/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Distinguishing factual vs opinion statements in the news (2018 companion)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/06/18/distinguishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 1. Soft companion to fill-20i info-dominance fight-each-other / Pew family."}
{"id": "cato-2020-62pct-afraid-share-political-views-courage", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-02", "uid": "C20260926-004030-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-02", "old_ids": ["cato-2020-62pct-afraid-share-political-views-courage"], "seq": "C00755", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Demoralizing Citizens", "Citizens lose courage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Cato Institute / YouGov's Summer 2020 national survey found 62% of Americans say the political climate prevents them from saying things they believe because others might find them offensive (up from 58% in 2017), including majorities of Democrats (52%), independents (59%), and Republicans (77%)—a cross-partisan courage-to-speak deficit. Status Confirmed for measured fear of expressing political views; does not prove a single cabal orchestrated the climate.", "sources": [{"title": "Cato Institute — Poll: 62% of Americans Say They Have Political Views They're Afraid to Share (2020)", "url": "https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/poll-62-americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share"}, {"title": "SSRN — Cato Political Expression Survey preprint (Ekins 2020)", "url": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3659953"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "cato-2020-self-censorship-fear-fraud-harder-detect", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-05", "uid": "C20260926-004030-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-05", "old_ids": ["cato-2020-self-censorship-fear-fraud-harder-detect"], "seq": "C00758", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "The tactic uses fear and self-censorship to create a false reality in which fraud is harder to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-07-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Cato/YouGov 2020 found 62% of Americans self-censor political views and 32% of employed Americans worry about career harm if their opinions became known—documenting fear-driven silence that shrinks the set of people willing to report, challenge, or publicly discuss irregularities. Soft remount of leaf-1 Cato family onto this exact fear/self-censorship pathKey. Status Confirmed for fear/self-censorship mechanism that can make detection harder; does not prove every unspoken concern was fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "Cato Institute — 62% afraid to share political views / career fear (2020)", "url": "https://www.cato.org/survey-reports/poll-62-americans-say-they-have-political-views-theyre-afraid-share"}, {"title": "WashU Source — Gibson self-censorship study companion (2020)", "url": "https://source.washu.edu/2020/08/free-speech-nearly-half-of-americans-self-censor-study-finds/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cato-2020-self-censorship-fear-fraud-harder-detect__washu-source-gibson-self-censorship-study-companion-2020.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 3. Soft remount of leaf-1 Cato/WashU family."}
{"id": "democracy-live-omniballot-mit-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-19", "uid": "C20260925-183614-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-19", "old_ids": ["democracy-live-omniballot-mit-2020"], "seq": "C00107", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06", "state": "WV / Multi-state", "description": "After West Virginia moved away from Voatz, it and other jurisdictions used Democracy Live's OmniBallot portal for electronic ballot delivery/marking (and in some configurations online return) for UOCAVA/disabled voters. MIT/UMich researchers (Specter, Halderman et al.) published a USENIX Security analysis finding serious risks in OmniBallot online return, including vote manipulation via malware or cloud-insider paths. Status Confirmed a second major mobile/internet voting stack with peer-reviewed vulnerability findings—parallel to the Voatz MIT analysis already logged.", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX Security — Security Analysis of the Democracy Live Online Voting System", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec21-specter-security.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/democracy-live-omniballot-mit-2020__usenix-security-security-analysis-of-the-democracy-live-onli.pdf"}, {"title": "MIT Internet Policy — OmniBallot security analysis PDF", "url": "https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/OmniBallot.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — After damaging report, W.Va. moves away from voting app (Voatz→alt path)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/5cafe205322a0abcb3f359f1ea40847f"}], "notes": "Part A enrich mit-voatz leaf.", "vendor": ["Democracy Live"], "vendor_models": ["Democracy Live OmniBallot"]}
{"id": "philadelphia-june-2020-polling-place-cuts-covid-workers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-08", "uid": "C20260926-012939-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-08", "old_ids": ["philadelphia-june-2020-polling-place-cuts-covid-workers"], "seq": "C00847", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06", "state": "PA", "description": "For Pennsylvania's June 2, 2020 primary, Philadelphia cut polling places dramatically (contemporary AP/Inquirer reporting: from ~830+ sites toward ~190) citing COVID-related unavailability of locations and poll workers, with reduced worker staffing allowed under emergency rules. Status Confirmed for COVID-era poll-worker/site shortage driving massive consolidation—peer to Milwaukee's April 2020 reduction from ~180 sites to five. Operational finding; not labeled as intentional fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Philadelphia looks to slash polling places in June 2 primary", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-42f85a5bc828a9bcfe2b30272bd6c16e"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Coronavirus leads Philadelphia to significantly cut polling places for 2020 Pa. primary", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/philadelphia-new-polling-places-2020-primary-20200512.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage."}
{"id": "uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-14", "uid": "C20260925-155410-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-14", "old_ids": ["uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa"], "seq": "C00014", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA/AAAS risk-management guidance on electronic ballot delivery, marking, and return classifies internet ballot return as high risk relative to paper return, documenting confidentiality, integrity, and availability concerns for electronic UOCAVA channels. Catalog seed warns UOCAVA expansions increase manipulation surface and points to VoteFromAbroad.org and VerityVote overseas-voting vulnerability materials.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA/AAAS — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/CISA%20Risk%20Management%20Electronic%20Ballot.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa__cisa-aaas-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-mar.pdf"}, {"title": "VerityVote — Overseas Voting Vulnerabilities (advocacy compilation)", "url": "https://verityvote.us/overseas-voting-vulnerabilities/"}], "notes": "CISA risk classification Confirmed; VerityVote is advocacy—use for catalog mapping, not as sole proof of fraud. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'UOCAVA' to 'Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) > This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at...'."}
{"id": "ca-ab860-2020-mail-ballot-every-active-voter", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-05", "uid": "C20260926-012939-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-05", "old_ids": ["ca-ab860-2020-mail-ballot-every-active-voter"], "seq": "C00844", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06-18", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 860 (signed June 18, 2020) required county elections officials to mail a ballot to every active registered voter for the November 3, 2020 general election, mandated vote-by-mail tracking, allowed postmarked ballots to be received up to 17 days after Election Day, and authorized earlier processing of returned VBM ballots. California SOS AP20:055 documents the COVID rationale and provisions. Status Confirmed for statewide conversion of the default pathway toward mail for Nov 2020 relative to ordinary request-based VBM—peer to New York's COVID absentee expansion.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS AP20:055 — Newsom signs AB 860 fortifying Nov 3, 2020 election (mail every active voter)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2020-news-releases-and-advisories/ap20055-gov-newsom-signs-legislation-fortify-cas-1132020-general-election-covid-19-pandemic", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab860-2020-mail-ballot-every-active-voter__california-sos-ap20-055-newsom-signs-ab-860-fortifying.png"}, {"title": "California Legislature — AB-860 Elections: vote by mail ballots (bill text)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB860", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab860-2020-mail-ballot-every-active-voter__california-legislature-ab-860-elections-vote-by-mail-ba.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to ny-covid-absentee-expansion-2020."}
{"id": "ga-2020-primary-absentee-plus-in-person-double-votes-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-02", "uid": "C20261009-105430-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-02", "old_ids": ["ga-2020-primary-absentee-plus-in-person-double-votes-counted"], "seq": "C01335", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06-09", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia's Secretary of State said on Sept. 8, 2020 that about 1,000 voters had returned absentee ballots and also voted in person in the June 9, 2020 primary, and that officials 'didn't catch them in time to keep the second votes from being tallied' (AP). State records later showed 1,042 suspected cases in 119 counties, found by comparing absentee and early-vote records to Election Day check-ins. The office's own investigation (reported by the AJC in 2022) reviewed 1,339 cases and found about 22%, roughly 300, were actual double votes. 78% showed only one vote. Causes were mostly voters who saw no 'received' status on My Voter Page and poll-worker error; no organized effort was found, and no outcome was affected. Rule at the time and as of 2026 (O.C.G.A. §21-2-388): an absentee voter may vote a regular ballot in person after surrendering the absentee ballot, or by asking in writing that it be cancelled. The registrar must first confirm the ballot 'has not yet been received.' A ballot still in the mail is marked 'Canceled' on the master absentee list and is to be cancelled on arrival. SB 202 (2021) did not remove this path. The double counts happened in the lag between ballot receipt, ENet status and the poll book. Status Confirmed for about 300 double votes tallied; the '1,000' figure was the initial allegation.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Georgia investigating 'potential double voting' in primary (Sept. 8, 2020)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/primary-elections-voting-georgia-politics-elections-04e172d66caf778b38e451827b2f8918"}, {"title": "AJC — Investigation finds far less double voting in Georgia than alleged (1,339 cases; ~22% double voting)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/investigation-finds-far-less-double-voting-in-georgia-than-alleged/WAOLVUT7B5HYFI7KX5E6OZW75A/"}, {"title": "AJC — Inquiry shows 1,000 Georgians may have voted twice, but no conspiracy (1,042 in 119 counties)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/inquiry-finds-1000-georgians-may-have-voted-twice-but-no-conspiracy/RGS3UI7JRJE5XP4OAL3T3BYDDI/"}, {"title": "O.C.G.A. §21-2-388 — Cancellation of absentee ballots of electors present in precinct (Justia, 2024 code)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-10/section-21-2-388/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. GA rule rechecked 2026-10-09 against the current §21-2-388 text: cancel by surrender or a written request with registrar confirmation; no provisional required."}
{"id": "mcca-2020-protest-civil-unrest-citizens-police-divide", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-07", "uid": "C20260926-033041-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-07", "old_ids": ["mcca-2020-protest-civil-unrest-citizens-police-divide"], "seq": "C01217", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Turn citizens against police and police against citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06-04", "state": "Federal / Multi-city", "description": "Major Cities Chiefs Association's June 4, 2020 open letter and subsequent 2020 Protest and Civil Unrest report documented how 2020 protest/unrest cycles—peaceful majorities alongside violence at a minority of events, assaults on officers, and 'provocative statements' that inflame tensions—drove citizens and police into mutual antagonism across major U.S. cities. Status Confirmed primary MCCA open letter + protest/civil-unrest report; peer to Gallup 2020 Black/White confidence divergence and USA Today defund citizens-police-divide cards already on this leaf—MCCA chiefs instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: turning citizens against police removes the trusted local observers who can watch precinct hand counts of paper ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Major Cities Chiefs Association — Open Letter Update (June 4, 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Open-Letter-Update.pdf"}, {"title": "MCCA — Report on the 2020 Protest and Civil Unrest (companion PDF)", "url": "https://www.majorcitieschiefs.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/MCCA-Report-on-the-2020-Protest-and-Civil-Unrest.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Law Enforcement Turn citizens against police leaf (non-Gallup/USA Today remount)."}
{"id": "philadelphia-2020-primary-40-mail-plus-in-person-4-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-03", "uid": "C20261009-105430-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-03", "old_ids": ["philadelphia-2020-primary-40-mail-plus-in-person-4-counted"], "seq": "C01336", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06-02", "state": "PA", "description": "In Pennsylvania's June 2, 2020 primary, Philadelphia found 40 voters who returned mail ballots and also voted in person. Poll workers had ignored the poll-book mark or the separate printed list of late mail requesters, and let voters use machines instead of provisional ballots. To check, officials scanned the signed poll books against the list of returned mail ballots. Thirty-six mail ballots were pulled in time, but four double votes were already counted: an early batch of mail ballots had been tabulated before poll-book data was available. PA rule (DOS 2026 provisional guidance, unchanged in substance): a voter issued a mail ballot votes a regular ballot only after surrendering the ballot and envelope; otherwise a provisional, counted only if no mail ballot was cast. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Philadelphia elections officials caught 40 cases of double-voting in the primary (June 16, 2020)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/election/pa-primary-election-mail-ballots-double-voting-20200616.html"}, {"title": "PA Department of State — Provisional Ballots Guidance (2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-pagov/en/dos/resources/voting-and-elections/directives-and-guidance/2026/2026-provisionalballots-guidance.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Failure mode: mail ballots tabulated before the cross-check; once separated from envelopes they cannot be retrieved.", "related": ["pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling"]}
{"id": "nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-11", "uid": "C20261028-132233-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-11", "old_ids": ["nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed"], "seq": "C01606", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail a ballot to every record, including phantom ones"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-06 to 2020-08-14", "state": "NV", "description": "For Nevada's June 2020 primary, Clark County mailed 1,325,934 ballots to all registered voters, active and inactive. The Las Vegas Review-Journal reported that 223,469 came back undeliverable and about 305,000 were returned by voters and counted. [1] About 58 percent of the undeliverable ballots belonged to inactive voters, and 93,585 belonged to voters listed as active. [1] The Public Interest Legal Foundation found 2,358 deceased people on Nevada's active rolls, more than 2,200 of them in Clark County; Registrar Joseph Gloria confirmed the undeliverable figures but said he could not verify the deceased count, and the newspaper reported no evidence of widespread misuse. [1] Status Confirmed: county-confirmed counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Las Vegas Review-Journal — More than 223K Clark County mailed ballots undeliverable in primary (Aug. 14, 2020)", "url": "https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/clark-county/more-than-223k-mailed-ballots-returned-undelivered-in-primary-2095001/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["pilf-2021-clark-county-nv-92367-mail-ballots-undeliverable-wrong-outdated-addresses", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates", "ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "ncsl-permanent-absentee-mail-ballot-lists", "ballotpedia-all-mail-voting-states", "hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation"]}
{"id": "cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-mobile", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-13", "uid": "C20260926-022005-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-13", "old_ids": ["cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-mobile"], "seq": "C00991", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05", "state": "US", "description": "CISA, EAC, FBI, and NIST Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (May 2020; publicly reissued) classifies electronic ballot return—including web portals, email, fax, and mobile-app return—as high risk that current technology cannot adequately secure, recommending paper return whenever possible. Companion AAAS EPI Center scientist letters likewise state that no mobile voting app is sufficiently secure for U.S. elections. Status Confirmed federal/scientific consensus against mobile/internet ballot return; peer to MIT Voatz and Democracy Live OmniBallot USENIX analyses on this leaf—CISA/EAC/FBI/NIST electronic-return guidance, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (resource page)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-mobile__untitled.png"}, {"title": "AAAS EPI Center — Combined scientist letters opposing internet/mobile voting (May 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://www.aaas.org/sites/default/files/2020-05/AAAS%20EPI%20Center%20Group%20Letters%20on%20Internet%20Voting%20Combined%20582020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-mobile__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Mobile Voting shiny-new-object leaf."}
{"id": "montgomery-pa-2020-wrong-party-mail-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260925-171133-01", "uid": "C20260925-171133-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-171133-01", "old_ids": ["montgomery-pa-2020-wrong-party-mail-ballots"], "seq": "C00068", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05", "state": "PA", "description": "Montgomery County, PA, mistakenly mailed about 1,984 June 2020 primary mail ballots with the wrong party (Democrats receiving Republican ballots and vice versa) after a ballot-printer data mix-up. County officials voided the bad ballots and reissued correct ones with USPS coordination. Status Confirmed for the wrong-ballot mailing and official remediation; intentional fraud not alleged by officials.", "sources": [{"title": "The Philadelphia Inquirer — Montgomery County sent voters wrong ballots for 2020 primary", "url": "https://inquirer.com/politics/election/montgomery-county-pa-wrong-primary-ballots-20200526.html"}], "notes": "Catalog leaf: wrong ballot styles / claimed mistakes. Operational/admin error — intentional fraud not established by cited sources."}
{"id": "ca-eo-n64-20-universal-mail-ballot-covid-emergency", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-29", "uid": "C20260925-205354-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-29", "old_ids": ["ca-eo-n64-20-universal-mail-ballot-covid-emergency"], "seq": "C00244", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Declare an emergency to force mail-ballot use and relax or ignore other election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05-08", "state": "CA", "description": "Governor Newsom's Executive Order N-64-20 (May 8, 2020), issued under California's COVID-19 emergency, directed that every eligible registered voter be mailed a ballot for the November 2020 general election — a universal-mail expansion implemented by emergency executive action rather than ordinary pre-pandemic statute alone. Follow-on EO N-67-20 added related mail-voting infrastructure mandates. Status Confirmed for emergency-declared expansion of mail balloting.", "sources": [{"title": "CA Governor — EO N-64-20 text (mail every voter a ballot)", "url": "https://gov.ca.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/05.08.2020-EO-N-64-20-text.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-eo-n64-20-universal-mail-ballot-covid-emergency__ca-governor-eo-n-64-20-text-mail-every-voter-a-ballot.pdf"}, {"title": "CA Governor press release — EO to mail every registered voter a ballot", "url": "https://www.gov.ca.gov/2020/05/08/governor-newsom-issues-executive-order-to-protect-public-health-by-mailing-every-registered-voter-a-ballot-ahead-of-the-november-general-election/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 15. Emergency → universal mail Confirmed."}
{"id": "cisa-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-uocava-move-act-context", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-15", "uid": "C20260925-233150-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-15", "old_ids": ["cisa-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-uocava-move-act-context"], "seq": "C00408", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "Joint CISA/EAC/FBI/NIST Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return guidance—driven by UOCAVA/MOVE Act electronic blank-ballot delivery and some jurisdictions' electronic return—rates electronic ballot return as high risk and recommends paper return whenever possible. Status Confirmed that federal risk managers document easier electronic UOCAVA pathways that expand remote-manipulation risk versus paper. Confirmed for access-vs-risk tradeoff in official guidance; not an attack on military voters' franchise.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-uocava-move-act-context__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Electronic Ballot Delivery and Marking (related PDF resource page cluster)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-uocava-move-act-context__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 8. Soft companion to existing uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa on UOCAVA stub."}
{"id": "cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-threat-model", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-07", "uid": "C20260925-234437-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-07", "old_ids": ["cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-threat-model"], "seq": "C00440", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "No one seems to ask \"How could a bad actor manipulate this?\" of each new part of UOCAVA that is brought forward."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-05-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA, EAC, FBI, and NIST's Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (May 2020; reissued publicly for 2024) assesses electronic return of voted ballots as high risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability even with controls, and recommends paper return whenever feasible—explicit federal threat modeling of how a bad actor could manipulate UOCAVA electronic-return paths. Status Confirmed that federal partners formally ask and answer the 'how could a bad guy manipulate this' question for electronic ballot return. Soft companion to existing cisa-2020-electronic-ballot-return / uocava-electronic-return-risk-cisa cards.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return (resource)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-eac-fbi-nist-2020-electronic-ballot-return-high-risk-threat-model__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return-resource.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Risk Management PDF (May 8, 2020)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2024-02/Final_%20Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020_508c.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 4."}
{"id": "civic-design-vbm-envelope-color-coding-ballot-type-county-differentiation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-09", "uid": "C20260925-220029-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-09", "old_ids": ["civic-design-vbm-envelope-color-coding-ballot-type-county-differentiation"], "seq": "C00362", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Center for Civic Design / USPS election-mail guidance documents that color is routinely used on VBM envelopes to differentiate ballot type, election, party materials, county, or UOCAVA/provisional categories, and that windows are used for addresses/barcodes/ballot-style verification. Status Confirmed that colors/windows encode type metadata visible on the outside of mail ballot packets—creating a process pathway to sort/'lose'/swap by type. Confirmed for design practice; intentional mass fraud via color-sorting not Confirmed here.", "sources": [{"title": "Civic Design — How to design VBM envelopes for USPS (PDF)", "url": "https://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/VAHworkbook-CCD_VAH-USPSrules.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/civic-design-vbm-envelope-color-coding-ballot-type-county-differentiation__civic-design-how-to-design-vbm-envelopes-for-usps-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Civic Design — Vote-by-Mail Envelope Design for California (PDF)", "url": "https://civicdesign.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/VBM-envelopes-documentation-17-1215-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/civic-design-vbm-envelope-color-coding-ballot-type-county-differentiation__civic-design-vote-by-mail-envelope-design-for-california-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 5. Design Confirmed; swap/lose motive Alleged only if asserted.", "related": ["az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"]}
{"id": "ny-2020-budget-campaign-finance-party-ballot-thresholds-buried", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-05", "uid": "C20260925-211320-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-05", "old_ids": ["ny-2020-budget-campaign-finance-party-ballot-thresholds-buried"], "seq": "C00250", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They slip legislative changes into the state budget (including changes that move representation away from the governed)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "NY", "description": "New York's FY2021 state budget enacted a sweeping campaign-finance / public-matching system and raised minor-party ballot-access thresholds (e.g., to 130,000 votes or 2%) inside the sprawling budget package after a prior commission version had been struck down in court — widely reported as election/political-party rules tucked into the budget rather than a standalone election bill. Status Confirmed for election-related law changes enacted via the state budget vehicle.", "sources": [{"title": "New York Post — Cuomo tucks campaign finance overhaul into state budget", "url": "https://nypost.com/2020/04/03/cuomo-tucks-campaign-finance-overhaul-intostate-budget/"}, {"title": "Gotham Gazette — Campaign finance system and party ballot thresholds passed in budget", "url": "https://gothamgazette.com/state/9274-struck-down-court-new-state-campaign-finance-system-and-political-party-ballot-thresholds-enacted-into-law-cuomo-albany"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 3."}
{"id": "ny-2020-budget-page303-cancel-noncompetitive-presidential-primary", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-06", "uid": "C20260925-211320-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-06", "old_ids": ["ny-2020-budget-page303-cancel-noncompetitive-presidential-primary"], "seq": "C00251", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They slip legislative changes into the state budget (including changes that move representation away from the governed)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "NY", "description": "A provision buried in New York's 2020 Education/Labor/Family Assistance budget bill (reported around page 303) authorized canceling a non-competitive presidential primary; the State Board of Elections then canceled the June 2020 presidential primary under that budget language. Status Confirmed for election-process authority enacted inside a budget bill and then used.", "sources": [{"title": "Ithaca Voice — State Board of Elections cancels June presidential primary (budget provision)", "url": "https://ithacavoice.org/2020/04/state-board-of-elections-cancels-junes-presidential-primary/"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 3 companion."}
{"id": "wi-april-2020-election-calendar-fight", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-61", "uid": "C20260925-155410-61", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-61", "old_ids": ["wi-april-2020-election-calendar-fight"], "seq": "C00061", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "WI", "description": "In the days before Wisconsin's April 7, 2020 election, calendar and deadline rules flipped repeatedly: Gov. Evers sought postponement and issued EO #74 attempting to move the election; the Wisconsin Supreme Court blocked that order; a federal district court extended absentee receipt deadlines; and on April 6 the U.S. Supreme Court in RNC v. DNC stayed the injunction insofar as it allowed ballots postmarked after Election Day, requiring postmark by April 7 and receipt by April 13. Status Confirmed for the succession of sudden deadline/calendar changes via executive, state-court, and SCOTUS action; disputes over which side benefited are political, not needed for the leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "SCOTUS — Republican National Committee v. Democratic National Committee (PDF)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/19pdf/589us2r23_m6io.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-april-2020-election-calendar-fight__scotus-republican-national-committee-v-democratic-national-c.pdf"}, {"title": "Cornell LII — RNC v. DNC text", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/19A1016"}, {"title": "Wisconsin EO #74 (attempted suspension / special session framing)", "url": "https://urbanmilwaukee.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingAndSpecialSession.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage__wisconsin-eo-74-poll-worker-shortage-consolidation-findings.pdf"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Date/Time games."}
{"id": "wi-eo-74-covid-suspend-inperson-expand-absentee-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-30", "uid": "C20260925-205354-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-30", "old_ids": ["wi-eo-74-covid-suspend-inperson-expand-absentee-2020"], "seq": "C00245", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Declare an emergency to force mail-ballot use and relax or ignore other election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-22", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Governor Evers' Executive Order #74, issued under the COVID-19 public-health emergency, sought to suspend in-person voting for the April 7, 2020 election and expand absentee/mail opportunities (later litigated amid the spring election). Status Confirmed for emergency executive action altering in-person vs. absentee modalities.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin EO #74 — Suspending in-person voting / special session (COVID)", "url": "https://evers.wi.gov/Documents/COVID19/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingandSpecialSession2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-eo-74-covid-suspend-inperson-expand-absentee-2020__wisconsin-eo-74-suspending-in-person-voting-special-session.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 15."}
{"id": "ca-sos-2020-primary-merged-duplicate-records-both-ballots-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-05", "uid": "C20261009-105430-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-05", "old_ids": ["ca-sos-2020-primary-merged-duplicate-records-both-ballots-counted"], "seq": "C01338", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04-07", "state": "CA", "description": "Responding to Election Integrity Project California about the March 3, 2020 primary, the California Secretary of State confirmed that 12 voter-record pairs were duplicates of the same person; counties merged them, and in each case the voter is 'suspected to have cast two ballots,' referred to investigators. In three more cases, voter history had been applied to separate records later merged. Two were caught before Election Day, but in the third 'the duplicate voting scenario was caught after the election and this resulted in both ballots being opened and counted on election night.' Another 32 apparent double votes were a county EMS defect that sent duplicate voter-history rows ('two votes were not cast'). Status Confirmed for one both-counted case and 12 suspected double votes via duplicate registrations, from the SOS's own letter.", "sources": [{"title": "California Secretary of State — Letter to EIPCa re possible double voting in 2020 Primary (Apr. 7, 2020, PDF)", "url": "https://www.eip-ca.com/letters/CA_SOS_duplicate_voting_response_to_EIPCa_200407_redacted.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Also fits 10 > Feedback Loop > Inject phantom voter registrations > Use plausible deniability in duplicating existing records (cross-leaf)."}
{"id": "wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-60", "uid": "C20260925-155410-60", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-60", "old_ids": ["wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage"], "seq": "C00060", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-04-07", "state": "WI", "description": "Ahead of Wisconsin's April 7, 2020 spring election/presidential primary, COVID-era poll-worker shortfalls forced massive site consolidations. Governor Evers' Executive Order #74 recited WEC estimates of thousands of missing workers and documented Milwaukee cutting polling places from 182 to five (~97% reduction), Green Bay from 31 to two, and Waukesha from 15 to one. Brennan Center analysis later estimated Milwaukee consolidation reduced turnout ~8.6 percentage points (larger for Black voters) despite a surge in absentee voting. Status Confirmed for worker shortages and consolidations; pandemic context noted, intentional partisan suppression not established by these sources.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin EO #74 (poll-worker shortage / consolidation findings)", "url": "https://urbanmilwaukee.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/EO074-SuspendingInPersonVotingAndSpecialSession.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage__wisconsin-eo-74-poll-worker-shortage-consolidation-findings.pdf"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Did consolidating polling places in Milwaukee depress turnout?", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/did-consolidating-polling-places-milwaukee-depress-turnout", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage__brennan-center-did-consolidating-polling-places-in-milwaukee.png"}, {"title": "PMC — Voting in a Pandemic: COVID-19 and Primary Turnout in Milwaukee", "url": "https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC8689108/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-milwaukee-2020-poll-worker-shortage__pmc-voting-in-a-pandemic-covid-19-and-primary-turnout-in-mil.png"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Election Workers (beyond Poinsett AR ei-2026-09-010)."}
{"id": "ga-signature-match-settlement-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-25", "uid": "C20260925-155410-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-25", "old_ids": ["ga-signature-match-settlement-2020"], "seq": "C00025", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03", "state": "GA", "description": "In Democratic Party of Georgia v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 1:19-cv-05028), the Democratic Party of Georgia, DSCC, and DCCC entered a Compromise Settlement Agreement with State Election Board defendants requiring that before an absentee ballot is rejected for a missing/mismatched signature, at least two additional registrars/clerks review it and a majority must agree to reject. Post-election, Georgia Republicans sued alleging the process was too lenient (dismissed for standing). SB 202 (2021) later replaced signature-match with ID-number verification for absentee ballots. Status Confirmed for the settlement's multi-reviewer rejection protocol and subsequent statutory overhaul.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Compromise Settlement Agreement (PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.283580/gov.uscourts.gand.283580.5.1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-signature-match-settlement-2020__courtlistener-recap-compromise-settlement-agreement-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse — Ga. Republican Party v. Raffensperger", "url": "https://clearinghouse.net/case/44530/"}], "notes": "Primary settlement document; partisan characterizations noted."}
{"id": "la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-16", "uid": "C20260925-183614-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-16", "old_ids": ["la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020"], "seq": "C00104", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03", "state": "CA", "description": "Los Angeles County's Voting Solutions for All People (VSAP) replaced neighborhood polling places with roughly 970–978 countywide vote centers for the March 2020 primary (multi-day voting; any-center model). LA Times and Common Cause reporting documented technology/check-in failures and long Election Day waits (substantial shares over 30 minutes; some over two hours) despite the consolidation sold as convenience. Status Confirmed major countywide vote-center centralization parallel to Maricopa 2016 PPE—fewer traditional precincts, centralized sites, wait-time/admin stress.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Times — L.A. County primary voting plagued with technology flaws", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-17/l-a-county-primary-voting-was-plagued-with-technology-flaws"}, {"title": "Common Cause CA — Problems & Promise (LA County vote centers report PDF)", "url": "https://www.commoncause.org/california/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LACountyVotingReport_WEB-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020__common-cause-ca-problems-promise-la-county-vote-centers-repo.pdf"}, {"title": "LA County RR/CC — Vote Center Placement Project", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/vsap/vote-center-placement-project", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020__la-county-rr-cc-vote-center-placement-project.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich maricopa vote-centers leaf.", "related": ["ca-la-county-2020-03-epollbook-sync-design-froze-devices-peak-checkin-provisional-ballots-independent-assessment"]}
{"id": "ny-2020-eo-presidential-primary-postponed-june-23", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-10", "uid": "C20260926-020640-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-10", "old_ids": ["ny-2020-eo-presidential-primary-postponed-june-23"], "seq": "C00943", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03", "state": "NY", "description": "Governor Cuomo's March 2020 executive order moved New York's presidential primary from **April 28 to June 23** amid COVID—an official calendar rewrite of Election Day timing after campaigns and county boards had planned around the original date. (State officials later tried to cancel the Democratic presidential primary; a federal court ordered it reinstated for June 23.) Status Confirmed executive date/time game shifting a major primary calendar; peer to WI April 2020 calendar fight and OH HB197 primary postponement—NY EO example, not those remounts.", "sources": [{"title": "NY Governor — EO moving presidential primary to June 23, 2020", "url": "https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/amid-ongoing-covid-19-pandemic-governor-cuomo-issues-executive-order-moving-new-york"}, {"title": "NYT — Cuomo postpones New York primary to June 23 for coronavirus", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/politics/ny-primary-voting-coronavirus.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on Date/Time games leaf."}
{"id": "oh-2020-primary-postponed-hb197-absentee", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-07", "uid": "C20260926-012939-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-07", "old_ids": ["oh-2020-primary-postponed-hb197-absentee"], "seq": "C00846", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03", "state": "OH", "description": "Ohio's March 17, 2020 primary was halted amid COVID-19 after last-minute health/order actions closed polls; the General Assembly's H.B. 197 then restructured completion of the primary into a primarily absentee process culminating April 28, 2020 (with limited in-person options and postmark/receipt rules). Contemporary NPR/AP coverage and the enrolled H.B. 197 document the sudden calendar and method shift. Status Confirmed for emergency date/method calendar games peer to Wisconsin's April 2020 court/EO/SCOTUS fight—not a fraud finding.", "sources": [{"title": "Ohio enrolled H.B. 197 (133rd GA) — primary postponement / absentee restructuring PDF", "url": "https://search-prod.lis.state.oh.us/api/v2/general_assembly_133/legislation/hb197/06_EN/pdf/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oh-2020-primary-postponed-hb197-absentee__ohio-enrolled-h-b-197-133rd-ga-primary-postponement-abs.pdf"}, {"title": "NPR — Ohio's Tuesday Primary Postponed Due To Coronavirus Fears", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2020/03/16/816610353/ohio-officials-request-postponing-tuesdays-primary-over-coronavirus-concerns"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to wi-april-2020-election-calendar-fight."}
{"id": "pew-2020-media-bubble-fifth-democrats-republicans-not-listen", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-04", "uid": "C20260926-003520-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-04", "old_ids": ["pew-2020-media-bubble-fifth-democrats-republicans-not-listen"], "seq": "C00717", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens stop listening to each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03-04", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's earlier Pathways cut found ~20% of Democrats and ~18% of Republicans got political news in a given week only from outlets with like-minded audiences—showing the 'will not listen to each other' isolation pattern before the 2020 campaign intensified. Status Confirmed for measured one-sided news diets.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — A fifth of Democrats, Republicans get news only from outlets with like-minded audiences (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/03/04/about-one-fifth-of-democrats-and-republicans-get-political-news-in-a-kind-of-media-bubble/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Americans are divided by party in the sources they turn to for political news (2020)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2020/01/24/americans-are-divided-by-party-in-the-sources-they-turn-to-for-political-news/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "ca-la-county-2020-03-epollbook-sync-design-froze-devices-peak-checkin-provisional-ballots-independent-assessment", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-10", "uid": "C20261026-180010-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-10", "old_ids": ["ca-la-county-2020-03-epollbook-sync-design-froze-devices-peak-checkin-provisional-ballots-independent-assessment"], "seq": "C01575", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-03-03 primary (assessment published June 2020)", "state": "CA", "description": "The Los Angeles County Chief Executive Office's \"Summary of Findings\" from its independent assessment of the March 2020 primary says that the electronic poll book technology used to check in voters at Vote Centers \"was not adequate for LA County's size and scope.\" [1] Design and testing issues \"caused the system to freeze frequently, resulting in long delays and bottlenecks during check-in at Vote Centers and requiring workers to provide provisional ballots to many voters who otherwise would have been permitted to vote in the traditional manner.\" [1] [3] The specific issues it lists include that \"The ePollbook design required devices to use significant processing power to sync during peak voter check-in times,\" that the system was not tested to meet the needs of a county the size of Los Angeles, and that device performance at each Vote Center could not be confirmed because the Vote Center locations were determined and set up at the last minute. [1] Status Confirmed by the county's own assessment that a poll book synchronization design problem froze check-in and caused many voters to receive provisional ballots. The finding concerns synchronization load and testing, not the content of registration data, and nothing indicates deliberate action.", "sources": [{"title": "Los Angeles County Chief Executive Office, Summary of Findings, Independent Assessment of the March 2020 Primary", "url": "https://ceo.lacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/LAC-Voting-Assessment-Summary-of-Findings.pdf"}, {"title": "Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, board correspondence of 2020-04-27", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/board-correspondence/04272020.pdf"}, {"title": "Common Cause California, report on the LA County voting experience (July 2020)", "url": "https://www.commoncause.org/california/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/LACountyVotingReport_WEB-1.pdf"}], "notes": "The quoted findings come from the county's Summary of Findings (source 1). Source 2 is the Registrar-Recorder's April 27, 2020 cover letter transmitting its report back to the Board of Supervisors on the March 2020 primary. Source 3 also describes ePollbook syncing problems that slowed check-in; it was not read in full.", "related": ["la-county-vsap-vote-centers-2020"]}
{"id": "mit-csail-2020-voatz-ballot-busted-security-analysis", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-09", "uid": "C20260926-022920-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-09", "old_ids": ["mit-csail-2020-voatz-ballot-busted-security-analysis"], "seq": "C01054", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will use the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) to push it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "MIT CSAIL researchers Michael A. Specter, James Koppel, and Daniel Weitzner published \"The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain\" (USENIX Security 2020): a security analysis of Voatz—the mobile/blockchain voting app promoted via NASS-hosted white papers and used in West Virginia UOCAVA pilots—finding vulnerabilities that could allow adversaries to alter, stop, or expose votes (device compromise, server-side manipulation, side channels, weak PIN). Status Confirmed peer-reviewed security paper; peer to NASS-hosted Voatz Winter19/Summer22 white papers on this leaf—adversarial analysis of the same product NASS platformed, not those remounts. PEP framing: association-channel push of phone voting outruns verifiable hand-marked paper safeguards.", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX Security 2020 — Specter, Koppel, Weitzner: The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain (PDF)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/sec20-specter.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-csail-2020-voatz-ballot-busted-security-analysis__usenix-security-2020-specter-koppel-weitzner-the-ballot-is-busted-before-the-blockchain-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX — presentation page: The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/specter", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-csail-2020-voatz-ballot-busted-security-analysis__usenix-presentation-page-the-ballot-is-busted-before-the-blockchain.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Use NASS to push mobile voting leaf.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "mit-voatz-mobile-voting-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-38", "uid": "C20260925-155410-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-38", "old_ids": ["mit-voatz-mobile-voting-2020"], "seq": "C00038", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-02", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "MIT researchers (Specter, Koppel, Weitzner) published a USENIX Security 2020 analysis of Voatz, a blockchain-marketed mobile voting app used in some U.S. elections for UOCAVA/absentee voters, finding multiple serious vulnerabilities including vote alteration/blocking possibilities and a ballot-secrecy leak via encrypted packet lengths (CVE-2020-8989). Status Confirmed for peer-reviewed/conference security findings on a deployed mobile-voting product—not a finding that any specific election outcome was flipped via Voatz.", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX Security 2020 — The Ballot is Busted Before the Blockchain (Voatz)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/specter", "local": "/archives/2026/09/encryption-linguistic-seed__usenix-security-2020-specter-et-al-voatz-analysis.png"}, {"title": "MIT Internet Policy — Voatz security analysis PDF", "url": "https://internetpolicy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SecurityAnalysisOfVoatz_Public.pdf"}, {"title": "CVE-2020-8989", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2020-8989", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-voatz-mobile-voting-2020__cve-2020-8989.png"}], "notes": "Canonical \"shiny new object\" mobile voting security case.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "doj-edva-2020-scott-mackenzie-sentenced-scam-pac-treasurer-conservative-majority-fund", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-02", "uid": "C20260926-024539-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-02", "old_ids": ["doj-edva-2020-scott-mackenzie-sentenced-scam-pac-treasurer-conservative-majority-fund"], "seq": "C01092", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Drain donors' money."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-02-21", "state": "VA / Federal", "description": "On Feb. 21, 2020, U.S. District Judge Liam O'Grady (E.D. Va.) sentenced scam-PAC treasurer Scott B. Mackenzie to 12 months and one day in prison, two years' probation, and $172,200 restitution after Mackenzie pleaded guilty to filing False FEC reports for Conservative Majority Fund / Conservative StrikeForce—PACs that raised millions from small-dollar donors while routing the bulk to fundraising/overhead rather than the causes marketed. Center for Public Integrity and DOJ materials contemporaneously describe the case as a historic professional-PAC-accountant prosecution for suck-up-money scam-PAC practice. Status Confirmed criminal sentence for False FEC reporting in a fundraising-overhead PAC ecosystem; peer to CLC/OpenSecrets scam-PAC inventory cards already on this leaf—Mackenzie treasurer sentence, not Kelley Rogers claim-our-side remount. PEP framing: fake groups that drain donor dollars away from transparent hand-count/reform work.", "sources": [{"title": "Center for Public Integrity — 'Scam PAC' treasurer Scott Mackenzie sentenced to federal prison (Feb. 21, 2020)", "url": "https://www.publicintegrity.org/politics/scam-pac-scott-mackenzie-court-justice-prison/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-edva-2020-scott-mackenzie-sentenced-scam-pac-treasurer-conservative-majority-fund__center-for-public-integrity-scam-pac-treasurer-scott-mackenz.png"}, {"title": "DOJ EDVA — Mackenzie criminal information (False FEC statements / Conservative Majority Fund) (Oct. 22, 2019)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/d9/press-releases/attachments/2019/10/22/mackenzie_information_2_0.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Fake Groups Suck up money leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-protect2020-strategic-plan-info-sharing-officials-dominance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-18", "uid": "C20260926-002757-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-18", "old_ids": ["cisa-protect2020-strategic-plan-info-sharing-officials-dominance"], "seq": "C00691", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Through election-security information dominance, they control exactly what our elected officials know."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-02-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA's #Protect2020 Strategic Plan describes GCC/SCC and EI-ISAC as primary coordinating bodies for two-way intelligence and best-practice sharing with state/local election officials—i.e., a federal information-dominance architecture controlling the threat/narrative package officials receive. Status Confirmed for the stated coordination architecture; 'usurpation' framing is catalog language over Confirmed voluntary-partnership design.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — #Protect2020 Strategic Plan PDF", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ESI%20Strategic%20Plan_FINAL%202.7.20%20508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-protect2020-strategic-plan-info-sharing-officials-dominance__cisa-protect2020-strategic-plan-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — GCC Executive Committee Aug 2020 readiness/info-sharing statement", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/joint-statement-election-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-executive-committee", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-protect2020-strategic-plan-info-sharing-officials-dominance__cisa-gcc-executive-committee-aug-2020-readiness-info-sharing.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "nbc-2020-ess-dominion-hart-cellular-modems-unofficial-results-airgap-myth", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-14", "uid": "C20260926-020046-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-14", "old_ids": ["nbc-2020-ess-dominion-hart-cellular-modems-unofficial-results-airgap-myth"], "seq": "C00932", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Start with disconnected, \"air-gapped\" systems, then mandate connections over several cycles until everything is networked."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01", "state": "US", "description": "NBC News (Jan. 10, 2020) reported that election-security researchers found dozens of voting-system back-ends online and that the three largest vendors—**ES&S, Dominion, and Hart**—acknowledged putting **cellular modems** in some tabulators/scanners to relay unofficial election-night results; ES&S told NBC ~14,000 DS200s with online modems were in use, and Hart ~1,600 modem tabulators in Michigan counties. Experts noted cellular networks still connect to the broader internet despite 'private APN / not public internet' vendor framing. Status Confirmed that modem/cellular unofficial-results paths contradict simplistic 'everything is air-gapped' citizen messaging—peer to ES&S modem FAQ and Virginia WinVote wireless DRE decertification on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC News — 'Online and vulnerable': experts find nearly three dozen U.S. voting systems connected to internet (modems)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436"}, {"title": "ES&S — Transmission of Unofficial Election Results FAQs (cellular/private-network modem practice)", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nbc-2020-ess-dominion-hart-cellular-modems-unofficial-results-airgap-myth__es-s-transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs-c.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on gradual network interconnection / air-gap narrative leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-34", "uid": "C20260925-155410-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-34", "old_ids": ["tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020"], "seq": "C00034", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Labs approve systems."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-24", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Deputy Secretary of State José A. Esparza denied state certification of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A on Jan. 24, 2020 after examiner reports concluded the system did not meet Texas Election Code §122.001 standards (accuracy/suitability/security concerns documented in SOS examination PDFs). The denial is an official refusal to certify—not a claim that EAC federal testing was fabricated, but evidence that state examiners rejected a federally reviewed configuration for Texas use. Status Confirmed for Texas non-certification decision and published examiner findings.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Dominion voting system examination status page", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/dominion.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-dominion-5-5-cert-denial-2019__texas-sos-dominion-voting-system-examination-status-pag.png"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Report of Review of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/sysexam/dominion-d-suite-5.5-a.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020__texas-sos-report-of-review-of-dominion-democracy-suite-5-5-a.pdf"}], "notes": "Maps to catalog Fake Testing and Certification leaf as certification-gate controversy; label carefully—not proof EAC certificates are forged. Fill-15g remount 2026-09-25.21-preview: stub Fake Testing and Certification → exact Labs approve systems Detail leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "tx-dominion-5-5a-state-exam-failed-fake-testing-and-certification-root", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-06", "uid": "C20261009-124707-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-06", "old_ids": ["tx-dominion-5-5a-state-exam-failed-fake-testing-and-certification-root"], "seq": "C01358", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Everyone downstream \"trusts\" the systems because they were \"tested\" and \"certified.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-24", "state": "TX", "description": "On January 24, 2020, Texas Deputy Secretary of State José A. Esparza denied state certification of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A after Texas voting-system examiners concluded the configuration did not meet Texas Election Code § 122.001 standards for accuracy, suitability, and security (concerns documented in the SOS Report of Review and examiner PDFs). The same family of systems had been through the federal VSTL/EAC testing pathway elsewhere, yet Texas still refused state certification—showing that \"certified\" upstream does not mean a system is fit for a state's own exam. Status Confirmed for the official Texas denial. Soft companion on the Fake Testing and Certification root (primary instance remains tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020 on Fake Testing / Certification > Labs approve systems.). Does not prove any VSTL falsified results; it does show vendor/lab certification theater is not a substitute for independent state scrutiny—or for paper hand counts citizens can observe.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Dominion voting system examination status page", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/dominion.shtml"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Report of Review of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/forms/sysexam/dominion-d-suite-5.5-a.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Oct. 2019 examiner report (Hurley) on Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A inspection", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/oct2019-hurley.pdf"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Soft companion on Fake Testing and Certification root; does not remount VSTL-pay leaf or FairVote financials. Standing VSTL remount noise skipped. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Fake Testing and Certification' to 'Fake Testing and Certification > Everyone downstream 'trusts' because they were 'tested' and 'certified'.'.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "doj-edva-2020-kelley-rogers-sentenced-scam-pacs-claim-conservative-side", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-05", "uid": "C20260926-023825-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-05", "old_ids": ["doj-edva-2020-kelley-rogers-sentenced-scam-pacs-claim-conservative-side"], "seq": "C01080", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Claim to be on our side."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-17", "state": "MD / VA / Federal", "description": "On Jan. 17, 2020, U.S. District Judge Liam O’Grady (E.D. Va.) sentenced Annapolis political consultant Kelley Rogers to three years in prison, three years supervised release, $491,299 restitution, and forfeiture after Rogers pleaded guilty to wire fraud for operating Conservative StrikeForce, Conservative Majority Fund, and Tea Party Majority Fund—PACs that claimed to support conservative candidates, veterans, GOTV, and 'election integrity' lawyers while diverting donor money to Rogers, associates, and further fundraising. CBS Baltimore / local coverage and the E.D. Va. charging papers corroborate the scam-PAC identity fraud. Status Confirmed federal criminal sentence; peer to SSCI IRA fake-activist groups and OpenSecrets scam-PAC identity cards already on this leaf—criminal conviction of U.S. scam-PAC operator claiming the conservative side, not those remounted. PEP framing: fake 'our side' fundraising siphons energy from real hand-count / integrity work.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Baltimore — Maryland political consultant Kelley Rogers sentenced for scam conservative PACs (Jan. 2020)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/baltimore/news/kelley-rogers-sentencing-scam-convservative-pacs/"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP — United States v. Kelley Rogers, E.D. Va. 19-CR-270 charging / plea papers", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.452710/gov.uscourts.vaed.452710.5.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-edva-2020-kelley-rogers-sentenced-scam-pacs-claim-conservative-side__courtlistener-recap-united-states-v-kelley-rogers-e-d-va-19-cr-270-charging-plea-papers-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Fake Groups claim-to-be-on-our-side leaf."}
{"id": "edva-2020-kelley-rogers-sentenced-3yrs-scam-pac-consultant-redirect-donors", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-02", "uid": "C20260926-025634-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-02", "old_ids": ["edva-2020-kelley-rogers-sentenced-3yrs-scam-pac-consultant-redirect-donors"], "seq": "C01107", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Redirect citizens away from real solutions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-17", "state": "VA / Federal", "description": "On Jan. 17, 2020, U.S. District Judge Liam O'Grady (E.D. Va.) sentenced scam-PAC consultant Kelley Rogers to three years in federal prison, three years supervised release, $491,299 restitution, and ≥$208,954 forfeiture after Rogers pleaded guilty to wire fraud for operating Conservative StrikeForce / Conservative Majority Fund / Tea Party Majority Fund—PACs that, per contemporaneous DOJ/WaPo reporting cited in Campaigns & Elections, raised ~$20 million from >9,000 conservative donors (2011–2018) while routing less than 2% to the marketed candidates and using fake invoices/false FEC statements to misappropriate the rest. Status Confirmed criminal sentence for redirecting donor dollars away from candidate/cause solutions into fundraising overhead and personal diversion; peer to OpenSecrets scam-PAC redirect inventory and FEC §30124 framework cards already on this leaf—Rogers consultant sentence, not Mackenzie treasurer remount (that card lives on Suck up money). PEP framing: fake groups that drain citizen resources away from hand-count/PEP solutions.", "sources": [{"title": "Campaigns & Elections — Scam PAC Consultant Gets Three Years in Federal Prison (Jan. 17, 2020)", "url": "https://campaignsandelections.com/industry-news/scam-pac-consultant-gets-three-years-in-federal-prison/"}, {"title": "ProPublica — Political Fundraiser Pleads Guilty To Fraud (Rogers plea coverage)", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/political-fundraiser-pleads-guilty-to-fraud"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Fake Groups Redirect the citizens away from real solutions leaf."}
{"id": "appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-independence-hidden-from-officials", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-08", "uid": "C20260926-031602-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-08", "old_ids": ["appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-independence-hidden-from-officials"], "seq": "C01173", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "If done properly, manipulation through the feedback loop remains hidden from county officials."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Appel & Stark's Evidence-Based Elections (Princeton CS; 2020) and Rivest/Stark software-independence literature state that undetected software/EMS faults can change outcomes without detection by election officials who only observe machine reports—unless a voter-verifiable paper trail is publicly audited or hand-counted. Software independence requires that an undetected change or error in software cannot cause an undetectable change in outcome; feedback-loop manipulation inside opaque EMS stacks fails that test from the county official's vantage point. Status Confirmed primary Appel-Stark evidence-based / software-independence framing that EMS manipulation stays hidden from officials without paper audits; peer to early-vote-files campaign-feedback-opaque and Rivest software-independence cards already on this leaf—Appel-Stark Evidence-Based Elections instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: only public hand examination of paper breaks the hidden-from-officials feedback loop.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel & Stark — Evidence-Based Elections (Princeton CS PDF, 2020)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-stark-2020-evidence-based-elections-software-independence-hidden-from-officials__appel-stark-evidence-based-elections-princeton-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Rivest — On the notion of software-independence in voting systems (NIST/companion definition)", "url": "https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv08z.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Feedback Loop hidden from county officials leaf."}
{"id": "az-const-county-recorder-partisan-office-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-28", "uid": "C20260926-004030-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-28", "old_ids": ["az-const-county-recorder-partisan-office-companion"], "seq": "C00781", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Others"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona's county recorder is a constitutionally/statutorily elected partisan county office that administers elections—exemplifying election administration vested in partisan elected officials rather than nonpartisan administrators. Soft remount of existing AZ recorder partisan-office card family. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Election Administration (AZ County Recorder row)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels"}, {"title": "Brennan/Vox — SOS races as election-administration control narrative companion", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/secretaries-state-2022-midterms-what-know"}, {"title": "Brennan/Vox — SOS races as election-administration control narrative companion", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-october-2022", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-const-county-recorder-partisan-office-companion__brennan-vox-sos-races-as-election-administration-control-narrative-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "bjs-2020-hiring-retention-leo-separations-force-retirement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-20", "uid": "C20260926-003520-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-20", "old_ids": ["bjs-2020-hiring-retention-leo-separations-force-retirement"], "seq": "C00733", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Force good officers into retirement by making the job miserable."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "BJS statistical tables on 2020 LE hiring/retention document tens of thousands of separations with voluntary resignations a large share of departures and substantial vacancies—confirming structural pressure pushing officers out of the profession. Status Confirmed for measured separation/vacancy patterns.", "sources": [{"title": "BJS — Hiring and Retention of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers, 2020 (PDF)", "url": "https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/hrslleo20st.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/bjs-2020-hiring-retention-leo-separations-force-retirement__bjs-hiring-and-retention-of-state-and-local-law-enforcement.pdf"}, {"title": "PERF — Staffing 2023 survey (resignations/retirements companion)", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2023", "local": "/archives/2026/09/bjs-2020-hiring-retention-leo-separations-force-retirement__perf-staffing-2023-survey-resignations-retirements-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "bjs-2020-separations-push-out-officers-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-24", "uid": "C20260926-004030-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-24", "old_ids": ["bjs-2020-separations-push-out-officers-companion"], "seq": "C00777", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Push out good officers to make room for officers who will not uphold the Constitution."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "BJS hiring/retention statistical tables quantify LE separations and recruitment shortfalls that create vacancies filled under pressure—structural conditions for pushing out experienced officers. Status Confirmed for separation/vacancy dynamics.", "sources": [{"title": "BJS — Hiring and Retention of State and Local Law Enforcement Officers, 2020 (PDF)", "url": "https://bjs.ojp.gov/document/hrslleo20st.pdf"}, {"title": "PERF — Staffing 2023 survey companion", "url": "https://www.policeforum.org/staffing2023"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "cis-essential-guide-county-it-shared-election-systems", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-18", "uid": "C20260926-004030-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-18", "old_ids": ["cis-essential-guide-county-it-shared-election-systems"], "seq": "C00771", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County IT staff"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "CIS Essential Guide to Election Security explicitly notes IT responsibilities are often shared with the rest of the county (shared county IT supporting elections)—placing county IT staff inside the same coordinated election-infrastructure ecosystem as clerks and vendors. Status Confirmed for shared county-IT / election-systems architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "CIS — Essential Guide to Election Security (PDF)", "url": "https://essentialguide.docs.cisecurity.org/_/downloads/en/v1.0.0/pdf/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-essential-guide-county-it-shared-election-systems__cis-essential-guide-to-election-security-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan (coordination architecture)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_specific_plan.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "cis-essential-guide-election-security-county-it-shared-services-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-11", "uid": "C20260926-031602-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-11", "old_ids": ["cis-essential-guide-election-security-county-it-shared-services-lockstep"], "seq": "C01176", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County IT staff"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CIS's Essential Guide to Election Security (EI-ISAC) instructs election offices—including those whose systems are hosted or supported by shared county IT—to inventory hardware/software/contractors/cloud, join EI-ISAC threat-intel channels, and operate under common hardening playbooks—documenting how county IT staff become lockstep operators of election infrastructure even when the clerk remains the named election official. Status Confirmed primary CIS Essential Guide documenting county-IT shared-services lockstep for election systems; peer to CISA Join EI-ISAC and CIS EI-ISAC hub cards already on this leaf—Essential Guide PDF instance, not those join-page remounts. PEP framing: centralized county-IT playbooks that treat elections as generic IT enlarge blast radius versus precinct-level hand-count simplicity.", "sources": [{"title": "CIS — Essential Guide to Election Security (PDF download)", "url": "https://essentialguide.docs.cisecurity.org/_/downloads/en/v1.0.0/pdf/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-essential-guide-election-security-county-it-shared-services-lockstep__cis-essential-guide-election-security-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CIS Essential Guide — Join the EI-ISAC (county IT / election-support membership)", "url": "https://essentialguide.docs.cisecurity.org/en/v1.41/bp/join_ei_isac.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cis-essential-guide-election-security-county-it-shared-services-lockstep__cis-essential-guide-join-ei-isac.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Infiltration of Offices County IT Staff leaf."}
{"id": "cisa-ei-isac-county-it-staff-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-17", "uid": "C20260926-004030-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-17", "old_ids": ["cisa-ei-isac-county-it-staff-lockstep"], "seq": "C00770", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County IT staff"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "CISA and CIS's Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC) enroll state/local election-supporting organizations—including county IT that shares or supports election systems—into a common threat-intel, alerting, and coordination channel with the Election Infrastructure GCC. That is institutional lock-step for county IT staff on election-security messaging and practices. Soft remount of fill-20j GCC/CISA county lock-step family onto County IT Staff pathKey. Status Confirmed for coordinated county-IT election-security architecture; sinister personnel 'infiltration' Alleged beyond coordination evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "CISA — Join the Elections Infrastructure ISAC (EI-ISAC)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/groups/join-elections-infrastructure-information-sharing-and-analysis-center-ei-isac", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-ei-isac-county-it-staff-lockstep__cisa-join-the-elections-infrastructure-isac-ei-isac.png"}, {"title": "CIS — EI-ISAC homepage (threat intel for SLTT election offices)", "url": "https://www.cisecurity.org/ei-isac", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cisa-ei-isac-county-it-staff-lockstep__cis-ei-isac-homepage-threat-intel-for-sltt-election-offices.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 9. Soft remount of GCC/CISA coordination onto County IT Staff. Coordination Confirmed; infiltration Alleged."}
{"id": "crs-census-apportionment-population-includes-noncitizens-headroom", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-30", "uid": "C20260926-002757-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-30", "old_ids": ["crs-census-apportionment-population-includes-noncitizens-headroom"], "seq": "C00703", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Population numbers are inflated by every available means to create headroom for more registered voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Longstanding Census/apportionment practice includes noncitizens in the apportionment population used for House seats and Electoral College allocation—creating structural population headroom independent of citizen registration rolls. Academic/policy literature documents the resulting representation gap between total-population seats and citizen voters. Status Confirmed for inclusion practice; partisan seat-shift magnitude estimates vary by source.", "sources": [{"title": "Census — Congressional Apportionment brief 2020", "url": "https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/2020/census-briefs/c2020br-01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-census-apportionment-population-includes-noncitizens-headroom__census-congressional-apportionment-brief-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "Sociological Science — Periodic Discordance Between Vote Equality and Representational Equality (peer-reviewed companion)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.15195/v2.a21"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "crs-hava-statewide-voter-registration-list-county-access", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-32", "uid": "C20260926-003520-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-32", "old_ids": ["crs-hava-statewide-voter-registration-list-county-access"], "seq": "C00745", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "If elected county officials do not fully control all registrations, a huge attack surface is left open."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "HAVA/CRS materials on computerized statewide voter registration lists require a single interactive statewide list with local official access—centralizing registration authority at the state-system layer rather than leaving counties as sole controllers of all records. Status Confirmed for statewide VRDB architecture reducing exclusive county control.", "sources": [{"title": "US Code — 52 USC 21083 computerized statewide voter registration list requirements", "url": "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?edition=prelim&f=treesort&num=0&req=%28title%3A52+section%3A21083+edition%3Aprelim%29+OR+%28granuleid%3AUSC-prelim-title52-section21083%29", "local": "/archives/2026/09/crs-hava-statewide-voter-registration-list-county-access__us-code-52-usc-21083-computerized-statewide-voter-registration-list-requirements.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration (agency-to-election-official transfers)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "naco-2020-county-role-secure-elections-sheriffs-layer", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-18", "uid": "C20260926-003520-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-18", "old_ids": ["naco-2020-county-role-secure-elections-sheriffs-layer"], "seq": "C00731", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County sheriffs"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NACo documents counties' central role administering secure elections and coordinating with state/federal partners— situating county sheriffs within the institutional lock-step that the catalog flags when offices move in common frameworks inhibiting independent transparency challenges. Status Confirmed for county election-admin coordination role.", "sources": [{"title": "NACo — The County Role in Elections", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/county-role-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-and-accurate-elections"}, {"title": "NASS — Joint statement / Tabletop the Vote 2022 (election security partners companion)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/node/2450", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-2020-county-role-secure-elections-sheriffs-layer__nass-joint-statement-tabletop-the-vote-2022-election-security-partners-companion.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "naco-county-role-elections-county-attorneys-lockstep", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-16", "uid": "C20260926-003520-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-16", "old_ids": ["naco-county-role-elections-county-attorneys-lockstep"], "seq": "C00729", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County attorneys"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NACo's county-role-in-elections materials describe counties administering elections within state/federal frameworks and coordinating with partners on security and accuracy—placing county legal/prosecutorial offices inside the same multi-agency election-security ecosystem as clerks and sheriffs. Status Confirmed for county institutional role in the coordinated election-admin architecture.", "sources": [{"title": "NACo — The County Role in Elections: How Counties Administer Secure Elections", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/county-role-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-and-accurate-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-county-role-elections-county-attorneys-lockstep__naco-the-county-role-in-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-elections.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Infrastructure Subsector-Specific Plan (coordination architecture)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/election_infrastructure_subsector_specific_plan.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 8 companion."}
{"id": "naco-county-role-elections-county-judges-layer", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-20", "uid": "C20260926-004030-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-20", "old_ids": ["naco-county-role-elections-county-judges-layer"], "seq": "C00773", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Public Offices", "We have observed individuals placed in the following positions over time, operating in lockstep to inhibit transparency and verifiability in elections:", "County judges"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NACo's county-role-in-elections materials describe counties administering elections within multi-agency state/federal frameworks—placing county courts/judges (who hear election contests, ballot disputes, and related orders in many states) inside the same institutional lock-step as clerks and attorneys. Status Confirmed for county institutional role; infiltration motive Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "NACo — The County Role in Elections", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/county-role-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-and-accurate-elections"}, {"title": "NCSL — Election Administration at State and Local Levels (county structures)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-administration-at-state-and-local-levels"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 10 companion."}
{"id": "naco-unc-sheriff-interlocal-contracts-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-22", "uid": "C20260926-004030-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-22", "old_ids": ["naco-unc-sheriff-interlocal-contracts-companion"], "seq": "C00775", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are being drawn into the service of the county (as a corporation) and the state through interlocal agreements and county policies."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "UNC School of Government and NACo-adjacent county practice materials document routine city–county contracts for sheriff-provided LE services under governing-board approval—normalizing sheriffs as contracted county/municipal service providers. Status Confirmed for interlocal contracting practice.", "sources": [{"title": "UNC SOG — Contracts between Cities and Sheriffs (and Counties) for Law Enforcement Services (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/reports/2025-10-17%202025154%20LGLB%20144_Welty.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/naco-unc-sheriff-interlocal-contracts-companion__unc-sog-contracts-between-cities-and-sheriffs-and-counties-for-law-enforcement-services-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NACo — County Role in Elections (county LE/admin layer companion)", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resources/county-role-elections-how-counties-administer-secure-and-accurate-elections"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "mt-2020-gop-funded-green-party-ballot-petition-struck-by-courts", "permanent_id": "C20261030-122043-02", "uid": "C20261030-122043-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-122043-02", "old_ids": ["mt-2020-gop-funded-green-party-ballot-petition-struck-by-courts"], "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Stack the ballot with spoilers to split the opponent's vote"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-163642-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-163642-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020-01 to 2020-03 (petition); 2020-08-07 (district court); 2020-08-19 / 2020-09-23 (Montana Supreme Court)", "state": "MT", "description": "In early 2020, petition circulators gathered signatures to qualify the Montana Green Party for the primary and the November 2020 general-election ballot. Montana Green Party leadership disclaimed the petition in February and later disclaimed the candidates running under its name. On March 24, 2020, news reports revealed that the Montana Republican Party had sponsored and organized the petition: its central committee contracted the firm Advanced Micro Targeting to gather signatures, reported as an in-kind contribution to \"Montanans for Conservation,\" an independent committee whose sole contributor was the Montana Republican Party. After signers learned who was behind it, hundreds asked to withdraw their names; AP reported more than 560. On Aug. 7, 2020, District Judge James Reynolds of Lewis and Clark County honored the withdrawals and enjoined the Secretary of State from giving the petition effect. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed by order on Aug. 19 and in a published opinion on Sept. 23, 2020 (Montana Democratic Party v. Stapleton, 2020 MT 244), holding that the party seeking ballot access must itself present the petition and that this one was neither presented nor supported by the Montana Green Party. Status Confirmed: the courts found the Republican Party sponsored the petition and the Green Party disavowed it. Catalog point: one party paid to put a third party's candidates on the ballot without that party's consent, and it was caught only because outsiders traced the money and contacted signers before the deadline.", "sources": [{"title": "Montana Supreme Court — Montana Democratic Party v. Stapleton, 2020 MT 244, DA 20-0396 (Sept. 23, 2020; copy via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Opinion-Published-2.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Montana Democratic Party v. Stapleton (2020) (curl 403, linked only)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/montana/supreme-court/2020/da-20-0396-0.html"}, {"title": "Associated Press — State Supreme Court upholds ruling on Green Party candidates (Aug. 2020; curl 403, linked only)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-2020-montana-general-elections-elections-courts-0e357bf53492c4e54c26e7af5d47ef35"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-30 (open web, zero X API). Peers on this leaf: Alaska 2026 spoilers; Florida SD37 ghost candidate. Opinion PDF curl 200, read with pdftotext (Advanced Micro Targeting, Montanans for Conservation, Decided Sept. 23, 2020). Signer-withdrawal count (560+) from AP via WebSearch extract. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ia-woodbury-2020-kim-taylor-forged-absentee-ballots-for-absent-children-52-counts-affirmed", "permanent_id": "C20261104-122254-01", "uid": "C20261104-122254-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-122254-01", "old_ids": ["ia-woodbury-2020-kim-taylor-forged-absentee-ballots-for-absent-children-52-counts-affirmed"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Injection of Votes for Existing Voters (Identity Theft)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2020 (primary and general elections); 2023-11-21 (jury verdict); 2024-04-01 (sentence); 2025-11-17 (Eighth Circuit affirms)", "state": "IA", "description": "In Sioux City, Iowa, during the 2020 elections, Kim Phuong Taylor, wife of Republican candidate Jeremy Taylor (an unsuccessful candidate for Iowa's 4th Congressional District in the June 2020 primary, then elected Woodbury County supervisor that November), ran what the Eighth Circuit called her own get-out-the-vote campaign among Vietnamese American families, some of whom struggled with English. She brought absentee forms, translated them, returned them to the county auditor's office, and came back to help fill out the ballots. When she learned a voting-age child was away from home, for example at college, she told another family member to complete the forms and vote on that child's behalf, or completed them herself; she turned in 26 doctored documents with handwriting or signatures that were not the children's own. Witnesses testified the signatures on their absentee requests and return envelopes were not theirs, and some said they went to vote in 2020 and were told they had already voted. The Woodbury County auditor grew suspicious and contacted the FBI. On Nov. 21, 2023, a federal jury convicted her on all 52 counts (3 fraudulent registration, 26 false information in registering and voting, 23 fraudulent voting). On April 1, 2024, Judge Leonard Strand sentenced her to four months in prison and four months of home confinement, below the 18-24 month guideline range prosecutors sought. Jeremy Taylor was named an unindicted co-conspirator and was not charged. On Nov. 17, 2025, the Eighth Circuit affirmed (United States v. Taylor, No. 24-1741), opening: \"Voter fraud is no myth.\" Status Confirmed: jury verdict, sentence, and published appellate affirmance. Catalog point: through the mail-ballot channel, ballots were requested and cast in the names of real, registered voters who were not there, and the voters themselves learned of it only when they showed up and were told they had already voted. Here an alert county auditor caught it; in-person Election Day voting with check-in against the poll book puts the actual voter in front of the precinct workers and removes that channel.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit — United States v. Kim Phuong Taylor, No. 24-1741 (filed Nov. 17, 2025)", "url": "https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/25/11/241741P.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ia-taylor-8th-cir-24-1741-opinion.pdf"}, {"title": "KTIV — Kim Taylor sentenced to eight months for voter fraud (April 1, 2024)", "url": "https://www.ktiv.com/2024/04/01/kim-taylor-sentenced-eight-months-voter-fraud/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ktiv-kim-taylor-sentenced-2024-04-01.html"}, {"title": "Iowa Public Radio — Kim Taylor sentenced to four months in prison for voter fraud (April 2, 2024)", "url": "https://www.iowapublicradio.org/ipr-news/2024-04-02/prison-sentence-for-wife-of-woodbury-county-supervisor-federal-prosecutors-wanted-more", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ipr-kim-taylor-sentenced-2024-04-02.html"}, {"title": "KWIT — Sioux City woman ends prison term for voter fraud (Aug. 27, 2024; witnesses told they had already voted)", "url": "https://www.kwit.org/podcast/spm-news-english/2024-08-27/newscast-8-27-2024-sioux-city-woman-ends-prison-term-for-voter-fraud-period-to-request-early-ballots-has-begun"}, {"title": "KCAU — 'Voter fraud is no myth': Court denies Kim Taylor's appeal (Nov. 2025)", "url": "https://www.kcau9.com/news/local-news/voter-fraud-is-no-myth-court-denies-kim-taylors-appeal/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-04 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (1 -> 2), peer Dauphin 2026 canvasser card. Opinion PDF read with pdftotext; opinion, KTIV and IPR archived (curl 200); KWIT and KCAU linked only. Party label stated because sources state it. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "brennan-avr-how-it-works-maximize-registration-encourage-everyone", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-35", "uid": "C20260926-002008-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-35", "old_ids": ["brennan-avr-how-it-works-maximize-registration-encourage-everyone"], "seq": "C00668", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Encourage everyone to register to vote to create as many registrations as possible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center AVR guidance and impact reports document Automatic Voter Registration as an explicit maximize-registrations design: opt-out DMV/agency flows, electronic transmission, and expansion beyond DMVs to put as many eligible people on the rolls as possible. Soft remount of prior Motor-Voter/AVR cards onto this Feedback Loop encourage-everyone pathKey. PEP contrast: expanding rolls without software-independent precinct hand count of hand-marked paper increases reliance on database-mediated eligibility; properly-run hand count remains viable for counting ballots cast (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep). Status Confirmed for maximize-registration policy design.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Automatic and Permanent Voter Registration: How It Works", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/media/117/download/Report_Automatic_Permanent_Voter_Registration_How_It_Works.pdf?inline=1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-avr-how-it-works-maximize-registration-encourage-everyone__brennan-center-automatic-and-permanent-voter-registration-how-it-works.pdf"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — AVR Impact on State Voter Registration", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/media/156/download/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf?inline=1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-avr-how-it-works-maximize-registration-encourage-everyone__brennan-center-avr-impact-on-state-voter-registration.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 18. Soft remount AVR/Motor-Voter family. PEP framing on software-dependent roll expansion vs hand count."}
{"id": "ca-2-ccr-19081-inactivating-cancelling-voters-after-notice", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-05", "uid": "C20260925-212129-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-05", "old_ids": ["ca-2-ccr-19081-inactivating-cancelling-voters-after-notice"], "seq": "C00302", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration records are changed to inactive without the voter's knowledge, preventing them from voting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-67", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "CA", "description": "California Code of Regulations title 2 §19081 implements NVRA-style list maintenance: counties inactivate and may later cancel registrations after forwardable confirmation notices and continued inactivity, changing status in the statewide database without requiring affirmative voter acknowledgment beyond the mailed notice. Voters who miss/ignore the notice can discover inactive/cancelled status at the polls and be steered to provisional/affirmation pathways. Status Confirmed for regulatory inactive/cancel pipeline triggered without in-person voter knowledge.", "sources": [{"title": "2 CCR §19081 — Inactivating and Cancelling Voters (Cornell LII)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/2-CCR-19081"}, {"title": "California SOS — NVRA Manual Ch. 4 Voter List Maintenance", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voter-registration/nvra/laws-standards/nvra-manual/chap-4", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-2-ccr-19081-inactivating-cancelling-voters-after-notice__california-sos-nvra-manual-ch-4-voter-list-maintenance.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-security-docs-not-public-logs-shield", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-29", "uid": "C20260925-214102-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-29", "old_ids": ["ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-security-docs-not-public-logs-shield"], "seq": "C00352", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "No access to security logs, hash testing, penetration testing, or ballot review files"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-61", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "GA", "description": "O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.24(g) withholds from public inspection documents/information that would endanger voting-system security — a statutory shield repeatedly used in Curling litigation to seal or deny citizen access to system security materials, test artifacts, and related review files. Status Confirmed for legal non-access to security-sensitive election-system records including materials that would encompass logs/testing/ballot-review file classes.", "sources": [{"title": "Election Law Navigator — O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.24", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/georgia/statute/21-2-379.24/"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Curling order discussing §21-2-379.24(g) seal", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.463.0.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 15. Related fill-15f card mounts Legislation>restrict citizen access; this mounts Records>no access to security logs exact leaf."}
{"id": "ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-voting-system-security-docs-not-public", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-02", "uid": "C20260925-212129-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-02", "old_ids": ["ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-voting-system-security-docs-not-public"], "seq": "C00299", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that restrict citizens' access, blocking us from seeing or verifying our own election system."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "GA", "description": "O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.24(g) provides that documents or information that, if made public, would endanger the security of any voting system used or considered for use in Georgia are not open to public inspection except by court order — a statutory shield repeatedly invoked in Curling litigation over Dominion BMD/software materials. Status Confirmed for Georgia law restricting citizen Open Records access to voting-system security documents.", "sources": [{"title": "Election Law Navigator — O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.24", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/georgia/statute/21-2-379.24/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-voting-system-security-docs-not-public__election-law-navigator-o-c-g-a-21-2-379-24.png"}, {"title": "Curling v. Raffensperger — court order discussing §21-2-379.24(g) seal (CourtListener PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.463.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-ocga-21-2-379-24-voting-system-security-docs-not-public__curling-v-raffensperger-court-order-discussing-21-2-379-24-g.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 1 companion.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "gao-19-485-voter-registration-list-management-address-data-risks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-34", "uid": "C20260926-002008-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-34", "old_ids": ["gao-19-485-voter-registration-list-management-address-data-risks"], "seq": "C00667", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Addresses modified (street names) to send ballots to known bad addresses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-19-485 reviews federal enforcement and state/local list management, including reliance on address/NCOA/returned-mail data with acknowledged matching and data-quality risks—i.e., street/address defects propagate into ballot-mail misdirection. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-19-485 — Voter Registration: Federal Enforcement and State/Local List Management", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485.pdf"}, {"title": "Lawyers' Committee — Returned Mail memo (undeliverable causes beyond relocation)", "url": "https://www.lawyerscommittee.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Returned-Mail-Memo-Final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-19-485-voter-registration-list-management-address-data-risks__lawyers-committee-returned-mail-memo-undeliverable-causes-be.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-16", "uid": "C20260926-013447-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-16", "old_ids": ["hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail"], "seq": "C00875", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Many states have permanent mail-ballot lists, causing a perpetual flood of ballots in the mail."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "HI", "description": "Hawaii Act 136 (2019) (HB1248 CD1) implemented statewide elections by mail beginning with the 2020 primary: the Office of Elections mails ballots to registered voters on the active list (subject to address validity), making Hawaii an all-mail jurisdiction where a separate 'permanent absentee' opt-in list is unnecessary because every active registrant is in the perpetual mail-ballot stream. Hawaii Elections' implementing report documents the transition. Status Confirmed for statutory all-mail / permanent mail-ballot flood architecture—third example alongside NCSL permanent-absentee list states and Ballotpedia all-mail-state inventory on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Hawaii Legislature — HB1248 CD1 / Act 136 (2019) elections by mail", "url": "https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/sessions/session2019/bills/HB1248_CD1_.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail__hawaii-legislature-hb1248-cd1-act-136-2019-elections-by.pdf"}, {"title": "Hawaii Elections — Implementing Elections by Mail Report (Nov 20, 2020 PDF)", "url": "https://elections.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020-11-20-Implementing-Elections-by-Mail-Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail__hawaii-elections-implementing-elections-by-mail-report.pdf"}, {"title": "HRS §11-101 — Elections by mail (current)", "url": "https://www.capitol.hawaii.gov/hrscurrent/Vol01_Ch0001-0042F/HRS0011/HRS_0011-0101.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail__hrs-11-101-elections-by-mail-current.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on permanent mail / all-mail flood leaf.", "related": ["nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates"]}
{"id": "jersey-city-nj-airbnb-filibuster-public-comment-hours-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-02", "uid": "C20260925-205354-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-02", "old_ids": ["jersey-city-nj-airbnb-filibuster-public-comment-hours-2019"], "seq": "C00217", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "People are assigned to run out the clock and eliminate or reduce our time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "NJ", "description": "When Jersey City Council later cut public-comment time from five minutes to three, Councilman James Solomon publicly described a recurring 'filibuster' pattern on issues such as Airbnb in which coordinated speakers forced the Council to spend upwards of seven hours on a single vote, pushing other public business past 1 a.m. Status Confirmed for the acknowledged run-out-the-clock / filibuster use of comment time that officials cited as the reason for tighter limits.", "sources": [{"title": "Hudson County View — Jersey City Council scales public comment from 5 to 3 minutes", "url": "https://hudsoncountyview.com/jersey-city-council-votes-to-scale-back-public-comment-from-5-minutes-to-3-minutes-each/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 1. Filibuster/run-clock acknowledged by councilmember."}
{"id": "jersey-city-nj-public-comment-5-to-3-minutes-ordinance", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-04", "uid": "C20260925-205354-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-04", "old_ids": ["jersey-city-nj-public-comment-5-to-3-minutes-ordinance"], "seq": "C00219", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Public speaking time is continually reduced"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "NJ", "description": "Jersey City Council passed an ordinance reducing public-portion speaking time from five minutes to three minutes per speaker (5–3 vote) and newly imposing a five-minute cap at budget hearings that previously had no limit. Status Confirmed for the statutory reduction of public speaking time.", "sources": [{"title": "Hudson County View — Jersey City Council scales public comment from 5 to 3 minutes", "url": "https://hudsoncountyview.com/jersey-city-council-votes-to-scale-back-public-comment-from-5-minutes-to-3-minutes-each/"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 2."}
{"id": "minnesota-2019-national-popular-vote-buried-omnibus-elections-bill", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-26", "uid": "C20260925-212129-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-26", "old_ids": ["minnesota-2019-national-popular-vote-buried-omnibus-elections-bill"], "seq": "C00323", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They inundate legislators with so many lengthy bills that no one has a chance to read them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota lawmakers in 2019 advanced National Popular Vote Compact language by placing it inside a larger omnibus elections bill — a documented tactic of burying consequential election rules inside lengthy packages that few legislators fully read line-by-line. Status Confirmed for election-rule burial in omnibus form (passage outcome may vary by session; the inundation/burial method is the Confirmed fact).", "sources": [{"title": "FEE — Minnesota lawmakers try to pass NPV by burying it in an omnibus bill", "url": "https://fee.org/articles/minnesota-lawmakers-are-trying-to-pass-national-popular-vote-by-burying-it-an-omnibus-bill/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/minnesota-2019-national-popular-vote-buried-omnibus-elections-bill__fee-minnesota-lawmakers-try-to-pass-npv-by-burying-it-in-an.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 15 companion. Election-specific omnibus burial example."}
{"id": "nyc-charter-rcv-also-known-as-instant-runoff-voting-ballot-abstract", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-08", "uid": "C20260925-233150-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-08", "old_ids": ["nyc-charter-rcv-also-known-as-instant-runoff-voting-ballot-abstract"], "seq": "C00401", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Beware of RCV implemented under a different name."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "NY", "description": "New York City's charter-revision ballot materials instituting ranked choice voting for specified municipal primaries/specials expressly equate the reform with instant runoff voting—the same transfer/elimination rules—demonstrating official adoption of RCV under the IRV synonym. Status Confirmed for NYC's dual naming of one method in formal ballot/Charter language.", "sources": [{"title": "NYC Votes — Ranked Choice Voting (official explanation)", "url": "https://www.vote.nyc/page/ranked-choice-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nyc-charter-rcv-also-known-as-instant-runoff-voting-ballot-abstract__nyc-votes-ranked-choice-voting-official-explanation.png"}, {"title": "FairVote press — NYC officials call for Instant Runoff Voting (same reform branding)", "url": "https://fairvote.org/press/nyc_elected_officials_and_advocates_call_for_instant_runoff_voting/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "pa-auditor-depasquale-voting-vendor-gifts-67-counties-trust-appearance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-14", "uid": "C20260926-000809-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-14", "old_ids": ["pa-auditor-depasquale-voting-vendor-gifts-67-counties-trust-appearance"], "seq": "C00567", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to trust machines and vendors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania Auditor General Eugene DePasquale surveyed all 67 counties on gifts from voting-machine vendors after an official served on an ES&S advisory board; 18 counties reported gifts ranging from Vegas trips to chocolate pretzels. DePasquale stated even legal small gifts 'smack of impropriety' when security/effectiveness should drive procurement—evidence of institutional pressure toward vendor trust. Status Confirmed for gift/hospitality pattern fostering vendor trust; no finding that gifts changed specific awards.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — PA Auditor General survey of county gifts from vendors", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/718270183/trips-to-vegas-and-chocolate-covered-pretzels-election-vendors-come-under-scruti"}, {"title": "WJAC — Audit says officials took freebies from voting machine firms", "url": "https://wjactv.com/news/local/audit-says-officials-took-freebies-from-voting-machine-firms"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 7 companion.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "philly-expressvote-xl-29m-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-06", "uid": "C20260925-183614-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-06", "old_ids": ["philly-expressvote-xl-29m-2019"], "seq": "C00094", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Update Scam", "Vulnerabilities are found, or \"found,\" to spur states and counties to buy new equipment and software to \"fix\" the problems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "PA", "description": "After Pennsylvania required counties to replace paperless DREs with voter-verifiable paper systems, Philadelphia awarded roughly a $29 million contract for ES&S ExpressVote XL ballot-marking/tabulation equipment (City Controller voting-technology procurement investigation; contemporary WHYY/PBS coverage of statewide ES&S spend). The replacement followed security and end-of-support pressure on legacy DREs—not a finding that paperless machines were fine. Status Confirmed large post-DRE replacement purchase. Parallel to Georgia's ~$107M Dominion buy: vulnerability/legacy pressure → multimillion new-vendor contract.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia City Controller — Voting Technology Procurement Investigation (PDF)", "url": "https://controller.phila.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/VOTING-TECHNOLOGY-PROCUREMENT-INVESTIGATION-PUBLIC.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philly-expressvote-xl-29m-2019__philadelphia-city-controller-voting-technology-procurement-i.pdf"}, {"title": "WHYY — Who makes money from Pa. voting machine requirement / ES&S county spend", "url": "https://whyy.org/articles/heres-who-makes-money-from-the-voting-machine-requirement-for-pa-counties/"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Reliability of pricey new voting machines questioned (ExpressVote XL)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/reliability-of-pricey-new-voting-machines-questioned"}], "notes": "Part A enrich ga-dominion-107m Update Scam leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation-clackamas-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-29", "uid": "C20260925-235207-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-29", "old_ids": ["unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation-clackamas-2018"], "seq": "C00502", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate digital ballot images where they are created."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "OR", "description": "UnclearBallot (Bernhard, Kandula, Wink, Halderman) automatically moves voter marks on ballot images—defeating image-only audits—validated on 181,541 Clackamas County 2018 ballot images (34% safely altered) and as a malicious Windows driver on an EAC-certified Fujitsu scanner. Status Confirmed that digital ballot images can be manipulated at scale when malware reaches the scanner/EMS path.", "sources": [{"title": "UnclearBallot — Automated Ballot Image Manipulation (PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf"}, {"title": "NSF Public Access — UnclearBallot", "url": "https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10222847-unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation-clackamas-2018__nsf-public-access-unclearballot.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 15. Prefer physical-ballot RLA / PEP hand count over image trust."}
{"id": "unclearballot-image-audits-defeat-incomplete-verifiability-need-physical-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-26", "uid": "C20260925-235207-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-26", "old_ids": ["unclearballot-image-audits-defeat-incomplete-verifiability-need-physical-ballots"], "seq": "C00499", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete verifiability"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "OR", "description": "UnclearBallot demonstrates that malware can alter ballot images so image-only audits (e.g., Maryland-style) cannot verify true outcomes—verifiability is incomplete unless physical ballots are examined (RLA). Tested on 181k+ Clackamas County ballot images. Status Confirmed for incomplete verifiability of image/electronic audit trails.", "sources": [{"title": "UnclearBallot PDF (Halderman lab)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf"}, {"title": "NSF PAR — UnclearBallot abstract", "url": "https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10222847-unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unclearballot-image-audits-defeat-incomplete-verifiability-need-physical-ballots__nsf-par-unclearballot-abstract.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "clearballot-verifynow-image-retabulation-depends-on-scanner-images", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-09", "uid": "C20260926-021547-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-09", "old_ids": ["clearballot-verifynow-image-retabulation-depends-on-scanner-images"], "seq": "C00972", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate digital ballot images where they are created."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019/2024", "state": "US", "description": "Clear Ballot's VerifyNow / ClearAudit product line advertises independent retabulation of scanner-produced digital ballot images—not physical paper—as the audit path, confirming jurisdictions treat software-generated images as the working ballot-of-record for image audits. UnclearBallot-class research shows those same images can be altered in lockstep with totals. Status Confirmed commercial image-audit architecture depending on manipulable digital images; peer to UnclearBallot Clackamas demo and Appel AVC firmware image+totals alteration—Clear Ballot product model, not those remounted. PEP framing: only physical hand-marked paper is software-independent evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "Clear Ballot — VerifyNow product (image-based retabulation / audit)", "url": "https://www.clearballot.com/products/verifynow", "local": "/archives/2026/09/clearballot-verifynow-image-retabulation-depends-on-scanner-images__clear-ballot-verifynow-product-image-based-retabulation-audit.png"}, {"title": "UnclearBallot (Bernhard/Halderman) — Automated ballot image manipulation defeating image-only audits (PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/clearballot-verifynow-image-retabulation-depends-on-scanner-images__unclearballot-bernhard-halderman-automated-ballot-image-manipulation-defeating.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Manipulate digital images leaf. PEP framing.", "vendor": ["Clear Ballot"]}
{"id": "nist-sp-1500-101-election-event-logging-cdf-gap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-06", "uid": "C20260926-021058-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-06", "old_ids": ["nist-sp-1500-101-election-event-logging-cdf-gap"], "seq": "C00954", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019/2020", "state": "US", "description": "NIST SP 1500-101 (**Election Event Logging Common Data Format**) exists because deployed voting systems have lacked interoperable, complete, analyst-usable event logs; the specification recommends mandatory fields (system ID, event type, timezone timestamps, user, outcome, event hash) and public vendor event-code documentation precisely to close those gaps. Status Confirmed federal standards body documenting incomplete/nonstandard election logging as a problem needing a CDF; peer to Berkeley AuditBear incomplete logs and Coffee County erasable UserLog—NIST logging-gap specification, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST SP 1500-101 — Election Event Logging Common Data Format Specification", "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.1500-101.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-sp-1500-101-election-event-logging-cdf-gap__nist-sp-1500-101-election-event-logging-common-data-format-specification.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST — Election Event Logging project page (CDF motivation / vendor documentation)", "url": "https://pages.nist.gov/ElectionEventLogging/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-sp-1500-101-election-event-logging-cdf-gap__nist-election-event-logging-project-page-cdf-motivation-vendor-documentation.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on incomplete logging leaf."}
{"id": "ga-bmd-qr-tabulation-not-human-readable-until-sb189-delay", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-27", "uid": "C20260925-214102-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-27", "old_ids": ["ga-bmd-qr-tabulation-not-human-readable-until-sb189-delay"], "seq": "C00350", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2026", "state": "GA", "description": "Under Georgia's HB316-era Dominion BMD system, scanners tabulated QR/barcode encodings rather than the human-readable text voters could verify — legally treating machine-coded marks as the counted ballot while human-readable text was secondary. SB189 later redefined the human-readable selections as the official ballot for tabulation/recount/audit (effective July 1, 2026), then SB3EX delayed that regime to Jan. 1, 2028, preserving QR tabulation through additional cycles. Status Confirmed for years of machine-coded tabulation without human-readable-as-official counting, and for definitional/effective-date games around when human-readable becomes the tabulated record.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — O.C.G.A. §21-2-379.23 human-readable official ballot language", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/georgia/title-21/chapter-2/article-9/part-6/section-21-2-379-23-d-1/"}, {"title": "Capitol Beat — SB3EX delay locks QR tabulation into November cycle", "url": "https://capitol-beat.org/2026/06/kemp-signs-elections-bill-locking-in-qr-code-voting-machines-for-november/"}, {"title": "Georgia GRA — SB3EX postpones QR removal; hand-count amendment tradeoff", "url": "https://georgiara.com/2026/06/21/as-georgia-legislature-moves-to-postpone-qr-code-removal-senate-adds-paper-hand-count-requirement-before-election-certification/"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 14. Confirmed non-human-readable tabulation practice + definition delay. Catalog 'early machine tabulation' clause also fits BMD/early scan feedback loops.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "nc-sbe-absentee-data-files-public-early-mail-who-voted-download", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-13", "uid": "C20260926-015536-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-13", "old_ids": ["nc-sbe-absentee-data-files-public-early-mail-who-voted-download"], "seq": "C00916", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Allowing voting before Election Day lets bad actors gather the information needed to estimate results more accurately and manipulate them by injecting ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2026", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections publishes downloadable Absentee Statewide/by-County ZIP files that contain a record of each absentee ballot—including absentee-by-mail and **in-person early voting**—with ballot and voter fields, refreshed daily once ballots go out; between early voting and Election Day, early-vote cast records are added the day after casting. NCSBE's own FAQ states detailed absentee-by-mail request info stays confidential until return or Election Day (S.L. 2019-239), but returned/processed and early-vote records are public in the absentee files—giving campaigns continuous who-has-voted visibility before Election Day. Status Confirmed for official public early/mail who-voted data architecture—peer to NYC BOE early-vote files and U.S. Elections Project daily early-vote analyses.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Absentee and Provisional Data (public Absentee ZIP downloads)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/results-data/absentee-and-provisional-data", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-sbe-absentee-data-files-public-early-mail-who-voted-download__ncsbe-absentee-and-provisional-data-public-absentee-zip.png"}, {"title": "NCSBE — How to Work with Our Data (absentee file use)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/about-elections/county-boards-elections/county-resources/county-board-kit/how-work-our-data", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-sbe-absentee-data-files-public-early-mail-who-voted-download__ncsbe-how-to-work-with-our-data-absentee-file-use.png"}, {"title": "U.S. Elections Project — Early Vote Analysis (public daily turnout context)", "url": "https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/Early_Vote_Analysis_10_4.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-sbe-absentee-data-files-public-early-mail-who-voted-download__u-s-elections-project-early-vote-analysis-public-daily.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on pre-Election Day who-voted information leaf."}
{"id": "wa-rcw-29a-40-170-ballot-drop-boxes-outside-usps-mailstream", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-05", "uid": "C20260926-015040-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-05", "old_ids": ["wa-rcw-29a-40-170-ballot-drop-boxes-outside-usps-mailstream"], "seq": "C00893", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "They provide an open path to inject ballots without even USPS mail-ballot tracking."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-44", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2026", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington RCW 29A.40.170 mandates county ballot drop boxes (minimum density rules) and directs that ballots be removed by at least two people, logged, and returned to the counting center in secured transport containers with seal verification—i.e., an official non-USPS deposit-and-transport path from drop box to tabulation. Companion WAC 434-250-100 regulates staffed/unstaffed deposit sites and 8:00 p.m. Election Day securing. Status Confirmed for a statutory drop-box architecture that deliberately routes ballots outside the USPS mailstream track-and-trace path—peer to CISA/EAC drop-box guidance and California Elec. Code third-party/drop-box return enabling the same non-USPS injection surface; not a finding Washington elections were stolen.", "sources": [{"title": "RCW 29A.40.170 — Ballot drop boxes (removal, secured transport, density minima)", "url": "https://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=29A.40.170", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-rcw-29a-40-170-ballot-drop-boxes-outside-usps-mailstream__rcw-29a-40-170-ballot-drop-boxes-removal-secured-transp.png"}, {"title": "WAC 434-250-100 — Ballot deposit sites (staffed/unstaffed; 8 p.m. secure)", "url": "https://warules.elaws.us/wac/434-250-100"}, {"title": "CISA/EAC — Ballot Drop Box guidance (drop boxes outside USPS mailstream)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ballot-drop-box_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Drop-Boxes open path without USPS tracking."}
{"id": "bridgeport-ct-2019-absentee-ballot-fraud-charges-edmonds-plea", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-02", "uid": "C20260926-022424-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-02", "old_ids": ["bridgeport-ct-2019-absentee-ballot-fraud-charges-edmonds-plea"], "seq": "C01032", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Mail them in."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2025", "state": "CT", "description": "Connecticut’s Chief State’s Attorney charged four Bridgeport Democratic mayoral-primary campaign workers (June 11, 2024) for 2019 absentee-ballot mishandling—unlawful possession, presence while applicants executed ballots, failed distribution lists, misrepresented eligibility, and (for some) witness tampering—after SEEC civil investigation referred evidence of criminal conduct. Josephine Edmonds later pleaded guilty to illegal ballot possession / being present while ballots were completed and related counts, receiving a suspended sentence and probation (2025 reporting). Status Confirmed mail/absentee ballot-collection injection pathway with criminal charging and at least one guilty plea; peer to NC Dowless mail-ballot operation and CA unauthorized drop-box mail-inject cards—Bridgeport 2019 absentee case, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "CT Division of Criminal Justice — Four Charged in 2019 Bridgeport Absentee Ballot Probe (June 11, 2024)", "url": "https://portal.ct.gov/dcj/press-room/press-releases/06112024bridgeport?archived=true", "local": "/archives/2026/09/bridgeport-ct-2019-absentee-ballot-fraud-charges-edmonds-plea__ct-division-of-criminal-justice-four-charged-in-2019-bridgeport-absentee-ballot-probe-june-11-2024.png"}, {"title": "CT Mirror — Suspect enters guilty plea in Bridgeport ballot fraud case", "url": "https://ctmirror.org/2025/07/23/ct-bridgeport-ballot-fraud-guilty-plea/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Mail them in leaf."}
{"id": "sf-dominion-rcv-computer-tabulation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-03", "uid": "C20260925-183614-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-03", "old_ids": ["sf-dominion-rcv-computer-tabulation"], "seq": "C00091", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "RCV is a bad idea for many reasons. One is that it is so complicated that it requires computer tabulation and locks us into it; that alone is reason to reject it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2025", "state": "CA", "description": "San Francisco has used ranked-choice / instant-runoff voting for local contests for years and tabulates those contests on Dominion Democracy Suite (e.g., D-Suite 5.10A materials cited by the Elections Commission), exporting Cast Vote Records that encode rankings for computer IRV rounds. City documentation describes scanners/central count capturing ballot images and computing RCV winners in software—not a precinct hand IRV. Status Confirmed that SF RCV outcomes depend on computerized ranked tabulation. Ballot/RCV design complexity drives machine dependence; PEP full hand count remains the transparency alternative.", "sources": [{"title": "SF.gov — San Francisco's Voting System report (Nov 2019)", "url": "https://www.sf.gov/reports--november-2019--san-franciscos-voting-system", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sf-dominion-rcv-computer-tabulation__sf-gov-san-francisco-s-voting-system-report-nov-2019.png"}, {"title": "SF Elections Commission attachment — Dominion Democracy Suite RCV tabulation context", "url": "https://www.sfgov.org/electionscommission/sites/default/files/Documents/meetings/2022/2022-11-16-commission/Attachment%201.pdf"}, {"title": "SF Elections — CVR export format (D-Suite rankings)", "url": "https://www.sfelections.org/results/20250916/data/N24_DSuite_CVRExportFormat.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sf-dominion-rcv-computer-tabulation__sf-elections-cvr-export-format-d-suite-rankings.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich me-ak-rcv leaf. Longstanding SF IRV computer tabulation.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "ny-election-law-8-500-poll-watcher-city-county-residency", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-03", "uid": "C20261009-124707-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-03", "old_ids": ["ny-election-law-8-500-poll-watcher-city-county-residency"], "seq": "C01355", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2024", "state": "NY", "description": "New York Election Law § 8-500 requires that each poll watcher be a qualified voter of the city or county in which he or she serves, with a later carve-out (signed into law August 2024 via S.6130A/A.530A) allowing a New York–resident attorney licensed in the state to serve as a watcher at any polling place statewide. The baseline city/county residency gate—like Pennsylvania's county rule—limits which trained observers can cover a jurisdiction and shrinks the pool of experienced out-of-county watchers. Status Confirmed for the statutory residency restriction (and the narrow attorney exception). Whether the policy is wise is outside the label; the catalog records it as a structural watcher-access constraint.", "sources": [{"title": "N.Y. Election Law § 8-500 (newyork.public.law)", "url": "https://newyork.public.law/laws/n.y._election_law_section_8-500"}, {"title": "NYS Senate Open Legislation — Election Law § 8-500", "url": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ELN/8-500"}, {"title": "NYS Senate — S.6130 / A.530 (2023–24) attorney poll-watcher residency carve-out bill text", "url": "https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/S6130"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Thickens 1-card Poll Watchers stub beyond pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020. Law.com paywall skipped; primary statute + bill text used."}
{"id": "robis-asked-epollbook-wan-central-server-near-realtime-voter-history-sync", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-12", "uid": "C20260926-014044-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-12", "old_ids": ["robis-asked-epollbook-wan-central-server-near-realtime-voter-history-sync"], "seq": "C00887", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Electronic poll books: each check-in is recorded in a central database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-08", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-08", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Robis Elections AskED ePollbook vendor documentation states devices may connect securely to a central server via WAN (including cellular cards such as Verizon), with SSL/VPN, so that 'with connectivity voter information is up-to-date and enables immediate updates of voter history,' while the Command Center provides 'Real-Time Reporting' of turnout/provisional/ballot-style data across the jurisdiction; peer-to-peer sync covers same-site devices when WAN is down. Verified Voting's AskED equipment page and NY early-voting vendor assessment describe centralized monitoring/data exchange. Status Confirmed for a third major e-pollbook product with near-realtime central check-in/history sync—peer to KnowInk Poll Pad/ePulse hub and ES&S ExpressPoll Connect jurisdiction-wide sync on this leaf; not a finding of vote alteration.", "sources": [{"title": "Robis Elections — AskED ePollbook (WAN central server / real-time Command Center)", "url": "https://robiselections.com/electronic-poll-book/asked-epollbook", "local": "/archives/2026/09/robis-asked-epollbook-wan-central-server-near-realtime-voter-history-sync__robis-elections-asked-epollbook-wan-central-server-real.png"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Robis AskED ePollbook", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/robis-asked-epollbook/"}, {"title": "Vote Early NY — Electronic Poll Book Vendor Assessment Report, Robis Elections (PDF)", "url": "https://www.voteearlyny.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ePoll-Book-Vendor-Report-Robis-Public-Version-06.04.2019.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Early Voting > Electronic Poll Books central database leaf."}
{"id": "ess-expressvote-barcode-tabulation-vv", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-08", "uid": "C20260925-183614-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-08", "old_ids": ["ess-expressvote-barcode-tabulation-vv"], "seq": "C00096", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the printout but encode different results in the QR code, then encrypt the QR code so humans cannot see what was done."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2023", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's equipment profile for the ES&S ExpressVote BMD states that summary cards list human-readable choices and encode the same selections in a machine-readable barcode, and that tabulators (typically DS200/DS300) always count votes by reading the barcode—not the human-readable text the voter can verify. Academic comments to NCSBE (Appel/Stark et al.) and Wisconsin Election Integrity filings similarly document ExpressVote dual-record (text + barcode) architecture. Status Confirmed barcode-opaque tabulation is not unique to Georgia Dominion ImageCast X BMDs.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressVote (barcode counted; text not tabulated)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expressvote/"}, {"title": "Appel/Stark et al. — Ballot-marking devices cannot assure the will of the voters (NCSBE PDF)", "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/2019-06-13/Voting%20System%20Certification/Public%20Comments/BMD%20paper%204.21.19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-expressvote-barcode-tabulation-vv__appel-stark-et-al-ballot-marking-devices-cannot-assure-the-w.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Election Integrity — ExpressVote barcode vs human-readable sworn response", "url": "https://wisconsinelectionintegrity.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/EL-20-24-McKimResponse-Dec4.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-expressvote-barcode-tabulation-vv__wisconsin-election-integrity-expressvote-barcode-vs-human-re.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich ga-bmd-qr leaf. ExpressVote barcode architecture Confirmed across many states.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote", "ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "ess-expressvote-xl-barcode-tabulation-vv", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-09", "uid": "C20260925-183614-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-09", "old_ids": ["ess-expressvote-xl-barcode-tabulation-vv"], "seq": "C00097", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the printout but encode different results in the QR code, then encrypt the QR code so humans cannot see what was done."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-87", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2023", "state": "PA/NY/Multi-state", "description": "Verified Voting's ExpressVote XL profile documents that the XL encodes voter choices in machine-readable barcodes and tabulates by reading those barcodes rather than the human-readable summary text; voters cannot verify barcode contents. NYSTEC/Verified Voting materials further note barcode-based tabulation and related certification controversies in New York. Status Confirmed a second major ES&S BMD/hybrid line uses barcode-opaque tabulation parallel to Dominion QR BMDs in Georgia.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — ES&S ExpressVote XL (barcodes tabulated; text not)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/ess-expressvote-xl/"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Reliability of pricey new voting machines questioned (XL)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/reliability-of-pricey-new-voting-machines-questioned"}], "notes": "Part A enrich ga-bmd-qr leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "caceo-county-membership-dues-ngo-clerks-association", "permanent_id": "C20261009-124707-05", "uid": "C20261009-124707-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-124707-05", "old_ids": ["caceo-county-membership-dues-ngo-clerks-association"], "seq": "C01357", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "An NGO (nongovernmental organization) paid by counties but unaccountable to the county's electors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-2020", "state": "CA", "description": "The California Association of Clerks and Election Officials (CACEO) is a private professional association of county clerks, election officials, city clerks, and related staff—not a body elected by or directly accountable to county electors. Its 2019/20 Annual Membership Dues form sets dues payable to \"California Association of Clerks and Election Officials\" (Deputy $50; Associate $175), with membership classified by county clerk / elections / clerk of the board / city clerk roles and dues collected from those officials' offices. Orange County's elections site lists CACEO among its affiliations as the statewide association promoting uniform practices among local election administrators. Status Confirmed for a county-official membership NGO funded by membership dues from county/city offices rather than by direct elector accountability. Soft companion to CCCA and iGO/NACRC cards on the same leaf; distinct from caceo-2023-election-leg-committee-support-letters-sos-aligned-statutes (different CACEO child leaf on SOS rulemaking).", "sources": [{"title": "CACEO — 2019/20 Annual Membership Dues form (PDF; Deputy $50 / Associate $175 payable to CACEO)", "url": "https://caceo.memberclicks.net/assets/documents/2019-20%20membership.form.pdf"}, {"title": "Orange County Registrar of Voters — affiliation page describing CACEO", "url": "https://ocvote.gov/about/affiliations/california-association-of-clerks-and-election-officials"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-09. Thickens 2-card County Clerks Association > NGO paid by counties leaf to 3. No InfluenceWatch/Capital Research/FairVote local wiring."}
{"id": "appel-demillo-stark-bmd-cannot-assure-complexity-officials", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-13", "uid": "C20260926-021058-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-13", "old_ids": ["appel-demillo-stark-bmd-cannot-assure-complexity-officials"], "seq": "C00961", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "The systems are too complex and vulnerable for election officials to understand."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-12", "state": "US", "description": "Appel, DeMillo & Stark (**Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters**) argue that modern election complexity pushes jurisdictions onto computers that officials cannot independently verify: BMDs/DREs are hackable, voters rarely catch misprints, and officials have no public evidence protocol to prove outcomes correct when machines misbehave. Status Confirmed research that system complexity exceeds officials' ability to understand/prove correctness; peer to Rivest-Wack software-complexity and Halpern vendor black-box cards—BMD contestability paper, not those remounted. PEP framing: hand-marked paper + transparent count is the practical remedy.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel, DeMillo & Stark — Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters", "url": "https://gatech.vote/assets/pdf/BMD_Cannot.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-2019-no-reliable-way-detect-hacked-bmd-la-limits__appel-demillo-stark-ballot-marking-devices-cannot-assure-the-will-of-the-voter.pdf"}, {"title": "SSRN abstract page — BMD Cannot Assure (same paper)", "url": "https://ssrn.com/abstract=3375755"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on systems too complex for officials leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "il-sos-2019-avr-programming-error-noncitizen-registrations", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-09", "uid": "C20260926-022005-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-09", "old_ids": ["il-sos-2019-avr-programming-error-noncitizen-registrations"], "seq": "C00987", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-12", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois Secretary of State / State Board of Elections disclosures (late 2019) documented a motor-voter programming error that forwarded roughly 574 applicants who answered ‘no’ to citizenship attestation to election authorities; about 545 were registered and a small number cast ballots before remediation, illustrating how DMV–election automation can inject illegitimate or contested registrations at scale. Status Confirmed AVR/motor-voter systems error producing non-citizen registration risk; peer to California Motor Voter EY duplicate audit and Oregon DMV AVR error cards—Illinois SOS programming-error episode, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Illinois: Error registered a possible 545 noncitizen voters", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-bc8cd3b0a901480136b9af926a93df27"}, {"title": "Illinois SBE email exhibit — Secretary of State Voter Registration Issue (Dec. 30, 2019)", "url": "https://blnnews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/sbe.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-sos-2019-avr-programming-error-noncitizen-registrations__illinois-sbe-email-exhibit-secretary-of-state-voter-registra.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Motor-Voter leaf. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'. Moved on Oct. 28, 2026 (Gouveia batch 2, pending Mark's approval) from 'Motor-Voter Registration' to its new child leaf 'Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in'.", "related": ["pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia"]}
{"id": "jeff-van-drew-2019-dem-to-gop-switch-after-winning-as-democrat-trump-endorsement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-13", "uid": "C20260926-024539-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-13", "old_ids": ["jeff-van-drew-2019-dem-to-gop-switch-after-winning-as-democrat-trump-endorsement"], "seq": "C01103", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Candidates switch parties to gain a competitive advantage while deceiving citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-12-19", "state": "NJ / Federal", "description": "On Dec. 19, 2019—one day after voting against both Trump impeachment articles—Rep. Jeff Van Drew, elected in 2018 as a Democrat in NJ-02, stood with President Trump in the Oval Office as Trump announced Van Drew would join the Republican Party and endorsed his reelection in a district Trump had carried; Roll Call contemporaneously documented the switch, staff resignations, and Democratic primary polling risk Van Drew faced if he remained a Democrat. Status Confirmed post-election party switch for competitive advantage after voters cast ballots under the prior label; peer to NC Chris Anglin Dem-to-GOP Supreme Court filing and Bernie Sanders Dem-primary/Independent-Senate cards already on this leaf—Van Drew 2019 switch, not those remounted. PEP framing: label changes that break the party brand voters thought they hired, without hand-count clarity on subsequent contests.", "sources": [{"title": "Roll Call — Trump announces Jeff Van Drew will become a Republican (Dec. 19, 2019)", "url": "https://rollcall.com/2019/12/19/trump-announces-jeff-van-drew-will-become-a-republican/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/jeff-van-drew-2019-dem-to-gop-switch-after-winning-as-democrat-trump-endorsement__roll-call-trump-announces-jeff-van-drew-will-become-a-republ.png"}, {"title": "nj.com — House makes it official: Van Drew's no longer a Democrat (Jan. 2020)", "url": "https://www.nj.com/politics/2020/01/house-makes-it-official-van-drews-no-longer-a-democrat.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Candidates changing parties leaf."}
{"id": "ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-04", "uid": "C20260926-012939-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-04", "old_ids": ["ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights"], "seq": "C00843", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-12-12", "state": "KY", "description": "On December 12, 2019 Kentucky Gov. Andy Beshear issued Executive Order 2019-003 automatically restoring voting and public-office rights for eligible people with Kentucky felony convictions after completion of incarceration, probation, or parole, without requiring payment of fines/restitution as a barrier, while excluding specified violent/sex/homicide/treason/election-bribery categories and federal/out-of-state convictions (those remain on discretionary application paths). Brennan Center and ACLU Kentucky contemporaneous summaries document the order and its carveouts (~140k–175k eligible estimates in advocacy coverage). Status Confirmed for Kentucky's restoration-with-exclusions executive structure—another peer to Florida Amendment 4 / SB 7066 eligibility fights; do not assert catalog 'isn't really for felons' motive.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Kentucky (EO 2019-003)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-kentucky", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights__brennan-center-voting-rights-restoration-efforts-in-ken.png"}, {"title": "ACLU Kentucky — Governor Beshear restores voting rights to roughly 175,000 Kentuckians", "url": "https://www.aclu-ky.org/news/governor-beshear-restores-voting-rights-roughly-175000-kentuckians/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights__aclu-kentucky-governor-beshear-restores-voting-rights-t.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 second peer on same Felon Voting Rights (subtitle) leaf."}
{"id": "ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights-restoration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-08", "uid": "C20260926-022005-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-08", "old_ids": ["ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights-restoration"], "seq": "C00986", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-12-12", "state": "KY", "description": "Kentucky Governor Andy Beshear’s Executive Order 2019-003 (Dec. 12, 2019) automatically restored voting and public-office rights to persons with qualifying Kentucky felony convictions who completed incarceration/probation/parole (with enumerated violent/election-bribery exclusions), shifting large cohorts onto voter rolls by executive action rather than case-by-case court restoration. Status Confirmed executive mass restoration pathway; peer to Florida Amendment 4/SB 7066 and Virginia Northam/McAuliffe restoration cards—Kentucky EO 2019-003, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Kentucky Governor — Executive Order 2019-003 Civil Rights Restoration PDF", "url": "https://governor.ky.gov/attachments/20191212_Executive-Order_2019-003.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights-restoration__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "Kentucky Civil Rights Restoration — official restoration program page", "url": "https://civilrightsrestoration.ky.gov/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ky-beshear-eo-2019-003-felon-voting-rights-restoration__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Felon Voting Rights leaf."}
{"id": "ocregister-2019-buena-park-recall-invalid-signatures-fail-qualify", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-40", "uid": "C20260926-002757-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-40", "old_ids": ["ocregister-2019-buena-park-recall-invalid-signatures-fail-qualify"], "seq": "C00713", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall groups are set up, then conveniently miss deadlines or make mistakes that invalidate the recall."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-11-25", "state": "CA", "description": "Orange County Register reported the 2019 Buena Park councilmember recall failed when only 1,097 of 2,106 submitted signatures were valid (1,877 required)—nearly 700 failing voter-record matching plus duplicates—i.e., a recall organization whose petition mistakes/invalidations prevented ballot qualification. Later felony charges against organizers (fill-20h) reinforce organized petition defects. Status Confirmed for failed qualification via invalid signatures.", "sources": [{"title": "OC Register — Recall attempt in Buena Park fails when many signatures declared invalid (2019)", "url": "https://www.ocregister.com/2019/11/25/recall-attempt-in-buena-park-fails-when-many-signatures-declared-invalid/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ocregister-2019-buena-park-recall-invalid-signatures-fail-qualify__oc-register-recall-attempt-in-buena-park-fails-when-many-signatures-declared-invalid-2019.png"}, {"title": "Voice of OC — Buena Park recall 33-felony charging case (2023 companion)", "url": "https://voiceofoc.org/2023/01/orange-county-sees-its-biggest-election-related-criminal-case-in-years-33-felony-counts/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 20 companion. Soft remount Buena Park family onto miss-deadlines/mistakes pathKey."}
{"id": "stanford-sheg-2019-civic-online-reasoning-voter-fraud-video-battlefield", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-05", "uid": "C20260926-033715-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-05", "old_ids": ["stanford-sheg-2019-civic-online-reasoning-voter-fraud-video-battlefield"], "seq": "C01230", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens do not understand the battlefield."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-11-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "Stanford History Education Group's Students' Civic Online Reasoning: A National Portrait (3,446 high-school students, 14 states; released Nov. 18, 2019) found 52% judged a grainy Facebook video of ballot-stuffing filmed in Russia as 'strong evidence' of U.S. voter fraud, and 96% failed to consider fossil-fuel funding when rating a climate site—showing prospective voters often will not understand the information battlefield. Status Confirmed primary SHEG Civic Online Reasoning national assessment; peer to Pew 2020 social-media-less-knowledgeable and Pew 2018 fact-vs-opinion cards already on this leaf—SHEG instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when citizens cannot evaluate viral fraud media, observable precinct hand counts of paper keep the count itself off the unverifiable online battlefield.", "sources": [{"title": "Stanford GSE — High school students unprepared to judge online credibility (SHEG Civic Online Reasoning, Nov. 18, 2019)", "url": "https://ed.stanford.edu/news/high-school-students-are-unprepared-judge-credibility-information-internet-according-stanford", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stanford-sheg-2019-civic-online-reasoning-voter-fraud-video-battlefield__stanford-gse-high-school-students-unprepared-to-judge-online-credibility-sheg-civic-online-reasoning-nov-18-2019.png"}, {"title": "Educational Researcher / SSRN — Students' Civic Online Reasoning: A National Portrait", "url": "https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.3102/0013189X211017495"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Psych Ops Misinforming will-not-understand-battlefield leaf (non-Pew)."}
{"id": "pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-straight-party-cross-filed-miscount", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-26", "uid": "C20261020-160717-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-26", "old_ids": ["pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-straight-party-cross-filed-miscount"], "seq": "C01019", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-11-05", "state": "PA", "description": "On Nov. 5, 2019, Northampton County, Pennsylvania's new ES&S ExpressVote XL machines produced wrong election-night tallies in races with cross-filed candidates (one candidate on more than one party line). In a Dec. 12, 2019 presentation, ES&S's Adam Carbullido said the tabulation errors occurred only in cross-filed races on ballots where the voter chose the straight-party option, and that the error should have been caught at configuration and during logic-and-accuracy testing; he attributed it to human error in setup. In the Court of Common Pleas judge race, Democrat Abe Kassis initially showed only 164 votes; hand-counted paper ballots later gave the correct result. ES&S said the problem would not recur because of a software update and because Pennsylvania eliminated straight-party voting starting with the 2020 primary. The county election commission voted no confidence in the XL. Status Confirmed: the vendor confirmed straight-party ballots were tabulated wrongly in cross-filed races. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "WITF / PA Post — Human error and sensitive touchscreens blamed for Northampton Co. election problems (Dec. 12, 2019)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2019/12/12/human-error-and-sensitive-touchscreens-blamed-for-northampton-co-election-problems/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-straight-party-cross-filed-miscount__witf2019.html"}, {"title": "WITF / PA Post — Northampton officials unanimously vote 'no confidence' in ExpressVote XL (Dec. 20, 2019)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2019/12/20/northampton-officials-unanimously-vote-no-confidence-in-expressvote-xl-voting-machine/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-straight-party-cross-filed-miscount__witf2019b.html"}, {"title": "New York Times — A Pennsylvania County's Election Day Nightmare Underscores Voting Machine Concerns (Nov. 30, 2019)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/us/politics/pennsylvania-voting-machines.html"}, {"title": "lehighvalleylive — Apologies offered, human error blamed for Northampton County election problems (Dec. 2019)", "url": "https://www.lehighvalleylive.com/elections/2019/12/apologies-offered-human-error-blamed-for-northampton-county-election-problems.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (witf2019, witf2019b). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): New York Times, lehighvalleylive. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote XL"]}
{"id": "pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-touchscreen-selection-errors", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-25", "uid": "C20261020-160717-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-25", "old_ids": ["pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-touchscreen-selection-errors"], "seq": "C01018", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-11-05", "state": "PA", "description": "In the Nov. 5, 2019 election, the first use of the ES&S ExpressVote XL in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, voters complained that the touchscreens were overly sensitive and did not register their choices, or registered choices they had not made; County Councilwoman Kathy Fox said it happened to her. In its Dec. 12, 2019 findings, ES&S said the touchscreen problem happened because selection boxes for different candidates were too close together, and said the boxes had been removed in its next software version. ES&S's Adam Carbullido said 30 percent of the county's machines were improperly configured. Philadelphia reported similar touchscreen hypersensitivity on the XL. The county election commission voted no confidence in the machine. The separate cross-filed straight-party tabulation error is on the straight-ticket card pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-straight-party-cross-filed-miscount. Status Confirmed: the vendor confirmed a touch-target layout defect and misconfigured machines. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WITF / PA Post — Human error and sensitive touchscreens blamed for Northampton Co. election problems (Dec. 12, 2019)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2019/12/12/human-error-and-sensitive-touchscreens-blamed-for-northampton-co-election-problems/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-touchscreen-selection-errors__witf2019.html"}, {"title": "WITF / PA Post — Northampton officials unanimously vote 'no confidence' in ExpressVote XL (Dec. 20, 2019)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2019/12/20/northampton-officials-unanimously-vote-no-confidence-in-expressvote-xl-voting-machine/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-northampton-2019-expressvote-xl-touchscreen-selection-errors__witf2019b.html"}, {"title": "lehighvalleylive — Apologies offered, human error blamed for Northampton County election problems (Dec. 2019)", "url": "https://www.lehighvalleylive.com/elections/2019/12/apologies-offered-human-error-blamed-for-northampton-county-election-problems.html"}, {"title": "New York Times — A Pennsylvania County's Election Day Nightmare Underscores Voting Machine Concerns (Nov. 30, 2019)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/30/us/politics/pennsylvania-voting-machines.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (witf2019, witf2019b). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): lehighvalleylive, New York Times. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote XL"]}
{"id": "ssci-2019-volume2-ira-social-media-influence-manipulate-public-opinion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-03", "uid": "C20260926-000809-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-03", "old_ids": ["ssci-2019-volume2-ira-social-media-influence-manipulate-public-opinion"], "seq": "C00556", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Use influencers to manipulate public opinion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-10-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Volume II (Oct 8, 2019) documents Russia's Internet Research Agency using social-media personas, ads, and influencer-style content to sow discord and influence U.S. public opinion around the 2016 election—including recruiting unwitting Americans and organizing real-world events. Status Confirmed that influence operators used online 'influences' to manipulate public opinion; domestic cabal framing not claimed here.", "sources": [{"title": "SSCI press — Bipartisan report on Russia's use of social media (Vol. II)", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/"}, {"title": "SSCI — Volume II Russia's Use of Social Media (PDF)", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-report-volume2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ssci-2019-volume2-ira-social-media-influence-manipulate-public-opinion__ssci-2019-volume2-ira-social-media-influence-manipulate-public-opinion.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 2."}
{"id": "ssci-ira-fake-american-activist-groups-claim-grassroots-side", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-09", "uid": "C20260926-000809-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-09", "old_ids": ["ssci-ira-fake-american-activist-groups-claim-grassroots-side"], "seq": "C00562", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Claim to be on our side."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-42", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-42", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-10-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "SSCI Volume II and supporting IRA analyses document Kremlin-backed operators posing as authentic American activist groups (e.g., Blacktivist, United Muslims of America, and opposing Houston rally personas) that claimed to be 'on the side' of targeted U.S. communities while advancing foreign information-warfare goals. Status Confirmed that fake groups claimed domestic-side identity; domestic controlled-opposition cabal beyond IRA not claimed here.", "sources": [{"title": "SSCI press — Russia's use of social media / IRA fake personas", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/2019/10/08/press-senate-intel-committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia-e2-80-99s-use-social-media/"}, {"title": "SSCI — New Knowledge IRA tactics & tropes (fake activist groups)", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-newknowledge-disinformation-report-whitepaper.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-ssci__oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-s.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 5."}
{"id": "tx-sos-advisory-2019-19-hb1850-early-voting-roster-daily-public-web-post", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-14", "uid": "C20260926-031135-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-14", "old_ids": ["tx-sos-advisory-2019-19-hb1850-early-voting-roster-daily-public-web-post"], "seq": "C01164", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Election Code", "Actions that facilitate indirect manipulation of our election system have been written into the election code:", "For example, Texas law"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-10-04", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas SOS Election Advisory No. 2019-19 explains HB 1850 amendments to Election Code §§85.072 and 87.121: early-voting roster information for personal-appearance and mail voters must be available for public inspection by 11:00 a.m. the day after entry/receipt, updated daily, posted on the county website (or commissioners-court bulletin board), and submitted for SOS website posting—codifying a public, downloadable who-has-voted feed during early voting. Status Confirmed primary Texas SOS advisory implementing the statutory early-voting roster / branch daily-register publicity rule; peer to Texas Election Code §85.072 branch daily register and Colorado CE-068 public ballot-status list cards already on this leaf—TX SOS Advisory 2019-19 / HB 1850 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: code that publishes near-real-time who-voted feedback enables targeting loops opaque to public hand-count observation.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Election Advisory No. 2019-19 (HB 1850 early voting rosters / branch daily register web posting)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2019-19.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-sos-advisory-2019-19-hb1850-early-voting-roster-daily-public-web-post__texas-sos-advisory-2019-19-election-rosters.png"}, {"title": "Texas Election Code §85.072 — Branch Daily Register (public.law text)", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._election_code_section_85.072"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Election Code Texas / early-voting roster publicity leaf."}
{"id": "wi-wec-2019-232k-eric-movers-kept-active-zignego-2021", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-07", "uid": "C20261008-203914-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-07", "old_ids": ["wi-wec-2019-232k-eric-movers-kept-active-zignego-2021"], "seq": "C00277", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-10 to 2021-07", "state": "WI", "description": "In 2019 the Wisconsin Elections Commission (WEC) mailed postcards to 232,579 voters whom the ERIC movers report flagged as possibly having moved. In June 2019 the commission voted not to deactivate non-responders within 30 days and to wait until after the 2021 elections; in the meantime those voters were watermarked in poll books. Voters sued (Zignego v. WEC). An Ozaukee County judge ordered deactivation and held the commission and three commissioners in contempt after a 3-3 vote to take no action. The court of appeals reversed, and on April 9, 2021 the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled 5-2 that the deactivation duty in Wis. Stat. 6.50(3) belongs to municipal clerks, not WEC. As of the April 2021 spring election, 69,441 voters on the list were still active. WEC deactivated the remaining 31,854 on July 31, 2021, about two years and two federal-cycle elections after the mailing. Status Confirmed: WEC's own release and the court record document a deliberate decision to keep flagged movers active through the 2020 election. The court held this was lawful for WEC, while answering the leaf's question of who is responsible: clerks, not the statewide commission.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Supreme Court — State ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 2021 WI 32 (opinion PDF)", "url": "https://www.wicourts.gov/sc/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=355119"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Elections Commission deactivates more than 205,000 voters", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/news/elections-commission-deactivates-more-205000-voters"}, {"title": "Justia — Zignego v. Wisconsin Elections Commission (2021)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/wisconsin/supreme-court/2021/2020ap000112.html"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). WEC and Justia pages return 403 to curl (bot block); the court PDF returns 200. Wisconsin is NVRA-exempt (EDR state). Not a mail-to-all state; ballots were not auto-mailed to these voters."}
{"id": "leadership-conference-2019-democracy-diverted-1688-polling-closures", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-05", "uid": "C20260926-022920-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-05", "old_ids": ["leadership-conference-2019-democracy-diverted-1688-polling-closures"], "seq": "C01050", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-09", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "The Leadership Conference Education Fund's September 2019 report Democracy Diverted: Polling Place Closures and the Right to Vote documents 1,688 polling-place closures across 13 formerly covered states from 2012–2018 after Shelby County ended preclearance—including large Georgia and other Southern net reductions—showing systematic Election Day site attrition as a process-interference pattern. Status Confirmed civil-rights research compilation with state/county tallies; peer to Poinsett County AR temporary closure and AJC Georgia precinct-dwindle cards—multi-state Leadership Conference tally, not those remounted. PEP framing: fewer neighborhood polling places push voters into early/mail/machine-centric channels harder to observe with hand-count staffing.", "sources": [{"title": "Leadership Conference Education Fund — Democracy Diverted: Polling Place Closures and the Right to Vote (PDF)", "url": "https://civilrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Democracy-Diverted.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/leadership-conference-2019-democracy-diverted-1688-polling-closures__leadership-conference-education-fund-democracy-diverted-polling-place-closures-and-the-right-to-vote-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Leadership Conference — Democracy Diverted resource page", "url": "https://civilrights.org/democracy-diverted/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Polling Places leaf."}
{"id": "tx-elec-code-85-072-branch-daily-register-public-downloadable", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-18", "uid": "C20260925-212129-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-18", "old_ids": ["tx-elec-code-85-072-branch-daily-register-public-downloadable"], "seq": "C00315", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Election Code", "Actions that facilitate indirect manipulation of our election system have been written into the election code:", "For example, Texas law"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-09", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Election Code §85.072 (Branch Daily Register), as amended by HB 1850 (2019), requires each early-voting branch to prepare a daily register of voters who cast ballots, deliver it to the early voting clerk, preserve it with precinct records, keep a current copy at the branch, and — critically — provide a downloadable database format for daily Internet posting of at least each voter's registration number, plus electronic submission of participation records to the Secretary of State. Catalog Detail leaf quotes this section. Status Confirmed for statute-coded near-real-time public who-has-voted early data (feeds the feedback-loop visibility the catalog describes; motive rhetoric not asserted).", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Statutes — Election Code §85.072 Branch Daily Register", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/EL/htm/EL.85.htm#85.072"}, {"title": "texas.public.law — §85.072 text", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._election_code_section_85.072"}, {"title": "86(R) HB 1850 enrolled — daily register Internet posting", "url": "https://capitol.texas.gov/tlodocs/86R/billtext/html/HB01850F.HTM"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 10. Exact statute named in catalog Detail."}
{"id": "ca-motor-voter-ey-audit-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-30", "uid": "C20260925-155410-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-30", "old_ids": ["ca-motor-voter-ey-audit-2019"], "seq": "C00030", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08", "state": "CA", "description": "An August 2019 Ernst & Young audit of California's New Motor Voter program (launched April 2018 under AB 1461 / related DMV-SOS automation) found roughly 83,684 duplicate voter registration records and over 170,000 records with party-preference discrepancies, attributing failures to inadequate software testing, confusing interfaces, and weak cross-agency governance. Officials stated eligibility/outcome integrity was not shown compromised; problems were operational. Status Confirmed for audit-documented Motor-Voter system errors (not intentional fraud).", "sources": [{"title": "Los Angeles Times — Nearly 84,000 duplicate voter records in Motor Voter audit", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-08-09/duplicate-voter-records-audit-california-motor-voter-system"}, {"title": "AP — Audit finds problems with California motor voter program", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-42cd6b5eeda94a218caa250b460b8503"}], "notes": "Operational Motor-Voter failure Confirmed. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'.", "related": ["ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied"]}
{"id": "defcon-27-2019-voting-village-every-device-compromised-bmd", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-19", "uid": "C20260925-212129-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-19", "old_ids": ["defcon-27-2019-voting-village-every-device-compromised-bmd"], "seq": "C00316", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Security researchers have demonstrated far more advanced manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "DEF CON 27 (2019) Voting Village reporting (University of Chicago Harris / co-authors) documented that participants compromised every device tested, including ballot-marking devices — extending the 2017 DRE findings to BMD-era equipment still used for 'accessible' and universal BMD deployments. Status Confirmed for continued researcher replication of advanced DRE/BMD manipulation after 2017.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 27 Voting Village Report (UChicago Harris PDF)", "url": "https://harris.uchicago.edu/files/def_con_27_voting_village_report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-27-2019-voting-village-every-device-compromised-bmd__def-con-27-voting-village-report-uchicago-harris-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "WIRED — Voting machine hacks help show how to protect elections", "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/voting-machine-hacks-defcon/"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 11 companion to remounted defcon-voting-village-2017."}
{"id": "stark-2019-no-reliable-way-detect-hacked-bmd-la-limits", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-07", "uid": "C20260926-021058-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-07", "old_ids": ["stark-2019-no-reliable-way-detect-hacked-bmd-la-limits"], "seq": "C00955", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Logic and accuracy (L&A) testing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08", "state": "US", "description": "Philip B. Stark's arXiv paper **\"There is no Reliable Way to Detect Hacked Ballot-Marking Devices\"** and Appel/DeMillo/Stark BMD analysis explain that conventional **logic-and-accuracy** / known-answer test decks cannot reliably detect malware that behaves correctly under test then cheats only in live voting (\"Dieselgate\"/Volkswagen behavior), and that parallel testing at scale is impractical. Status Confirmed L&A cannot guarantee software integrity; peer to EAC L&A quick-start and NC SBE all-machines L&A—research limit on L&A, not those procedure cards remounted. PEP framing: machine L&A ≠ transparent hand count of paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Stark (2019) — There is no Reliable Way to Detect Hacked Ballot-Marking Devices (arXiv:1908.08144)", "url": "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08144", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-2019-no-reliable-way-detect-hacked-bmd-la-limits__stark-2019-there-is-no-reliable-way-to-detect-hacked-ballot-marking-devices-ar.png"}, {"title": "Appel, DeMillo & Stark — Ballot-Marking Devices Cannot Assure the Will of the Voters (L&A / Dieselgate section)", "url": "https://gatech.vote/assets/pdf/BMD_Cannot.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-2019-no-reliable-way-detect-hacked-bmd-la-limits__appel-demillo-stark-ballot-marking-devices-cannot-assure-the-will-of-the-voter.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on logic-and-accuracy testing leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-24", "uid": "C20261020-160717-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-24", "old_ids": ["ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves"], "seq": "C01017", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08-27", "state": "MS", "description": "In the Aug. 27, 2019 Mississippi Republican gubernatorial runoff, a voter in Lafayette County filmed a touchscreen selecting Tate Reeves each time he tapped Bill Waller Jr.; Taylor Rayburn's tweet of the 14-second clip went viral. Lafayette County officials told WMC Action News 5 that the machine tested fine the Friday before but was likely mishandled and \"lost its calibration\"; it was taken out of service after 19 votes, all of which were counted. The Secretary of State said three TSX machines in three precincts (Lafayette and Calhoun counties) malfunctioned and 31 votes were cast before they were shut down; ES&S, which services Mississippi's Diebold/Premier AccuVote-TSX machines, confirmed the cause was faulty calibration. It is unclear whether any of the 31 votes were recorded wrongly. Video: a 54-second Scripps/Newsy report showing the viral clip of the touchscreen highlighting Reeves when the voter's finger is on Waller. Direction: Waller to Reeves (Republican to Republican). Status Confirmed: the vendor confirmed miscalibration and the machines were pulled. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Viral video of voting machine malfunction in Mississippi governor runoff, explained (Aug. 29, 2019)", "url": "https://politifact.com/article/2019/aug/29/viral-video-voting-machine-malfunction-mississippi/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves__pf2019.html"}, {"title": "WMC Action News 5 — Oxford voting machine taken out of service after malfunctioning (Aug. 27, 2019)", "url": "https://www.actionnews5.com/2019/08/27/oxford-voting-machine-taken-out-service-after-malfunctioning/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves__an5_2019.html"}, {"title": "USA Today — Video shows machine changing vote in Mississippi governor runoff (Aug. 28, 2019)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/08/28/video-shows-machine-changing-vote-mississippi-governor-runoff/2139558001/"}, {"title": "Scripps / Newsy (YouTube) — Mississippi voting machine malfunction video (Aug. 28, 2019)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC-ar3pqsK4"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), Aug. 29, 2026 repost of this clip with the 2014 Virginia Beach clip, presented without date or place (see virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2093693691017810316", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (pf2019, an5_2019). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): USA Today, Scripps / Newsy (YouTube). Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted. Video archived with capture_video.py (unredacted).", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier", "ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["AccuVote-TSX"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iC-ar3pqsK4", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves__youtube-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves__youtube-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 54.149, "bytes": 7839992, "sha256": "1abfb3d5c43b768f5e95790c082c695e69c817957a0cf53d401df055df7551fd", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves__youtube-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ga-sos-2019-dominion-democracy-suite-5-5-a-state-certification", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-09", "uid": "C20260926-022424-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-09", "old_ids": ["ga-sos-2019-dominion-democracy-suite-5-5-a-state-certification"], "seq": "C01039", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Systems are certified."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-08-09", "state": "GA", "description": "After EAC Certificate of Conformance for Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A (Jan. 30, 2019) and Pro V&V state testing, Georgia Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger certified Dominion’s Democracy Suite 5.5-A for statewide use on August 9, 2019—the certification gate preceding Georgia’s ~$107M BMD/scanner deployment. Status Confirmed state certification of a federally conformant system as the legal predicate for field use; peer to EAC Certificate of Conformance / NIST NVLAP VSTL cards on this leaf—Georgia SOS Aug. 2019 Dominion state certification, not those remounted. Does not prove certification equals fraud-proof security (PEP: certification ≠ observable hand count).", "sources": [{"title": "AJC — Georgia's new voting system certified by secretary of state (Aug. 2019)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/georgia-new-107m-voting-system-certified-for-use-elections/aCJvJ6TosKpMxGlvhPg0rM/"}, {"title": "EAC — Certificate of Conformance / Scope Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5-A", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/CertConf_Scope_DSuite5.5-A.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sos-2019-dominion-democracy-suite-5-5-a-state-certification__eac-certificate-of-conformance-scope-dominion-democracy-suite-5-5-a.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Systems are certified leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "ga-dominion-107m-dre-replacement-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-182526-03", "uid": "C20260925-182526-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-182526-03", "old_ids": ["ga-dominion-107m-dre-replacement-2019"], "seq": "C00086", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Update Scam", "Vulnerabilities are found, or \"found,\" to spur states and counties to buy new equipment and software to \"fix\" the problems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-07", "state": "GA", "description": "After years of federal litigation and expert findings on Georgia's aging paperless DRE fleet (Curling v. Raffensperger), Georgia awarded Dominion Voting Systems a roughly $107 million statewide contract (announced July 2019) to replace those DREs with new Ballot Marking Devices, printers, and scanners producing paper records. Separately, CISA's June 3, 2022 advisory ICSA-22-154-01 documented multiple vulnerabilities in Dominion Democracy Suite ImageCast X configurations and stated Dominion reported the issues addressed in subsequent software/firmware versions—illustrating the continuing vendor update/upgrade cycle after public advisories. Status Confirmed for the large new-equipment purchase following security findings and for the CISA-documented vulnerability→vendor-update pathway. Catalog claim that vulnerabilities are manufactured solely to spur sales remains Alleged and is not established by these sources.", "sources": [{"title": "GovTech — Georgia Awards $107M Voting Machine Contract to Dominion (July 2019)", "url": "https://www.govtech.com/security/Georgia-Awards-107M-Voting-Machine-Contract-to-Dominion.html"}, {"title": "CISA ICSA-22-154-01 — Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion ImageCast X (June 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-22-154-01", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-dominion-107m-dre-replacement-2019__cisa-icsa-22-154-01-vulnerabilities-affecting-dominion-image.png"}, {"title": "Patch — Ocean County, NJ $9.4M ES&S purchase replacing Dominion machines citing greater safety protocols (2023)", "url": "https://patch.com/new-jersey/tomsriver/new-voting-machines-coming-ocean-county"}], "notes": "Confirmed purchase/upgrade facts after security findings. Motive that vulns are planted to force buys = Alleged only.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "gao-19-485-federal-election-fraud-tiny-share-prosecutions-2001-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-03", "uid": "C20260925-211320-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-03", "old_ids": ["gao-19-485-federal-election-fraud-tiny-share-prosecutions-2001-2017"], "seq": "C00248", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "There is no meaningful penalty for breaking election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-19-485 reported that from FY2001–FY2017 DOJ's Public Integrity Section filed only 19 election-fraud cases (~3% of its caseload) and U.S. Attorneys' Offices filed 185 election-fraud cases (~0.02% of their overall caseload). Status Confirmed for the documented rarity of federal criminal election-fraud filings relative to overall caseloads — evidence that criminal enforcement is sparse even where statutes exist (not a claim that no penalties exist on paper).", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-19-485 — Voter Registration: Federal Enforcement Efforts and List Management", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-19-485-federal-election-fraud-tiny-share-prosecutions-2001-2017__gao-19-485-voter-registration-federal-enforcement-efforts-and-list-management.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-19-485 Highlights", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485-highlights.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-19-485-federal-election-fraud-tiny-share-prosecutions-2001-2017__gao-19-485-highlights.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 2. Confirmed low federal prosecution volume / caseload share."}
{"id": "rucho-gerrymandering-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-31", "uid": "C20260925-155410-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-31", "old_ids": ["rucho-gerrymandering-2019"], "seq": "C00031", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Redistricting and Gerrymandering"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-27", "state": "Federal / NC / MD", "description": "In Rucho v. Common Cause, 588 U.S. 684 (2019), the U.S. Supreme Court held 5–4 that partisan gerrymandering claims present nonjusticiable political questions in federal court, vacating lower-court rulings on North Carolina and Maryland maps. The decision leaves partisan map-drawing disputes primarily to state courts and legislatures. Status Confirmed for the holding; does not itself validate any particular map as fair or fraudulent.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Supreme Court opinion PDF — Rucho v. Common Cause", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-422_9ol1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rucho-gerrymandering-2019__u-s-supreme-court-opinion-pdf-rucho-v-common-cause.pdf"}, {"title": "Oyez — Rucho v. Common Cause", "url": "https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-422", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rucho-gerrymandering-2019__oyez-rucho-v-common-cause.png"}], "notes": "Foundational SCOTUS districting control case within scope."}
{"id": "abfde-fulltime-two-year-fde-training-requirement-vs-election-sig-check", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-03", "uid": "C20260925-234437-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-03", "old_ids": ["abfde-fulltime-two-year-fde-training-requirement-vs-election-sig-check"], "seq": "C00436", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Proper training takes two years of certified document-examiner schooling."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-21", "state": "Federal", "description": "The American Board of Forensic Document Examiners (ABFDE) Qualifications and Requirements for Certification require applicants to complete and document a full-time training period of at least two years (minimum 24 months under a principal trainer) in a recognized forensic laboratory before certification testing—far longer than typical election-office signature-verification classes. Status Confirmed that professional FDE certification paths specify a multi-year full-time training bar. Catalog leaf maps this gap honestly: election signature gates are not ABFDE-grade processes. PEP/hand-count framing: precinct public hand count of hand-marked paper does not depend on opaque high-volume envelope-signature screening pipelines.", "sources": [{"title": "ABFDE — Qualifications and Requirements for Certification (PDF; ≥2 years full-time training)", "url": "https://abfde.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/QualificationsRequirementsCertification.pdf"}, {"title": "ABFDE — Objectives for Training (minimum two years full-time)", "url": "https://abfde.org/htdocs/certification/ObjectivesforTraining.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 2."}
{"id": "tx-dominion-5-5-cert-denial-2019", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-14", "uid": "C20260926-012939-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-14", "old_ids": ["tx-dominion-5-5-cert-denial-2019"], "seq": "C00853", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Labs approve systems."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-20", "state": "TX", "description": "Before denying Democracy Suite 5.5-A in January 2020, the Texas Secretary of State denied certification of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5 on June 20, 2019 after January 2019 examiner hearings. Official SOS examination-status pages and the Report of Review PDF document the denial; the later 5.5-A review expressly notes 5.5 had already been denied and that 5.5-A was EAC-certified yet still failed Texas Election Code §122.001 standards per examiners. Status Confirmed for a distinct Texas examiner/lab-gate denial event on the same 'Labs approve systems' leaf—showing EAC/VSTL approval does not equal state approval.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Report of Review of Dominion Democracy Suite 5.5 (Denied June 20, 2019)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/dominion-democracy-suite-5.5.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-dominion-5-5-cert-denial-2019__texas-sos-report-of-review-of-dominion-democracy-suite.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Dominion voting system examination status page (5.5 and 5.5-A denials)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/dominion.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-dominion-5-5-cert-denial-2019__texas-sos-dominion-voting-system-examination-status-pag.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020. Distinct prior denial.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite"]}
{"id": "gao-19-485-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-enforcement-accountability-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-06", "uid": "C20260926-032507-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-06", "old_ids": ["gao-19-485-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-enforcement-accountability-gaps"], "seq": "C01201", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "No responsible party is accountable for keeping the voter rolls accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-19-485 (Voter Registration: Information on Federal Enforcement Efforts and State and Local List Management) found DOJ NVRA list-maintenance oversight relied heavily on state-reported information, lacked specific goals and timelines for its 2017 compliance review, and had limited capacity to pursue enforcement—documenting a structural federal accountability gap over who keeps statewide rolls accurate even though NVRA/HAVA assign shared duties. Status Confirmed primary GAO-19-485 on weak federal enforcement visibility over list maintenance; peer to CRS NVRA/HAVA shared-accountability and FL Auditor 2021-096 soft-remount cards already on this leaf—GAO-19-485 federal-enforcement gap instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: diffuse no-single-owner accountability for roll accuracy expands the soft-identity pool that only precinct paper hand counts can reconcile to humans.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-19-485 — Voter Registration: Federal Enforcement Efforts and State/Local List Management (product page)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-485", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-19-485-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-enforcement-accountability-gaps__gao-19-485-voter-registration-federal-enforcement-efforts-and-state-local-list-management-product-page.png"}, {"title": "GAO-19-485 — Full report PDF", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-19-485-nvra-hava-list-maintenance-enforcement-accountability-gaps__gao-19-485-full-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on No responsible party / accountability for keeping voter rolls accurate leaf."}
{"id": "gao-19-485-voter-registration-list-management-source-path-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-31", "uid": "C20260926-002757-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-31", "old_ids": ["gao-19-485-voter-registration-list-management-source-path-gaps"], "seq": "C00704", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration databases do not require, or even record, the source of each registration (the individual who caused it and the full path it took into the database)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-06-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-19-485 on voter-registration list management documents federal/state reliance on external match sources (NCOA, SSA death, felony, vital records) and recurring data-quality/timeliness gaps—without a mandated end-to-end 'SOURCE of the registration record' field capturing who caused each registration and its full path into the database. Status Confirmed for list-management architecture lacking comprehensive provenance requirements.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-19-485 — Voter Registration: Federal Enforcement Efforts and State/Local List Management", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 — Additional Data Could Help Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists (foundational)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/a246629.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 16."}
{"id": "denver-2019-voatz-uocava-mobile-voting-pilot-blockchain", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-02", "uid": "C20260926-020046-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-02", "old_ids": ["denver-2019-voatz-uocava-mobile-voting-pilot-blockchain"], "seq": "C00919", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will cite UOCAVA's \"proven track record\" as evidence that mobile voting is \"safe and secure.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-05/2019-06", "state": "CO", "description": "Denver Elections Division's 2019 Professional Practices paper (AEAO) documents a municipal pilot with Voatz, Tusk Philanthropies, and the National Cyber Security Center offering a **blockchain-based mobile voting app only to UOCAVA** (military/overseas) voters in the May/June 2019 municipal elections—explicitly framed as more convenient and 'more secure' electronic return than email PDF attachments, with survey respondents preferring the app. Status Confirmed that a major city marketed smartphone mobile voting via the UOCAVA 'proven need / safer than email' track-record narrative—peer to WV 2018 Voatz military pilots and Democracy Live OmniBallot UOCAVA portals; not proof the blockchain layer defeated device/compromise risks later documented in independent Voatz audits.", "sources": [{"title": "Denver Elections / AEAO — Enhanced Security and Access for UOCAVA Voters (2019 Voatz mobile pilot recap PDF)", "url": "https://new.voatz.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Denver-Pilots-Recap.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/denver-2019-voatz-uocava-mobile-voting-pilot-blockchain__denver-elections-aeao-enhanced-security-and-access-for.pdf"}, {"title": "Salon / IND — Smartphone voting underway in Denver UOCAVA pilot (Rosenfeld, May 2019)", "url": "https://www.salon.com/2019/05/27/smartphone-voting-is-underway-inside-the-most-radical-voting-system-in-america_partner/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on mobile voting marketed via UOCAVA proven track record leaf.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "npr-2019-ess-customer-advisory-board-vendor-trips-clerks-trust-relationships", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-13", "uid": "C20260926-000809-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-13", "old_ids": ["npr-2019-ess-customer-advisory-board-vendor-trips-clerks-trust-relationships"], "seq": "C00566", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks to trust machines and vendors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-05-02", "state": "Federal", "description": "NPR (May 2019) documents ES&S customer advisory boards, Las Vegas expense-paid trips, and conference sponsorships that deepen election-official trust/relationships with voting-machine vendors ahead of major 2020 procurements; former VA elections commissioner Edgardo Cortes describes comfort with longtime vendors driving buy decisions. Soft maps clerk-association/vendor-conference culture. Status Confirmed for vendor-driven trust cultivation of clerks/election officials; 'instruct' via associations is Partially inferred from conference/vendor ecosystem.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Trips to Vegas: election vendors under scrutiny (ES&S advisory board)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/05/02/718270183/trips-to-vegas-and-chocolate-covered-pretzels-election-vendors-come-under-scruti"}, {"title": "WJAC — PA Auditor General: officials took freebies from voting machine firms", "url": "https://wjactv.com/news/local/audit-says-officials-took-freebies-from-voting-machine-firms", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-2019-ess-customer-advisory-board-vendor-trips-clerks-trust-relationships__wjac-pa-auditor-general-officials-took-freebies-from-voting.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 7. Soft companion to fill-20e Clerks NGO / Agents of SOS leaves.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "ga-hb316-2019-bmd-paper-ballot-package-after-dre-litigation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-04", "uid": "C20260925-214102-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-04", "old_ids": ["ga-hb316-2019-bmd-paper-ballot-package-after-dre-litigation"], "seq": "C00327", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They disguise bills that contain Trojan horses."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-04", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia HB 316 (2019) was the post-DRE legislative package that mandated electronic ballot markers producing paper ballots counted by scanners — publicly framed as restoring 'paper ballots' after Curling litigation — while locking in statewide BMD+QR/barcode tabulation rather than precinct hand-marked / hand-counted paper. Status Confirmed for a reform package whose citizen-facing 'paper ballot' framing embedded continued electronic marking/tabulation architecture (later QR/human-readable fights in SB189 / SB3EX).", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia — HB 316 signed legislation PDF", "url": "https://gov.georgia.gov/document/signed-legislation/hb316pdf/download", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-hb316-2019-bmd-paper-ballot-package-after-dre-litigation__georgia-hb-316-signed-legislation-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Curling litigation record discussing HB316 BMD paper system (CourtListener)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.751.0_5.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-hb316-2019-bmd-paper-ballot-package-after-dre-litigation__curling-litigation-record-discussing-hb316-bmd-paper-system.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 2 companion. Trojan = 'paper ballot' reform embedding BMDs."}
{"id": "mueller-2019-illinois-sboe-russian-compromise-voter-data-attractive-attack-surface", "permanent_id": "C20260926-024539-09", "uid": "C20260926-024539-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-024539-09", "old_ids": ["mueller-2019-illinois-sboe-russian-compromise-voter-data-attractive-attack-surface"], "seq": "C01099", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "This creates a much more attractive attack surface."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-04", "state": "IL / Federal", "description": "Special Counsel Mueller's 2019 Report Volume I documents that Russian military intelligence compromised the Illinois State Board of Elections voter-registration system and extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before detection—proof that centralized electronic registration databases present a high-value, successfully exploited attack surface even when vote tallies themselves were not altered. Status Confirmed primary DOJ finding of foreign compromise of a state voter-registration system; peer to CISA election cyber-risk and DEF CON Voting Village equipment-compromise cards already on this leaf—Illinois SBOE intrusion, not those remounted. PEP framing: concentrated electronic rolls/aggregation create attractive targets that hand-marked, locally observed counts avoid.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — Mueller Report Vol. I (Russian efforts against state election infrastructure / Illinois SBOE)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/sco/file/1373816/dl"}, {"title": "NBC News — CISA backlog story summarizing Mueller Illinois SBOE compromise (Nov. 2, 2022)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/security/100-election-jurisdictions-waiting-federal-cyber-help-sources-say-rcna55115"}], "notes": "Enrich-b15 third on Creates a much more attractive attack surface leaf."}
{"id": "appel-2019-bmd-paper-cannot-assure-will-of-voters-qr-vs-human-readable", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-15", "uid": "C20260926-023825-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-15", "old_ids": ["appel-2019-bmd-paper-cannot-assure-will-of-voters-qr-vs-human-readable"], "seq": "C01090", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the screen and the printout, but record the votes however you like in the database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-04-21", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Andrew Appel, Richard DeMillo, and Philip Stark’s Apr. 21, 2019 paper 'Ballot-marking devices cannot assure the will of the voters' (submitted to NCSBE and mirrored by Verified Voting / CITP) explains that BMDs can display/print human-readable selections while encoding different selections in a QR/barcode that scanners actually tabulate—so voters cannot verify the counted vote. Status Confirmed peer-reviewed/public academic policy paper; peer to Halderman GA ICX QR analysis and Princeton/Feldman Diebold malware cards already on this leaf—Appel–DeMillo–Stark BMD unverifiability paper, not those remounted. PEP framing: show-one-thing/record-another on BMDs is why hand-marked paper under hand count is the PEP remedy.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel / DeMillo / Stark — Ballot-marking devices cannot assure the will of the voters (Apr. 21, 2019 PDF via NCSBE)", "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/2019-06-13/Voting%20System%20Certification/Public%20Comments/BMD%20paper%204.21.19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-2019-bmd-paper-cannot-assure-will-of-voters-qr-vs-human-readable__appel-demillo-stark-ballot-marking-devices-cannot-assure-the-will-of-the-voters-apr-21-2019-pdf-via-ncsbe.pdf"}, {"title": "Verified Voting / Appel — Why Voters Should Mark Ballots by Hand", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/why-voters-should-mark-ballots-by-hand-andrew-appel/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Show-one-thing-record-another BMD/DRE leaf."}
{"id": "politico-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-directory-share-info-channel", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-05", "uid": "C20260926-030706-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-05", "old_ids": ["politico-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-directory-share-info-channel"], "seq": "C01140", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Share information with the cabal."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-25", "state": "Federal", "description": "Politico Morning Score (Mar. 25, 2019) documents the DCCC preferred-vendor standards as a formal shared-consultant directory: the committee would neither hire nor recommend vendors working for primary challengers, and both supporters and detractors acknowledged the policy 'codifies what had been assumed by many consultants in past cycles'—i.e., a standing information-sharing / preferred-firm channel across caucus campaigns that challengers are cut out of. Status Confirmed primary Politico reporting of the preferred-vendor share/recommend channel; peer to Intercept share-info and FEC common-vendor 11 CFR 109.21 cards already on this leaf—Politico directory/codification framing, not those remounted. PEP framing: preferred-vendor information pipelines that concentrate campaign intel outside public scrutiny.", "sources": [{"title": "Politico Morning Score — DCCC's new vendor policy kneecaps primary challengers (preferred-vendor channel)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-score/2019/03/25/dcccs-new-vendor-policy-kneecaps-primary-challengers-556292"}, {"title": "The Hill — House Democrats' campaign arm lifts ban on consultants who work for primary challengers (2021 informal share continues)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/542286-house-democrats-campaign-arm-lifts-ban-on-consultants-who-work-for-primary/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Campaign Consultants Share information with cabal leaf."}
{"id": "intercept-2019-dccc-blacklist-block-opportunities-primary-challengers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-25", "uid": "C20260926-002757-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-25", "old_ids": ["intercept-2019-dccc-blacklist-block-opportunities-primary-challengers"], "seq": "C00698", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Block opportunities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "DCCC's 2019 written policy refused business with or recommendations to any consultant working for a primary opponent of a sitting House Democrat—explicitly blocking consulting opportunities for challengers and the firms that serve them. Status Confirmed for the published blacklist/block-opportunities rule (later formally ended in 2021).", "sources": [{"title": "The Intercept — DCCC will cut off firms that challenge incumbents (2019)", "url": "https://theintercept.com/2019/03/22/house-democratic-leadership-warns-it-will-cut-off-any-firms-who-challenge-incumbents/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/intercept-2019-dccc-blacklist-block-opportunities-primary-challengers__the-intercept-dccc-will-cut-off-firms-that-challenge-incumbe.png"}, {"title": "The Hill — Dems seek to stifle primary challenges to incumbents (2019)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/435332-dems-seek-to-stifle-primary-challenges-to-incumbents/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 13."}
{"id": "intercept-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-control-information-flow-consultants", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-23", "uid": "C20260926-002757-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-23", "old_ids": ["intercept-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-control-information-flow-consultants"], "seq": "C00696", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Control the flow of information."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Intercept documented the DCCC's preferred-vendor regime: consultants must agree not to work with primary challengers to access DCCC business/recommendations, and the committee is described as a 'consultant factory' that directs candidates to its own alumni—controlling which consultants get information, access, and paid flow. Soft remount of DCCC control architecture onto Control-information-flow pathKey. Status Confirmed for preferred-vendor information/access control.", "sources": [{"title": "The Intercept — DCCC Warns It Will Cut Off Firms That Challenge Incumbents (2019)", "url": "https://theintercept.com/2019/03/22/house-democratic-leadership-warns-it-will-cut-off-any-firms-who-challenge-incumbents/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/intercept-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-control-information-flow-consultants__the-intercept-dccc-warns-it-will-cut-off-firms-that-challenge-incumbents-2019.png"}, {"title": "CNN — AOC rebukes DCCC 'blacklist' of companies working with primary challengers (2019)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/31/politics/dccc-primary-challenger-rule"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 12."}
{"id": "intercept-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-share-info-consultants", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-23", "uid": "C20260926-003520-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-23", "old_ids": ["intercept-2019-dccc-preferred-vendor-share-info-consultants"], "seq": "C00736", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Share information with the cabal."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Intercept documented the DCCC preferred-vendor regime requiring consultants not to work with primary challengers to access DCCC business—creating a shared-information / access network among approved consultants that can covertly constrain the candidates they ostensibly serve. Soft remount of DCCC consultant-factory family onto 'Share information with cabal' pathKey. Status Confirmed for preferred-vendor information/access control; 'cabal' label is catalog framing.", "sources": [{"title": "The Intercept — House Democratic leadership warns it will cut off firms who challenge incumbents (2019)", "url": "https://theintercept.com/2019/03/22/house-democratic-leadership-warns-it-will-cut-off-any-firms-who-challenge-incumbents/"}, {"title": "FEC — Coordinated communications / common-vendor conduct standards (regulatory companion)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/help-candidates-and-committees/candidate-taking-receipts/coordinated-communications/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 12. Soft remount of fill-20i DCCC Control-information-flow / Block-opportunities family."}
{"id": "the-hill-2019-dccc-stifle-primary-challenges-block-opportunities-consultants", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023825-07", "uid": "C20260926-023825-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023825-07", "old_ids": ["the-hill-2019-dccc-stifle-primary-challenges-block-opportunities-consultants"], "seq": "C01082", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Block opportunities."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Hill (Mar. 22, 2019) contemporaneously reported the DCCC’s written policy refusing business with consultants who work for primary challengers to Democratic incumbents—explicitly framed as stifling primary challenges and cutting off consultant opportunities for insurgent campaigns. Status Confirmed contemporaneous national reporting of the blacklist/opportunity-block rule; peer to The Intercept’s preferred-vendor documentation and the NYT 2021 end-of-blacklist history cards already on this leaf—The Hill’s stifle-primaries framing, not those remounted. PEP framing: consultant cartels that block challenger infrastructure also block candidates who would prioritize hand-count / decentralization reforms.", "sources": [{"title": "The Hill — Dems seek to stifle primary challenges to incumbents (Mar. 22, 2019)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/435332-dems-seek-to-stifle-primary-challenges-to-incumbents/"}, {"title": "Politico — DCCC ends ban on vendors who work with primary challengers (Mar. 9, 2021) (history of the block)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2021/03/09/dccc-ban-primary-challengers-474588"}], "notes": "Enrich-b14 third on Campaign Consultants Block opportunities leaf."}
{"id": "thehill-2019-dccc-stifle-primary-challengers-vendor-blacklist-control-info", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-04", "uid": "C20260926-030706-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-04", "old_ids": ["thehill-2019-dccc-stifle-primary-challengers-vendor-blacklist-control-info"], "seq": "C01139", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Control the flow of information."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Hill (March 2019) reports the DCCC's formal preferred-vendor policy stating its 'core mission' includes 'supporting and protecting incumbents' and that 'the DCCC will not conduct business with, nor recommend to any of its targeted campaigns, any consultant that works with an opponent of a sitting Member of the House Democratic Caucus'—explicitly cutting challengers off from the committee's vendor-recommendation / information channel. Status Confirmed primary contemporaneous Hill reporting of the blacklisting control-of-information-flow rule; peer to Intercept preferred-vendor and Vox 2018 primary-meddling cards already on this leaf—Hill policy-text reporting, not those remounted. PEP framing: consultant blacklists that starve citizen candidates of operational information undercut contested primaries that hand-count transparency would otherwise make auditable.", "sources": [{"title": "The Hill — Dems seek to stifle primary challenges to incumbents (DCCC vendor ban, Mar. 2019)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/435332-dems-seek-to-stifle-primary-challenges-to-incumbents/"}, {"title": "Politico Morning Score — DCCC's new vendor policy kneecaps primary challengers (Mar. 25, 2019)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/newsletters/morning-score/2019/03/25/dcccs-new-vendor-policy-kneecaps-primary-challengers-556292"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Campaign Consultants Control information flow leaf."}
{"id": "nc-sbe-2019-dowless-mail-ballot-injection", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-39", "uid": "C20260926-004030-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-39", "old_ids": ["nc-sbe-2019-dowless-mail-ballot-injection"], "seq": "C00792", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation"], "leaf_id": "L20261106-233323-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261106-233323-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-13", "state": "NC", "description": "North Carolina State Board of Elections' March 13, 2019 order on NC-9 found Leslie McCrae Dowless coordinated an unlawful absentee-ballot operation (forged requests, ballot collection, falsified witnesses, altered ballots) that injected mail ballots into the system—directly matching 'Inject ballots into the system > Mail them in.' Soft remount of fill-20h/j Dowless/Bladen harvest family onto this Feedback Loop pathKey. Status Confirmed for adjudicated mail-ballot injection scheme; nationwide feedback-loop cabal Alleged beyond NC-9.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Order in Congressional District 9 / Dowless absentee scheme (PDF, Mar 13, 2019)", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/State_Board_Meeting_Docs/Congressional_District_9_Portal/Order_03132019.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-sbe-2019-dowless-mail-ballot-injection__ncsbe-order-in-congressional-district-9-dowless-absentee-scheme-pdf-mar-13-2019.pdf"}, {"title": "NBC News — Four people plead guilty in North Carolina ballot probe", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/four-people-plead-guilty-north-carolina-ballot-probe-2016-2018-electio-rcna49534"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 20. Soft remount of NC Dowless / Bladen family onto Feedback Mail-them-in pathKey."}
{"id": "nh-doj-2019-mckinnon-unh-ma-nh-dual-voting-traveling-recruit", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-07", "uid": "C20260926-032507-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-07", "old_ids": ["nh-doj-2019-mckinnon-unh-ma-nh-dual-voting-traveling-recruit"], "seq": "C01202", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Recruit individuals willing to travel (college students, transient workers, activists, or paid operatives)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-03-01", "state": "NH / MA", "description": "New Hampshire DOJ (March 1, 2019) announced that UNH student Spencer McKinnon pleaded guilty to providing a false statement on a NH voter-registration form after casting a Massachusetts absentee ballot from Dracut (Oct. 24, 2016) and two days later registering in Durham, NH while affirming he was 'not domiciled or voting in any other state'—the first Interstate Voter Crosscheck-driven conviction after the 2016 cycle; sentence included suspended jail, $2,000 fine, community service, and loss of NH voting rights. Status Confirmed primary NH DOJ college-student dual MA/NH voting conviction illustrating recruited/traveling student multi-state registration risk; peer to Milwaukee Sandburg Hall college dual-reg and Brennan WI EDR college dual-vote cards already on this leaf—McKinnon UNH Crosscheck conviction instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: traveling college operatives who register/vote across states collide with one-person-one-vote; public hand counts still require domicile-consistent paper.", "sources": [{"title": "NH DOJ — Guilty Plea and Sentencing of Spencer McKinnon for Wrongful Voting (March 1, 2019)", "url": "https://www.doj.nh.gov/news-and-media/guilty-plea-and-sentencing-spencer-mckinnon-wrongful-voting"}, {"title": "AP — 2nd UMaine student charged with voter fraud (college dual-vote companion)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maine-election-2020-6586e91bcae342d46e6223e1425d5f09"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Traveling Voter Operations Recruit individuals willing to travel leaf."}
{"id": "nass-voatz-winter19-under-the-hood-white-paper-hosted-mobile-voting", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-21", "uid": "C20260925-234437-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-21", "old_ids": ["nass-voatz-winter19-under-the-hood-white-paper-hosted-mobile-voting"], "seq": "C00454", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will use the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) to push it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-94", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-94", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-02", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NASS hosted and published Voatz's 'Under the Hood: The West Virginia Mobile Voting Pilot' white paper (Winter 2019) on nass.org—using the Secretaries of State association platform to circulate vendor mobile/blockchain voting advocacy to election officials nationwide. Status Confirmed that NASS was used as a distribution/push channel for mobile voting materials. Soft companion to existing wv-2018-voatz / mit-voatz cards.", "sources": [{"title": "NASS — Voatz white paper Under the Hood (Winter 2019 PDF)", "url": "https://www.nass.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/white-paper-voatz-nass-winter19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nass-voatz-winter19-under-the-hood-white-paper-hosted-mobile-voting__nass-voatz-white-paper-under-the-hood-winter-2019-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "StateScoop — West Virginia blockchain mobile voting expansion coverage", "url": "https://statescoop.com/west-virginia-may-offer-blockchain-based-ballots-to-all-of-its-overseas-voters-this-november/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 11.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "npr-2019-dowless-nc9-ballot-harvest-compromise-workers-crimes", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-05", "uid": "C20260926-002008-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-05", "old_ids": ["npr-2019-dowless-nc9-ballot-harvest-compromise-workers-crimes"], "seq": "C00638", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Compromise people by inducing them to commit election crimes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-02-27", "state": "NC", "description": "Leslie McCrae Dowless's illegal absentee-ballot collection operation in NC-9 (2016/2018) paid workers to possess and handle others' ballots—felonies under NC law—then pressured them to stick together and obstruct investigators (Lisa Britt testimony). Workers who joined for pay were thereby compromised into election crimes and silence. Soft remount of existing NC Bladen ballot-harvesting card family onto this exact Fear/Discredit compromise pathKey. Status Confirmed for operative-driven compromise of workers into crimes; Mark Harris campaign knowledge/motive Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — NC political operative charged in election fraud scheme (2019)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/02/27/698606483/political-operative-at-center-of-tainted-n-c-election-charged"}, {"title": "NCSBI — SBI arrests after Bladen absentee ballot irregularities (2019)", "url": "https://www.ncsbi.gov/Newsroom/News-Releases/SBI-Agents-Arrest-Several-after-Investigation-into", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-2019-dowless-nc9-ballot-harvest-compromise-workers-crimes__ncsbi-sbi-arrests-after-bladen-absentee-ballot-irregularities-2019.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 3. Soft remount of NC Dowless/Bladen harvest family onto compromise pathKey."}
{"id": "aspen-co-2019-ballots-mailed-to-57-preregistered-16-17-year-olds", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-35", "uid": "C20260925-235207-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-35", "old_ids": ["aspen-co-2019-ballots-mailed-to-57-preregistered-16-17-year-olds"], "seq": "C00508", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "Provides plausible excuses for procedural \"mistakes\" that enable indirect manipulation of elections:", "Send ballots to young people. If caught, claim it was a mistake; if not, they gain uninformed voters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-02-18", "state": "CO", "description": "Aspen/Pitkin County (Feb 2019) mailed municipal-election ballots to 57 preregistered 16- and 17-year-olds after a voter list failed to filter underage confidential/pre-registered voters; officials called it a mistake, sent explanation letters, and said returned underage ballots would be flagged/excluded. Status Confirmed for the exact 'ballots sent to youth / claim mistake' procedural failure on a youth pre-registration substrate.", "sources": [{"title": "Denver Post / AP — Aspen ballots sent to dozens of underage voters", "url": "https://www.denverpost.com/2019/02/18/aspen-election-ballots-sent-underage-voters/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aspen-co-2019-ballots-mailed-to-57-preregistered-16-17-year-olds__denver-post-ap-aspen-ballots-sent-to-dozens-of-underage-voters.png"}, {"title": "Aspen Times — Ballots sent to underage voters in city election", "url": "https://www.aspentimes.com/news/local/ballots-sent-to-underage-voters-in-city-election/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 18."}
{"id": "jw-v-logan-la-county-2019-settlement-1-5m-inactive-1-2m-removed", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-03", "uid": "C20261008-203914-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-03", "old_ids": ["jw-v-logan-la-county-2019-settlement-1-5m-inactive-1-2m-removed"], "seq": "C00273", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01", "state": "CA", "description": "Judicial Watch v. Logan (C.D. Cal. No. 2:17-cv-08948) was a 2017 NVRA suit by Judicial Watch, four Los Angeles County voters and Election Integrity Project California. It settled in January 2019. In the settlement, Los Angeles County acknowledged about 1,565,000 registrations on its inactive file as of April 27, 2018. The county agreed to mail address-confirmation notices to every inactive registrant not already scheduled for cancellation, and to cancel those who neither responded nor voted over two federal general elections. California's Secretary of State agreed to update the state NVRA manual to make clear that ineligible names must be removed. The county mailed about 1.5 million notices in 2019. Judicial Watch reported that the county later confirmed 1,207,613 inactive registrations were removed, and that more than 634,000 of its inactive voters had not voted in at least 10 years. Status Confirmed: the signed settlement and the county's reported removals. The settlement was not an admission that ineligible votes were cast. The card shows a backlog of roughly 1.5 million stale records in the nation's largest county, which now mails a ballot to every active voter.", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch v. Logan — Settlement Agreement (Exhibit A, PDF)", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/JW-v.-Logan-exhibit-A-settlement-08948.pdf"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch — Los Angeles County confirms removal of 1.2 million ineligible voters (settlement progress)", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/los-angeles-county-lawsuit-settlement/"}, {"title": "The Daily Signal — After a lawsuit, Los Angeles County begins to clean up its voter rolls (June 24, 2019)", "url": "https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/06/24/after-a-lawsuit-los-angeles-county-begins-to-clean-up-its-voter-rolls/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). 1.2M figure is Judicial Watch's report of county progress data. Two source pages return 403 to curl (bot block); content confirmed via search. Peer to OH/IN/KY settlement cards; not a remount."}
{"id": "ap-2019-judge-rodolfo-delgado-bribery-conviction-tx", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-15", "uid": "C20260926-005107-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-15", "old_ids": ["ap-2019-judge-rodolfo-delgado-bribery-conviction-tx"], "seq": "C00808", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Compromise and blackmail judges and prosecutors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "TX", "description": "AP reported that former South Texas district judge Rodolfo 'Rudy' Delgado was convicted of accepting bribes (federal prosecution), demonstrating adjudicated compromise of a sitting trial judge — the leaf's 'compromised … judges' pathway. Bribery creates classic blackmail/leverage vulnerability even when the charged offense is bribery rather than a separate blackmail count. Status Confirmed for bribery conviction of a U.S. state district judge; broader cabal blackmail network Alleged beyond this case.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Ex-South Texas district judge convicted of accepting bribes", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-11818548953c4246815e3ffa2258b21f"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Ex-Bucks judge John Waltman 6.5 years for corruption (2019 companion)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/news/john-waltman-judge--20190610.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2019-judge-rodolfo-delgado-bribery-conviction-tx__philadelphia-inquirer---ex-bucks-judge-john-waltman-6-5-years-for-corruption--20.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 8."}
{"id": "atavist-2019-red-fawn-fallis-distraction-disruption-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-14", "uid": "C20260926-003520-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-14", "old_ids": ["atavist-2019-red-fawn-fallis-distraction-disruption-companion"], "seq": "C00727", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They cause distractions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "ND", "description": "Atavist's Red Fawn Fallis investigation details how an FBI informant's relationship and firearm involvement at Standing Rock produced legal crises and internal turmoil that distracted and damaged the camp's cohesion—illustrating infiltrator-linked distraction/disruption effects. Status Confirmed for documented informant-linked crisis; broader cabal orchestration Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Atavist Magazine — Red Fawn Fallis / Standing Rock pipeline informant case", "url": "https://magazine.atavist.com/2019/red-fawn-fallis-standing-rock-pipeline"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock CHS count and tasking (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "atavist-2019-red-fawn-fallis-fbi-informant-harmon-gun-disruption", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-12", "uid": "C20260926-002757-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-12", "old_ids": ["atavist-2019-red-fawn-fallis-fbi-informant-harmon-gun-disruption"], "seq": "C00685", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They cause disruptions."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "ND", "description": "Court-documented Standing Rock case of Red Fawn Fallis: FBI informant Heath Harmon entered a romantic relationship with Fallis and possessed the firearm involved when she was tackled/arrested—illustrating how infiltrator relationships can escalate into disruption and criminal exposure that fractures movements. Status Confirmed for informant relationship + firearm ownership facts in the case record.", "sources": [{"title": "The Atavist — The Heart Still Stands (Red Fawn Fallis / Standing Rock)", "url": "https://magazine.atavist.com/2019/red-fawn-fallis-standing-rock-pipeline"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock FBI informants (Harmon/Fallis summary in broader CHS context)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "atavist-2019-red-fawn-unsuspecting-person-infiltrators", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-15", "uid": "C20260926-004030-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-15", "old_ids": ["atavist-2019-red-fawn-unsuspecting-person-infiltrators"], "seq": "C00768", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They sometimes work through an unsuspecting member of the group so that no one suspects them."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "ND", "description": "Atavist's Red Fawn Fallis investigation details how an FBI informant's romantic relationship and firearm involvement produced legal crises affecting Fallis and the broader camp—i.e., infiltrator effects routed through another person in the group so the tasking was not obvious to everyone. Soft remount of fill-20j Atavist distraction companion onto this exact 'unsuspecting person' pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented informant-linked harm via a third party; broader conspiracy Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Atavist Magazine — Red Fawn Fallis / Standing Rock pipeline informant case", "url": "https://magazine.atavist.com/2019/red-fawn-fallis-standing-rock-pipeline"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock CHS count and tasking (2024)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 8. Soft remount of Standing Rock / Atavist family."}
{"id": "brennan-avr-impact-expand-rolls-low-propensity-young-low-income", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-35", "uid": "C20260926-002757-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-35", "old_ids": ["brennan-avr-impact-expand-rolls-low-propensity-young-low-income"], "seq": "C00708", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Their goal is to increase registered voters as much as possible, especially low- or no-propensity voters, because they need those database entries to attach votes to."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center AVR impact reporting and related analyses document Automatic Voter Registration as an explicit strategy to expand rolls and bring in populations that traditional registration misses—including younger and lower-income cohorts often modeled as lower-propensity—creating more database entries to which outreach/votes can attach. Status Confirmed for maximize-registration architecture targeting low-engagement populations; 'attach phantom votes' motive Alleged beyond Confirmed roll-expansion.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — AVR Impact on State Voter Registration PDF", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/media/156/download/Report_AVR_Impact_State_Voter_Registration.pdf?inline=1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-avr-impact-expand-rolls-low-propensity-young-low-income__brennan-center-avr-impact-on-state-voter-registration-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Data for Progress — AVR boosts turnout among young and low-income people (2019 analysis)", "url": "https://www.dataforprogress.org/blog/2019/7/11/automatic-voter-registration-boosts-turnout-among-young-and-low-income-people"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 18. Honest: roll expansion Confirmed; phantom-attach motive Alleged."}
{"id": "brennan-fec-deadlock-stonewalling-enforcement-no-teeth", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-22", "uid": "C20260926-002757-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-22", "old_ids": ["brennan-fec-deadlock-stonewalling-enforcement-no-teeth"], "seq": "C00695", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Many election laws have no enforcement consequences, so nothing deters violations, inviting abuse under a false sense of security."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center analysis of FEC deadlocks/stonewalling documents how 3–3 partisan ties and delayed guidance can block investigations and advisory opinions—leaving campaign-finance and related election rules without effective enforcement teeth. Status Confirmed for structural deadlock/non-enforcement pattern; does not mean every violation goes unpunished.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — FEC Stonewalling Candidates, Parties Seeking Guidance", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/new-findings-fec-stonewalling-candidates-parties-seeking-guidance-about", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-fec-deadlock-stonewalling-enforcement-no-teeth__brennan-center-fec-stonewalling-candidates-parties-seeking-guidance.png"}, {"title": "FEC — Enforcement statistics FY1977–2026 (agency-published trends)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/enforcementstats1977to2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-fec-deadlock-stonewalling-enforcement-no-teeth__fec-enforcement-statistics-fy1977-2026-agency-published-trends.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 11 companion. Weaker/advocacy-leaning Brennan framing labeled; deadlock mechanism itself Confirmed via FEC stats companion."}
{"id": "ors-247-017-oregon-avr-dmv-to-sos-to-county-clerk-not-full-local-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-07", "uid": "C20260926-030706-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-07", "old_ids": ["ors-247-017-oregon-avr-dmv-to-sos-to-county-clerk-not-full-local-control"], "seq": "C01142", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "If elected county officials do not fully control all registrations, a huge attack surface is left open."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon Revised Statutes §247.017 (Motor Voter / AVR) requires DMV to transmit electronic name/age/residence/citizenship/signature records on a Secretary of State schedule to the SOS, who then provides them to the county clerk; registration completes after a 21-day opt-out unless declined, and the county clerk may not add the person or send a ballot until that window ends—placing initiation and routing of registrations in statewide SOS/DMV hands rather than full elective county control of every record's origin. Status Confirmed primary Oregon statute of the SOS-mediated AVR attack-surface; peer to NCSL AVR county-not-full-control and CRS/HAVA statewide-list cards already on this leaf—ORS 247.017 workflow, not those remounted. PEP framing: statewide AVR pipelines that strip county electors' full control of registration inflows without public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "ORS 247.017 — Transfer of voter registration materials from DMV to SOS to county clerk (AVR opt-out)", "url": "https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_247.017"}, {"title": "Oregon Legislature — ORS Chapter 247 (Qualification & Registration of Electors)", "url": "https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors247.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ors-247-017-oregon-avr-dmv-to-sos-to-county-clerk-not-full-local-control__oregon-legislature-ors-chapter-247-voter-registration.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Registration county officials not in full control of registrations leaf."}
{"id": "tal-crowds-on-demand-suppression-reinforcement-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-08", "uid": "C20260926-004030-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-08", "old_ids": ["tal-crowds-on-demand-suppression-reinforcement-companion"], "seq": "C00761", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Suppression reinforcement"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "NPR/This American Life undercover reporting on Crowds on Demand documents paid participants staged as protesters and even fake news crews—manufactured opposition that normalizes hostility and makes genuine supporters less willing to display allegiance (the leaf's suppression-reinforcement loop). Soft remount of Crowds-on-Demand family onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for paid manufactured-opposition mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR / This American Life — There's a Guy for That (Crowds on Demand)", "url": "https://www.thisamericanlife.org/671/theres-a-guy-for-that"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock CHS / manufactured disruption companion", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 4 companion. Soft remount of fill-20i/h Crowds-on-Demand family."}
{"id": "va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-01", "uid": "C20261026-180010-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-01", "old_ids": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after"], "seq": "C01566", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2019 (state VERIS site-visit notes); 2020 (ePollTab certification); 2025 to 2026 (Loudoun page, state handbook and checklists)", "state": "VA", "description": "Loudoun County's election-security page states that an \"electronic pollbook\" is \"created with data downloaded from VERIS as the two system[s] are not connected to one another in any way.\" [1] VERIS is Virginia's statewide voter registration system. During early voting the county updates the pollbook daily, and the Election Day pollbooks are created after early voting closes. [1] Loudoun's own ePollTab FAQ asks, \"Is the electronic pollbook connected to the state voter registration system?\" and answers, \"No. These two systems operate completely independently of one another. Any data transfer occurs manually.\" [2] The county has used DemTech's electronic poll books since 2008, first the Advocate system and then ePollTab, which the Virginia State Board of Elections certified on Sept. 18, 2020. [2] The state's 2026 General Registrar and Electoral Board handbook sets two points in time: about 20 days before the election the registrar downloads the initial pollbook data file produced from VERIS and builds the initial electronic pollbook file, and 2 days before the election the registrar downloads the final pollbook data and creates the distribution files. [4] For the return path, the state's 2019 VERIS project site-visit notes, which report interviews with unnamed general registrars whose localities used DemTech's older Advocate system, describe this process: a USB drive in each precinct's poll book laptop collects the .pollbook file (a proprietary DemTech export), the localities do not receive the USB until the next day during the canvass, the file is converted through DemTech's PAM tool into the CSV format VERIS requires, and it is then uploaded to VERIS to give voter credit for each precinct, which the notes call \"a manual process.\" [3] Those notes do not name Loudoun, and no source reviewed shows that Loudoun's current ePollTab workflow uses the same USB and PAM steps. After the election, the state canvass checklist (revised October 2026) directs localities to \"Import EPB voter credit into VERIS,\" to \"Review the voter credit import Exception File and update voter histories in VERIS,\" and to compare turnout to credit. [6] The state's pollbook testing checklist (March 2025) tells localities to confirm that \"the voter's status in VERIS and the pollbook file match\" and lists as a common missed step verifying that the final pollbook file is valid, timely (\"as up to date as possible\") and correct. [5] Status Confirmed that, in Virginia, the poll book is a separate copy built from a VERIS download, that Loudoun states any data transfer between its poll book and VERIS is manual, that the state's 2019 notes describe a USB and conversion path for Advocate localities, and that voting credit returns by an import that can produce exceptions. No source says a discrepancy was exploited, and none says a voter was affected by this design.", "sources": [{"title": "Loudoun County, Keeping Our Elections Secure", "url": "https://www.loudoun.gov/5732/Keeping-Our-Elections-Secure"}, {"title": "Loudoun County, FAQ's about the ePollTab Electronic Pollbook System", "url": "https://www.loudoun.gov/DocumentCenter/View/170063/ePollTab-FAQs"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT, VERIS RFP Project Site Visit and Interview Notes (created Oct. 2, 2019; USB and PAM passage on page 5)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/veris-rfp-project/Finalized_LocalitySiteVisitNotes_11.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT, GREB Handbook Chapter 10, Election Day Preparation (2026 update)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2026-updates/10_Election-Day-Prep_FINAL_2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT, Electronic Pollbook Logic and Accuracy Testing Steps checklist (March 2025)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/voting-equipment/EPB-Logic-and-Accuracy-Testing-Steps_Checklist-Mar-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT, What to do with your numbers: canvass checklists (rev. 10-2026)", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/formswarehouse/election-management/canvass-documents/What-to-do-with-your-numbers-Checklists-(rev-10-2026).pdf"}], "notes": "The USB and PAM passage is on page 5 of the 2019 VERIS site-visit notes, which concern localities that used the DemTech Advocate system and do not name Loudoun.", "vendor": ["DemTech"], "related": ["mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live", "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling", "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "demtech-epolltab-wireless-merlin-aws", "demtech-epolltab-android-windows-cots-tablets"]}
{"id": "colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-14", "uid": "C20260926-020640-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-14", "old_ids": ["colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy"], "seq": "C00947", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "They randomize CVR data, claiming it is necessary to protect voter privacy."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-60", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado RLA / CORLA anonymity guidance (McBurnett et al. and related written comments on Election Rulemaking) discusses **randomizing / shuffling CVR and ballot-image presentation order** and redacting batch/style fields specifically **to protect voter privacy / anonymity**—the same privacy rationale used to justify disordered CVR exports. Status Confirmed privacy-justified CVR randomization practice in a leading RLA state; peer to Hart Verity randomized CVR order and DVSOrder shuffle guidance—Colorado CORLA anonymity docs, not those remounts.", "sources": [{"title": "CORLA anonymity of CVR (McBurnett) — randomization / batch-style privacy strategies", "url": "https://neal.mcburnett.org/elections/corla/CORLA_anonymity_of_CVR_final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy__corla-anonymity-of-cvr-mcburnett-randomization-batch-st.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS rulemaking written comments — strategies for anonymity of voted ballot sheets / CVRs (2018)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule_making/written_comments/2018/20180309BranscombEtAl.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy__colorado-sos-rulemaking-written-comments-strategies-for.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on randomize CVR for privacy leaf.", "related": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"]}
{"id": "congress-115th-house-content-filtering-facebook-google-twitter-as-media-gatekeepers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-02", "uid": "C20260926-000015-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-02", "old_ids": ["congress-115th-house-content-filtering-facebook-google-twitter-as-media-gatekeepers"], "seq": "C00515", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Create a parallel media system: social media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "Federal", "description": "A 115th Congress House hearing examined Facebook, Google, and Twitter content-filtering practices as election-adjacent gatekeeping—confirming platforms operate as a constructed information channel with ad policies, account removals, and election-integrity tooling distinct from traditional media. Status Confirmed for social media as an alternate media system; cabal-authorship remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Congress.gov — Facebook, Google and Twitter: Examining Content Filtering Practices", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/event/115th-congress/house-event/108546/text", "local": "/archives/2026/09/congress-115th-house-content-filtering-facebook-google-twitter-as-media-gatekeepers__congress-115th-house-content-filtering-facebook-google-twitter-as-media-gatekeep.png"}, {"title": "Senate Judiciary 2020 hearing page (platform CEOs as media actors)", "url": "https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/breaking-the-news-censorship-suppression-and-the-2020-election"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "nas-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-dre-not-effectively-securable", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-36", "uid": "C20260926-000015-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-36", "old_ids": ["nas-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-dre-not-effectively-securable"], "seq": "C00549", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "There is no way to secure these systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "Federal", "description": "National Academies Securing the Vote (2018), as cited throughout Appel/Stark and Halderman litigation, concludes paperless/software-dependent systems lack effective assurance against undetectable outcome-changing software errors—reinforcing that pure electronic tabulation cannot be secured to election-grade assurance without voter-verified paper + audit. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel & Stark citing NAS Securing the Vote (software dependence)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST Rivest software-independence white paper", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 18 companion."}
{"id": "nasem-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-public-cannot-verify", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-07", "uid": "C20260926-021547-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-07", "old_ids": ["nasem-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-public-cannot-verify"], "seq": "C00970", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No public visibility"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "US", "description": "National Academies Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018) concludes that elections should not rely on software-dependent systems the public cannot independently verify, and recommends voter-verifiable paper ballots plus risk-limiting audits so outcomes do not rest on trusting proprietary vendor machines. Status Confirmed NAS consensus that software-dependent black-box tabulation denies public visibility/verification; peer to Rivest-Wack SI and NYBooks vendor-opacity coverage—NAS report, not those remounted. PEP framing: transparent hand count of hand-marked paper is publicly observable.", "sources": [{"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018 PDF mirror)", "url": "https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/NASEM18.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nasem-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-public-cannot-verify__national-academies-securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy-2018-pdf-mi.pdf"}, {"title": "National Academies Press — Securing the Vote (official NAP page)", "url": "https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nasem-2018-securing-the-vote-software-dependent-public-cannot-verify__national-academies-press-securing-the-vote-official-nap-page.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on No visibility to the public leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "nc-chris-anglin-dem-to-gop-supreme-court-split-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-21", "uid": "C20260925-205354-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-21", "old_ids": ["nc-chris-anglin-dem-to-gop-supreme-court-split-2018"], "seq": "C00236", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Candidates switch parties to gain a competitive advantage while deceiving citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "NC", "description": "Chris Anglin, a registered Democrat until June 2018, switched to Republican and filed for North Carolina Supreme Court against Republican incumbent Barbara Jackson (with Democrat Anita Earls also on the ballot). GOP leaders publicly called him a Democratic 'plant' intended to split the Republican vote; Anglin sued and retained the Republican ballot label. Earls won with ~49.5%; Jackson ~34%; Anglin ~16%. Status Confirmed for the party-switch candidacy and three-way ballot that split same-party branding — not a judicial finding of coordinated 'deception' conspiracy.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Former Democrat won't run unless labeled Republican", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-985b021f58344b0f8a119b6c9f6f6a4b"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — North Carolina Supreme Court elections, 2018", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Supreme_Court_elections,_2018"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 11. Party-switch / similar-label split Confirmed as event."}
{"id": "tusk-philanthropies-voatz-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-military-pr-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-20", "uid": "C20260925-235207-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-20", "old_ids": ["tusk-philanthropies-voatz-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-military-pr-2018"], "seq": "C00493", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "See https://www.mobilevoting.org/about."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "WV", "description": "Tusk/Montgomery Philanthropies' 2018 PR announced a first-in-nation mobile voting blockchain pilot for active-duty service members (Voatz)—the philanthropic pipeline behind later Mobile Voting Project advocacy. Status Confirmed for funded mobile/blockchain voting pilots as the implementation path the catalog leaf points to via mobilevoting.org.", "sources": [{"title": "PR Newswire — Tusk/Montgomery Philanthropies mobile voting blockchain pilot", "url": "https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tuskmontgomery-philanthropies-announces-first-in-the-nation-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-program-for-active-duty-service-members-300621268.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tusk-philanthropies-voatz-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-military-pr-2018__pr-newswire-tusk-montgomery-philanthropies-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot.png"}, {"title": "StateScoop — WV 144 voted via mobile blockchain app", "url": "https://statescoop.com/west-virginia-says-144-people-voted-using-mobile-blockchain-app/"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 10 companion. Soft companion to prior WV Voatz cards.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "wv-2018-voatz-mobile-voting-pilot-marketed-for-military-uocava", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-27", "uid": "C20260925-233150-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-27", "old_ids": ["wv-2018-voatz-mobile-voting-pilot-marketed-for-military-uocava"], "seq": "C00420", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will cite UOCAVA's \"proven track record\" as evidence that mobile voting is \"safe and secure.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-92", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018", "state": "WV", "description": "West Virginia's 2018 Voatz smartphone voting pilot was expressly framed for active-duty military / UOCAVA voters and promoted as a secure mobile channel building on overseas-voting convenience—later abandoned amid security criticism. Status Confirmed that mobile voting was introduced and marketed via the UOCAVA 'serve those who serve' / proven-overseas pathway. Confirmed for the justification pathway; 'safe and secure' claim is Disputed by subsequent researcher criticism and WV's later ditching of Voatz.", "sources": [{"title": "MeriTalk — West Virginia ditches controversial Voatz app", "url": "https://www.meritalk.com/articles/west-virginia-ditches-controversial-voatz-app-for-may-election/"}, {"title": "PR Newswire — Tusk/Montgomery mobile voting blockchain pilot for active duty service members", "url": "https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tuskmontgomery-philanthropies-announces-first-in-the-nation-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-program-for-active-duty-service-members-300621268.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wv-2018-voatz-mobile-voting-pilot-marketed-for-military-uocava__wv-2018-voatz-mobile-voting-pilot-marketed-for-military-uocava__pr-newswire-tusk-montgomery-mobile-voting-blockchain-pilot-for-active-duty-servi.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 14. Soft companion to mit-voatz-mobile-voting-2020 on Mobile Voting stub.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "robis-asked-epollbook-command-center-realtime-checkin-sync", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-11", "uid": "C20260926-020640-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-11", "old_ids": ["robis-asked-epollbook-command-center-realtime-checkin-sync"], "seq": "C00944", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Design a system to monitor who has voted", "In person: design an electronic poll-book system to track who votes in person."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018/2024", "state": "US", "description": "Verified Voting's equipment profile for **Robis AskED ePollbook** documents that when connected, units **synchronize check-in data with a jurisdiction central database in near-real-time**, and the web-based **AskED Command Center** lets central office staff monitor real-time precinct metrics—enabling live visibility into who has checked in in person. Status Confirmed EPB architecture designed to feed who-voted monitoring to a central hub; peer to KnowInk ePulse and ExpressPoll Connect on this leaf—AskED product (already catalogued elsewhere for WAN sync on a different leaf), not a soft remount of those two sources.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Robis AskED ePollbook (Command Center; near-real-time central sync)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/robis-asked-epollbook/"}, {"title": "Robis Elections — AskED ePollbook product (central Command Center / help desk)", "url": "https://www.robiselections.com/electronic-poll-book/asked-epollbook", "local": "/archives/2026/09/robis-asked-epollbook-command-center-realtime-checkin-sync__robis-elections-asked-epollbook-product-central-command.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on in-person EPB who-voted monitoring leaf."}
{"id": "ballot-scout-democracy-works-enhanced-voting-mail-ballot-tracking-imb", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-10", "uid": "C20260926-015040-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-10", "old_ids": ["ballot-scout-democracy-works-enhanced-voting-mail-ballot-tracking-imb"], "seq": "C00898", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "They collect data and build a model of the election results before tabulation:", "Mail-in ballot tracking: citizens are told the tracking exists so they can follow their ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Ballot Scout—developed by Democracy Works and licensed/operated by Enhanced Voting—is a web-based mail-ballot tracking product that combines USPS Intelligent Mail Barcode scan data with election-office data to give administrators and voters near-real-time status (mailed/in-transit/received/accepted/flagged), with admin dashboards and voter-facing notifications. Vendor materials market it to state and local election offices as an inexpensive IMB-integrated tracking solution. Status Confirmed for a second major commercial mail-ballot tracking architecture alongside BallotTrax—peer to BallotTrax statewide deployments and to public absentee-returned files used for campaign ballot chase; not proof of illicit model-driven ballot injection.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Works — Ballot Scout product page", "url": "https://www.democracy.works/ballot-scout"}, {"title": "Ballot Scout — FAQ (USPS IMB + election-office data)", "url": "https://www.ballotscout.org/faq-en", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ballot-scout-democracy-works-enhanced-voting-mail-ballot-tracking-imb__ballot-scout-faq-usps-imb-election-office-data.png"}, {"title": "Enhanced Voting — Ballot Scout solution", "url": "https://www.enhancedvoting.com/solutions/ballot-scout/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ballot-scout-democracy-works-enhanced-voting-mail-ballot-tracking-imb__enhanced-voting-ballot-scout-solution.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Mail-in Ballot-Tracking leaf.", "vendor": ["Enhanced Voting"]}
{"id": "mn-same-day-registration-post-check", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-22", "uid": "C20260925-183614-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-22", "old_ids": ["mn-same-day-registration-post-check"], "seq": "C00110", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Same-day voter registration, which paves the way for last-second ballot injections"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2026", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota has long allowed Election Day registration; Legislative Auditor / PED evaluations describe same-day registrants voting provisionally or immediately while eligibility substantiation (including postal verification cards and documentation) is processed afterward—creating a structural vote-now, verify-later window. Status Confirmed SDR post-election verification design in a landmark SDR state.", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota OLA PED — Voter Registration summary (PDF)", "url": "https://www.auditor.leg.state.mn.us/ped/pedrep/voterregsum.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-same-day-registration-post-check__minnesota-ola-ped-voter-registration-summary-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration (MN among SDR states)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}], "notes": "Part B same-day leaf. MN post-check SDR Confirmed."}
{"id": "vr-systems-evid-windows-laptops-tablets", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-16", "uid": "C20260925-184601-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-16", "old_ids": ["vr-systems-evid-windows-laptops-tablets"], "seq": "C00134", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Electronic poll books usually consist of common Android tablets or Windows laptops (easily abused by those who know how) in a custom enclosure."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "VR Systems EViD electronic poll books are documented by Verified Voting / vendor materials as running on Windows laptops and Windows tablets (including EViD Edge), i.e., standard Windows PCs in election check-in hardware. Status Confirmed for Windows laptop/tablet EPB deployments matching the leaf's hardware claim.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — VR Systems EViD", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/vr-systems-evid/"}, {"title": "VR Systems — EViD product page", "url": "https://www.vrsystems.com/products/evid", "local": "/archives/2026/09/vr-systems-evid-windows-laptops-tablets__vr-systems-evid-product-page.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 7. Windows laptop EPB example.", "vendor": ["VR Systems"], "vendor_models": ["VR Systems EViD"], "related": ["nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered"]}
{"id": "ca-2ccr-20158-epb-wireless-wan-dedicated-cellular-allowed", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-06", "uid": "C20260926-020046-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-06", "old_ids": ["ca-2ccr-20158-epb-wireless-wan-dedicated-cellular-allowed"], "seq": "C00923", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll books are linked over insecure wireless connections to a central database outside the polling place (sometimes out of state) that unknown parties control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-79", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2025", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State electronic-poll-book regulations (2 CCR §20158 in the published modified text) **recommend against** IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs but, if deployed, require AES-256, WPA2, dedicated WAP with no public/guest access; and for **WAN** transmission of voter-registration data from an EPB to a centralized location expressly allow a dedicated leased line, hardware VPN, **or a dedicated cellular connection** void of public/guest access. The same section requires near-real-time sync of who-voted activity across county EPBs. Status Confirmed that California's official EPB rules normalize wireless/cellular networked poll books rather than air-gapped isolation—peer to KnowInk PollPad Wi-Fi/cellular ePulse and DemTech Merlin wireless architectures.", "sources": [{"title": "CA SOS — Modified text of electronic poll book regulations (2 CCR 20158 wireless / WAN / dedicated cellular)", "url": "https://admin.cdn.sos.ca.gov/regulations/proposed/elections/poll-book/modified-text-epoll-book-regulations-1-17-18.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-2ccr-20158-epb-wireless-wan-dedicated-cellular-allowed__ca-sos-modified-text-of-electronic-poll-book-regulation.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — State certification requirements for electronic poll books (California EPB rules referenced)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-technology/estep-program/electronic-poll-books/state-certification-requirements-electronic-poll-books", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-2ccr-20158-epb-wireless-wan-dedicated-cellular-allowed__eac-state-certification-requirements-for-electronic-pol.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on EPB wireless/cellular interconnection leaf."}
{"id": "ca-dropbox-camera-if-feasible-20135", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-25", "uid": "C20260925-183614-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-25", "old_ids": ["ca-dropbox-camera-if-feasible-20135"], "seq": "C00113", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "Many boxes required to have surveillance cameras do not."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Code of Regulations Title 2 §20135 (Drop-off Location and Drop Box Security), summarized on the Secretary of State's vote-by-mail drop-box regulation page, provides that official drop boxes should be monitored by video security surveillance or an internal camera capable of capturing images/video—if feasible—and may rely on existing building cameras. The \"if feasible\" qualifier means 100% camera coverage is not an unconditional legal mandate. Status Confirmed that California's own regulations undercut claims of universal drop-box surveillance.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Vote-by-Mail Ballot Drop Boxes regulations", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/vote-mail-ballot-drop-boxes-and-drop-locations", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-dropbox-camera-if-feasible-20135__california-sos-vote-by-mail-ballot-drop-boxes-regulations.png"}, {"title": "Justia — 2 CCR §20135 Drop-off Location and Drop Box Security", "url": "https://regulations.justia.com/states/california/title-2/division-7/chapter-3/article-1/section-20135/"}], "notes": "Part B empty Drop-Boxes camera leaf. \"If feasible\" = not 100%."}
{"id": "ess-cellular-modem-results-transmission", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-10", "uid": "C20260925-183614-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-10", "old_ids": ["ess-cellular-modem-results-transmission"], "seq": "C00098", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Air-gapped systems deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "ES&S publishes FAQs acknowledging optional cellular-modem transmission of unofficial election-night results from tabulators after polls close, describing private-network paths rather than a claim of zero radio connectivity. Princeton CITP (2018) analyzed voting-machine modem architectures and argued cellular links still traverse carrier infrastructure and are not equivalent to a true air gap. Status Confirmed that major-vendor official materials document wireless/modem connectivity options that contradict simplistic \"air-gapped = unreachable\" public framing. Removable media and result modems are administrative pathways even when vendors deny \"Internet voting.\"", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S — Transmission of Unofficial Election Results FAQs (cellular modem options)", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — Are voting-machine modems truly divorced from the Internet? (2018)", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2018/02/22/are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced-from-the-internet/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-cellular-modem-results-transmission__princeton-citp-are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced-from.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich air-gapped-linguistic-seed. Confirmed vendor-documented modem/wireless results paths.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "ess-ds200-operator-settable-date-time-clock-county-guides", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-07", "uid": "C20260926-022424-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-07", "old_ids": ["ess-ds200-operator-settable-date-time-clock-county-guides"], "seq": "C01037", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Date and Time Manipulation", "Various parts of the voting system frequently show inaccurate dates and times."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "County ES&S DS200 operator/L&A checklists (e.g., Wright County MN and Douglas County WI published how-tos) document an admin-authenticated System Settings → Date and Time Options menu that lets election workers set the tabulator’s internal clock before opening polls; poll tapes and event logs then print using that operator-set real-time clock. Status Confirmed that DS200 tape timestamps are under authenticated operator control and therefore not an immutable external time source; peer to Antrim Dominion ICP settable-clock Lenberg/forensic cards—ES&S DS200 clock-setting procedure, not Dominion remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Wright County MN — Changing Time on DS200", "url": "https://www.co.wright.mn.us/DocumentCenter/View/26916/Changing-Time-on-DS200"}, {"title": "Douglas County WI — DS200 How to Change Date/Time", "url": "https://www.douglascountywi.gov/DocumentCenter/View/14379/DS200-and-EV---How-to-Change-Time", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ds200-operator-settable-date-time-clock-county-guides__douglas-county-wi-ds200-how-to-change-date-time.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on date/time inaccurate voting systems leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "hart-verity-relay-optional-cellular-modem-results-transmission", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-13", "uid": "C20260926-013447-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-13", "old_ids": ["hart-verity-relay-optional-cellular-modem-results-transmission"], "seq": "C00872", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Ability to connect to other networks (including the internet)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Hart InterCivic Verity voting systems have long offered optional cellular/wireless results transmission via Verity Relay (EAC certification materials for Verity 2.x list optional 4G LTE modem and Relay kits for unofficial results reporting). Princeton CITP and Free Speech For People analyses of precinct-tabulator modems argue that cellular paths are Internet-adjacent despite vendor 'private APN' framing—the same connectivity debate that surrounds ES&S DS200 modems. Status Confirmed for Hart Verity's optional cellular modem/Relay network path as a peer to ES&S DS200 wireless unofficial-results transmission and Virginia's WinVote Wi-Fi DRE decertification on this 'alternate networks' tabulation leaf. Connectivity ≠ proven outcome flip; air-gapped hand counts remove the modem surface.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Hart InterCivic Verity 2.2 Certification Modification Test Report (Relay/modem references)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Hart_Intercivic_Verity_2_2_Certification_Modification_Test_Report_v1_1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-relay-optional-cellular-modem-results-transmission__eac-hart-intercivic-verity-2-2-certification-modificati.pdf"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — Are voting-machine modems truly divorced from the Internet?", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2018/02/22/are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced-from-the-internet/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-relay-optional-cellular-modem-results-transmission__princeton-citp-are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced.png"}, {"title": "Free Speech For People — Letter to MI AG on ES&S DS200 wireless modem / cellular-vs-internet framing", "url": "https://freespeechforpeople.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/mi.ag_.modems.final-rf.docx-copy-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hart-verity-relay-optional-cellular-modem-results-transmission__free-speech-for-people-letter-to-mi-ag-on-es-s-ds200-wi.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on Tabulation alternate-networks / wireless connectivity leaf.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin", "permanent_id": "C20260925-182526-01", "uid": "C20260925-182526-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-182526-01", "old_ids": ["me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin"], "seq": "C00084", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "RCV is a bad idea for many reasons. One is that it is so complicated that it requires computer tabulation and locks us into it; that alone is reason to reject it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-11", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2024", "state": "ME/AK", "description": "Official Maine and Alaska materials document that ranked-choice / instant-runoff rounds depend on specialized computer tabulation software—not precinct plurality hand counts alone. Maine SOS's RCV Tabulation Explainer states that after materials arrive in Augusta, vote data are loaded into a results program on an unconnected computer and RCV tabulation software applies statutory elimination/transfer rules; Maine's published 2018 RCV cost sheet lists leased \"RCV software (ERM, RCV Utility)\" at $22,400 per election cycle. Alaska Division of Elections explains that even where rural precincts hand-count first choices on Election Night, subsequent RCV rounds—if needed—are tabulated at the Director's Office after the 15th day. Status Confirmed for computer/software dependency of RCV round tabulation (machine lock-in relative to simple plurality). Does not claim any specific race was stolen. Where contests use plurality, a properly-run transparent hand count (PEP) does not require RCV software stacks.", "sources": [{"title": "Maine SOS — How does the RCV tabulation process work? (2020 PDF)", "url": "https://www1.maine.gov/sos/sites/maine.gov.sos/files/content/assets/RCVTabulationExplainer.2020.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin__maine-sos-how-does-the-rcv-tabulation-process-work-2020-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Maine SOS — 2018 RCV costs (lease of RCV software ERM / RCV Utility)", "url": "https://www.maine.gov/sos/sites/maine.gov.sos/files/content/assets/rcv.costs.2018.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin__maine-sos-2018-rcv-costs-lease-of-rcv-software-erm-rcv-utili.pdf"}, {"title": "Maine SOS — Ranked-Choice Voting FAQs (closed-system computers for RCV software)", "url": "https://www.maine.gov/sos/elections-voting/ranked-choice-voting-frequently-asked-questions", "local": "/archives/2026/09/me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin__maine-sos-ranked-choice-voting-faqs-closed-system-computers.png"}, {"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — Ballot Counting System (subsequent RCV rounds at Director's Office)", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/ballot-counting-process/counting-system-and-schedule/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/me-ak-rcv-computer-tabulation-lockin__alaska-division-of-elections-ballot-counting-system-subseque.png"}], "notes": "Confirmed computer dependency / RCV software lock-in. No stolen-race claim. PEP framing for plurality hand-count transparency only."}
{"id": "mit-election-lab-maine-rcv-unranked-choice-error-complexity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-12", "uid": "C20260926-022005-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-12", "old_ids": ["mit-election-lab-maine-rcv-unranked-choice-error-complexity"], "seq": "C00990", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Allows covert election manipulation hidden in the complexity of the calculations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2021", "state": "ME", "description": "MIT Election Lab analysis of Maine’s ranked-choice voting (‘Unranked Choice’) documents measurable ballot-error and ranking-behavior complexity in early RCV implementations—overvotes, skipped rankings, and exhausted ballots that make outcomes harder for the public to reconstruct than plurality tallies—while Burlington VT Condorcet failure and Alaska 2022 Condorcet analyses on this leaf already show algorithmic pathology. Status Confirmed RCV complexity/error-surface evidence from Maine; peer to Burlington Condorcet and Alaska Condorcet cards—MIT Maine unranked-choice study, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "MIT Election Lab — Unranked Choice: Error Rates in Maine’s Ranked-Choice Voting (Medium)", "url": "https://medium.com/mit-election-lab/unranked-choice-b41223e58cbb"}, {"title": "ESRA — Adventures in Ranked Choice Voting: Maine 2018 Gubernatorial Primary", "url": "https://esra-conference.org/publications/adventures-ranked-choice-voting-examining-maines-2018-gubernatorial-primary", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mit-election-lab-maine-rcv-unranked-choice-error-complexity__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on RCV covert complexity leaf."}
{"id": "la-county-vca-vote-centers-11-day-convenience-any-site-model", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-11", "uid": "C20260926-022424-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-11", "old_ids": ["la-county-vca-vote-centers-11-day-convenience-any-site-model"], "seq": "C01041", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Sold as a convenience"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2020", "state": "CA", "description": "Los Angeles County’s Voter’s Choice Act / Voting Solutions for All People rollout replaced neighborhood Election Day precinct polling places with multi-day Vote Centers marketed for convenience: any county voter may cast a ballot at any Vote Center during an 11-day period, with registration, accessible BMDs, language services, and ballot drop-off co-located. County Vote Center Placement Project materials and SOS VCA announcements frame the model explicitly as expanding convenient access while shrinking the dense precinct-site footprint. Status Confirmed mega-county vote-center convenience centralization; peer to Larimer CO pioneer vote centers and Maricopa any-site convenience cards—LA County VCA Vote Centers, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "LA County RR/CC — Vote Center Placement Project", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/vsap/vote-center-placement-project", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-vca-vote-centers-11-day-convenience-any-site-model__la-county-rr-cc-vote-center-placement-project.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Padilla announces opening of Vote Centers in Voter’s Choice Act counties (2018)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2018-news-releases-and-advisories/secretary-state-alex-padilla-announces-opening-all-vote-centers-voters-choice-act-counties", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-county-vca-vote-centers-11-day-convenience-any-site-model__california-sos-padilla-announces-opening-of-vote-centers-in-voters-choice-act-counties-2018.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Sold as conveniences leaf."}
{"id": "la-dominion-95m-dre-replacement-voided-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-07", "uid": "C20260925-183614-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-07", "old_ids": ["la-dominion-95m-dre-replacement-voided-2018"], "seq": "C00095", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Update Scam", "Vulnerabilities are found, or \"found,\" to spur states and counties to buy new equipment and software to \"fix\" the problems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-2019", "state": "LA", "description": "Louisiana—long reliant on paperless DREs last purchased around 2005 and repeatedly cited by Verified Voting/Brennan Center for lacking voter-verifiable paper—awarded Dominion a roughly $95 million statewide replacement contract in 2018; the state's chief procurement officer later rescinded the award after an ES&S protest (AP, StateScoop). Subsequent SOS statements (2025–2026) still project ~$100 million to replace end-of-life machines because parts are no longer manufactured. Status Confirmed that documented DRE end-of-support / no-paper security pressure drove a nine-figure replacement procurement (even though the 2018 Dominion award was voided and re-bid).", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Louisiana's lucrative voting machine contract award canceled", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-0d48a7125e344581a0a4135d67e58efe"}, {"title": "StateScoop — Louisiana cancels $95 million contract for new voting machines", "url": "https://statescoop.com/louisiana-cancels-95-million-contract-for-new-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "The Advertiser — New Louisiana voting machines will cost $100 million (2026)", "url": "https://www.theadvertiser.com/story/news/2026/02/25/new-louisiana-voting-machines-will-cost-100-million-state-official-says/88861152007/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/la-dominion-95m-dre-replacement-voided-2018__the-advertiser-new-louisiana-voting-machines-will-cost-100-m.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich Update Scam. Award voided but procurement driven by DRE EOS/security pressure Confirmed.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-ssci", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-04", "uid": "C20260926-000809-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-04", "old_ids": ["oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-ssci"], "seq": "C00557", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Influence Operations", "Use influencers to manipulate public opinion."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-15", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-12", "state": "Federal", "description": "SSCI-commissioned Oxford/New Knowledge analyses of IRA activity (released with the Committee's social-media work) show computational propaganda designed to polarize U.S. audiences, suppress or misdirect some voter groups, and amplify divisive content—i.e., using social influence channels to manipulate opinion at scale. Status Confirmed for foreign influence ops via social media; partisan motive attribution beyond the reports stays Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "SSCI — The IRA, Social Media and Political Polarization (Oxford/Graphika PDF)", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-the-ira-social-media-and-political-polarization.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-ssci__oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-s.pdf"}, {"title": "SSCI — New Knowledge IRA tactics & tropes whitepaper", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-newknowledge-disinformation-report-whitepaper.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-ssci__oxford-newknowledge-ira-computational-propaganda-polarization-report-s.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "ca-dmv-2018-voter-registration-applications-delayed-untransmitted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-06", "uid": "C20260926-013447-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-06", "old_ids": ["ca-dmv-2018-voter-registration-applications-delayed-untransmitted"], "seq": "C00865", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11", "state": "CA", "description": "Contemporaneous SF Chronicle and LA Times reporting documented that California DMV failed to transmit hundreds of voter-registration applications/updates to the Secretary of State before the November 2018 election deadline (coverage cited on the order of ~589 applications, including new registrations and address changes), prompting state investigation into whether delayed Motor Voter transmissions affected election administration. Later Motor Voter annual reports continued to disclose late-transmission cohorts and kiosk software errors. Status Confirmed for a documented DMV→elections portal/transmission backlog creating registration/voter-roll lag—peer operational failure mode to Texas DPS's 2025–2026 online registration backlog (ei-2026-09-001); not proof ballots were cast by ineligible persons from the delayed file. Distinct from the Motor-Voter EY-audit card on the Motor-Voter sub-leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "SF Chronicle — California probing whether DMV's delay of voter registration applications affected election", "url": "https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/California-probing-whether-DMV-s-delay-of-voter-13592831.php"}, {"title": "LA Times — California will investigate whether DMV voter registration errors changed election results", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-dmv-voter-registration-election-results-settlement-20190205-story.html"}, {"title": "California SOS — California New Motor Voter 2022 Annual Report (late-transmission disclosures)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/motor-voter/annual-report-2022.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-dmv-2018-voter-registration-applications-delayed-untransmitted__california-sos-california-new-motor-voter-2022-annual-r.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to ei-2026-09-001 on Registration; Voter Rolls (portal/transmission backlog). Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration'.", "related": ["ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied"]}
{"id": "fl-amendment-4-2018-felon-rights-restoration-then-sb7066", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-20", "uid": "C20260925-211320-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-20", "old_ids": ["fl-amendment-4-2018-felon-rights-restoration-then-sb7066"], "seq": "C00265", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Amendment 4 (2018) automatically restored voting rights to most people with felony convictions upon completion of sentence; SB 7066 (2019) then defined completion to include payment of legal financial obligations, upheld by the 11th Circuit. Status Confirmed for the large-scale statutory/constitutional expansion of the eligible-felon registration pool and the subsequent conditioning fight — catalog motive rhetoric ('not really for felons') is NOT asserted beyond the documented eligibility expansion.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Division of Elections — Felon Voting Rights", "url": "https://dos.fl.gov/elections/for-voters/voter-registration/felon-voting-rights", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-amendment-4-2018-felon-rights-restoration-then-sb7066__florida-division-of-elections-felon-voting-rights.png"}, {"title": "Florida Senate — 2019 Bill Summary SB 7066", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Committees/BillSummaries/2019/html/7066", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-amendment-4-2018-felon-rights-restoration-then-sb7066__florida-senate-2019-bill-summary-sb-7066.png"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Voting Rights Restoration Efforts in Florida", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-rights-restoration-efforts-florida", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-amendment-4-2018-felon-rights-restoration-then-sb7066__brennan-center-voting-rights-restoration-efforts-in-florida.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 11. Confirmed eligibility expansion; do not assert cabal motive from catalog subtitle."}
{"id": "fl-broward-2018-rejected-provisionals-mixed-into-counted-batch", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-06", "uid": "C20261009-105430-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-06", "old_ids": ["fl-broward-2018-rejected-provisionals-mixed-into-counted-batch"], "seq": "C01339", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11-10", "state": "FL", "description": "During Florida's Nov. 2018 recount, Broward Supervisor of Elections Brenda Snipes' office mixed about 20–22 provisional ballots the canvassing board had rejected (e.g. for signature problems) into a batch of 205 valid ballots. The ballots could not be separated once mixed, and the batch went into Broward's totals, so the provisional hold failed at the counting step. Status Confirmed (Miami Herald, from canvassing-board proceedings). This is not a mail-plus-provisional double vote; it shows ballots set aside as invalid can still end up counted.", "sources": [{"title": "Miami Herald — Broward elections office made 22 void ballots part of count", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article221478875.html"}, {"title": "Miami Herald — Broward's elections supervisor mixed bad ballots with good", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article221452655.html"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09."}
{"id": "knox-county-tn-storm-power-outage-paper-ballots-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-05", "uid": "C20260925-194013-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-05", "old_ids": ["knox-county-tn-storm-power-outage-paper-ballots-2018"], "seq": "C00189", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Power outages"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11-06", "state": "TN", "description": "Storm-related power outages hit nine Knox County, Tennessee polling places on Election Day 2018 (peak ~32,000 KUB customers without power). Election Commissioner Cliff Rodgers reported paper-ballot fallback at multiple sites (including Shoreline Church with flashlights and Cedar Bluff outdoor voting for light), with paper ballots secured in boxes for end-of-day scanning. Status Confirmed for multi-precinct power-outage disruption forcing alternate custody/counting paths; accuracy of final results not independently litigated here.", "sources": [{"title": "Knoxville News Sentinel / Columbia Tribune wire — Knox County voters not stopped by storms; paper ballots used", "url": "https://www.columbiatribune.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/06/tennessee-election-day-2018-turnout-knoxville/1819447002/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/knox-county-tn-storm-power-outage-paper-ballots-2018__knoxville-news-sentinel-columbia-tribune-wire-knox-county-vo.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 2. Nine precincts; paper/flashlight fallback Confirmed."}
{"id": "sc-richland-york-2018-ivotronic-touch-changed-votes-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-23", "uid": "C20261020-160717-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-23", "old_ids": ["sc-richland-york-2018-ivotronic-touch-changed-votes-calibration"], "seq": "C01016", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11-06", "state": "SC", "description": "On Nov. 6, 2018, voters in Richland and York counties, South Carolina complained that the state's paperless ES&S iVotronic touchscreens changed their votes. In York County, Angelique McGowan said the machine moved her 5th District congressional vote from Democrat Archie Parnell to Republican Ralph Norman six times; the machine was closed for recalibration and a second machine was also pulled; York County director Wanda Hemphill and county officials said the cause was calibration. Richland County elections director Rokey Suleman told WIS: \"We've had machine issues that are typical in the field, mostly calibration issues ... When you hit the machine for one person, it can sometimes switch to the other candidate if there is a calibration issue,\" citing shaky hands, long fingernails and 14-year-old equipment; he said 30 technicians were in the field and that recalibrating machines two or three times a day is typical. One Richland voter reported a Republican selection changing to a Democrat. Duncan Buell's League of Women Voters report on the iVotronic event logs found election-day screen-calibration events on 9.27% (2010), 8.88% (2012), 10.60% (2014), 10.83% (2016) and 11.44% (Nov. 2018) of South Carolina's iVotronics; in Nov. 2018 Richland's rate was 38.18% and York's 12.23%. South Carolina replaced the iVotronic with the ES&S ExpressVote BMD in 2019-2020; the State Election Commission's 2026 Poll Manager handbook (p. 52) still lists the problem: \"The voter pushes the oval for one candidate but another candidate is selected,\" with calibration as the cause. No affected vote was established; the iVotronic had no paper ballot. Status Confirmed: both county directors attributed the reports to calibration and machines were recalibrated or pulled. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WIS-TV — Election officials respond to machine malfunctions following voter complaints of changed votes (Nov. 6, 2018)", "url": "https://www.wistv.com/2018/11/06/election-officials-respond-machine-malfunctions-following-voter-complaints-changed-votes/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-richland-york-2018-ivotronic-touch-changed-votes-calibration__wistv2018.html"}, {"title": "The Herald (Rock Hill) — York County voters report machines changing votes (Nov. 6, 2018)", "url": "https://www.heraldonline.com/news/local/article221199050.html"}, {"title": "The State — Richland County voting machine problems (Nov. 6, 2018)", "url": "https://www.thestate.com/news/local/article221194610.html"}, {"title": "The Hill — Voters in South Carolina say voting machines are changing their choices (Nov. 6, 2018)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/415152-voters-in-south-carolina-say-voting-machines-are-changing-their-choices/"}, {"title": "WLTX — Richland County says review your ballots after voting issues reported (Nov. 2018)", "url": "https://www.wltx.com/article/news/politics/elections/richland-county-says-review-your-ballots-after-voting-issues-reported/101-611652645"}, {"title": "Duncan A. Buell / League of Women Voters SC — Report on the 2018 South Carolina general election (iVotronic event-log calibration statistics, PDF)", "url": "https://my.lwv.org/sites/default/files/buell-lwvscreport2018scelection.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-richland-york-2018-ivotronic-touch-changed-votes-calibration__buell2018.pdf"}, {"title": "South Carolina State Election Commission — Poll Manager / PLT Handbook 2026 (p. 52 troubleshooting: another candidate selected; calibration; PDF)", "url": "https://scvotes.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/PLT-Handbook-Digital.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-richland-york-2018-ivotronic-touch-changed-votes-calibration__scplt2026.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (wistv2018, buell2018, scplt2026). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): The Herald (Rock Hill), The State, The Hill, WLTX. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-06", "uid": "C20261026-180010-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-06", "old_ids": ["ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies"], "seq": "C01571", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11-06 election; order filed 2019-08-15", "state": "GA", "description": "In Curling v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga., Doc. 579, filed Aug. 15, 2019), the court describes how Georgia's electronic poll books received voter data in 2018. [1] It states that \"Confidential voter identification data from eNet is fed directly into the 'ExpressPoll' electronic pollbooks,\" and it quotes the state's request for proposals, which requires the system to accept \"imports of voter registration data from eNet on removable memory devices for the purposes of building an elector's list for any given election.\" [1] On page 98 the court summarizes plaintiffs' evidence from the November 6, 2018 election: \"Forty-six individual voters described issues with the electronic pollbook, including voters not being listed as registered, wrong addresses listed for the voters, incorrect polling places, and listing voters as having already voted. Many of the voters were offered a provisional ballot, but several voters were not.\" [1] The order directs the State to submit a plan, by January 3, 2020, to address \"errors and discrepancies in the voter registration database that may cause eligible voters to (i) not appear as eligible voters in the electronic pollbooks, (ii) receive the wrong ballot, (iii) be assigned to the wrong precinct,\" or be prevented from casting a regular ballot, and to prepare an updated paper backup of the poll book. [1] A later filing (Doc. 598, Sept. 4, 2019) says the new Dominion/Liberty Vote poll books \"will pull voter registration and precinct data from the SOS voter registration database.\" [2] Status Confirmed that the order exists, that it contains these statements and directives, and that the court treated the registration-to-poll-book data transfer as a risk. The 46 accounts are voter declarations offered by the plaintiffs, which the court summarized; this card does not establish how many errors occurred or their cause. Nothing here alleges deliberate manipulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Curling v. Raffensperger, Order of Aug. 15, 2019, Doc. 579 (pp. 72, 89 n.70, 98, and the order's paragraph 1)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.579.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Curling v. Raffensperger, Doc. 598 (Sept. 4, 2019)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.598.0.pdf"}], "notes": "Doc. 579 page references: pp. 72, 89 n.70, 98, and the order's paragraph 1. The 46 accounts are voter declarations offered by the plaintiffs and summarized by the court.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "related": ["defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db", "nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered", "ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb", "tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected"]}
{"id": "ga-2018-11-sos-kemp-oversaw-own-governor-race-refused-recusal-resigned-day-of-brown-v-kemp-hearing", "permanent_id": "C20261120-122513-02", "uid": "C20261120-122513-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261120-122513-02", "old_ids": ["ga-2018-11-sos-kemp-oversaw-own-governor-race-refused-recusal-resigned-day-of-brown-v-kemp-hearing"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Seat an election official with a conflict of interest on the canvassing or recount board."], "leaf_id": "L20261109-123201-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261109-123201-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11-06 (Brown v. Kemp filed); 2018-11-08 (Kemp resigned as hearing began)", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp was the Republican nominee for governor in the Nov. 6, 2018 general election against Democrat Stacey Abrams. As secretary of state he was the state's chief election officer, responsible for certifying results and for ordering recounts in close races, and he also chaired the State Election Board. The complaint in Brown v. Kemp states that earlier Georgia secretaries of state had stepped back when they were candidates (Cathy Cox recused from chairing the State Election Board in 2006; Max Cleland and Karen Handel resigned), while Kemp refused to recuse and had pledged to keep authority over any recount in his own race. At 5 p.m. on Election Day, five Georgia voters (LaTosha Brown, Jennifer N. Ide, Katharine Wilkinson, Candace Fowler and Chalis Montgomery), represented by Protect Democracy, filed an emergency federal suit in Atlanta asking the court to bar Kemp from counting votes, certifying results, or taking part in any runoff or recount in his own race. The complaint called his dual role a violation of 'a basic notion of fairness—that a man should not be a judge in his own matter' and cited his office's publicly posted accusation, made days before the election, that the Democratic Party had attempted to hack the voter registration system. On Nov. 8, a day after his campaign declared victory and with Abrams not conceding, Kemp resigned as secretary of state just as the hearing began; the case was dismissed as moot. Kemp said he resigned to work on the transition (AP via PBS NewsHour; Protect Democracy; Flagpole). Status Confirmed: Kemp's candidacy, his refusal to recuse, the voters' lawsuit and his resignation at the start of its hearing are documented by the AP and the court filing. The conflict and bias claims were allegations in the suit and were never decided by a court. Catalog point: the chief election officer stayed in charge of administering, counting and certifying his own race until a lawsuit forced the question two days after the election. Results counted by hand at each precinct and posted in public do not depend on the impartiality of the official at the top.", "sources": [{"title": "PBS NewsHour (AP) — Brian Kemp resigns as Georgia secretary of state (Nov. 8, 2018)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/brian-kemp-resigns-as-georgia-secretary-of-state", "local": "/archives/2026/11/pbs-ap-ga-2018-11-08-kemp-resigns-sos-lawsuit-hearing.html"}, {"title": "Protect Democracy — Brown v. Kemp (case page)", "url": "https://protectdemocracy.org/work/brown-v-kemp/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/protectdemocracy-ga-2018-brown-v-kemp.html"}, {"title": "Brown et al. v. Kemp, N.D. Ga. — Complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief (Nov. 6, 2018), via Ohio State election law litigation archive", "url": "https://law.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Brown_et_al_v._Kemp__Docket_N11618.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/osu-ga-2018-11-06-brown-v-kemp-complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "POLITICO — Lawsuit seeks to bar Kemp from counting votes in Georgia governor's race (Nov. 6, 2018)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/story/2018/11/06/georgia-2018-brian-kemp-counting-votes-967429"}, {"title": "Flagpole — Lawsuit filed by former Athens candidate against Kemp dismissed after Kemp resigns (Nov. 8, 2018)", "url": "https://old.flagpole.com/news/in-the-loop/lawsuit-filed-by-former-athens-candidate-against-kemp-dismissed-after-kemp-resigns"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-20 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-20 12:25 PM ET). PBS/AP, Protect Democracy and the complaint PDF archived (curl 200); POLITICO returned 403 to curl and Flagpole was not fetched, so both are linked only (content seen in search extracts). Distinct from the existing GA 2018 touchscreen-calibration card. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-bladen-ballot-harvesting-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-22", "uid": "C20260925-155410-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-22", "old_ids": ["nc-bladen-ballot-harvesting-2018"], "seq": "C00022", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-11 to 2019-02", "state": "NC", "description": "After the Nov. 2018 U.S. House District 9 race, the North Carolina State Board of Elections conducted an evidentiary hearing on absentee-ballot irregularities centered on Bladen County operative Leslie McCrae Dowless Jr. Testimony described paid collectors gathering completed/incomplete absentee ballots (illegal under NC law for non-family handlers). On Feb. 21–25, 2019 the Board unanimously ordered a new election. Multiple associates later pleaded guilty to misdemeanor conspiracy to possess absentee ballots (2022); Dowless died in 2022 before state trial on related felonies (he had a separate federal Social Security fraud conviction). Status Confirmed for Board findings, new-election order, and guilty pleas by associates—not a finding that every third-party ballot-return jurisdiction is fraudulent.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — State Board unanimously orders new election in 9th District", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2019/02/25/state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-9th-congressional-district", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-bladen-ballot-harvesting-2018__ncsbe-state-board-unanimously-orders-new-election-in-9th-dis.png"}, {"title": "AP — New election ordered in disputed North Carolina House race", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/e79854eb724b483a9a2ebbc2672d06d8"}, {"title": "WSOC-TV — Four plead guilty in ballot fraud probe", "url": "https://www.wsoctv.com/news/local/plea-agreements-reached-by-4-nc-congress-ballot-probe/E7BX4FYHXZDEXBN2XAP7VZ367Y/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-bladen-ballot-harvesting-2018__wsoc-tv-four-plead-guilty-in-ballot-fraud-probe.png"}], "notes": "Canonical U.S. illegal ballot-harvesting adjudication post-2016. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Ballot Harvesting > Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk.'."}
{"id": "ga-2018-naacp-bartow-cobb-henry-abrams-touch-shows-kemp-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-19", "uid": "C20261020-160717-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-19", "old_ids": ["ga-2018-naacp-bartow-cobb-henry-abrams-touch-shows-kemp-calibration"], "seq": "C01012", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-10", "state": "GA", "description": "In October 2018 early voting, the Georgia NAACP said it had complaints of touchscreens selecting the wrong candidate in Bartow, Candler, Cobb, Dodge and Henry counties, and filed a complaint. Bartow County voter Pamela Grimes told Fox 5 that when she pushed Stacey Abrams the machine put an X in the box for Brian Kemp, and it took three tries to cast her vote correctly. Bartow Election Supervisor Joseph Kirk said he had calibrated all machines before early voting began Oct. 15 but conceded they were old: \"This is a calibration issue. That is all this is ... the machines were uploaded in 2002,\" and asked voters to report problems so the machine can be fixed. Secretary of State Kemp's office (Kemp was also the Republican candidate for governor) said machines were not switching votes and urged voters to check the review screen. Direction reported: Democrat to Republican. Status Confirmed: the county supervisor attributed the Bartow case to calibration. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX 5 Atlanta — Voters claim machine registered wrong candidate during voting (Oct. 25, 2018)", "url": "https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/voters-claim-machine-registered-wrong-candidate-during-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-2018-naacp-bartow-cobb-henry-abrams-touch-shows-kemp-calibration__fox5_2018.html"}, {"title": "USA Today — Georgia NAACP files complaint over voting machine errors in some counties (Oct. 23, 2018)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/23/georgia-naacp-filed-complaint-voting-errors-some-counties/1741406002/"}, {"title": "11Alive — Georgia Secretary of State's office says machines not switching votes; NAACP urges vigilance (Oct. 2018)", "url": "https://www.11alive.com/article/news/politics/elections/georgia-secretary-of-state-office-machines-not-switching-votes-naacp-urges-vigilance/85-608127520"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (fox5_2018). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): USA Today, 11Alive. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "latimes-2018-walker-grassroots-for-hire-manufactured-rallies-industry", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-02", "uid": "C20260926-033041-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-02", "old_ids": ["latimes-2018-walker-grassroots-for-hire-manufactured-rallies-industry"], "seq": "C01212", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Manufactured rallies and other orchestrated protests display opposition designed to distort perceptions of public sentiment."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-10-21", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Los Angeles Times (Oct. 21, 2018) reporting on Crowds on Demand's extortion lawsuit quotes UCLA sociology professor Edward Walker—author of Grassroots for Hire: Public Affairs Consultants in American Democracy—explaining that hundreds of lobbying/public-affairs firms manufacture grassroots-looking rallies and protests as paid advocacy theater, even when not as openly branded as Crowds on Demand. Status Confirmed primary LA Times + Walker academic framing of manufactured-rally industry practice; peer to NPR 2016 COD manufactured-rallies and NPR 2018 Entergy paid-actors cards already on this leaf—Walker industry-academic instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: manufactured rally theater distorts perceived public sentiment that precinct hand counts of paper keep tied to present voters, not hired crowds.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Times — Paid protesters? Beverly Hills firm Crowds on Demand accused of extortion (Walker Grassroots for Hire, Oct. 21, 2018)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-crowds-extortion-20181021-story.html"}, {"title": "Cambridge University Press — Edward T. Walker, Grassroots for Hire: Public Affairs Consultants in American Democracy (2014)", "url": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/grassroots-for-hire/34BF1602635C2870428C34A9E1387415", "local": "/archives/2026/09/latimes-2018-walker-grassroots-for-hire-manufactured-rallies-industry__cambridge-university-press-edward-t-walker-grassroots-for-hire-public-affairs-consultants-in-american-democracy-2014.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Manufactured rallies leaf."}
{"id": "tx-williamson-2018-8000-mail-ballots-omit-libertarian-strange-court-criminal-appeals-reissued", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-06", "uid": "C20261023-123356-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-06", "old_ids": ["tx-williamson-2018-8000-mail-ballots-omit-libertarian-strange-court-criminal-appeals-reissued"], "seq": "C01531", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-10-03 (error announced); corrected ballots mailed the following week", "state": "TX", "description": "In early October 2018, Williamson County, Texas, Elections Administrator Chris Davis announced that about 8,000 ballots by mail already sent to voters for the Nov. 6, 2018 general election left off Libertarian candidate William Bryan Strange III in the statewide race for Presiding Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals. \"Essentially our office made a mistake,\" Davis told KXAN. He said the office had downloaded the candidate list and sample ballot from the Secretary of State's website on Aug. 30, when the list was incomplete, and did not go back to check for an updated version before printing. The local Republican, Democratic and Libertarian parties had also reviewed the mail ballots without noticing the omission. The county reprinted and re-mailed corrected ballots, revised its online sample ballots, reprogrammed 180 electronic voting machines that had already been set up for early voting, and asked voters to wait for and use the corrected ballot. Status Confirmed: the county administrator acknowledged the error publicly. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a single stale download put two versions of the same ballot into 8,000 households and required reprogramming of 180 machines, and none of the parties' reviewers caught it. Every reissue leaves voters holding two ballots and leaves election workers deciding which one counts. Ballots proofed in public against the certified candidate list, and hand counted at the precinct, make such omissions visible to everyone before and after voting.", "sources": [{"title": "KXAN — WilCo reprinting 8,000 ballots after mistakenly leaving out a candidate (Oct. 3, 2018)", "url": "https://www.kxan.com/news/local/williamson-county/wilco-reprinting-8000-ballots-after-mistakenly-leaving-out-a-candidate/"}, {"title": "CBS Austin — Williamson County reissuing 8,000 ballots after a candidate's name was left off (Oct. 2018)", "url": "https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/williamson-county-reissuing-8000-ballots-after-a-candidates-name-was-left-off"}, {"title": "Community Impact — Williamson County to reissue election ballots-by-mail due to editing error (Oct. 2018)", "url": "https://communityimpact.com/round-rock-pflugerville-hutto/city-county/williamson-county-to-reissue-election-ballots-by-mail-due-to-editing-error/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Found while re-checking research-queue item tx-williamson-2020-county-email-local-contest-left-off-ballot-style; this is a different (2018) omission and does not corroborate that 2020 sub-claim. Peer to laporte-in-2026-long-beach-council-vote-for-five-not-three-41-voters on this leaf (5 -> 6). KXAN text verified by curl; CBS Austin and Community Impact link-checked."}
{"id": "jlarc-2018-virginia-veris-multiple-unique-ids-no-referential-integrity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-15", "uid": "C20260926-033715-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-15", "old_ids": ["jlarc-2018-virginia-veris-multiple-unique-ids-no-referential-integrity"], "seq": "C01240", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No referential integrity"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-09-10", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia JLARC Report 508 (Operations and Performance of Virginia's Department of Elections, Sept. 10, 2018) documents that some voters have multiple unique identification numbers in the VERIS statewide registration database and that ELECT's name-matching algorithm and registrar guidance were inadequate to ensure uniform add/remove decisions—symptoms of weak unique-person / referential-integrity constraints across the statewide list. Status Confirmed primary JLARC Rpt508 findings on VERIS data quality and list-maintenance controls; peer to FL Auditor 2021-096 duplicate pairs and GAO-06-247 HAVA statewide-list cards already on this leaf—JLARC VERIS instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: rolls without strong unique-person integrity hide who is who; precinct hand counts of paper still tie ballots to present voters.", "sources": [{"title": "JLARC — Operations and Performance of Virginia's Department of Elections (Report 508, Sept. 10, 2018 PDF)", "url": "https://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/jlarc-2018-virginia-veris-multiple-unique-ids-no-referential-integrity__jlarc-operations-and-performance-of-virginia-s-department-of-elections-report-508-sept-10-2018-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "JLARC — Department of Elections 2018 study page", "url": "https://jlarc.virginia.gov/2018-elections.asp", "local": "/archives/2026/09/jlarc-2018-virginia-veris-multiple-unique-ids-no-referential-integrity__jlarc-department-of-elections-2018-study-page.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Voter Rolls No referential integrity leaf (non-FL-auditor/GAO remount)."}
{"id": "nas-2018-securing-the-vote-no-guarantee-software-unaudited", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-13", "uid": "C20260926-033041-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-13", "old_ids": ["nas-2018-securing-the-vote-no-guarantee-software-unaudited"], "seq": "C01223", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-09-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine consensus report Securing the Vote (Sept. 6, 2018) states there is no realistic mechanism to fully secure vote-casting and tabulation computer systems from cyber threats, so jurisdictions must assure outcome accuracy without relying on the hardware/software that produced the tally—via human-readable paper ballots and risk-limiting audits—and recommends removing unauditable systems from service. Status Confirmed primary NAS 2018 Securing the Vote consensus finding; peer to Appel-Stark 2020 no-perfect-infallible-way and Antrim soft-companion cards already on this leaf—NAS 2018 consensus instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: NAS's no-guarantee finding is why public hand examination of paper remains the assurance path.", "sources": [{"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018 report release)", "url": "https://www.nationalacademies.org/news/securing-the-vote-new-report", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nas-2018-securing-the-vote-no-guarantee-software-unaudited__national-academies-securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy-2018-report-release.png"}, {"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote Chapter 7 auditing / no realistic mechanism (companion)", "url": "https://www.nationalacademies.org/read/25120/chapter/7", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nas-2018-securing-the-vote-no-guarantee-software-unaudited__national-academies-securing-the-vote-chapter-7-auditing-no-realistic-mechanism-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Tabulation No way to guarantee leaf."}
{"id": "national-academies-2018-securing-the-vote-software-independence-black-box-limits", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030706-14", "uid": "C20260926-030706-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030706-14", "old_ids": ["national-academies-2018-securing-the-vote-software-independence-black-box-limits"], "seq": "C01149", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Do not look \"under the hood\" to ensure their security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018) concludes that end-to-end reliance on unauditable software is unacceptable: source-code review and lab testing cannot by themselves guarantee software integrity because attacks may occur in other system layers, and recommends voter-verifiable paper ballots plus risk-limiting audits—i.e., officials cannot securely 'look under the hood' of black-box systems via certification alone. Status Confirmed primary NAS consensus report on black-box limits; peer to EAC trusted-build and CA TTBR red-team cards already on this leaf—NAS Securing the Vote, not those remounted. PEP framing: black-box certification theater that substitutes vendor trust for public hand-count verification.", "sources": [{"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy (2018)", "url": "https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy", "local": "/archives/2026/09/national-academies-2018-securing-the-vote-software-independence-black-box-limits__national-academies-securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy-2018.png"}, {"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote (read online / chapter view)", "url": "https://nap.nationalacademies.org/read/25120/chapter/1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/national-academies-2018-securing-the-vote-software-independence-black-box-limits__national-academies-securing-the-vote-read-online-chapter-1.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b18 third on Software Don't look under the hood leaf."}
{"id": "defcon-26-2018-voting-village-ess-m650-remote-network-hack", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-03", "uid": "C20260926-022424-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-03", "old_ids": ["defcon-26-2018-voting-village-ess-m650-remote-network-hack"], "seq": "C01033", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Security researchers have demonstrated far more advanced manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "DEF CON 26 Voting Village’s 2018 public report (Blaze, Braun, Jefferson, Hursti, MacAlpine, Moss) documented dozens of vulnerabilities across 30+ pieces of U.S.-deployed election equipment, including remote network exploitation of the ES&S M650 high-speed tabulator then used in ~26 states/D.C., plus a machine used in 18 states compromised in about two minutes. Authors warned that hacking one high-speed county tabulator could flip statewide/Electoral College margins in a close race. Status Confirmed laboratory/public-test replication of advanced remote and local manipulation on fielded gear; peer to DEF CON 2017 and DEF CON 27 Voting Village cards on this leaf—DEF CON 26/2018 M650 report, not those remounted. PEP: paper hand-count observation contrasts trusting unobservable machine pipelines.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 26 — Voting Village Report (official PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-26-2018-voting-village-ess-m650-remote-network-hack__def-con-26-voting-village-report-official-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — DEF CON Voting Village: bug could flip Electoral College", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/09/e-voting-researchers-warn-of-hack-that-could-flip-the-electoral-college/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Security researchers have replicated leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-01", "uid": "C20260926-020046-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-01", "old_ids": ["defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db"], "seq": "C00918", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll-book data can be read by others to see how to manipulate the election by adding phantom ballots and then injecting phantom electronic check-ins."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-08/2018-09", "state": "US", "description": "DEF CON 26 Voting Village's published technical report documents that researchers examining a Diebold/ES&S ExpressPoll-5000 electronic poll book could access the file system and **read and write the voter databases** with SQLite, and found **passwords stored in cleartext** in the database (root password still the default 'password'; admin password 'pasta'). Status Confirmed that EPB voter-check-in data and credentials were readable/writable once the device was obtained—peer to DEF CON 25 Shelby leftover-voter-file exposure and KnowInk ePulse central check-in sync readability; not a claim that a specific 2018 election outcome was flipped via this vector.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 26 Voting Village Report — ExpressPoll-5000 cleartext passwords and writable voter DB (SQLite)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db__def-con-26-voting-village-report-expresspoll-5000-clear.pdf"}, {"title": "WhoWhatWhy — Hackers expose vulnerabilities in popular e-poll books (ExpressPoll passwords / data)", "url": "https://whowhatwhy.org/politics/elections/hackers-expose-vulnerabilities-in-popular-e-poll-books/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db__whowhatwhy-hackers-expose-vulnerabilities-in-popular-e.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on EPB data readable / phantom check-in manipulation leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"], "related": ["ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies"]}
{"id": "fl-duval-2018-08-28-primary-ballots-printed-slightly-too-wide-1700-rejected-by-precinct-scanners", "permanent_id": "C20261116-122653-01", "uid": "C20261116-122653-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-122653-01", "old_ids": ["fl-duval-2018-08-28-primary-ballots-printed-slightly-too-wide-1700-rejected-by-precinct-scanners"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Print the ballot image slightly shrunk so citizens do not notice but tabulators cannot scan it, causing ballots to be segregated and providing an excuse to \"re-create\" them (this happened in Arizona)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-08-28 (Florida primary election)", "state": "FL", "description": "In the Aug. 28, 2018 Florida primary, the Duval County Supervisor of Elections Office used a new ballot printing vendor, and some ballots were printed 'with a very slight variance from the specs,' making them too wide for many precinct tabulators to accept, Chief Elections Officer Robert Phillips told 104.5 WOKV. By that night about 1,700 ballots across 45 precincts could not be scanned. Voters reported their ballots were not read and were instead collected by poll workers. Rejected ballots went into each scanner's 'emergency compartment'; after the polls closed, poll workers re-ran them, and those still rejected were put in an 'unscanned bag' and taken to the elections office, where central scanners 'not as picky about the size specifications' read them. Supervisor Mike Hogan said voters were also offered the chance to spoil the first ballot and fill out a new one, that pre-election testing had not shown the problem, and that the printer was ES&S, the county's longtime tabulator vendor, on a new printing contract: 'that's just not acceptable work.' Status Confirmed: the supervisor and chief elections officer acknowledged the out-of-spec ballots, the number rejected and the handling. The ballots here were slightly too large rather than shrunk; the effect the leaf describes is the same, since an invisible size deviation made voters' ballots unreadable at the precinct and sent them out of the normal count into separate handling away from the polling place. Catalog point: a size deviation a voter cannot see decides whether a precinct machine accepts the ballot; paper ballots counted by people at the precinct do not depend on a slight printing tolerance.", "sources": [{"title": "104.5 WOKV — About 1,700 ballots were too big to be scanned at Duval County precincts (Stephanie Brown, Aug. 28, 2018)", "url": "https://www.wokv.com/news/local/some-duval-county-ballots-not-being-accepted-precinct-machines/CwvnjF3xJcOTnmDRfIFR5K/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wokv-duval-2018-08-28-1700-ballots-too-big-es-s.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-16 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-16 12:26 PM ET). WOKV article read via WebFetch and archived (curl 200). Vendor tag ES&S because the source names ES&S as the printer and tabulator vendor. Related card: Maricopa AZ 2022 fit-to-page shrunk ballots on this leaf. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "judicial-watch-doj-kentucky-2018-nvra-consent-judgment-list-maintenance", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-14", "uid": "C20260926-022424-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-14", "old_ids": ["judicial-watch-doj-kentucky-2018-nvra-consent-judgment-list-maintenance"], "seq": "C01044", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-07", "state": "KY", "description": "In July 2018 Kentucky entered a court-approved NVRA consent judgment with Judicial Watch and the U.S. Department of Justice after failing to conduct regular residence-based voter-list maintenance since about 2009. The decree required address canvassing (NCOA/ERIC and related data), confirmation notices, and removal only after nonresponse plus two federal general elections; Kentucky mailed an initial canvass to roughly 617,000 registrants. Status Confirmed multi-year failure to purge/maintain rolls remedied by federal consent judgment; peer to Judicial Watch Ohio and Indiana NVRA settlement cards—Kentucky 2018 NVRA consent judgment, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — United States announces settlement with Kentucky ensuring NVRA list-maintenance compliance", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/united-states-announces-settlement-kentucky-ensuring-compliance-voter-registration-list"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Judicial Watch / United States v. Kentucky NVRA consent judgment", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.kyed.84534/gov.uscourts.kyed.84534.39.0_2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/judicial-watch-doj-kentucky-2018-nvra-consent-judgment-list-maintenance__courtlistener-recap-judicial-watch-united-states-v-kentucky-nvra-consent-judgment.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Leaving bad records in leaf."}
{"id": "lwv-florida-v-detzner-2018-campus-early-voting-ban-struck", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-15", "uid": "C20260926-022424-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-15", "old_ids": ["lwv-florida-v-detzner-2018-campus-early-voting-ban-struck"], "seq": "C01045", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-07", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida’s Secretary of State had categorically barred early-voting sites at university-affiliated facilities (including UF’s Reitz Union). In League of Women Voters of Florida v. Detzner (N.D. Fla. 2018), the federal court held that categorical campus ban unconstitutional under the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, restoring supervisors’ discretion to site early voting on eligible campus facilities; subsequent cycles saw multiple Florida campus early-voting sites. Status Confirmed campus early-voting exclusion litigation and court-ordered restoration; peer to NC campus early-voting denial and Texas A&M Brazos campus-site removal cards—Florida LWV v. Detzner campus EV ruling, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "GovInfo — League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner (N.D. Fla.) opinion PDF", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-flnd-4_18-cv-00251/pdf/USCOURTS-flnd-4_18-cv-00251-0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lwv-florida-v-detzner-2018-campus-early-voting-ban-struck__govinfo-league-of-women-voters-of-fla-v-detzner-n-d-fla-opinion-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Florida early-vote campus complaint / case materials", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Florida-Early-Vote-Amended-Complaint-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lwv-florida-v-detzner-2018-campus-early-voting-ban-struck__democracy-docket-florida-early-vote-campus-complaint-case-materials.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Colleges leaf."}
{"id": "sc-buell-2018-ivotronic-event-log-timestamp-anomalies", "permanent_id": "C20261002-123208-07", "uid": "C20261002-123208-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261002-123208-07", "old_ids": ["sc-buell-2018-ivotronic-event-log-timestamp-anomalies"], "seq": "C01323", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Date and Time Manipulation", "Various parts of the voting system frequently show inaccurate dates and times."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-96", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-96", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-06", "state": "SC", "description": "Duncan Buell / University of South Carolina analyses of 2018 South Carolina primary iVotronic EL152 event logs (published as the 2018 Primary Report and related League of Women Voters SC coverage) document timestamps that jump backward and forward—including Chester County entries reverting from June 12 to June 10—and malformed/invalid dates such as ‘1994-01-1 -14:-26,’ alongside other system-log anomalies. Contemporary reporting (The State, StateScoop) summarized the findings as logging and tallying failures on paperless DRE equipment. Status Confirmed for documented inaccurate/malformed event-log date/time on SC iVotronic systems in 2018; does not by itself prove intentional vote flipping—distinct from Antrim clock-menu remounts on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Buell / U. of South Carolina — 2018 Primary Report (iVotronic EL152 event-log analysis PDF)", "url": "https://cse.sc.edu/~mgv/csce390f18/2018PrimaryReport.pdf"}, {"title": "StateScoop — South Carolina voting machines miscounted hundreds of ballots, report finds", "url": "https://statescoop.com/south-carolina-voting-machines-miscounted-hundreds-of-ballots-report-finds/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-02. Confirmed log timestamp anomalies; Antrim remounts skipped—SC Buell 2018 only.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S iVotronic"]}
{"id": "pew-2018-fact-opinion-distinguish-battlefield-understanding", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-02", "uid": "C20260926-003520-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-02", "old_ids": ["pew-2018-fact-opinion-distinguish-battlefield-understanding"], "seq": "C00715", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Psychological Operations", "Misinforming the Public Through Information Dominance", "Citizens do not understand the battlefield."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-06-18", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2018 survey found sizable shares of Americans struggled to classify news statements as factual vs opinion (only ~26% correctly identified all five factual statements), with political awareness and digital savviness strongly predicting performance—documenting a baseline public difficulty parsing the information environment that information-dominance tactics exploit. Status Confirmed for measured fact/opinion classification difficulty.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Can Americans tell factual from opinion statements in the news? (2018)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2018/06/18/distinguishing-between-factual-and-opinion-statements-in-the-news/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Americans' views of 2024 election news / hard to tell truth from fiction (2024 companion)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2024/10/10/americans-views-of-2024-election-news/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 1 companion."}
{"id": "abc-2018-dccc-interference-key-house-primaries-sabotage-pattern", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-22", "uid": "C20260926-002008-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-22", "old_ids": ["abc-2018-dccc-interference-key-house-primaries-sabotage-pattern"], "seq": "C00655", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Subtly sabotage campaigns."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05", "state": "Federal", "description": "ABC News and related 2018 coverage documented a broader DCCC pattern of intervening in House primaries against candidates the committee disliked—campaigns crying foul at national-party sabotage of their own side's primaries. Status Confirmed for coordinated primary-interference/sabotage pattern.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC News — Campaigns cry foul in national Democrats' interference in key House races", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/campaigns-cry-foul-national-democrats-interference-key-house/story?id=53622017"}, {"title": "Roll Call — DCCC Unloads on Democratic Candidate in Texas", "url": "https://rollcall.com/2018/02/23/dccc-unloads-on-democratic-candidate-in-texas/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/abc-2018-dccc-interference-key-house-primaries-sabotage-pattern__roll-call-dccc-unloads-on-democratic-candidate-in-texas.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 11 companion."}
{"id": "pew-2018-urban-demographic-trends-cities-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-32", "uid": "C20260926-004030-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-32", "old_ids": ["pew-2018-urban-demographic-trends-cities-companion"], "seq": "C00785", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Move people into cities to run for office and begin shifting political demographics at the county and state levels."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-22", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's earlier urban/suburban/rural demographic report documents younger, denser, more diverse urban counties vs older rural counties with outmigration—structural population movement into cities that changes who can win local offices. Status Confirmed for demographic urbanization patterns underlying political geography.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Demographic and economic trends in urban, suburban and rural communities (2018)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2018/05/22/demographic-and-economic-trends-in-urban-suburban-and-rural-communities/"}, {"title": "Pew Research — Changing partisan coalitions / urban-rural (2024 companion)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2024/04/09/changing-partisan-coalitions-in-a-politically-divided-nation/"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "al-2018-alabama-v-commerce-suit-census-counting-illegal-immigrants-apportionment", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-05", "uid": "C20261023-123356-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-05", "old_ids": ["al-2018-alabama-v-commerce-suit-census-counting-illegal-immigrants-apportionment"], "seq": "C01530", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Mass immigration, combined with a census that counts immigrants, justifies a higher population, creates headroom for more registered voters, and enables gerrymandering."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-21 (complaint); 2021-05-03 (voluntary dismissal)", "state": "AL", "description": "In May 2018, the State of Alabama and U.S. Rep. Mo Brooks sued the Department of Commerce and the Census Bureau in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Alabama (Alabama v. U.S. Department of Commerce, No. 2:18-cv-00772), challenging the Bureau's Feb. 8, 2018 Residence Rule (83 Fed. Reg. 5525), under which illegal immigrants are counted in the population used to apportion House seats and Electoral College votes. The complaint argued that including them would cost Alabama a congressional seat and an electoral vote to states with larger illegal-immigrant populations. Brooks described the suit on the House floor on May 22, 2018. After the 2020 apportionment results, released in April 2021, showed Alabama keeping all seven seats, the parties filed a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal without prejudice on May 3, 2021. Status Confirmed: the suit and the rule it challenged are documented in the court record and the Congressional Record; the court did not rule on the merits. Catalog point: a sitting state government went to federal court because the census rule shifts representation toward states with large non-citizen populations, the same rule that sets district sizes and the population base that voter-roll totals are measured against. Rolls checked locally and publicly against real, verifiable voters keep inflated totals from being used.", "sources": [{"title": "Alabama v. U.S. Department of Commerce — Complaint (N.D. Ala., May 2018; via Brennan Center)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/Alabama_v_Dept-of-Commerce_Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "Congressional Record — Rep. Mo Brooks on Alabama's census lawsuit (May 22, 2018)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CREC-2018-05-22/html/CREC-2018-05-22-pt1-PgH4287-5.htm"}, {"title": "Alabama v. U.S. Department of Commerce — Joint Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal (May 3, 2021; via Loyola Law School All About Redistricting)", "url": "https://redistricting.lls.edu/wp-content/uploads/AL-census-20210503-joint-stip-to-voluntary-dismissal.pdf"}, {"title": "Redistricting Online — Federal court dismisses Alabama challenge to including illegal immigrants in apportionment results (May 4, 2021; curl 406 bot-block 2026-10-23, URL retained)", "url": "https://redistrictingonline.org/2021/05/04/federal-court-dismisses-alabama-challenge-to-including-illegal-immigrants-in-apportionment-results/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to us-cis-2024-tilting-balance-immigrants-in-census-shift-17-house-seats on this leaf (1 -> 2). Distinct from scotus-2020-trump-v-new-york (other leaf). Complaint, Congressional Record and stipulation curl 200; Redistricting Online 406."}
{"id": "broward-fl-2018-snipes-canova-ballots-destroyed-pending-litigation-lawfare", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-10", "uid": "C20260926-033715-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-10", "old_ids": ["broward-fl-2018-snipes-canova-ballots-destroyed-pending-litigation-lawfare"], "seq": "C01235", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Delay releasing information until it is suddenly gone for some reason (hard-drive crash, backup failure, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-14", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida circuit court (May 2018) ruled Broward Supervisor of Elections Brenda Snipes improperly destroyed 2016 Democratic primary paper ballots—before the federal 22-month retention period and while Tim Canova's public-records/litigation demand to inspect those ballots was pending—so the physical evidence was gone when the requester pursued access. Status Confirmed primary court ruling + NBC 6 / AP contemporaneous coverage; peer to Coos County OR hard-drive-crash PRR and Georgia Kennesaw CES wipe-after-lawsuit cards already on this leaf—Broward Snipes/Canova ballot-destruction instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: destroying paper ballots under pending records fights erases the hand-countable record PEP requires be preserved and publicly observable.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC 6 — Judge Rules Broward Elections Supervisor Improperly Destroyed Ballots (May 14, 2018)", "url": "https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/judge-rules-broward-elections-supervisor-improperly-destroyed-ballots/47903/"}, {"title": "Fox News — Florida judge rules ballots were illegally destroyed in Wasserman Schultz race", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/florida-judge-rules-ballots-were-illegally-destroyed-in-wasserman-schultz-race"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Lawfare Blocking evidence information-gone leaf."}
{"id": "npr-2018-entergy-crowds-on-demand-paid-actors-power-plant-rally", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-08", "uid": "C20260926-002757-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-08", "old_ids": ["npr-2018-entergy-crowds-on-demand-paid-actors-power-plant-rally"], "seq": "C00681", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Manufactured rallies and other orchestrated protests display opposition designed to distort perceptions of public sentiment."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-05", "state": "LA", "description": "NPR and The Lens documented Crowds on Demand paying actors ($60 to attend / $200 to speak from scripts) to appear as grassroots supporters of a New Orleans power plant at City Council meetings—manufactured public sentiment that helped shape official perceptions. Entergy's own investigation confirmed Crowds on Demand compensated recruited attendees. Status Confirmed for paid manufactured-support rallies at official proceedings.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — New Orleans News Site Finds Actors Were Paid To Support A Power Plant (2018)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/05/05/608785751/new-orleans-news-site-finds-actors-were-paid-to-support-a-power-plant"}, {"title": "Entergy/investigation report PDF — Crowds on Demand paid individuals at NOPS meetings", "url": "https://www.desmog.com/wp-content/uploads/files/NOPS%20Investigation%20Report%20Final%205%2010%202018.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-2018-entergy-crowds-on-demand-paid-actors-power-plant-rally__entergy-investigation-report-pdf-crowds-on-demand-paid-individuals-at-nops-meetings.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 4 companion."}
{"id": "vox-2018-dccc-primary-meddling-control-info-candidate-selection", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-24", "uid": "C20260926-002757-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-24", "old_ids": ["vox-2018-dccc-primary-meddling-control-info-candidate-selection"], "seq": "C00697", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Control the flow of information."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-95", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "Vox's 2018 explainer on DCCC primary meddling documents national Democrats releasing opposition research, pressuring candidates to withdraw, and steering resources toward preferred nominees—i.e., consultants/party apparatus controlling information flow around who is viable. Status Confirmed for documented primary information-control interventions.", "sources": [{"title": "Vox — The DCCC's controversial meddling in primaries, explained (2018)", "url": "https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/3/17290902/dccc-2018-midterms-primaries-democrats-nancy-pelosi-laura-moser"}, {"title": "The Intercept — DCCC Moser public oppo / primary interference companion", "url": "https://theintercept.com/2018/02/22/national-democrats-go-nuclear-publicly-slam-a-dem-candidate-as-corrupt-for-far-less-than-its-own-officials-do/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/vox-2018-dccc-primary-meddling-control-info-candidate-selection__the-intercept-dccc-moser-public-oppo-primary-interference-co.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 12 companion. Soft remount of DCCC-Moser family onto Control information flow."}
{"id": "vox-2018-dccc-primary-meddling-opposition-research-pattern", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-28", "uid": "C20260926-001426-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-28", "old_ids": ["vox-2018-dccc-primary-meddling-opposition-research-pattern"], "seq": "C00621", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Hire people to disparage opponents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-05-03", "state": "Federal", "description": "Vox's overview of DCCC 2018 primary interventions documents a broader pattern of national-party research/comms deployed against disfavored primary candidates—institutionalizing 'hire people to bad-mouth opponents' as nomination-control practice. Status Confirmed for the pattern reporting.", "sources": [{"title": "Vox — DCCC's controversial meddling in primaries, explained", "url": "https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/3/17290902/dccc-2018-midterms-primaries-democrats-nancy-pelosi-laura-moser"}, {"title": "The Hill — DNC chair questions House campaign arm's attack on progressive", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/376498-dnc-chair-responds-to-dccc-opposition-research-on-progressive-i-wouldnt/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-06", "uid": "C20261028-134437-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-06", "old_ids": ["ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied"], "seq": "C01618", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).", "Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-04-23 to 2019", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 8, 2018, the DMV and the California Department of Technology told Secretary of State Alex Padilla that \"approximately 1,500 customers may have been registered to vote in error\" between April 23 and Sept. 25, 2018. When technicians at field offices processed requests to change a customer's voter-eligibility answers, \"the customer's initial responses were retained instead of the correct and revised responses.\" The letter said none of the affected customers were undocumented immigrants who received a license under AB 60. [1] Los Angeles County Registrar Dean Logan's Oct. 15, 2018, memo to the Board of Supervisors adds that an earlier error (April 23 to Aug. 5, 2018) affected about 23,000 customers whose records were \"inadvertently merged\" when technicians had more than one customer record open; that in both errors some customers who had asked to opt out were registered anyway; and that \"a recent LA Times story references a Legal Permanent Resident (LPR) residing in Orange County from Canada was registered to vote.\" [2] AP reported that at least one noncitizen and perhaps more were registered, and that the 1,500 included legal noncitizens. [3] The Sacramento Bee later reported that six of the people registered in error voted in 2018 and were not charged. [4] Status Confirmed: official letter and county memo.", "sources": [{"title": "California DMV and Department of Technology — Letter to Secretary of State Alex Padilla (Oct. 8, 2018; PDF, posted by Ventura County Clerk-Recorder)", "url": "https://clerkrecorder.venturacounty.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Letter-to-SOS-Alex-Padilla-October-8-2018-v3.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied__dmv-letter-to-sos-2018-10-08.pdf"}, {"title": "Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Dean Logan — Memo to the Board of Supervisors on DMV Motor Voter registration errors (Oct. 15, 2018; PDF)", "url": "https://www.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/board-correspondence/10152018.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied__la-rrcc-board-memo-2018-10-15.pdf"}, {"title": "Associated Press — California DMV: Non-citizens may be registered to vote (Oct. 2018)", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-f5f245dbff474013a5f4bda673818138"}, {"title": "Sacramento Bee — Report on Californians erroneously registered by the DMV who voted in 2018", "url": "https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article233729662.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ca-dmv-2018-voter-registration-applications-delayed-untransmitted", "ca-motor-voter-ey-audit-2019", "ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "az-2024-mvd-dpoc-coding-error-218000-voters-full-ballot-az-supreme-court", "ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation"]}
{"id": "ca-v-ross-citizenship-question-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-02", "uid": "C20260925-184601-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-02", "old_ids": ["ca-v-ross-citizenship-question-2018"], "seq": "C00120", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Before 2010, the census form included a citizenship question."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-03-26", "state": "CA / Federal", "description": "California (with Los Angeles County and multiple cities) sued Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross in N.D. Cal. (California v. Ross, 3:18-cv-01865) seeking to keep a citizenship question off the 2020 decennial Census, arguing undercount risk under the Enumeration Clause and APA. The complaint notes citizenship had not been asked of every household on the short-form census since 1950 and was not among subjects reported to Congress in March 2017. Status Confirmed for the lawsuit and its aim to keep the question off; not an adjudication of fraud motives.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — CA v. Ross First Amended Complaint (PDF)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/CA_v_Ross_First-Amended-Complaint.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-v-ross-citizenship-question-2018__brennan-center-ca-v-ross-first-amended-complaint-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse — California v. Ross", "url": "https://clearinghouse.net/case/16535/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-v-ross-citizenship-question-2018__civil-rights-litigation-clearinghouse-california-v-ross.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 1. CA lawsuit to keep citizenship question off 2020 Census."}
{"id": "tx-gregg-2018-shannon-brown-marlena-jackson-illegal-vote-harvesting-guilty-plea", "permanent_id": "C20261106-122819-02", "uid": "C20261106-122819-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-122819-02", "old_ids": ["tx-gregg-2018-shannon-brown-marlena-jackson-illegal-vote-harvesting-guilty-plea"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-09", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-03 (Democratic primary); 2020-09 (indictments/arrests); 2022-01-20 (guilty pleas and sentences)", "state": "TX", "description": "In the March 2018 Gregg County Democratic primary for County Commissioner Precinct 4, Shannon Brown defeated former Longview Councilwoman Kasha Williams by five votes. On Sept. 24, 2020, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton announced that a grand jury had indicted Brown, his wife Marlena Jackson, Charlie Burns, and DeWayne Ward on felony charges tied to an organized vote-harvesting scheme: investigators said the group targeted young, able-bodied voters for mail ballots by fraudulently claiming those voters were disabled, in most cases without the voters' knowledge or consent, to enlarge the mail-ballot pool. The AG release said 134 felony charges were filed across the four defendants (23 against Brown, 97 against Jackson, eight against Burns, six against Ward), including organized election fraud, illegal voting, fraudulent use of a mail-ballot application, unlawful possession of a mail ballot, tampering with a governmental record, and election fraud. On Jan. 20 and 25, 2022, Brown and Jackson each pleaded guilty to one Class A misdemeanor count of election fraud; District Judge Alfonso Charles sentenced each to one year of probation and a $2,000 fine and required a written public apology to Gregg County residents, which the Longview News-Journal reported would be published. Brown remained in office under the plea terms. Status Confirmed: guilty pleas, sentences, and AG and district-attorney announcements of the harvesting scheme that swung a five-vote primary. Catalog point: mail ballots obtained under false disability claims became a harvested commodity that decided a local race by five votes; paper in-person Election Day voting with the voter present does not open that mail-harvester channel.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Attorney General — Paxton Helps Secure Fair and Safe Elections for Gregg County (Jan. 25, 2022)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/paxton-helps-secure-fair-and-safe-elections-gregg-county", "local": "/archives/2026/11/tx-oag-gregg-shannon-brown-guilty-plea-2022-01.html"}, {"title": "Texas Attorney General — Joint prosecution of Gregg County organized election fraud in mail-in balloting scheme (Sept. 24, 2020)", "url": "https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-announces-joint-prosecution-gregg-county-organized-election-fraud-mail-balloting-scheme", "local": "/archives/2026/11/tx-oag-gregg-indictments-2020-09.html"}, {"title": "Longview News-Journal — Gregg County commissioner pleads guilty to misdemeanor charge in election fraud case (Jan. 20, 2022)", "url": "https://news-journal.com/2022/01/20/gregg-county-commissioner-pleads-guilty-to-misdemeanor-charge-in-election-fraud-case/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/longview-news-journal-shannon-brown-guilty-2022-01.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-06 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peer Hamtramck 2025 card. Both AG releases and Longview News-Journal archived (curl 200). Party label stated because sources state it. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "dccc-2018-laura-moser-opposition-research-primary-smear", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-27", "uid": "C20260926-001426-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-27", "old_ids": ["dccc-2018-laura-moser-opposition-research-primary-smear"], "seq": "C00620", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Hire people to disparage opponents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-02", "state": "TX", "description": "In the 2018 TX-07 Democratic primary, the DCCC publicly released opposition research attacking progressive candidate Laura Moser—an unusual party-committee intervention hiring/deploying research to bad-mouth a same-party primary opponent and steer the nomination. Widely covered (WaPo, Vox, Hill); the backlash became a campaign issue. Status Confirmed for hired/institutional bad-mouthing inside a primary.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Progressives rage at DCCC after it attacks Laura Moser", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2018/02/23/progressives-rage-at-dccc-after-it-attacks-texas-candidate-for-begrudgingly-moving-to-houston/"}, {"title": "Vox — DCCC scorched-earth campaign against Moser explained", "url": "https://www.vox.com/2018/3/7/17084808/dccc-laura-moser-texas-democratic-primary-2018"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 14."}
{"id": "dccc-2018-laura-moser-public-oppo-subtle-primary-sabotage", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-21", "uid": "C20260926-002008-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-21", "old_ids": ["dccc-2018-laura-moser-public-oppo-subtle-primary-sabotage"], "seq": "C00654", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Subtly sabotage campaigns."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-02-22", "state": "TX", "description": "In 2018 the DCCC publicly released opposition research attacking Democratic primary candidate Laura Moser—an establishment effort widely reported as attempting to sink her primary (Vox/Intercept/Roll Call). Soft remount of fill-20g Bad-mouth opponents DCCC-Moser source family onto this exact consultant/covert-subvert sabotage pathKey. Status Confirmed for coordinated primary-sabotage via oppo dump; 'consultants hired by Moser herself sabotaging her' not claimed.", "sources": [{"title": "The Intercept — DCCC Goes Nuclear On Texas Candidate Laura Moser (2018)", "url": "https://theintercept.com/2018/02/22/national-democrats-go-nuclear-publicly-slam-a-dem-candidate-as-corrupt-for-far-less-than-its-own-officials-do/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dccc-2018-laura-moser-public-oppo-subtle-primary-sabotage__the-intercept-dccc-goes-nuclear-on-texas-candidate-laura-moser-2018.png"}, {"title": "Vox — DCCC's scorched-earth campaign against Moser backfired", "url": "https://www.vox.com/2018/3/7/17084808/dccc-laura-moser-texas-democratic-primary-2018"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 11. Soft remount of fill-20g DCCC-Moser family onto sabotage pathKey."}
{"id": "princeton-appel-2018-ess-ds200-cellular-modem-not-air-gapped", "permanent_id": "C20260926-030239-01", "uid": "C20260926-030239-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-030239-01", "old_ids": ["princeton-appel-2018-ess-ds200-cellular-modem-not-air-gapped"], "seq": "C01121", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Air-gapped systems deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-02-22", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Princeton CITP's Andrew Appel and Kyle Jamieson (Feb. 22, 2018) document that ES&S DS200 optical-scan tabulators use a Multitech cellular modem to upload election-night results to county canvassing computers, and that the vendor/county claim of an 'analog modem' / non-Internet path is false: cellular calls traverse carrier Autonomous Systems that are part of the packet-switched Internet and are vulnerable to border-router bugs and Stingray-style impostor towers—i.e., modeming is not a true air gap. Status Confirmed primary academic analysis of the air-gap linguistic deception around cellular results transmission; peer to ES&S modem FAQ and NIST USB/memory-card air-gap bridge cards already on this leaf—Princeton modem/Internet analysis, not those remounted. PEP framing: 'air-gapped' branding that hides radio paths undercuts public hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "Princeton CITP — Are voting-machine modems truly divorced from the Internet? (Appel/Jamieson, Feb. 22, 2018)", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2018/02/22/are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced-from-the-internet/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/princeton-appel-2018-ess-ds200-cellular-modem-not-air-gapped__princeton-citp-are-voting-machine-modems-truly-divorced-from-the-internet-appel-jamieson-feb-22-2018.png"}, {"title": "Motherboard / Vice — Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials (Zetter)", "url": "https://www.vice.com/en/article/exclusive-critical-us-election-systems-have-been-left-exposed-online-despite-official-denials/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b17 third on Linguistic Deception Air-Gapped Systems Deception leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "nyt-2018-myth-hacker-proof-voting-machine-remote-access-vs-encryption-claims", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-08", "uid": "C20261014-123054-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-08", "old_ids": ["nyt-2018-myth-hacker-proof-voting-machine-remote-access-vs-encryption-claims"], "seq": "C01388", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Encryption deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2018-02-21", "state": "US", "description": "The New York Times Magazine investigation \"The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine\" (Feb. 21, 2018; summarized contemporaneously on Election Law Blog) documented that election vendors and officials had long marketed systems as secure, air-gapped, or otherwise insulated, while researchers and reporting found remote-access software, modems, and other connectivity in deployed election infrastructure—contradicting the public shorthand that encryption or isolation made the machines safe. Status Confirmed for the documented gap between security marketing language and observed remote-access/connectivity findings in that investigation (primary article paywalled to some crawlers; Election Law Blog contemporaneous summary retained). Catalog note: \"encrypted\" and \"air-gapped\" are useful words for calming the public, but they do not mean the public can verify outcomes. Software-independent paper hand counts do.", "sources": [{"title": "Election Law Blog — \"The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine\" (contemporaneous summary of NYT Magazine investigation; Feb. 2018)", "url": "https://electionlawblog.org/2018/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine/"}, {"title": "New York Times Magazine — The Myth of the Hacker-Proof Voting Machine (Feb. 21, 2018; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/21/magazine/the-myth-of-the-hacker-proof-voting-machine.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for marketing-vs-connectivity gap as reported. Thickens encryption-linguistic-seed. Cross-leaf: Air-Gapped Systems Deception; CISA crypto-secrets card."}
{"id": "abc7-chicago-il-ivrs-russian-penetration-password-vendor-cascade-reporting", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-32", "uid": "C20260926-000015-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-32", "old_ids": ["abc7-chicago-il-ivrs-russian-penetration-password-vendor-cascade-reporting"], "seq": "C00545", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017", "state": "IL", "description": "Contemporary reporting (ABC7 Chicago / Chicago Sun-Times) on the Illinois breach detailed how compromised credentials and related systems expanded the incident beyond the initial SQL injection—illustrating higher-order leverage paths attackers seek after a primary breach. Status Confirmed for cascade narrative in official/press accounts.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC7 Chicago — How the Russians penetrated Illinois election computers", "url": "https://abc7chicago.com/post/how-the-russians-penetrated-illinois-election-computers/3778816/"}, {"title": "Chicago Sun-Times — Illinois' chapter in the Russian hacking saga", "url": "https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/6/7/18391500/illinois-chapter-in-the-russian-hacking-saga", "local": "/archives/2026/09/abc7-chicago-il-ivrs-russian-penetration-password-vendor-cascade-reporting__abc7-chicago-il-ivrs-russian-penetration-password-vendor-cascade-reporting.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "defcon-25-voting-village-commercially-available-equipment-firmware-compromise", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-34", "uid": "C20260925-234437-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-34", "old_ids": ["defcon-25-voting-village-commercially-available-equipment-firmware-compromise"], "seq": "C00467", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Such code is trivial for an insider to embed, or for an attacker who gains physical or supply-chain access to the firmware."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village report documents researchers compromising commercially available election equipment (including firmware/software paths) with physical access measured in minutes to hours—supporting that embeddable malicious code is realistic once access is obtained. Status Confirmed for physical-access firmware/software compromise demonstrations. Soft companion to existing DEF CON village cards.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX / academic follow-ons citing Village findings (Halderman Antrim paper context)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "defcon-25-winvote-wireless-hardware-broadcasting-wifi", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-26", "uid": "C20260925-234437-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-26", "old_ids": ["defcon-25-winvote-wireless-hardware-broadcasting-wifi"], "seq": "C00459", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wireless devices installed in hardware"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017", "state": "VA", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village reporting and Virginia WinVote history document voting machines with built-in wireless networking hardware that broadcast/attackable Wi-Fi—physical wireless devices in election hardware. Status Confirmed. Soft companion to virginia-2015-winvote / DEF CON village report.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}, {"title": "NBC News — voting systems found connected to internet (wireless exposure reporting)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/online-vulnerable-experts-find-nearly-three-dozen-u-s-voting-n1112436"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "co-rla-statute-1-7-515", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-35", "uid": "C20260925-155410-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-35", "old_ids": ["co-rla-statute-1-7-515"], "seq": "C00035", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-7-515 mandates risk-limiting audits after coordinated elections, with Secretary of State rules (8 CCR 1505-1 Rule 25) specifying comparison vs ballot-polling methods, contest selection, and continuation until the risk limit is met or a full hand count. Colorado SOS publishes RLA FAQs and results. Status Confirmed for the statutory/regulatory RLA requirement—an official audit framework often debated by activists as either integrity safeguard or insufficient substitute for full hand counts.", "sources": [{"title": "C.R.S. §1-7-515 — Risk-limiting audits", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7-515"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Risk-Limiting Audit FAQs", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/RLA/faqs.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rla-statute-1-7-515__colorado-sos-risk-limiting-audit-faqs.png"}], "notes": "Official RLA architecture Confirmed."}
{"id": "ga-sb189-bmd-qr-official-text-delayed-years-after-curling", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-05", "uid": "C20260926-013447-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-05", "old_ids": ["ga-sb189-bmd-qr-official-text-delayed-years-after-curling"], "seq": "C00864", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2026", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia's Curling v. Raffensperger litigation (filed 2017) challenged Dominion BMD QR-code tabulation on the ground voters cannot verify the barcode that scanners actually count. After years of litigation and a January 2024 trial, the N.D. Ga. court dismissed the case March 31, 2025 for lack of standing—without ordering an immediate statewide hand-marked paper remedy. Separately, SB 189 made human-readable BMD text (not the QR/barcode) the official vote for tabulation/audits effective July 1, 2026, but subsequent reporting documented further postponement of the QR ban (special-session delay) while BMDs remained in use. Status Confirmed for multi-year delay between documented QR/barcode opacity findings and a statutory/operational fix—peer delay-tactics pattern to Pennsylvania's ExpressVote XL defect-to-settlement timeline; not a finding that any election outcome was flipped. PEP hand-marked paper precinct counts avoid barcode opacity.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia General Assembly — SB 189 (BMD human-readable text / QR tabulation)", "url": "https://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/64471", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sb189-bmd-qr-official-text-delayed-years-after-curling__georgia-general-assembly-sb-189-bmd-human-readable-text.png"}, {"title": "Courthouse News — Curling v. Raffensperger opinion/order PDF (Mar 2025 dismissal)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/curling-v-raffensperger-order-dismiss-usdc-northern-georgia.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-sb189-bmd-qr-official-text-delayed-years-after-curling__courthouse-news-curling-v-raffensperger-opinion-order-p.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Curling et al v. Raffensperger, No. 1:2017cv02989 Document 1868 (N.D. Ga. 2025)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/gandce/1:2017cv02989/240678/1868/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to pa-expressvote-xl-remedy-delay-2023 (delay fixing known equipment/tabulation defects).", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "us-never-resided-overseas-voters-37-38-states-dc-policy-2017-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-01", "uid": "C20261009-100620-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-01", "old_ids": ["us-never-resided-overseas-voters-37-38-states-dc-policy-2017-2026"], "seq": "C01265", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2026", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Most states let U.S. citizens born abroad who have never lived in the United States register and vote absentee by borrowing a parent's or legal guardian's last U.S. address (some states also a spouse's), with no personal residence history in the state. FVAP's 2017 'Never Resided Voters' policy brief counted 36 states and estimated about 11,590 registered never-resided voters in 2016; 7 of those states limited them to federal offices. 2026 counts differ by source and date: The Guardian (Oct. 1, 2026) says 38 states plus D.C.; U.S. Vote Foundation, AARO, and Democrats Abroad-aligned guides say 37 states plus D.C. The gap is reconciled by North Carolina: a June 9, 2026 Wake County ruling (RNC/NCGOP v. State Board) barred NC never-residents from all contests, so 38 → 37 (plus D.C.) after June 2026. The Center for U.S. Voters Abroad tally is 24 states full ballot, 12 federal-only, and Oregon conditional. Eligibility rests on a sworn statement on the FPCA/FWAB that the applicant has never lived in the U.S. and on the parent's former address; election offices generally cannot independently confirm a never-resident's family link to that address. Status Confirmed for the policy facts and counts (state statutes, FVAP brief, advocacy-group tallies). No fraud finding is implied; the PEP point is that this eligibility class rests on unverifiable self-attestation, which observers cannot check.", "sources": [{"title": "FVAP — Never Resided Voters policy brief (Feb. 2017, PDF; Wayback copy — original fvap.gov URL now 404)", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20241219101850/https://www.fvap.gov/uploads/FVAP/EO/FVAPNeverResidedPolicyBrief_20170222_FINAL.pdf"}, {"title": "The Guardian — DNC sues over last-minute changes to overseas voting form (38 states + DC; Oct. 1, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/01/dnc-lawsuit-trump-changes-overseas-voter-citizens"}, {"title": "U.S. Vote Foundation — Press release: FPCA/FWAB emergency changes (37 states + DC; Sept. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.usvotefoundation.org/press/fpca-fwab-emergency-changes"}, {"title": "Center for U.S. Voters Abroad — Born abroad and never lived in the U.S.? Where you can still vote (state table)", "url": "https://www.usvotersabroad.org/guides/born-abroad-never-lived-in-us"}, {"title": "Overseas Vote Foundation — Vote as a U.S. citizen born abroad (state list)", "url": "https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/post/voting-us-elections-explained-can-i-vote-us-citizen-born-abroad"}, {"title": "NCSL — Voting for Military and Overseas Voters (voting residence; never-resided note)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voting-for-military-and-overseas-voters"}], "notes": "Leaf seed card (master-catalog leaf added 2026-10-09). Count reconciliation: 36 (FVAP 2017) → 38+DC (pre-June 2026, Guardian) → 37+DC (post NC June 9, 2026 ruling; USVF/AARO/CUSVATP). Democrats Abroad '37' matches post-NC count. FVAP's own never-resided brief and state list are no longer on fvap.gov (404 as of 2026-10-09; USVF also notes the list was removed); cited via Wayback."}
{"id": "curling-v-raffensperger-2017-2025-multi-year-bmd-remedy-delay", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-11", "uid": "C20260926-022920-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-11", "old_ids": ["curling-v-raffensperger-2017-2025-multi-year-bmd-remedy-delay"], "seq": "C01056", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2025", "state": "GA", "description": "Curling v. Raffensperger (N.D. Ga. 1:17-cv-02989), filed August 2017 challenging Georgia DRE then Dominion BMD/QR systems, did not reach a full trial on the BMD claims until January 2024 and was dismissed March 31, 2025 for lack of Article III standing—nearly eight years of litigation during which QR-coded BMDs remained in statewide use while statutory human-readable/QR remedies (e.g., SB 189) were deferred toward 2026. CourtListener docket and the court's Opinion and Order document the timeline. Status Confirmed multi-year federal delay-to-remedy pattern; peer to PA ExpressVote XL remedy delay and GA SB189 delayed human-readable text cards—Curling docket duration, not those remounted. PEP framing: prolonged litigation/legislative deferral keeps opaque machine tabulation in place for multiple election cycles.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Curling v. Raffensperger, 1:17-cv-02989 docket (filed Aug. 8, 2017; terminated Mar. 31, 2025)", "url": "https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/6139924/curling-v-raffensperger/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/curling-v-raffensperger-2017-2025-multi-year-bmd-remedy-delay__courtlistener-curling-v-raffensperger-1-17-cv-02989-docket-f.png"}, {"title": "Courthouse News — Curling v. Raffensperger Opinion and Order (Mar. 31, 2025 PDF)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/curling-v-raffensperger-order-dismiss-usdc-northern-georgia.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/curling-v-raffensperger-2017-2025-multi-year-bmd-remedy-delay__courthouse-news-curling-v-raffensperger-opinion-and-order-mar-31-2025-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Delay Tactics root leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "ri-gen-laws-17-19-37-4-risk-limiting-audits-mandatory", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-01", "uid": "C20260926-022005-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-01", "old_ids": ["ri-gen-laws-17-19-37-4-risk-limiting-audits-mandatory"], "seq": "C00979", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-2024", "state": "RI", "description": "Rhode Island Gen. Laws §17-19-37.4 (SB 413, 2017; amended 2024) authorizes and, commencing 2020, requires the state board with local boards to conduct risk-limiting audits after presidential preference primaries and general elections—hand-tallying audit units until strong statistical evidence supports the reported outcome or a full manual tally replaces machine totals. 410-RICR-20-00-28 sets a maximum 9% risk limit and public observation rules. Status Confirmed statutory RLA program peer to Colorado C.R.S. §1-7-515 and Virginia §24.2-671.2 cards already on this leaf—Rhode Island RLA statute/regs, not those remounted. PEP framing: RLAs still depend on intact paper ballots and custody; they do not make opaque machine pipelines trustworthy by themselves.", "sources": [{"title": "Verified Voting — Rhode Island Audit Law Database (§17-19-37.4 / 410-RICR-20-00-28)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaw/rhode-island/"}, {"title": "Rhode Island Department of State — 410-RICR-20-00-28 Risk Limiting Audits", "url": "https://rules.sos.ri.gov/Regulations/part/410-20-00-28", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ri-gen-laws-17-19-37-4-risk-limiting-audits-mandatory__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Auditing leaf."}
{"id": "wired-2017-propublica-subscription-bombing-mailing-list-stuffing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-07", "uid": "C20260926-002008-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-07", "old_ids": ["wired-2017-propublica-subscription-bombing-mailing-list-stuffing"], "seq": "C00640", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Mailing-list stuffing attacks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-35", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-11-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "WIRED/ProPublica documented subscription bombing (mailing-list stuffing): attackers automate signup of a victim's address to thousands of newsletters/accounts so confirmation floods overwhelm the inbox and can cripple an organization's mail system—explicitly framed as harassment/intimidation after investigative reporting. Status Confirmed for mailing-list stuffing as an intimidation technique against journalists/activists.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — How Journalists Fought Back Against Crippling Email Bombs (2017)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/story/how-journalists-fought-back-against-crippling-email-bombs/"}, {"title": "MITRE ATT&CK — Email Bombing (T1667)", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1667/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wired-2017-propublica-subscription-bombing-mailing-list-stuffing__mitre-att-ck-email-bombing-t1667.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 4."}
{"id": "mn-st-paul-2017-candidate-dai-thao-marked-voters-ballot-acquitted-2020-consent-decree-lifts-limits", "permanent_id": "C20261102-123005-03", "uid": "C20261102-123005-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-123005-03", "old_ids": ["mn-st-paul-2017-candidate-dai-thao-marked-voters-ballot-acquitted-2020-consent-decree-lifts-limits"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Steering the voter's choices at the point of voting", "Voter-assistance rights: an assister chosen to help a voter with language, sight, or reading can steer or mark that voter's choices inside the booth, where no one else can see."], "leaf_id": "L20261021-170325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261021-170325-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-11-07 (election); 2018-10-23 (acquittal order); 2020-04-21 (consent decree filed)", "state": "MN", "description": "In the November 2017 St. Paul mayoral election, City Council Member Dai Thao, a candidate on that ballot, helped an elderly Hmong-speaking voter who asked for his help: he interpreted for her, helped her register, and went into the booth and marked her ballot. Minnesota law then barred candidates from assisting voters and limited any assister to three voters per election, and Thao was charged in 2018 with unlawfully marking a ballot, misconduct in or near a polling place, and unlawfully assisting a voter. On Oct. 23, 2018, Ramsey County District Judge Nicole Starr found him not guilty, ruling that the candidate ban conflicts with Section 208 of the federal Voting Rights Act, which lets a voter choose any assister other than an employer or union officer, and that he reasonably relied on the election judges, who used his translation and did not tell him to stop until after the ballot was cast. Thao and others then sued the Secretary of State, and a consent decree filed April 21, 2020, in Ramsey County (No. 62-CV-20-1044) agreed that both the candidate ban and the three-voter limit are preempted, permanently barred their enforcement, and required training materials to be revised before the November 2020 election. No court found that Thao steered the voter's choices. Status Confirmed: the assistance, the acquittal, and the consent decree are court records. Catalog point: since 2020, a Minnesota candidate may go into the booth and mark a voter's ballot, for any number of voters, and no one else sees the marks; the safeguard against a steered or misdirected mark is now only the voter's trust in whoever she picked.", "sources": [{"title": "Ramsey County District Court — Thao v. Simon consent decree, No. 62-CV-20-1044 (filed April 21, 2020; via Minnesota Attorney General)", "url": "https://www.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/docs/Thao_ConsentDecree.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/11/mn-thao-consent-decree.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Judge: St. Paul City Council Member Thao acted legally in helping voter (2018; curl 403, linked only)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/elections-courts-voting-st-paul-b74cc4f3394b40efa33415a2baf44d42"}, {"title": "Star Tribune — St. Paul City Council Member Thao acted legally in helping voter, judge rules (2018; curl 429, linked only)", "url": "https://www.startribune.com/st-paul-city-council-member-thao-acted-legally-in-helping-voter-judge-rules/500172682/"}, {"title": "Star Tribune — Minnesota candidates for office can help voters cast ballots, judge rules (2020; curl 429, linked only)", "url": "https://www.startribune.com/minnesota-candidates-for-office-can-help-voters-cast-ballots-judge-rules/569891942"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-02 (open web, zero X API). Empty leaf (0 -> 2) with PA Mills card. Consent decree archived (curl 200) and quoted for the acquittal date, the judge, and the preemption finding; charges and reliance on election judges from AP and Star Tribune as returned by WebSearch. Framed as a rule-gap instance, not as proven steering."}
{"id": "broward-fl-2017-snipes-destroyed-2016-primary-ballots-pending-prr", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-07", "uid": "C20261014-123054-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-07", "old_ids": ["broward-fl-2017-snipes-destroyed-2016-primary-ballots-pending-prr"], "seq": "C01387", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wipe hard drives so no evidence of manipulation remains."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-09-01", "state": "FL", "description": "Despite pending public-records requests and litigation by Tim Canova seeking access to paper ballots from the August 2016 Democratic primary in Florida's 23rd congressional district, Broward County Supervisor of Elections Brenda Snipes issued a Sept. 1, 2017 order authorizing destruction of hundreds of boxes of in-person, early-voting, and vote-by-mail materials from that primary. Contemporary Christian Science Monitor reporting (Dec. 15, 2017) documents the destruction order amid ongoing Circuit Court proceedings and notes federal 22-month retention expectations for federal-election records. Status Confirmed for the destruction order while records requests and a lawsuit seeking examination of the ballots were pending (CSM / court filings as reported); federal retention-law adjudication is outside this card. Catalog note: once the physical ballots are gone, no independent recount or citizen examination can test the machine totals. Cross-leaf Lawfare card broward-fl-2018-snipes-canova covers the blocking-evidence framing; this card places the same destruction on the wipe-evidence leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Christian Science Monitor — Why did Broward destroy 2016 ballots? Sanders ally seeks US probe (Dec. 15, 2017)", "url": "https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2017/1215/Why-did-Broward-destroy-2016-ballots-Sanders-ally-seeks-US-probe"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for destruction amid pending PRR/litigation. Peer lawfare card retained. Cross-leaf: Lawfare > Blocking evidence."}
{"id": "defcon-2017-expresspoll-5000-epb-compromised-live-voter-data", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-15", "uid": "C20260925-212129-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-15", "old_ids": ["defcon-2017-expresspoll-5000-epb-compromised-live-voter-data"], "seq": "C00312", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "They can be abused wirelessly from the parking lot, by wire inside the polling place, or over the cellular network or internet from anywhere in the world."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village researchers examined a Diebold ExpressPoll 5000 electronic poll book still containing ~654k Shelby County, TN voter records, documented weak physical/USB protections, default credentials findable online, and Windows CE software-update/bootloader injection paths — demonstrating EPB compromise potential with ordinary tools. Separately, the Village's WinVote remote Wi-Fi takeover within ~minutes/~150–300+ ft (extendable with a cheap antenna) illustrates parking-lot-range wireless abuse of election equipment. Status Confirmed for researcher-demonstrated EPB/equipment abuse surfaces including wireless and local access.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF) — ExpressPoll 5000 + WinVote range", "url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2025/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-2017-expresspoll-5000-epb-compromised-live-voter-data__def-con-25-voting-village-report-pdf-expresspoll-5000-winvot.pdf"}, {"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (www mirror)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 8. Confirmed lab findings; not a proven in-election wireless EPB takeovers claim.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"]}
{"id": "defcon-25-expresspoll-shelby-county-voter-data-on-resold-epb", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-21", "uid": "C20260925-233150-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-21", "old_ids": ["defcon-25-expresspoll-shelby-county-voter-data-on-resold-epb"], "seq": "C00414", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll-book data can be read by others to see how to manipulate the election by adding phantom ballots and then injecting phantom electronic check-ins."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-81", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07", "state": "TN", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village reporting and contemporaneous news documented a Diebold ExpressPoll electronic poll book still containing roughly 600,000+ Shelby County, TN voter records after resale—showing EPB voter data can be read offline by unauthorized parties when devices are not properly wiped. Status Confirmed for unauthorized readability of EPB voter files. Confirmed for data exposure; phantom check-in fraud using that data stays Alleged here.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}, {"title": "Action News 5 — Hackers access info of 600K Shelby County voters (ExpressPoll)", "url": "https://www.actionnews5.com/story/36027244/hackers-access-info-of-600k-shelby-county-voters/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 11.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressPoll"]}
{"id": "defcon-25-voting-village-report-commercially-available-election-equipment-compromised", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-18", "uid": "C20260925-233150-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-18", "old_ids": ["defcon-25-voting-village-report-commercially-available-election-equipment-compromised"], "seq": "C00411", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "This creates a much more attractive attack surface."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village report documents researchers compromising multiple pieces of commercially deployed U.S. election equipment (DREs, optical scanners, electronic poll books) within days using ordinary tools—empirical demonstration that computerized election components present an attractive, practically exploitable attack surface. Status Confirmed for researcher-demonstrated compromise of real equipment models.", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-25-voting-village-report-commercially-available-election-equipment-compromised__defcon-25-voting-village-report-commercially-available-election-equipment-compromised__def-con-25-voting-village-report-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Cyber Risk resource hub", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/election-cyber-risk", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-25-voting-village-report-commercially-available-election-equipment-compromised__cisa-election-cyber-risk-resource-hub.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 9 companion. 2017 Village work remains cited baseline within 2016–present scope."}
{"id": "defcon-voting-village-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-13", "uid": "C20260925-155410-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-13", "old_ids": ["defcon-voting-village-2017"], "seq": "C00013", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Voting on DRE or BMD Touchscreens", "Covert Tap-Misregistration Programming", "Security researchers have demonstrated far more advanced manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "DEF CON 25 Voting Machine Hacking Village (Las Vegas, July 2017) published a September 2017 report: every piece of equipment in the village was effectively breached; the AVS WinVote DRE was remotely taken over within minutes (CVE-2003-0352), enabling vote alteration; AccuVote-TSx, ES&S iVotronic, Sequoia AVC Edge DREs and a Diebold ExpressPoll 5000 EPB were also compromised with ordinary tools by participants with little prior knowledge. Catalog Detail leaf explicitly cites DEF CON Voting Village. Status Confirmed for researcher-replicated advanced manipulation of DRE/EPB equipment (lab/conference setting, not a proven in-election outcome flip).", "sources": [{"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-voting-village-2017__def-con-25-voting-village-report-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USA Today — Hackers at DefCon exploit vulnerabilities in voting machines", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2017/07/30/hackers-defcon-conference-exploit-vulnerabilities-voting-machines/523639001/"}], "notes": "Fill-15f remount 2026-09-25.20-preview: stub Electronic Voting Machines → exact Detail leaf citing DEF CON Voting Village under Voting on DRE or BMD.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier", "Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S iVotronic", "Diebold/Premier AccuVote", "Sequoia AVC Advantage/Edge"]}
{"id": "ga-kennesaw-ces-server-hard-drives-wiped-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-30", "uid": "C20260925-185839-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-30", "old_ids": ["ga-kennesaw-ces-server-hard-drives-wiped-2017"], "seq": "C00181", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wipe hard drives so no evidence of manipulation remains."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07-07", "state": "GA", "description": "Associated Press and Curling v. Kemp litigation records establish that Kennesaw State University's Center for Election Systems wiped the hard drives of its elections.kennesaw.edu server on July 7, 2017—days after the federal lawsuit challenging Georgia's election system was filed—with additional internal servers later degaussed. Plaintiffs argued spoliation of election-system evidence; the FBI reportedly held an earlier forensic image. Status Confirmed that election-system server hard drives were wiped after litigation began (motive for wipe remains disputed; fact of wipe Confirmed). Transparent paper hand count (PEP) reduces reliance on wiped EMS disks for outcome verification.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Georgia election server wiped after suit filed", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-kennesaw-ces-server-hard-drives-wiped-2017__ap-georgia-election-server-wiped-after-suit-filed.png"}, {"title": "AP — Q&A: Why wiping of Georgia elections server matters", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/7d63dd986bd34e7286a14807f514aca4"}, {"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Curling discovery statement re FBI server image", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.589.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-kennesaw-ces-server-hard-drives-wiped-2017__courtlistener-recap-curling-discovery-statement-re-fbi-serve.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 14. Distinct from existing ga-ces-kennesaw-server-exposure-2016 (breach leaf)."}
{"id": "ga-kennesaw-ces-wipe-after-lawsuit-spoliation-2017-lawfare", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-27", "uid": "C20260925-194013-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-27", "old_ids": ["ga-kennesaw-ces-wipe-after-lawsuit-spoliation-2017-lawfare"], "seq": "C00211", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Delay releasing information until it is suddenly gone for some reason (hard-drive crash, backup failure, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-07-07", "state": "GA", "description": "Days after Curling v. Kemp was filed (July 3, 2017) challenging Georgia's election system, Kennesaw State University Center for Election Systems wiped the elections.kennesaw.edu server hard drives (July 7); internal backup servers were later degaussed. AP, PBS, and Ars Technica documented the wipe after suit; plaintiffs argued spoliation of election-system evidence needed for litigation. (Companion Tabulation 'Wipe hard drives' card covers the same facts from an evidence-destruction angle; this card maps the lawsuit-timed disappearance as Blocking-evidence / Lawfare.) Status Confirmed that election-system drives were wiped after litigation began, removing evidence requesters sought.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Georgia election server wiped after suit filed", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Georgia election server wiped after suit filed", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/georgia-election-server-wiped-after-suit-filed"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — Days after activists sued, Georgia’s election server was wiped clean", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/days-after-activists-sued-georgias-election-server-was-wiped-clean/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 13. Lawsuit-timed wipe Confirmed (Lawfare Blocking evidence framing)."}
{"id": "cap-2017-oregon-avr-116k-unlikely-registrants-low-propensity", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-09", "uid": "C20260926-032507-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-09", "old_ids": ["cap-2017-oregon-avr-116k-unlikely-registrants-low-propensity"], "seq": "C01204", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Their goal is to increase registered voters as much as possible, especially low- or no-propensity voters, because they need those database entries to attach votes to."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-06-01", "state": "OR", "description": "Center for American Progress / Gronke et al. 'Who Votes With Automatic Voter Registration?' (June 2017) found Oregon Motor Voter added >272,000 registrations in 2016 including >116,000 people 'unlikely to have registered otherwise' (low prior engagement: not registered 2008–2014, old enough to have been, did not return postcard), of whom >40,000 voted—while OMV registrants were younger, lower-income, more rural/suburban, and more ethnically diverse, with 43.6% turnout vs 84.1% for traditional registrants. Status Confirmed primary CAP/Gronke Oregon AVR impact quantifying mass addition of low-propensity roll entries; peer to Brennan AVR impact and Catalist vote-propensity model cards already on this leaf—CAP Oregon AVR 116k-unlikely instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: industrial expansion of low-propensity database entries enlarges the soft-identity pool that machine systems can attach ballots to; public hand counts still require human-present paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Center for American Progress — Who Votes With Automatic Voter Registration? Oregon AVR impact (June 2017 PDF)", "url": "https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2017/06/OregonAVR-report1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cap-2017-oregon-avr-116k-unlikely-registrants-low-propensity__center-for-american-progress-who-votes-with-automatic-voter-registration-oregon-avr-impact-june-2017-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Demos — Automatic Voter Registration in Oregon (companion AVR impact brief)", "url": "https://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/AVR%20in%20Oregon%20FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/cap-2017-oregon-avr-116k-unlikely-registrants-low-propensity__demos-automatic-voter-registration-in-oregon-companion-avr-impact-brief.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Voter Rolls increase registered voters especially low-to-no-propensity leaf."}
{"id": "aapor-2017-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-14", "uid": "C20260926-013447-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-14", "old_ids": ["aapor-2017-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls"], "seq": "C00873", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-05", "state": "US", "description": "AAPOR's Ad Hoc Committee on 2016 Election Polling published 'An Evaluation of 2016 Election Polls in the U.S.' (May 2017), documenting systematic underestimation of Trump support in key states and analyzing nonresponse, education weighting, and late-deciding voters as error sources—establishing a prior-cycle official polling-miss diagnosis before the 2020 AAPOR task force and 2024 Reuters underestimation coverage already on this leaf. Status Confirmed for a third major-cycle documented systematic pre-election polling miss. Polling error ≠ ballot fraud; listed under Fake polling results perception ops.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — An Evaluation of 2016 Election Polls in the U.S. (Ad Hoc Committee report)", "url": "https://aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/AAPOR-2016-Election-Polling-Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2017-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls__aapor-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls-in-the-u-s-a.pdf"}, {"title": "AAPOR — 2016 Election Polling Report landing / related materials", "url": "https://aapor.org/publications-resources/election-polling-resources/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2017-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls__aapor-2016-election-polling-report-landing-related-mate.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 third on Fake polling results leaf (2016 cycle)."}
{"id": "nc-sbe-2016-audit-24-substantiated-double-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-12", "uid": "C20261009-105430-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-12", "old_ids": ["nc-sbe-2016-audit-24-substantiated-double-votes"], "seq": "C01345", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-04-21", "state": "NC", "description": "The NC State Board of Elections' post-election audit report for the 2016 general election lists '24 substantiated cases of double-voting initiated through tips and data audits,' with a few dozen more under review. It warns that poll-worker errors assigning voter history to the wrong person create false positives that only detailed review can resolve. NC runs a voter-history audit (check-ins vs ballots cast) after every election, which is how such cases surface after certification. The report does not break the 24 down into mail-plus-in-person and other types. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NC State Board of Elections — Post-Election Audit Report, 2016 General Election (PDF)", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/sboe/Post-Election%20Audit%20Report_2016%20General%20Election/Post-Election_Audit_Report.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSBE — Post-Election Procedures and Audits", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/about-elections/election-security/post-election-procedures-and-audits"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09."}
{"id": "nc-sbe-2016-post-election-audit-41-noncitizens-cast-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-04", "uid": "C20261012-125218-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-04", "old_ids": ["nc-sbe-2016-post-election-audit-41-noncitizens-cast-ballots"], "seq": "C01362", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-04-21", "state": "NC", "description": "The North Carolina State Board of Elections' Post-Election Audit Report for the 2016 general election (released April 21, 2017) found that 41 non-citizens with legal status (green cards and similar) cast ballots, out of nearly 4.8 million votes. Pairing state and federal databases flagged another 34 voters who then proved citizenship, and 61 more records remained under review. The same audit documented 441 open cases of voting by suspected active felons, 24 substantiated double votes and two voter-impersonation referrals involving deceased relatives. NCSBE says interviews showed some noncitizens were misinformed by voter-registration drive workers and, in at least one case, by a precinct official. Then-director Kim Strach told the News & Observer \"There is not anywhere a citizenship database\" and that the state has to rely on the felony penalty for falsely checking the citizenship box. The board said no contest outcome was affected. Status Confirmed (official state audit). Catalog note: these ballots were accepted and counted, and found only by an after-the-fact audit. Board staff pointed to registration-drive misinformation and an attestation-only checkbox, the kind of plausible \"mistake\" that, once confirmed anywhere, gives cover everywhere.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSBE — Post-Election Audit Report: General Election 2016 (PDF)", "url": "https://dl.ncsbe.gov/sboe/Post-Election%20Audit%20Report_2016%20General%20Election/Post-Election_Audit_Report.pdf"}, {"title": "NCSBE — SBE Releases Post-Election Report for 2016 General Election (Apr. 21, 2017)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2017/04/21/sbe-releases-post-election-report-2016-general-election"}, {"title": "NCSBE — Maintaining Accurate Voter Rolls (registration-drive misinformation finding)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/about-elections/maintaining-accurate-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "Raleigh News & Observer — NC Board of Elections 2016 report (Strach: no citizenship database)", "url": "https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article148730284.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed via official audit. N&O did not answer curl (timeout); quote also summarized in search snippet. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration > not adequate protections; Voter Rolls."}
{"id": "pa-philadelphia-2017-hd197-special-poll-43-7-election-board-bogus-ballots-false-certification-guilty-pleas", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-02", "uid": "C20261109-122834-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-02", "old_ids": ["pa-philadelphia-2017-hd197-special-poll-43-7-election-board-bogus-ballots-false-certification-guilty-pleas"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "Election judges add fraudulent ballots to voting machines and falsely certify the results."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-03-21 (special election); 2017-10-30 (charges); 2018-04 to 2018-06 (pleas and dispositions)", "state": "PA", "description": "In the March 21, 2017 special election for Pennsylvania's 197th House District in North Philadelphia, the four-member election board at Poll 43-7 (Esperanza Health Center, Kensington and Allegheny Avenues) was charged by Attorney General Josh Shapiro and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office on Oct. 30, 2017 with intimidating voters, casting bogus ballots and falsely certifying the results at their polling place. Shapiro said one elderly Republican couple voted together but only one vote was recorded, while the other appeared to have been replaced with a write-in vote for the Democratic candidate, ward leader Emilio Vazquez, who won the seat on a write-in campaign with 73.5% after his party missed the ballot deadline; a Green Party voter was told the machine was broken and was cursed at when he returned. Machine inspector Thurman George pleaded guilty in May 2018 to fraud by an election officer, a third-degree felony (five years' probation, four-year voting disqualification); translator Wallace Hill pleaded guilty to failure to perform duty; minority inspector Calvin Mattox pleaded guilty to serving outside his district; and Judge of Elections Dolores Shaw received accelerated rehabilitative disposition. Prosecutors said the fraud did not change the outcome. Status Confirmed by guilty pleas and dispositions announced by the Pennsylvania Attorney General and reported by the Philadelphia Inquirer and WHYY. Catalog point: the officials certifying a precinct's machine totals were themselves the ones substituting votes; precinct-level counting by observed, bipartisan citizens checks certifiers instead of trusting them.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Attorney General — Case update: Election fraud in 197th State House race (2018)", "url": "https://www.attorneygeneral.gov/taking-action/case-update-election-fraud-in-197th-state-house-race-2/"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Election fraud charges filed in 197th District special election (Oct. 30, 2017)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/election-fraud-charges-filed-in-197th-district-special-election-20171030.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/inquirer-197th-charges-2017-10.html"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Philly election worker pleads guilty to fraud (May 9, 2018)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/politics/state/philly-election-worker-pleads-guilty-to-fraud-20180509.html", "local": "/archives/2026/11/inquirer-197th-george-plea-2018-05.html"}, {"title": "WHYY — 4 charged with vote manipulation in Philadelphia special election (Oct. 2017)", "url": "https://whyy.org/articles/4-charged-vote-manipulation-philadelphia-special-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/whyy-197th-four-charged-2017-10.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-09 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET). Thin leaf (2 -> 3), peers DeMuro and Myers (Philadelphia). Inquirer x2 and WHYY archived (curl 200); PA AG page linked only (curl 404 to the fetcher; content read via search). Party labels stated because sources state them. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "dhs-election-infrastructure-ci-designation-2017", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-08", "uid": "C20260925-184601-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-08", "old_ids": ["dhs-election-infrastructure-ci-designation-2017"], "seq": "C00126", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Critical infrastructure: they claim the backups contain information that would compromise the security of critical-infrastructure election systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-01-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "On January 6, 2017, DHS designated election infrastructure as critical infrastructure within the Government Facilities Sector. CISA describes covered systems as including voter-registration databases, voting systems, and IT used to manage counting/auditing/reporting. The CI designation is routinely cited in security-exemption arguments when requesters seek detailed system images, configurations, or backups. Status Confirmed for the designation and its scope over election databases/systems; individual FOIA outcomes vary.", "sources": [{"title": "CRS — Designation of Election Systems as Critical Infrastructure (IF10677)", "url": "https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10677", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dhs-election-infrastructure-ci-designation-2017__crs-designation-of-election-systems-as-critical-infrastructu.png"}, {"title": "CISA — Election Security", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/topics/election-security", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dhs-election-infrastructure-ci-designation-2017__cisa-election-security.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 4. CI designation used as predicate for security denials."}
{"id": "aapor-2016-polling-underestimate-trump-perception-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-04", "uid": "C20260926-004030-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-04", "old_ids": ["aapor-2016-polling-underestimate-trump-perception-companion"], "seq": "C00757", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "When results are falsified, voters misled about their candidate's popularity find the stolen victory more plausible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "AAPOR's evaluation of 2016 election polls documented systematic state-level underestimation of Trump support (esp. Upper Midwest), driven mainly by late movement and failure to weight adequately for education—again showing how pre-election popularity cues can mislead the public about how popular a candidate truly was. Soft companion to the 2020 AAPOR task-force card on the same pathKey. Status Confirmed for documented popularity-perception error; cabal motive Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "AAPOR — An Evaluation of 2016 Election Polls in the United States (PDF)", "url": "https://www.aapor.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/AAPOR-2016-Election-Polling-Report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/aapor-2016-polling-underestimate-trump-perception-companion__aapor-an-evaluation-of-2016-election-polls-in-the-united-states-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Public Opinion Quarterly — An Evaluation of the 2016 Election Polls in the United States (DOI)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfx047"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 2 companion. Foundational 2016 OK (catalog cites modern election cycles)."}
{"id": "heritage-va-low-propensity-false-registration-risk-show-up", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-39", "uid": "C20260926-005107-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-39", "old_ids": ["heritage-va-low-propensity-false-registration-risk-show-up"], "seq": "C00832", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Low-propensity voters: riskier, because these voters may actually show up."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2017-01-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Heritage Foundation's voter-fraud database and contemporaneous Virginia coverage document false/fraudulent registrations clustered around low-engagement populations (including student/JMU-area cases already in corpus) — exactly where associating an illicit ballot with a low-propensity living registrant is riskier because that person may later appear and be told they already voted. Soft remount of low-propensity harvest family onto this Feedback priority pathKey. Status Confirmed for adjudicated false-registration / low-engagement risk pattern in VA corpus family; cabal-scale preference algorithm Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage Foundation — Election Fraud Cases database", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud", "local": "/archives/2026/09/heritage-va-low-propensity-false-registration-risk-show-up__heritage-foundation---election-fraud-cases-database.png"}, {"title": "PILF — Critical Condition (inactive/low-engagement roll errors companion)", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/research/critical-condition-american-voter-rolls-filled-with-errors-dead-voters-and-duplicate-registrations/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 20. Soft remount low-propensity harvest family."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-230-county-office-vacancy-board-appoints-until-next-election", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-15", "uid": "C20260926-000809-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-15", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-230-county-office-vacancy-board-appoints-until-next-election"], "seq": "C00568", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "Election officials who resign before the end of their term can be replaced by appointees who are not accountable to the citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona A.R.S. §16-230(A)(2) provides that when a county office becomes vacant (death, disability, resignation, or other cause), the board of supervisors appoints a same-party replacement to serve until the next regular general election—i.e., mid-term resignation yields an appointed official not directly elected for that remainder. Status Confirmed for statutory appointed-replacement pathway; 'not beholden' motive framing is advocacy.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Legislature — A.R.S. §16-230 vacancy in county offices; appointment", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00230.htm"}, {"title": "KJZZ — AZ Supreme Court / Maricopa Recorder vacancy-election fight coverage (context)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-07-07/arizona-supreme-court-sides-with-maricopa-county-recorder-heap-in-election-fight"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 8. Foundational statute OK; 2016–present practice continues."}
{"id": "ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-23", "uid": "C20260925-155410-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-23", "old_ids": ["ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016"], "seq": "C00023", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Change the law to let anyone return another voter's ballot, legalizing ballot harvesting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-20", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "CA", "description": "California AB 1921 (2015–2016) amended Elections Code §3017 to allow a vote-by-mail voter to designate any person to return their ballot (removing prior family/household-only limits), while prohibiting per-ballot compensation schemes. Status Confirmed for the statute expanding lawful third-party ballot return (often labeled \"ballot harvesting\" in political debate). Enactment is not itself a finding of fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "CA Legislature — Bill Text AB-1921", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1921", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016__ca-legislature-bill-text-ab-1921.png"}, {"title": "CA Legislature — AB-1921 floor analysis", "url": "https://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_1901-1950/ab_1921_cfa_20160429_111838_asm_floor.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ab1921-third-party-ballot-return-2016__ca-legislature-ab-1921-floor-analysis.png"}], "notes": "Statute Confirmed; fraud claims about post-2016 CA elections are separate. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Ballot Harvesting > Change the law to let anyone return another voter's ballot, legalizing ballot harvesting.'."}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-third-party-ballot-return-anyone-may-return-another", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-15", "uid": "C20260925-211320-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-15", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-third-party-ballot-return-anyone-may-return-another"], "seq": "C00260", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "There is no control over what is deposited or by whom."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "CA", "description": "California law (as amended by AB 1921 and related Elections Code provisions) broadly permits a person to return another voter's vote-by-mail ballot, including via drop box, without the drop box itself authenticating the depositor's identity. Unstaffed drop boxes by design accept whatever sealed envelopes are inserted. Status Confirmed for the legal/operational absence of depositor identity control at the point of drop-box insertion (not a proven fraud count).", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Unauthorized Ballot Drop Boxes and Ballot Return Requirements (CCROV)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/2022/may/22112jl.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-third-party-ballot-return-anyone-may-return-another__california-sos-unauthorized-ballot-drop-boxes-and-ballot-ret.pdf"}, {"title": "California DOJ Information Bulletin 2024-DLE-15 — Ballot Collection Laws", "url": "https://www.oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2024-dle-15.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-third-party-ballot-return-anyone-may-return-another__california-doj-information-bulletin-2024-dle-15-ballot-colle.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 8. Confirmed structural lack of depositor control at unstaffed boxes under CA return rules."}
{"id": "doj-newark-campaign-treasurer-embezzlement-220k", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-26", "uid": "C20260926-001426-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-26", "old_ids": ["doj-newark-campaign-treasurer-embezzlement-220k"], "seq": "C00619", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "A campaign's financial manager may waste funds or break laws to compromise the candidate they claim to support."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "NJ", "description": "DOJ/USAO New Jersey: former treasurer for a Newark mayoral election campaign admitted embezzling over $220,000 and falsifying filings—another Confirmed financial-manager conversion pathway that compromises the candidate's resources and legal posture. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ USAO-NJ — Former Newark mayor campaign treasurer admits embezzling $220k+", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/former-treasurer-newark-mayor-election-campaign-admits-embezzling-over-220000"}, {"title": "FEC — Phillips/Heller conviction update (parallel financial-manager pattern)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-referral-secures-criminal-conviction-in-campaign-finance-matter/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build-witnessed-vstl-manufacturer-not-public-source", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-10", "uid": "C20260925-235207-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-10", "old_ids": ["eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build-witnessed-vstl-manufacturer-not-public-source"], "seq": "C00483", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That the software running on their systems is what was originally tested"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC Notice of Clarification NOC 16-02 details the Trusted Build as a witnessed VSTL+manufacturer process producing hashed executables deposited with EAC—not an open public source-code inspection by county clerks. Status Confirmed that assurance that 'running software = originally tested' is mediated by VSTL hashes/trusted build, not by officials reading source under the hood.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC NOC 16-02 — Trusted Build procedure", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/NOC.1602.TrustedBuild.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build-witnessed-vstl-manufacturer-not-public-source__eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build-procedure.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC trusted-build blog (chain of evidence for officials)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/blogs/what-trusted-build-and-why-it-used", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-noc-16-02-trusted-build-witnessed-vstl-manufacturer-not-public-source__eac-trusted-build-blog-chain-of-evidence-for-officials.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "iaogo-nacrc-iacreot-merged-clerks-recorders-association-membership-model", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-12", "uid": "C20260926-000015-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-12", "old_ids": ["iaogo-nacrc-iacreot-merged-clerks-recorders-association-membership-model"], "seq": "C00525", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "An NGO (nongovernmental organization) paid by counties but unaccountable to the county's electors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016", "state": "Federal", "description": "National Association of County Recorders, Election Officials and Clerks (NACRC) merged with IACREOT into the International Association of Government Officials (iGO)—membership professional associations funded by local-government official dues, not by elector referendum. Status Confirmed that clerks/recorders associations are NGO membership bodies; malicious 'cabal control' Alleged separately.", "sources": [{"title": "PRLog — NACRC and IACREOT announce merged organization", "url": "https://www.prlog.org/12530428-nacrc-and-iacreot-announce-name-of-their-new-merged-organization.html"}, {"title": "iGO — International Association of Government Officials", "url": "https://iaogo.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/iaogo-nacrc-iacreot-merged-clerks-recorders-association-membership-model__iaogo-nacrc-iacreot-merged-clerks-recorders-association-membership-model.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "oh-orc-3506-05-voting-system-source-code-escrow", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-09", "uid": "C20260926-020640-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-09", "old_ids": ["oh-orc-3506-05-voting-system-source-code-escrow"], "seq": "C00942", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Put the software you want them to see in escrow; they will not know it differs from the software on the voting machines."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-88", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016/2024", "state": "OH", "description": "Ohio Revised Code §3506.05 requires certification guidelines to mandate that vendors escrow **voting-system source code**, documentation, and configuration with an **independent escrow agent** approved by the Secretary of State (election-specific variable codes excluded). Status Confirmed escrow-as-certification-checkbox architecture where officials rely on escrowed artifacts rather than continuous public verification that deployed machines match escrow; peer to CA Elec. Code 19212 and WI Stat. 5.905—Ohio statute, not those remounts.", "sources": [{"title": "ORC §3506.05 — Voting machine certification; source code escrow with independent agent", "url": "https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-revised-code/section-3506.05", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oh-orc-3506-05-voting-system-source-code-escrow__orc-3506-05-voting-machine-certification-source-code-es.png"}, {"title": "Ohio Admin. Code 111:3-9-04 — Certification / escrow-related voting system rules", "url": "https://codes.ohio.gov/ohio-administrative-code/rule-111:3-9-04", "local": "/archives/2026/09/oh-orc-3506-05-voting-system-source-code-escrow__ohio-admin-code-111-3-9-04-certification-escrow-related.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on source-code escrow ≠ deployed software leaf."}
{"id": "az-early-ballot-scan-upon-processing-ars-16-550-551", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-13", "uid": "C20260925-185839-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-13", "old_ids": ["az-early-ballot-scan-upon-processing-ars-16-550-551"], "seq": "C00164", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Some states claim not to tabulate during early voting, yet scanning ballots is tabulating them, and some people can see the results in real time."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona permits verified early ballots to be processed and scanned/tabulated on a ballot-by-ballot basis upon receipt / immediately after envelope processing (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 16-550, 16-551; AZSOS ballot-processing guidance), while prohibiting release of aggregated results before Election Day close. Status Confirmed that Arizona feeds early ballots through tabulating machines before Election Day while claiming results are not yet released—matching the leaf's scan-vs-tabulation-language concern.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona SOS — Ballot processing procedures", "url": "https://azsos.gov/elections/about-elections/elections-procedures/ballot-processing", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-early-ballot-scan-upon-processing-ars-16-550-551__arizona-sos-ballot-processing-procedures.png"}, {"title": "Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 16-550 — Receipt of voter's ballot", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00550.htm"}, {"title": "NCSL Table 16 — Arizona row (scan immediately after processing)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-16-when-absentee-mail-ballot-processing-and-counting-can-begin"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 6. AZ clear scan-during-early-voting example."}
{"id": "ca-elec-10002-10418-municipal-elections-by-county", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-17", "uid": "C20260925-185839-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-17", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-10002-10418-municipal-elections-by-county"], "seq": "C00168", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They require municipalities to use county election systems to centralize and control downstream elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code § 10002 authorizes a city to request that the county elections official conduct specified municipal election services (with Board of Supervisors approval and city reimbursement). Elections Code §§ 10400–10418 authorize consolidation of municipal elections with statewide or other elections, after which the county elections official administers ballots, precincts, counting, canvassing, and certification on the county's systems. In practice this routes many city elections onto county voting equipment and central count processes. Status Confirmed for statutory pathways forcing/inducing municipalities onto county-run election systems when consolidated or contracted.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code § 10002 — County elections official conducting city election", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=10002", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-10002-10418-municipal-elections-by-county__california-elections-code-10002-county-elections-official-co.png"}, {"title": "California Elections Code § 10418 — Consolidated election procedures", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=10418", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-10002-10418-municipal-elections-by-county__california-elections-code-10418-consolidated-election-proced.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 8. Consolidation/contract model centralizes onto county systems."}
{"id": "co-cora-critical-infrastructure-security-exemption", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-09", "uid": "C20260925-184601-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-09", "old_ids": ["co-cora-critical-infrastructure-security-exemption"], "seq": "C00127", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Critical infrastructure: they claim the backups contain information that would compromise the security of critical-infrastructure election systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado CORA (C.R.S. § 24-72-204) authorizes denial/redaction of records whose disclosure would reveal specialized details of critical infrastructure useful for planning an attack—including cybersecurity vulnerabilities, system designs, and protective measures. Election EMS databases, backups, credentials, and system images are commonly argued into this exemption alongside the election-setup non-public rule. Status Confirmed for the statutory CI/security exemption mechanism available against election-system backup requests.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — C.R.S. § 24-72-204 (CORA allowances/denials)", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/co/title-24-government-state/co-rev-st-sect-24-72-204/"}, {"title": "CML — Bright Light of Public Scrutiny seminar materials (CORA/CI discussion)", "url": "https://www.cml.org/docs/default-source/2022-annual-seminar-on-municipal-law/bright-light-of-public-scrutiny-2.pdf?sfvrsn=dc1e2ca7_2", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-cora-critical-infrastructure-security-exemption__cml-bright-light-of-public-scrutiny-seminar-materials-cora-c.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 4. State CI exemption applied to election tech records."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-7-510-election-setup-records-not-public", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-07", "uid": "C20260925-184601-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-07", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-7-510-election-setup-records-not-public"], "seq": "C00125", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Public Information Requests", "Election Database Backups: Vendors and some counties use numerous excuses to deny access to these databases and to charge exorbitant fees, including:", "Intellectual property: they claim the database backups contain intellectual property."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado C.R.S. § 1-7-510 requires deposit of electronic 'election setup records' (tabulation-software records defining ballots and tabulation instructions) with the Secretary of State and expressly provides that those deposited setup records 'shall not be public records' under CORA (art. 72 of title 24). Combined with vendor proprietary assertions commonly attached to EMS images/backups, this creates a statutory non-public status for core election-programming database materials. Status Confirmed for the statutory public-records exclusion of election setup records.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. § 1-7-510", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7-510"}, {"title": "Colorado Sun — Experts warn on Mesa voting-system software copies", "url": "https://coloradosun.com/2021/08/28/mesa-county-elections-breach/"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 3. Statutory IP/non-public barrier to election programming backups."}
{"id": "eac-federal-form-id-none-instruction", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-25", "uid": "C20260925-185839-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-25", "old_ids": ["eac-federal-form-id-none-instruction"], "seq": "C00176", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No driver's license, ID card, or Social Security card"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The U.S. Election Assistance Commission's National Mail Voter Registration Form instructs applicants to provide a current, valid state driver's license number or, if none, the last four digits of the Social Security number; applicants with neither are instructed per state-specific instructions / to indicate they have none, after which the state assigns a unique identifier under HAVA. Status Confirmed that the national form's published instructions allow completing registration without presenting a DL, state ID card, or Social Security card.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — National Mail Voter Registration Form PDF", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hava-303a5-unique-id-if-no-dl-or-ssn__eac-national-mail-voter-registration-form-eng-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — National Mail Voter Registration Form information page", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 11. Form-level Confirmed."}
{"id": "va-24-2-626-counties-cities-must-acquire-voting-systems", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-16", "uid": "C20260925-185839-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-16", "old_ids": ["va-24-2-626-counties-cities-must-acquire-voting-systems"], "seq": "C00167", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They require municipalities to use county election systems to centralize and control downstream elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Code § 24.2-626 requires the governing body of each county and city to provide State Board-approved electronic voting systems at every precinct for all elections held in the county, city, or any part thereof, and to purchase/lease/acquire those systems. Combined with Virginia's structure in which towns generally vote on county-administered equipment for shared elections, this centralizes equipment acquisition and certification at the county/city governing-body level rather than allowing each smaller municipality to run independent uncertified systems. Status Confirmed for mandatory county/city acquisition of approved systems for all local elections.", "sources": [{"title": "Code of Virginia § 24.2-626 — Governing bodies shall acquire electronic voting systems", "url": "https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title24.2/chapter6/section24.2-626/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-24-2-626-counties-cities-must-acquire-voting-systems__code-of-virginia-24-2-626-governing-bodies-shall-acquire-ele.png"}, {"title": "Virginia ELECT — Voting Equipment handbook chapter", "url": "https://www.elections.virginia.gov/media/grebhandbook/2025-updates/4_Voting_Equipment_2025_en.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/va-24-2-626-counties-cities-must-acquire-voting-systems__virginia-elect-voting-equipment-handbook-chapter.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 8. Statutory centralization of voting-system acquisition."}
{"id": "follow-my-vote-blockchain-e2e-verifiable-mobile-voting-marketing", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-03", "uid": "C20260926-020046-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-03", "old_ids": ["follow-my-vote-blockchain-e2e-verifiable-mobile-voting-marketing"], "seq": "C00920", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Mobile Voting and Other Novelty Technologies", "As voting machines and mail-in voting come to be seen as rife with fraud, they will attempt to introduce \"mobile voting\":", "They will appeal to President Trump's enthusiasm for cryptocurrency and the public's growing acceptance of blockchain."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-93", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-93", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2025", "state": "US", "description": "Follow My Vote's public site and reports (including the 2020 State of Follow My Vote report and later IP/release posts) market **blockchain / distributed-ledger technology** as the foundation for secure end-to-end verifiable **mobile/online voting** for government elections—CB Insights and industry roundups featured the project as a blockchain-voting exemplar. Status Confirmed that crypto/blockchain framing is used to sell mobile voting as the 'shiny new object'—peer to Voatz's blockchain+biometrics marketing and Tusk/Mobile Voting Project VoteSecure cryptographic protocol work; Follow My Vote later announced winding down its elections-grade system effort (2025), which does not erase the years of blockchain-voting advocacy.", "sources": [{"title": "Follow My Vote — Blockchain Voting Pioneers (site / marketing archive)", "url": "https://followmyvote.com/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/follow-my-vote-blockchain-e2e-verifiable-mobile-voting-marketing__follow-my-vote-blockchain-voting-pioneers-site-marketin.png"}, {"title": "Follow My Vote — The State of Follow My Vote → 2020 Report (blockchain mobile voting for government elections)", "url": "https://followmyvote.com/the-state-of-follow-my-vote-2020-report/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on blockchain/crypto mobile-voting marketing leaf."}
{"id": "ess-ballot-production-front-back-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-04", "uid": "C20260925-181533-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-04", "old_ids": ["ess-ballot-production-front-back-registration"], "seq": "C00076", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Misalignment between the front and back of the ballot causes misreads, easily diverting ballots to adjudication for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2024", "state": "Multi", "description": "ES&S ballot production guidance (Ballot Production Guide / California Unity use procedures) requires front-and-back registration overlays and timing-track alignment checks for duplex ballots; ballots out of registration must be adjusted and reprinted because misregistration can cause read errors or rejection on ES&S equipment. Status Confirmed for vendor-documented front/back alignment sensitivity; intentional misalignment-for-adjudication schemes are not established by these manuals.", "sources": [{"title": "ES&S Ballot Production Guide (registration / duplex)", "url": "https://copswiki.org/w/pub/Common/M1917/BallotProductionGuide.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ballot-production-front-back-registration__es-s-ballot-production-guide-registration-duplex.pdf"}, {"title": "CA SOS — ES&S Unity 3.4.1.0 Use Procedures (duplex / registration)", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/ess/unity3410/use-procedures.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ess-ballot-production-front-back-registration__ca-sos-es-s-unity-3-4-1-0-use-procedures-duplex-registration.pdf"}], "notes": "Confirmed for vendor-documented duplex registration sensitivity. Intentional misalignment-for-adjudication not established by manuals.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "ga-ces-kennesaw-server-exposure-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-18", "uid": "C20260925-183614-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-18", "old_ids": ["ga-ces-kennesaw-server-exposure-2016"], "seq": "C00106", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-2017", "state": "GA", "description": "Security researcher Logan Lamb reported that the Kennesaw State University Center for Election Systems server hosting Georgia election-related files (including voter registration data for millions of Georgians) was exposed on the public Internet; subsequent Curling litigation and AP/Ars coverage described Shellshock-era compromise indicators and 2017 data destruction/wiping disputes. Status Confirmed major election-system / voter-registration infrastructure exposure distinct from the 2016 Illinois IVRS SQL-injection breach.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Expert: Georgia election server showed signs of tampering", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/hacking-ap-top-news-elections-politics-technology-39dad9d39a7533efe06e0774615a6d05"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — Georgia election server vulnerable to Shellshock / may have been hacked", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/01/a-georgia-election-server-was-vulnerable-to-shellshock-and-may-have-been-hacked/"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Curling litigation CES / data destruction materials", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1817.13.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-ces-kennesaw-server-exposure-2016__courtlistener-curling-litigation-ces-data-destruction-materi.pdf"}], "notes": "Part A enrich il-ivrs-breach leaf. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Data Breaches; Software' to 'Data Breaches > Beyond the original breach are usually hidden higher-order breaches as a resu...'."}
{"id": "stein-pa-statewide-contest-1m-bond-withdrawn-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-24", "uid": "C20260925-194013-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-24", "old_ids": ["stein-pa-statewide-contest-1m-bond-withdrawn-2016"], "seq": "C00208", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Out-lawyer citizens so they cannot afford representation to fight on equal terms."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-12-03", "state": "PA", "description": "Green Party candidate Jill Stein's 2016 Pennsylvania statewide presidential election contest was ordered by Commonwealth Court to post a $1 million cost bond to proceed (Trump counsel had sought $10 million). Stein's filing stated petitioning voters were 'regular citizens of ordinary means' who could not afford the bond; the statewide contest was withdrawn and the campaign shifted to federal court. WHYY documented the bond barrier. Status Confirmed that a seven-figure litigation-cost bond forced ordinary citizens off a statewide election contest path.", "sources": [{"title": "WHYY — Stein drops PA statewide challenge citing $1 million bond", "url": "https://whyy.org/articles/stein-drops-first-challenge-to-presidential-vote-in-pennsylvania-moving-to-federal-court/"}, {"title": "Stein v. Cortés opinion (E.D. Pa. Dec 12, 2016) — recount injunction denied", "url": "https://law.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Stein.v.Cortes-Opinion121216.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stein-pa-statewide-contest-1m-bond-withdrawn-2016__stein-v-cort-s-opinion-e-d-pa-dec-12-2016-recount-injunction.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 12. $1M contest bond Confirmed citizen-cost barrier."}
{"id": "detroit-2016-general-136-precincts-unrecountable-bureau-of-elections-audit", "permanent_id": "C20261007-123654-04", "uid": "C20261007-123654-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-123654-04", "old_ids": ["detroit-2016-general-136-precincts-unrecountable-bureau-of-elections-audit"], "seq": "C01332", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-11", "state": "MI", "description": "During the December 2016 presidential recount in Michigan, many Detroit precincts could not be recounted because the number of voters in their poll books did not match the number of ballots in their containers. The Michigan Bureau of Elections then audited 136 Detroit precincts from the November 8, 2016 election and released findings on February 9, 2017. It found no evidence of pervasive voter fraud or widespread machine failure, but documented 216 questionable votes and record-keeping failures by precinct workers, including improper poll-book use, ballots left in tabulator bins, and mishandled provisional-ballot records. Status Confirmed for an official audit of records too broken to allow a recount. When the paper trail and the poll book disagree, a recount is legally blocked and the machine's election-night totals stand, which is why PEP-style reconciliation at the precinct is so important.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan Secretary of State — Bureau of Elections releases Detroit precinct audit findings (Feb. 9, 2017)", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/MISOS/bulletins/186213e"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press — State audit: No evidence of fraud in Detroit vote (Feb. 9, 2017)", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/09/detroit-vote-problems-election-audit/97690514/"}, {"title": "The Detroit News — State audit finds 216 questionable votes in Detroit (Feb. 9, 2017)", "url": "https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2017/02/09/state-audit-finds-questionable-votes-detroit/97696820/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-07. Confirmed official audit; companion to the Detroit Aug. 2020 primary out-of-balance card. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Reporting; Records' to 'Reporting > No guarantee to the public that the shown state/fed totals are actually accurate'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Reporting > No guarantee to the public that the shown state/fed totals are actually accurate' to the new leaf 'Records > Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount.'."}
{"id": "stein-wi-2016-recount-3-5m-upfront-fee-cost-barrier", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-05", "uid": "C20260926-022005-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-05", "old_ids": ["stein-wi-2016-recount-3-5m-upfront-fee-cost-barrier"], "seq": "C00983", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Out-lawyer citizens so they cannot afford representation to fight on equal terms."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-11", "state": "WI", "description": "Green Party nominee Jill Stein’s 2016 Wisconsin presidential recount required an upfront deposit estimated at roughly $3.5 million (WEC wire confirmation $3,499,689) before counties would recount nearly 3 million ballots; actual county costs later totaled about $2.01 million with a partial refund. Status Confirmed multi-million-dollar cost barrier to invoke statewide recount machinery; peer to Stein PA $1M contest bond and King v. Whitmer fee-sanction chill cards—Wisconsin recount fee structure, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Wisconsin presidential recount cost $2M (Stein $3.5M estimate/deposit)", "url": "https://apnews.com/united-states-government-4a69d9b7018c42618f474313e156ae8d"}, {"title": "EAC — Wisconsin Presidential Recount Experience (Hein; $3.5M petition fee deposited)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/event_document/files/day1-2017-02-13-09_15-04-Hein_Recount-Experience.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stein-wi-2016-recount-3-5m-upfront-fee-cost-barrier__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on Out-lawyer the citizens leaf."}
{"id": "nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-07", "uid": "C20261026-180010-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-07", "old_ids": ["nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered"], "seq": "C01572", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-11-08 (federal analysis announced 2019-12-30)", "state": "NC", "description": "On Election Day 2016 in Durham County, North Carolina, electronic poll book laptops \"presented inaccurate data to poll workers in a small number of precincts,\" according to the State Board of Elections and Durham County's joint release of December 30, 2019. [1] The laptops were \"erroneously identifying voters as having already voted, identifying registered voters as unregistered, and prompting poll workers to ask voters to present an ID.\" [1] The State Board required the county to switch to paper poll books. [2] The federal analysis by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency examined 24 EViD laptops, 21 USB drives used to load voter registration data onto the laptops, and the county desktop used by Durham elections employees who \"downloaded voter registration data from state servers and loaded it onto the USB activators.\" [1] It found no malware or remote access. [1] The State Board concluded the problems were \"most likely the result of Durham County staff and poll worker error and unfamiliarity ... combined with a lack of adequate staff training and quality control by the EViD vendor, VR Systems.\" [1] Status Confirmed that the failures occurred, that the data path was a download from state servers onto USB drives and then onto the laptops, and that the federal analysis found no cyberattack and officials attributed the cause to error and inadequate quality control. A Politico report that one analysis found some laptops retained earlier-election data was seen only in a search summary and is not part of this card. No source shows deliberate manipulation.", "sources": [{"title": "North Carolina State Board of Elections, \"Federal analysis finds no evidence of cyberattack in Durham County in 2016\" (Dec. 30, 2019)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2019/12/30/federal-analysis-finds-no-evidence-cyberattack-durham-county-2016"}, {"title": "North Carolina State Board of Elections, statement on Durham County (Nov. 8, 2016)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2016/11/08/sbe-statement-durham-county"}], "notes": "A Politico report that some laptops retained earlier-election data was seen only in a search summary and is not relied on here.", "vendor": ["VR Systems"], "related": ["vr-systems-evid-windows-laptops-tablets", "vr-systems-2016-gru-vendor-impersonation-spearphish-florida-counties-higher-order", "ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies", "oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes", "ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb"]}
{"id": "pew-edison-early-absentee-phone-supplement-exit-polls-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-08", "uid": "C20260925-185839-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-08", "old_ids": ["pew-edison-early-absentee-phone-supplement-exit-polls-2016"], "seq": "C00159", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Early voting makes exit polling more difficult and costly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-11-02", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Pew Research Center's explainer on Edison Research National Election Pool exit polls documents that because Edison expected 35–40% of the 2016 vote to be cast before Election Day, the firm ran a large supplemental telephone survey of early and absentee/mail voters (~16,000 phone interviews) alongside ~85,000 in-person exit interviews, with nearly 3,000 temporary workers on Election Day. Edison EVP Joe Lenski stated early/absentee/vote-by-mail growth 'definitely adds a source for more potential bias or error' and can force more caution calling close states. Status Confirmed that early voting forces costly dual-mode exit-poll design and raises error/bias risk.", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research Center — How the general election exit poll works (Edison / early vote)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/11/02/just-how-does-the-general-election-exit-poll-work-anyway/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pew-edison-early-absentee-phone-supplement-exit-polls-2016__pew-research-center-how-the-general-election-exit-poll-works.png"}, {"title": "Public Opinion Quarterly — Interview Mode Effects: Exit Polls and Early Voting", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfs025"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 4. Operational cost/complexity Confirmed; not a fraud finding."}
{"id": "nc-2016-2018-naacp-five-counties-and-guilford-touch-picks-name-below-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-17", "uid": "C20261020-160717-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-17", "old_ids": ["nc-2016-2018-naacp-five-counties-and-guilford-touch-picks-name-below-calibration"], "seq": "C01010", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-10/2018-10", "state": "NC", "description": "In the first days of October 2016 early voting, the North Carolina NAACP wrote to the State Board of Elections that voters in five counties said touchscreens had flipped their votes; in each case the voter corrected it before casting. It asked the board to remove malfunctioning machines and post signs telling voters to check their ballots. The board said the machines were tested before the election, are recalibrated each day before voting, and would be pulled if needed (WGBH/NPR). On Oct. 23, 2018, Rabbi Fred Guttman reported at the Leonard Recreation Center early-voting site in Greensboro (Guilford County) that touching one name picked the name below it, moving selections from Democrat to Republican; a poll worker shut the machine down. Guilford elections director Charlie Collicutt attributed it to calibration on older (2006) touchscreens with a paper audit log, said reports were few and not widespread, and told voters to trust the green check and the paper scroll; Guttman agreed \"It's definitely a problem with the calibration.\" Direction reported (2018): Democrat to Republican. Status Confirmed: officials attributed the 2018 Guilford case to calibration and pulled the machine. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WGBH / NPR — Some Machines Are Flipping Votes, But That Doesn't Mean They're Rigged (Oct. 26, 2016)", "url": "https://www.wgbh.org/news/2016-10-26/some-machines-are-flipping-votes-but-that-doesnt-mean-theyre-rigged", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2016-2018-naacp-five-counties-and-guilford-touch-picks-name-below-calibration__gbh2016.html"}, {"title": "Triad City Beat — Calibration at fault for votes changing at Guilford County site (Oct. 24, 2018)", "url": "https://triad-city-beat.com/calibration-at-fault-for-votes-changing-at-guilford-county-site/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2016-2018-naacp-five-counties-and-guilford-touch-picks-name-below-calibration__tcb2016.html"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — America's Aging Voting Machines Managed to Survive Another Election (Nov. 2016)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/americas-aging-voting-machines-managed-survive-another-election", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2016-2018-naacp-five-counties-and-guilford-touch-picks-name-below-calibration__brennan2016.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (gbh2016, tcb2016, brennan2016). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-bryan-2016-clinton-touch-shows-trump-kemp-says-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-18", "uid": "C20261020-160717-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-18", "old_ids": ["ga-bryan-2016-clinton-touch-shows-trump-kemp-says-calibration"], "seq": "C01011", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-10-25", "state": "GA", "description": "On Oct. 25, 2016, a voter in Bryan County, Georgia (west of Savannah) struggled to vote for Hillary Clinton: on the review screen the touchscreen repeatedly showed Donald Trump. Secretary of State Brian Kemp opened an investigation and told WSB-TV: \"The county is responsible for doing the logic and accuracy testing, and the calibration obviously was off a little bit on this machine.\" The county took the machine out of service and later said it tested all its machines. Merle King of the Center for Election Systems at Kennesaw State explained that calibration is set by touching crosshairs and that a miscalibrated machine makes a wrong choice easy, as can long fingernails, jewelry or sleeves. A circulating Henry County Facebook claim was denied by that county's director. Direction: Democrat to Republican. Status Confirmed: the Secretary of State attributed it to miscalibration and the machine was pulled. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WSB-TV — State investigating claim voting machine flipped man's vote (Oct. 2016)", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/politics/state-invesitgating-claim-voting-maching-flipped-mans-vote/461316959/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-bryan-2016-clinton-touch-shows-trump-kemp-says-calibration__wsb2016.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (wsb2016). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-chambers-2016-ess-straight-party-omitted-race-programming-error", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-21", "uid": "C20261020-160717-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-21", "old_ids": ["tx-chambers-2016-ess-straight-party-omitted-race-programming-error"], "seq": "C01014", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-10-24", "state": "TX", "description": "On Monday, Oct. 24, 2016, the first day of early voting in Chambers County, Texas, County Clerk Heather H. Hawthorne learned that a straight-party vote, for both Republicans and Democrats, did not automatically select one race on each ballot. The county's release said the error was caused in programming by ES&S, the vendor that programs the county's election software. Hawthorne notified ES&S and the Secretary of State's office, which told her to use emergency paper ballots until the problem was fixed; ES&S sent corrected software, which she installed on the iVotronic machines the next day. Per Snopes, the error did not affect the presidential race and affected both parties equally. No count of affected straight-party ballots was published. Status Confirmed: the county confirmed a vendor straight-party programming error and pulled the machines for paper ballots until it was corrected. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "Snopes — Texas Vote Switching (Oct. 25, 2016), quoting the Chambers County Clerk's release on the ES&S straight-party programming error", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/texas-vote-switching/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-chambers-2016-ess-straight-party-omitted-race-programming-error__snopestx2016.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (snopestx2016). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "fl-miami-dade-2016-gladys-coego-elections-worker-marked-undervoted-mayor-race-on-mail-ballots-guilty-plea", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-01", "uid": "C20261109-122834-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-01", "old_ids": ["fl-miami-dade-2016-gladys-coego-elections-worker-marked-undervoted-mayor-race-on-mail-ballots-guilty-plea"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation", "undervotes on ballots can easily be filled in to manipulate those races"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-28", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-10-24 to 2016-10-25 (conduct); 2016-10-28 (arrest); 2017-07-24 (guilty plea); 2017-08 (sentence)", "state": "FL", "description": "Gladys Coego, 74, a temporary worker hired through a staffing agency by the Miami-Dade County Elections Department to open vote-by-mail envelopes and check ballots before scanning, was caught in the Doral ballot-processing room in October 2016 marking other voters' mail ballots for mayoral candidate Raquel Regalado with a black pen she kept hidden in her purse. A fellow temp worker saw her mark three ballots and reported it; Tabulation Manager LaRhonda Wimberly watched her mark another and confiscated it. The ballot had been filled out in blue ink except for a single black mark for Regalado in the mayor's race, and Deputy Elections Director Rosy Pastrana found more ballots in her stack that appeared altered the same way. Mayor Carlos Gimenez said investigators believed she had bubbled in Regalado on about five ballots on which the voters had left the mayor's race blank (under-voted). Coego was charged with two felony counts of marking another person's ballot, pleaded guilty to both on July 24, 2017, and was later sentenced to house arrest; prosecutor Devon Helfmeyer wrote that over two days she 'repeatedly and unlawfully voted in the mayoral election, against the wishes of the legitimate electors.' Investigators found no link to the Regalado campaign. Status Confirmed by the guilty plea and the Miami-Dade State Attorney's arrest affidavit as reported by the Miami Herald. Catalog point: a worker inside the central mail-ballot room filled in races voters had left blank before the ballots reached the scanner; the alteration was caught only because a co-worker happened to notice the different ink, and once scanned, those votes count like any other.", "sources": [{"title": "Miami Herald — Two women busted for election fraud in Miami-Dade (Patricia Mazzei, Oct. 28, 2016)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/article111029767.html"}, {"title": "Miami Herald — Elderly Miami woman admits to voter fraud (David Ovalle, July 24, 2017)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article163316298.html"}, {"title": "AP — Election worker gets house arrest for marking ballots (Aug. 2017)", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-1b34bf35dd1c4f7c95e5acac7a827cca"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-09 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET). Thin leaf (3 -> 4), peers Swenson (Clackamas 2013) and Glass (OK 1961). Miami Herald pages read via WebFetch; curl archive timed out, linked only. AP linked only (fetch timed out); sentence length not stated because not read directly. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-2016-online-registration-crash-deadline-day-court-extension-27000", "permanent_id": "C20261021-122912-01", "uid": "C20261021-122912-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-122912-01", "old_ids": ["va-2016-online-registration-crash-deadline-day-court-extension-27000"], "seq": "C01504", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Online registration systems fail on the registration deadline, blocking last-day registrations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-10-17 (deadline outage); 2016-10-20 (court order); extension through 2016-10-21", "state": "VA", "description": "On Monday, Oct. 17, 2016, the registration deadline for the Nov. 8 general election, heavy traffic caused Virginia's online voter-registration system to crash temporarily in the hours before the 11:59 p.m. cutoff. State election officials and Gov. Terry McAuliffe's office said they had no authority to extend a deadline set by state law. On Oct. 18, New Virginia Majority Education Fund, a second organization and two prospective voters who could not register because of the crash sued in federal court in Alexandria (New Virginia Majority Education Fund v. Virginia Department of Elections, No. 1:16-cv-1319). At a hearing on Oct. 20, Judge Claude M. Hilton granted a shorter extension than requested and reopened registration through Friday, Oct. 21; state officials had wanted it to run through Monday. McAuliffe said the Department of Elections and the Virginia Information Technology Agency had worked overtime to expand the system's capacity. According to the Federal Judicial Center's case study, more than 27,000 Virginians registered during the extension. Status Confirmed: the outage, the lawsuit and the court-ordered extension are documented in the court record and by the governor's office. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: a single state web portal failing on the last day decided, for a time, whether thousands of eligible citizens could get on the rolls, and only a federal court could reopen the door. The same portal failed again on the 2020 deadline. Paper and in-person registration at the local registrar remained available and did not depend on the website.", "sources": [{"title": "Federal Judicial Center — Emergency Election Cases: Extending Voter Registration Because of a Website Crash (New Va. Majority Educ. Fund v. Va. Dep't of Elections, 2016 and 2020)", "url": "https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/48/EE-VAE-1-16-cv-1319-NVM.pdf"}, {"title": "WSET / Associated Press — Virginia voter registration deadline extended through Friday (Oct. 20, 2016)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/local/virginia-voter-registration-deadline-extended-through-friday"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-21 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to the Oklahoma 2026 and Bexar TX 2026 deadline-outage cards on this leaf (2 -> 5 with the VA 2020 and FL 2020 cards). Both sources curl 200; text verified via WebSearch extracts."}
{"id": "ca-elec-4005-vca-vote-centers-replace-precincts", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-08", "uid": "C20260926-020640-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-08", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-4005-vca-vote-centers-replace-precincts"], "seq": "C00941", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Enact laws that make it prohibitively difficult to qualify many locations as polling places, forcing centralization into vote centers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-97", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-09", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §4005 (Voter's Choice Act / SB 450) authorizes counties to run **all-mailed ballot elections** with far fewer **vote centers** (e.g., formulas such as one 11-day center per ~50,000 registered voters and one 4-day center per ~10,000) instead of traditional neighborhood precinct polling places—explicitly centralizing in-person voting into fewer sites while every voter is mailed a ballot. Status Confirmed statutory path that replaces dense precinct polling with centralized vote centers; peer to AZ ARS 16-411 consolidation and CO CRS 1-5-102.9 VSPC model—CA VCA statute, not those remounts. Machine/centralization complexity is the problem; PEP precinct hand count remains the transparent remedy.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code §4005 — Voter's Choice Act all-mailed / vote-center model", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&division=4.&title=&part=&chapter=1.&article=", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-4005-vca-vote-centers-replace-precincts__california-elections-code-4005-voter-s-choice-act-all-m.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Elections Code sections pertaining to voting centers (§4005)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/publications-and-resources/elections-officers-digest/elections-code-pertaining-voting-centers", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-4005-vca-vote-centers-replace-precincts__california-sos-elections-code-sections-pertaining-to-vo.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on laws forcing centralized vote centers / fewer precincts leaf."}
{"id": "co-cbs4-2016-dead-voters-ballots-78-deceased-still-active", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-09", "uid": "C20261008-203914-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-09", "old_ids": ["co-cbs4-2016-dead-voters-ballots-78-deceased-still-active"], "seq": "C00279", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-09", "state": "CO", "description": "A September 2016 CBS4 Denver investigation compared Colorado voting histories with a federal death database. It found several cases, in El Paso, Denver and Jefferson counties, where ballots were cast in the names of people months or years after they died. In one case a deceased couple remained on active rolls and mail ballots kept going to their home because the records did not meet the exact-match criteria for removal. Officials explained that names, dates of birth and addresses must match precisely before a dead voter can be removed, so minor data errors leave the dead registered. After reviewing CBS4's findings, the Secretary of State's office confirmed that at least 78 deceased people remained eligible to vote and told county clerks to remove them. The Secretary said he would pursue prosecutions and work to streamline deceased-voter removal. Status Confirmed: the Secretary of State verified the 78 records still on the rolls. Individual cases of votes cast were referred for investigation. In a mail-to-all state, an unremoved dead record means a live ballot sent to a household.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Colorado — CBS4 investigation finds dead voters casting ballots in Colorado (Sept. 2016)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/cbs4-investigation-finds-dead-voters-casting-ballots-in-colorado/"}, {"title": "The Denver Post — Colorado investigating potential fraud after news report of 'dead voters' (Sept. 23, 2016)", "url": "https://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/23/potential-fraud-dead-voters/"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). CBS page returns 406 to curl (bot block); content confirmed via search and Denver Post (200). Cross-leaf: graveyard/phantom-record leaves."}
{"id": "il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-31", "uid": "C20260926-000015-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-31", "old_ids": ["il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00544", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-08-31", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois SBE's 2016 IVRS SQL-injection breach (≈76k–90k voter records) prompted password resets and 2FA because investigators reasonably suspected IVRS passwords—including those of election authorities, vendors, and web services—were compromised: a classic higher-order credential cascade beyond the original exfiltration. Soft remount of prior IL IVRS card onto this exact pathKey. Status Confirmed for cascade risk; vote alteration not found.", "sources": [{"title": "Illinois SBE — Aug 31, 2016 press release (IVRS breach)", "url": "https://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/AboutTheBoard/PDF/08_31_16PressRelease.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remount__il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remou.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Senate Intelligence — Illinois Voter Registration System materials", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-os-ssandvoss-062117-0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remount__il-ivrs-2016-sql-injection-password-resets-vendor-web-service-cascade-soft-remou.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 16. Soft remount of existing IL IVRS card family."}
{"id": "in-2016-indiana-voter-registration-project-falsified-applications-12-charged", "permanent_id": "C20261019-125714-05", "uid": "C20261019-125714-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-125714-05", "old_ids": ["in-2016-indiana-voter-registration-project-falsified-applications-12-charged"], "seq": "C01454", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-08 (investigation opened); 2016-10-04 (raid); 2017-06-09 (charges)", "state": "IN", "description": "In August 2016, Indiana State Police opened an investigation after county election officials in Marion and Hendricks counties flagged suspicious voter registration forms submitted by the Indiana Voter Registration Project (IVRP), a paid canvassing drive tied to the Patriot Majority USA dark-money group. The probe spread to many more counties, and on Oct. 4, 2016 detectives searched the group's Indianapolis office and seized its computers. Police said the suspect forms mixed fake names, addresses and birthdates with real people's information, and warned that victims might find their records altered only when they went to vote. On June 9, 2017, Marion County Prosecutor Terry Curry charged the organization, 11 canvassers and a supervisor with submitting false, fictitious or fraudulent registration applications in Marion and St. Joseph counties. The 167 pages of charging documents described registrations for people who did not exist, who said they never filled out forms, a felon, a minor, a non-citizen and a dead person. Workers were paid $50 to $75 a day under a quota of 10 applications per shift, and police found the group's listed Gary office was a vacant lot. The prosecutor said these were not allegations of voter fraud. Nine defendants completed pretrial diversion, two took plea agreements with probation, and one case was dismissed. Status Confirmed (state police investigation and county criminal charges with resolved outcomes). Catalog note: quota-paid drives produce plausible-looking bad records in bulk. Whether the motive was pay or politics, those records enter the rolls under 'mistake' cover unless a clerk catches them.", "sources": [{"title": "IndyStar — Indiana voter group registered a felon, non-U.S. citizen and a dead person, police say (June 9, 2017; paywall 402 to curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2017/06/09/voter-registration-group-charged-falsifying-registrations/384244001/"}, {"title": "IndyStar — State Police raid Indy office in growing voter fraud case (Oct. 4, 2016; paywall 402 to curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.indystar.com/story/news/crime/2016/10/04/state-police-raid-indy-office-growing-voter-fraud-case/91540816/"}, {"title": "AP — Canvassers charged in fake, fraudulent voter registrations (June 2017; curl 403 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/national-national-general-news-6b71a926cb624a209851b41ac616b184"}, {"title": "IndyStar — Fact check: Pence claims Hoosiers prosecuted in ballot fraud case (Aug. 4, 2020; case outcomes: 9 diversion, 2 pleas, 1 dismissal)", "url": "https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/04/fact-check-mike-pence-claims-hoosiers-prosecuted-ballot-fraud-case/5573213002/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-19 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to mi-muskegon-2020-gbi-strategies-fake-voter-registration-applications-fbi and fl-alachua-2022 on this leaf (3 -> 4). Cross-leaf: NGO registration / API access (paid third-party drive)."}
{"id": "il-ivrs-breach-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-39", "uid": "C20260925-155410-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-39", "old_ids": ["il-ivrs-breach-2016"], "seq": "C00039", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-07", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois State Board of Elections announced in mid-2016 that attackers used SQL injection against the Illinois Voter Registration System (IVRS), exfiltrating information on roughly 76,000–90,000 voters; officials stated voter records were not altered and voting equipment was not affected. The incident was later cited in U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee materials on 2016 election-infrastructure targeting. Status Confirmed for the official breach acknowledgment (confidentiality impact); integrity of cast ballots not implicated by the Board's statements.", "sources": [{"title": "Illinois State Board of Elections — Aug. 31, 2016 press release (PDF)", "url": "https://www.elections.il.gov/Downloads/AboutTheBoard/PDF/08_31_16PressRelease.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Senate Intelligence — Illinois Voter Registration System materials", "url": "https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/sites-default-files-documents-os-ssandvoss-062117-0.pdf"}], "notes": "Within scope as 2016 statewide VRDB breach. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Data Breaches; Software' to 'Data Breaches > Beyond the original breach are usually hidden higher-order breaches as a resu...'."}
{"id": "doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-09", "uid": "C20260925-233150-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-09", "old_ids": ["doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints"], "seq": "C00402", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Reasonable Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements for disabled citizens are appropriate, but these must be taken into account: the June 2016 U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division ADA Checklist for Polling Places (votingchecklist.pdf)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division's June 2016 ADA Checklist for Polling Places (voting checklist) sets detailed physical-accessibility criteria (parking, routes, ramps, entrances, voting area clearances, etc.) that public entities must meet or remediate—often with temporary fixes or by relocating sites. Status Confirmed that this federal checklist is the catalog-cited standard constraining which buildings can serve as polling places. Confirmed for accessibility requirements as location/logistics constraints; the leaf text itself affirms reasonable ADA protections while noting they must be accounted for in site selection (centralization pressure when many neighborhood sites fail the checklist).", "sources": [{"title": "ADA.gov archive — ADA Checklist for Polling Places (2016 PDF)", "url": "https://archive.ada.gov/votingchecklist.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints__doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints__ada-gov-archive-ada-checklist-for-polling-places-2016-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "ADA.gov — Polling Places Checklist resource page", "url": "https://www.ada.gov/resources/polling-places-checklist/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints__doj-ada-checklist-polling-places-2016-accessibility-constraints__ada-gov-polling-places-checklist-resource-page.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 5. Accessibility Confirmed as site constraint; do not frame disability access as illegitimate."}
{"id": "npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-artificial-crowd-generation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-03", "uid": "C20260926-001426-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-03", "old_ids": ["npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-artificial-crowd-generation"], "seq": "C00596", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Artificial crowd generation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-06-09", "state": "CA", "description": "NPR All Things Considered (Jun 9, 2016) interviewed This American Life contributor Davy Rothbart after he went undercover at Crowds on Demand, a California firm that supplies paid fake protesters, pretend campaign protesters, fake paparazzi, and staged news crews—demonstrating a commercial Artificial Crowd Generation capability available for hire. Status Confirmed for the paid-crowd industry mechanism; does not prove any specific election protest was wholly synthetic.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Sourcing The Crowd: California Company Stages Phony Protests", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2016/06/09/481433870/sourcing-the-crowd-california-company-stages-phony-protests"}, {"title": "LA Times — Crowds on Demand paid protesters / Bakala litigation coverage", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-crowds-extortion-20181021-story.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 2."}
{"id": "npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-fake-news-crew-media-amplification", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-03", "uid": "C20260926-002008-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-03", "old_ids": ["npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-fake-news-crew-media-amplification"], "seq": "C00636", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Media amplification"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-06-09", "state": "CA", "description": "NPR/This American Life undercover reporting on Crowds on Demand documents paid participants posing as news crews and protesters specifically to generate camera-ready scenes that media and bystanders amplify as organic opposition—i.e., manufactured rallies designed to be amplified. Soft remount of fill-20g Crowds-on-Demand Artificial Crowd Generation source family onto this exact Media Amplification pathKey. Status Confirmed for the paid-media-amplification mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Sourcing The Crowd: California Company Stages Phony Protests (2016)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2016/06/09/481433870/sourcing-the-crowd-california-company-stages-phony-protests"}, {"title": "CBS News — Company with crowds for hire sees opportunity in politics", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/company-with-crowds-for-hire-sees-opportunity-in-politics/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 2. Soft remount of Crowds-on-Demand family onto Media Amplification pathKey."}
{"id": "npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-manufactured-rallies-forced-opposition", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-07", "uid": "C20260926-002757-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-07", "old_ids": ["npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-manufactured-rallies-forced-opposition"], "seq": "C00680", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Manufactured rallies and other orchestrated protests display opposition designed to distort perceptions of public sentiment."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-24", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-06-09", "state": "CA", "description": "NPR/This American Life undercover reporting on Crowds on Demand documents paid participants staged as protesters, fans, and even fake news crews—manufactured rallies/orchestrated protests designed to distort perceptions of public sentiment. Soft remount of Crowds-on-Demand family onto this exact Manufactured-rallies pathKey. Status Confirmed for paid manufactured-opposition mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Sourcing The Crowd: California Company Stages Phony Protests (2016)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2016/06/09/481433870/sourcing-the-crowd-california-company-stages-phony-protests"}, {"title": "Crowds on Demand — company advertising protests/rallies/advocacy for hire", "url": "https://crowdsondemand.com/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/npr-2016-crowds-on-demand-manufactured-rallies-forced-opposition__crowds-on-demand-company-advertising-protests-rallies-advocacy-for-hire.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 4. Soft remount of Crowds-on-Demand family onto Manufactured rallies pathKey."}
{"id": "npr-crowds-on-demand-paid-participants-transported-events-bus-in-capability", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-05", "uid": "C20260926-001426-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-05", "old_ids": ["npr-crowds-on-demand-paid-participants-transported-events-bus-in-capability"], "seq": "C00598", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Bus-in tactics"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-06-09", "state": "CA", "description": "Crowds on Demand's documented business model (NPR / This American Life undercover; LA Times) supplies paid participants to protests and events from outside the immediate local organic base—functionally a commercial Bus-In / import-crowd pathway even when transport logistics vary by gig. Status Confirmed for paid non-local crowd supply capability. Soft companion to Artificial Crowd leaf; does not validate every viral 'buses = paid plants' social-media claim (many of which fact-checkers dispute).", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Crowds on Demand stages phony protests / paid participants", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2016/06/09/481433870/sourcing-the-crowd-california-company-stages-phony-protests"}, {"title": "LA Times — Crowds on Demand hires protesters for rallies/PR", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-crowds-extortion-20181021-story.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 3. Honest: commercial capability Confirmed; viral bus-photo conspiracies often false."}
{"id": "pa-union-2016-primary-constable-mills-false-assistance-declaration-unregistered-man-voted", "permanent_id": "C20261102-123005-02", "uid": "C20261102-123005-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-123005-02", "old_ids": ["pa-union-2016-primary-constable-mills-false-assistance-declaration-unregistered-man-voted"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Steering the voter's choices at the point of voting", "Voter-assistance rights: an assister chosen to help a voter with language, sight, or reading can steer or mark that voter's choices inside the booth, where no one else can see."], "leaf_id": "L20261021-170325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261021-170325-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-04-26 (primary); 2017-06-30 (jury verdict); 2017-08-21 (sentence); 2020-01-03 (Superior Court affirms PCRA denial)", "state": "PA", "description": "At the White Deer Township polling place in Union County, Pennsylvania, during the 2016 primary, Bryan Bradway, a veteran whose name was not in the poll book, was told he could not vote that day. According to the Pennsylvania Superior Court's summary of the trial record, state constable Roger L. Mills, who was registered at that precinct, then told the judge of election, Linda Dantonio, that he needed help to vote because he could not read or see, though she had just watched him reading the newspaper. Mills signed a declaration of assistance naming Bradway as his assister. Dantonio and four other witnesses testified that Bradway voted at the machine while Mills stood with his back turned looking out the window; Bradway testified that he did not assist Mills, and Mills admitted he had agreed with Bradway beforehand on whom to vote for. A Union County jury convicted Mills in June 2017 of unlawful assistance in voting and hindering performance of duty; Judge Michael Sholley sentenced him to 48 hours to 12 months in jail plus 12 months of probation and barred him from constable duties in Union and Snyder counties for two years. The Superior Court affirmed the denial of his post-conviction petition on Jan. 3, 2020. Status Confirmed: jury conviction, sentence, and appellate affirmance. Catalog point: a declaration of assistance accepted on the spot put a second person alone at the machine, and the only people who knew what happened there were the two men inside; poll workers caught this one only because the judge of election had seen the claimed vision problem was false.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Superior Court — Commonwealth v. Mills, No. 14 MDA 2019 (Jan. 3, 2020; via Justia, curl 403, linked only)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/superior-court/2020/14-mda-2019.html"}, {"title": "The Daily Item — Jury finds constable guilty of breaking election law (2017; curl 429, linked only)", "url": "https://www.dailyitem.com/news/local_news/jury-finds-constable-guilty-of-breaking-election-law/article_4cfcbe7d-ce25-503d-a318-21a060e18f9d.html"}, {"title": "The Daily Item — Union County judge sentences constable, bars him from official duty (2017; curl 429, linked only)", "url": "https://www.dailyitem.com/news/local_news/union-county-judge-sentences-constable-bars-him-from-official-duty/article_8149dfcc-4721-58fd-8444-a76d09d9f057.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-02 (open web, zero X API). Empty leaf (0 -> 2). Facts from the Superior Court memorandum text and Daily Item reports as returned by WebSearch; all three pages blocked curl (403/429), so no local archives."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2016-ppe-vote-centers", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-59", "uid": "C20260925-155410-59", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-59", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2016-ppe-vote-centers"], "seq": "C00059", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-03-22", "state": "AZ", "description": "For the March 22, 2016 Arizona presidential preference election, Maricopa County shifted to a countywide vote-center model and cut Election Day locations from more than 200 (2012) to 60, citing cost and rising mail voting. Voters waited hours; county recorder records later showed votes still being cast past 10 p.m. at 20 of 60 sites and past midnight at five Phoenix-area sites, with one final ballot near 1 a.m. County officials later acknowledged the 60-site plan was a mistake. Status Confirmed for the consolidation, countywide access model, and documented wait times; intentional disenfranchisement motive not established.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Records reveal scope of wait times in Arizona primary", "url": "https://apnews.com/general-news-47da6cbdb2c74ca88584f42059358e40", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2016-ppe-vote-centers__ap-records-reveal-scope-of-wait-times-in-arizona-primary.png"}, {"title": "Arizona Republic — Lack of polling sites caused Maricopa election chaos", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/23/maricopa-county-presidential-primary-election-chaos-arizona/82174876/"}, {"title": "Arizona Republic — Long lines, too few polls frustrate metro Phoenix voters", "url": "https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/03/22/arizona-primary-voter-turnout-long-lines/82125816/"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: County-Wide Voting. Strong official/records documentation."}
{"id": "nbc4-2016-crowds-on-demand-scripted-citizens-media-theater", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-04", "uid": "C20260926-002008-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-04", "old_ids": ["nbc4-2016-crowds-on-demand-scripted-citizens-media-theater"], "seq": "C00637", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Media amplification"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-02-18", "state": "CA", "description": "NBC4 Los Angeles reported paid actors appearing as 'concerned citizens' with scripted lines at public meetings—political theater designed to look like spontaneous public sentiment for cameras and officials. Status Confirmed for scripted-citizen media theater; does not prove every protest is hired.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC4 LA — Concerned Citizens Turn Out to Be Political Theater (2016)", "url": "https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/concerned-citizens-turn-out-to-be-political-theater/2021439/"}, {"title": "Wikipedia — Crowds on Demand (secondary summary of contemporaneous reporting)", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crowds_on_Demand", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nbc4-2016-crowds-on-demand-scripted-citizens-media-theater__wikipedia-crowds-on-demand-secondary-summary-of-contemporaneous-reporting.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 2 companion."}
{"id": "or-ors-247-017-oregon-motor-voter-automatic-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-11", "uid": "C20260926-021058-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-11", "old_ids": ["or-ors-247-017-oregon-motor-voter-automatic-registration"], "seq": "C00959", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Encourage everyone to register to vote to create as many registrations as possible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016-01", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon Motor Voter (ORS 247.017 / SOS FAQ) **automatically registers** eligible unregistered residents after qualifying DMV license/ID transactions on an **opt-out** model: do nothing for 21 days and you are registered nonaffiliated. Status Confirmed statewide AVR maximizing registrations without affirmative citizen action; peer to Brennan AVR how-it-works and federal NVRA motor-voter agency registration—Oregon AVR implementation, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Oregon SOS — Oregon Motor Voter Act FAQ (automatic opt-out registration)", "url": "https://sos.oregon.gov/elections/pages/motor-voter-faq.aspx", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-ors-247-017-oregon-motor-voter-automatic-registration__oregon-sos-oregon-motor-voter-act-faq-automatic-opt-out-registration.png"}, {"title": "ORS 247.017 — Oregon Motor Voter automatic voter registration", "url": "https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_247.017"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on maximize/encourage mass registration feedback-loop leaf.", "related": ["ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out"]}
{"id": "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-05", "uid": "C20261026-180010-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-05", "old_ids": ["mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually"], "seq": "C01570", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2016 (Minnesota Secretary of State Electronic Roster Guide); current-edition check 2026-10-26", "state": "MN", "description": "Minnesota's Secretary of State Electronic Roster Guide (2016) says that, after the registration cutoff and after rosters are generated in the statewide voter registration system (SVRS), the county \"runs the epollbook Real Time Roster File Extract and provides to vendor.\" [1] The guide describes this extract as a text file of election roster records that counties generate on demand and give to the vendor or e-poll book programmer to create the election rosters, so despite its name it is a file, not a live link. [1] Counties generate separate \"Roster Supplement: Accepted Ballots\" files to add accepted-absentee notations to rosters already created, and a supplement listing Election Day registrants who already have accepted absentee ballots. [1] The guide describes a VPN to the vendor's servers, says no other internet or local network access should be configured, and says that after the election the vendor or county produces separate Election Day Registration and voting-history files that are uploaded to SVRS. [1] It adds: \"Any history not posted to ePollbook at the polling place must be entered manually into SVRS by the county.\" [1] Status Confirmed that, as written in the 2016 guide, the roster in the polling place is a vendor-built copy of SVRS, updated only by supplement files, and that history and registrations return to SVRS by upload or manual entry. The label applies to the 2016 document only. As checked on Oct. 26, 2026, the guide has been removed from the Secretary of State's guides list, although the PDF can still be opened at its original address, and no successor was found. [2] Because the guide has not been replaced by a newer edition, the current statement of the process cannot be verified against it. The current County Election Administration Guide (2024) mentions \"Electronic roster file uploads\" among the system functions and requires voting history to be posted within six weeks of an election, but it does not describe the Real Time Roster File Extract, the vendor handoff or the supplement files, and it contains no passage requiring unposted history to be entered manually. [3] Minnesota Statutes 2024, section 201.225, still requires an electronic roster to be loaded with a data file that includes voter registration data in a format the Secretary of State prescribes, to export data in a prescribed format, and to be networked only within the polling place on Election Day (except for updating absentee ballot records), which supports the file-based design. [4]", "sources": [{"title": "Minnesota Secretary of State, Electronic Roster Guide (2016)", "url": "https://sos.mn.gov/media/4mzagi5f/electronic-roster-guide.pdf"}, {"title": "Minnesota Secretary of State, Election Guides page (current list)", "url": "https://www.sos.mn.gov/election-administration-campaigns/election-administration/election-guides/"}, {"title": "Minnesota Secretary of State, County Election Administration Guide (2024)", "url": "https://www.sos.mn.gov/media/ukxlp5k0/county-election-administration-guide.pdf"}, {"title": "Minnesota Statutes 2024, section 201.225, Electronic roster authorization", "url": "https://www.revisor.mn.gov/statutes/2024/cite/201.225/pdf"}], "notes": "The 2016 guide is no longer listed on the Secretary of State's guides page as of Oct. 26, 2026, but the PDF still opens at its original address. No vendor is named in the sections used.", "related": ["va-2026-loudoun-pollbook-built-from-veris-download-not-connected-final-file-2-days-out-credit-imported-after", "mi-2024-election-day-epb-offline-export-from-qvf-after-4pm-day-before-early-voting-epb-live", "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling", "wi-badger-book-not-connected-to-internet-cannot-access-wisvote-data-file-uploaded-after-election", "oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes", "ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb"]}
{"id": "fl-dos-dominion-ice-icp-optional-cellular-modem-hardware", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-05", "uid": "C20260926-021058-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-05", "old_ids": ["fl-dos-dominion-ice-icp-optional-cellular-modem-hardware"], "seq": "C00953", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wireless devices installed in hardware"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-57", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-57", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Division of Elections Dominion Democracy Suite qualification test report lists **optional COTS cellular modems** as hardware for ImageCast Precinct (**eDevices CellGo GPRS**) and ImageCast Evolution (**Zoom 4598 3G+**), plus analog modem options, and documents modem transmission testing. Status Confirmed wireless/cellular hardware offered for Dominion precinct tabulators; peer to ESS DS200 optional cellular modem board and DEF CON WinVote Wi-Fi—Dominion FL modem bill-of-materials, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida DOS — Dominion Democracy Suite Release 4.14.17 Version 1 Qualification Test Report (ICE/ICP cellular modems)", "url": "https://files.floridados.gov/media/695113/dominion-democracy-suite-release-41417-version-1-test-report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-dos-dominion-ice-icp-optional-cellular-modem-hardware__florida-dos-dominion-democracy-suite-release-4-14-17-version-1-qualification-t.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC Scope of Certification — Dominion Democracy Suite networking / modem notes (context)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/28/Scope.of.Cert.4.14-A_Final.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-dos-dominion-ice-icp-optional-cellular-modem-hardware__eac-scope-of-certification-dominion-democracy-suite-networking-modem-notes-con.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on wireless devices installed in tabulator hardware leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "virginia-2015-winvote-wifi-default-wep-remote-compromise-backdoor-surface", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-23", "uid": "C20260925-234437-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-23", "old_ids": ["virginia-2015-winvote-wifi-default-wep-remote-compromise-backdoor-surface"], "seq": "C00456", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Backdoors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia's AVS WinVote DREs used weakly protected Wi-Fi (including default WEP) and were shown remotely compromiseable; the state decertified the systems after documenting the remote-access attack surface. Status Confirmed for an undocumented/poorly controlled remote-access path functioning as a practical backdoor surface. Soft companion to existing virginia-2015-winvote cards on Gradual Network / alternate-networks leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — Virginia finally drops America's worst voting machines (WinVote)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virginia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/virginia-2015-winvote-wifi-default-wep-remote-compromise-backdoor-surface__def-con-25-voting-village-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 12. Confirmed for remote-access surface; 'intentional vendor backdoor' not claimed."}
{"id": "nist-voting-security-recommendations-usb-memory-card-bridges-airgap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-08", "uid": "C20260926-023334-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-08", "old_ids": ["nist-voting-security-recommendations-usb-memory-card-bridges-airgap"], "seq": "C01068", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Air-gapped systems deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST ITL Voting Security Recommendations (archived collaborate.nist.gov voting TWiki materials) warn that an Election Management System kept \"offline\" can still be infected via intranet paths and that malware can transfer from an exposed EMS onto memory cards configured for tabulators/scanners—explicitly advising against USB transfers to/from voting equipment and documenting that \"air-gapped\" rhetoric fails when removable media bridges the gap. Status Confirmed federal technical guidance; peer to catalog air-gap linguistic seed and ES&S cellular-modem results transmission already on this leaf—NIST removable-media bridge analysis, not modem remounted. PEP framing: \"air-gapped\" branding obscures the USB/memory-card attack surface that precinct hand counts avoid.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Security Recommendations (Voting / EMS isolation, USB & memory-card transfer risks)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/voting/security-recommendations", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-voting-security-recommendations-usb-memory-card-bridges-airgap__nist-security-recommendations-voting-ems-isolation-usb-memory-card-transfer-risks.png"}, {"title": "NIST VTS 200-1 — Cybersecurity Framework Election Infrastructure Profile (PDF)", "url": "https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/vts/NIST.VTS.200-1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-voting-security-recommendations-usb-memory-card-bridges-airgap__nist-vts-200-1-cybersecurity-framework-election-infrastructure-profile-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on Air-Gapped Systems Deception leaf."}
{"id": "bernie-sanders-dem-primary-run-independent-senate-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-22", "uid": "C20260925-205354-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-22", "old_ids": ["bernie-sanders-dem-primary-run-independent-senate-registration"], "seq": "C00237", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Candidates switch parties to gain a competitive advantage while deceiving citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-2016", "state": "VT / Federal", "description": "Sen. Bernie Sanders, long an Independent in Senate registration/caucus practice, filed to run as a Democrat in the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries (and similarly dual-tracked Democratic primary participation with Independent Senate identity in later cycles). Status Confirmed for strategic party-label use across contests; 'deceiving citizens' motive language in the catalog is advocacy opinion not adjudicated here.", "sources": [{"title": "NPR — Bernie Sanders files to run as both Democrat and Independent", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/03/04/700121429/bernie-sanders-files-to-run-as-a-democrat-and-an-independent"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 11. Cross-label candidacy Confirmed."}
{"id": "doj-fbi-michael-maggio-arkansas-judge-bribery-plea-sentence", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-13", "uid": "C20260926-022920-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-13", "old_ids": ["doj-fbi-michael-maggio-arkansas-judge-bribery-plea-sentence"], "seq": "C01058", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Compromise and blackmail judges and prosecutors."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-80", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-80", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-2016", "state": "AR", "description": "Former Arkansas Circuit Judge Michael A. Maggio pleaded guilty (January 2015) to federal-program bribery for accepting campaign contributions—including funds tied to a nursing-home owner—while reducing a $5.2 million jury verdict against the owner's company to $1 million; in March 2016 he received the statutory maximum 10-year federal prison sentence (FBI Little Rock / DOJ OPA). Status Confirmed adjudicated judicial bribery; peer to Judge Rodolfo Delgado (TX) and Sen. Menendez corruption convictions on this leaf—Maggio Arkansas judicial bribery, not those remounted. PEP framing: compromised adjudicators undermine enforcement of election and related integrity laws.", "sources": [{"title": "FBI Little Rock — Former Judge Pleads Guilty to Accepting Bribe During Campaign to Be Elected to the Arkansas Court of Appeals", "url": "https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/littlerock/news/press-releases/former-judge-pleads-guilty-to-accepting-bribe-during-campaign-to-be-elected-to-the-arkansas-court-of-appeals", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-fbi-michael-maggio-arkansas-judge-bribery-plea-sentence__fbi-little-rock-former-judge-pleads-guilty-to-accepting-bribe-during-campaign-to-be-elected-to-the-arkansas-court-of-appeals.png"}, {"title": "DOJ OPA — Former Judge Sentenced to 10 Years for Accepting Bribe During His Arkansas Court of Appeals Campaign", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/former-judge-sentenced-10-years-accepting-bribe-during-his-arkansas-court-appeals-campaign"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Compromised judges/prosecutors leaf."}
{"id": "cnn-2015-crowds-for-hire-artificial-crowd-industry", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-01", "uid": "C20260926-033041-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-01", "old_ids": ["cnn-2015-crowds-for-hire-artificial-crowd-industry"], "seq": "C01211", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "Artificial crowd generation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-10-16", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "CNN Business (Oct. 16, 2015) documented the commercial 'crowds for hire' industry—profiling Crowds on Demand founder Adam Swart and describing paid actors supplied for campaign rallies, premieres, and grassroots-style activism that organizers and audiences often never learn are paid—establishing artificial crowd generation as an openly marketed product, not a one-off anecdote. Status Confirmed primary CNN Business industry reporting on paid-crowd generation; peer to NPR 2016 Crowds on Demand undercover and Bakala v. Krupa astroturf court-findings cards already on this leaf—CNN industry-profile instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: paid artificial crowds manufacture perceived public sentiment that public hand counts of paper ballots cannot be skewed by rented bodies at a rally.", "sources": [{"title": "CNN Business — The lucrative business of crowds for hire (Oct. 16, 2015)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2015/10/16/business/crowds-for-hire"}, {"title": "LA Times — Paid protesters? Crowds on Demand and the hire-a-crowd industry (companion)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-crowds-extortion-20181021-story.html"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Forced Opposition Projection Artificial Crowd Generation leaf."}
{"id": "ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-01", "uid": "C20261028-134437-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-01", "old_ids": ["ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration"], "seq": "C01613", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-10-10 to 2018", "state": "CA", "description": "California's New Motor Voter Act (AB 1461), signed Oct. 10, 2015, replaced opt-in registration at the DMV with registration by default. The Secretary of State's release said the law \"will register to vote every eligible California citizen who goes to a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) office to get a driver's license or renew one, potentially adding millions to California's voter rolls,\" quoted Secretary Alex Padilla: \"Citizens should not be required to opt-in to their fundamental right to vote,\" and predicted \"the largest sustained voter registration drive in our nation's history.\" It noted that California became \"the second state in the nation to adopt an automatic voter registration system,\" after Oregon. [1][3] The Secretary of State's Motor Voter page says DMV customers' information is sent electronically and \"Once your eligibility to vote is determined, you will be registered to vote,\" and that \"Individuals with AB 60 driver's licenses are not eligible to participate.\" [2] NCSL lists AB 1461 as enacted in 2015 and implemented in 2018, with a front-end (point-of-service) opt-out. [4] Status Confirmed: official release, statute, and program page.", "sources": [{"title": "California Secretary of State — Governor Brown Signs California New Motor Voter Act (news release, Oct. 10, 2015)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2015-news-releases-and-advisories/governor-brown-signs-california-new-motor-voter-act", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration__ca-sos-release-2015-10-10.html"}, {"title": "California Secretary of State — California Motor Voter (program page)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/california-motor-voter", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration__ca-sos-motor-voter-page.html"}, {"title": "California Legislature — AB 1461 (2015), enrolled bill text", "url": "http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/15-16/bill/asm/ab_1451-1500/ab_1461_bill_20150916_enrolled.html"}, {"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration (summary and state table, updated Aug. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out__ncsl-avr-2026-08-19.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out", "ca-motor-voter-ey-audit-2019", "ca-dmv-2018-voter-registration-applications-delayed-untransmitted", "ca-dmv-2018-10-1500-registered-in-error-eligibility-changes-not-applied", "ca-sos-prereg-16-17-dmv-motor-voter-automatic-when-eligible", "or-ors-247-017-oregon-motor-voter-automatic-registration", "ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence"]}
{"id": "ca-sb415-2015-election-consolidation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-03", "uid": "C20260925-181533-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-03", "old_ids": ["ca-sb415-2015-election-consolidation"], "seq": "C00075", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Consolidating many smaller elections into fewer, larger ones makes ballots more complex, which is used to argue that hand counting is too difficult."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-09-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California SB 415 (California Voter Participation Rights Act), chaptered Sept. 1, 2015 and operative Jan. 1, 2018, generally requires political subdivisions with significantly lower off-cycle turnout to stop holding stand-alone local elections and to consolidate with statewide election dates (plan by 2018; consolidate by Nov. 8, 2022). Cities such as Manhattan Beach publicly moved municipal elections onto even-year statewide ballots in response. Status Confirmed for the statute and consolidation mandate; whether consolidation was designed to impede hand counting is not established by the legislative text—label Confirmed for the consolidation policy itself.", "sources": [{"title": "California LegInfo — SB-415 Voter participation (bill text)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB415", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-sb415-2015-election-consolidation__california-leginfo-sb-415-voter-participation-bill-text.png"}, {"title": "City of Manhattan Beach — SB 415 election date change", "url": "https://www.manhattanbeach.gov/departments/city-clerk/2020-election-date-change"}], "notes": "Confirmed for consolidation statute/mandate. Hand-count-impediment motive not established by legislative text."}
{"id": "virginia-2015-winvote-wifi-dre-decertified-remote-network-risk", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-36", "uid": "C20260925-233150-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-36", "old_ids": ["virginia-2015-winvote-wifi-dre-decertified-remote-network-risk"], "seq": "C00429", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Ability to connect to other networks (including the internet)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-08", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia decertified the Advanced Voting Solutions WinVote DRE after researchers demonstrated it could be reached over Wi-Fi with weak networking/crypto—prompting statewide removal. Status Confirmed that voting equipment with wireless networking capability created remote-compromise risk sufficient for state decertification. (2015 incident remains the canonical U.S. wireless-tabulator caution inside modern certification debates.)", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — Virginia finally drops America's worst voting machines (WinVote Wi-Fi)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virginia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "ES&S — unofficial results transmission FAQs (continuing optional wireless paths in other product lines)", "url": "https://www.essvote.com/faqs/transmission-of-unofficial-election-results-faqs/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 18 companion. Soft companion to virginia-2015-winvote card on Gradual Network leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "virginia-2015-winvote-wireless-dre-decertified-after-remote-hack-risk", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-14", "uid": "C20260925-212129-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-14", "old_ids": ["virginia-2015-winvote-wireless-dre-decertified-after-remote-hack-risk"], "seq": "C00311", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Start with disconnected, \"air-gapped\" systems, then mandate connections over several cycles until everything is networked."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-72", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-08", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia decertified the AVS WinVote DRE in 2015 after findings that the touchscreen broadcast an unprotected Wi-Fi access point and could be remotely compromised — a concrete case where a deployed 'voting machine' was networked in practice contrary to public air-gap assumptions, later cited again when DEF CON researchers took over a WinVote in minutes. Status Confirmed for state decertification predicated on wireless connectivity/remote-control risk.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — Virginia finally drops America's worst voting machine (WinVote)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2015/08/virginia-finally-drops-americas-worst-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "DEF CON 25 Voting Village Report (WinVote remote compromise)", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-25/DEF%20CON%2025%20voting%20village%20report.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "doj-2015-ferguson-hands-up-dont-shoot-media-narrative-discounted", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-06", "uid": "C20260926-033041-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-06", "old_ids": ["doj-2015-ferguson-hands-up-dont-shoot-media-narrative-discounted"], "seq": "C01216", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Attack law enforcement through the media."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-76", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-76", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-03-04", "state": "MO", "description": "DOJ Civil Rights Division's March 4, 2015 report on the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, MO, discounted media-amplified 'hands up, don't shoot' surrender narratives: material witness accounts were inconsistent with forensic evidence, some witnesses recanted after initially telling media/law enforcement they saw a surrender, and credible witnesses placed Brown moving toward Officer Wilson when fatal shots were fired—showing a viral media attack frame that did not survive federal investigation. Status Confirmed primary DOJ Ferguson shooting report documenting media-amplified anti-police narrative later unsupported by forensics; peer to Gallup 2020 police-confidence record-low and USA Today defund-budget-cuts cards already on this leaf—DOJ Ferguson media-narrative instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: media attack cycles that collapse under forensic review also erode trust in officers who would observe precinct hand counts of paper.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — Report Regarding the Criminal Investigation into the Shooting Death of Michael Brown by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson (March 4, 2015 PDF)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf"}, {"title": "NPR — Ferguson Documents: Justice Investigation Backs Former Officer Wilson (March 4, 2015 companion)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/04/390753502/ferguson-documents-justice-investigation-backs-officer-wilson"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Law Enforcement Media attack on law enforcement leaf."}
{"id": "hyattsville-md-2015-charter-amendment-voting-age-16", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-06", "uid": "C20260926-022920-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-06", "old_ids": ["hyattsville-md-2015-charter-amendment-voting-age-16"], "seq": "C01051", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Minor voting rights: this lets easily influenced minors, who cannot yet sign a contract or serve on a jury, choose laws, judges, and officials up to the president."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-01", "state": "MD", "description": "Hyattsville, Maryland City Council adopted Charter Amendment 2015-01 (second reading Jan. 20, 2015; first passage Jan. 5) lowering the municipal voting age from 18 to 16 for city elections—joining Takoma Park as an early U.S. locality enfranchising 16- and 17-year-olds in local contests. City agenda packets and contemporary reporting document the charter change effective for the May 5, 2015 municipal election. Status Confirmed enacted charter amendment; peer to Takoma Park 2013 and Berkeley/Oakland school-board youth vote cards—Hyattsville municipal charter, not those remounted. PEP framing: expanding the electorate to adolescents via accessibility framing changes who is mobilized without addressing machine-count integrity.", "sources": [{"title": "City of Hyattsville — Agenda Jan. 20, 2015 (Charter Amendment 2015-01 second reading)", "url": "https://www.hyattsville.org/AgendaCenter/ViewFile/Agenda/_01202015-34"}, {"title": "Streetcar Suburbs Publishing — Council lowers Hyattsville voting age to 16 years old", "url": "https://streetcarsuburbs.news/breaking-news-council-lowers-hyattsville-voting-age-to-16-years-old/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on Minor Voting Rights leaf."}
{"id": "oh-hamilton-2014-23-absentee-plus-provisional-caught", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-13", "uid": "C20261009-105430-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-13", "old_ids": ["oh-hamilton-2014-23-absentee-plus-provisional-caught"], "seq": "C01346", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-01-12", "state": "OH", "description": "Hamilton County found that at least 26 voters cast two ballots in the Nov. 2014 election; 23 had voted absentee and then cast a provisional ballot at their polling place. Because Ohio requires absentee requesters to vote provisionally and holds those ballots until eligibility is checked, only one ballot per voter was counted ('The system worked the way it should' — Board President Tim Burke). Officials believed most were errors, including elderly voters, and said intentional cases would be referred to prosecutors. Status Confirmed. Counter-view card. It shows the check can work where it is enforced, through a provisional hold, a real-time lookup or a barcode cancel. Under the leaf's framework, the confirmed failures on this leaf (GA 2020, Philadelphia 2020, Franklin OH 2021, St. Clair Shores 2024, CA 2020) are what make 'it was a mistake' a credible explanation wherever the check is not enforced.", "sources": [{"title": "Cincinnati Enquirer — 26 voted twice in November but only counted once (Jan. 12, 2015)", "url": "https://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2015/01/12/voted-twice-november-election/21643387/"}, {"title": "USA Today — In Ohio county, 26 voted twice in November (Jan. 12, 2015)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/01/12/hamilton-county-ohio-double-voting-november-election/21662095/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. Counter-view (cross-check worked)."}
{"id": "politico-mccaskill-akin-2012-elevate-weak-opponent-donor-waste-template", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-28", "uid": "C20260926-002757-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-28", "old_ids": ["politico-mccaskill-akin-2012-elevate-weak-opponent-donor-waste-template"], "seq": "C00701", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Lack what it takes to win, draining donor dollars and wasting resources."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015-01-01", "state": "MO", "description": "Former Sen. Claire McCaskill's own memoir/Politico excerpt describes spending $1.7M in 2012 ads to elevate Todd Akin in the GOP primary because he was the opponent she was most likely to beat—foundational template for purposely supporting a weak opposing-side candidate who then consumes that side's resources. Foundational pre-2016 OK (catalog cites pattern). Status Confirmed via McCaskill's own account.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenSecrets — McCaskill Akin elevation recounted in 2022 primary-meddling analysis", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2022/07/democrats-spend-millions-on-republican-primaries/"}, {"title": "NBC — Democratic group meddles in Ohio GOP Senate primary to boost Trump-backed candidate (2024 continuation)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2024-election/democratic-group-meddles-ohio-gop-senate-primary-trump-rcna143390"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 14 companion. Foundational 2012 OK; 2022/2024 companions show continuity."}
{"id": "ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-03", "uid": "C20261028-134437-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-03", "old_ids": ["ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out"], "seq": "C01615", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015 to 2026-08-19", "state": "US", "description": "NCSL (updated Aug. 19, 2026) says \"Twenty-four states and Washington, D.C., are categorized by NCSL as having enacted or implemented automatic voter registration,\" in which \"Information gathered from participating government agencies is transmitted to election officials, who use it to either create a new voter record or update an existing registration.\" It describes two models: front-end opt-out, where the customer may decline at the point of service, and back-end opt-out, where a post-transaction mailer is the only chance to decline. Within front-end, one approach \"takes the customer through the voter registration process during the transaction unless they actively select an option to decline.\" [1] NCSL's state table shows the direction of travel: Colorado's first phase (2017, administrative action) \"was a front-end opt out system,\" and SB 235 in 2019 \"instituted a back-end opt out system implemented in 2020\"; D.C. moved from front-end (2016) to back-end; Alaska (2016 Measure 1, Permanent Fund Dividend applications), Oregon (2015), Michigan (2018 Proposal 3), Nevada (2018 Question 5), Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, Delaware, and Washington use back-end mailers; Pennsylvania (2023) acted by governor announcement. [1] Who originates these records is covered by the earlier NCSL card on county control (linked). Status Confirmed: NCSL summary and table.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration (summary and state table, updated Aug. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out__ncsl-avr-2026-08-19.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ncsl-avr-automatic-voter-registration-county-not-full-control", "or-ors-247-017-oregon-motor-voter-automatic-registration", "ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out", "ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence"]}
{"id": "pima-az-2016-ds850-daily-ballot-image-deletion-policy", "permanent_id": "C20261014-123054-06", "uid": "C20261014-123054-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-123054-06", "old_ids": ["pima-az-2016-ds850-daily-ballot-image-deletion-policy"], "seq": "C01386", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wipe hard drives so no evidence of manipulation remains."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-37", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2015 to 2016-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "After Pima County, Arizona deployed ES&S DS850 high-speed scanners, the Elections Integrity Commission's January 2016 annual report recorded that saving ballot-image files proved time-consuming and that \"ballot image saving was turned off after storing approximately 90,000 images.\" Courthouse News (Aug. 29, 2016) and the Arizona Daily Star (Aug. 28, 2016) reported that elections director Brad Nelson's stated practice was to delete digital ballot images after each day's early-ballot tabulation even though the scanners count from those images; a lawsuit by early voter Richard Hernandez sought to force retention for the required 22 months. Facing the suit, the county said it would hold primary images pending the litigation outcome while defending the prior daily-clear policy. Status Confirmed for the documented turn-off/daily-deletion practice and the contemporaneous official/press record (not a finding that any race was flipped). Catalog note: wiping the digital images the machine actually counted removes the audit trail that would let citizens compare paper to what the software saw. Distinct from Mesa Trusted Build and Antrim remounts on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Courthouse News — Electronic Vote-Counting Method Challenged (Pima DS850 image deletion; Aug. 29, 2016)", "url": "https://v2.courthousenews.com/electronic-vote-counting-method-challenged/"}, {"title": "Arizona Daily Star / Tucson.com — County to hold onto ballot images after suit filed (Aug. 28, 2016)", "url": "https://tucson.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/article_7b3f1958-83a4-58be-ae96-db06fd37e432.html"}, {"title": "Pima County Election Integrity Commission — January 15, 2016 minutes / annual-report context (CivicPlus asset)", "url": "https://content.civicplus.com/api/assets/az-pimacounty/852d5827-c94e-4558-93ee-7e30e647e84e"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-14 (Wed open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed for deletion policy / turn-off after ~90k images. AUDIT USA advocacy pages 403 to curl; primary press + CivicPlus minutes used instead. Not Mesa remount.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS850"]}
{"id": "biggers-morality-at-ballot-wedge-propositions-mobilize-peripheral-voters", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-02", "uid": "C20260925-220029-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-02", "old_ids": ["biggers-morality-at-ballot-wedge-propositions-mobilize-peripheral-voters"], "seq": "C00355", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They put a sacrificial measure on the ballot that rallies a particular group, increasing biased voter participation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Daniel R. Biggers' Cambridge University Press book Morality at the Ballot (and related articles) shows morality/wedge ballot propositions—unlike most technical measures—can entice peripheral voters and reshape who turns out, i.e., riling identity/moral groups to change the electorate's composition. Status Confirmed for the academic finding that certain ballot measures are used as turnout/composition tools; not Confirmed that any specific modern measure was placed solely as a sacrificial fraud device.", "sources": [{"title": "Cambridge — Morality at the Ballot (Biggers)", "url": "https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/morality-at-the-ballot/02B3D657C843C1B34453DF1F8A91CE12", "local": "/archives/2026/09/biggers-morality-at-ballot-wedge-propositions-mobilize-peripheral-voters__cambridge-morality-at-the-ballot-biggers.png"}, {"title": "Public Opinion Quarterly — Political Engagement, Mobilization, and Direct Democracy", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfp017"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 1 companion. Wedge/morality measures as biased-turnout tools Confirmed in literature."}
{"id": "judicial-watch-indiana-nvra-settlement-statewide-cleanup-2014", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-24", "uid": "C20260925-211320-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-24", "old_ids": ["judicial-watch-indiana-nvra-settlement-statewide-cleanup-2014"], "seq": "C00269", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014", "state": "IN", "description": "Judicial Watch/True the Vote NVRA litigation against Indiana concluded with a settlement requiring statewide address-confirmation mailings and lasting list-maintenance procedure changes after allegations that inactive/bad records remained on the rolls. Status Confirmed for settlement forcing cleanup after alleged non-purging.", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch — Indiana lawsuit forces statewide clean-up of voter registration lists", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/judicial-watch-true-vote-historic-indiana-lawsuit-forces-statewide-clean-voter-registration-lists-permanent-changes-election-law-procedures/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/judicial-watch-indiana-nvra-settlement-statewide-cleanup-2014__judicial-watch-indiana-lawsuit-forces-statewide-clean-up-of.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "makse-sokhey-household-signs-descriptive-norm-visible-support", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-02", "uid": "C20260926-001426-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-02", "old_ids": ["makse-sokhey-household-signs-descriptive-norm-visible-support"], "seq": "C00595", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Suppression-Based Perception Framing", "Examples", "Media pressure"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-23", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014", "state": "Federal", "description": "Political-science work on household campaign signs (Makse & Sokhey and related Canadian Journal of Political Science follow-ons) treats yard/window signs as neighbor-to-neighbor cues that make private vote choice publicly visible and can form descriptive social norms about who is 'backed'—exactly the perception channel Media Pressure coverage exploits when it narrates scarcity or abundance of visible support. Foundational pre-2016 OK when catalog cites perception/visible-support mechanism. Status Confirmed for the academic mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "Canadian Journal of Political Science — Do Household Political Campaign Signs Help Win Vote Share? (citing Makse/Sokhey)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1017/s0008423923000501", "local": "/archives/2026/09/makse-sokhey-household-signs-descriptive-norm-visible-support__canadian-journal-of-political-science-do-household-political-campaign-signs-help-win-vote-share-citing-makse-sokhey.png"}, {"title": "Slate interview — Sokhey on yard-sign signaling / solidarity clustering", "url": "https://slate.com/human-interest/2020/10/political-yard-sign-get-off-my-lawn.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 1 companion. Foundational academic OK."}
{"id": "ca-co-prereg-auto-active-at-18", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-27", "uid": "C20260925-184601-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-27", "old_ids": ["ca-co-prereg-auto-active-at-18"], "seq": "C00145", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Youth Pre-Registration", "When pre-registrants turn 18, their records automatically become active, which can be used as an excuse to inject phantom ballots."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-2026", "state": "CA / CO", "description": "California Elections Code § 2102 and Colorado C.R.S. § 1-2-101 (as summarized by NCSL) provide that properly executed youth preregistrations become effective / the person is automatically registered upon reaching age 18 (subject to currency of information). Status Confirmed for automatic activation at 18; the catalog's 'excuse for injection of phantom ballots' causal claim is not established by these statutes and remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Preregistration for Young Voters (CA/CO statutory capsules)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}, {"title": "CA Elections Code via NCSL table (SB 113 / §2102)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/preregistration-for-young-voters"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 12 child. Auto-activate Confirmed; phantom-injection motive Alleged."}
{"id": "philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-09", "uid": "C20260925-181533-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-09", "old_ids": ["philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018"], "seq": "C00081", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "Election judges add fraudulent ballots to voting machines and falsely certify the results."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-2018 / convictions 2021-2022", "state": "PA", "description": "Marie Beren, a Philadelphia Judge of Elections and Democratic ward leader, accepted bribes from political consultant and former U.S. Rep. Michael \"Ozzie\" Myers to add fraudulent ballots to voting machines and falsely certify results for favored Democratic candidates in various primary and general elections between 2014 and 2018 (Heritage VFDB Criminal Conviction entries; DOJ press materials summarized therein). Myers was charged with more than a dozen felonies for orchestrating ballot-box stuffing schemes in Philadelphia wards/divisions. Status Confirmed for criminal adjudication of the ballot-stuffing/false-certification scheme as recorded in Heritage's conviction-classified case files; not a claim about 2020/2022 statewide presidential outcomes.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage VFDB — Marie Beren 2022 PA (Criminal Conviction PDF)", "url": "http://static-legal.heritage.org/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/37th%20Batch/Marie%20Beren%202022%20PA.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018__heritage-vfdb-marie-beren-2022-pa-criminal-conviction-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB — Marie Beren Source 2 (PDF)", "url": "http://static-legal.heritage.org/Voter%20Fraud%20Database/37th%20Batch/Marie%20Beren%202022%20PA%20Source%202.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018__heritage-vfdb-marie-beren-source-2-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage VFDB shortlink — Michael Ozzie Myers entry", "url": "https://herit.ag/3f2Sx0u", "local": "/archives/2026/09/philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018__heritage-vfdb-shortlink-michael-ozzie-myers-entry.pdf"}], "notes": "EDS heritage-election-fraud-database. Confirmed criminal ballot-stuffing/false certification scheme (Beren/Myers). Cross-leaf: Election Workers / Certification. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Election Workers > Election judges add fraudulent ballots to voting machines and falsely certify the results.'."}
{"id": "virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-27", "uid": "C20260925-183614-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-27", "old_ids": ["virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014"], "seq": "C00115", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-11-04", "state": "VA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 4, 2014, a voter at Tallwood Elementary School in Virginia Beach, Virginia, filmed a touchscreen voting machine in the U.S. House 2nd District race between Republican Rep. E. Scott Rigell and Democrat Suzanne D. Patrick. Each time the voter touched Rigell's name, the machine selected Patrick. According to the voter, a poll worker advised him to touch above the box, which let him select Rigell. The video was posted to YouTube and carried by The Washington Post. The Republican Party of Virginia alerted the Department of Elections. Its executive director, Shaun Kenney, wrote that the party had found calibration errors on DRE touchscreen machines in at least four congressional districts, in Arlington, Prince William, Spotsylvania and Virginia Beach, because the screen's touch sensor was not aligned with the text on the screen. Donna Patterson of the Virginia Beach Registrar's office said the office had received calls from three or four polling places where the summary screen did not match the voter's choice, and that all of those machines were taken out of service until a technician could resolve the problem. Susan Lee of the Virginia Department of Elections said the problem was caused by touchscreen calibration and that some machines may need additional calibration after transportation to a precinct. Cameron Glenn Sasnett of the Department told The Virginian-Pilot that Virginia Beach had far more reports of irregularities than any other locality in the commonwealth, blamed the city's antiquated touchscreens, and said the problems were resolved once technicians recalibrated the machines. The Pilot reported that one voter, John Owens, was told by the registrar's office that his fingers were too fat and that he might bring a Q-tip, and that Rigell's office was told by the State Board of Elections that long fingernails can confuse the machines. The Pew Charitable Trusts later reported that in 43 precincts in Virginia Beach and Newport News, votes for Rigell were recorded as ballots for his opponent, that testing had been done at a central location, and that jostling in transit caused the calibration problems. The machines were paperless DREs, so there was no paper record against which to check the votes; the Verified Voting Foundation's Voting News tags the Pilot article AccuVote TSX and Diebold Premier. On Aug. 29, 2026, The SCIF (@TheSCIF) reposted this clip on X, after the 2019 Lafayette County, Mississippi clip (Waller to Reeves), with the caption that the machine will not let the voter select the Republican and automatically selects the Democrat. The repost gives no date or place, and it presents the two older clips as if current; the Mississippi clip is Republican to Republican. Status Confirmed: state and local election officials acknowledged that touchscreens selected the wrong candidate, attributed it to calibration, and pulled and recalibrated the machines. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by honest calibration drift looks the same as one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target, and officials can close any such report with the same calibration answer. Nothing here shows intent; on a paperless DRE the only safeguard was the voter's own review of the summary screen.", "sources": [{"title": "WTVR CBS 6 — VIDEO: Virginia voting machine won't let you pick the Republican candidate (Nov. 4, 2014; Registrar's office, RPV letter, Department of Elections)", "url": "https://www.wtvr.com/2014/11/04/virginia-beach-voting-machine", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014__wtvr2014.html"}, {"title": "WWBT NBC12 — Calibration to blame for voting issues in Virginia Beach, Newport News (Nov. 4, 2014)", "url": "https://www.12onyourside.com/story/27269071/calibration-to-blame-for-voting-issues-in-virginia-beach-newport-news/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014__wwbt2014.html"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Voting machine glitch in Va. caught on camera (video, Nov. 4, 2014; Tallwood Elementary)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/politics/voting-machine-glitch-caught-on-camera/2014/11/04/8cd7fe3e-6464-11e4-ab86-46000e1d0035_video.html"}, {"title": "The Voting News / Virginian-Pilot — Election problems point a finger at Beach's clunky voting machines (Nov. 5, 2014)", "url": "https://thevotingnews.com/election-problems-point-a-finger-at-beachs-clunky-voting-machines-virginia-pilot/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014__votingnews.html"}, {"title": "The Pew Charitable Trusts — Election Tech Tuesday: Occasional Voting Machine Errors Persist Despite State Testing (Dec. 9, 2014)", "url": "https://www.pew.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2014/12/09/election-tech-tuesday-occasional-voting-machine-errors-persist-despite-state-testing", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014__pew2014.html"}, {"title": "YouTube — Voting Machine Caught on Camera Casting Ballot for Democrat when Selecting Republican (2014 voter video)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=St25jdBdtmE"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), repost of the Mississippi and Virginia Beach clips: \"Electronic voting machine will not let voter select the Republican candidate…\" (Aug. 29, 2026, 9:34 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2093693691017810316", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF post, fxtwitter data (archived 2026-10-21)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2093693691017810316", "local": "/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}], "notes": "Enriched 2026-10-21 12:15 AM ET from Mark's @TheSCIF lead (post 2093693691017810316, Aug. 29, 2026 13:34 UTC = 9:34 AM ET; 72 s video). The video was identified from its frames: a Lafayette County, MS 2019 runoff screen (Reeves/Waller; already carded as ms-lafayette-2019-gop-runoff-tsx-waller-touch-selects-reeves) and a VA 2nd District 2014 screen (Rigell/Patrick). Status raised from Partially confirmed to Confirmed on official acknowledgments (Registrar's office, Department of Elections). The post's partisan framing is reported as the poster's claim and not adopted. Archived: WTVR, WWBT, Pew and Voting News pages; X capture, fxtwitter JSON and the video (unredacted). The Washington Post blocks curl and is linked only. Not a 2025-26 event. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["AccuVote-TSX"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2093693691017810316", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 71.75, "bytes": 4932579, "sha256": "86cb45451b9376e1a60f64476d8ec516e8d2ad111d4642b138f0d2bd1f2635fa", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/virginia-beach-dre-calibration-2014--thescif__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-15", "uid": "C20261020-160717-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-15", "old_ids": ["md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties"], "seq": "C01008", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-10", "state": "MD", "description": "During October 2014 early voting, Maryland voters reported touchscreens showing the Democrat after they touched the Republican: Marsha Epstein (Pikesville) said her vote for Larry Hogan registered for Anthony Brown until her third try, and William Childers (Aberdeen) said Rep. Andy Harris switched to Bill Tilghman. The state GOP said it had about 50 complaints from 12 counties. The State Board of Elections (statement Oct. 28, 2014) said about 20 units were reported; 12 were tested and the issue could not be replicated; the rest were stopped or monitored. Deputy administrator Nikki Charlson said three were removed for calibration problems (\"the place a voter touched did not line up with their intended votes\"); Frederick and Anne Arundel each pulled a machine. At its Oct. 30 meeting the board reported 31 units taken out of service during early voting for reasons including calibration, and wrong-candidate reports on 21 units in 14 counties, all corrected by the voters, four confirmed as voter error. Status Confirmed: the state confirmed calibration faults on pulled units. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Maryland State Board of Elections — Response to Voter Complaints about Voting Units Displaying Incorrect Selections (Oct. 28, 2014; PDF)", "url": "https://elections.maryland.gov/press_room/2014%20General_Voting%20Unit%20Issues%20-%20Statement.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties__mdsbe2014.pdf"}, {"title": "Maryland State Board of Elections — Meeting minutes, Oct. 30, 2014 (31 units out of service; 21 units, 14 counties; PDF)", "url": "https://www.elections.maryland.gov/pdf/minutes/2014_10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties__mdmin2014.pdf"}, {"title": "Capital Gazette — GOP calls for investigation of voting machines after errors are reported (Oct. 28, 2014)", "url": "https://www.capitalgazette.com/2014/10/28/gop-calls-for-investigation-of-voting-machines-after-errors-are-reported/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties__capgaz2014a.html"}, {"title": "Capital Gazette — Two county machines decommissioned after early-voting problems (Oct. 28, 2014)", "url": "https://www.capitalgazette.com/2014/10/28/two-county-machines-decommissioned-after-early-voting-problems/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties__capgaz2014b.html"}, {"title": "WBAL-TV — Some early voting issues reported in Md. (Oct. 2014)", "url": "https://www.wbaltv.com/article/voting-issues-reported-as-md-candidates-begin-home-stretch/7089988", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2014-early-voting-hogan-touch-shows-brown-21-units-14-counties__wbal2014.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 5 (mdsbe2014, mdmin2014, capgaz2014a, capgaz2014b, wbal2014). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-philadelphia-demuro-judge-of-elections-rang-up-votes-2014-2016-guilty-plea-2020", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-03", "uid": "C20261023-123356-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-03", "old_ids": ["pa-philadelphia-demuro-judge-of-elections-rang-up-votes-2014-2016-guilty-plea-2020"], "seq": "C01528", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "Election judges add fraudulent ballots to voting machines and falsely certify the results."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-05-20, 2015-05-19, 2016 primaries (conduct); 2020-05-21 (guilty plea)", "state": "PA", "description": "Domenick J. DeMuro, the elected Judge of Elections for Philadelphia's 39th Ward, 36th Division, pleaded guilty in federal court on May 21, 2020 to conspiracy to deprive voters of their civil rights (18 U.S.C. 241) and a related Travel Act count, U.S. Attorney William M. McSwain announced. According to the federal Information, a local political consultant (\"Consultant #1\") paid DeMuro between $300 and $5,000 per election, from at least April 2014 through June 2016, to \"ring up\" fraudulent votes on the voting machines for the consultant's clients and preferred candidates, including judicial candidates, and DeMuro then certified the machine results. In the May 20, 2014 primary he added 27 fraudulent ballots and certified a results receipt showing 118 ballots cast when only 91 voters had appeared; in the May 19, 2015 primary he added 40, and in the 2016 primary he added 46. Former U.S. Rep. Michael \"Ozzie\" Myers was later charged as the consultant in the same scheme (see the Beren/Myers card on this leaf). Status Confirmed: guilty plea in federal court. Catalog point: the false totals were entered into machines and then blessed by the official who signed the results, so the machine tape and the certificate agreed with each other while the voter count did not. Comparing the number of signatures in the poll book with ballots hand counted in public at the precinct, before anyone signs, exposes that kind of gap the same night.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, E.D. Pa. — United States Attorney William M. McSwain Announces Guilty Plea of Former Philadelphia Judge of Elections Who Committed Election Fraud (May 21, 2020)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/video/united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-announces-guilty-plea-former-philadelphia"}, {"title": "U.S. v. Domenick J. DeMuro — Information (E.D. Pa. No. 2:20-cr-00112, filed Mar. 3, 2020; via Public Interest Legal Foundation)", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/pilf-files/Information_DeMuro.-5.21.20-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Former Philly election judge pleads guilty to stuffing ballot boxes for Democratic candidates (May 21, 2020)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/news/voter-fraud-philadelphia-ward-leader-judge-of-elections-domenick-demuro-guilty-plea-20200521.html"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Confirmed. Peer to philly-beren-myers-ballot-stuffing-2014-2018 on this leaf (1 -> 2); that card does not name DeMuro. Ballot counts (27/40/46) and charges (18 U.S.C. 241; Travel Act 18 U.S.C. 1952) checked in the Information text. DOJ page, Information PDF and Inquirer curl 200."}
{"id": "judicial-watch-ohio-nvra-settlement-list-maintenance-2014", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-23", "uid": "C20260925-211320-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-23", "old_ids": ["judicial-watch-ohio-nvra-settlement-list-maintenance-2014"], "seq": "C00268", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2014-01", "state": "OH", "description": "Judicial Watch and True the Vote's NVRA lawsuit against Ohio Secretary of State Husted settled in January 2014 with Ohio agreeing to systematic programs to identify and remove deceased, duplicate, and relocated registrants — after plaintiffs alleged inadequate list maintenance left ineligible records on the rolls. Status Confirmed for litigation and settlement predicated on failure to purge/maintain rolls under NVRA §8.", "sources": [{"title": "Judicial Watch — Ohio voter-rolls settlement agreement (PDF)", "url": "http://www.judicialwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/01-14-Ohio-Voter-Rolls-Settlement.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/judicial-watch-ohio-nvra-settlement-list-maintenance-2014__judicial-watch-ohio-voter-rolls-settlement-agreement-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Judicial Watch press — Suit to force Ohio clean-up of voting rolls", "url": "https://www.judicialwatch.org/judicial-watch-and-true-the-vote-sue-ohio-to-force-clean-up-of-voting-rolls/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/judicial-watch-ohio-nvra-settlement-list-maintenance-2014__judicial-watch-press-suit-to-force-ohio-clean-up-of-voting-r.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 13."}
{"id": "colorado-crs-1-2-217-7-same-day-registration-realtime-vote-centers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-26", "uid": "C20260926-000015-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-26", "old_ids": ["colorado-crs-1-2-217-7-same-day-registration-realtime-vote-centers"], "seq": "C00539", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Real-time adjustments to voter rolls, even during the election"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado C.R.S. §1-2-217.7 (as summarized by NCSL) authorizes voter registration / updates at statewide vote centers through Election Day with a networked e-pollbook tied to SCORE—explicit real-time adjustments during the election window. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL same-day registration table — Colorado real-time SCORE e-pollbook", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Justia — C.R.S. §1-2-217.7 voter registration at VSPCs", "url": "https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-1/article-2/part-2/section-1-2-217-7/"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "sternad-2013-guilty-plea-illegal-contributions-rivera-primary-split", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-10", "uid": "C20260926-023334-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-10", "old_ids": ["sternad-2013-guilty-plea-illegal-contributions-rivera-primary-split"], "seq": "C01070", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Bribe others to run to split the vote"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013", "state": "FL", "description": "Justin Lamar Sternad pleaded guilty in 2013 to federal charges including conspiracy, false statements, and accepting illegal campaign contributions in the scheme FEC later sued as FEC v. Rivera—where former Rep. David Rivera was alleged to have secretly funded Sternad's Democratic primary run to split the vote against a preferred opponent; Sternad received a seven-month sentence. FEC MUR 6655 materials and contemporaneous Politico/Florida Politics reporting document the guilty plea and the secret-funding theory. Status Confirmed federal criminal guilty plea by the straw/split-vote candidate; peer to FEC v. Rivera civil allegations and 52 U.S.C. §30122 name-of-another framework already on this leaf—Sternad plea, not Rivera civil remounted. PEP framing: secretly bankrolling a primary spoiler is classic vote-split engineering outside transparent precinct counting.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — MUR 6655 materials (Rivera / Sternad / Alliegro)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/6655/6655_06.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/sternad-2013-guilty-plea-illegal-contributions-rivera-primary-split__fec-mur-6655-materials-rivera-sternad-alliegro.pdf"}, {"title": "Politico — Rivera being sued by FEC over campaign cash fraud scheme (Jul. 17, 2017)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/07/17/rivera-being-sued-by-fec-over-campaign-cash-fraud-scheme-113428"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on bribe-others-to-run-to-split-vote leaf."}
{"id": "co-all-mail-vspc-mail-stream-statute", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-23", "uid": "C20260925-183614-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-23", "old_ids": ["co-all-mail-vspc-mail-stream-statute"], "seq": "C00111", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting", "Colorado and other states force citizens to convert in-person votes to mail or drop-box ballots, laundering them all into one voting type."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado conducts primary/general elections as mail-ballot elections under C.R.S. Title 1 Article 7.5: county clerks mail a ballot packet to every active registered elector (e.g., §1-7.5-107). Voters may still appear at Voter Service and Polling Centers, but ballots—whether mailed, dropped, or obtained/returned in person—enter the same centralized mail-ballot verification and tabulation stream rather than a traditional precinct hand-count Election Day model. Status Confirmed statutory all-mail architecture that folds in-person options into the mail/drop-box processing pipeline.", "sources": [{"title": "C.R.S. §1-7.5-107 — Mail ballot packets to active electors", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7.5-107"}, {"title": "C.R.S. §1-7.5-104 — Mail ballot elections", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7.5-104"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Where & How to Vote (mail + VSPC)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/mobile/whereHow.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/verified-voting-handmarked-opscan-majority__colorado-sos-where-how-to-vote-mail-vspc-paper-processed-for.png"}], "notes": "Part B empty leaf. CO all-mail/VSPC unified stream Confirmed."}
{"id": "swgdoc-minimum-24-month-fulltime-fde-training-standard", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-01", "uid": "C20260926-015040-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-01", "old_ids": ["swgdoc-minimum-24-month-fulltime-fde-training-standard"], "seq": "C00889", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Proper training takes two years of certified document-examiner schooling."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-38", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-2026", "state": "National", "description": "SWGDOC's Standard for Minimum Training Requirements for Forensic Document Examiners (v. 2013-1) requires the equivalent of a minimum of 24 months full-time training under a principal trainer (completed within four years), with baccalaureate degree and form/color/visual acuity screening for trainees, and principal trainers themselves needing ≥24 months supervised training plus five years post-training FDE experience. SWAFDE FAQs affirm the same 2–4 year full-time apprenticeship norm and reject online/correspondence courses as fulfilling basic FDE training. Status Confirmed for a third professional/standards body documenting multi-year apprenticeship as the minimum for forensic signature comparison—peer to ABFDE and ASQDE paths already on this leaf; contrasts with hours-scale election-worker signature training and is not a finding that any specific election was stolen.", "sources": [{"title": "SWGDOC — Standard for Minimum Training Requirements for Forensic Document Examiners (PDF)", "url": "https://www.swgdoc.org/documents/SWGDOC%20Standard%20for%20Minimum%20Training%20Requirements%20for%20Forensic%20Document%20Examiners.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/swgdoc-minimum-24-month-fulltime-fde-training-standard__swgdoc-standard-for-minimum-training-requirements-for-f.pdf"}, {"title": "SWAFDE — FAQs (2–4 years full-time apprenticeship; rejects online/correspondence)", "url": "https://www.swafde.org/faqs", "local": "/archives/2026/09/swgdoc-minimum-24-month-fulltime-fde-training-standard__swafde-faqs-2-4-years-full-time-apprenticeship-rejects.png"}, {"title": "SWGDOC — Membership (primary training: two years or more full-time apprenticeship)", "url": "https://www.swgdoc.org/index.php/about-us/membership", "local": "/archives/2026/09/swgdoc-minimum-24-month-fulltime-fde-training-standard__swgdoc-membership-primary-training-two-years-or-more-fu.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on Proper training takes 2 years FDE schooling leaf."}
{"id": "utah-vote-by-mail-active-voters-automatic-ballot-vote-centers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-13", "uid": "C20260926-014044-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-13", "old_ids": ["utah-vote-by-mail-active-voters-automatic-ballot-vote-centers"], "seq": "C00888", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting", "Colorado and other states force citizens to convert in-person votes to mail or drop-box ballots, laundering them all into one voting type."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-2025", "state": "UT", "description": "Utah administers elections primarily by mail: the Lieutenant Governor / Vote.Utah.gov guidance states that every active registered voter automatically receives a ballot in the mail (county clerks mail in a defined window before Election Day), with return by mail, drop box, or in-person at vote centers—so in-person Election Day voting deposits into the same statewide mail/drop processing stream rather than a separate precinct hand-count silo. Ballotpedia lists Utah among all-mail voting states; Utah Code Title 20A Chapter 3a Part 2 structures mail-ballot conduct for active voters. Status Confirmed for statutory/operational all-mail conversion of the electorate into a unified mail/drop stream—peer to Colorado VSPC-into-mail-stream statute and WA/OR/HI all-mail systems on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Vote.Utah.gov — Learn About Voting by Mail (active voters automatically receive ballots)", "url": "https://vote.utah.gov/learn-about-voting-by-mail-and-absentee-voting/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/utah-vote-by-mail-active-voters-automatic-ballot-vote-centers__vote-utah-gov-learn-about-voting-by-mail-active-voters.png"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — All-mail voting (Utah listed)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/All-mail_voting"}, {"title": "Salt Lake County Clerk — Vote by Mail", "url": "https://www.saltlakecounty.gov/clerk/elections/vote-by-mail/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/utah-vote-by-mail-active-voters-automatic-ballot-vote-centers__salt-lake-county-clerk-vote-by-mail.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on In-Person Voting converted to Mail-in leaf."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-5-102-9-voter-service-polling-centers-countywide", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-10", "uid": "C20260926-022005-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-10", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-5-102-9-voter-service-polling-centers-countywide"], "seq": "C00988", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Revised Statutes §1-5-102.9 mandates county voter service and polling centers (VSPCs) sized by active-elector counts for general elections—any eligible county voter may vote, register, update records, obtain/replace mail ballots, and drop ballots at designated centers rather than only an assigned neighborhood precinct—codifying countywide vote-center architecture after the 2013 Voter Access and Modernized Elections reforms. Status Confirmed statutory countywide center model; peer to Maricopa 2016 PPE vote centers and LA County VSAP vote-center cards—Colorado §1-5-102.9, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. §1-5-102.9 Voter service and polling centers", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-5-102.9"}, {"title": "Colorado General Assembly — CRS Title 1 PDF (includes §1-5-102.9)", "url": "https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/images/olls/crs2024-title-01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-crs-1-5-102-9-voter-service-polling-centers-countywide__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on County-Wide Voting leaf."}
{"id": "co-crs-1-5-102-9-voter-service-polling-centers-replace-precinct-model", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-14", "uid": "C20260925-214102-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-14", "old_ids": ["co-crs-1-5-102-9-voter-service-polling-centers-replace-precinct-model"], "seq": "C00337", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Enact laws that make it prohibitively difficult to qualify many locations as polling places, forcing centralization into vote centers."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-97", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-2021", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado's statutory Voter Service and Polling Center (VSPC) model (C.R.S. §1-5-102.9 and related mail-ballot code) replaces dense traditional precinct polling places with fewer multi-service centers where any county voter can cast a ballot, paired with universal mail ballots — a legal design that centralizes in-person voting infrastructure. Status Confirmed for statute-driven centralization of in-person locations relative to historic precinct density.", "sources": [{"title": "C.R.S. §1-5-102.9 — Voter service and polling centers", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-5-102.9"}, {"title": "Larimer County — Vote Center History", "url": "https://www.larimer.gov/clerk/elections/resources/history-vote-centers/vote-center-history"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 7 companion. ei-2026-09-010 (Poinsett AR closure) remains on Polling Places stub — staffing/cert barriers are a related qualification choke."}
{"id": "dominion-fl-ds-41417-optional-cellular-modem-icp-ice-results-transmission", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-08", "uid": "C20260926-014044-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-08", "old_ids": ["dominion-fl-ds-41417-optional-cellular-modem-icp-ice-results-transmission"], "seq": "C00883", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Gradual Network Interconnection Strategy", "Install wireless cards, modems, and other connectivity (even covertly) without citizens' and election officials' awareness."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-71", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-71", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-08", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Division of Elections Bureau of Voting Systems Certification's August 2013 qualification test report for Dominion Democracy Suite Release 4.14.17 documents optional cellular/analog modem hardware on ImageCast Precinct (ICP) and ImageCast Evolution (ICE) tabulators—including eDevices CellGo GPRS external cellular modem (ICP) and Zoom 4598 3G+ external cellular modem (ICE)—plus ImageCast Listener/RAS-server Standard Configuration components, and explicitly tested election-reporting transfer via 'ICP / ICE – cellular modem' (alongside analog modem, LAN, and direct methods). Status Confirmed for state certification documentation that Dominion precinct tabulators can be configured with separate cellular modem boards/devices for results transmission—peer to ES&S FAQ/DS200 modem interconnect cards on this leaf; not proof any Florida election night results were remotely altered. Distinct from Hart Verity Relay card on the alternate-networks leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida DOS — Dominion Democracy Suite 4.14.17 Version 1 Qualification Test Report (PDF)", "url": "https://files.floridados.gov/media/695113/dominion-democracy-suite-release-41417-version-1-test-report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dominion-fl-ds-41417-optional-cellular-modem-icp-ice-results-transmission__florida-dos-dominion-democracy-suite-4-14-17-version-1.pdf"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Dominion Democracy Suite equipment database (context)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/dominion-democracy-suite/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Gradual Network Interconnection > install wireless/modems leaf (Dominion peer to ESS).", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "takoma-park-md-charter-voting-age-16-2013", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-28", "uid": "C20260925-194013-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-28", "old_ids": ["takoma-park-md-charter-voting-age-16-2013"], "seq": "C00212", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Minor voting rights: this lets easily influenced minors, who cannot yet sign a contract or serve on a jury, choose laws, judges, and officials up to the president."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-07-02", "state": "MD", "description": "Takoma Park, Maryland Charter Amendment Resolution 2013-1 (adopted May 13, 2013; effective July 2, 2013) lowered the municipal voting age to 16 for city elections (mayor/council), officially documented on the city's elections and charter pages. Status Confirmed for under-18 municipal franchise expansion. Catalog leaf rhetoric that minors are 'easily manipulated' is not independently proven by these sources and is not asserted as a factual finding here.", "sources": [{"title": "Takoma Park — Charter Amendment Resolution 2013-1 (voting age 16) PDF", "url": "https://takomaparkmd.gov/DocumentCenter/View/2716"}, {"title": "Takoma Park — Elections (eligibility age 16+)", "url": "https://takomaparkmd.gov/2275/ELECTIONS"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Voting under age 18", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Voting_under_age_18"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 14. Confirmed under-18 municipal vote; manipulation claim not sourced."}
{"id": "hea-487a23-campus-voter-registration-form-distribution-mandate", "permanent_id": "C20260926-023334-05", "uid": "C20260926-023334-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-023334-05", "old_ids": ["hea-487a23-campus-voter-registration-form-distribution-mandate"], "seq": "C01065", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["College Campuses", "Our children are targeted on campuses to capture their votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-50", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013-07-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Higher Education Act Title IV §487(a)(23) (20 U.S.C. §1094(a)(23)) conditions federal student-aid program participation on institutions in NVRA-covered states making a good-faith effort to distribute state mail voter-registration forms to each degree/certificate student physically in attendance and to make forms widely available—requesting forms 120 days before the state registration deadline. ED FSA Dear Colleague letters (GEN-13-17; later GEN updates) restate the campus distribution mandate. Status Confirmed federal statutory/program-participation requirement; peer to TurboVote/SLSV and MIT campus-drive cards already on this leaf—statutory HEA mandate, not those remounted. PEP framing: federally conditioned campus registration pipelines concentrate young-voter acquisition inside institutions that also push early/mail/machine workflows.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Dept. of Education FSA — GEN-13-17 Requirement for distribution of voter registration forms", "url": "https://fsapartners.ed.gov/knowledge-center/library/dear-colleague-letters/2013-07-01/gen-13-17-subject-requirement-distribution-voter-registration-forms", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hea-487a23-campus-voter-registration-form-distribution-mandate__u-s-dept-of-education-fsa-gen-13-17-requirement-for-distribution-of-voter-registration-forms.png"}, {"title": "NAICU — HEA §487(a)(23) statutory text (voter registration forms)", "url": "https://www.naicu.edu/media/cymfswcb/hea101-voterreg.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b13 third on campus vote-capture leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-05", "uid": "C20261028-134437-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-05", "old_ids": ["ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence"], "seq": "C01617", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2013 to 2023-03-13", "state": "US", "description": "NCSL (updated March 13, 2023) reports that nineteen states and the District of Columbia (California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington) issue driver's licenses to people who cannot prove lawful presence. Examples include California's AB 60 (2013); New Jersey's 2019 law, under which \"The commission may not retain copies of documents submitted to establish eligibility\"; and New York's 2019 law, under which \"Such licenses must be visually identical to federal-purpose driver's licenses,\" apart from an allowed federal-purpose notation. [1] Every one of those jurisdictions except Utah also appears on NCSL's 2026 automatic-voter-registration table (linked card), so in 18 states and D.C. the same DMV licenses people without lawful status and feeds voter registration; keeping the two apart depends on DMV coding. [1][2] California's Motor Voter page says \"Individuals with AB 60 driver's licenses are not eligible to participate.\" [3] Status Confirmed as to the laws. The two NCSL lists date from 2023 and 2026, and NCSL does not report that any such license holder was registered.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — States Offering Driver's Licenses to Immigrants (updated March 13, 2023)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/immigration/states-offering-drivers-licenses-to-immigrants", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence__ncsl-2023-03-13.html"}, {"title": "NCSL — Automatic Voter Registration (summary and state table, updated Aug. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/automatic-voter-registration", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out__ncsl-avr-2026-08-19.html"}, {"title": "California Secretary of State — California Motor Voter (program page)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/california-motor-voter", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration__ca-sos-motor-voter-page.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ncsl-2026-avr-24-states-dc-front-end-and-back-end-opt-out", "ca-2015-ab-1461-new-motor-voter-act-opt-in-to-automatic-registration", "ei-2026-09-023", "wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request", "pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia"]}
{"id": "az-statute-allows-counties-vote-centers-decade", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-10", "uid": "C20260925-211320-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-10", "old_ids": ["az-statute-allows-counties-vote-centers-decade"], "seq": "C00255", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Centralizes control"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-19", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona state law has authorized counties to use vote centers (entirely or alongside precincts) for roughly a decade; most Arizonans now live in counties that offer countywide vote centers (Maricopa, Pima, Yuma, Yavapai, etc.), shifting administration from neighborhood precinct clerks toward county-scale site networks. Status Confirmed for the statutory/county adoption path that centralizes Election Day infrastructure at county level.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Arizona law allows vote centers; most counties use them", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/aug/01/voting-centers-have-replaced-traditional-precincts/"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 5 companion."}
{"id": "berkeley-daw-auditbear-evt12-election-logs-incomplete-or-missing", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-32", "uid": "C20260925-233150-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-32", "old_ids": ["berkeley-daw-auditbear-evt12-election-logs-incomplete-or-missing"], "seq": "C00425", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Self-deleting logs"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-56", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Wagner et al. AuditBear (EVT 2012) documents real election systems whose audit logs were incomplete, missing critical events, or otherwise inadequate for reconstructing what the software did—showing the class of non-durable/insufficient logging that 'self-deleting' or non-retained logs exemplify. Status Confirmed for documented inadequate election-log retention/completeness as a class. (2012 paper remains the canonical citation still used in 2016–present litigation/expert work.)", "sources": [{"title": "AuditBear — Berkeley EVT'12 PDF", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/auditbear-evt12.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Halderman Coffee County userlog erasability exhibit", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "berkeley-daw-auditbear-evt12-incomplete-election-audit-logs", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-27", "uid": "C20260925-220029-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-27", "old_ids": ["berkeley-daw-auditbear-evt12-incomplete-election-audit-logs"], "seq": "C00380", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete logging"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Academic work 'Automated Analysis of Election Audit Logs' (Berkeley/EVT 2012) analyzes real voting-system audit logs and documents incomplete logging—missing machine records and gaps that limit detection of omitted or altered vote events. Status Confirmed that production election audit logs can be incomplete in ways that impair forensic reconstruction.", "sources": [{"title": "Berkeley — Automated Analysis of Election Audit Logs (PDF)", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/auditbear-evt12.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 14."}
{"id": "fec-name-of-another-ban-52usc-30122-straw-funding-legal-framework", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-18", "uid": "C20260926-000809-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-18", "old_ids": ["fec-name-of-another-ban-52usc-30122-straw-funding-legal-framework"], "seq": "C00571", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Bribe others to run to split the vote"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-04", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012", "state": "Federal", "description": "FECA's contributions-in-the-name-of-another ban (52 U.S.C. §30122)—the statute FEC invoked in Rivera—exists precisely because secretly financing another candidacy (including to split a primary) is a recognized abuse vector. Status Confirmed for the legal framework targeting straw/split-vote funding; Rivera outcome remains Partially confirmed separately.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — FEC v. Rivera (Act §30122 name-of-another framing)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-rivera/"}, {"title": "FEC Record — Appeals court vacates Rivera summary judgment", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/appeals-court-vacates-grant-of-summary-judgment-in-fec-v-rivera/"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-37", "uid": "C20260926-000809-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-37", "old_ids": ["openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized"], "seq": "C00590", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "There is no public place where all totals are posted transparently."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012", "state": "Federal", "description": "OpenElections (founded 2012; ongoing) exists because the U.S. lacks a single free, standardized public posting of all precinct-level certified totals—volunteers must FOIA/scrape/convert disparate official sources. That mission statement is itself evidence there is no universal public place where all totals are transparently and additionally posted. Status Confirmed. Foundational project still active 2016–present.", "sources": [{"title": "OpenElections — About (mission: first free standardized precinct results)", "url": "https://openelections.net/about/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized__openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized.png"}, {"title": "Nature Scientific Data — American election results at the precinct level (2022)", "url": "https://www.nature.com/articles/s41597-022-01745-0", "local": "/archives/2026/09/openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized__openelections-precinct-results-not-uniformly-public-standardized.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 19. Soft companion to fill-20e Reporting accuracy leaf."}
{"id": "lindeman-stark-gentle-introduction-rla-audits-reported-vs-paper-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-11", "uid": "C20260926-021547-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-11", "old_ids": ["lindeman-stark-gentle-introduction-rla-audits-reported-vs-paper-ballots"], "seq": "C00974", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Audits are engineered to avoid catching fraud (easy when the fraud is algorithmic)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012/2020", "state": "US", "description": "Lindeman & Stark's Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits (NIST-hosted) states that RLAs check whether reported outcomes are consistent with a trustworthy paper trail of voter-verified ballots—if the paper trail itself is wrong (e.g., BMD barcode misprint), an RLA can confirm the wrong outcome rather than catch algorithmic fraud. Status Confirmed that RLAs engineered against paper-vs-report disagreement do not detect fraud baked into the paper trail; peer to Stark Curling BMD-misprint declarations and GA 2020 incomplete-accounting audit notes—Gentle Introduction framing, not those remounted. PEP framing: hand-marked paper is the trustworthy trail RLAs need.", "sources": [{"title": "Lindeman & Stark — A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits (NIST-hosted)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/document/gentle-introduction-risk-limiting-audits", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lindeman-stark-gentle-introduction-rla-audits-reported-vs-paper-ballots__lindeman-stark-a-gentle-introduction-to-risk-limiting-audits-nist-hosted.pdf"}, {"title": "Stark — They may look and look, yet not see: BMDs cannot be tested adequately (arXiv HTML)", "url": "https://arxiv.org/html/1908.08144", "local": "/archives/2026/09/lindeman-stark-gentle-introduction-rla-audits-reported-vs-paper-ballots__stark-they-may-look-and-look-yet-not-see-bmds-cannot-be-tested-adequately-arxi.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Engineered to avoid catching the fraud (algorithmic) leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "co-nist-rla-sample-by-design", "permanent_id": "C20260925-182526-05", "uid": "C20260925-182526-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-182526-05", "old_ids": ["co-nist-rla-sample-by-design"], "seq": "C00088", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "\"Risk-limiting audits\" and \"partial manual counts\" are used to justify auditing only a small portion, convincing the public the rest of the tabulation is accurate."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-64", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-2026", "state": "CO/US", "description": "Official RLA definitions establish that risk-limiting audits examine a statistically chosen subset of ballots—not a full hand count of every ballot up front. Colorado SOS RLA FAQs state ballots are randomly selected from county manifests and that \"the number of ballots that are chosen to audit is based on the margin of the race that is targeted. The closer the margin, the more ballots are audited.\" Colorado Election Rule 25 defines an RLA as a post-election audit with a pre-specified minimum chance of requiring a full hand count if a full hand count would change the reported outcome—i.e., expansion to full count is a contingency, while ordinary operation is a sample. NIST's Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits illustrates stopping sample sizes on the order of tens to low hundreds of ballots for multi-percent margins (e.g., ~96 ballots in a worked 5% diluted-margin example at 10% risk). Status Confirmed that RLAs are partial-sample audits by design. This does not prove hand counts are slow or unworkable; it contrasts sample audits that leave most ballots unexamined by hand with a full transparent hand count (PEP) that verifies every ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado SOS — Risk-Limiting Audit FAQs (sample size set by margin)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/elections/RLA/faqs.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-rla-statute-1-7-515__colorado-sos-risk-limiting-audit-faqs.png"}, {"title": "8 CCR 1505-1 Rule 25 — Risk-limiting audit definition (sample; full hand count contingency)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/colorado/8-CCR-1505-1-25"}, {"title": "NIST — A Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits (PDF)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/2025/03/31/A_Gentle_Introduction_to_Risk-Limiting_Audits.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-nist-rla-sample-by-design__nist-a-gentle-introduction-to-risk-limiting-audits-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "C.R.S. §1-7-515 — Risk-limiting audits", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7-515"}], "notes": "Confirmed partial-sample-by-design. Distinct from co-rla-statute-1-7-515 / va-rla-2024-general (parent Auditing path only). Do not frame as proof hand counts fail—PEP full hand count as transparency contrast."}
{"id": "ca-elec-code-2170-conditional-voter-registration-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-07", "uid": "C20260926-014044-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-07", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-code-2170-conditional-voter-registration-election-day"], "seq": "C00882", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Same-day voter registration, which paves the way for last-second ballot injections"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §2170 establishes Conditional Voter Registration (CVR): during the 14 days immediately preceding an election or on Election Day, an eligible elector may deliver a registration affidavit to the county elections official and cast a provisional (or, under specified VoteCal checks, nonprovisional) ballot; the registration becomes effective if eligibility/DMV-or-SSA validation succeeds during the canvass. NCSL and Ballotpedia list California among same-day/Election Day registration states under this statute. Status Confirmed for statutory last-window registration+ballot casting architecture—peer to NCSL multi-state SDR inventory and Minnesota's same-day registration post-check practice; not proof of phantom ballot injection.", "sources": [{"title": "California Elections Code §2170 — Conditional Voter Registration", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=2170.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-code-2170-conditional-voter-registration-election-day__california-elections-code-2170-conditional-voter-regist.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Same Day Voter Registration (California CVR)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/same-day-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Same-day voter registration (CA Elec Code §2170)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Same-day_voter_registration"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Same-day voter registration leaf."}
{"id": "ga-ajc-precinct-closures-polling-places-dwindled-2012-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260926-013447-09", "uid": "C20260926-013447-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-013447-09", "old_ids": ["ga-ajc-precinct-closures-polling-places-dwindled-2012-2020"], "seq": "C00868", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-06", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-2020", "state": "GA", "description": "Atlanta Journal-Constitution and GPB/NPR reporting documented large net reductions in Georgia Election Day polling places after the Supreme Court ended preclearance: AJC analysis found counties closed 214 precincts between 2012 and 2018 with measurable turnout effects where travel distances jumped; by mid-2020 coverage cited ~214–331 fewer locations statewide versus earlier baselines, with metro Atlanta losing dozens of sites and 2020 COVID consolidations further concentrating voters (e.g., Fulton sites serving thousands). Status Confirmed for documented polling-place consolidation/closures—peer to Poinsett County AR's 2026 temporary Tyronza site closure for worker-certification shortage (ei-2026-09-010); distinct causes (resource/preclearance/COVID vs. training-window shortage) but same Polling Places leaf surface.", "sources": [{"title": "AJC — Precinct closures decrease Election Day turnout in Georgia", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/precinct-closures-harm-voter-turnout-georgia-ajc-analysis-finds/11sVcLyQCHuQRC8qtZ6lYP/"}, {"title": "GPB — For Nonwhite Georgia Voters, Numbers Have Soared As Polling Places Dwindled", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2020/10/17/for-nonwhite-georgia-voters-numbers-have-soared-polling-places-dwindled"}, {"title": "NPR — Why Do Nonwhite Georgia Voters Have To Wait In Line For Hours?", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2020/10/17/924527679/why-do-nonwhite-georgia-voters-have-to-wait-in-line-for-hours-too-few-polling-pl"}], "notes": "Enrich-b2 peer to ei-2026-09-010 (Polling Places closures/consolidation)."}
{"id": "pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-13", "uid": "C20261020-160717-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-13", "old_ids": ["pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney"], "seq": "C01006", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-11-06", "state": "PA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 6, 2012, a voter in Millerstown Borough, Perry County, Pennsylvania filmed an ES&S iVotronic (\"IVO\") touchscreen lighting up Mitt Romney each time he pressed Barack Obama; he wrote that everything from the top of Romney's button to the bottom of Obama's checkbox selected Romney. The YouTube video went viral. Perry County said that at about 9:15 a.m. it received the report, the voter cancelled the vote and used another machine, and the machine was pulled, recalibrated, tested and returned to service; it was \"not aware of any votes that were improperly cast and counted.\" Department of State spokesman Ron Ruman said the machine was broken and had been fixed, calling it a momentary glitch. The same day in Lewisburg, Union County, Bucknell staffer Andy Hirsh filmed a machine selecting Romney for Obama and David Freed for Kathleen Kane; he said another voter had complained about the same machine, and it was taken out of service and recalibrated (NBC). Video: a 17-second YouTube repost of the Perry County clip shows the Romney/Ryan field lit while the finger presses Obama/Biden. Direction: Democrat to Republican. Status Confirmed: state and county officials confirmed the malfunction and recalibration. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WGAL — Voter reports problem casting presidential ballot; Perry County statement (Nov. 6, 2012)", "url": "https://www.wgal.com/article/voter-reports-problem-casting-presidential-ballot/6223129", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__wgal2012.html"}, {"title": "The Times Herald (AP) — Pa. machine switched vote from Obama to Romney (Nov. 6, 2012)", "url": "https://www.timesherald.com/2012/11/06/pa-machine-switched-vote-from-obama-to-romney/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__th2012.html"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer (AP) — Official: Central Pa. vote-switching machine fixed (Nov. 6, 2012)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/breaking/20121106_Official__Central_Pa__vote-switching_machine_fixed.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__inq2012.html"}, {"title": "NBC10 Philadelphia — Pa. Voter: Faulty Voting Machine Picked Wrong Candidate (Union County, Nov. 6, 2012)", "url": "https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/politics/pennsylvania-voting-machine-picked-wrong-candidate/1949130/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__nbc10_2012.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (wgal2012, th2012, inq2012, nbc10_2012). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted. Video archived with capture_video.py (unredacted).", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fHQtM0DrTNQ", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__youtube-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__youtube-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 17.485, "bytes": 2071345, "sha256": "c17d5b1f0db5da4ca40c0f95c4f4265887350f7d7a6c348098ee9c22e21b3285", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/pa-2012-perry-union-ivotronic-obama-touch-selects-romney__youtube-video.json"}]}
{"id": "co-mesa-pueblo-2012-romney-touch-obama-machine-recalibrated-pulled", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-14", "uid": "C20261020-160717-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-14", "old_ids": ["co-mesa-pueblo-2012-romney-touch-obama-machine-recalibrated-pulled"], "seq": "C01007", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-10", "state": "CO", "description": "On the first day of October 2012 early voting in Mesa County, Colorado, a voter complained that a touchscreen would not record his intended choice (reported by the Grand Junction Daily Sentinel; the RNC cited it as a Romney-to-Obama flip). Clerk and Recorder Sheila Reiner said there was a problem with that single machine's calibration; a technician recalibrated it and, although it then worked, the county stopped using it, and the voter cast a paper ballot. In Pueblo County the Republican Party reported about 15 similar complaints, and nine Pueblo and three Adams County reports reached the state; Secretary of State Scott Gessler's office investigated with both parties and \"weren't able to reproduce the problem.\" The RNC's Nov. 2012 letter to six states, including Colorado, asked for recalibration of all touchscreens. Status Confirmed for Mesa (the clerk confirmed a calibration fault); the Pueblo reports were not reproduced. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Westword — Romney votes in Colorado might count for Obama? RNC, officials on computer glitch (Nov. 2012)", "url": "https://www.westword.com/news/romney-votes-in-colorado-might-count-for-obama-rnc-officials-on-computer-glitch-5872195/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-mesa-pueblo-2012-romney-touch-obama-machine-recalibrated-pulled__westword2012a.html"}, {"title": "Westword — Romney backers accidentally voting for Obama?: GOP cites more reports of machine errors (Nov. 2012)", "url": "https://www.westword.com/news/romney-backers-accidentally-voting-for-obama-gop-cites-more-reports-of-machine-errors-5842252/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-mesa-pueblo-2012-romney-touch-obama-machine-recalibrated-pulled__westword2012b.html"}, {"title": "CBS4 Colorado — Republicans Want Touch-Screen Voting Machines Recalibrated (Nov. 3, 2012)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/colorado/news/republicans-want-touch-screen-voting-machines-recalibrated/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-mesa-pueblo-2012-romney-touch-obama-machine-recalibrated-pulled__cbsco2012.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (westword2012a, westword2012b, cbsco2012). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-11", "uid": "C20261020-160717-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-11", "old_ids": ["nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated"], "seq": "C01004", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-10", "state": "NC", "description": "During October 2012 early voting, about two dozen Guilford County, North Carolina voters (Bur-Mil Park, Jamestown, Pleasant Garden sites; e.g., Faurest Stum) reported that touchscreens marked Barack Obama when they touched Mitt Romney; Davidson, Mecklenburg and New Hanover counties had a handful of reports. Guilford elections director George Gilbert said the cause is calibration between the touch layer and display, that machines are calibrated each morning but can drift during the day, that recalibration takes about 60 seconds, and that \"it can go either way, and it has\"; the same happened in 2008. State director Gary Bartlett told the RNC that all 24 Guilford voters corrected their ballots and that improperly calibrated machines do not systematically favor one party. The RNC then asked six states to recalibrate all touchscreens before Election Day. The South Carolina Legislative Audit Council later cited North Carolina's 2012 early-voting reports as iVotronic vote flipping. Status Confirmed: the county director confirmed calibration drift and recalibrated the machines. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WXII 12 — Glitches reported at early voting sites in Guilford, Davidson (Oct. 2012)", "url": "https://www.wxii12.com/article/glitches-reported-at-early-voting-sites-in-guilford-davidson/2047905", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated__wxii2012.html"}, {"title": "FOX8 — More voting problems reported in Jamestown, Pleasant Garden (Oct. 2012)", "url": "https://myfox8.com/news/more-early-voting-issues-in-guilford-county/"}, {"title": "Computerworld — States rebut RNC complaints about e-voting systems (Nov. 2012)", "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/1413098/states-rebut-rnc-complaints-about-e-voting-systems.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated__cwrnc2012.html"}, {"title": "WRAL — RNC asks elections officials to double-check equipment (Nov. 2012)", "url": "https://wral.com/story/rnc-asks-elections-officials-to-double-check-equipment/11729680/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated__wral2012.html"}, {"title": "South Carolina Legislative Audit Council — A Review of the State Election Commission (2013), iVotronic vote flipping incl. NC 2012 (PDF)", "url": "https://lac.sc.gov/sites/lac/files/Documents/Legislative%20Audit%20Council/Reports/A-K/SEC_2013.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-guilford-2012-early-voting-24-flip-reports-recalibrated__sclac2013.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (wxii2012, cwrnc2012, wral2012, sclac2013). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): FOX8. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "washpost-nep-cancel-exit-polls-19-states-2012", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-09", "uid": "C20260925-185839-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-09", "old_ids": ["washpost-nep-cancel-exit-polls-19-states-2012"], "seq": "C00160", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Early Voting", "Early voting makes exit polling more difficult and costly."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-10-04", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "The Washington Post reported that the National Election Pool (networks + AP) reduced full state exit-poll coverage from all 50 states to 31 for 2012, citing mounting survey costs as early voting forced expensive telephone supplements to in-person precinct interviews. ABC elections director Dan Merkle said the aim was still to deliver a quality product in the most important states amid those costs. Contemporaneous Texas Tribune coverage confirmed Texas among states that lost full state-level exit polls. Status Confirmed that early-voting-driven cost/complexity led NEP to drop statewide exit polls in 19 states.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Networks, AP cancel exit polls in 19 states", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2012/10/04/networks-ap-cancel-exit-polls-in-19-states/"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — No exit polls for Texas (2012)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2012/10/04/no-more-exit-polls-texas/"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 4. Cost-driven coverage cut Confirmed."}
{"id": "nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-39", "uid": "C20260926-000809-39", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-39", "old_ids": ["nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection"], "seq": "C00592", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below the margin of error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST-hosted Lindeman & Stark 'Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits' explains that small margins require examining far more ballots because distributed or dilute miscounts can hide beneath conventional recount thresholds/'margin of error' intuitions—RLAs enlarge samples as diluted margin shrinks. Catalog tactic of distributing manipulation below MoE/recount margins is exactly the threat model RLAs address. Foundational pre-2016 OK; still governing practice. Status Confirmed for the detection problem / threat model; does not prove any specific election was so manipulated. PEP: precinct hand count observes all ballots locally without trusting statewide dilute margins.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits (Lindeman & Stark)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/document/gentle-introduction-risk-limiting-audits", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-lindeman-stark-rla-vs-fixed-recount-thresholds-soft-companion__nist-gentle-introduction-to-risk-limiting-audits.pdf"}, {"title": "Stark — Super-simple simultaneous single-ballot RLAs (EVT/WOTE 2010)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evtwote10/tech/full_papers/Stark.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection__nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 20. PEP contrast on dilute-margin / software-tabulation dependence."}
{"id": "nist-lindeman-stark-rla-vs-fixed-recount-thresholds-soft-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-38", "uid": "C20260926-001426-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-38", "old_ids": ["nist-lindeman-stark-rla-vs-fixed-recount-thresholds-soft-companion"], "seq": "C00631", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below recount thresholds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-03", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-09", "state": "Federal", "description": "Lindeman & Stark's NIST-hosted Gentle Introduction to RLAs explains why fixed recount/audit thresholds miss dilute, distributed outcome-changing error—motivating risk-limiting methods that enlarge samples as margins shrink. Soft remount companion to fill-20f MoE cards onto this recount-margin pathKey. Foundational pre-2016 OK. Status Confirmed for the detection problem. PEP framing as on leaf 19 primary.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Gentle Introduction to Risk-Limiting Audits", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/document/gentle-introduction-risk-limiting-audits", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-lindeman-stark-rla-vs-fixed-recount-thresholds-soft-companion__nist-gentle-introduction-to-risk-limiting-audits.pdf"}, {"title": "Appel — Effective audit policy for voter-verified paper ballots", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/appel-audits.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-lindeman-stark-rla-vs-fixed-recount-thresholds-soft-companion__appel-effective-audit-policy-for-voter-verified-paper-ballots.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 19 companion. PEP framing."}
{"id": "klimek-election-forensics-precinct-turnout-clustering-detection", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-04", "uid": "C20260926-010219-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-04", "old_ids": ["klimek-election-forensics-precinct-turnout-clustering-detection"], "seq": "C00837", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Distribution", "Do not choose records in the same precinct; distribute them across precincts where there is room. Stay under 100% voter participation so the injections do not stand out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-14", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-09-24", "state": "Federal", "description": "Peer-reviewed election-forensics literature (Klimek et al., PNAS 2012; summarized in the IIE/UM Election Forensics Guide) shows that ballot-stuffing concentrated in a subset of precincts produces detectable right-skew / fat-tail turnout distributions and unusually high turnout–vote correlations — i.e., clustering illicit associations in the same precincts makes statistical anomalies that stick out. Soft companion establishing why the leaf advises distributing records across precincts with leftover participation room rather than concentrating them. Status Confirmed for the forensic detection principle (foundational method still cited 2016–present); US cabal application Alleged case-by-case. Note: viral 2020 MI '>100% turnout' lists were largely data errors — the scrutiny those claims drew still illustrates how over-participation figures attract immediate investigation.", "sources": [{"title": "Klimek et al. — Statistical detection of systematic election irregularities (PNAS 2012)", "url": "https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1210722109"}, {"title": "IIE / University of Michigan — A Guide to Elections Forensics (turnout-distribution tools)", "url": "https://www.iie.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/UM-Election-Forensics-Guide-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/klimek-election-forensics-precinct-turnout-clustering-detection__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 2 companion. Foundational 2012 OK (methods used in modern forensics). Soft remount of clustering-detection family."}
{"id": "buzzfeed-2012-unions-bused-occupy-protesters-charlotte-dnc-bus-in", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-07", "uid": "C20260926-033715-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-07", "old_ids": ["buzzfeed-2012-unions-bused-occupy-protesters-charlotte-dnc-bus-in"], "seq": "C01232", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Bus-in tactics"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-09-04", "state": "NC", "description": "BuzzFeed News (Sept. 4, 2012) documented that Strong Economy for All—a New York labor coalition including SEIU 1199, UFT, RWDSU, and CWA—paid for buses carrying Occupy activists from New York to Tampa, with organizers then dropping 40+ protesters in Charlotte for DNC demonstrations—establishing organized charter bus-in capability for political protest optics. Status Confirmed primary BuzzFeed reporting with coalition spokesman confirmation of paid buses; peer to NPR Crowds on Demand paid-transport capability and PolitiFact charter-bus-not-proof-paid cards already on this leaf—union/Occupy bus-in instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: bused-in bodies manufacture protest scale that public hand counts of paper ballots cannot be skewed by.", "sources": [{"title": "BuzzFeed News — Unions Bused Occupy Protesters To Charlotte (Sept. 4, 2012)", "url": "https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/rosiegray/unions-bused-occupy-protesters-to-charlotte"}, {"title": "WFAE — DNC protesters / Charlotte march context companion", "url": "https://www.wfae.org/politics/2012-09-03/dnc-protesters-police-coordinate-for-peaceful-march"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Forced Opposition Bus-In Tactics leaf (non-COD/PolitiFact)."}
{"id": "tx-dominion-assure-1-3-cert-denial-2013", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-05", "uid": "C20260926-020046-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-05", "old_ids": ["tx-dominion-assure-1-3-cert-denial-2013"], "seq": "C00922", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Labs approve systems."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-08/2013-03", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Secretary of State voting-system examination records list Dominion Voting Systems **Assure 1.3** (GEMS / AccuVote components) as examined Aug. 22–23, 2012 and **Denied** certification on **March 12, 2013**—the same official Dominion status table that later records Democracy Suite 5.5 and 5.5-A denials. Status Confirmed that Texas's lab/examiner process refused state approval of a Dominion system years before the 5.5/5.5-A denials already on this leaf—showing certification is not a rubber stamp even after federal pathways; peer to TX 5.5 and 5.5-A denials.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SOS — Voting System Examination(s) and Status for Dominion (Assure 1.3 Denied 3/12/2013)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/dominion.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-dominion-assure-1-3-cert-denial-2013__texas-sos-voting-system-examination-s-and-status-for-do.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on labs/state certification approve-or-deny leaf.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote", "Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote Democracy Suite", "Diebold/Premier AccuVote", "Diebold/Premier GEMS"]}
{"id": "co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-17", "uid": "C20261028-132233-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-17", "old_ids": ["co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir"], "seq": "C01612", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Covertly link \"secret\" ballots back to voters through serialization and tracking"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2012-05 to 2014-10-21", "state": "CO", "description": "In Citizen Center v. Gessler (10th Cir. No. 12-1414, decided Oct. 21, 2014), the court described how in May 2012 six Colorado counties (Larimer, Jefferson, Boulder, Chaffee, Eagle, and Mesa) \"had the theoretical ability to learn how individuals voted because the ballots were traceable.\" [1] The plaintiffs identified three ways: a unique number or barcode on the ballot, a ballot that is unique on a voting machine, and a ballot that is unique within a batch. [1] New Secretary of State regulations then prohibited unique numbers or barcodes, required at least ten ballots of each style per number, and required batch numbers to be dissociated; the court held the case partly moot, dismissed most claims, and reversed and remanded the equal protection and procedural due process claims against the Secretary of State. [1] Status Confirmed: federal appellate opinion.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit — Citizen Center v. Gessler, No. 12-1414, opinion (Oct. 21, 2014; Judge Bacharach)", "url": "https://ca10.washburnlaw.edu/cases/2014/10/12-1414.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-citizen-center-v-gessler-2014-six-counties-traceable-ballots-10th-cir__ca10-12-1414-opinion-2014-10-21.pdf"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. The opinion spells the county \"Chafee.\"", "related": ["pa-delco-2026-06-director-affidavit-mail-ballot-barcode-could-identify-voter", "pa-allegheny-2021-10-npc-barcode-and-voter-name-printed-on-secrecy-envelope-30-ballots", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "hart-verity-cvr-randomized-order-privacy", "colorado-corla-cvr-anonymity-shuffle-privacy", "dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance", "pa-honey-v-lycoming-2026-cvr-not-ballot-box-contents-years-of-word-games"]}
{"id": "nistir-7551-uocava-threat-analysis-electronic-cast-ballot-return", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-08", "uid": "C20260925-234437-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-08", "old_ids": ["nistir-7551-uocava-threat-analysis-electronic-cast-ballot-return"], "seq": "C00441", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "No one seems to ask \"How could a bad actor manipulate this?\" of each new part of UOCAVA that is brought forward."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-52", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-52", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011", "state": "Federal", "description": "NISTIR 7551 A Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems documents threats across postal, fax, email, and web transmission of registration materials, blank ballots, and cast ballots, concluding that electronic transmission of cast ballots poses more serious challenges than blank-ballot delivery. Status Confirmed as foundational federal threat analysis still cited in 2016–present UOCAVA risk guidance. Foundational pre-2016 security research allowed when catalog cites the mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — NISTIR 7551 Threat Analysis on UOCAVA Voting Systems (govinfo PDF)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GOVPUB-C13-4ba3a3b7b6d892fb6850f5700d779469/pdf/GOVPUB-C13-4ba3a3b7b6d892fb6850f5700d779469.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nistir-7551-uocava-threat-analysis-electronic-cast-ballot-return__nist-nistir-7551-threat-analysis-on-uocava-voting-systems-govinfo-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA Mail-in Voting Infrastructure Risk Assessment (references electronic return risk)", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa-mail-in-voting-infrastructure-risk-assessment_508.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 4 companion. Foundational NISTIR within catalog-cited security research."}
{"id": "wa-or-hi-all-mail-voting-systems", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-24", "uid": "C20260925-183614-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-24", "old_ids": ["wa-or-hi-all-mail-voting-systems"], "seq": "C00112", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["In-Person Voting Converted to Mail-In Voting", "Colorado and other states force citizens to convert in-person votes to mail or drop-box ballots, laundering them all into one voting type."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-18", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-18", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011-2026", "state": "WA/OR/HI", "description": "Washington, Oregon, and Hawaii likewise conduct statewide elections primarily by mail: every active voter is mailed a ballot; in-person options are typically limited to voting centers / ballot drop-off that feed the same mail-ballot processing and central tabulation—not neighborhood precinct Election Day hand counts. Status Confirmed additional all-mail states beyond Colorado that convert the dominant voting path into a unified mail/drop-box stream.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia — Ballot drop box laws by state (all-mail context WA/OR/HI)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_drop_box_laws_by_state"}, {"title": "EAC — Ballot Drop Box white paper (all-mail / drop-box systems)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Ballot_Drop_Box.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado Lawyer — Beyond the Myth of Election Insecurity (CO all-mail model overview)", "url": "https://cl.cobar.org/features/beyond-the-myth-of-election-insecurity/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-or-hi-all-mail-voting-systems__colorado-lawyer-beyond-the-myth-of-election-insecurity-co-al.png"}], "notes": "Part B CO-force leaf; sibling all-mail states Confirmed."}
{"id": "argonne-2011-diebold-accuvote-hardware-mitm-remote-tamper", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-12", "uid": "C20260926-020640-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-12", "old_ids": ["argonne-2011-diebold-accuvote-hardware-mitm-remote-tamper"], "seq": "C00945", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Backdoors"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-32", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011-09", "state": "US", "description": "Argonne National Laboratory researchers publicly demonstrated (2011) a **hardware man-in-the-middle** attack on Diebold AccuVote-TS machines using ~$26 of commodity electronics inserted into the circuitry to **remotely intercept and alter votes** without modifying official source code—an undocumented backdoor-like path outside the application UI. Status Confirmed researcher-demonstrated remote hardware tamper surface on a widely deployed DRE; peer to VA WinVote Wi-Fi default/WEP compromise and Halderman Coffee County EMS SQL edit path—Argonne AccuVote MITM, not those remounts.", "sources": [{"title": "Ars Technica — Diebold voting machines vulnerable to remote tampering via man-in-the-middle (Argonne)", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2011/09/diebold-voting-machines-vulnerable-to-remote-tampering-via-man-in-the-middle-attack/"}, {"title": "Salon — Diebold voting machines can be hacked by remote control (Argonne ~$26 hardware)", "url": "https://www.salon.com/2011/09/27/votinghack/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on tabulation back doors leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "eac-2011-ess-unity-ds200-ballot-skew-technical-advisory", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-05", "uid": "C20260926-022424-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-05", "old_ids": ["eac-2011-ess-unity-ds200-ballot-skew-technical-advisory"], "seq": "C01035", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Misalignment between the front and back of the ballot causes misreads, easily diverting ballots to adjudication for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-63", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011-07-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "EAC Certified System Technical Advisory ESS2011-03 (July 28, 2011) and the related formal investigation of ES&S Unity 3.2.x documented that DS200 scanners can fail to count a valid marked position when ballot images are skewed/distorted—shifting mark-evaluation areas away from printed voting targets—so a marked oval may be read as a different selection or not registered at all. EAC image review found varying skew especially on longer (e.g., 17\") ballots. Status Confirmed federal advisory that misalignment/skew causes misreads and lost/ redirected marks (adjudication pathway); peer to ES&S Ballot Production Guide front/back registration and Maricopa 2020 calibration cards—EAC DS200 skew advisory, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Technical Advisory ESS2011-03 Unity 3.2.1.0 DS200 Ballot Skew", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Unity3210_Ballot_Skew-Technical_Advisory-07.28.2011-FINAL.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2011-ess-unity-ds200-ballot-skew-technical-advisory__eac-technical-advisory-ess2011-03-unity-3-2-1-0-ds200-ballot-skew.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Formal Investigation ES&S Unity 3.2.0.0 (ballot skew / DS200)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/voting_system/files/Formal_Investigation_ESS_Unity_3200_FINAL_12.20.11.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2011-ess-unity-ds200-ballot-skew-technical-advisory__eac-formal-investigation-es-s-unity-3-2-0-0-ballot-skew-ds200.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Misalignment front/rear ballot leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S DS200"]}
{"id": "pressenterprise-2011-san-jacinto-recall-petition-forgery-hill", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-03", "uid": "C20260926-032507-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-03", "old_ids": ["pressenterprise-2011-san-jacinto-recall-petition-forgery-hill"], "seq": "C01198", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall booths are set up, then the signatures are thrown out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011-07-25", "state": "CA", "description": "Press-Enterprise (July 25, 2011) reported Riverside County DA charges of perjury and forgery against paid signature-gatherer Lillian Hill after the San Jacinto City Council recall: the registrar rejected 655 signatures she submitted as non-matching, and investigator Jorge Chavez documented more than 20 voters identifying their listed signatures as forgeries; Hill allegedly admitted fraud and reimbursed the $480 paid for the signatures. Status Confirmed primary Press-Enterprise / Riverside DA charging record of forged recall-petition signatures thrown out by the registrar; peer to Voice of OC Buena Park 33-felony and LA Times Gascón dead-person signature cards already on this leaf—San Jacinto 2010/2011 Hill forgery instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: forged recall signatures that registrars throw out show how petition theater can manufacture or invalidate citizen-initiated counts outside public hand-count observation of ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Press-Enterprise — San Jacinto: Petition forgery alleged in 2010 recall (July 25, 2011)", "url": "https://www.pressenterprise.com/2011/07/25/san-jacinto-petition-forgery-alleged-in-2010-recall/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pressenterprise-2011-san-jacinto-recall-petition-forgery-hill__press-enterprise-san-jacinto-petition-forgery-alleged-in-201.png"}, {"title": "People v. Calban, 65 Cal. App. 3d 578 — circulating/filing recall petitions with forged signatures (companion statute case)", "url": "https://app.midpage.ai/document/people-v-calban-2114491"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Recalls Fake recall booths / sigs thrown out leaf."}
{"id": "ca-top-two-candidates-open-primary-act", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-24", "uid": "C20260925-184601-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-24", "old_ids": ["ca-top-two-candidates-open-primary-act"], "seq": "C00142", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Open primaries can be used to cheat: they let the opposing party control who is on the ticket. Open primaries are a Trojan horse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2011-01-01", "state": "CA", "description": "California's Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act (Prop 14; effective Jan 1, 2011) places all candidates for voter-nominated offices on one ballot; any voter may vote for any candidate regardless of party preference, and only the top two vote-getters advance—even if both are from the same party. The California Secretary of State documents this crossover structure explicitly. Status Confirmed for the open/top-two structure enabling cross-party influence over who reaches the general; 'trojan horse' motive language is advocacy opinion.", "sources": [{"title": "CA Secretary of State — Primary Elections in California", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/primary-elections-california", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-top-two-candidates-open-primary-act__ca-secretary-of-state-primary-elections-in-california.png"}, {"title": "PPIC — Open Primaries (At Issue)", "url": "https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/content/pubs/atissue/AI_210EMAI.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-top-two-candidates-open-primary-act__ppic-open-primaries-at-issue.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 11. CA top-two open primary structure."}
{"id": "appel-effective-audit-policy-fixed-percent-may-miss-distributed-small-fraud", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-40", "uid": "C20260926-000809-40", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-40", "old_ids": ["appel-effective-audit-policy-fixed-percent-may-miss-distributed-small-fraud"], "seq": "C00593", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Distribute the manipulation across states, counties, and precincts to stay below the margin of error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010", "state": "Federal", "description": "Appel's effective-audit-policy work (and related Stark conservative audits) shows fixed-percentage precinct audits can fail to detect fraud distributed to stay under recount/MoE thresholds—motivating risk-limiting methods. Status Confirmed for the academic/security finding that distribution-below-threshold is a live attack/error class against weak audits.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel — Effective audit policy for voter-verified paper ballots (Princeton)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/appel-audits.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-effective-audit-policy-fixed-percent-may-miss-distributed-small-fraud__appel-effective-audit-policy-fixed-percent-may-miss-distributed-small.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST — Gentle Introduction to RLAs", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/document/gentle-introduction-risk-limiting-audits", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection__nist-lindeman-stark-rla-small-margins-distributed-error-detection.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 20 companion. Foundational pre-2016 cited by catalog security framing."}
{"id": "census-citizenship-moved-to-acs-2010", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-01", "uid": "C20260925-184601-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-01", "old_ids": ["census-citizenship-moved-to-acs-2010"], "seq": "C00119", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Population", "Before 2010, the census form included a citizenship question."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010", "state": "Federal", "description": "The U.S. Supreme Court in Department of Commerce v. New York (2019) recounts that citizenship/birthplace questions appeared on decennial censuses for much of U.S. history, then on the long-form sample through 2000; for the 2010 Census the citizenship question was moved off the short-form decennial questionnaire onto the American Community Survey (ACS), which is sent annually to a small sample of households. Catalog leaf concerns removal of the citizenship question from the Census Form prior to/around 2010. Status Confirmed for the historical form change as stated in the Court's opinion; motive claims are not adjudicated here.", "sources": [{"title": "Supreme Court — Department of Commerce v. New York, 18-966 (slip op.)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/18-966_bq7c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/census-citizenship-moved-to-acs-2010__supreme-court-department-of-commerce-v-new-york-18-966-slip.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — Department of Commerce v. New York, 588 U.S. ___ (2019)", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/588/18-966/"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 1. Primary: SCOTUS factual background on 2010 ACS move."}
{"id": "fec-mur5814-campaign-manager-embezzlement-control-of-funds", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-24", "uid": "C20260926-002008-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-24", "old_ids": ["fec-mur5814-campaign-manager-embezzlement-control-of-funds"], "seq": "C00657", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "Many campaign managers are controlled opposition who try to control and spy on citizen candidates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-97", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC MUR 5814 and related enforcement records document campaign managers/treasurers exercising unilateral control over candidate funds (including embezzlement cases)—illustrating how managers can dominate citizen candidates' operations and information flow. Soft companion to fill-20g financial-manager embezzlement cards. Status Confirmed for manager-control/abuse pathway; 'controlled opposition spy' motive Alleged beyond the financial crimes.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC MUR 5814 — campaign manager embezzlement / control documentation", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/5814/10044263242.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-mur5814-campaign-manager-embezzlement-control-of-funds__fec-mur-5814-campaign-manager-embezzlement-control-documentation.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC — Referral secures criminal conviction in campaign finance matter (Phillips/Heller context companion)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/fec-referral-secures-criminal-conviction-in-campaign-finance-matter/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 12 companion. Soft companion to fill-20g embezzlement leaf."}
{"id": "us-vote-foundation-overseas-vote-fpca-registration-ballot-request-tool", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015040-07", "uid": "C20260926-015040-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015040-07", "old_ids": ["us-vote-foundation-overseas-vote-fpca-registration-ballot-request-tool"], "seq": "C00895", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "For example, see what this organization is doing."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010s-2026", "state": "National / Overseas", "description": "U.S. Vote Foundation's Overseas Vote initiative operates a guided online Registration/Ballot Request wizard that generates the Federal Post Card Application (FPCA)—a single form that simultaneously registers eligible overseas citizens and requests an absentee ballot—then instructs print/sign/send or photo-sign-email where states allow. The Foundation markets Overseas Vote as a specialty UOCAVA assistance pipeline with Help Desk support, FWAB backup, and state transmission-option guidance. Status Confirmed for a major NGO-run interactive FPCA completion/submission pipeline for overseas voters—peer to Democrats Abroad VoteFromAbroad.org FPCA helper (already on this leaf); not proof of fraudulent overseas ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Vote Foundation — Voting Abroad / Overseas Voter FAQs (FPCA wizard)", "url": "https://www.usvotefoundation.org/overseas-voter-faq", "local": "/archives/2026/09/us-vote-foundation-overseas-vote-fpca-registration-ballot-request-tool__u-s-vote-foundation-voting-abroad-overseas-voter-faqs-f.png"}, {"title": "U.S. Vote Foundation — Photo-Sign-Email Form Functionality", "url": "https://www.usvotefoundation.org/photo-sign-email-absentee-ballot-request-online", "local": "/archives/2026/09/us-vote-foundation-overseas-vote-fpca-registration-ballot-request-tool__u-s-vote-foundation-photo-sign-email-form-functionality.png"}, {"title": "Overseas Vote Foundation — Request Overseas Ballot Every Calendar Year", "url": "https://www.overseasvotefoundation.org/post/every-calendar-year-register-and-request-your-overseas-absentee-ballot", "local": "/archives/2026/09/us-vote-foundation-overseas-vote-fpca-registration-ballot-request-tool__overseas-vote-foundation-request-overseas-ballot-every.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b4 third on UOCAVA 'look what this organization is doing' leaf."}
{"id": "dc-precinct-67-bunker-hill-water-main-break-2010", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-02", "uid": "C20260925-194013-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-02", "old_ids": ["dc-precinct-67-bunker-hill-water-main-break-2010"], "seq": "C00186", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Water main breaks"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010-11-02", "state": "DC", "description": "On Election Day 2010 at D.C. Precinct 67 (Bunker Hill Elementary), a water main break flooded parking/entrances and contributed to a power surge that disabled touch-screen machines around 2:45 p.m. Precinct leadership and D.C. Board of Elections Director Rokey Suleman shifted voters to paper ballots counted by hand / scanner on battery and arranged generators and auxiliary equipment while the Fire Department shut power elsewhere in the building. Status Confirmed for water-main-break disruption of electronic voting and chain-of-custody continuity at a polling place; voting continued on paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Howard University News Service — Precinct 67 continues despite water main break", "url": "https://hunewsservice.com/news/state-local/washington-d-c/precinct-67-voters-workers-continue-despite-water-main-break/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 1. Water main → power surge → paper fallback Confirmed."}
{"id": "doj-oig-2010-fbi-advocacy-groups-informant-play-against", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-12", "uid": "C20260926-003520-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-12", "old_ids": ["doj-oig-2010-fbi-advocacy-groups-informant-play-against"], "seq": "C00725", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltrators", "They then turn members against each other."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-49", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2010-09-20", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ OIG's review of FBI investigations of domestic advocacy groups found inappropriate use of a confidential informant to collect and retain First Amendment activity information and thin predication in some inquiries—documenting institutional pathways where infiltrators can gather and leverage internal group dynamics. Status Confirmed for OIG findings on informant misuse risks; not a finding of election-specific cabal direction.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OIG — Review of the FBI's Investigations of Certain Domestic Advocacy Groups (2010)", "url": "https://oig.justice.gov/reports/review-fbis-investigations-certain-domestic-advocacy-groups-redacted-version"}, {"title": "Grist — Standing Rock CHS depositions (2024 companion)", "url": "https://www.grist.org/indigenous/fbi-informant-standing-rock-protest-court-documents-surveillance/"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 6 companion."}
{"id": "fvap-move-act-electronic-blank-ballot-delivery-requirement-expands-remote-path", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-16", "uid": "C20260925-233150-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-16", "old_ids": ["fvap-move-act-electronic-blank-ballot-delivery-requirement-expands-remote-path"], "seq": "C00409", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2009", "state": "Federal", "description": "The Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act requires states to provide electronic transmission of blank absentee ballots to UOCAVA voters—codifying easier remote access that depends on email/online delivery infrastructure beyond precinct paper. Status Confirmed for the statutory electronic-delivery mandate that enlarges the remote attack/error surface even when voted ballots return on paper. (Electronic return remains a separate, higher-risk choice addressed in CISA guidance.)", "sources": [{"title": "FVAP — MOVE Act overview", "url": "https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/move-act"}, {"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 8 companion. MOVE Act 2009 is the still-operative statutory mechanism within 2016–present practice."}
{"id": "eac-estep-electronic-ballot-delivery-systems-uocava-move-act-portals", "permanent_id": "C20260926-015536-09", "uid": "C20260926-015536-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-015536-09", "old_ids": ["eac-estep-electronic-ballot-delivery-systems-uocava-move-act-portals"], "seq": "C00912", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2009-2026", "state": "National", "description": "EAC's ESTEP Electronic Ballot Delivery (EBD) Systems page states that the 2009 MOVE Act amended UOCAVA to require states to offer electronic delivery of blank ballots and related materials to UOCAVA voters via email, fax, or secure web portals—and notes there are currently **no federal standards** guiding how states/localities/manufacturers must design and implement those systems, which is why EAC is piloting EBD. Status Confirmed that federal law expanded easier remote blank-ballot access while EAC itself flags the absence of design/security standards for those electronic delivery paths—peer to FVAP MOVE Act overview and CISA high-risk electronic-return guidance (this card centers blank-ballot delivery portals, not return).", "sources": [{"title": "EAC ESTEP — Electronic Ballot Delivery (EBD) Systems (MOVE Act portals; no federal design standards)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-technology/estep-program/electronic-ballot-delivery-systems", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-estep-electronic-ballot-delivery-systems-uocava-move-act-portals__eac-estep-electronic-ballot-delivery-ebd-systems-move-a.png"}, {"title": "FVAP — MOVE Act overview", "url": "https://www.fvap.gov/info/laws/move-act"}, {"title": "CISA — Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/risk-management-electronic-ballot-delivery-marking-and-return", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-estep-electronic-ballot-delivery-systems-uocava-move-act-portals__cisa-risk-management-for-electronic-ballot-delivery-mar.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b5 third on UOCAVA easier-access / expanded remote vulnerability leaf."}
{"id": "co-crs-24-72-205-5-ballot-public-inspection-random-order", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-06", "uid": "C20260926-022424-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-06", "old_ids": ["co-crs-24-72-205-5-ballot-public-inspection-random-order"], "seq": "C01036", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Randomize ballot order within batches, destroying the scan-order record and hiding manipulation patterns (Montgomery County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2009-2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado’s CORA ballot-inspection statute C.R.S. §24-72-205.5 expressly authorizes the designated election official to present ballots available for public inspection in random order, with redaction of unique identifying marks and withholding of styles matching nine or fewer printed ballots—privacy-driven randomization that deliberately destroys inspectable cast-order / time-series adjacency of physical ballots. Status Confirmed statutory random-order presentation of ballots; peer to Scan-Shuffle-Rescan academic shuffle and DVSorder privacy-rerandomize cards—Colorado §24-72-205.5 random inspection order, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. §24-72-205.5 Public inspection of ballots", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_24-72-205.5"}, {"title": "Colorado FOIC — enrolled HB09-1036 ballot inspection / random order legislative text", "url": "https://coloradofoic.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/1036_enr.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Randomize ballot order leaf."}
{"id": "gao-2009-polling-place-accessibility-barriers-majority-sites", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-10", "uid": "C20260925-233150-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-10", "old_ids": ["gao-2009-polling-place-accessibility-barriers-majority-sites"], "seq": "C00403", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Reasonable Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements for disabled citizens are appropriate, but these must be taken into account: the June 2016 U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division ADA Checklist for Polling Places (votingchecklist.pdf)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2009-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-09-685 (June 2009) estimated that on Election Day 2008 only about 27% of polling places had no potential impediments in the path from parking to the voting area (up from 16% in 2000), with the remainder having potential architectural barriers—and nearly half of accessible voting systems arranged in ways that could challenge some voters with disabilities. Status Confirmed for GAO's measured accessibility shortfalls; catalog framing that ADA checklists are used to close preferred rooms remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-09-685 — Voters With Disabilities: More Polling Places Had No Potential Impediments Than in 2000, but Challenges Remain (PDF)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-685.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-2009-polling-place-accessibility-barriers-majority-sites__gao-09-685-voters-with-disabilities-polling-places.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-09-941 — Voters with Disabilities: Additional Monitoring of Polling Places Could Further Improve Accessibility (PDF)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-941.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-2009-polling-place-accessibility-barriers-majority-sites__gao-09-941-additional-monitoring-polling-places.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 5 companion. Primary is GAO 2009 national observation study; DOJ checklist remains on sibling card."}
{"id": "burlington-vt-irv-condorcet-failure-2009", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-27", "uid": "C20260925-205354-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-27", "old_ids": ["burlington-vt-irv-condorcet-failure-2009"], "seq": "C00242", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Allows covert election manipulation hidden in the complexity of the calculations."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-12", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2009-03", "state": "VT", "description": "Burlington, Vermont's March 2009 mayoral election under instant-runoff (ranked-choice) voting elected Bob Kiss even though Kurt Wright was the Condorcet (pairwise) winner — a documented Condorcet failure of IRV. Academic and election-methods analyses show the multi-round elimination/transfer mathematics can produce outcomes opaque to casual observers and non-additive versus plurality intuition. Status Confirmed for the mathematical/complexity property (Condorcet failure + multi-round opacity); not a finding that officials covertly altered tallies in Burlington.", "sources": [{"title": "RangeVoting.org — Burlington 2009 IRV mayoral election analysis", "url": "https://www.rangevoting.org/Burlington.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/burlington-vt-irv-condorcet-failure-2009__rangevoting-org-burlington-2009-irv-mayoral-election-analysi.png"}, {"title": "Electoral Studies — Ballot (and voter) exhaustion under Instant Runoff Voting", "url": "https://bpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/u.osu.edu/dist/e/1083/files/2014/12/ElectoralStudies-2fupfhd.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/burlington-vt-irv-condorcet-failure-2009__electoral-studies-ballot-and-voter-exhaustion-under-instant.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 14. Complexity/Condorcet failure Confirmed; PEP/hand plurality contrast: simple first-past-post hand counts avoid IRV round opacity."}
{"id": "appel-avc-advantage-firmware-alters-ballot-images-and-totals-together", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-30", "uid": "C20260925-235207-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-30", "old_ids": ["appel-avc-advantage-firmware-alters-ballot-images-and-totals-together"], "seq": "C00503", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate digital ballot images where they are created."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-47", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008", "state": "NJ", "description": "Appel's AVC Advantage work showed fraudulent firmware can alter ballot images and candidate totals together so electronic records agree with each other but not with actual votes—foundational demonstration of digital-record manipulation inside tabulation devices. Status Confirmed for the mechanism (lab/expert report).", "sources": [{"title": "Appel — AVC Advantage insecurities (ballot images agree with fraudulent totals)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/advantage-insecurities-redacted.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-avc-advantage-firmware-alters-ballot-images-and-totals-together__appel-avc-advantage-insecurities-ballot-images-agree-with-fr.pdf"}, {"title": "UnclearBallot — modern optical-scan image manipulation", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 15 companion.", "vendor": ["Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["Sequoia AVC Advantage/Edge"]}
{"id": "appel-sequoia-avc-advantage-fraudulent-firmware-replace-rom-undetectable-records", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-12", "uid": "C20260925-235207-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-12", "old_ids": ["appel-sequoia-avc-advantage-fraudulent-firmware-replace-rom-undetectable-records"], "seq": "C00485", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That it has no malicious programming embedded in it"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008", "state": "NJ", "description": "Appel's Sequoia AVC Advantage analysis showed fraudulent firmware could be installed (ROM replacement / viral cartridge propagation) and then undetectably alter votes while keeping paperless electronic records consistent—demonstrating that black-box DREs without software-independent paper audits cannot assure absence of malicious embedded code. Foundational pre-2016 research still cited in catalog security literature. Status Confirmed for the laboratory/expert-report mechanism.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel et al. — Insecurities of Sequoia AVC Advantage 9.00H (Princeton)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/advantage-insecurities-redacted.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-sequoia-avc-advantage-fraudulent-firmware-replace-rom-undetectable-records__appel-et-al-insecurities-of-sequoia-avc-advantage-9-00h-princeton.pdf"}, {"title": "Appel expert report — fraudulent firmware undetectably steals votes", "url": "https://law.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Appelexpertreport.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-sequoia-avc-advantage-fraudulent-firmware-replace-rom-undetectable-records__appel-expert-report-fraudulent-firmware-undetectably-steals-votes.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 6 companion. Foundational pre-2016 OK when catalog cites software-independence / DRE risks.", "vendor": ["Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["Sequoia AVC Advantage/Edge"]}
{"id": "texas-sao-08-012-voter-registration-system-excessive-county-admin-privileges", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-20", "uid": "C20260926-000015-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-20", "old_ids": ["texas-sao-08-012-voter-registration-system-excessive-county-admin-privileges"], "seq": "C00533", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose access-control security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-84", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas State Auditor Report 08-012 on the SOS voter registration system found excessive county administrative privileges, shared/group and unreviewed accounts, terminated-user access issues, and inadequate log monitoring—foundational pre-2016 documentation of loose voter-roll access controls still cited as the classic state audit. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas SAO Report 08-012 — Voter Registration System access controls", "url": "https://sao.texas.gov/reports/main/08-012.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas SAO — Report 08-012 key points", "url": "https://sao.texas.gov/reports/main/08-012.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 10 companion. Foundational pre-2016 OK when catalog cites access-control weaknesses."}
{"id": "umich-ess-everest-2008", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-12", "uid": "C20260925-155410-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-12", "old_ids": ["umich-ess-everest-2008"], "seq": "C00012", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008", "state": "OH", "description": "As part of Ohio's Project EVEREST, researchers (including University of Pennsylvania/related teams publishing at USENIX EVT'08) evaluated ES&S DRE and optical-scan systems and election management software, finding numerous exploitable vulnerabilities enabling alteration of precinct results, corrupt firmware, erased audit records, and potential viral propagation between machines and backend systems. Catalog seed: Princeton and University of Michigan teams demonstrated malware for Diebold and ES&S systems.", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX EVT'08 — Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and EMS", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/aviv/aviv_html/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/umich-ess-everest-2008__usenix-evt-08-security-evaluation-of-es-s-voting-machines-an.png"}, {"title": "PDF mirror — ES&S evaluation (evt08)", "url": "https://cernyp.github.io/publications/evt08/evt08.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/umich-ess-everest-2008__pdf-mirror-es-s-evaluation-evt08.pdf"}], "notes": "Academic/state-commissioned security review. Confirmed for demonstrated technical vulnerabilities, not for any specific election outcome fraud.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier"]}
{"id": "wa-top-two-primary-i872-grange", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-25", "uid": "C20260925-184601-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-25", "old_ids": ["wa-top-two-primary-i872-grange"], "seq": "C00143", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Open primaries can be used to cheat: they let the opposing party control who is on the ticket. Open primaries are a Trojan horse."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-07", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-2026", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington's top-two primary (Initiative 872), upheld against facial challenge in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party (552 U.S. 442, 2008), likewise advances the two candidates with the most votes regardless of party, with all voters participating on a single ballot. WA SOS historical materials describe the shift from blanket primary to top-two. Status Confirmed for open/top-two crossover structure.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party", "url": "https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/552/442/"}, {"title": "WA Secretary of State — History of the Washington State Primary", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/elections/data-research/history-laws-and-litigation/history-washington-state-primary", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-top-two-primary-i872-grange__wa-secretary-of-state-history-of-the-washington-state-primar.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 11. WA top-two."}
{"id": "appel-nj-avc-advantage-malware-flips-passes-prelat-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022005-14", "uid": "C20260926-022005-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022005-14", "old_ids": ["appel-nj-avc-advantage-malware-flips-passes-prelat-calibration"], "seq": "C01029", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-2009", "state": "NJ", "description": "Princeton/CITP work in the New Jersey Sequoia AVC Advantage litigation (Appel expert report; EVT'09 paper) demonstrated malware that can pass pre-election logic-and-accuracy / Pre-LAT testing yet, during the official election, silently transfer votes from one candidate to another while preserving totals—showing how DRE ‘calibration’/pre-test theater fails to detect vote-flip firmware. Status Confirmed DRE vote-flip malware surviving pre-election tests; peer to Virginia Beach and Sarasota iVotronic calibration cards—NJ AVC Advantage Appel demonstration, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Appel — Expert Report on Sequoia AVC Advantage (NJ voting-machine litigation PDF)", "url": "https://law.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/Appelexpertreport.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-nj-avc-advantage-malware-flips-passes-prelat-calibration__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX EVT'09 — Appel et al. The New Jersey Voting-machine Lawsuit and the AVC Advantage", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evtwote09/tech/full_papers/appel.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/appel-nj-avc-advantage-malware-flips-passes-prelat-calibration__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b10 third on DRE touch-screen calibration leaf.", "vendor": ["Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["Sequoia AVC Advantage/Edge"]}
{"id": "ca-prop8-2008-same-sex-marriage-ban-wedge-ballot-measure-turnout-mobilization", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-05", "uid": "C20260926-025634-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-05", "old_ids": ["ca-prop8-2008-same-sex-marriage-ban-wedge-ballot-measure-turnout-mobilization"], "seq": "C01110", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They put a sacrificial measure on the ballot that rallies a particular group, increasing biased voter participation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-11-04", "state": "CA", "description": "California Proposition 8 (Nov. 4, 2008)—the constitutional ban on same-sex marriage—passed 52.5%–47.5% amid record social-issue spending and church/LGBT mobilization on both sides; contemporaneous CA SOS Statement of Vote and political-science literature on morality/wedge ballot measures document how high-salience sacrificial propositions pull peripheral and identity-motivated voters to the polls in ways that reshape co-occurring candidate contests. Status Confirmed primary statewide ballot measure whose campaign functioned as a turnout/wedge mobilizer; peer to Tolbert midterm-initiative turnout and Biggers morality-at-ballot cards already on this leaf—Prop 8 instance, not those academic remounts. PEP framing: sacrificial ballot fights that inflame turnout without adding hand-count transparency.", "sources": [{"title": "California Secretary of State — Statement of Vote, November 4, 2008 General Election (Prop 8)", "url": "https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2008-general/sov_complete.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-prop8-2008-same-sex-marriage-ban-wedge-ballot-measure-turnout-mobilization__california-sos-2008-general-election-statement-of-vote-prop8-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — California Proposition 8, Ban on Same-Sex Marriage (2008)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_Ban_on_Same-Sex_Marriage_(2008)"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Legislation sacrificial-bill turnout leaf."}
{"id": "eac-2008-systest-labs-nvlap-suspension-blind-trust-cert-lab", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-15", "uid": "C20260926-033041-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-15", "old_ids": ["eac-2008-systest-labs-nvlap-suspension-blind-trust-cert-lab"], "seq": "C01225", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Trust them blindly (voluntarily or involuntarily)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-10-31", "state": "Federal", "description": "NIST NVLAP suspended SysTest Labs' accreditation Oct. 28, 2008, and the EAC suspended SysTest's Voting System Test Laboratory accreditation Oct. 31, 2008, for failing program requirements (inadequate test-method documentation/validation, staffing, manufacturer-assurance issues)—showing that officials who blindly trusted systems because a federal VSTL had certified them were trusting a lab whose own accreditation could be—and was—suspended. Status Confirmed primary EAC suspension notice + NIST NVLAP suspension; peer to EAC VSTL conformance trust-chain and CA TTBR Bowen withdraw-after-ITA-cert cards already on this leaf—SysTest 2008 suspension instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: blind trust in paid certifiers fails when the certifier itself is suspended; public hand counts do not depend on VSTL accreditation theater.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Suspension of Accreditation Notice to SysTest Labs (Oct. 31, 2008 PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/EAC%20Suspension%20of%20Accreditation%20Notice%20to%20SysTest%20Labs.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2008-systest-labs-nvlap-suspension-blind-trust-cert-lab__eac-suspension-of-accreditation-notice-to-systest-labs-oct-31-2008-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST NVLAP — Suspends Accreditation of SysTest Labs (Oct. 28, 2008 companion)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/itl/nvlap-suspends-accreditation-systest-labs-10-28-08", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-2008-systest-labs-nvlap-suspension-blind-trust-cert-lab__nist-nvlap-suspends-accreditation-of-systest-labs-oct-28-2008-companion.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Software blindly trust certifications leaf."}
{"id": "brennan-verifiedvoting-2008-letter-16-states-ivotronic-vote-flipping", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-07", "uid": "C20261020-160717-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-07", "old_ids": ["brennan-verifiedvoting-2008-letter-16-states-ivotronic-vote-flipping"], "seq": "C01000", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-10-27", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "On Oct. 27, 2008 the Brennan Center for Justice and Verified Voting wrote to the secretaries of state of 16 states using ES&S iVotronic machines (Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin) about \"vote flipping\" reported in West Virginia and Tennessee, stating that \"there is a good chance that at least part of this problem can be attributed to calibration on the iVotronic machines.\" They noted West Virginia's order to recalibrate every machine each morning and urged similar steps. In Nov. 2008 (reported by WIRED) the Ohio EVEREST / Aviv et al. ES&S security review showed iVotronic calibration could be changed in the field without a password, using a supervisor PEB or a home-made PEB emulator, so one candidate's touch region maps to another while the rest of the screen looks normal (see umich-ess-everest-2008). A 2013 South Carolina Legislative Audit Council report likewise listed iVotronic vote-flipping reports in Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Ohio, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. Status Confirmed: the letter, the calibration-attack research and the state audit are documents of record. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center & Verified Voting — Letter to Secretaries of State re: iVotronic \"Vote Flipping\" (Oct. 27, 2008)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/letter-secretaries-state-re-ivotronic-vote-flipping", "local": "/archives/2026/10/brennan-verifiedvoting-2008-letter-16-states-ivotronic-vote-flipping__brennan2008.html"}, {"title": "WIRED — Report: ES&S Voting Machines Can Be Maliciously Calibrated to Favor Specific Candidates (Nov. 2008)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2008/11/report-ess-voti/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/brennan-verifiedvoting-2008-letter-16-states-ivotronic-vote-flipping__wiredcal2008.html"}, {"title": "Aviv et al., USENIX EVT'08 — Security Evaluation of ES&S Voting Machines and Election Management System (PDF)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/aviv/aviv.pdf"}, {"title": "South Carolina Legislative Audit Council — A Review of the State Election Commission (2013), 'Problems With Other States' iVotronic Machines' (PDF)", "url": "https://lac.sc.gov/sites/lac/files/Documents/Legislative%20Audit%20Council/Reports/A-K/SEC_2013.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/brennan-verifiedvoting-2008-letter-16-states-ivotronic-vote-flipping__sclac2013.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (brennan2008, wiredcal2008, sclac2013). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Aviv et al., USENIX EVT'08. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "rivest-software-independence-vs-feedback-ems-hidden-from-officials", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-06", "uid": "C20260926-010219-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-06", "old_ids": ["rivest-software-independence-vs-feedback-ems-hidden-from-officials"], "seq": "C00839", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "If done properly, manipulation through the feedback loop remains hidden from county officials."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-17", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-08-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "Rivest's foundational 'software independence' definition (Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 2008; TGDC/VVSG framing still governing): a system is software-dependent if undetected software change/error can cause an undetectable change in the election outcome — i.e., manipulations inside EMS/VR-feedback databases can be hidden from county officials who only observe physical polls and vendor readouts. Contrast with PEP (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep): a properly-run precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is software-independent and publicly observable, so the same class of silent database/feedback-loop association cannot hide from observers the way it can inside clerk-only machine/VR pipelines. Status Confirmed for the SI detection-gap principle (foundational; still cited); does not invent that PEP was used on-site in any named county, and does not claim a specific cabal already exploited a named EMS.", "sources": [{"title": "Rivest — On the notion of software independence in voting systems (Phil Trans R Soc A 2008)", "url": "https://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs/Riv08b.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-software-independence-vs-feedback-ems-hidden-from-officials__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Precinct Election Process (PEP) framing", "url": "https://handcountroadshow.org/pep", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-software-independence-vs-feedback-ems-hidden-from-officials__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 3 companion. PEP framing. Foundational SI OK. Soft remount SI corpus onto Feedback hide-from-officials leaf."}
{"id": "us-evt-2008-aslam-popa-rivest-equal-probability-precinct-sampling-ignores-size", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-05", "uid": "C20261012-141825-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-05", "old_ids": ["us-evt-2008-aslam-popa-rivest-equal-probability-precinct-sampling-ignores-size"], "seq": "C01372", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-07", "state": "US", "description": "Choosing random precincts is not the same as choosing random ballots. If every precinct has equal odds, a 10,000-ballot precinct is no more likely to be drawn than a 100-ballot one, so an attacker who puts the manipulation in a few large precincts faces much less chance of detection than the audit's headline confidence suggests. MIT's Javed Aslam, Raluca Ada Popa and Ronald Rivest, \"On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes\" (USENIX EVT 2008), formalize this. They show uniform precinct sampling must count far more votes to reach the same detection confidence, and propose size-aware methods (PPEBWR, sampling with probability proportional to each precinct's error bound, and NEGEXP) that cut the votes counted roughly two- to threefold. New Mexico's own rule admits the point: its 90% detection table \"requires that the probability of selecting a precinct is proportional to the precinct size.\" Status Confirmed (peer-reviewed analysis plus state rule). Catalog note: a uniform precinct draw is random in name only for ballots. Weight selection by size, sample ballots, or hand count everything, so no ballot is safe from being checked.", "sources": [{"title": "Aslam, Popa & Rivest — On Auditing Elections When Precincts Have Different Sizes (USENIX EVT 2008, PDF)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/aslam/aslam.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/rhino-evt08-aslam-precinct-sizes__usenix-evt08-aslam-auditing-elections-precincts-different-sizes-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX — EVT '08 paper page", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/evt-08/auditing-elections-when-precincts-have-different-sizes"}, {"title": "1.10.23.9 NMAC — detection table requires size-proportional selection", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-mexico/N-M-Admin-Code-SS-1.10.23.9"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). Structural item (6)."}
{"id": "us-evt-2008-2009-audit-selection-predictability-calandrino-rescorla", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-04", "uid": "C20261012-141825-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-04", "old_ids": ["us-evt-2008-2009-audit-selection-predictability-calandrino-rescorla"], "seq": "C01371", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2008-07 / 2009-08", "state": "US", "description": "Two peer-reviewed USENIX election-technology papers show why audit selection must be truly unpredictable. Calandrino, Halderman and Felten (Princeton), \"In Defense of Pseudorandom Sample Selection\" (EVT 2008): \"If an adversary knows or can influence which subset of ballots will be considered during the audit, that individual can commit fraud in a manner that the audit will not detect ... Even partial knowledge, such as knowledge of biases in the selection algorithm, may be sufficient to undermine the effectiveness of the audit.\" They add that \"numerous attacks, from weighted dice to malicious software, can bias a selection process,\" and that simple dice rolling is \"not necessarily robust against sleight of hand.\" Eric Rescorla, \"On the Security of Election Audits with Low Entropy Randomness\" (EVT/WOTE 2009; often misdated as 2019), shows that when a small random seed is stretched into many audit picks, an attacker who can influence the selection or choose which units to attack can keep altered precincts out of the sample, so actual detection can fall well below what the nominal audit statistics promise. Status Confirmed (the published findings). Catalog note: an audit is only as good as the randomness behind it. Fully observable, verifiable selection, or counting every ballot by hand, removes the attack surface.", "sources": [{"title": "Calandrino, Halderman & Felten — In Defense of Pseudorandom Sample Selection (USENIX EVT 2008, PDF)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt08/tech/full_papers/calandrino/calandrino.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/rhino-evt08-calandrino-randomness__usenix-evt08-calandrino-in-defense-of-pseudorandom-sample-selection-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Rescorla — On the Security of Election Audits with Low Entropy Randomness (USENIX EVT/WOTE 2009, PDF)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evtwote09/tech/full_papers/rescorla-randomness.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX — EVT/WOTE '09 paper page (Rescorla)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote-09/security-election-audits-low-entropy-randomness"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). Request said '2019' for low-entropy paper; actual is 2009 (Rescorla). Detection-shortfall wording paraphrased from paper's attack analysis."}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-ita-cert-failed-adversarial-fake-testing-and-cert-root", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-19", "uid": "C20260925-234437-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-19", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-ita-cert-failed-adversarial-fake-testing-and-cert-root"], "seq": "C00452", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007", "state": "CA", "description": "California TTBR demonstrated that systems carrying federal/ITA certification certificates still failed comprehensive adversarial red-team and source-code review—showing certification theater can miss exploitable flaws. Status Confirmed for certification-vs-adversarial-reality gap. Soft remount onto exact root leaf 'Fake Testing and Certification' (distinct from slash-variant children already filled).", "sources": [{"title": "UC Davis — Overview of TTBR Red Team Reports", "url": "https://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/notes/2007-CaSoS/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-ita-cert-failed-adversarial-fake-testing-and-cert-root__uc-davis-overview-of-ttbr-red-team-reports.png"}, {"title": "NYT — Scientists' Tests Hack Into Electronic Voting Machines (2007)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/us/28vote.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 10. Exact path is 'Fake Testing and Certification' (and), not slash children. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Fake Testing and Certification' to 'Fake Testing and Certification > Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues.'."}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-source-code-review-under-nda-not-public-secret-to-electors", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-34", "uid": "C20260925-233150-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-34", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-source-code-review-under-nda-not-public-secret-to-electors"], "seq": "C00427", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Secret source code"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007", "state": "CA", "description": "California's Top-to-Bottom Review published red-team/source-code findings but did so through controlled expert access to proprietary vendor code—not open publication of full voting-system source to electors—leaving the implementation secret to the public even after state review. Status Confirmed that 'reviewed' ≠ public source. Soft companion to fill-20a TTBR trust-cascade / Fake Testing cards.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review / OVSTA frequently requested information", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-source-code-review-under-nda-not-public-secret-to-electors__ca-ttbr-source-code-review-under-nda-not-public-secret-to-electors__california-sos-top-to-bottom-review-ovsta-frequently-requested-information.png"}, {"title": "California SOS — Escrow of Source Codes (code remains non-public)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/escrow-source-codes/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "diebold-accuvote-ts-malware-silent-vote-steal-evt07-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-17", "uid": "C20260925-212129-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-17", "old_ids": ["diebold-accuvote-ts-malware-silent-vote-steal-evt07-companion"], "seq": "C00314", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program the system to select whichever candidate you like, regardless of which candidate's name is touched."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007", "state": "Federal", "description": "USENIX EVT'07 full paper accompanying the Princeton AccuVote-TS work details how vote-stealing malware can be configured to shift a minimum percentage of votes to a preferred candidate while keeping race totals and counter displays looking normal — operationalizing the catalog leaf's 'after X tries, select the programmed candidate' counter idea. Status Confirmed companion detail on programmable silent preference (lab demonstration).", "sources": [{"title": "Feldman/Halderman/Felten — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS (HTML full)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/"}, {"title": "ACM mirror PDF — AccuVote-TS security analysis", "url": "https://www.acm.org/binaries/content/assets/public-policy/usacm/e-voting/reports-and-white-papers/ts06_full.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/diebold-accuvote-ts-malware-silent-vote-steal-evt07-companion__acm-mirror-pdf-accuvote-ts-security-analysis.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 9 companion to remounted princeton-diebold-2006.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "fl-appellate-trade-secret-priority-over-public-voting-system-code-access", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-33", "uid": "C20260925-233150-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-33", "old_ids": ["fl-appellate-trade-secret-priority-over-public-voting-system-code-access"], "seq": "C00426", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Secret source code"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida appellate caselaw (Wexler / related trade-secret election-software disputes summarized in FindLaw/contemporaneous reporting) held vendor trade-secret protection can outweigh public demands to inspect voting-system source code—keeping the software that counts votes secret from the public. Status Confirmed for the legal secrecy regime. (Foundational 2007 holding still governs access fights into the 2016–present period.)", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — Florida DCA trade-secret / election transparency decision page", "url": "https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/fl-district-court-of-appeal/1270727.html"}, {"title": "California SOS — escrow regime as limited non-public code access substitute", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/escrow-source-codes/"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 17."}
{"id": "uconn-diebold-accuvote-os-memory-card-security-assessment", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-31", "uid": "C20260925-194013-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-31", "old_ids": ["uconn-diebold-accuvote-os-memory-card-security-assessment"], "seq": "C00215", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007", "state": "CT / Multi-state", "description": "University of Connecticut VoTeR Center's security assessment of the Diebold AccuVote-OS optical-scan terminal independently analyzed memory-card attack surfaces (including counter/script manipulation on removable media) and confirmed that unauthorized preloading/alteration of card contents can change reported results while preserving deceptive zero reports — reinforcing the Hursti-class preload risk. Status Confirmed for academic reproduction/confirmation of preload-capable memory-card attacks on a certified optical-scan platform.", "sources": [{"title": "UConn VoTeR — Security Assessment of the Diebold Optical Scan Voting Terminal", "url": "https://voter.engr.uconn.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3651/2023/02/uconn_report-os.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uconn-diebold-accuvote-os-memory-card-security-assessment__uconn-voter-security-assessment-of-the-diebold-optical-scan.pdf"}, {"title": "Wikipedia — Hursti Hack (overview with citations)", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hursti_Hack", "local": "/archives/2026/09/uconn-diebold-accuvote-os-memory-card-security-assessment__wikipedia-hursti-hack-overview-with-citations.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 15. Academic confirmation of memory-card preload attacks.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "fl-stat-101-591-manual-audit-1-2pct-one-race-not-binding", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-03", "uid": "C20260926-020640-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-03", "old_ids": ["fl-stat-101-591-manual-audit-1-2pct-one-race-not-binding"], "seq": "C00936", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Some states redefine their \"audit\" to cripple it and make it worthless."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-68", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-68", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007/2024", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Stat. §101.591 brands a post-certification **voting system audit** that (for the manual option) tallies **one randomly selected race** in only **1–2% of precincts**, is conducted **after** certification, and—per Verified Voting's audit-law summary—is **not binding** on official results and does not trigger a full recount. Status Confirmed that Florida's statutory 'audit' is a narrow sample procedure that cannot detect or correct systemic machine/ballot mis-tabulation the way a properly-run PEP hand count of paper would; peer to GA BMD-QR RLA called 'audit' and AL HB95 machine-rescan-as-audit, not a claim every FL election was wrong.", "sources": [{"title": "Fla. Stat. §101.591 — Voting system audit (manual 1–2% precincts / one race)", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2024/101.591", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-stat-101-591-manual-audit-1-2pct-one-race-not-binding__fla-stat-101-591-voting-system-audit-manual-1-2-precinc.png"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Florida audit law summary (not binding; one contest; sample precincts)", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/auditlaw/florida/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on redefined worthless 'audit' leaf. PEP framing: sample machine audit ≠ transparent hand count."}
{"id": "everest-hart-tally-odbc-sql-direct-edit-outside-app", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-01", "uid": "C20260926-021547-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-01", "old_ids": ["everest-hart-tally-odbc-sql-direct-edit-outside-app"], "seq": "C00964", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Change the database outside the voting-system software."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-31", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007/2008", "state": "OH", "description": "Ohio Project EVEREST / USENIX EVT'08 analysis of Hart InterCivic documents that EMS Tally databases can be reached via ODBC with passwords pulled from application config files, then edited with arbitrary SQL—including changing vote totals and scrubbing or rewriting audit-log entries—outside the normal Tally UI. Status Confirmed direct database edit path peer to Dominion EMS SQL Server Management Studio findings on Coffee County/Antrim leaves—Hart/EVEREST ODBC-SQL path, not those remounted. PEP framing: opaque EMS databases raise the cost of citizen verification versus hand-marked paper.", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX EVT'08 — Butler et al. Systemic Issues in Hart/Premier (EVEREST): ODBC/SQL direct Tally DB edit", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/butler/butler_html/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/everest-hart-tally-odbc-sql-direct-edit-outside-app__usenix-evt-08-butler-et-al-systemic-issues-in-hart-premier-everest-odbc-sql-di.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Ohio EVEREST report PDF (Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/EVEREST.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/everest-hart-tally-odbc-sql-direct-edit-outside-app__eac-ohio-everest-report-pdf-evaluation-and-validation-of-election-related-equi.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Change database outside of voting system software leaf.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"]}
{"id": "ohio-everest-2007-certified-ess-premier-hart-critical-security-failures", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020046-08", "uid": "C20260926-020046-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020046-08", "old_ids": ["ohio-everest-2007-certified-ess-premier-hart-critical-security-failures"], "seq": "C00925", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-10/2007-12", "state": "OH", "description": "Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner's EVEREST final report (Dec. 7, 2007)—teams from Penn State, University of Pennsylvania, and WebWise Security—concluded that **all studied systems** then used in Ohio (ES&S, Premier/Diebold, Hart), despite prior certification pathways, possessed **critical security failures** rendering technical controls insufficient for a trustworthy election (insufficient security, improper crypto/key management, forgeable audits, fragile software). The executive summary states reviewers could subvert every provided system in ways that would often lead to undetectable manipulation. Status Confirmed that adversarial state review exposed what ordinary certification/ITA testing missed—peer to California TTBR Bowen withdrawals and TTBR red-team/source reports on this leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "EVEREST Final Report (Ohio SOS) — Evaluation and Validation of Election-Related Equipment, Standards and Testing (Dec. 7, 2007)", "url": "https://cise.ufl.edu/~butler/pubs/everest.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ohio-everest-2007-certified-ess-premier-hart-critical-security-failures__everest-final-report-ohio-sos-evaluation-and-validation.pdf"}, {"title": "DEF CON 26 Voting Village Report — cites EVEREST M650 update flaw still present a decade later", "url": "https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-26/DEF%20CON%2026%20voting%20village%20report.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/defcon-26-expresspoll-cleartext-passwords-writable-voter-db__def-con-26-voting-village-report-expresspoll-5000-clear.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b6 third on test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues leaf.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Hart InterCivic", "Diebold/Premier"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-bowen-withdraw-approval-after-ita-cert-blind-trust-leaf", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-14", "uid": "C20260925-234437-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-14", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-bowen-withdraw-approval-after-ita-cert-blind-trust-leaf"], "seq": "C00447", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Trust them blindly (voluntarily or involuntarily)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-74", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-08", "state": "CA", "description": "After TTBR findings, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen withdrew approval/decertified previously ITA-certified systems—demonstrating that prior 'tested and certified' trust was insufficient once independent adversarial review occurred. Status Confirmed for the trust-then-fail certification episode. Soft remount onto exact 'blindly trust' leaf.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT — Scientists' Tests Hack Into Electronic Voting Machines in California (2007)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/28/us/28vote.html"}, {"title": "Computerworld — California report slams e-voting system security", "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/1473805/california-report-slams-e-voting-system-security.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "doj-federal-prosecution-election-offenses-civil-deferral-negligent-feca", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-04", "uid": "C20260925-211320-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-04", "old_ids": ["doj-federal-prosecution-election-offenses-civil-deferral-negligent-feca"], "seq": "C00249", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "There is no meaningful penalty for breaking election laws."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-26", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-08", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ's Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses manual states that FECA violations that are not knowing and willful (e.g., negligence/mistake) or that fall below statutory dollar thresholds are handled non-criminally by the FEC under civil enforcement — not prosecuted as crimes. Status Confirmed for the formal federal policy that large classes of election-law breaches are steered to civil/administrative tracks rather than criminal penalties.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ — Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses (7th ed., rev. Aug 2007)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2013/09/30/electbook-rvs0807.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 2. Confirmed civil-deferral pathway for many FECA breaches."}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-01", "uid": "C20260926-012939-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-01", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review"], "seq": "C00840", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-08-03", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Debra Bowen's 2007 Top-to-Bottom Review (TTBR), led by University of California computer scientists, adversarially tested and source-reviewed Diebold/Premier, Sequoia, and Hart electronic voting systems then certified for California use. UC source-code and red-team reports documented serious design and implementation flaws (including malware installation paths, weak cryptography, and viral propagation via removable media). On August 3, 2007, Bowen withdrew approval / imposed conditional reapproval with strengthened use conditions for the reviewed systems. Status Confirmed for official state-commissioned finding that then-certified EVM platforms had exploitable security weaknesses—not a finding that any particular election outcome was flipped. Machine complexity and opaque firmware are the problem surface; PEP precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is the transparency contrast (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review (official page, UC reports & Aug 3, 2007 decisions)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__california-sos-top-to-bottom-review-official-page-uc-re.png"}, {"title": "UC / CA SOS — Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (TTBR PDF)", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__uc-ca-sos-source-code-review-of-the-diebold-voting-syst.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX Security '07 — Wagner et al. report on California top-to-bottom review", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/sec07/tech/wagner.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__usenix-security-07-wagner-et-al-report-on-california-to.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to umich-ess-everest-2008 on Electronic Voting Machines leaf. Distinct CA official review vs Ohio EVEREST ES&S paper.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic", "Diebold/Premier"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-ita-certified-systems-failed-adversarial-review-bowen", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-21", "uid": "C20260925-214102-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-21", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-ita-certified-systems-failed-adversarial-review-bowen"], "seq": "C00344", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-08-03", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Debra Bowen's 2007 Top-to-Bottom Review subjected federally/state-certified voting systems (Diebold/Premier, Hart, Sequoia, ES&S InkaVote Plus) to University of California source-code, red-team, and documentation review. Systems that had cleared Independent Testing Authority / certification pathways were found to have serious exploitable vulnerabilities; Bowen withdrew approval / imposed conditional reapproval on Aug. 3, 2007. Status Confirmed that then-prevailing certification test procedures had not surfaced the issues adversarial academic review found — i.e., testing designed/scoped to miss real security problems.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review home (decisions + UC reports)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review"}, {"title": "CA SOS CDN — ES&S InkaVote Plus rescission/withdrawal PDF", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/ess/ess-rescission-withdrawal.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-ita-certified-systems-failed-adversarial-review-bowen__ca-sos-cdn-es-s-inkavote-plus-rescission-withdrawal-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 11. Confirmed certification-scope failure; not a claim modern VSTL manuals are unchanged.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Hart InterCivic", "Diebold/Premier"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-bowen-withdraw-approval-after-ita-certified-systems-failed-review", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-24", "uid": "C20260925-220029-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-24", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-bowen-withdraw-approval-after-ita-certified-systems-failed-review"], "seq": "C00377", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Everyone downstream \"trusts\" the systems because they were \"tested\" and \"certified.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-08-03", "state": "CA", "description": "Companion proof that the trust cascade can be misplaced: California SOS Debra Bowen's 2007 Top-to-Bottom Review withdrew/conditionally reapproved systems that had already cleared ITA/certification pathways after UC adversarial review found serious exploitable vulnerabilities—i.e., downstream trust in prior certification was not equivalent to security. Status Confirmed. Soft remount-style companion to fill-15g Test-procedures / Labs-approve cards.", "sources": [{"title": "CA SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review home", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review"}, {"title": "CA SOS CDN — ES&S InkaVote Plus rescission/withdrawal PDF", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/vendors/ess/ess-rescission-withdrawal.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 12 companion. Shows certified≠secure.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-diebold-memory-card-candidate-coordinate-vote-swap", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-04", "uid": "C20260926-022424-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-04", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-diebold-memory-card-candidate-coordinate-vote-swap"], "seq": "C01034", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-07", "state": "CA", "description": "California Secretary of State Top-to-Bottom Review source-code analysis of the Diebold AccuVote system (Wagner et al., July 2007) found that optical-scan memory-card data was unauthenticated with weak checksums/signatures, and that votes could be swapped or neutralized by modifying candidate voting coordinates stored on the removable memory card—plus AccuBasic interpreter paths enabling arbitrary code on the card. Status Confirmed laboratory/source-review finding that removable memory media can manipulate recorded vote totals; peer to Hursti Leon County preload/totals and AccuBasic interpreter cards on this leaf—CA TTBR coordinate-swap finding, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS TTBR — Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (Wagner et al.)", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-diebold-memory-card-candidate-coordinate-vote-swap__california-sos-ttbr-source-code-review-of-the-diebold-voting-system-wagner-et-al.pdf"}, {"title": "WIRED — CA Releases Source Code Review of Voting Machines (Diebold memory-card flaws)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2007/08/ca-releases-sou/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on Manipulate votes on thumb/flash drives leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-diebold-memory-card-programming-attacks", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-19", "uid": "C20260926-012939-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-19", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-diebold-memory-card-programming-attacks"], "seq": "C00858", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate programming on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-07", "state": "CA", "description": "California's 2007 TTBR Diebold source-code review (UC Berkeley team for the Secretary of State) documented that AccuVote optical-scan/DRE memory-card handling lacked adequate integrity protections: malicious software could be installed via memory cards, propagate virally between precinct devices and the county EMS, and alter ballot definitions or results. Distinct from the 2005 Leon County Hursti live demonstration, this is an official state-commissioned code review confirming programming-via-removable-media attack surfaces. Status Confirmed for documented memory-card programming vulnerabilities; PEP hand count of voter-marked paper detects outcome manipulation the machines miss.", "sources": [{"title": "CA SOS TTBR — Source Code Review of the Diebold Voting System (July 2007 PDF)", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__uc-ca-sos-source-code-review-of-the-diebold-voting-syst.pdf"}, {"title": "California SOS — Top-to-Bottom Review official page", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__california-sos-top-to-bottom-review-official-page-uc-re.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to hursti-diebold-memory-card-leon-county-2005 (programming leaf).", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-certified-systems-compromised-officials-had-trusted-ita", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-12", "uid": "C20260925-234437-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-12", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-certified-systems-compromised-officials-had-trusted-ita"], "seq": "C00445", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "Do not look \"under the hood\" to ensure their security"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-75", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-75", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-07", "state": "CA", "description": "California's 2007 Top-to-Bottom Review red-team reports showed that federally/ITA-certified voting systems from major vendors could be compromised in ways affecting recording, tabulation, or reporting—after officials had already trusted certification. Status Confirmed that 'don't look under the hood / trust certification' failed under adversarial review. Soft remount of TTBR family onto exact Software > Don't look under the hood leaf. Foundational pre-2016 research catalog-cited.", "sources": [{"title": "UC Davis / Bishop — Overview of TTBR Red Team Reports", "url": "https://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/~bishop/notes/2007-CaSoS/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-certified-systems-compromised-officials-had-trusted-ita__uc-davis-bishop-overview-of-ttbr-red-team-reports.png"}, {"title": "California SOS TTBR — Sequoia red team report (PDF example)", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/red-sequoia.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-certified-systems-compromised-officials-had-trusted-ita__california-sos-ttbr-sequoia-red-team-report-pdf-example.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 6 companion. Soft remount TTBR onto exact leaf."}
{"id": "ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-source-code-reports-document-missed-vulns", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-22", "uid": "C20260925-214102-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-22", "old_ids": ["ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-source-code-reports-document-missed-vulns"], "seq": "C00345", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Test procedures designed to avoid finding real issues."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-33", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2007-07", "state": "CA", "description": "Companion: UC red-team and source-code team reports published through the SOS TTBR portal detail concrete attack paths and code defects in certified systems — evidence that prior ITA-style conformance testing did not equate to adversarial security evaluation. Status Confirmed for the documentary record of issues missed by prior test procedures.", "sources": [{"title": "California SOS — TTBR UC Red Team / Source Code report index", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ovsta/frequently-requested-information/top-bottom-review"}, {"title": "Internet Archive — contemporaneous SOS voting systems review page", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20070817120818/www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-red-team-source-code-reports-document-missed-vulns__internet-archive-contemporaneous-sos-voting-systems-review-p.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 11 companion. Remount tx-dominion-5-5a fills sibling Labs approve systems leaf."}
{"id": "brennan-making-the-list-name-matching-false-nonmatches-duplicates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-34", "uid": "C20260926-001426-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-34", "old_ids": ["brennan-making-the-list-name-matching-false-nonmatches-duplicates"], "seq": "C00627", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Duplicate entries for individuals with name changes (maiden and married names)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006", "state": "Federal", "description": "Brennan Center 'Making the List' and GAO list-maintenance work document that exact-match rules on name+DOB can both create false non-matches when voters change names (maiden→married) and leave duplicate active records when matching fails—foundational pre-2016 OK; still describes the duplicate-name problem ERIC later industrializes. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Making the List (voter list maintenance)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Report_Making-the-List.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-making-the-list-name-matching-false-nonmatches-duplicates__brennan-center-making-the-list-voter-list-maintenance.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 — Accurate voter registration lists / matching challenges", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-478", "local": "/archives/2026/09/brennan-making-the-list-name-matching-false-nonmatches-duplicates__gao-05-478-accurate-voter-registration-lists-matching-challenges.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 17 companion. Foundational OK."}
{"id": "princeton-avir-diebold-2006-malware-undetectable-vote-theft", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-16", "uid": "C20260925-234437-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-16", "old_ids": ["princeton-avir-diebold-2006-malware-undetectable-vote-theft"], "seq": "C00449", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Show one thing on the screen and the printout, but record the votes however you like in the database."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Princeton's analysis of a Diebold AccuVote-TS DRE demonstrated malware that could steal votes while the voter-facing interface appeared normal—classic show-one-thing / record-another on DREs without voter-verifiable paper. Status Confirmed as foundational security research still cited for touchscreen recording integrity risks. Soft companion to existing princeton-diebold-2006 card.", "sources": [{"title": "Princeton / Felten — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt06/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman.pdf"}, {"title": "Verified Voting — Diebold AccuVote-TS risks overview", "url": "https://verifiedvoting.org/election-system/diebold-accuvote-ts/"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 8 companion. Foundational pre-2016 research.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "rivest-software-independence-definition-undetectable-outcome-change", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-25", "uid": "C20260925-235207-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-25", "old_ids": ["rivest-software-independence-definition-undetectable-outcome-change"], "seq": "C00498", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete verifiability"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006", "state": "Federal", "description": "Software independence is defined so that undetected software change/error cannot cause an undetectable election-outcome change—software-dependent tabulators therefore have incomplete verifiability by definition. Status Confirmed for the incomplete-verifiability diagnosis of machine tabulation without voter-verified paper + audits. Point to PEP: properly-run precinct hand count of hand-marked paper is a software-independent path (do not invent on-site PEP use).", "sources": [{"title": "Rivest & Wack — software independence definition (NIST PDF)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}, {"title": "UnclearBallot — image audits are not software-independent", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-software-independence-definition-undetectable-outcome-change__unclearballot-image-audits-are-not-software-independent.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 13."}
{"id": "rivest-wack-software-complexity-exceeds-officials-ability-to-prove-correctness", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-37", "uid": "C20260925-235207-37", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-37", "old_ids": ["rivest-wack-software-complexity-exceeds-officials-ability-to-prove-correctness"], "seq": "C00510", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Usurpation of Election Officials' Authority", "The systems are too complex and vulnerable for election officials to understand."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-62", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006", "state": "Federal", "description": "Rivest & Wack argue voting-system software complexity vastly exceeds our ability to prove correctness or test satisfactorily within reasonable budgets—so election officials cannot personally understand/verify black-box systems and must trust vendors/VSTLs. Status Confirmed for the complexity→official-dependence diagnosis. PEP framing: complexity is a machine/centralized problem; properly-run hand count of hand-marked paper remains viable (no invented on-site PEP claim).", "sources": [{"title": "Rivest & Wack — software independence / complexity (NIST)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}, {"title": "Halpern — Who Owns Our Voting Machines? (vendor dependence)", "url": "https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2020/11/19/election-who-owns-our-voting-machines/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-wack-software-complexity-exceeds-officials-ability-to-prove-correctness__halpern-who-owns-our-voting-machines-vendor-dependence.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 19. First Cat-2 instances in evidence set."}
{"id": "rivest-wack-software-independence-public-cannot-verify-complex-black-box", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-23", "uid": "C20260925-235207-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-23", "old_ids": ["rivest-wack-software-independence-public-cannot-verify-complex-black-box"], "seq": "C00496", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No public visibility"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-34", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-34", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006", "state": "Federal", "description": "Rivest & Wack's NIST/MIT software-independence paper states that when election integrity depends on complex, difficult-to-test software, the public cannot independently verify outcomes—software-dependent tabulation is opaque by design. Foundational pre-2016 framing still used in VVSG/audit debates. Status Confirmed for the no-public-visibility problem of black-box tabulation; PEP/hand-count contrast: precinct public observation of hand-marked paper counting restores visibility without inventing on-site PEP use.", "sources": [{"title": "Rivest & Wack — On the notion of software independence in voting systems (NIST)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-wack-software-independence-public-cannot-verify-complex-black-box__rivest-wack-on-the-notion-of-software-independence-in-voting-systems-nist.pdf"}, {"title": "National Academies — Securing the Vote (software independence / paper audits)", "url": "https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rivest-wack-software-independence-public-cannot-verify-complex-black-box__national-academies-securing-the-vote-software-independence-paper-audits.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 12."}
{"id": "nist-2006-sts-software-independence-vvsg-software-dependent-unverifiable", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-06", "uid": "C20260926-021547-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-06", "old_ids": ["nist-2006-sts-software-independence-vvsg-software-dependent-unverifiable"], "seq": "C00969", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Incomplete verifiability"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-59", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-11", "state": "US", "description": "NIST STS draft white paper Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007 defines software-dependent systems (classic DREs) as those whose outcome correctness depends on trusting complex software because electronic records cannot be audited against independent voter-verified evidence—making undetectable outcome changes possible. Status Confirmed federal standards body documenting incomplete verifiability of software-dependent tabulation; peer to Rivest SI definition and UnclearBallot image-audit defeat—NIST STS SI recommendation paper, not those remounted. PEP framing: hand-marked paper enabling independent audit restores verifiability.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST STS — Requiring Software Independence in VVSG 2007 (Nov 2006 draft PDF)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/documents/itl/vote/DraftWhitePaperOnSIinVVSG2007-20061120.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-2006-sts-software-independence-vvsg-software-dependent-unverifiable__nist-sts-requiring-software-independence-in-vvsg-2007-nov-2006-draft-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "NIST — On the notion of software independence in voting systems (SI definition PDF)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nist-2006-sts-software-independence-vvsg-software-dependent-unverifiable__nist-on-the-notion-of-software-independence-in-voting-systems-si-definition-pd.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Incomplete verifiability leaf. PEP framing."}
{"id": "fl-broward-miami-dade-2006-ivotronic-early-voting-flips-recalibrated", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-04", "uid": "C20261020-160717-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-04", "old_ids": ["fl-broward-miami-dade-2006-ivotronic-early-voting-flips-recalibrated"], "seq": "C00997", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-10", "state": "FL", "description": "During early voting for the Nov. 2006 general election, voters in Miami-Dade and Broward counties, Florida told the Miami Herald that ES&S iVotronic touchscreens showed a different candidate than the one they touched (for example a vote for Jim Davis for governor showing Charlie Crist). Miami-Dade Supervisor Lester Sola sealed the two machines that drew complaints, said a technician found no problems, and said no votes were lost. In Broward, Peter Corwin of the county administrator's office said flipping problems are common on a certain percentage of machines, that individual devices had unique problems, and that they were addressed by recalibrating the devices. ES&S said voters could fix selections on the review screen. Status Confirmed: Broward officials confirmed device problems fixed by recalibration; Miami-Dade found none. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Computerworld — Voters in Fla., Texas complain of e-voting glitches (Nov. 1, 2006)", "url": "https://www.computerworld.com/article/1646112/voters-in-fla-texas-complain-of-e-voting-glitches.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fl-broward-miami-dade-2006-ivotronic-early-voting-flips-recalibrated__cw2006.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (cw2006). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "princeton-feldman-halderman-felten-2006-accuvote-certified-malware", "permanent_id": "C20260926-020640-13", "uid": "C20260926-020640-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-020640-13", "old_ids": ["princeton-feldman-halderman-felten-2006-accuvote-certified-malware"], "seq": "C00946", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-13", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-09", "state": "US", "description": "Princeton CITP (Feldman/Halderman/Felten) **Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS** (2006) showed that NASED-certified BallotStation software could be infected in about a minute via memory card, silently stealing votes and spreading virally—demonstrating that **certified** electronic voting machines remained deeply insecure while officials trusted federal/state certification. Status Confirmed foundational EVM vulnerability research on certified equipment; peer to UMich EVEREST and CA TTBR on this parent leaf—Princeton AccuVote paper (distinct from the DRE \"program whichever candidate\" child-leaf princeton-diebold-2006 card).", "sources": [{"title": "Princeton CITP — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine (2006)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/legacy/event/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/princeton-feldman-halderman-felten-2006-accuvote-certified-malware__princeton-citp-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-accuvot.png"}, {"title": "Princeton News — Researchers reveal extremely serious vulnerabilities in e-voting machines (2006)", "url": "https://www.princeton.edu/news/2006/09/13/researchers-reveal-extremely-serious-vulnerabilities-e-voting-machines-0", "local": "/archives/2026/09/princeton-feldman-halderman-felten-2006-accuvote-certified-malware__princeton-news-researchers-reveal-extremely-serious-vul.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b7 third on Electronic Voting Machines parent leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "princeton-diebold-2006", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-11", "uid": "C20260925-155410-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-11", "old_ids": ["princeton-diebold-2006"], "seq": "C00011", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program the system to select whichever candidate you like, regardless of which candidate's name is touched."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-09-13", "state": "Federal", "description": "Princeton CITP researchers Ariel J. Feldman, J. Alex Halderman, and Edward W. Felten's peer-reviewed analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS DRE demonstrated that malware installed with brief physical/memory-card access could silently steal votes — modifying both copies of election results while preserving total ballot counts and appearing consistent in logs/counters, i.e., recording a programmed candidate preference regardless of the touchscreen selection the voter saw. Status Confirmed for laboratory demonstration of programmable silent vote-stealing on a widely deployed DRE (not a court finding of an in-election deployment).", "sources": [{"title": "Feldman/Halderman/Felten — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS (USENIX EVT'07)", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/feldman/feldman_html/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/princeton-diebold-2006__feldman-halderman-felten-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-ac.png"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — AccuVote-TS executive summary", "url": "http://citpsite.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/oldsite-htdocs/voting/summary.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/princeton-diebold-2006__princeton-citp-accuvote-ts-executive-summary.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f remount 2026-09-25.20-preview: stub Electronic Voting Machines → exact DRE 'Program the system to select whichever candidate' Detail leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "hursti-2006-diebold-tsx-memory-card-bootloader-reflash", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022920-08", "uid": "C20260926-022920-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022920-08", "old_ids": ["hursti-2006-diebold-tsx-memory-card-bootloader-reflash"], "seq": "C01053", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program the system to select whichever candidate you like, regardless of which candidate's name is touched."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-85", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-85", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-07", "state": "Federal", "description": "Harri Hursti's Black Box Voting Diebold TSx/TS6 evaluation (unredacted July 2006) demonstrated that AccuVote touchscreen DREs would accept specially named files from removable PCMCIA memory cards (e.g., bootloader/OS reflash payloads) without authentication—enabling persistent malicious software that can make the machine record votes for a programmed candidate regardless of the name touched. Princeton Feldman/Halderman/Felten AccuVote-TS work and California TTBR later confirmed related viral/memory-card code-execution paths. Status Confirmed independent security research with public PDF; peer to Princeton 2006 and EVT'07 malware papers on this leaf—Hursti memory-card reflash vector, not those remounted. PEP framing: DRE software-defined selection severs voter intent from countable paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Black Box Voting / Hursti — Critical Security Issues with Diebold TSx (unredacted PDF, July 2006)", "url": "https://blackboxvoting.org/BBVreportIIunredacted.pdf"}, {"title": "Black Box Voting / Hursti — Diebold TSx Evaluation Security Alert supplement (May 22, 2006 PDF)", "url": "https://blackboxvoting.org/BBVreportII-supplement-unredacted.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b12 third on DRE program-whichever-candidate leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "rivest-wack-nist-software-dependent-systems-cannot-be-adequately-secured", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-35", "uid": "C20260926-000015-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-35", "old_ids": ["rivest-wack-nist-software-dependent-systems-cannot-be-adequately-secured"], "seq": "C00548", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "There is no way to secure these systems."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-48", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-07-28", "state": "Federal", "description": "Rivest & Wack (NIST draft, 2006; Phil. Trans. R. Soc. A 2008): software-dependent voting systems leave election outcomes dependent on complex software that cannot be fully proven correct or secured against undetected change—hence the software-independence requirement. Catalog ALL-CAPS overclaim softened to Confirmed for: software-dependent tabulators cannot be secured in the strong sense of undetectable-error immunity. Foundational pre-2016 OK. PEP: software-independent hand-marked paper + public hand count addresses the gap (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — Rivest/Wack On the notion of software independence in voting systems", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}, {"title": "Appel & Stark — Evidence-Based Elections (computers cannot be assured bug-free)", "url": "https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/papers/Appel-Stark-GLTR-2020.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 18. Honest framing of absolute catalog language vs software-independence science."}
{"id": "gao-06-247-statewide-voter-registration-databases-havasource-limits", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002757-32", "uid": "C20260926-002757-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002757-32", "old_ids": ["gao-06-247-statewide-voter-registration-databases-havasource-limits"], "seq": "C00705", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Voter registration databases do not require, or even record, the source of each registration (the individual who caused it and the full path it took into the database)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-69", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-03-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO's early HAVA statewide voter-registration database review documents states implementing computerized lists with varying data elements and matching rules—foundational evidence that federal law required statewide databases but did not mandate a universal registrant-SOURCE provenance trail. Foundational pre-2016 OK. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-06-247 — Nine States' Experiences Implementing Computerized Statewide Voter Registration Lists", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-247.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-06-247-statewide-voter-registration-databases-havasource-limits__gao-06-247-nine-states-experiences-implementing-computerized.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-19-485 — Later list-management update confirming ongoing external-match reliance", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-19-485.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20i leaf 16 companion. Foundational OK."}
{"id": "diebold-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-vote-manipulation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-012939-20", "uid": "C20260926-012939-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-012939-20", "old_ids": ["diebold-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-vote-manipulation"], "seq": "C00859", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-02", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Independent security analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic interpreter (Ferguson/Feldman/Halderman et al., widely cited Feb 2006; mirrored in California TTBR materials) showed that malicious AccuBasic scripts on AccuVote-OS memory cards could alter reported vote totals and related election data without obvious detection by poll workers relying on the card's printed reports. Complements the Leon County Hursti demonstration with a formal interpreter-vulnerability analysis. Status Confirmed for research-demonstrated vote-total manipulation via removable election media. Transparent PEP precinct hand counts of hand-marked paper remain the detection/remedy framing.", "sources": [{"title": "Ferguson et al. — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (PDF)", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/accubasic.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/diebold-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-vote-manipulation__ferguson-et-al-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-accubas.pdf"}, {"title": "CA SOS TTBR — Diebold source review discussing AccuBasic/memory-card risks", "url": "https://votingsystems.cdn.sos.ca.gov/oversight/ttbr/diebold-source-public-jul29.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-ttbr-2007-electronic-voting-machines-review__uc-ca-sos-source-code-review-of-the-diebold-voting-syst.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b1 peer to hursti-diebold-memory-card-vote-totals-2005.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "wagner-2006-accuvote-os-fails-check-counters-zero-start", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-03", "uid": "C20260926-021547-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-03", "old_ids": ["wagner-2006-accuvote-os-fails-check-counters-zero-start"], "seq": "C00966", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-02", "state": "CA", "description": "Same AccuBasic VSTAAB review confirms the AV-OS fails to check that vote counters are zero at the start of election day and manipulates counters as 16-bit values without overflow checks—enabling Hursti-style pre-loading of non-zero counters that wrap or cancel while Zero Reports can be falsified by modified AccuBasic scripts on the card. Status Confirmed counter-preload / zero-check gap; peer to Leon County preload demo and UConn AccuVote-OS assessment—AccuBasic zero-check finding, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Wagner/Jefferson/Bishop — AccuBasic report: AV-OS fails to check counters zero; 16-bit wrap", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/accubasic.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wagner-jefferson-2006-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-programming__wagner-jefferson-bishop-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-accubasic-interpreter.pdf"}, {"title": "Black Box Voting — Hursti memory-card report (preload / False zero report context)", "url": "https://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Pre-load votes on thumb/flash drives leaf."}
{"id": "wagner-jefferson-2006-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-programming", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-02", "uid": "C20260926-021547-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-02", "old_ids": ["wagner-jefferson-2006-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-programming"], "seq": "C00965", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate programming on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006-02", "state": "CA", "description": "California VSTAAB Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (Wagner, Jefferson, Bishop, Feb. 2006) confirms that AccuBasic object programs (.abo) stored on removable memory cards are executed by firmware interpreters, that Hursti-style card programming works without passwords/keys/GEMS access, and that interpreter bugs enable an attacker with card access to inject code controlling machine behavior. Status Confirmed memory-card programming path; peer to Leon County Hursti demo and CA TTBR Diebold memory-card findings—AccuBasic interpreter source review, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Wagner/Jefferson/Bishop — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (UC Berkeley PDF)", "url": "https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/accubasic.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wagner-jefferson-2006-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-programming__wagner-jefferson-bishop-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-accubasic-interpreter.pdf"}, {"title": "UC Davis mirror — AccuBasic Interpreter report index", "url": "https://nob.cs.ucdavis.edu/bishop/notes/2006-inter/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wagner-jefferson-2006-accubasic-interpreter-memory-card-programming__uc-davis-mirror-accubasic-interpreter-report-index.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Manipulate programming on thumb/flash drives leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier GEMS"]}
{"id": "pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-04", "uid": "C20261028-134437-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-04", "old_ids": ["pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia"], "seq": "C01616", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Motor-Voter Registration", "Pass off DMV registration as citizenship verification to let noncitizen registrations in"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-02", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2006 to 2017-12-12", "state": "PA", "description": "Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt testified to the Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee on Dec. 12, 2017, that 220 noncitizens had been registered in Philadelphia between 2006 and 2017, that 90 (41%) of them voted, casting 227 votes, and that 168 (76%) \"either initially registered to vote through PennDOT 'Motor Voter,' or modified their voter registration record at some point through 'Motor Voter.' Those voters cast a total of 166 votes.\" He explained that \"PennDOT verifies these immigration documents electronically with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the applicant's driver's license record is marked using an INS Indicator. Nevertheless, following this interaction, non-citizen applicants – just the same as U.S. citizen applicants – are asked using touch screen technology if they would like to register to vote,\" and that the answer to \"Are you a citizen of the U.S.\" is the only information county offices have to verify citizenship. [1] The Department of State's written testimony to the House State Government Committee (Oct. 25, 2017) reported 1,160 statewide records cancelled after registrants self-reported they were not citizens; 248 had voted at least once (642 ballots), and about 66% (769) \"had initially applied through the Motor Voter system.\" The Department authorized PennDOT to \"reconfigure the Motor Voter process to prevent non-citizens from ever being offered the voter registration screens.\" [2] AP reported the PennDOT glitch in 2017. [3] Status Confirmed: official testimony.", "sources": [{"title": "Philadelphia City Commissioner Al Schmidt — Testimony to the Pennsylvania Senate State Government Committee (Dec. 12, 2017; PDF)", "url": "https://pasenategop.com/stategovernment/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/schmidt.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia__schmidt-senate-testimony-2017-12-12.pdf"}, {"title": "Pennsylvania Department of State, Commissioner Jonathan Marks — Written testimony, House State Government Committee hearing on non-citizens voting (Oct. 25, 2017; PDF)", "url": "https://www.legis.state.pa.us/WU01/LI/TR/Transcripts/2017_0109_0002_TSTMNY.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/pa-2017-penndot-motor-voter-glitch-noncitizens-registered-philadelphia__pa-dos-marks-house-testimony-2017-10-25.pdf"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Pennsylvania system glitch let non-citizens register to vote (2017)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/id-31e1db9488af4a5a95634ee1b7bc0174"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["pa-2023-09-19-penndot-automatic-voter-registration-opt-in-to-opt-out", "pa-auditor-2026-motor-voter-200k-apps-registration-voter-rolls", "il-sos-2019-avr-programming-error-noncitizen-registrations", "or-dmv-avr-error-1948-2024", "ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence"]}
{"id": "eff-printer-machine-identification-code-yellow-tracking-dots-steganography", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-13", "uid": "C20260925-235207-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-13", "old_ids": ["eff-printer-machine-identification-code-yellow-tracking-dots-steganography"], "seq": "C00486", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "If the QR-code scheme is discovered, use what appear to be random dots on the page, which the programming watches for and acts on."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-90", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-90", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005", "state": "Federal", "description": "EFF's Machine Identification Code / printer-tracking-dots research documents that many color laser printers embed nearly invisible yellow-dot patterns (often appearing as random dots) encoding printer serial/time data—machine-readable steganography on printed pages that humans miss without magnification/blue light. Status Confirmed that printer 'random dots' are a real, programmable forensic channel on printed output. Catalog claim that election tabulators 'watch for them' as vote-adjustment instructions is Alleged (not shown in EFF work); this card confirms the steganographic-dot substrate.", "sources": [{"title": "EFF — List of printers which do/do not display tracking dots", "url": "https://www.eff.org/pages/list-printers-which-do-or-do-not-display-tracking-dots", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eff-printer-machine-identification-code-yellow-tracking-dots-steganography__eff-list-of-printers-which-do-do-not-display-tracking-dots.png"}, {"title": "Wikipedia — Printer tracking dots / machine identification code (overview)", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Printer_tracking_dots", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eff-printer-machine-identification-code-yellow-tracking-dots-steganography__wikipedia-printer-tracking-dots-machine-identification-code-overview.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 7. Confirmed for steganographic yellow/random dots on printed pages; vote-instruction use Alleged."}
{"id": "eff-yellow-dots-low-visual-contrast-scanners-blue-channel-detect", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-15", "uid": "C20260925-235207-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-15", "old_ids": ["eff-yellow-dots-low-visual-contrast-scanners-blue-channel-detect"], "seq": "C00488", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "If the \"random\" dot approach is discovered, use a very light color such as yellow that the scanner can detect but the human eye cannot without a magnifying glass."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005", "state": "Federal", "description": "EFF decoding work on printer yellow tracking dots notes yellow has very low visual contrast against white for the human eye yet is recoverable via blue-light illumination, magnification, or scanner color-channel enhancement—exactly the 'light yellow humans miss / machines detect' property. Status Confirmed for the colorimetric mechanism. Using such marks as covert ballot-tabulation instructions remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "EFF/CCC — Decoding Identifying Printer Information (yellow dots, blue light)", "url": "https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/printers/ccc.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eff-yellow-dots-low-visual-contrast-scanners-blue-channel-detect__eff-ccc-decoding-identifying-printer-information-yellow-dots-blue-light.pdf"}, {"title": "EFF — printer tracking dots list / MIC project", "url": "https://www.eff.org/pages/list-printers-which-do-or-do-not-display-tracking-dots"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 8."}
{"id": "gao-hava-statewide-lists-without-strong-unique-person-constraints", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-36", "uid": "C20260926-001426-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-36", "old_ids": ["gao-hava-statewide-lists-without-strong-unique-person-constraints"], "seq": "C00629", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "No referential integrity"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-16", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO's early HAVA statewide-list reviews found states struggled to build accurate computerized registration databases with reliable unique-voter identification across agencies—i.e., weak cross-table / cross-agency referential integrity in practice. Foundational pre-2016 OK. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-06-247 — Nine States' Experiences Implementing Computerized Statewide Lists", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-06-247.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-hava-statewide-lists-without-strong-unique-person-constraints__gao-06-247-nine-states-experiences-implementing-computerized-statewide-lists.pdf"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 — Additional Data Could Help Maintain Accurate Lists", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/a246629.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-hava-statewide-lists-without-strong-unique-person-constraints__gao-05-478-additional-data-could-help-maintain-accurate-list.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 18 companion. Foundational OK."}
{"id": "wi-stat-5-905-voting-software-escrow-withheld-public-records", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-01", "uid": "C20260925-212129-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-01", "old_ids": ["wi-stat-5-905-voting-software-escrow-withheld-public-records"], "seq": "C00298", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that restrict citizens' access, blocking us from seeing or verifying our own election system."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Stat. §5.905 requires vendors of approved electronic voting systems to escrow vote-counting source code and related human-readable software components with the Wisconsin Elections Commission, which must keep them in strict confidence and withhold them from public-records requesters under §19.35(1) except for limited recount-party reviewers who sign confidentiality agreements protecting proprietary information. Status Confirmed for a statute that blocks ordinary citizen Open Records access to the software that counts votes.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Legislature — §5.905 Software components", "url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2021/statutes/statutes/5/iii/905/1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-5-905-voting-software-escrow-withheld-public-records__wisconsin-legislature-5-905-software-components.png"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Court of Appeals — ES&S proprietary confidentiality under §5.905 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.wicourts.gov/ca/opinion/DisplayDocument.pdf?content=pdf&seqNo=259014", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-5-905-voting-software-escrow-withheld-public-records__wisconsin-court-of-appeals-es-s-proprietary-confidentiality.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 1. Confirmed statutory access barrier; PEP/hand-count contrast: transparent hand count needs no escrowed black-box code.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "wi-stat-7-52-central-count-absentee-municipal-board-not-polling-place", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021547-10", "uid": "C20260926-021547-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021547-10", "old_ids": ["wi-stat-7-52-central-count-absentee-municipal-board-not-polling-place"], "seq": "C00973", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Reporting", "Centralizing results makes fraud difficult, if not impossible, to detect."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-54", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005/2021", "state": "WI", "description": "Wisconsin Stat. §7.52 authorizes municipalities by ordinance to canvass all absentee ballots at a municipal board of absentee ballot canvassers in lieu of canvassing them at election-day polling places under §6.88—centralizing absentee tabulation away from ward/polling-place boards. Status Confirmed statutory central-count pathway peer to Michigan AVCB/early-vote accumulation statutes that detach absentees from election-day precinct mapping—WI §7.52 text, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Wis. Stat. §7.52 — Canvassing of absentee ballots (central count in lieu of polling-place canvass)", "url": "https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2021/statutes/statutes/7/ii/52/1", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-7-52-central-count-absentee-municipal-board-not-polling-place__wis-stat-7-52-canvassing-of-absentee-ballots-central-count-in-lieu-of-polling.png"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Central Count Absentee Ballot Municipalities list", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/central-count-absentee-ballot-municipalities", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wi-stat-7-52-central-count-absentee-municipal-board-not-polling-place__wisconsin-elections-commission-central-count-absentee-ballot-municipalities-li.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b9 third on Centralization of results (MI AVCB leaf) with WI peer statute."}
{"id": "eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs", "permanent_id": "C20260925-182526-02", "uid": "C20260925-182526-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-182526-02", "old_ids": ["eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs"], "seq": "C00085", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Fake Testing and Certification", "Vendors pay the \"testing\" labs."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-65", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-2026", "state": "US", "description": "Under the EAC Voting System Testing & Certification Program, Voting System Test Laboratories (VSTLs) are paid by the voting-system manufacturer seeking certification—not by the EAC or an independent public purse. The EAC's own FAQ asks \"Why are manufacturers allowed to pay VSTL directly?\" and answers that the EAC lacks legal authority to collect manufacturer testing fees (Miscellaneous Receipts Act), so manufacturers contract and pay labs themselves; manufacturers also choose which accredited VSTL to use. EAC VSTL Program Manual §2.16.4 (Fee for Service) likewise refers to \"fees paid by a manufacturer to a VSTL\" and requires fees be solely for testing services (not contingent on outcome). Status Confirmed for the structural vendor-pays-lab payment model in federal certification. Does not by itself prove any particular lab falsified results.", "sources": [{"title": "EAC — Voting Equipment FAQs (manufacturers pay VSTL directly; choose lab)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/frequently-asked-questions"}, {"title": "EAC — Voting System Test Laboratory Program Manual Version 3.0 (§2.16.4 Fee for Service)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/VSTL_Program_Manual_Version_3_0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs__eac-voting-system-test-laboratory-program-manual-version-3-0.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — Testing & Certification Program overview", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/election-technology/testing-certification-program-tc", "local": "/archives/2026/09/eac-vstl-manufacturer-pays-labs__eac-testing-certification-program-overview.png"}], "notes": "Confirmed structural payment model. Distinct from tx-dominion-5-5a-cert-denial-2020 (state non-certification under Fake Testing and Certification stub)."}
{"id": "wa-wac-434-250-120-missing-illegible-postmark-uses-signature-date", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-06", "uid": "C20260926-014044-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-06", "old_ids": ["wa-wac-434-250-120-missing-illegible-postmark-uses-signature-date"], "seq": "C00881", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Missing postmarks"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-30", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-2024", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington Administrative Code 434-250-120 provides that if a mail-ballot envelope's postmark is illegible or missing, 'the date of the voter's signature is the date of mailing as per RCW 29A.40.110,' and meter postage/dated stamps do not qualify as postmarks; the ballot may still be counted if received by close of business the day before certification (or via drop box by 8 p.m. Election Day). Status Confirmed for a formal missing/illegible-postmark acceptance rule that substitutes the voter's attested signature date for USPS postmark evidence—peer to California Elec. Code §3020 missing/illegible postmark treatment; illustrates CoC reliance on envelope attestation when postal marks fail.", "sources": [{"title": "WAC 434-250-120 — Verification of the signature and return date (PDF)", "url": "https://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=434-250-120&pdf=true", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-wac-434-250-120-missing-illegible-postmark-uses-signature-date__wac-434-250-120-verification-of-the-signature-and-retur.pdf"}, {"title": "RCW 29A.40.110 — Processing incoming ballots (cross-ref in WAC)", "url": "https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=29A.40.110", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-wac-434-250-120-missing-illegible-postmark-uses-signature-date__rcw-29a-40-110-processing-incoming-ballots-cross-ref-in.png"}, {"title": "Election Law Navigator — Wash. WAC 434-250-120", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/washington/regulation/434-250-120/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-wac-434-250-120-missing-illegible-postmark-uses-signature-date__election-law-navigator-wash-wac-434-250-120.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Missing Postmarks leaf."}
{"id": "hursti-diebold-memory-card-leon-county-2005", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-19", "uid": "C20260925-184601-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-19", "old_ids": ["hursti-diebold-memory-card-leon-county-2005"], "seq": "C00137", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate programming on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-39", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-12", "state": "FL", "description": "In authorized Leon County, FL tests (Dec 2005), Harri Hursti demonstrated that a modified Diebold AccuVote-OS memory card could alter election programming/results so a mock election reported inverted totals (e.g., 7 Yes / 1 No vs actual 2 Yes / 6 No) that also flowed into the central tabulator without detection except by hand-counting paper ballots. California's independent analysis confirmed the attack class. Foundational removable-media programming manipulation—directly on-point for flash/thumb election media. Status Confirmed for the demonstrated vulnerability class (pre-2016 foundational research cited by the catalog).", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Officials challenge balloting security (Hursti/Leon County)", "url": "http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101051_pf.html"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — Diebold voting machines hacked in Florida", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/12/5821-2/"}, {"title": "Black Box Voting / Hursti materials archive reference", "url": "https://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hursti-diebold-memory-card-leon-county-2005__black-box-voting-hursti-materials-archive-reference.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 9. Confirmed memory-card programming manipulation; PEP/hand count detects.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "hursti-diebold-memory-card-preload-counters-leon-2005", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-30", "uid": "C20260925-194013-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-30", "old_ids": ["hursti-diebold-memory-card-preload-counters-leon-2005"], "seq": "C00214", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-40", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-12", "state": "FL", "description": "In authorized Leon County, Florida public tests (Dec 2005), Harri Hursti / Black Box Voting demonstrated that Diebold AccuVote-OS removable memory cards could be preloaded with crafted vote-counter values (including integer-overflow / negative-offset techniques) so the machine printed a plausible zero tape yet later reported inverted or otherwise false totals that the central tabulator accepted — while paper ballots retained true marks. Washington Post, Ars Technica, and the Black Box Voting report document the preload-on-removable-media attack. (Sibling cards cover manipulate-programming and manipulate-vote-totals aspects of the same demo; this card centers the preload-on-card technique.) Status Confirmed for laboratory/public-test preload of votes via election memory media — not a documented live-election exploit. Paper hand-count / PEP-style observation remains the transparent contrast to trusting preloaded machine media.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Fla. rejects electronic voting system (Hursti/Leon coverage)", "url": "http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/21/AR2006012101051_pf.html"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — Diebold voting machines hacked in Florida", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2005/12/5821-2/"}, {"title": "Black Box Voting — BBV report on Diebold memory-card tests", "url": "https://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hursti-diebold-memory-card-leon-county-2005__black-box-voting-hursti-materials-archive-reference.pdf"}, {"title": "Ballot Integrity — Florida: The Harri Hursti Hack", "url": "https://www.ballot-integrity.org/docs/hursti_hack.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 15. Preload-on-memory-card technique Confirmed (authorized test).", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "hursti-diebold-memory-card-vote-totals-2005", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-20", "uid": "C20260925-184601-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-20", "old_ids": ["hursti-diebold-memory-card-vote-totals-2005"], "seq": "C00138", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate votes on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-41", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-12", "state": "FL", "description": "Same Leon County Hursti demonstration showed the compromised memory card caused false vote totals to be reported and accepted by the central tabulator—i.e., manipulation of recorded votes via removable election media, not merely configuration metadata. Paper ballots retained the true marks. Status Confirmed for removable-media vote-total manipulation in a controlled public test.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballot Integrity — Hursti Hack documentation (PDF)", "url": "https://www.ballot-integrity.org/docs/hursti_hack.pdf"}, {"title": "TX SoS archive — Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter (PDF)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/security_diebold_accubasic.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hursti-diebold-memory-card-vote-totals-2005__tx-sos-archive-security-analysis-of-the-diebold-accubasic-in.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 9 sibling — manipulate votes on flash media.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"]}
{"id": "hursti-2005-leon-county-diebold-memory-card-malicious-code", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032507-02", "uid": "C20260926-032507-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032507-02", "old_ids": ["hursti-2005-leon-county-diebold-memory-card-malicious-code"], "seq": "C01197", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Software", "Lack of Downstream Verification", "Officials who conduct elections using black-box systems:", "They are not allowed to look \"under the hood\" to verify:", "That it has no malicious programming embedded in it"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-77", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-77", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-12-13", "state": "FL", "description": "Black Box Voting's Hursti/Thompson Leon County (FL) Dec. 2005 live demonstration—and Black Box Voting's technical report on Diebold AccuVote-OS 1.94w—showed that executable AccuBasic code on the removable memory card could silently invert vote totals and force a false zero-report without passwords or GEMS access; Supervisor Ion Sancho stated he would have certified the tampered results with no way to detect the alteration. WIRED contemporaneous coverage confirmed the memory-card malicious-programming path. Status Confirmed primary Hursti Leon County / Black Box Voting memory-card executable-code demonstration that malicious programming can embed undetectably from the official's vantage; peer to Halderman ICX supply-chain/insider malware and Appel Sequoia AVC Advantage fraudulent-firmware cards already on this leaf—Hursti Diebold AccuVote-OS instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: black-box tabulators that officials cannot inspect under the hood hide malicious code that only public hand examination of paper can catch.", "sources": [{"title": "Black Box Voting — Security Analysis of Diebold AccuVote-OS 1.94w / Hursti memory-card report (PDF)", "url": "https://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf"}, {"title": "WIRED — Diebold Hack Hints at Wider Flaws (Hursti/Thompson Leon County, Dec. 21, 2005)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2005/12/diebold-hack-hints-at-wider-flaws/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b22 third on Software Lack of downstream verification malicious programming under-the-hood leaf.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote", "Diebold/Premier GEMS"]}
{"id": "gao-05-478-voter-list-name-matching-aliases-maiden-married-duplicates", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-10", "uid": "C20260926-025634-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-10", "old_ids": ["gao-05-478-voter-list-name-matching-aliases-maiden-married-duplicates"], "seq": "C01115", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Duplicate entries for individuals with name changes (maiden and married names)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-86", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-86", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-06", "state": "Federal", "description": "GAO-05-478 (Elections: Additional Data Could Help State and Local Elections Officials Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists) documents that aliases, nicknames, and name changes (including maiden-to-married transitions) make automated matching across registration files difficult and can produce both false duplicate matches and false non-matches—structural list-maintenance conditions that leave same-person duplicate entries on rolls when matching rules are too strict or too loose. Status Confirmed primary federal audit findings on name-change/alias matching failure modes; peer to ERIC same-state-duplicates FAQ and Brennan Making-the-List name-matching cards already on this leaf—GAO matching analysis, not those remounted. PEP framing: opaque machine matching on name variants enlarges unverifiable roll complexity versus public hand-count rolls.", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-05-478 — Elections: Additional Data Could Help Maintain Accurate Voter Registration Lists (June 2005)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-05-478", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-05-478-voter-list-name-matching-aliases-maiden-married-duplicates__gao-05-478-elections-accurate-voter-registration-lists.png"}, {"title": "GAO-05-478 full PDF", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/a246629.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-05-478-voter-list-name-matching-aliases-maiden-married-duplicates__gao-05-478-full-report-page.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Voter Rolls Duplicate maiden/married names leaf."}
{"id": "brennan-edr-wi-college-dual-vote-traveling-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-34", "uid": "C20260926-004030-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-34", "old_ids": ["brennan-edr-wi-college-dual-vote-traveling-companion"], "seq": "C00787", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Recruit individuals willing to travel (college students, transient workers, activists, or paid operatives)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-10", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2005-01-01", "state": "WI", "description": "Brennan Center / contemporaneous WI materials discussing 2004 college dual-voting and EDR fraud allegations (including Eau Claire / Howard cases in the corpus) document real recruitment of mobile college populations into registration/voting controversies—showing why 'recruit college students willing to travel' is a live operational concern even when most cases are ordinary residency error. Status Confirmed for documented college dual-registration/dual-vote enforcement cases; nationwide paid traveling cabal Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Brennan Center — Analysis of election-day registration fraud claims (PDF includes WI 2004 discussion)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/edr_fraud.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Student residency guide", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/StudentWIGuide2022_0.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 17 companion. Soft remount of WI college dual-vote family."}
{"id": "oh-cuyahoga-2004-recount-workers-preselected-ballots-convicted-our-random-is-our-random", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-02", "uid": "C20261012-141825-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-02", "old_ids": ["oh-cuyahoga-2004-recount-workers-preselected-ballots-convicted-our-random-is-our-random"], "seq": "C01369", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2004-12-16 (convictions 2007-01-24)", "state": "OH", "description": "Ohio's 2004 presidential recount required each county to hand count a 3% sample and fall back to a full hand recount only if that sample did not match the machine count. In Cuyahoga County, elections coordinator Jacqueline Maiden and ballot manager Kathleen Dreamer worked behind closed doors for three days before the public Dec. 16, 2004 recount, prosecutors said, to pick ballots and precincts they knew would not produce discrepancies, avoiding the full hand recount. In the documentary \"Hacking Democracy\" (HBO, 2006), Dreamer says \"our random is our random\" and Maiden says \"we have that option to select.\" On Jan. 24, 2007 a jury convicted both of felony negligent misconduct of an elections employee and a misdemeanor failure to perform duty (a third worker was acquitted). Judge Peter Corrigan gave each the maximum 18 months and said \"I can't help but feel there's more to this story.\" In August 2007 another judge granted new trials because of Corrigan's conflict of interest; later dispositions are not tracked on this card. The special prosecutor did not claim the outcome was affected. Status Confirmed: a jury verdict that recount sample selection was rigged, plus the officials' own recorded words. Catalog note: the textbook RHINO. The \"random\" sample was chosen by the very people whose count was being checked. When a fair sample doesn't match, a full hand count is the remedy, which is exactly why rigging the sample paid off.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post (AP) — Election Staff Convicted in Recount Rig (Jan. 24, 2007)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/24/AR2007012401441_pf.html"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times (AP) — Election workers sentenced in Ohio recount (Mar. 14, 2007)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2007-mar-14-na-ohio14-story.html"}, {"title": "Columbus Dispatch (AP) — Election workers get retrial (Aug. 7, 2007)", "url": "https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2007/08/07/election-workers-get-retrial/23471555007/"}, {"title": "Salon — \"Hacking Democracy\" review (\"Our random is our random\") (Nov. 2, 2006)", "url": "https://www.salon.com/2006/11/02/hacking/"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). Convictions later vacated for new trial (judge conflict); status rests on verdict + recorded admissions."}
{"id": "oh-mahoning-2004-ivotronic-25-machines-kerry-touch-jumps-to-bush", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-02", "uid": "C20261020-160717-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-02", "old_ids": ["oh-mahoning-2004-ivotronic-25-machines-kerry-touch-jumps-to-bush"], "seq": "C00995", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2004-11-02", "state": "OH", "description": "On Nov. 2, 2004, Youngstown voter Jeanne White pressed Kerry on a Mahoning County, Ohio ES&S iVotronic touchscreen \"and watched her vote jump to the Bush column\" (Washington Post). Board of Elections chairman Mark Munroe told the Youngstown Vindicator that 20 to 30 machines had to be recalibrated during voting \"because some votes for a candidate were being counted for that candidate's opponent,\" citing causes such as static electricity; the Post counted 25 machines with what officials called \"calibration problems.\" Deputy director Thomas McCabe: \"It happens every election. It's something we have to live with, and we can fix it.\" Board tech specialist Chris Rakocy later put it at 18 of 1,148 machines and said errors were corrected on the review screen. The House Judiciary Democratic staff report (Conyers, \"What Went Wrong in Ohio,\" 2005) cited it; no count of affected votes was ever established. Direction reported: Kerry to Bush. Status Confirmed: officials confirmed calibration faults moving selections to the opponent and recalibrated the machines. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Post — Several Factors Contributed to 'Lost' Voters in Ohio (Dec. 15, 2004)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64737-2004Dec14_3.html"}, {"title": "VotersUnite — Youngstown Vindicator report on Mahoning County machine problems, Nov. 2004 (Munroe: 20-30 machines recalibrated)", "url": "https://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3674"}, {"title": "House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff (Conyers) — What Went Wrong in Ohio (2005), Mahoning County section", "url": "https://www.biknotes.com/_files/ugd/b8b6dc_0c18d73e7d2c4a5ea570588741875536.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 0 (none). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Washington Post, VotersUnite, House Judiciary Committee Democratic Staff (Conyers). Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "larimer-co-vote-centers-pioneered-convenience-cost-2003", "permanent_id": "C20260925-211320-07", "uid": "C20260925-211320-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-211320-07", "old_ids": ["larimer-co-vote-centers-pioneered-convenience-cost-2003"], "seq": "C00252", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Implementing \"Countywide Voting\"", "Sold as a convenience"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-98", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-98", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2003", "state": "CO", "description": "Larimer County, Colorado, pioneered the vote-center model in 2003, publicly framed as giving voters more convenient choices and reducing costs of HAVA-era equipment compliance versus staffing every traditional precinct. Status Confirmed for countywide vote centers sold and adopted as a convenience/cost reform.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Why many voters use voting centers, not precincts (Larimer 2003 origin)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/article/2022/aug/01/voting-centers-have-replaced-traditional-precincts/"}], "notes": "Fill-15e leaf 4."}
{"id": "il-10-ilcs-5-23-15-1-source-code-foia-exempt-escrow", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-04", "uid": "C20260926-021058-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-04", "old_ids": ["il-10-ilcs-5-23-15-1-source-code-foia-exempt-escrow"], "seq": "C00952", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Secret source code"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-58", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2003/2005", "state": "IL", "description": "Illinois 10 ILCS 5/23-15.1 requires vendors to escrow ballot-counting **computer code** with the State Board of Elections, then declares that code **strictly confidential**, vendor intellectual property, and **not subject to public disclosure under FOIA**—available only to contest parties under confidentiality agreements or court order. Status Confirmed statutory secrecy of tabulation source from electors; peer to FL appellate trade-secret priority and CA TTBR NDA review—IL FOIA-exempt escrow statute, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "10 ILCS 5/23-15.1 — Production of ballot counting code; FOIA-exempt escrow", "url": "https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/001000050K23-15.1.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-23-15-1-source-code-foia-exempt-escrow__10-ilcs-5-23-15-1-production-of-ballot-counting-code-foia-exempt-escrow.png"}, {"title": "Illinois General Assembly — 10 ILCS 5/ Election Code (escrow / confidentiality framework)", "url": "https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?ActID=170&ChapterID=3", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-10-ilcs-5-23-15-1-source-code-foia-exempt-escrow__illinois-general-assembly-10-ilcs-5-election-code-escrow-confidentiality-frame.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on secret source code leaf."}
{"id": "hava-first-time-mail-registrant-photo-or-utility-bill-alternative-not-universal-photo", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-34", "uid": "C20260925-235207-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-34", "old_ids": ["hava-first-time-mail-registrant-photo-or-utility-bill-alternative-not-universal-photo"], "seq": "C00507", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose or no ID requirements to register to vote in many cases"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-78", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2002", "state": "Federal", "description": "HAVA §303 / NCSL 'First Time Voters' summary: first-time federal voters who register by mail must show photo ID or a utility bill/bank statement/etc. copy—but providing a matched DL number or SSN last four at registration commonly exempts that showing, and ordinary (non-mail-first-time) registration does not impose a universal photo-ID-to-register rule. Status Confirmed that US registration law does not impose a nationwide photo-ID requirement to register.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — First Time Voters / HAVA mail-registration ID alternatives", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id"}, {"title": "EAC — National Mail Voter Registration Form", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/voters/national-mail-voter-registration-form", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hava-first-time-mail-registrant-photo-or-utility-bill-alternative-not-universal-photo__eac-national-mail-voter-registration-form.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 17 companion."}
{"id": "hava-303a5-unique-id-if-no-dl-or-ssn", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-24", "uid": "C20260925-185839-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-24", "old_ids": ["hava-303a5-unique-id-if-no-dl-or-ssn"], "seq": "C00175", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No driver's license, ID card, or Social Security card"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2002-2026", "state": "Federal", "description": "Help America Vote Act § 303(a)(5) provides that a federal voter-registration application may not be accepted unless it includes the applicant's driver's license number if the applicant has one, or the last four digits of the Social Security number if the applicant has no driver's license number; if the applicant has neither, the State must assign a unique identifying number. DOJ Civil Rights Division guidance confirms the statutory structure: lack of a DL or SSN card does not by itself bar registration—states assign an alternate unique ID. Status Confirmed that federal law expressly contemplates registration without a driver's license, ID card, or Social Security card number when neither DL nor SSN is available.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ Civil Rights — Help America Vote Act (verification / unique ID discussion)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/help-america-vote-act-4"}, {"title": "EAC — National Mail Voter Registration Form (ENG PDF)", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/Federal_Voter_Registration_ENG.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hava-303a5-unique-id-if-no-dl-or-ssn__eac-national-mail-voter-registration-form-eng-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 11. Statutory unique-ID pathway Confirmed."}
{"id": "hava-52-usc-21081-a3-accessible-voting-system-each-polling-place", "permanent_id": "C20260926-022424-12", "uid": "C20260926-022424-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-022424-12", "old_ids": ["hava-52-usc-21081-a3-accessible-voting-system-each-polling-place"], "seq": "C01042", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Reasonable Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements for disabled citizens are appropriate, but these must be taken into account: the June 2016 U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division ADA Checklist for Polling Places (votingchecklist.pdf)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-99", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2002-2024", "state": "Federal", "description": "HAVA §301(a)(3), codified at 52 U.S.C. §21081(a)(3), requires that voting systems used in federal elections provide voters with disabilities—including blind and visually impaired voters—the same opportunity for access and participation (privacy and independence), and that each polling place have at least one accessible voting system. That federal mandate, together with DOJ ADA polling-place checklists, constrains which sites can qualify as polling places and pushes jurisdictions toward fewer, larger, fully equipped centers. Status Confirmed statutory accessibility constraint on polling-place qualification; peer to DOJ 2016 ADA checklist and GAO-09-685 accessibility-barrier cards—HAVA §301(a)(3)/§21081 accessible-system requirement, not those remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Cornell LII — 52 U.S.C. §21081 Voting systems standards (HAVA §301)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/52/21081"}, {"title": "EAC Advisory 2007-001 — Accessible Voting Systems for In-person Absentee Voting", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/1/EAC%20Advisory%202007-001%20Accessible%20Voting%20Systems%20for%20In-person%20Absentee%20Voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hava-52-usc-21081-a3-accessible-voting-system-each-polling-place__eac-advisory-2007-001-accessible-voting-systems-for-in-person-absentee-voting.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b11 third on ADA polling-place requirements leaf."}
{"id": "tx-dallas-2002-ivotronic-democratic-touches-register-republican", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-01", "uid": "C20261020-160717-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-01", "old_ids": ["tx-dallas-2002-ivotronic-democratic-touches-register-republican"], "seq": "C00994", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2002-10", "state": "TX", "description": "During October 2002 early voting in Dallas County, Texas, dozens of voters in several precincts complained that when they touched a Democratic candidate on the county's ES&S iVotronic touchscreens, the screen registered the Republican. Election officials blamed \"badly calibrated voting machines\" (knocked out of alignment in transport, per UPI), removed 18 of more than 400 machines, and told election judges to check calibration each morning. Democrats asked District Judge Karen Johnson for court-supervised testing of the machines; she declined. Officials said no votes were lost or miscounted because voters could correct the selection before casting. Direction reported: Democrat to Republican. Status Confirmed: county officials confirmed the miscalibration and pulled machines. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "UPI — Snag in Texas as early voting begins (Oct. 23, 2002)", "url": "https://www.upi.com/Top_News/2002/10/23/Snag-in-Texas-as-early-voting-begins/19741035398667/"}, {"title": "Texas Observer — Political Intelligence: Votescam in the electronic age (Dallas County 2002 calibration complaints)", "url": "https://www.texasobserver.org/1214-political-intelligence-votescam-in-the-electronic-age/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2002-ivotronic-democratic-touches-register-republican__txobs2002.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (txobs2002). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): UPI. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "hava-52-usc-21083-computerized-statewide-voter-registration-list-centralized", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031135-15", "uid": "C20260926-031135-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031135-15", "old_ids": ["hava-52-usc-21083-computerized-statewide-voter-registration-list-centralized"], "seq": "C01165", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Centralizing certain components defeats decentralization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-70", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2002-10-29", "state": "Federal", "description": "Help America Vote Act §303 (52 U.S.C. §21083) requires each state to implement a single, uniform, official, centralized, interactive computerized statewide voter registration list defined, maintained, and administered at the state level, with immediate electronic access for any election official in the state—federal law that defeats purely local roll decentralization. NCSL's Vote Centers brief notes multiple states require vote centers to access that centralized statewide list. Status Confirmed primary HAVA statewide-list mandate; peer to CISA centralized-component cyber-risk and Colorado vote-center statewide-VR access cards already on this leaf—HAVA 52 USC 21083 instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: federally mandated statewide centralization creates single points of failure that county-level public hand counts were meant to avoid.", "sources": [{"title": "52 U.S.C. §21083 — Computerized statewide voter registration list requirements (HAVA §303)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/52/21083"}, {"title": "NCSL — Vote Centers (statewide voter registration access requirements)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/vote-centers"}], "notes": "Enrich-b19 third on Technology/Cyber-Security Decentralization defeated when components centralized leaf."}
{"id": "tolbert-grummel-smith-2001-ballot-initiatives-raise-turnout-midterms", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-01", "uid": "C20260925-220029-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-01", "old_ids": ["tolbert-grummel-smith-2001-ballot-initiatives-raise-turnout-midterms"], "seq": "C00354", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They put a sacrificial measure on the ballot that rallies a particular group, increasing biased voter participation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-21", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2001", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Peer-reviewed political-science research (Tolbert, Grummel & Smith, American Politics Research 2001; related Smith salience work) finds that ballot initiatives and referenda measurably increase voter turnout—especially in midterm/low-information elections—when campaigns mobilize around salient measures. Status Confirmed that putting hot-button measures on the ballot is a documented turnout-mobilization tool that can shift who participates; Confirmed for the process/effect literature, not a claim every measure is a 'sacrificial' fraud scheme.", "sources": [{"title": "I&R Institute PDF — Tolbert/Grummel/Smith Effects of Ballot Initiatives on Turnout", "url": "https://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I%26R%20Research%20and%20History/I%26R%20Studies/Tolbert%20Grummel%20and%20Smith%20(Dan)%20-%20Effects%20of%20Initiatives%20on%20Voter%20Turnout%20IRI.pdf"}, {"title": "Chapman Law Review — Differential Effects of Initiatives/Referenda on Turnout 1890–2008", "url": "https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol19/iss1/2", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tolbert-grummel-smith-2001-ballot-initiatives-raise-turnout-midterms__chapman-law-review-differential-effects-of-initiatives-refer.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 1. Confirmed turnout-mobilization effect of ballot measures; motive/'sacrificial' framing stays advocacy."}
{"id": "nvra-public-hospitals-voter-registration-agencies-ny", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-06", "uid": "C20260925-185839-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-06", "old_ids": ["nvra-public-hospitals-voter-registration-agencies-ny"], "seq": "C00157", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "Hospitals"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-25", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-25", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2000-2026", "state": "NY / Federal", "description": "Under the National Voter Registration Act, public acute-care hospitals operated by state/local government that provide or assist with Medicaid applications must be designated voter-registration agencies. The Second Circuit in Disabled in Action of Metropolitan New York v. Hammons applied that distinction in New York, requiring designation of public hospitals (private hospitals are not automatic agencies). Hospital-based registration creates voter-roll records from patient populations that routinely include people with historically low voting propensity. Status Confirmed for the hospital-as-registration-agency pathway; individual ballot-attachment fraud at hospitals is not established by these sources.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Disabled in Action of Metropolitan New York v. Hammons, 202 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2000)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/F3/202/110/528215/"}, {"title": "DOJ — National Voter Registration Act overview", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra"}, {"title": "AAMC Center for Health Justice — Voter registration at health-care institutions fact sheet", "url": "https://www.aamchealthjustice.org/our-work/policy/voter-fact-sheet", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nvra-public-hospitals-voter-registration-agencies-ny__aamc-center-for-health-justice-voter-registration-at-health.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 3. Confirmed registration-at-hospitals pathway. Sibling leaf Mental health institutions exists for psych-hospital cases."}
{"id": "texas-gov-code-791-interlocal-sheriffs-sequestered", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-21", "uid": "C20260926-004030-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-21", "old_ids": ["texas-gov-code-791-interlocal-sheriffs-sequestered"], "seq": "C00774", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are being drawn into the service of the county (as a corporation) and the state through interlocal agreements and county policies."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2000-01-01", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Government Code Chapter 791 (Interlocal Cooperation Contracts) and related AG opinions authorize counties/cities to contract sheriffs' offices into multi-jurisdictional LE service frameworks requiring commissioners-court approval—i.e., sheriffs operating under county corporate/interlocal policy structures rather than as fully independent constitutional silos. Soft companion to fill-20j County Sheriffs GCC/NACo cards. Status Confirmed for interlocal/county-policy sequestration mechanism; 'corporation' rhetorical framing is catalog wording, not a separate legal finding.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Government Code Ch. 791 — Interlocal Cooperation Contracts (statute text)", "url": "https://statutes.capitol.texas.gov/Docs/GV/htm/GV.791.htm"}, {"title": "Texas Government Code Ch. 791 — Interlocal Cooperation Contracts (statute text)", "url": "https://texas.public.law/statutes/tex._gov%27t_code_section_791.001"}, {"title": "Texas AG Opinion JC-0263 — Sheriff participation in interlocal tactical response (PDF)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2000/jc0263.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/texas-gov-code-791-interlocal-sheriffs-sequestered__texas-ag-opinion-jc-0263-sheriff-participation-in-interlocal-tactical-response-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 11. Foundational pre-2016 statute OK (catalog cites interlocal mechanism). Soft companion to Sheriffs lock-step."}
{"id": "tx-gov-code-791-006-interlocal-liability-sheriffs-sequestered-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-14", "uid": "C20260926-031602-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-14", "old_ids": ["tx-gov-code-791-006-interlocal-liability-sheriffs-sequestered-companion"], "seq": "C01179", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "Sheriffs are being drawn into the service of the county (as a corporation) and the state through interlocal agreements and county policies."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-73", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "2000-01-01", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Government Code §791.006 (Interlocal Cooperation Contracts—civil liability) and related Chapter 791 framework assign liability and service obligations when local governments contract for law-enforcement services, reinforcing how sheriff offices are sequestered into multi-jurisdiction county/state service contracts rather than operating solely as independent constitutional officers. Companion Texas Local Government Code Ch. 362 mutual-aid / AG opinion pathways likewise place sheriffs under receiving-jurisdiction command structures in task-force settings. Status Confirmed primary TX Gov't Code §791.006 liability/interlocal sequestration companion to Ch. 791 authority; peer to texas-gov-code-791 root and NACo/UNC interlocal cards already on this leaf—§791.006 / Ch. 362 companion instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: contractual sequestration of sheriffs into county/state service stacks can dilute independent protection of citizen election observers.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — Texas Government Code §791.006 (Interlocal civil liability)", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/tx/government-code/gov-t-sect-791-006/"}, {"title": "Texas AG Opinion GA-0189 — mutual aid / interlocal LE command framework companion", "url": "https://www.oag.state.tx.us/sites/default/files/opinion-files/opinion/2004/ga0189.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tx-gov-code-791-006-interlocal-liability-sheriffs-sequestered-companion__texas-ag-opinion-ga-0189-mutual-aid-interlocal-command.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Law Enforcement Sheriffs sequestered via interlocal agreements leaf."}
{"id": "ca-elec-8103-candidate-filing-fee-percent-of-salary", "permanent_id": "C20260926-021058-10", "uid": "C20260926-021058-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-021058-10", "old_ids": ["ca-elec-8103-candidate-filing-fee-percent-of-salary"], "seq": "C00958", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Cost of Running for Office", "Raise the cost of running for office so that only candidates with big money behind them can afford to run, disenfranchising ordinary American citizens."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-91", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1994/2024", "state": "CA", "description": "California Elections Code §8103 sets candidate declaration filing fees as a **percentage of first-year salary** (generally **2%** for U.S. Senator/state offices; **1%** for Representative, Board of Equalization, appellate justice, state Senator, and Assembly)—creating five-figure cash barriers for ordinary citizens unless they circulate in-lieu petitions. Status Confirmed salary-percent filing-fee barrier; peer to Florida §99.092 percent-of-salary qualifying fee and Texas primary filing fees up to $5,000—CA statute detail, not FL/TX remounted.", "sources": [{"title": "Cal. Elec. Code §8103 — Filing fees as percent of first-year salary", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=8103.", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-8103-candidate-filing-fee-percent-of-salary__cal-elec-code-8103-filing-fees-as-percent-of-first-year-salary.png"}, {"title": "California Public Law — Elections Code §8103 text", "url": "https://california.public.law/codes/elections_code_section_8103", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ca-elec-8103-candidate-filing-fee-percent-of-salary__california-public-law-elections-code-8103-text.png"}], "notes": "Enrich-b8 third on increase cost-to-run / filing-fee barrier leaf."}
{"id": "ecfr-11-cfr-9428-nvra-federal-form-id-none-no-dl-ssn", "permanent_id": "C20260926-031602-15", "uid": "C20260926-031602-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-031602-15", "old_ids": ["ecfr-11-cfr-9428-nvra-federal-form-id-none-no-dl-ssn"], "seq": "C01180", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Some registration \"requirements\" allow:", "No driver's license, ID card, or Social Security card"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-53", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1994-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "11 CFR Part 9428 (NVRA federal voter-registration form regulations) and the EAC/DOJ HAVA implementation pathway require the federal form to collect driver's-license or state-ID number, or last-four SSN if the applicant has neither; applicants with neither an applicable ID nor an SSN indicate 'none' and the state must assign a unique identifier—explicitly allowing registration without DL, ID card, or full SS card. Status Confirmed primary eCFR 11 CFR 9428 NVRA federal-form ID rules documenting no-DL/no-SSN path; peer to HAVA §303(a)(5) and EAC Federal Form 'none' instruction cards already on this leaf—11 CFR 9428 regulatory instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: registration pathways without strong unique ID expand the soft-identity pool that machine-tabulated systems must secure; public hand counts still require knowing which humans cast which paper ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "eCFR — 11 CFR Part 9428 National Voter Registration Act (federal form)", "url": "https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-11/chapter-II/part-9428"}, {"title": "DOJ CRT — Help America Vote Act (unique ID if no DL/SSN companion)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/help-america-vote-act-4"}], "notes": "Enrich-b20 third on Registration no driver's license, ID card, SS card leaf."}
{"id": "doj-crt-nvra-1993-motor-voter-maximize-agency-registration", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-36", "uid": "C20260926-002008-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-36", "old_ids": ["doj-crt-nvra-1993-motor-voter-maximize-agency-registration"], "seq": "C00669", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Encourage everyone to register to vote to create as many registrations as possible."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-05", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1993", "state": "Federal", "description": "DOJ Civil Rights Division's NVRA materials describe the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (Motor Voter) as requiring DMV and designated agencies to offer registration—foundational federal policy to drive registration volume upward. Foundational pre-2016 statute OK because catalog cites Motor-Voter/agency registration continuously through present. Status Confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ CRT — The National Voter Registration Act Of 1993 (NVRA)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra"}, {"title": "NCSL — Voter Registration List Maintenance (NVRA context)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-registration-list-maintenance"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 18 companion. Foundational NVRA OK."}
{"id": "or-ors-254-470-person-may-return-ballot-for-elector-drop-site", "permanent_id": "C20260926-014044-01", "uid": "C20260926-014044-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-014044-01", "old_ids": ["or-ors-254-470-person-may-return-ballot-for-elector-drop-site"], "seq": "C00876", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Drop Boxes", "There is no control over what is deposited or by whom."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-43", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1981-2026", "state": "OR", "description": "Oregon ORS 254.470(6)(d) expressly provides that 'if a person returns a ballot for an elector, the person shall deposit the ballot' by mail, at the county clerk's office, or at any designated place of deposit (official drop site) not later than two days after receiving it—without requiring a familial/household/caregiver relationship. NCSL Table 10 and Ballotpedia classify Oregon among states where anyone chosen by the voter may return a ballot (subject to the two-day deposit rule and separate drop-site signage rules under ORS 260.695). Status Confirmed for a statutory architecture in which third parties may place ballots into official drop boxes/mailstream with limited who/what gatekeeping—peer to California Elec. Code third-party return and Texas's acknowledged drop-box custody-risk framing; not a finding that Oregon elections were stolen. (2025 HB 3467 would narrow who may return; current ORS 254.470 text remains the operative baseline cited here.)", "sources": [{"title": "ORS 254.470 — Procedures for conducting election by mail (person may return ballot for elector)", "url": "https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_254.470", "local": "/archives/2026/09/or-ors-254-470-person-may-return-ballot-for-elector-drop-site__ors-254-470-procedures-for-conducting-election-by-mail-perso.png"}, {"title": "NCSL — Table 10: Ballot Collection Laws (Oregon: person may return on behalf of another)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/table-10-ballot-collection-laws"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Ballot collection laws by state (Oregon: anyone chosen by the voter)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Ballot_collection_laws_by_state"}], "notes": "Enrich-b3 third on Drop-Boxes > No control of what gets put in or by who."}
{"id": "usc-52-20701-22month-minimum-retention-statute", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-16", "uid": "C20260925-205354-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-16", "old_ids": ["usc-52-20701-22month-minimum-retention-statute"], "seq": "C00231", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Deliberately misinterpret the 22-month federal retention minimum to restrict access to election records for 22 months."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-55", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1960", "state": "Federal", "description": "52 U.S.C. §20701 requires officers of elections to retain and preserve covered federal-election records and papers for 22 months from the date of the election — a minimum preservation floor with criminal penalties for early destruction. The statute does not create a FOIA/public-records freeze or authorize withholding access for 22 months; disclosure is governed by separate state/federal access law. Status Confirmed for the statutory minimum-retention text that is frequently cited in records disputes (catalog 'misinterpret as access barrier' framing is advocacy; card documents the statute and the minimum-vs-access distinction).", "sources": [{"title": "52 U.S.C. §20701 — Retention and preservation of records", "url": "https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:52%20section:20701%20edition:prelim)", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usc-52-20701-22month-minimum-retention-statute__52-u-s-c-20701-retention-and-preservation-of-records.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Public Records Requests Best Practices", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/Public_Records_Requests_Best_Practices_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usc-52-20701-22month-minimum-retention-statute__eac-public-records-requests-best-practices.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 8. Statute Confirmed; misuse-as-withholding is the catalog theory."}
{"id": "pa-election-code-county-board-provides-voting-equipment", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-18", "uid": "C20260925-185839-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-18", "old_ids": ["pa-election-code-county-board-provides-voting-equipment"], "seq": "C00169", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They require municipalities to use county election systems to centralize and control downstream elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-27", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1937-2026", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania's Election Code assigns county boards of elections authority and duty to purchase, preserve, store, and maintain voting equipment (including electronic voting systems under Article XI-A) used in election districts within the county—including municipal and school elections conducted under county administration. Municipalities do not independently field separate certified county-bypass tabulation systems for those elections. Status Confirmed for county-board-centered provision of voting systems used by municipalities.", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Election Code — Article XI voting equipment (county boards)", "url": "https://www.palegis.us/statutes/unconsolidated/law-information/view-statute?txtType=HTM&yr=1937&sessInd=0&smthLwInd=0&act=320&chpt=11", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-election-code-county-board-provides-voting-equipment__pennsylvania-election-code-article-xi-voting-equipment-count.png"}, {"title": "NACO — America's County Governments primer on county-level election administration", "url": "https://www.naco.org/resource/americas-county-governments-primer-county-level-election-administration", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-election-code-county-board-provides-voting-equipment__naco-america-s-county-governments-primer-on-county-level-ele.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 8. County board as equipment provider for local elections."}
{"id": "az-const-art12-sec3-county-recorder-elected-partisan-office", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-21", "uid": "C20260926-001426-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-21", "old_ids": ["az-const-art12-sec3-county-recorder-elected-partisan-office"], "seq": "C00614", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Make nonpartisan positions partisan. Examples:", "Arizona clerk and recorder"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-82", "status": "Confirmed", "date": "1912", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Constitution Art. XII §3 creates the county recorder as an elected county officer; nomination/filing practice under A.R.S. Title 16 places major-party candidates on partisan ballots. The recorder administers voter registration, early voting, and related election duties—so a core elections office is structurally partisan. Catalog 'make non-partisan partisan' overclaims a recent flip; honest status Confirmed for partisan elected control of AZ recorder election functions (foundational OK; still governing). Status does not claim every recorder abuses the office.", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — Arizona Constitution Art. XII §3 County officers", "url": "https://law.justia.com/constitution/arizona/12/3.htm"}, {"title": "AZLeg — A.R.S. §16-311 nomination papers / partisan public office", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00311.htm"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 11. Honest framing of catalog wording vs longstanding partisan structure."}
{"id": "tx-kerr-2026-11-17-commissioner-paces-votes-no-canvass-certified-before-hand-count-audits", "permanent_id": "C20261118-121028-01", "uid": "C20261118-121028-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-121028-01", "old_ids": ["tx-kerr-2026-11-17-commissioner-paces-votes-no-canvass-certified-before-hand-count-audits"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Make certification procedurally automatic instead of contingent on supporting evidence. This is how they seal the fraud."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-63", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-17 (canvass vote); audits scheduled 2026-11-19 (RLA) and 2026-11-23 to 2026-12-03 (hand count audit)", "state": "TX", "description": "On Nov. 17, 2026, Kerr County, Texas Commissioner Rich Paces (Precinct 2) posted on X from his verified-profile account @RichPaces that \"earlier today, I voted against the Kerr County election canvass, because ... none of the hand count audits have been carried out, so how can I certify any result?\" He added that he had not received an answer to his question about how many votes were cast on Hart InterCivic Vanguard touch-screen voting machines, and that he had concerns about results in many races, citing lesser-known judicial candidates receiving several percentage points more votes than well-known Republican candidates. A widely shared post by @Lorionafarm (Lori Gallagher) the same evening states that the Commissioners Court certified the Nov. 3 canvass 3–1 and that no ballot had yet been checked by hand, with a risk-limiting audit still to start; that post attaches a 7-minute video, which has not been reviewed for this card. Separately, Texas has begun its first mandatory statewide post-election audits under 2021 law, which use statistical sampling of paper ballots. Paces's dissent is documented by his own statement; the vote count comes from a secondary post, and no specific irregularity in the Kerr County results has been identified or substantiated. Not yet available: the official Commissioners Court minutes or recording, the county's response to his Hart Vanguard question, and the audit schedule and results. Nov. 18 update: Kerr County's official election notices, signed by the general custodian of election records, set the state risk-limiting audit for the 2026 general election for Nov. 19 starting at 9 a.m. at the county Juvenile Facility, 3499 Legion Drive, Kerrville (notice dated Nov. 10), with the contests and risk limit chosen by the Texas Secretary of State, and the separate post-election hand count audit at the same location at 9 a.m. on Nov. 23, 24 and 30 and Dec. 1, 2 and 3 (notice dated Nov. 16). Paces's own campaign website had said in a Nov. 9 post that the Commissioners Court would formally canvass the results on Nov. 17. The notices confirm that both audits were scheduled to take place after the canvass, which matches Paces's statement that no hand-count audit had been done before he voted; they do not show any problem with the results. The official minutes or recording of the canvass vote are still not available. Status Partially confirmed: Commissioner Paces's own first-hand statement documents his no vote and his reason, and Kerr County's official election notices confirm that both the state risk-limiting audit and the post-election hand count audit were scheduled after the Nov. 17 canvass. The 3–1 tally comes from a secondary post, and the official minutes are not yet available. No irregularity in the Kerr County results has been identified. Catalog point: the canvass was certified before any ballot had been checked by hand, so certification did not depend on the audit evidence; any audit finding would come only after the results were already official.", "sources": [{"title": "Rich Paces, Kerr County Commissioner Precinct 2 (X) — Kerr County canvass and audit schedule (2026-11-18T00:44:22Z)", "url": "https://x.com/RichPaces/status/2122853385980559541"}, {"title": "Rich Paces campaign/office newsroom — Kerr County canvass and audit schedule (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://richpaces.com/newsroom/county-judge-declares-precinct-2-independent-candidate-ineligible-2026-11-09"}, {"title": "Kerr County Elections (Notice of Risk-Limiting Audit) — Kerr County canvass and audit schedule (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://legacy.co.kerr.tx.us/elections/docs/2026-11-03/Notice_of_Risk-Limiting_Audit.pdf"}, {"title": "Kerr County Elections (Notice of Post-Election Hand Count Audit) — Kerr County canvass and audit schedule (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://legacy.co.kerr.tx.us/elections/docs/2026-11-03/Notice_of_Post-Election_Hand_Count_Audit.pdf"}, {"title": "X: @Lorionafarm (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2122863000071643150"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Kerr Co. TX commissioner votes no on canvass (ei-2026-10-445)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-445 (added 2026-11-18 12:10 PM ET, 2026-11-18 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon emerging/unconfirmed, medium confidence). Description taken from the EMon summary. The @Lorionafarm 7-minute video (including the 'rolling dice' sample-selection remark) has not been reviewed and is not relied on. Queue cross-check: no related research-queue items. Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["Hart InterCivic Vanguard"]}
{"id": "ms-2026-11-10-affidavit-ballots-rejected-for-poll-worker-missing-initials-signatures", "permanent_id": "C20261112-180515-01", "uid": "C20261112-180515-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261112-180515-01", "old_ids": ["ms-2026-11-10-affidavit-ballots-rejected-for-poll-worker-missing-initials-signatures"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-07", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-09 to 2026-11-11 (affidavit ballot reviews)", "state": "MS", "description": "After Mississippi's Nov. 3, 2026 general election, as counties reviewed thousands of affidavit (provisional) ballots in the close U.S. Senate race between Scott Colom and Sen. Cindy Hyde-Smith, multiple named observers reported that affidavit ballots were being rejected because of poll-worker omissions rather than voter errors. On Nov. 10, Brandon Presley, the 2023 Democratic nominee for governor, wrote on X that he was \"watching provisional ballot after provisional ballot get thrown out because the POLL WORKER, not the voter didn't initial the ballot,\" in cases where a poll worker had signed the affidavit envelope; he did not name a county or give a count. Newsweek (Nov. 11–12) reported that Mississippi law requires a poll worker to initial the ballot and both the voter and a poll worker to sign the affidavit envelope, and cited The Atlantic's report that representatives of several groups said ballots were rejected \"because poll workers—not voters—failed to adhere to strict procedures.\" De'Angelo Houston, president of the Meridian-Lauderdale County NAACP, said he watched an election official reject 21 affidavit ballots for missing signatures from either the voter or a poll worker. A voting rights advocate monitoring Harrison County told Newsweek officials accepted 746 and rejected 704 affidavit ballots on Nov. 11, and Southern Poverty Law Center state policy director Sonya Williams-Barnes said rejections involved both voter and poll-worker errors. The Mississippi Center for Justice wrote non-partisan count monitors on Nov. 9 that, under Wilbourn v. Hobson and later rulings, a ballot cannot be rejected only because a poll worker did not sign or initial it absent proof of fraud, and said that in its view the Secretary of State's official handbook incorrectly tells election commissioners to reject ballots missing a poll worker's signature; it said fixing this would take a lawsuit after the count. Update (Nov. 13, 2026, final): Secretary of State Michael Watson announced that official results from all 82 counties are in; 21,344 affidavit ballots were processed statewide and about 73% were accepted. Results that night showed Scott Colom with 479,404 votes (49.3%) and Cindy Hyde-Smith with 471,817 (48.6%), a 7,587-vote margin (WLBT). No court challenge to the affidavit-ballot decisions had been reported. How many statewide rejections were due to poll-worker omissions is still not reported. Status Partially confirmed: rejections tied to poll-worker omissions are reported by named first-hand observers and national press, and the conflicting handbook guidance is documented by a legal organization; no county or the Secretary of State has published how many ballots were rejected for poll-worker omissions, and Secretary Watson reported about 76% of affidavit ballots accepted statewide as of Nov. 9. Catalog point: when a ballot's validity turns on an election worker's initials or signature, a worker's omission, whether careless or deliberate, can void a lawful voter's ballot after the fact, and the voter has no way to cure it.", "sources": [{"title": "X: @BrandonPresley (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://x.com/BrandonPresley/status/2120263060502053260"}, {"title": "Newsweek — Mississippi Senate ballots rejected over poll worker errors (Nov. 2026)", "url": "https://www.newsweek.com/mississippi-senate-ballots-rejected-poll-worker-errors-12700665"}, {"title": "Knewz (citing Newsweek) — Mississippi provisional ballots rejected due to poll worker errors (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://knewz.com/mississippi-provisional-ballot-rejected-due-poll-worker-error/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Center for Justice — Letter to non-partisan monitors of Mississippi's affidavit ballot count (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://mscenterforjustice.org/letter-to-non-partisan-monitors-of-mississippis-affidavit-ballot-count/"}, {"title": "Mississippi Center for Justice — Letter PDF (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://mscenterforjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Letter-to-Affidavit-Ballot-Count-Monitors-re-MS-Law-1.pdf"}, {"title": "X: @mckinsey2119 (2026-11-07), original research-queue report", "url": "https://x.com/mckinsey2119/status/2119149342233931828"}, {"title": "X: @NancyCatLover (2026-11-07), original research-queue report", "url": "https://x.com/NancyCatLover/status/2119152038177120485"}, {"title": "WLBT — Mississippi Secretary of State releases final election numbers (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.wlbt.com/2026/11/14/ms-secretary-state-releases-final-election-numbers/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — MS NRSC affidavit ballot preservation demand (ei-2026-10-324)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-324 update). Promoted from research queue rq-2026-11-09-ms-ballots-questioned-missing-poll-worker-initials-x-replies on 2026-11-12 6:05 PM ET (2026-11-12 PM EDS/EMon ingest) after EMon ei-2026-10-324 Nov. 12 update; corroboration verified by WebSearch (Newsweek, Mississippi Center for Justice). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "il-chicago-2026-11-03-logan-square-rockwell-precinct-out-of-ballots-machine-down", "permanent_id": "C20261103-181235-03", "uid": "C20261103-181235-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-181235-03", "old_ids": ["il-chicago-2026-11-03-logan-square-rockwell-precinct-out-of-ballots-machine-down"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "IL", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the ABC7 Chicago I-Team reported long lines at a polling place on Rockwell in Logan Square (1st Ward) that serves three precincts. Voters in Precinct 5 \"were not able to vote at all\" because the precinct ran out of ballots and its electronic machine was not working; two technicians had not yet been able to fix it. Precinct 4 voters could vote only electronically, and Precinct 6 was operating normally. The League of Women Voters said it alerted the Chicago Board of Elections and was told more ballots were on the way. The board told ABC7 that some locations \"did have issues opening\" but that, as far as it knew, no voters had been turned away or unable to vote, either once issues were resolved or by going to a nearby vote center. An X post says voters were sent to a Bucktown vote center; that detail has not been confirmed by the board. Status Partially confirmed: the ABC7 Chicago I-Team reported the precinct had run out of ballots and its machine was down, and the Chicago Board of Elections acknowledged that some locations had issues opening, but the board says that as far as it knows no voters were turned away or unable to vote. Catalog point: one precinct at a shared site had neither paper ballots nor a working machine, so its voters could not vote there until supplies or repairs arrived.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC7 Chicago (I-Team, live updates) — Chicago Logan Square Rockwell precinct outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://abc7chicago.com/post/election-day-illinois-2026-voters-head-polls-chicago-area/20011258/"}, {"title": "Chicago Board of Elections (Election Day voting) — Chicago Logan Square Rockwell precinct outage (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.chicagoelections.gov/voting/election-day-voting"}, {"title": "X post by @profilopolitics (2026-11-03T18:31:12Z)", "url": "https://x.com/profilopolitics/status/2117686046423158818"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Chicago Logan Square Rockwell precinct outage (ei-2026-10-252)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-252 (added 2026-11-03 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "in-hamilton-2026-11-03-two-polling-sites-delayed-machines-not-enabled-power-blip", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-21", "uid": "C20261104-121522-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-21", "old_ids": ["in-hamilton-2026-11-03-two-polling-sites-delayed-machines-not-enabled-power-blip"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "IN", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, the X account @mattvanswol posted that people were reporting polling stations in Hamilton County, Indiana, were down, and quoted an unnamed voter: \"14 minutes after the polls opened, 5 of the 6 voting machines at my polling location were down.\" The post does not name the voter, the polling location or the cause, and the original voter post could not be found. This is the poster's claim, and no county official or news outlet has confirmed machine failures. WIBC reported the same day that Hamilton County Republican Party Chairman Mario Massillamany said two of the county's 102 polling locations had temporary disruptions that were quickly resolved; he described one as opening at about 6:05 to 6:07 a.m. because the inspector and judge arrived five minutes late, and he reported waits of an hour to an hour and a half at some locations. He did not describe the second disruption, and it is not known whether it is the one the voter described. UPDATE (Nov. 4): Hamilton County Election Administrator Beth Sheller said in a midday update on Nov. 3 that two polling sites had delays of about 15 minutes each. At one, poll workers had not completed the step to enable the machines for voting (their training calls for pushing a button to start the election), and it took about 15 minutes to find the cause. At the other, a power outage of about 15 seconds forced workers to reboot the electronic poll pads and voting machines. Sheller said, \"We are not having voting machine problems,\" and called these \"typical things that happen on election day.\" She said about 38,000 people had voted at polling places by midday. It is not known which site the voter in the X post described. Status Partially confirmed: Hamilton County Election Administrator Beth Sheller confirmed two sites with delays of about 15 minutes (machines not enabled at the start, and a 15-second power loss that forced reboots of poll pads and machines) and said there were no voting machine problems. The relayed claim that five of six machines were down at one site is not confirmed. Catalog point: a missed start-up step and a brief power blip were each enough to stop voting at a site until the equipment was restarted.", "sources": [{"title": "@mattvanswol (X) — Hamilton County IN brief polling delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/mattvanswol/status/2117633843738165334"}, {"title": "WIBC — Hamilton County IN brief polling delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://wibc.com/900969/hamilton-county-polling-issues-resolved/"}, {"title": "LarryInFishers.com — Hamilton County IN brief polling delays (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.larryinfishers.com/2026/11/03/sheller-about-38000-vote-in-hamilton-county-as-two-polling-sites-experience-brief-delays/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hamilton County IN brief polling delays (ei-2026-10-246)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-246 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-03-in-hamilton-five-of-six-machines-down-unnamed-voter. Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "sc-berkeley-2026-11-03-howe-hall-eight-ballots-spoiled-machine-issue-rep-moore", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-22", "uid": "C20261104-121522-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-22", "old_ids": ["sc-berkeley-2026-11-03-howe-hall-eight-ballots-spoiled-machine-issue-rep-moore"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No way to guarantee error-free and abuse-free operation"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-35", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "SC", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, at 1:00 PM ET, South Carolina state Rep. JA Moore (D, House District 15) posted on X that he had stopped by the Howe Hall precinct in Berkeley County, that \"the voting machines are down,\" and that voters were being told to cast provisional ballots. He said poll workers told him they were working to fix the machines and that he was in touch with the South Carolina Democratic Party's legal team. In the attached 46-second video, recorded outside what he calls \"Ames Elementary School\" in Goose Creek, he says there were \"reports of issues early in the day with the voting machines\" and that \"eight ballots… had to be spoiled and reissued here.\" Berkeley County's polling place list puts Howe Hall 1 and Howe Hall 2 at Howe Hall AIMS Elementary School, 115 Howe Hall Rd., Goose Creek. This is the legislator's account; Berkeley County Voter Registration and Elections and news outlets have not confirmed a machine outage there, how long it lasted or how many provisional ballots were cast. The county says challenged and provisional ballots go before the county board at a hearing on Nov. 6 at 10 a.m. UPDATE (5:25 PM ET): In a follow-up X post with a 50-second video, Rep. Moore said that while he was at the Howe Hall polling location doing an interview about the earlier problem, two young women arrived to cast their first votes, and he called the situation \"unacceptable.\" An X trending-news summary (generated from posts, not an outlet) reports that the first-time voters were told their names were missing from the rolls and were not offered provisional ballots at first, and that after Moore stepped in they cast provisional ballots. A Palmetto State Watch post says the South Carolina Election Commission (@scvotes) replied that it was not aware of issues at the precinct. None of this has been confirmed by Berkeley County Voter Registration and Elections or a news outlet. UPDATE (Nov. 4): WCIV (ABC News 4) reported on the evening of Nov. 3 that poll workers at Howe Hall said a combination of voter operator error and minor technical issues with one voting machine caused eight ballots to be spoiled or rejected. The technical issues were corrected, the eight voters were given new ballots, and those ballots were counted. The report does not mention a full machine outage, provisional ballots for those voters, or the first-time voters Rep. Moore described, so those parts remain his account. Rep. Moore told WCIV that poll workers \"do God's work.\" Status Partially confirmed: WCIV (ABC News 4) reported poll workers said voter error and minor technical issues with one machine caused eight ballots to be spoiled, and those voters received new ballots that were counted. The full outage and provisional ballots described by state Rep. JA Moore remain his account. Catalog point: a machine problem spoiled eight ballots at one precinct before it was corrected.", "sources": [{"title": "Rep. JA Moore (@jamooreforsc, X), post with video — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/jamooreforsc/status/2117678194195079335"}, {"title": "Berkeley County Voter Registration and Elections (election notices and polling places) — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://berkeleycountysc.gov/dept/elections/election-notices/"}, {"title": "Rep. JA Moore (@jamooreforsc, X), follow-up post with video — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/jamooreforsc/status/2117745065892385186"}, {"title": "Palmetto State Watch (@WatchPalmetto, X) — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/WatchPalmetto/status/2117707447423156459"}, {"title": "WCIV (ABC News 4) — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://abcnews4.com/news/local/voting-machine-issue-at-howe-hall-spoils-eight-ballots-voters-reissued-new-ones"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Berkeley County SC Howe Hall spoiled ballots (ei-2026-10-250)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-250 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status resolved). Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-03-sc-berkeley-howe-hall-machines-down-provisional-ballots-rep-moore. Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-collin-2026-11-03-hd61-45-overvotes-seven-vote-margin-zero-overvotes-2024-recount-petition", "permanent_id": "C20261119-180749-01", "uid": "C20261119-180749-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261119-180749-01", "old_ids": ["tx-collin-2026-11-03-hd61-45-overvotes-seven-vote-margin-zero-overvotes-2024-recount-petition"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "ballot alteration prior to tabulation", "overvotes can be added to cancel or invalidate a race and send the ballot to adjudication"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-29", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (election); 2026-11-16 (certification); 2026-11-18 (recount petition)", "state": "TX", "description": "Collin County commissioners certified Texas House District 61 on Nov. 16, 2026, with Republican Rep. Keresa Richardson at 44,936 votes and Democrat Brittany Black at 44,929, a seven-vote margin out of 91,569 votes cast in the race. Richardson's election-night lead of 134 votes narrowed to 43, then 17, then 7 as later ballots were counted. The county's official final summary report lists 45 overvotes in the contest (33 in early voting and 12 on Election Day, none by mail), more than six times the margin. Black filed a recount petition on Nov. 18 and paid a deposit of about $5,600, according to The Dallas Morning News as cited by The Texan; no recount date had been set as of Nov. 19, and the county judge, as recount coordinator, must approve the petition. TX3D News reported on X that Black wants the 45 overvoted ballots examined and that Collin County recorded zero overvotes in this race in 2022 and 2024. The county's official final November 5, 2024 results confirm the 2024 part: the HD-61 contest (98,145 votes) shows 0 overvotes in every voting category; the 2022 figure has not been checked. No source alleges misconduct, and Richardson remains the certified winner unless the recount changes the totals. Status Partially confirmed: the 45 overvotes, the seven-vote margin and the 2024 zero-overvote baseline are all in Collin County's official results, and the recount petition is reported by The Dallas Morning News and The Texan. What has not been shown is why the overvotes occurred; overvotes can come from voter marking errors as well as from marks added after the ballot was cast, and no source alleges that any ballot was altered. Catalog point: a race decided by seven votes contains 45 ballots whose choice was voided as overvotes, a category that was zero in the same district two years earlier; only a hand examination of those physical ballots can show whether the extra marks are the voters' own.", "sources": [{"title": "Collin County Elections (official final summary results) (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.collincountytx.gov/docs/default-source/elections/election-results/november-3-2026---general-and-special-elections---summary-results-report---offical-final.pdf"}, {"title": "Candor Wire (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://candorwire.com/hottest-news/collin-county-hd-61-recount-filed-brittany-black/"}, {"title": "The Dallas Morning News (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/article/recount-requested-race-keresa-richardson-won-7-22539672.php"}, {"title": "The Texan (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://thetexan.news/elections/2026/democrat-asks-for-recount-after-texas-rep-keresa-richardson-s-7-vote-win/article_aad62a5e-5067-4a92-8b97-f6e60be5584c.html"}, {"title": "Candor Wire (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://candorwire.com/hottest-news/collin-county-house-district-61-seven-votes-canvass/"}, {"title": "Collin County Elections — November 5, 2024 combined accumulated totals, official final (HD-61: 0 overvotes)", "url": "https://www.collincountytx.gov/docs/default-source/elections/results-archive/november-5-2024-combined-accumulated-totals-official-final2a0e4bf870d14e93a7bf1ae4b9aca757.pdf?sfvrsn=40df053c_0"}, {"title": "TX3D News (X) — Black seeks examination of 45 overvotes", "url": "https://x.com/TX3DNews/status/2123545267962298655"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Collin Co. TX HD-61 recount over 45 overvotes (ei-2026-10-453)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-453 (added 2026-11-19 6:07 PM ET, 2026-11-19 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon unconfirmed, medium confidence; overvote counts and 2024 baseline verified against official county results via one WebSearch). First card on this leaf. Queue cross-check: related ballot-mark/count queue items (rq-2026-11-09-ct-stamford-crossed-out-ballot-roundup-1exposethemedia, rq-2026-11-12-wa-ld24-ballots-cast-vs-vote-totals-20133-gap-forthegood) concern other states and claimants; this card does not corroborate them. No vendor named in sources. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "in-clark-2026-11-03-jeffersonville-hs-scanner-malfunction-1640-ballots-vs-1612-pollbook-board-declines-count", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-06", "uid": "C20261111-123004-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-06", "old_ids": ["in-clark-2026-11-03-jeffersonville-hs-scanner-malfunction-1640-ballots-vs-1612-pollbook-board-declines-count"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-62", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-11-03 (Election Day malfunction); 2026-11-10 (board declines count); 2026-11-11 (pollbook figures stated)", "state": "IN", "description": "At Jeffersonville High School, the vote site for Clark County, Indiana precincts 13, 23, 24 and 26, a ballot scanner malfunctioned on Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, and had to be replaced, County Clerk Ryan Lynch acknowledged (WHAS11). The site is in Senate District 45, where preliminary results show Republican Senate leader Chris Garten ahead of Democrat Nick Marshall 21,817 to 21,520, a 297-vote margin. The Clark County Election Board publicly noticed a Nov. 10 meeting to count only the number of physical ballots cast for the four precincts, then voted 2-1 that night not to do it, with Lynch and Republican member Tony Singleton in the majority; Lynch said, 'We had some malfunctions on election morning, but at this point, I didn't see a statistical basis to move forward with,' and that he could not get a clear answer from the state on whether the board could legally conduct the count. On Nov. 11, Garten told the Indiana Capital Chronicle that records from the precincts show 1,640 ballots cast on Election Day compared with 1,612 voters recorded in the electronic pollbook, a 28-ballot difference he said 'appears to be related to a technical issue with the electronic pollbook.' Indiana Democratic Chair Karen Tallian and 9th District Chair Adam Dickey called the explanation 'fundamentally wrong,' said a jammed machine might have left 'several hours of votes that were not counted,' and said they will pursue a recount or contest; Lynch had not replied on whether he agrees with Garten's figures. Counties must certify by Nov. 16; candidates may petition for a recount by Nov. 17 and party chairs by Nov. 20, before the State Recount Commission. Update (Nov. 12–13, 2026): The Clark County Democratic Party announced on Nov. 12 that it was filing a recount petition and an election contest in Senate District 45 and in the Clark County auditor race, where Republican R. Monty Snelling leads Democrat Antonio Veals by 257 votes; the disputes go to the Indiana Recount Commission (Indiana Citizen, Louisville Public Media). The Indiana Citizen reported that a ballot jammed in the Jeffersonville High School scanner at about 11 a.m.; officials replaced the top section of the machine and moved its data stick while the ballot bin was left untouched, and the printed totals report is timestamped 11:08 a.m. Democratic Vice Chair Virginia Peck said her photo of the machine screen before the replacement showed 474 ballots already scanned, and Democrats question whether those were included in the final tally. Garten's attorneys, Jim Bopp and Ted Nolting, said the printed totals show the number of voters matches the votes cast. The county noticed an Election Board meeting at noon on Nov. 13 to review provisional ballots and certify. Update (Nov. 13–16, 2026): WDRB/WAVE, citing the News and Tribune, reported Nov. 13 that the Clark County Democratic Party is filing for recounts in the SD-45 and county auditor races; Louisville Public Media reported that candidates have until noon Nov. 17 to file a recount or contest petition and parties until Nov. 20. The Election Board posted a notice dated Nov. 13 that it will not hold its regularly scheduled Nov. 16 meeting and that its next scheduled meeting is Dec. 21, 2026. The sources reviewed do not report the outcome of the Nov. 13 certification meeting, and no recount result has been reported. Update (Nov. 16, 2026): IndyStar, WBIW and WTHR reported that the Clark County Democratic Party filed a lawsuit naming the Clark County Election Board, the County Clerk and Sen. Chris Garten, seeking judicial review under IC 3-6-5-34 of the board's Nov. 10 resolution (which said the ballot sheets, poll pads and precinct results were reconciled and that the board had no authority to open the ballot containers), and preliminary injunctions barring certification of the SD-45 results and Garten's seating until the Indiana Recount Commission makes a final determination. The party says the Democratic board member's motions to hand count the ballots or run them through a tabulator for a total ballot count died for lack of a second; that characterization is the party's. The suit is separate from a recount or contest action, not yet filed as of Nov. 16; no ruling has been reported. Update (Nov. 16 to 17, 2026): the Indiana Capital Chronicle reported that Scott County Circuit Court Judge Jason Mount, serving as special judge, issued a temporary restraining order barring Sen. Chris Garten from taking the oath of office or being seated for District 45 and blocking the Clark County Election Board from certifying the results until he rules on a preliminary injunction, with a hearing set for Nov. 18 in Jeffersonville. Per the Chronicle, the Democrats' filing cites the scanner tape's 1,640 ballots, 474 ballots cast before the machine was replaced while only 333 voters had signed in by 11:08 a.m., and poll pad records showing more than 100 sign-ins after 7 p.m.; these are the plaintiffs' allegations, not verified findings. On Nov. 17, The Indiana Lawyer (Indianapolis Business Journal) reported that Garten petitioned the Indiana Supreme Court, arguing the judge exceeded his authority, and asked to be cleared for swearing-in. The order is temporary and is not a finding that ballots went uncounted; no Supreme Court ruling had been reported. Update (Nov. 18, 2026): WTHR reported that the Nov. 18 preliminary-injunction hearing was canceled after the judge granted Garten's request to recuse himself, and a new judge is being sought; the Supreme Court's block on certifying the SD-45 and auditor results remains in place. The Indiana Recount Commission, acting on Garten's recount petition for the four Jeffersonville precincts, ordered all election materials for the race impounded, including ballots, voting systems, tally and canvass sheets, poll lists, electronic pollbooks, and absentee applications, affidavits and envelopes, and directed the county election board and clerk to secure them with the Indiana State Police and the State Board of Accounts. The same day, Clark County Democratic Chair Miguel Hampton petitioned the commission for a manual recount of all 86 precincts in the district, consolidation with Garten's petition, an election contest and, if warranted, a special election, citing the Jeffersonville High School machine malfunction and reported electronic pollbook problems (WTHR, Indiana Capital Chronicle, WRTV). No recount result has been reported. Status Partially confirmed: the scanner malfunction and the board's refusal to count are officially acknowledged, and the 28-ballot pollbook gap is stated from precinct records by the leading candidate and reported by the Indiana Capital Chronicle; the county has not confirmed the figures, and whether any votes went uncounted is unresolved. Catalog point: the ballots, the pollbook and the scanner disagree at one site in a 297-vote race, and the board that could have simply counted the paper chose not to; a public precinct hand count on election night would have settled the number before anyone had a stake in it.", "sources": [{"title": "Indiana Capital Chronicle — Democrats eye seeking recount in Republican Senate leader Chris Garten's tight reelection race (Tom Davies, Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://indianacapitalchronicle.com/2026/11/11/democrats-eye-seeking-recount-in-republican-senate-leader-chris-gartens-tight-reelection-race/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/incapchronicle-garten-recount-1640-vs-1612-2026-11-11.html"}, {"title": "Indiana Capital Chronicle — Ballot review set in southern Indiana county amid tight race for state Senate's top Republican (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://indianacapitalchronicle.com/2026/11/09/ballot-review-set-in-southern-indiana-county-amid-tight-race-for-state-senates-top-republican/"}, {"title": "WHAS11 — Clark County election board recounting ballots from 4 precincts Tuesday night (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.whas11.com/article/news/local/indiana/clark-county-election-board-recounting-ballots-from-four-precincts-tuesday-night-ryan-lynch/417-3fea8f71-5788-4adb-ac38-82b3d6451010"}, {"title": "WTHR — Clark County Election Board refuses to recanvass ballots after discrepancies in election results (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wthr.com/article/news/politics/elections/clark-county-reviews-ballots-indiana-senate-district-45-race-chris-garten-nick-marshall/531-f16d9acf-ffd8-4d78-8c1e-3615379542fb"}, {"title": "Indy Politics — Clark County board reverses course, won't count Jeffersonville HS ballots (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://indypolitics.org/clark-county-election-board-reverses-course-wont-count-jeffersonville-high-school-ballots/"}, {"title": "News and Tribune — Clark County Election Board refrains from ballot recount (Nov. 2026)", "url": "https://www.newsandtribune.com/news/clark-county-election-board-refrains-from-ballot-recount/article_7f98e7fc-a25d-460b-ac66-5ba973f6691e.html"}, {"title": "The Indiana Citizen — Clark County voting glitches dispute heading to Recount Commission (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://indianacitizen.org/voting-glitches-partisan-election-dispute-in-clark-county-heading-to-recount-commission/"}, {"title": "Louisville Public Media — Democrats say they'll seek recount for Indiana SD-45 and Clark County auditor (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://www.lpm.org/news/2026-11-12/democrats-say-theyll-seek-recount-for-indiana-senate-district-45-clark-county-auditor"}, {"title": "Clark County Clerk of Courts — Election Board meeting notice (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.in.gov/counties/clarkcountyclerkofcourts/voting-and-elections/"}, {"title": "WDRB/WAVE — Clark County Democratic Party to file recounts in 2 midterm races (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.wdrbwave.com/2026/11/13/clark-county-democratic-party-file-recounts-2-midterm-elections/"}, {"title": "IndyStar — Clark County Democrats sue over SD-45 certification (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2026/11/16/indiana-democrats-sue-senate-president-pro-tempore-chris-garten-after-election/92811116007/"}, {"title": "WBIW — Clark County Democrats sue over SD-45 certification (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.wbiw.com/2026/11/16/clark-county-democratic-party-files-lawsuit-over-nov-3-election-ballot-discrepancies/"}, {"title": "WTHR — Clark County Democrats sue over SD-45 certification (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://www.wthr.com/article/news/politics/crossroads-politics/no-other-option-clark-county-democrats-sue-to-stop-certification-of-top-senate-republicans-election/531-8639f244-e67d-48b2-af58-113f9b85c1de"}, {"title": "Indiana Capital Chronicle — SD-45 restraining order and Supreme Court petition (2026-11-16)", "url": "https://indianacapitalchronicle.com/2026/11/16/judge-issues-order-blocking-indiana-senate-gop-leader-chris-garten-from-starting-new-term/"}, {"title": "The Indiana Lawyer (Indianapolis Business Journal) — SD-45 restraining order and Supreme Court petition (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/garten-asks-supreme-court-to-overturn-order-blocking-his-swearing-in"}, {"title": "Indiana Supreme Court (published order, State ex rel. Garten v. Clark Circuit Court No. 1) — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://www.in.gov/courts/files/order-other-2026-26S-OR-412.pdf"}, {"title": "WTHR — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://www.wthr.com/article/news/politics/indiana-supreme-court-lifts-order-blocking-chris-garten-taking-office-indiana-senate-president-pro-tem/531-4859a6ba-0b5d-483b-9203-1e2bf790fff1"}, {"title": "The Indiana Citizen — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://indianacitizen.org/recount-requested-garten-takes-oath-of-office-calls-court-fight-to-keep-him-from-filling-senate-seat-lawfare/"}, {"title": "The Indiana Lawyer — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/sen-garten-calls-for-recount-of-his-race-following-close-win-calls-dem-efforts-law-fare"}, {"title": "Axios Indianapolis — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/local/indianapolis/2026/11/17/chris-garten-will-request-recount-indiana-senate-race"}, {"title": "WTHR — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.wthr.com/article/news/politics/crossroads-politics/key-indiana-senate-election-hearing-canceled-after-judge-recuses-himself-president-pro-tem-chris-garten-nick-marshall-supreme-court/531-0ca54290-ac4c-4512-8b48-46b173895c06"}, {"title": "WTHR — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.wthr.com/article/news/politics/elections/indiana-recount-commission-orders-ballots-to-be-impounded-in-state-senate-race-garten-marshall-clark-county-elections-politics-republican-democrat/531-a838a38d-45c0-4d17-a08e-0c1726f0f8b3"}, {"title": "Indiana Capital Chronicle — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://indianacapitalchronicle.com/2026/11/18/democrats-seek-special-election-in-gop-indiana-senate-leaders-disputed-race/"}, {"title": "WRTV — SD-45 recount and impoundment (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.wrtv.com/news/election/clark-county-democrats-call-for-recount-of-all-votes-in-senate-leaders-election/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-19 12:14 PM ET (2026-11-19 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-387 update). Refreshed 2026-11-17 12:07 PM ET (2026-11-17 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-387 update). Refreshed 2026-11-16 6:12 PM ET (2026-11-16 PM EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-387 update). Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-387 update). Refreshed 2026-11-13 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-13 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-387 update). Promoted 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET from research queue item rq-2026-11-09-in-clark-jeffersonville-hs-precincts-ballots-cast-vs-counted-sd45-physical-count (EMon ei-2026-10-387): the Nov. 11 Indiana Capital Chronicle report carries precinct-record figures (1,640 ballots vs 1,612 pollbook voters) from the leading candidate and the Democratic Party's response, a news report that reached the people involved (Mark's 2026-10-20 rule), on top of the clerk's acknowledged scanner malfunction. Labeled Partially confirmed because the county has not confirmed the figures. Capital Chronicle Nov. 11 archived (curl 200); WHAS11 returned 403 to curl, linked only. Party labels stated because sources state them. No vendor named in the sources read. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting", "permanent_id": "C20261026-233450-01", "uid": "C20261026-233450-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-233450-01", "old_ids": ["tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting"], "seq": "C01577", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Publicly funded voter outreach targeted by race or ethnicity"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-233450-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-233450-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 26, 2026, at 3:31 PM ET, Parker Thayer, who describes himself as an investigative researcher for the Capital Research Center, posted on X that the Harris County, Texas, elections department \"bought $43,000 of early voting reminder ads on Facebook and Instagram, but many of the ads are using \"Detailed Targeting\" filters clearly intended to discriminate on the basis of race\" [1][2][3]. He attached Meta Ad Library charts of the targeting, showing African and African-American interests near 50% of spend and Hispanic and Latin American interests near 21% [4]. Meta's Ad Library confirms the ad buy, the spend and the targeting [11]. The Harris County Elections Department page shows 15 issue, electoral and political ads paid for by Harris County Elections Department, started on Sep. 23 and Oct. 7, 2026, with text that reads: \"It's your choice to make this November! Early voting is October 19th through the 30th, and Election Day is November 3rd. Plan. Check. Vote!\" [11]. Reported spend was $10,865 for Oct. 18–24, $42,870 for Sep. 25–Oct. 24, and $45,324 for Jul. 27–Oct. 24 [11][12][14]. The ads were limited to Harris County, shown to all genders, and used no custom or lookalike audiences [12][14]. Under Detailed targeting (included), the ads used interest categories such as African-American literature, Afrobeat, African dance, African art, African culture, Africa and African-American studies; Hispanic and Latin American interests such as Latin dance, Panama, Spanish as a second language, Hispanic Kitchen, Spanish language and Guatemala; and Asian country interests such as India, China, Vietnam and the Philippines [11][12][14]. Measured from Meta's bar charts, and therefore approximate, the shares of spend were: African and African-American interests about 49% (7 days), about 40% (30 days) and about 39% (90 days); African-American studies about 7%, about 13% and about 13%; Hispanic and Latin interests about 21% in each period; and Asian interests about 8% in each period [11][12][14]. Part of the spend was also targeted to Spanish speakers [12][14]. In the same thread, Thayer wrote that race \"shouldn't even be a consideration\" for an official government office and that the targeting \"seems like a clear attempt to try and boost turnout among the demographics most favorable to Talarico\" [5][6][7]; he also asked @HarrisVotes to explain why users interested in \"African-American Literature\" and \"African Culture\" were singled out for a reminder [8][9][10]. That intent and partisan aim are Thayer's reading; the Ad Library data shows what was selected and paid for, not why. Harris County is covered under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act for Hispanic, Chinese (including Taiwanese) and Vietnamese language minorities [16], so Spanish-, Chinese- and Vietnamese-language outreach is a required and separate category and is not treated here as evidence of wrongdoing. Thayer's post text does not mention the Hispanic or Asian targeting or the Section 203 coverage, although his attached image shows the Hispanic interests. No public response from the county was found as of 11:30 PM ET on Oct. 26, 2026. Meta's restriction period on new US political and issue ads runs Oct. 27–Nov. 3, 2026 [17]. Status Partially confirmed: the ad buy, spend and targeting are confirmed by the Meta Ad Library; intent and partisan purpose are alleged by the poster and are not shown by the data. 2026 instance. Update (Oct. 29 to 30, 2026): The State of Texas, through the Office of the Attorney General (Attorney General Ken Paxton recused because he was on the ballot), sued the Harris County Clerk and the clerk's director of communications on Oct. 29, alleging the Elections Department spent an estimated $43,429 over 30 days ($10,804 over seven days) on Meta 'Plan. Check. Vote!' ads using 'detailed targeting' tags such as 'African-American history,' 'Hispanic kitchen,' 'African-American literature' and 'Latin dance' and many Asian and Latin American country tags, and that doing so was ultra vires (Bloomberg Law; OAG filing). On Oct. 30 the OAG announced a settlement under which the Harris County Clerk's Office agreed to remove the ads that used the race-based targeting settings and not reactivate those settings during the election period. The county's own public statement on the settlement was not found in this sweep.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Parker Thayer (@ParkerThayer), \"The official Harris County TX Department of Elections bought $43,000 of early voting reminder ads…\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 3:31 PM ET; web.archive.org save retried 2026-10-26 11:30 PM ET and failed (HTTP 523); local copies listed below)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802139201499206"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer post: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802139201499206", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer post: fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-26; about 25,000 views at capture)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802139201499206", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X media — image attached to the Parker Thayer post (two Meta Ad Library detailed-targeting charts)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVlI0GKXQAAeDwn.png?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply: \"This seems like a clear attempt to try and boost turnout among the demographics most favorable to Talarico.\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 3:31 PM ET; web.archive.org save failed, local copies below)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802141378355589"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802141378355589", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting--reply-intent__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply: fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114802141378355589", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting--reply-intent__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply asking @HarrisVotes to explain the \"African-American Literature\" and \"African Culture\" targeting (Oct. 26, 2026, 3:43 PM ET; web.archive.org save failed, local copies below)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114805247021637954"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply (@HarrisVotes): rendered capture (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114805247021637954", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting--reply-harrisvotes__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Parker Thayer thread reply (@HarrisVotes): fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://x.com/ParkerThayer/status/2114805247021637954", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting--reply-harrisvotes__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "Meta Ad Library — Harris County Elections Department (page 1466536130271166), issue, electoral and political ads, Ads and Audience tabs (read Oct. 26, 2026, about 11:20–11:30 PM ET; web.archive.org save retried 2026-10-26 11:30 PM ET and failed (HTTP 520); local copies listed below)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&view_all_page_id=1466536130271166"}, {"title": "Meta Ad Library — Audience tab, last 7 days (Oct. 18–24, 2026; $10,865, 15 ads): full-page screenshot (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&view_all_page_id=1466536130271166", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-7d.png"}, {"title": "Meta Ad Library — Audience tab, last 7 days: page text (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&view_all_page_id=1466536130271166", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-7d.txt"}, {"title": "Meta Ad Library — Audience tab, last 30 days (Sep. 25–Oct. 24, 2026; $42,870, 15 ads): full-page screenshot (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&view_all_page_id=1466536130271166", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-30d.png"}, {"title": "Meta Ad Library — Audience tab, last 30 days: page text (archived 2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.facebook.com/ads/library/?active_status=all&ad_type=political_and_issue_ads&country=US&view_all_page_id=1466536130271166", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-30d.txt"}, {"title": "Federal Register — Voting Rights Act Amendments of 2006, Determinations Under Section 203 (86 FR 69611, Dec. 8, 2021)", "url": "https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/08/2021-26547/voting-rights-act-amendments-of-2006-determinations-under-section-203"}, {"title": "Meta for Developers — Upcoming 2026 restriction period for US ads (Oct. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2026/10/06/upcoming-2026-restriction-period-for-us-ads/"}, {"title": "Texas Office of the Attorney General — Secures legal victory stopping Harris County Clerk from race-targeted election advertising (press release, Oct. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://oag.state.tx.us/news/releases/office-attorney-general-secures-legal-victory-stopping-harris-county-clerk-weaponizing-racially", "local": "/archives/2026/11/txoag-harris-clerk-race-targeted-ads-settlement-2026-10-30.html"}, {"title": "Bloomberg Law — Texas Sues Harris County Over Race-Targeted Election Ads on Meta (Ryan Autullo, Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/texas-sues-harris-county-over-race-targeted-election-ads-on-meta"}, {"title": "Texas OAG — State of Texas petition against the Harris County Clerk (filing PDF)", "url": "https://oag.state.tx.us/sites/default/files/images/press/HC%20Filing.pdf"}], "notes": "Filed 2026-10-26 11:30 PM ET from Mark's link (Parker Thayer X post 2114802139201499206, posted 2026-10-26 19:31 UTC = 3:31 PM ET), approved [pt447u]. New leaf created for this card. Facts read directly from the Meta Ad Library (page 1466536130271166); percentages are approximate, measured from bar widths. Meta's 7/30/90-day windows roll, so later reads will differ. web.archive.org returned 523 (X) and 520 (Meta) on retry; local copies kept. No vendor (Meta is the ad platform, not an election vendor). Intent and partisan aim are attributed to the poster. Section 203 language outreach is noted as context, not wrongdoing. No outreach to any office. Nothing redacted. 2026 instance: flagged for EMon. Refreshed 12:29 PM ET 2026-11-13 (open-web fortify sweep): state lawsuit and settlement added; zero X API.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image attached to Parker Thayer's Oct. 26, 2026 X post: Meta Ad Library detailed-targeting chart for Harris County Elections Department ads (African-American literature, Africa, African art, Afrobeat, African culture and African dance near 50% of spend; Latin dance, Panama, Spanish as a second language, Hispanic Kitchen, Spanish language and Guatemala near 21%)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-7d.png", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-7d-thumb.webp", "alt": "Meta Ad Library, Harris County Elections Department, Audience tab, last 7 days (Oct. 18–24, 2026): $10,865 spent, 15 ads; location Harris County, TX; all genders; detailed targeting; Spanish language; no custom or lookalike audiences"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-30d.png", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-harris-2026-10-elections-dept-meta-early-voting-ads-race-ethnicity-interest-targeting__meta-adlibrary-audience-30d-thumb.webp", "alt": "Meta Ad Library, Harris County Elections Department, Audience tab, last 30 days (Sep. 25–Oct. 24, 2026): $42,870 spent, 15 ads; detailed targeting led by African-American literature, Africa, African dance, African culture, Afrobeat and African art"}]}
{"id": "ga-cobb-2026-10-27-fort-orange-press-absentee-ballots-not-mailed-2900-voters-lawsuit", "permanent_id": "C20261028-180452-01", "uid": "C20261028-180452-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-180452-01", "old_ids": ["ga-cobb-2026-10-27-fort-orange-press-absentee-ballots-not-mailed-2900-voters-lawsuit"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-27", "state": "GA", "description": "Cobb County, Georgia, voter Michael Olaribigbe filed a proposed class-action lawsuit in Cobb County Superior Court on Oct. 27, 2026, against Elections Director Leigh Phillips and the members of the Cobb County Board of Elections and Registration, CBS News Atlanta, Atlanta News First and FOX 5 Atlanta reported on Oct. 28. The verified complaint alleges that absentee ballots recorded as \"issued\" between Oct. 6 and Oct. 15 were not actually mailed for up to nearly two weeks by the county's vendor, New York-based Fort Orange Press, and that about 2,900 voters are still waiting for their ballots. It says roughly 3,300 ballots were recorded as issued in that window and only about 450 have been returned. Georgia law requires ballots to be mailed within three days of a timely application during early voting. The plaintiff asked the court to order replacement ballots sent by overnight mail with overnight return envelopes and to notify affected voters. Democracy Docket published an Oct. 27 article reporting that a judge had granted the emergency motion, but the article was taken down and its address returned \"410 Gone\" on Oct. 28; no court record or other outlet confirms that an order was issued. Update, Oct. 28, 2026: the Cobb County Board of Elections and Registration said in a county news release that \"a limited number of voters\" who requested absentee ballots \"may have experienced a delay in receiving their ballot,\" that the delay \"appears to have been caused by the county's absentee ballot vendor, Fort Orange Press,\" and that it mainly affects ballots recorded as issued between Oct. 7 and Oct. 15. The board said affected voters who contact the elections office and sign a cancellation affidavit will be sent a new ballot by USPS Priority Express Mail with a prepaid express return envelope, with no extension of the receipt deadline. The county did not give a number of affected voters. Mailed ballots must reach the county by 7 p.m. on Nov. 3. Update, Oct. 29, 2026: The Atlanta Journal-Constitution reported that Olaribigbe agreed to drop the lawsuit after the county agreed to send him a new ballot by express delivery. The county elections office disputed the number of voters affected but said the New York-based vendor was behind the delays; the report mentions no court order. Status Partially confirmed: the county has acknowledged the vendor delay for ballots issued Oct. 7 to 15, but the figure of about 2,900 undelivered ballots remains the plaintiff's allegation, and no court order has been confirmed, and the plaintiff has agreed to drop the suit. Catalog point: the county's records showed ballots as \"issued\" while, according to the complaint, they sat with an out-of-state print-and-mail vendor, a stage of custody that voters and observers cannot see.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS News Atlanta — Absentee ballot issues may disenfranchise thousands of metro Atlanta voters, lawsuit claims (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/atlanta/news/absentee-ballot-issues-may-disenfranchise-thousands-of-metro-atlanta-voters-lawsuit-claims/"}, {"title": "Atlanta News First — Lawsuit: Nearly 2,900 Cobb absentee ballots at risk for Nov. 3 election (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.atlantanewsfirst.com/2026/10/28/lawsuit-nearly-2900-cobb-absentee-ballots-risk-nov-3-election/"}, {"title": "FOX 5 Atlanta — Lawsuit seeks emergency delivery of Cobb absentee ballots (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox5atlanta.com/news/lawsuit-seeks-emergency-delivery-cobb-absentee-ballots"}, {"title": "Verified complaint, Olaribigbe v. Phillips, Cobb County Superior Court (Oct. 27, 2026; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-27-Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — case page, Olaribigbe v. Phillips (lists complaint and emergency TRO motion only; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/georgia-mail-ballot-delays-challenge/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — \"Georgia court orders county to overnight absentee ballots to nearly 3,000 voters who never received them\" (Oct. 27, 2026; article taken down, HTTP 410 Gone on Oct. 28; no archive capture exists)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/georgia-court-orders-county-to-overnight-absentee-ballots-to-nearly-3000-voters-who-never-received-them/"}, {"title": "EMon recovered text excerpt of the removed Democracy Docket article (search-index passages, not an archive snapshot)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ei-2026-10-187__democracy-docket-removed-article-excerpt.txt"}, {"title": "Cobb County — Cobb County Elections Addresses Absentee Ballot Mailing Delays (news release, Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cobbcounty.gov/news/cobb-county-elections-addresses-absentee-ballot-mailing-delays"}, {"title": "The Atlanta Journal-Constitution — Cobb resident to receive new absentee ballot, drops lawsuit (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ajc.com/politics/2026/10/cobb-resident-new-absentee-ballot/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Cobb County, GA suit over ~2,900 undelivered absentee ballots (ei-2026-10-187)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "2026-10-29 PM ingest: added AJC report that the plaintiff dropped the suit after the county agreed to express-mail him a new ballot; county disputes the affected count; label unchanged. 2026-10-29 AM ingest: relabeled Alleged to Partially confirmed after the Cobb County Oct. 28 release (curl 200) acknowledged the Fort Orange Press delay. EMon ei-2026-10-187 (added 2026-10-28 PM ingest; EMon unconfirmed/emerging). Lawsuit confirmed by CBS Atlanta, ANF, FOX 5 (curl 200) and the filed complaint (curl 200); allegations not confirmed by the county, so Alleged. Claimed court order is unconfirmed and filed to the research queue (rq-2026-10-28-ga-cobb-claimed-overnight-ballot-order). Peers: nass-fort-orange-press-2023 chain-of-custody card and co-2024 Fort Orange Press timing-mark card (same vendor). Plaintiff represented by Elias Law Group. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Fort Orange Press"]}
{"id": "tn-montgomery-2026-10-26-twin-allegedly-voted-in-registered-sisters-name-expired-id", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-07", "uid": "C20261109-121807-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-07", "old_ids": ["tn-montgomery-2026-10-26-twin-allegedly-voted-in-registered-sisters-name-expired-id"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Weak identity check at the point of voting"], "leaf_id": "L20261025-113703-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261025-113703-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "TN", "description": "According to The Tennessee Conservative (Olivia Lupia, Nov. 2, 2026), Montgomery County Administrator of Elections Amanda Joslin said that while reconciling end-of-day totals for early voting on Monday, Oct. 26, her office found one more vote than voter-history entries. Staff hand-checked all 2,378 applications from that day and found two applications issued for a single registered voter, printed almost simultaneously at two different stations with similar but noticeably different signatures. Security camera footage and further checks led the office to conclude the two voters appeared to be twin sisters, only one of whom is registered, and that the other allegedly used the registered sister's old, expired ID. Joslin said the extra ballot cannot be removed because ballots are anonymous, and that her office is turning the evidence over to the District Attorney, who will decide whether to prosecute. No one has been named or charged; this is an allegation reported by the county's elections administrator. Status Partially confirmed: Montgomery County Administrator of Elections Amanda Joslin confirmed the extra vote, the two applications and the referral to the District Attorney (The Tennessee Conservative, Nov. 2); the identity of the second voter and any charge are not established. Allegations are accusations only. Catalog point: a second person allegedly voted on a registered voter's record using an old, expired ID; the extra ballot surfaced only in end-of-day reconciliation and cannot be removed because ballots are anonymous.", "sources": [{"title": "The Tennessee Conservative — Montgomery Co. TN: voter's twin allegedly voted in her name (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://tennesseeconservativenews.com/exclusive-montgomery-county-elections-administrator-catches-voter-fraud-during-early-voting/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Montgomery Co. TN: voter's twin allegedly voted in her name (ei-2026-10-359)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-359 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-fec-2026-10-26-efiling-system-offline-week-before-midterms-bad-actor-breach-attempt", "permanent_id": "C20261027-181423-01", "uid": "C20261027-181423-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-181423-01", "old_ids": ["us-fec-2026-10-26-efiling-system-offline-week-before-midterms-bad-actor-breach-attempt"], "seq": "C01582", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Technology and Cybersecurity", "Bad actors can then exploit it for a much larger blast radius."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-69", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-69", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "US", "description": "The Federal Election Commission's electronic filing system, which campaigns, parties and political committees use to file campaign-finance reports, went offline at about 10 p.m. Eastern time on Monday, Oct. 26, 2026, one week before the Nov. 3 midterms, and was still offline on the afternoon of Oct. 27, according to the agency's status page and website notice. Reuters reported, citing an email it had seen, that an FEC electronic filings officer told several campaign compliance firms that night, \"We have a bad actor attempting to breach FEC systems. As a result, we've had to temporarily shut down our web facing services.\" FEC officials publicly declined to comment on the cause, including whether it was a hack (The Washington Post); the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency referred questions to the FEC, and the FBI did not immediately respond. No source reports that any system was actually breached or data taken, and no one has been named as responsible. While the system is down, committees cannot file the 24-hour and 48-hour independent-expenditure reports required in the final weeks before the election; Steven Mele of MBA Consulting Group told Reuters, \"I've never seen this in 26 years,\" and that \"there will be less disclosure on the elections\" until it is fixed. The FEC's public website and its search of past filings were not affected, and no restoration time had been announced. The FEC does not run elections, and the outage does not affect casting ballots. Status Partially confirmed: the FEC confirms the outage; the breach attempt rests on an FEC staff email reported by Reuters, which the agency has not publicly confirmed. Catalog point: one central federal filing system serves every federal committee in the country, so a single attack, or a precautionary shutdown, halts last-week spending disclosure nationwide at once.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters — Hacker trying to breach US Federal Election Commission system, email shows (Oct. 27, 2026; curl 401, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/technology/hacker-trying-breach-us-federal-election-commission-system-email-shows-2026-10-27/"}, {"title": "CNA — Hacking attempts against US Federal Election Commission system triggered outage, email shows (republishing Reuters, Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.channelnewsasia.com/business/hacking-attempts-against-us-federal-election-commission-system-triggered-outage-email-shows-6497701"}, {"title": "FEC.gov status page — FEC's electronic filing system outage (incident opened Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://fecgov.statuspage.io/incidents/1f16b9021jfx"}, {"title": "Federal Election Commission — website notice that the electronic filing system is offline (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — FEC's filing system is down a week before the election; agency won't say why (Oct. 27, 2026; paywalled, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/27/fecs-filing-system-is-down-week-before-election-agency-wont-say-why/"}, {"title": "The Hill — FEC filing system down (Oct. 27, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://thehill.com/policy/technology/6175878-fec-filing-system-down/"}, {"title": "Washington Examiner — Federal Election Commission website filing system outage (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/campaigns/4781775/federal-election-commission-website-filing-system-outage/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — FEC e-filing system offline; hacking attempts reported (ei-2026-10-174)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-174 (added 2026-10-27 evening ingest). CNA text-verified (FEC officer email quote, 24/48-hour reports, Mele quote, CISA/FBI); status page and Washington Examiner curl 200; Reuters 401, The Hill 403, WaPo timeout (URLs retained). EMon also lists an X post by @ninoboxer summarizing Reuters (not needed as a source). Watch for FEC restoration notice or any confirmation of breach scope. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-riverside-san-diego-2026-11-registrar-meta-gotv-ads-detailed-targeting-cultural-ethnic-interest-tags", "permanent_id": "C20261113-122945-04", "uid": "C20261113-122945-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-122945-04", "old_ids": ["ca-riverside-san-diego-2026-11-registrar-meta-gotv-ads-detailed-targeting-cultural-ethnic-interest-tags"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Publicly funded voter outreach targeted by race or ethnicity"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-233450-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-233450-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-26 to 2026-11-01 (week of Meta ad spending reviewed); 2026-11-09 (report)", "state": "CA", "description": "City Journal (Christopher F. Rufo and Kenneth Schrupp, Nov. 9, 2026) reviewed Meta's public ad database for the week ending Nov. 1, 2026 and reported that the Riverside County Registrar of Voters aimed more than 10% of its Meta advertising dollars at one downtown Riverside ZIP code and directed 'detailed targeting' spending at users linked to interest tags such as 'Wiz Khalifa,' 'Soul music,' 'Rick Ross,' '2 Chainz' and 'Gangsta rap,' with more than 40% of the week's spending aimed at Spanish-speaking audiences. It reported that San Diego County directed nearly 65% of its Meta ad spending at viewers who speak Filipino, Chinese and other non-English languages and bought ads targeting users Meta linked to 'African-American history,' 'African-American studies,' 'African culture' and 'Native American studies.' Neither county responded to City Journal's requests for comment. The article notes that Riverside agreed to outreach in low-turnout areas in a 2022 settlement with Inland Empire United (ACLU). Status Partially confirmed: the spending and targeting tags are drawn from Meta's public ad records as reported by City Journal and were not independently re-pulled here; the partisan purpose is the authors' inference. Language-minority outreach can be legally required (both counties are covered for several languages under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act), so language targeting alone is not treated as wrongdoing; the cultural and ethnic interest tags are the point of this card. Compare the Harris County, Texas 2026 card on this leaf, where the state sued and the clerk agreed to remove the targeting. Catalog point: taxpayer-funded turnout ads aimed by ethnic and cultural proxies use government money to work some voters and not others.", "sources": [{"title": "City Journal — California Counties Targeted Get-Out-the-Vote Ads to Users Interested in 'Gangsta Rap' (Christopher F. Rufo and Kenneth Schrupp, Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.city-journal.org/article/meta-riverside-san-diego-voter-outreach", "local": "/archives/2026/11/cityjournal-riverside-san-diego-meta-gotv-targeting-2026-11-09.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-13 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-13 12:29 PM ET). City Journal article read via WebFetch and archived (curl 200). Meta Ad Library figures not re-pulled by this sweep. Section 203 coverage context drawn from the existing Harris card's approach; no vendor. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted", "permanent_id": "C20261028-134437-07", "uid": "C20261028-134437-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-134437-07", "old_ids": ["ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"], "seq": "C01619", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).", "Accept a checked box as proof of citizenship, then change the flag later"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-134437-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-134437-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-25 to 2026-10-26", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 26, 2026, First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli (Central District of California) posted a 24-second clip from what he called \"yesterday's Ninth Circuit hearing\" in United States v. California. In the clip a judge asks: \"you would agree that if there is an illegal citizen, I mean a non-citizen, that votes, and we don't stop it now, that that vote, that ballot will then be counted, correct?\" California's counsel answers: \"That's, that's absolutely correct.\" (Transcribed from the archived clip on Oct. 28, 2026; it matches the quote in the post.) [1] Essayli's post calls this a \"stunning admission\" that California does \"nothing to check the citizenship status of voters and will count the illegal ballots of noncitizens who vote\"; that characterization is DOJ's argument, not a court finding. On Oct. 26 the Ninth Circuit dismissed DOJ's appeal 2–1 because the district court had not yet ruled. [2][3] Status Partially confirmed: the exchange is on the recording; the full hearing recording was not reviewed.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @USAttyEssayli (First Assistant U.S. Attorney, C.D. Cal.), post with 24-second Ninth Circuit hearing clip (Oct. 26, 2026, 3:28 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/USAttyEssayli/status/2114801393244729569", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted__x-video.json"}, {"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit — Order, United States v. State of California, No. 26-7070 (Oct. 26, 2026; per curiam; Bennett and Sanchez concurring; Bumatay dissenting)", "url": "https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/26/26-7070.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation__ca9-26-7070-order-2026-10-26.pdf"}, {"title": "CBS News — Appeals court dismisses DOJ's request to force California to set aside ballots (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/appeals-court-dismisses-doj-trump-california-ballots/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t482u/t483u, Gouveia video batch 2; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/USAttyEssayli/status/2114801393244729569", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 23.847, "bytes": 1363823, "sha256": "b107a86edd5182fad3833d2a48826ed85a6034495d6b52f2c8f3a0d96b873246", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted__x-video.json"}], "related": ["ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation", "ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request", "ei-2026-10-009", "wi-wec-2026-clerks-cannot-use-modified-save-citizenship-checks"]}
{"id": "tx-southlake-2026-10-24-diwalifest-road-closures-town-hall-early-voting-access", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-01", "uid": "C20261026-121625-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-01", "old_ids": ["tx-southlake-2026-10-24-diwalifest-road-closures-town-hall-early-voting-access"], "seq": "C01544", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-06", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-24 to 2026-10-25", "state": "TX", "description": "On Saturday, Oct. 24, 2026, the only full Saturday of Texas early voting, barricades and fencing set up for DiwaliFest at Southlake Town Square closed streets and parking near the Southlake Town Hall early-voting site at 1400 Main St., one of Tarrant County's 47 countywide early-voting locations. Residents posted photos on X saying voters were being turned away or delayed. The Dallas Morning News reported that, after complaints that the closures were restricting access to the polls, city officials reopened streets that day, worked with organizers to shrink the event's footprint and improve parking, and organizers canceled a planned fireworks show; the Tarrant County Republican Party filed legal action against the city over access during the festival. The city said in a Facebook statement that all entrances to Town Hall stayed open to voters throughout voting hours (7 a.m. to 7 p.m.). CBS News Texas also covered the dispute. The Morning News said it was unclear whether any voter was prevented from voting. Status Partially confirmed: the road and parking closures, the complaints, the reopening and the GOP legal action are reported by news outlets; that voters were actually blocked is not established.", "sources": [{"title": "Dallas Morning News — Southlake reopens streets near early-voting site after access complaints (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/article/southlake-reopens-streets-early-voting-access-22493607.php"}, {"title": "CBS News Texas — Southlake festival of lights and early-voting access (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/southlake-festival-of-lights-early-voting-oct-25-2026/"}, {"title": "X — @CoffeeGirlTX resident photos of barricades near Southlake Town Hall (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/CoffeeGirlTX/status/2114050402421289318"}, {"title": "City of Southlake — November 3, 2026 election information", "url": "https://www.cityofsouthlake.com/4386/November-3-2026-Election-Information"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Southlake TX DiwaliFest closures near early-voting site (ei-2026-10-150)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-150 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200 for DMN and CBS. Placed on the Polling Places tactic (access to a polling site restricted during voting hours). PEP note: access was restored the same day after citizens documented it and the county party acted."}
{"id": "tx-jefferson-2026-10-beaumont-touchscreen-selections-switching-machines-pulled", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-02", "uid": "C20261028-121857-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-02", "old_ids": ["tx-jefferson-2026-10-beaumont-touchscreen-selections-switching-machines-pulled"], "seq": "C01584", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-22 to 2026-10-27", "state": "TX", "description": "On Thursday, Oct. 22, 2026, Jefferson County Democratic Party Chair Ramona Young recorded a Facebook video saying that three voters at the John Paul Davis Community Center and one at Rogers Park, both early-voting sites in Beaumont, Texas, had reported their touchscreen selections switching to the other candidate: \"It's like flipping from Democrat to Republican.\" She said that when voters tried to correct it, the button did not respond and they had to press it again and again until it flipped back, that some voters may not notice and could cast a vote they did not intend, and that \"This needs to be addressed immediately.\" She said she had called the clerk's office and was told to fill out an incident report and mail it in; two of the voters also filed reports with the Texas Democratic Party's Voter Protection Network. [1] County Clerk Roxanne Acosta-Hellberg told 12News on Oct. 23, \"We were made aware of an incident yesterday specifically, and someone came to our office to report some incidences and concerns.\" She said the equipment is tested and calibrated before the election, compared the touchscreens to cellphone screens that can register a tap on the wrong part of the screen (\"They are very sensitive screens, just like very much our cell phones\"), and said, \"You have the availability to review everything before you print the ballot.\" [1] On Oct. 27, 12News reported that the county had removed up to three machines from the Theodore Johns Library and Marion and Ed Hughes Public Library early-voting sites. Montie Morgan, who said he has voted for 56 years, told 12News that at Theodore Johns Library the machine selected a candidate he had not planned to vote for when his finger moved near the edge of the screen: \"When I was moving my hand down, this part of my finger dragged across, and since it was on top, it got that.\" He said he then selected his intended candidate, and: \"It was a mechanical thing, but I didn't experience that when I hit any other ballot.\" Election manager Aaron Kelly said, \"We followed our protocol, and our protocol requires us to pull the machines. We pulled the machines, we tested the machines and we found no errors,\" and the county said the machines will not be used for the rest of this election. The article does not say what replaced the machines. Voters can review their selections before printing and, Kelly said, can return to the check-in table and correct a printed ballot twice before depositing it in the tabulator. [2][3] The Texas Secretary of State's list of voting systems by county shows Jefferson County using ES&S EVS 6.3.0.0 equipment: 360 ExpressVote ballot-marking devices, 65 DS200 and 2 DS450 scanners. [7] The list shows the county's equipment; none of the news reports names the make of the machines pulled. Status Partially confirmed: the county confirms the voter reports and the removal of the machines; its own testing found no errors, and no independent examination has been reported. Catalog point: when a touchscreen selects a candidate the voter did not choose, the voter has to catch it; a hand-marked paper ballot leaves no screen between the voter's mark and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "12News (KBMT), Scott Eslinger — Voters report ballot selections flipping at 2 Jefferson County early voting sites; county clerk says voters can review ballots (2:54 PM CDT Oct. 23, 2026; Ramona Young's Oct. 22 Facebook video and Clerk Acosta-Hellberg's statements; full text archived)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/politics/elections/voters-report-ballot-selections-flipping-at-2-jefferson-county-early-voting-sites/502-a8dcb3a3-6ad0-4eb4-bda8-b8624bfec85f", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-jefferson-2026-10-beaumont-touchscreen-selections-switching-machines-pulled__12news-2026-10-23-article.html"}, {"title": "12News (KBMT), Daniela Taboada-Palau — Jefferson County removes voting machines after reports of ballot selection issues (7:29 PM CDT Oct. 27, 2026; full text and lead image archived)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/politics/elections/jefferson-county-removes-voting-machines-after-reports-of-ballot-selection-issues/502-b35d8730-4689-4254-aa4a-ab0fe292eded", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-jefferson-2026-10-beaumont-touchscreen-selections-switching-machines-pulled__12news-2026-10-27-article.html"}, {"title": "12News video — Jefferson County removes voting machines after reports of ballot selection issues (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/video/news/politics/elections/jefferson-county-removes-voting-machines-after-reports-of-ballot-selection-issues/502-d761ea30-aa86-4515-9f65-043cf6b5d041"}, {"title": "12News video — reporter Daniela Taboada-Palau tests Jefferson County's voting machines while voting (Oct. 27, 2026; the page text does not give the outcome)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/video/news/local/12news-reporter-daniela-taboada-palau-tested-jefferson-countys-voting-machines/502-eb9154f7-9b2a-4bbe-9331-6b20f57169c6"}, {"title": "Hoodline, Maddie Taylor Hartley — Jefferson County voters report ballots flipping to other candidate; clerk says check before printing (Oct. 24, 2026; secondary, based on 12News and KFDM)", "url": "https://hoodline.com/2026/10/jefferson-county-voters-report-ballots-flipping-to-other-candidate-clerk-says-check-before-printing/"}, {"title": "KFDM, Tre Sanchez — Jefferson County election officials show how electronic ballots create paper records (Sept. 18, 2026; background: the ballot-marking device prints a paper ballot, up to three redos, tabulators offline)", "url": "https://kfdm.com/news/local/jefferson-county-election-officials-show-how-electronic-ballots-create-paper-records"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Voting Systems by County 2026 (rev. 09/01/2026): JEFFERSON — ES&S EVS 6.3.0.0; ExpressVote 360; DS200 65; DS450 2 (the county's certified equipment, not a statement about the machines pulled)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/forms/sysexam/voting-sys-bycounty.pdf"}, {"title": "12News lead image for the Oct. 27, 2026 story (archived copy)", "url": "https://www.12newsnow.com/article/news/politics/elections/jefferson-county-removes-voting-machines-after-reports-of-ballot-selection-issues/502-b35d8730-4689-4254-aa4a-ab0fe292eded", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-jefferson-2026-10-beaumont-touchscreen-selections-switching-machines-pulled__12news-2026-10-27-lead.jpg"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Jefferson County, TX machines pulled after selection-switch reports (ei-2026-10-176)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-176 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). Peers: tn-williamson and tn-davidson touchscreen cards. Updated 2026-10-28 (Mark t503u): the full text of both 12News articles was read on 2026-10-28 (the Oct. 27 article through the 12News page fetch, the Oct. 23 article likewise; direct curl gets an Akamai 403) and both are archived as text copies with the Oct. 27 lead image; every quote on this card is checked against that text. Ramona Young's Facebook video itself was not found; her statements are as reported by 12News. The 12News test-voting video page does not give the outcome in its text. Vendor tag ES&S / ExpressVote from the Texas SOS Voting Systems by County 2026 list, which shows the county's equipment (Mark t503u). Label stays Partially confirmed. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "fl-2026-10-federal-agents-early-voting-sites-leon-cbp-monroe-key-largo-arrest", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-05", "uid": "C20261026-121625-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-05", "old_ids": ["fl-2026-10-federal-agents-early-voting-sites-leon-cbp-monroe-key-largo-arrest"], "seq": "C01548", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-03", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-23", "state": "FL", "description": "Two Florida supervisors of elections raised concerns about federal agents at early-voting sites during the week of Oct. 19, 2026. In Leon County, Supervisor Mark S. Earley said two U.S. Customs and Border Protection vehicles parked for about 10 minutes on Oct. 19 outside the Northeast Branch Library, the county's busiest early-voting site, and he filed a complaint with the FBI; his office later said the sheriff's office and FBI found that the agents were driving to an out-of-state assignment and stopped to try to vote early, were not Leon County voters, and left when told so, and Earley said he accepts that account. In Monroe County, Supervisor Sherri Hodies opened an investigation after a voter reported armed, masked federal agents making a stop on Oct. 20 at the entrance to the Murray Nelson Government Center in Key Largo, an early-voting site; CBP said Border Patrol agents made a targeted immigration arrest after a vehicle stop on U.S. Highway 1 and the driver pulled into a lot next to the polling location. Hodies said the agents appeared to be outside the 150-foot no-solicitation zone but cited the federal law barring armed federal officers at polling places, and said she has spoken with the FBI, the Secretary of State and law enforcement. Status Partially confirmed: the agents' presence is confirmed by the supervisors and CBP; the Leon County visit was explained as innocent, and no intent to intimidate voters has been established in Monroe County.", "sources": [{"title": "Scripps News — Border Patrol agents spotted near Florida polling site were there to vote, investigation finds", "url": "https://www.scrippsnews.com/politics/midterm-elections/border-patrol-agents-spotted-near-florida-polling-site-were-there-to-vote-investigation-finds"}, {"title": "Key West Citizen (KeysNews) — Elections supervisor opens investigation involving Border Patrol in Key Largo", "url": "https://www.keysnews.com/news/local/elections-supervisor-opens-investigation-involving-border-patrol/article_cbdd252a-8d01-4aed-9e6d-4461f8d54f96.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Florida federal agents at early-voting sites (ei-2026-10-155)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-155 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200 for both. Leon portion kept for completeness with the innocent explanation stated plainly."}
{"id": "wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park", "permanent_id": "C20261023-121426-05", "uid": "C20261023-121426-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-121426-05", "old_ids": ["wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park"], "seq": "C01525", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-22", "state": "WA", "description": "King County Elections said on Oct. 22, 2026, that two U.S. Postal Service bins of undelivered mail containing election ballots had been found in dumpsters at Golden Gardens Park in Seattle's Ballard neighborhood earlier that week. The county recovered 92 ballots and reissued replacement ballots to every affected voter (KIRO 7). Seattle police checked 26 trash bins in two parking lots and found no additional ballots (The Seattle Focal). The county reported the incident to USPS and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, which is investigating how the mail ended up there (FOX 13). County officials said mail theft occurs in every major election cycle and that ballots are typically not the target. No arrest, suspect or cause has been reported. On Oct. 23, King County Elections chief of staff Kendall Hodson told The Seattle Times the ballots were undelivered and so had not been used to vote; all affected voters were reissued ballots; ballots are not typically the target of mail theft, as shown by their being thrown away; and signature verification means that \"even if someone with nefarious intent found these ballots and tried to vote (with) them, they would be rejected once they got to our team.\" The Seattle Times and KING 5 describe the incident as apparent mail theft (stolen mail). As of Oct. 23, no arrest or cause had been reported. Status Partially confirmed: King County Elections confirms that undelivered ballots in USPS bins were dumped and recovered, but who dumped them, and whether it was a postal worker or a thief, has not been established. Catalog point: 92 voters' ballots were found only because someone noticed bins in a park dumpster; a voter whose ballot simply never arrives may not know why. Ballots issued in person at the precinct on Election Day never ride in a postal bin.", "sources": [{"title": "KIRO 7 — USPS bins with election ballots discovered in dumpsters at Seattle's Golden Gardens (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/usps-bins-with-elections-ballots-discovered-dumpsters-seattles-golden-gardens/7OY7DMFJDJGCLKHK3O5545I34A/"}, {"title": "FOX 13 Seattle — Ballots found in dumpster at Golden Gardens (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox13seattle.com/news/ballots-found-dumpster-golden-gardens"}, {"title": "The Seattle Focal — King County replaces 92 ballots recovered from Golden Gardens dumpsters (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://focalnews.org/seattle-wa/politics/king-county-replaces-92-ballots-recovered-from-golden-gardens-dumpsters"}, {"title": "The Seattle Times — Undelivered ballots found at Golden Gardens after apparent mail theft (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/undelivered-ballots-found-at-golden-gardens-after-apparent-mail-theft/"}, {"title": "KING 5 — 92 undelivered ballots in stolen mail found in dumpster at Golden Gardens Park (Oct. 2026; curl 403 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.king5.com/article/news/politics/elections/92-undelivered-ballots-found-dumpster-golden-gardens/281-8e5badc2-f626-406f-a3a9-5286a2e3b2ba"}, {"title": "WILX (KING via CNN Newsource, by Sebastian Robertson) — Undelivered mail ballots found in dumpster as Election Day nears (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wilx.com/2026/10/24/undelivered-mail-ballots-found-dumpster-election-day-nears/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park__wilx-2026-10-24-undelivered-mail-ballots-found-dumpster.html"}, {"title": "X — Jennifer Asper (@j3669), link-only reply sharing the WILX article under her own post of the KING/CNN headline (Oct. 24, 2026, 2:38 PM ET; no media)", "url": "https://x.com/j3669/status/2114063878942343671", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — King County, WA ballots in dumped USPS bins (ei-2026-10-139)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-25 (Mark): WILX syndication of the KING story (Sebastian Robertson, KING via CNN Newsource, Oct. 24, 2026; curl 200 with a browser user agent; HTML archived) and the X post by @j3669 (Jennifer Asper, Oct. 24, 2026, 2:38 PM ET; a link-only reply to her own post of the KING/CNN headline, which is how Mark found the article; fxtwitter JSON and rendered capture archived) added. WILX adds nothing materially new: 92 undelivered ballots found in a dumpster near Golden Gardens Park, reported to Seattle police and USPS, all 92 invalidated and replaced; Hodson says this is generally mail theft, the ballots are almost never the target, and King County sees a handful of similar cases in major elections; a blank ballot cannot be used to vote fraudulently because returned ballots are checked against registration, screened for duplicates and signature-verified. Label unchanged (Partially confirmed); perpetrator still unknown. Refresh 2026-10-23 evening EMon: Seattle Times (curl 200, Hodson quotes text-verified) and KING 5 (403) added; label unchanged, perpetrator still unknown. EMon ei-2026-10-139 (2026-10-23). Mapped to 7 USPS > postal workers dump election mail (peers: Beauchene NJ 2020, Kean mailers 2024, ei-2026-09-022 Utah). Partially confirmed because the perpetrator is unknown. KIRO 7, FOX 13, Seattle Focal curl 200; KIRO text-verified (92 ballots reissued). Recheck for USPIS findings or arrests. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["ei-2026-09-022", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"]}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-chandler-gilbert-bod-printer-trays-opened-overnight", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-02", "uid": "C20261019-123505-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-02", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-chandler-gilbert-bod-printer-trays-opened-overnight"], "seq": "C01433", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-56", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-56", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-15 to 2026-10-16", "state": "AZ", "description": "On the morning of Oct. 16, 2026, an election inspector at the Chandler-Gilbert Community College early voting site in Maricopa County found that the paper trays on three ballot-on-demand printers had been opened sometime after voting closed on Oct. 15, according to the Maricopa County Recorder's Office. The office said its procedure is \"to remove and secure all ballot paper nightly, rendering the trays empty and unable to be used.\" It sent replacement equipment, returned the original printers for a full forensic examination, and said early voting continued without interruption and no voters were affected. The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office and campus security are investigating. A Recorder's Office spokesperson said \"this may simply be human error\" and that the public will be updated when the investigation ends. Officials have not said who opened the equipment. Status Partially confirmed: the overnight access is confirmed by the Recorder's own statement (FOX 10, AZFamily); the cause and any tampering are unknown and under investigation. Catalog point: printers that make ballots on demand sit overnight at an unattended site, and the safeguard is a staff routine of removing the paper. When something is found opened, the first public explanation offered is human error. Ballots preprinted in counted, numbered stacks, kept in sealed containers, signed in and out by bipartisan teams and counted by hand at the precinct leave far less to explain the next morning.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX 10 Phoenix — Unauthorized access reported at Chandler-Gilbert Community College early voting site (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox10phoenix.com/election/unauthorized-access-reported-chandler-gilbert-community-college-early-voting-site"}, {"title": "AZFamily — Tampering or human error? Chandler voting equipment investigated (Oct. 16 to 17, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/17/tampering-or-human-error-chandler-voting-equipment-investigated/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa Chandler-Gilbert BOD printers opened (ei-2026-10-041)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-041 (first_seen 2026-10-16; EMon status emerging, confidence high; official_error unknown). Both news sources curl 200 (FOX 10 quotes the Recorder release). X trending item not fetched (zero X API). Mapped to Chain of Custody sleight of hand (custody of ballot-printing equipment). Related Maricopa cards: MCTEC late-night USBs (ei-2026-10-019), Runbeck early mailing (ei-2026-10-007). Watch forensic and sheriff findings. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Chain of Custody sleight of hand' to 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand' to the new leaf 'Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand > Ballot-printing equipment and supplies are accessed after hours without authorization.'."}
{"id": "ca-san-mateo-2026-daly-city-post-office-mail-theft-vbm-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-05", "uid": "C20261019-123505-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-05", "old_ids": ["ca-san-mateo-2026-daly-city-post-office-mail-theft-vbm-ballots"], "seq": "C01436", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-14", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 14, 2026, the San Mateo County Registration and Elections Division was told of a mail theft at a Daly City post office, and the county said \"the stolen mail reportedly included San Mateo County Vote by Mail ballots.\" A Daly City USPS employee reported the theft at 4:30 p.m. that day (KRON4), and USPS told ABC7 that mail was taken from the loading dock of the Sullivan Avenue post office. The county said the number of ballots potentially affected has not been determined; officials have not confirmed that any ballots were taken and told ABC7 they do not believe the thieves targeted the mail because it held ballots. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service is investigating. Voters can track ballots through the state's Where's My Ballot service, request a replacement online by Oct. 27 or vote at any county Vote Center, and the county advised asking a postal clerk to hand-postmark ballots mailed close to Election Day. This follows the Oct. 6 Sacramento mail-truck theft already on this leaf. Status Partially confirmed: the theft and the investigation are confirmed by the county and several outlets; whether ballots were actually taken, and how many, is not yet known. Catalog point: once ballots are in the mail stream, the county cannot say how many were lost when mail is stolen and must rely on each voter to notice. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. In-person voting at the precinct keeps the ballot with the voter and the poll workers until it is counted.", "sources": [{"title": "San Mateo County ACRE — Report of vote-by-mail ballots stolen from Daly City post office (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://smcacre.gov/elections/news/report-vote-mail-ballots-stolen-daly-city-post-office"}, {"title": "KQED — Mail-in ballots stolen from San Mateo post office, election officials say (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kqed.org/news/12104753/mail-in-ballots-stolen-from-san-mateo-post-office-election-officials-say"}, {"title": "San Francisco Chronicle — Daly City ballots stolen (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/article/daly-city-ballots-stolen-22481056.php"}, {"title": "ABC7 San Francisco — San Mateo County officials issue ballot warning after Daly City mail theft (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://abc7news.com/post/san-mateo-county-elections-officials-issue-ballot-warning-mail-theft-daly-city/19945449/"}, {"title": "KRON4 — Officials investigate possible ballot thefts in San Mateo County (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.kron4.com/news/your-local-election-hq/officials-investigate-possible-ballot-thefts-in-san-mateo-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Daly City mail theft (ei-2026-10-044)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-044 (first_seen 2026-10-17; EMon status active, confidence high; official_error no). County, KQED, SF Chronicle and ABC7 curl 200; KRON4 403. ABC7 date wording conflict noted by EMon; event date Oct. 14 per the county. Peer: Sacramento mail-truck theft (ei-2026-10-027). Cross-leaf: USPS. Watch USPIS count or arrests."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-mctec-late-night-flash-drives-post-la-video", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-05", "uid": "C20261012-123213-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-05", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-mctec-late-night-flash-drives-post-la-video"], "seq": "C01292", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Manipulate programming on USB flash drives."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-39", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-07 to 2026-10-16", "state": "AZ", "description": "Surveillance video released Oct. 9–10, 2026 by the Phoenix watchdog group We the People USA Alliance appears to show two Maricopa County Elections Department employees returning to the Maricopa County Tabulation and Election Center (MCTEC) on the night of Oct. 7 after leaving around 6:23 p.m. They were present from about 9:08 to 11:15 p.m.; one adult was accompanied by a toddler. One employee appears to insert external flash drives into computers around 10:38 p.m. This was two days after the county's Oct. 5 logic-and-accuracy (L&A) test for the Nov. 3 midterms. Alliance co-founder Shelby Busch says the camera view is not among the county's public livestreams, that the drive contents are unknown, and that the group reported details to authorities. The group named one employee; The Gateway Pundit says it did not independently verify the ID. Maricopa County Elections said the employees were \"working on a legitimate election task, late into the night,\" warned that the images may be used to imply wrongdoing, and said the tabulation center can be viewed 24/7. Supervisor Mark Stewart said Oct. 10 that the County Manager confirmed both were election-department employees finishing work before the weekend. On Oct. 12, Stewart told FOX 10 Phoenix that the employees were following the two-person badge-in rule and that one was updating election-related software ahead of the long weekend because testing was scheduled for the following week. He said the tabulators in that room are air-gapped, so \"the only way that they could update that software is with a thumb drive.\" He called the optics \"horrendous,\" said his office will keep looking into it, and said the elections director has invited all political parties to observe the process. Status Partially confirmed: the county's own explanation confirms that election software was loaded onto air-gapped equipment by thumb drive, after hours and after the Oct. 5 L&A test. It has not released the drives' contents, the software versions, or a media log, and no source has shown misconduct; this card does not claim any programming was altered. Sources are the watchdog's video and conservative outlets (Gateway Pundit, KVI). Catalog point: removable media inserted after L&A, out of public view and with no published task log, is exactly the gap this leaf describes. The fix is a published, witnessed media log or, better, ballots that never pass through flash drives at all. A comparable 2022 Maricopa episode, new memory cards installed after L&A, is noted in coverage. Oct. 14 update (KJZZ): Board of Supervisors Chair Kate Brophy McGee and Vice Chair Debbie Lesko said in a joint statement that the employees were updating software on the ballot duplication system, which a bipartisan board uses to duplicate torn or damaged ballots and which must be set up before early ballots are tabulated. They said one employee loaded authorized election files onto a duplication terminal with a USB drive, as state election rules allow, that the terminal is not connected to the internet or to the tabulators, and that no changes were made to the election management system or the tabulators. The county disputes the watchdog's suggestion of wrongdoing. Note that the Board's account (a duplication terminal) differs from Supervisor Stewart's Oct. 12 account to FOX 10 (software updates to air-gapped tabulators). Oct. 15 update (12News, from an investigative report obtained through a public-records request): after Shelby Busch of We the People USA Alliance and the Republican National Committee raised the video with a top official in Recorder Justin Heap's office, two of Heap's staff members filed a complaint with the FBI's Phoenix office, which passed the matter to the Arizona Attorney General's Office. The Attorney General's investigator concluded that \"both employees were authorized to be present in the tabulation center after hours\" and \"were performing their official duties.\" Board Chair Kate Brophy McGee called the referral \"disgusting\" and said a single phone call would have resolved the concern; Heap's spokeswoman said suspicious late-night activity in tested facilities \"should always be investigated.\" The Phoenix FBI office referred questions to the county and the Attorney General's office. Oct. 16 update (AZFamily): the Attorney General investigators' document states that \"[n]o information was developed indicating that the employees were unauthorized to be present in the facility or engaged in activities outside the scope of their official responsibilities.\" Chair Brophy McGee criticized Recorder Heap for escalating to the FBI instead of calling the county and cited election-worker safety concerns; Heap said referring after-hours activity in a secured facility was appropriate and that he still has unanswered questions. The status stays Partially confirmed only for the practice itself: the Board admits that election files were loaded by USB drive after L&A, out of public view. The misconduct claim is not supported, because an Attorney General investigation found the employees authorized and performing official duties. The drive contents and a media log are still unpublished, which is the visibility gap this leaf describes.", "sources": [{"title": "The Gateway Pundit — Maricopa County election employees seen late night at MCTEC (Oct. 10, 2026; partisan outlet; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-12, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2026/10/watch-maricopa-county-election-employees-seen-late-night/"}, {"title": "570 KVI — Maricopa accused of tampering with voting machines again as video depicts after-hours activity (Oct. 11, 2026; county statement quoted)", "url": "https://www.kvi.com/2026/10/11/maricopa-accused-of-tampering-with-voting-machines-again-as-video-depicts-after-hours-shenanigans/"}, {"title": "FOX 10 Phoenix — Maricopa County responds to late-night staff photos at tabulation center; Supervisor Stewart explains software update (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox10phoenix.com/news/maricopa-county-responds-late-night-staff-photos-tabulation-center"}, {"title": "KJZZ — Maricopa County supervisors refute online election misinformation; USB loaded authorized files onto ballot-duplication terminal (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-10-14/maricopa-county-supervisors-refute-online-election-misinformation"}, {"title": "12News (KPNX) — Recorder Heap staff referral to FBI; AZ Attorney General investigator finds employees authorized and performing official duties (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/elections/justin-heap-fbi-to-investigate-election-allegations-against-maricopa-county-board-arizona/75-2a4feac9-bb74-439b-b038-b73aa9ae8cd1"}, {"title": "AZFamily (3TV / CBS 5) — Why Arizona investigators found no wrongdoing in the Maricopa election video; Heap says questions remain (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/16/why-arizona-investigators-found-no-wrongdoing-maricopa-election-video/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa MCTEC late-night USBs (ei-2026-10-019)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-019 (first_seen 2026-10-10, last_updated 2026-10-16; EMon status disputed, confidence high). Refresh 2026-10-16 AM: +AZFamily (curl 200) quoting the AG investigators' document (no information developed that the employees were unauthorized or acted outside official duties); Heap still has unanswered questions. Card kept Partially confirmed for the admitted post-L&A USB practice only. Refresh 2026-10-15 PM: 12News (curl 200) on Heap-staff FBI referral handed to AZ AG; AG investigator found both employees authorized and performing official duties. Card kept Partially confirmed for the admitted post-L&A USB practice only; misconduct claim now explicitly unsupported. Refresh 2026-10-15 AM: Board chair/vice-chair statement via KJZZ (duplication terminal, USB per state rules, not connected to tabulators/EMS); account differs from Stewart's tabulator description; card status kept Partially confirmed (EMon's disputed = wrongdoing claim disputed by county). Refresh 2026-10-14 AM: county task explanation via Supervisor Stewart (FOX 10 Oct. 12): thumb-drive software update to air-gapped tabulators before testing; status raised Alleged to Partially confirmed per the prior raise rule (task disclosed); misconduct still unshown. Prior basis, Alleged only: county admits presence and denies wrongdoing; no drive-contents or task disclosure; employee ID unverified, so the name is omitted from the card. Mapped to Tabulation > Manipulate programming on thumb/flash drives (peers: Hursti Leon County, CA TTBR memory-card attacks). Cross-leaf: Logic and accuracy testing; No visibility to the public. X video/trending not fetched (zero X API). KVI added via free WebSearch 2026-10-12. Raise only if the county discloses the task or a mainstream/official source corroborates misconduct."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-usps-mail-ballot-delivery-delays-replacements-urged", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-10", "uid": "C20261019-123505-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-10", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-usps-mail-ballot-delivery-delays-replacements-urged"], "seq": "C01441", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-41", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-07 to 2026-10-15", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Oct. 14, 2026, the Maricopa County Recorder's Office issued a statement on Postal Service delivery delays for mail ballots. It said about 1.9 million early ballots were handed to USPS on Oct. 7, that returned ballots began arriving Oct. 13, and that \"some voters have not yet received their ballots.\" Voters who requested a mail ballot but did not have it by the end of that week were urged to request a replacement by the Oct. 23 deadline or vote in person at a Vote Center. KJZZ reported the office did not say how many voters were still waiting. KJZZ also reported that Recorder Justin Heap had earlier claimed a Phoenix postal facility closed in 2025 and that ballots would route through San Diego; a USPS spokesman told 12News that no Phoenix-area processing facilities closed and that USPS has ample capacity. Unconfirmed social-media reports of undelivered ballots in Pima County are not part of this card. Status Partially confirmed: the delays are acknowledged by the Recorder's own statement; the number affected is unknown, and the cause is disputed between the county and USPS. Catalog point: when nearly two million ballots go through the mail, neither the county nor the Postal Service can say how many have not arrived, and each voter must notice and ask for another. In-person precinct voting does not depend on a mail route.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County Recorder's Office — Statement on mail-ballot delivery delays (Oct. 14, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://recorder.maricopa.gov/news/DeliveryDelays.html"}, {"title": "KJZZ — Maricopa County early voters who don't have ballots by end of week should request new ones (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kjzz.org/elections/2026-10-15/maricopa-county-early-voters-who-dont-have-ballots-by-end-of-week-should-request-new-ones"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa USPS mail-ballot delays (ei-2026-10-050)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-050 (first_seen 2026-10-14; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high; official_error no). KJZZ curl 200; Recorder page 403 (statement text from EMon's verified summary). Pima claims excluded as unverified. Peers: USPS RTO card (ei-2026-09-002), Runbeck early mailing (ei-2026-10-007)."}
{"id": "ca-sacramento-2026-college-glen-mail-truck-theft-ballots-may-be-taken-usps-100k-reward", "permanent_id": "C20261012-182116-01", "uid": "C20261012-182116-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-182116-01", "old_ids": ["ca-sacramento-2026-college-glen-mail-truck-theft-ballots-may-be-taken-usps-100k-reward"], "seq": "C01374", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-06 to 2026-10-10", "state": "CA", "description": "On Tuesday, Oct. 6, 2026, at about 2:30 PM PT, a USPS mail truck was broken into in Sacramento's College Glen neighborhood. Surveillance video shows a masked man in a gray SUV opening the truck's rear compartment and taking trays of mail. U.S. Postal Inspector Jonathan Lanning said election ballots processed for delivery that day \"may have been\" among the stolen mail, but he has not confirmed that any ballots were taken. The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) is investigating and is offering a reward of up to $100,000 for information leading to an arrest and conviction. Some residents say ballots they were expecting have not arrived. Sacramento County elections spokesperson Ken Casparis said voters who have not received a ballot can request a replacement by phone or email, and that the county will count only the first ballot returned with a valid signature. Status Partially confirmed: the theft, the surveillance footage, the USPIS investigation and reward, and the official statement that ballots may have been taken are on record (KCRA, New York Post, Hoodline, Sacramento Bee). The loss of any specific ballots is not confirmed, and viral social posts claiming that voters are missing ballots because of the theft go further than officials have said. Mark framing: a bad actor doesn't need one perfect exploit. Once outbound ballots ride in an unguarded truck, a single theft anywhere makes \"lost in the mail\" a credible explanation everywhere, and every replacement ballot means two live ballots exist for the same voter until reconciliation catches the first one. In-person voting on precinct hand-marked paper ballots keeps the ballot in sight from issue to count. Related: San Diego Valley Center strewn ballots (ei-2026-10-021).", "sources": [{"title": "KCRA — Sacramento College Glen mail theft: ballots may have been affected; county replacement-ballot guidance (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kcra.com/article/sacramento-college-glen-mail-theft-ballots/74097322"}, {"title": "Sacramento Bee — Postal inspector says stolen mail may have included ballots (Oct. 10, 2026; curl timed out 2026-10-12, likely bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article317572876.html"}, {"title": "New York Post — Sacramento mail theft sparks fears stolen ballots could keep voters from voting (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/10/10/us-news/sacramento-mail-theft-sparks-fears-stolen-ballots-could-keep-voters-from-voting/"}, {"title": "Hoodline — Sacramento mail truck heist may have grabbed ballots; $100K reward offered (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://hoodline.com/2026/10/sacramento-mail-truck-heist-may-have-grabbed-ballots-100k-reward-offered/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Sacramento College Glen mail truck theft (ei-2026-10-027)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-027 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-12; EMon status active, confidence medium; minted from a Mark-submitted X tip). Partially confirmed: theft + USPIS reward + inspector's 'may have' statement confirmed; ballot loss unconfirmed. Viral X post not used as a source (zero X API). Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (peers: San Diego Valley Center ei-2026-10-021, Maricopa Runbeck ei-2026-10-007). Cross-leaf: USPS. Raise to Confirmed if USPIS confirms ballots were in the stolen trays. Watch arrests and county replacement counts."}
{"id": "co-grand-2026-mail-ballots-not-arriving-clerk-working-with-usps", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-04", "uid": "C20261021-121524-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-04", "old_ids": ["co-grand-2026-mail-ballots-not-arriving-clerk-working-with-usps"], "seq": "C01500", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-41", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10-02 to 2026-10-20", "state": "CO", "description": "The Grand County, Colorado Clerk and Recorder's Office posted a notice addressing voters' concerns that their mail ballots had not arrived, Sky-Hi News reported on Oct. 20, 2026. \"We understand that not receiving your ballot as expected may be concerning, and the Clerk's Office is working closely with the USPS to expedite delivery of any outstanding ballots,\" the notice said. The ballots were mailed from the Postal Service's Denver regional mail facility on Oct. 2. The office had not said whether the problem was countywide. Voters with a correct address who have not received a ballot can get a replacement at the county's early-voting center. Status Partially confirmed: the clerk's office acknowledged outstanding, undelivered ballots and is working with the Postal Service, but the number of ballots involved and the cause have not been reported. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: ballots that leave a regional postal facility and do not reach voters for more than two weeks sit in a part of the chain of custody that neither the county nor the public can observe. In-person precinct voting does not depend on the mail stream reaching the voter.", "sources": [{"title": "Sky-Hi News — Grand County Elections addresses concerns over undelivered mail ballots (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.skyhinews.com/news/grand-county-elections-addresses-concerns-over-undelivered-mail-ballots/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Grand County, CO undelivered ballots (ei-2026-10-118)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-118 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed). Mapped to 7 USPS (peer: Maricopa ei-2026-10-050). Quote text from EMon verified summary; Sky-Hi News curl 200. Watch for a count or cause."}
{"id": "ky-madison-2026-10-early-voting-touchscreen-issues-machines-recalibrated", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-13", "uid": "C20261102-121503-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-13", "old_ids": ["ky-madison-2026-10-early-voting-touchscreen-issues-machines-recalibrated"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (early voting)", "state": "KY", "description": "Some Madison County, Kentucky, voters told LEX 18 that during the first two days of early voting, voting machines were slow and in some cases the screens selected a different candidate than the one they intended. Voter Tammy Gay said she \"kept having to press over and over again\" to make her selections. County Clerk Kenny Barger said the office received the reports and \"calibrated every machine, every express voting machine, every marking device\" the next morning. He said that if a voter does not touch the center of the box with the candidate's name, \"there's an opportunity there for it to select a different candidate,\" and urged voters to tell a poll worker before scanning, because \"until that ballot's scanned, you have not voted.\" No count of affected voters was given. Status Partially confirmed: county officials acknowledge the reports and recalibrated machines; no altered votes have been confirmed. Catalog point: when a touchscreen shows a selection the voter did not make, the voter must notice and correct it; voters who do not check the screen or printout carry the error into the count. A hand-marked paper ballot counted by hand at the precinct removes the touchscreen from the voter's choice.", "sources": [{"title": "LEX 18 — Madison County, KY touchscreen reports (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.lex18.com/news/covering-kentucky/madison-county-voters-report-voting-machine-issues-during-early-voting-in-kentucky"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Madison County, KY touchscreen reports (ei-2026-10-211)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-211 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "tn-sevier-2026-10-expressvote-touchscreen-reports-styluses-handed-out", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-12", "uid": "C20261102-121503-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-12", "old_ids": ["tn-sevier-2026-10-expressvote-touchscreen-reports-styluses-handed-out"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (early voting)", "state": "TN", "description": "Sevier County, Tennessee, Administrator of Elections Nathan Whaley said he received a handful of reports during early voting that ExpressVote touchscreens selected the candidate above or below the one a voter touched. Voter Helen Meehan told WVLT that three times \"the other candidate came up of the other party\" before her choice registered on the fourth try. Whaley said bipartisan teams tested the machines before early voting and found no equipment errors, and that the screens can be sensitive to touches near the edge of a box. Four days into early voting, the county began handing out styluses and Q-tips; Whaley said there have been no complaints since more than 10,000 voters received them, that every voter who complained said they cast the vote they intended, and that styluses will be available at all polling sites on Election Day. Officials urge voters to check the review screen and the printed paper ballot before it is scanned and to tell a poll worker about any problem. Sevier, Greene, Loudon and Roane are the four East Tennessee counties that use the ExpressVote system. Status Partially confirmed: county election officials acknowledge the voter reports and responded by handing out styluses; no altered votes have been confirmed. Catalog point: when a touchscreen shows a selection the voter did not make, the voter must notice and correct it; voters who do not check the screen or printout carry the error into the count. A hand-marked paper ballot counted by hand at the precinct removes the touchscreen from the voter's choice.", "sources": [{"title": "WVLT — Sevier County, TN touchscreen reports (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.wvlt.tv/2026/10/30/sevier-county-gives-voters-q-tips-other-styluses-after-touchscreen-reports/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Sevier County, TN touchscreen reports (ei-2026-10-210)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-210 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "fl-broward-2026-10-supervisor-reports-usps-mail-ballot-delays", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-10", "uid": "C20261102-121503-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-10", "old_ids": ["fl-broward-2026-10-supervisor-reports-usps-mail-ballot-delays"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-10 (delays reported)", "state": "FL", "description": "Broward County Supervisor of Elections Joe Scott says mail ballots are being delayed in U.S. Postal Service delivery in both directions, with some locally mailed ballots taking up to two weeks to reach his office, and that a large batch of ballots from Hallandale Beach was found sitting at a postal facility for about a week (NBC 6). His office reports a higher-than-average number of voters saying they never received requested mail ballots or that returned ballots were not shown as received. Scott urged voters not to mail ballots now and instead drop them at one of the county's 30 early-voting sites through Nov. 1 or at the elections office; Florida mail ballots must arrive by 7 p.m. on Nov. 3 to count. A USPS South Florida spokesperson told the Miami Herald that local management reports no delays in Broward or Monroe processing or delivery facilities, while NBC 6 reports the concerns were elevated to Postal Inspection Service headquarters. On Oct. 31, X News summaries reported other south Florida officials and State Rep. Angie Nixon echoing the drop-off advice, with local deliveries said to take 12 to 14 days. Oct. 30 update: The Washington Post reports that in neighboring Monroe County, election officials said about 100 voters reported delays; Supervisor of Elections Sherri Hodies said some ballots mailed from other states in early October reached Miami on Oct. 24 and Key West two days later. The Postal Service said it saw no delays at its facilities serving either county and could not investigate further without reviewing individual pieces of mail. Status Partially confirmed: the Broward and Monroe supervisors of elections report the delays; the Postal Service says it found no delays at its facilities. Catalog point: a mailed ballot passes through hands outside election officials' custody in both directions, and delays there can keep ballots from arriving or from being shown as received in time.", "sources": [{"title": "WLRN — Broward mail ballot delays (2026-10-28)", "url": "https://www.wlrn.org/government-politics/2026-10-28/broward-supervisor-of-elections-urges-in-person-voting-following-reports-of-mail-in-ballot-delays"}, {"title": "Miami Herald — Broward mail ballot delays (2026-10-29)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/election/voter-guide/article317820918.html"}, {"title": "NBC 6 South Florida — Broward mail ballot delays (2026-10-28)", "url": "https://www.nbcmiami.com/elections/broward-elections-chief-urges-early-voting/3878731/"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — Broward mail ballot delays (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2026/10/30/florida-election-officials-alarmed-slow-delivery-mail-in-ballots/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Broward mail ballot delays (ei-2026-10-217)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-217 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-006", "permanent_id": "C20261005-121257-03", "uid": "C20261005-121257-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-121257-03", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-006"], "seq": "C01277", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Reasonable Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements for disabled citizens are appropriate, but these must be taken into account: the June 2016 U.S. DOJ Civil Rights Division ADA Checklist for Polling Places (votingchecklist.pdf)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-99", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-99", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-09-29", "state": "MI", "description": "Blind and disabled Detroit voters told the Detroit City Council on Sept. 29, 2026 (and local outlets afterward) that Voter Assist Terminals (VATs), the audio/tactile machines used for independent accessible voting, frequently fail to power on, freeze, have inaudible audio in loud polling places, or lack headphones and trained poll workers. Accounts include a voter who said she went through three machines over about two hours on the Aug. 4 primary. Detroit Advocates of the Blind (Richard Clay, Stephen Handschu) call it a recurring ADA/civil-rights failure and pressed City Clerk Janice Winfrey's office and Wayne County Clerk Cathy Garrett for fixes before Nov. 3. The Detroit Department of Elections told BridgeDetroit every one of 158 polling locations has a VAT plus reserves, with specialists assigned and complaint teams that repair or swap machines; advocates and Detroit Disability Power say setup and training gaps persist. Council members said concerns were raised with the clerk and training plans are needed. Status Partially confirmed: public council testimony and multi-outlet reporting (Detroit Free Press, BridgeDetroit, ClickOnDetroit/WDIV) document the complaints, while the department disputes their scope and no formal finding or lawsuit exists yet. Shows accessible-voting equipment adding failure points at the polls; a hand-marked paper ballot with simple assistive aids remains a viable accessible option. Also relevant to Electronic Voting Machines leaves.", "sources": [{"title": "Detroit Free Press — Voters from blind community urge Detroit to fix voting machines", "url": "https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/detroit/2026/09/30/voters-from-blind-community-urge-detroit-to-fix-voting-machines/92003713007/"}, {"title": "BridgeDetroit — Detroit voters with disabilities raise concerns over unreliable voting machines", "url": "https://www.bridgedetroit.com/detroit-voters-with-disabilities-raise-concerns-over-unreliable-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "ClickOnDetroit / WDIV — Blind voters in Detroit say their voting machines almost never work", "url": "https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2026/10/02/blind-voters-in-detroit-say-their-voting-machines-almost-never-work-why-advocates-say-its-illegal/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Detroit VAT accessibility failures (ei-2026-10-006)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-006 (first_seen 2026-09-30, last_updated 2026-10-03). Partially confirmed: council testimony + 3 outlets; department disputes scope; no lawsuit yet. Mapped to Polling Places > ADA leaf (peer DOJ ADA checklist card). Cross-leaf Electronic Voting Machines. Watch clerk training/fix plan before EV/ED."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-sept-28-charges-pleas-fl-ks-nj-tx-hi-noncitizen-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261020-120650-04", "uid": "C20261020-120650-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-120650-04", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-sept-28-charges-pleas-fl-ks-nj-tx-hi-noncitizen-voting"], "seq": "C01458", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-09-28", "state": "FL, KS, NJ, TX, HI", "description": "On Sept. 28, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges and guilty pleas involving 12 people in election-related cases. Four Eastern District of Pennsylvania defendants are on the Pennsylvania card and the former Utah postal carrier accused of discarding about 300 mail ballots is on the Utah card, so this card covers the other seven. Middle District of Florida: Christiane Vinette Young, 75, a Canadian national DOJ describes as in the country illegally, charged with three counts of voting by an alien (the 2024 general, 2022 general and 2022 primary elections). Southern District of Florida: Valery Zidor, a Haitian national on Temporary Protected Status at the time, pleaded guilty to two counts of falsely claiming citizenship to vote and one count of voting by an alien in the 2024 general election. District of Kansas: George Olawunmi Johnson, a Nigerian lawful permanent resident, charged with false claims of citizenship (including when registering in February 2010), fraudulent election conduct and voting by an alien in November 2024. District of New Jersey: Patrick Terrance Reid, 61, a Jamaican lawful permanent resident of Orange, accused of voting in the 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 presidential elections, and Danubis Bernat, 49, a Venezuelan lawful permanent resident of South Amboy, accused of voting in person in 2024; both are also charged with false statements on citizenship applications. Western District of Texas: Imelda Magallanes, 51, a Mexican lawful permanent resident, charged with voting by an alien; Midland County records show she registered in October 2020 and voted in November 2024. District of Hawaii: Bernadette Acaso, 20, a Filipino lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty to voting as an alien by mail ballot in 2024. These are charges only, and every defendant who has not pleaded guilty is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court. Status Partially confirmed: Zidor and Acaso have admitted the offenses in court, while the other five charges are accusations only. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: one plea involves a noncitizen record that received and returned a mail ballot with no one checking eligibility in person, and one charge alleges a noncitizen record used across four presidential elections. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with in-person check-in and identification, give records like these more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges and guilty pleas involving 12 individuals in election crimes (Sept. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-and-guilty-pleas-involving-12-individuals-election"}, {"title": "The Epoch Times — 12 people charged with federal election crimes (Sept. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/12-people-charged-with-federal-election-crimes-6095971"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — Bridgewater woman admits illegally voting in 2024 presidential election (Oct. 19, 2026; notes the Reid and Bernat charges)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/judiciary/bridgewater-woman-admits-illegally-voting-in-2024-presidential-election/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ Sept. 28 charges and pleas (ei-2026-10-062)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-062 (first_seen 2026-09-28; backfill). EDPA four are on ei-2026-10-008 and the Utah carrier on ei-2026-09-022, so seven covered here; none on other cards, checked by name. Two pleas plus five charges, so Partially confirmed. DOJ release text-verified (Young, Zidor, Reid, Bernat, Magallanes, Acaso); all sources curl 200."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-002", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-49", "uid": "C20260925-155410-49", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-49", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-002"], "seq": "C00049", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-41", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Brookings analysis of 2026 primaries in California, North Carolina, and Washington finds USPS Regional Transportation Optimization (RTO)—one daily truck instead of two for many rural post offices >50 miles from plants—roughly doubled late-arrival mail-ballot rejection rates in exposed counties. Estimates 43,000–55,000 additional late rejections possible nationally if the pattern holds in November. USPS also confirmed (Dec. 2025) a postmark may no longer show the day mail was sent. Oct. 2, 2026 update: Democracy Docket reports RTO is active in 61% of planned ZIP codes (~42.5% of continental U.S. ZIPs) with no new activations in October, and USPS recommends mailing completed ballots at least a week before Election Day. A USPS Extraordinary Measures memo (PDF, Oct. 1) authorizes General Election ballot-mail extraordinary measures (postmark lines, extended retail hours, drive-through options) starting Oct. 24, 2026—10 days before Nov. 3, versus about 15 days in 2022 and 2024 (Oct. 21 start in 2024)—with mandatory return-ballot handling from Oct. 26; the memo states no reason for the shorter window. Status Partially confirmed: the memo dates and RTO rollout are documented; the Brookings rejection effect is a rigorous observational estimate and the November projection remains an estimate, not an adjudicated finding of intentional disenfranchisement. Oct. 22, 2026 update: a ProPublica data analysis (Ken B. Morales, Jen Fifield, Misty Harris) of the 2026 primaries in the five states with detailed mail-ballot data (Washington, California, Ohio, North Carolina, Oregon) found that late-arrival rejection rates doubled or tripled versus the 2022 primary in counties where USPS cut pickups at post offices 50 or more miles from processing plants from twice daily to once, with little change where service was unchanged; ProPublica reports the effect was largest in areas that voted for Trump in 2024. In 11 mostly rural eastern Washington counties nearly 2,000 ballots arrived late, versus about 600 in 2022; in Stevens County the share of ballots rejected for a late postmark rose to 8% from 1%, and County Auditor Lori Larsen (R) said more than 500 late ballots arrived three days after the primary. Washington Secretary of State Steve Hobbs (D) told ProPublica he sees the changes as a way to undermine mail voting. USPS leaders say the general-election extraordinary measures should prevent similar delays; experts told ProPublica mistakes are still likely. Catalog point: a ballot that depends on a delivery truck can be lost to a logistics decision; ballots cast in person on Election Day and hand counted at the precinct do not travel through the mail at all.", "sources": [{"title": "ProPublica — Postal Service cuts doubled late mail-ballot rejections in 2026 primaries (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/mail-ballot-delays-postal-service-midterms"}, {"title": "Brookings — Postal network redesign and mail ballot rejections in the 2026 primaries", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/postal-network-redesign-and-mail-ballot-rejections-in-the-2026-primaries/"}, {"title": "Brookings — New post office policy could lead to tens of thousands of additional rejections", "url": "https://www.brookings.edu/articles/new-post-office-policy-could-lead-to-the-rejection-of-tens-of-thousands-of-mail-in-ballots-in-november/"}, {"title": "USPS — 2026 Extraordinary Measures memo for Ballot Mail (PDF)", "url": "https://about.usps.com/what/government-services/election-mail/pdf/2026-extraordinary-measures-memo.pdf"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — USPS pushes back measures that ensure mail ballots arrive on time", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/usps-pushes-back-measures-that-ensure-mail-ballots-arrive-on-ti/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — The Postal Service is slowing delivery: will your mail ballot be affected?", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/the-postal-service-is-slowing-delivery-will-your-mail-ballot-be-affected/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — USPS RTO / late mail-ballot rejections (ei-2026-09-002)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-002 refresh 2026-10-22 PM: added ProPublica five-state analysis (WA, CA, OH, NC, OR; curl 200, text-verified incl. Stevens County 8% vs 1%); status stays Partially confirmed (observational analysis plus official statements, no finding of intent). Earlier refresh 2026-10-05 AM: added USPS Extraordinary Measures memo (start Oct 24 vs ~15 days prior cycles; mandatory return-ballot handling Oct 26) + Democracy Docket RTO 61% planned ZIPs / no October activations. Status stays Partially confirmed (projection)."}
{"id": "ncsl-14-states-dc-no-documentation-required-at-polls-verification-without-id", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-33", "uid": "C20260925-235207-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-33", "old_ids": ["ncsl-14-states-dc-no-documentation-required-at-polls-verification-without-id"], "seq": "C00506", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Loose or no ID requirements to register to vote in many cases"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-78", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-78", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-09-03", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL reports 14 states and D.C. do not require documentation to vote at the polls (signature/other methods). Separately, federal NVRA/HAVA registration pathways commonly accept driver's-license number or last-four SSN without a photo-ID document at registration. Status Partially confirmed: leaf targets registration ID looseness; NCSL poll-ID map is strong for 'many cases have no/loose document ID,' paired with federal mail-registration practice that does not mandate photo ID to register.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Voter ID Laws (14 states + DC no documentation at polls)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id"}, {"title": "DOJ CRT — National Voter Registration Act overview", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/national-voter-registration-act-1993-nvra"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 17. Partially confirmed — registration vs poll ID distinction labeled honestly."}
{"id": "az-maricopa-2026-07-21-primary-poll-book-connectivity-outages-observer-sonnenklar-report", "permanent_id": "C20261027-121429-04", "uid": "C20261027-121429-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-121429-04", "old_ids": ["az-maricopa-2026-07-21-primary-poll-book-connectivity-outages-observer-sonnenklar-report"], "seq": "C01581", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Poll books are linked over insecure wireless connections to a central database outside the polling place (sometimes out of state) that unknown parties control."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-79", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-07-21 (observer report shared 2026-10-26)", "state": "AZ", "description": "During Maricopa County's July 21, 2026 primary, county elections spokesperson Jennifer Liewer said a small number of poll books had brief connectivity problems, that about 99% of more than 1,900 poll books were working, that every location had several poll books, and that no one was turned away; Supervisor Mark Stewart described intermittent AT&T connectivity problems at a limited number of locations and said backup Verizon connections were being deployed. Election observer Mark J. Sonnenklar of Ethos Law Group, who describes himself as a roving attorney trained by the RNC Election Integrity program, later shared on X (Oct. 26, 2026) a signed report of his visits to 10 vote centers that day. It states that poll books stopped working for one or more periods at 8 of the 10 centers, usually all at once; that at least one tabulator did not work all day at Stonegate Community Center, Mountain View Community Center and North Scottsdale United Methodist Church; that busy centers such as Via Linda Senior Center and Horizon Community Center were under-equipped and understaffed; and that inspectors at two centers said some voters' party registration had been changed from Republican to no party without their consent. An Oct. 13 letter in the same PDF, signed by Deputy County Attorney Joseph E. La Rue (not independently confirmed), says the outages were brief, backup tabulators were available, and the county knows of no party-change complaints; the observer's Oct. 19 rebuttal disputes this and cites secondhand reports of a 45-minute poll-book failure at the Florence Ely Nelson vote center during early voting on Oct. 15. Status Partially confirmed: the poll-book connectivity outages are acknowledged by the county; the observer's other claims have not been confirmed by a news outlet or election official.", "sources": [{"title": "AZFamily — Maricopa County reports intermittent AT&T connectivity issues at voting locations (July 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/07/21/maricopa-county-reports-intermittent-att-connectivity-issues-voting-locations/"}, {"title": "12News — Outage affecting voting locations on primary Election Day in Arizona (July 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.12news.com/article/news/politics/elections/power-outage-affecting-voting-locations-primary-election-day-arizona/75-47ccb6fd-02ad-4dc5-bac4-2d36ca999e21"}, {"title": "FOX 10 Phoenix — primary-day coverage (video)", "url": "https://www.fox10phoenix.com/video/fmc-9ch1in98ec3nn4fa"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Supervisor Mark Stewart — email bulletin", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/AZMARIC/bulletins/421706f"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Supervisor Mark Stewart — primary recap bulletin", "url": "https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/AZMARIC/bulletins/422578f"}, {"title": "X — @honorck1, observer Mark J. Sonnenklar's account of his report (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/honorck1/status/2114722328017764667"}, {"title": "Observer's report and county correspondence (PDF on Google Drive, linked in the post)", "url": "https://drive.google.com/file/d/1jUGQo4KoX85LMG1z_Bzjz0H81V-4QbPf/view?usp=sharing"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Maricopa primary observer report (ei-2026-10-169)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-169 (added 2026-10-27 PM ingest; EMon marks the observer report unconfirmed). AZFamily and county bulletin curl 200. Carded as Partially confirmed because the county acknowledged the poll-book connectivity outages that day; the party-change and tabulator claims stay unconfirmed and see also Voter Rolls > Mass changes of party affiliation to unaffiliated. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "va-2026-spanberger-rights-restoration-letters-to-deceased", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-06", "uid": "C20261012-123213-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-06", "old_ids": ["va-2026-spanberger-rights-restoration-letters-to-deceased"], "seq": "C01293", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-07-01 to 2026-10-15", "state": "VA", "description": "Gov. Abigail Spanberger's administration restored voting and other civil rights to about 66,085 formerly incarcerated Virginians in 2026 through a proactive case review under the governor's constitutional authority. Families, including Howard \"Skip\" Lambert (whose daughter died in 2024) and Peggie Young (a deceased friend), reported receiving July 1 restoration orders and Aug. 31 notices from Secretary of the Commonwealth Candi Mundon-King. The notices urged online re-registration by QR code and were addressed to the deceased recipients. Fox News Digital (Oct. 5) said it authenticated Lambert's documents, and House Minority Leader Terry Kilgore called the vetting inadequate. On Oct. 9 Spanberger told reporters her office is \"looking into\" cases where restoration \"appears to be\" for people who had died. She attributed the gaps to databases that record felony convictions but \"would not necessarily\" record deaths, stressed that restoration is not automatic registration, and noted that voting in someone else's name is a felony. Oct. 14 to 15 update: WSET reported that a Nelson County woman received a restoration letter addressed to her partner, who died in January 2016. The governor's office told WSET that restoration \"does not register them to vote\" and that anyone registering a deceased person or voting in another person's name \"should expect to be prosecuted.\" Asked on Oct. 15 how many letters went to deceased people, Gov. Spanberger gave no number; she said the process relies on Department of Corrections and State Police records and that corrections depend partly on how quickly families report deaths. No official count had been released. Status Partially confirmed: authenticated letters and the governor's on-record acknowledgment that her office is investigating; the number of deceased recipients is unknown, and no registrations or votes in the names of the deceased have been reported. Distinct from ELECT's separate court-driven notices to about 235,000 Virginians. Catalog point: a mass restoration list built without a death match produces official mail inviting dead people to re-register. Whether the cause is negligence or design, it generates exactly the stale-record entry points this leaf and Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in describe.", "sources": [{"title": "Washington Examiner — Spanberger says office looking into rights restorations that reached deceased former felons (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/4761190/spanberger-restore-dead-people-voting-rights/"}, {"title": "Fox News — Spanberger voting-rights letters sent to dead felons amid ballot-access push (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/spanberger-voting-rights-letters-sent-dead-felons-amid-ballot-access-push"}, {"title": "WSET ABC13 — Nelson County woman questions restoration letter addressed to deceased partner (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/local/nelson-county-woman-questions-voter-rights-restoration-letter-addressed-to-deceased-man-october-2026"}, {"title": "WSET ABC13 — Spanberger addresses letters restoring voting rights to deceased Virginians (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://wset.com/news/local/spanberger-addresses-letters-restoring-voting-rights-to-deceased-virginians-october-2026"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — VA restoration letters to deceased (ei-2026-10-020)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: WSET Nelson County case (deceased 2016) and Spanberger Oct. 15 remarks; still no count. Stays Partially confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-020 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-11; EMon status emerging, confidence high). Partially confirmed: authenticated documents + governor acknowledgment; count unknown; no proxy votes reported. Mapped to Accessibility Sleight of Hand > Felon Voting Rights (master leaf; peer va-northam-mcauliffe felon-rights card sits on the legacy 'Felon Voting Rights' node). Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in. X trending not used (zero X API). Watch ELECT/registrar list checks and count of affected letters before Nov. 3."}
{"id": "ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-16", "uid": "C20260925-194013-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-16", "old_ids": ["ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026"], "seq": "C00200", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Run a candidate B with a name similar to candidate A's to confuse voters and siphon votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-05", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-06", "state": "AK", "description": "Retired teacher Dan J. Sullivan sought the 2026 Alaska U.S. Senate Republican primary ballot against incumbent Sen. Dan S. Sullivan. Major outlets reported Republican claims of a 'sham'/decoy intended to confuse voters and bleed votes toward Democrat Mary Peltola; Alaska courts (trial court then Alaska Supreme Court) ruled the same-named challenger eligible to remain on the ballot, rejecting a subjective good-faith bar. DOJ later issued grand-jury subpoenas into possible wire fraud/conspiracy; as of reporting, no conviction. Update Oct. 23, 2026: President Trump told reporters he directed the suit to be filed (NBC News). A Justice Department spokesperson said the department is acting under the National Voter Registration Act so that \"this frivolous candidacy does not undermine the integrity of Alaska's election or the will of its voters,\" and the department's rapid-response account on X posted that claims DOJ is trying to stop Alaska's election are false. No ruling has been reported. Status Partially confirmed: same-name ballot presence and voter-confusion risk Confirmed by court record and coverage; intentional coordinated decoy scheme remains Alleged/under investigation. Oct. 22, 2026 update: the Justice Department and the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Alaska sued the State of Alaska and Division of Elections Director Carol Beecher in federal court, asking U.S. District Judge Sharon L. Gleason to bar certification of any U.S. Senate result \"that may be impacted by voter confusion\" pending an investigation into whether votes cast for Daniel J. Sullivan were meant for Sen. Dan S. Sullivan, who faces Democrat Mary Peltola. The suit cites a June 15 Division of Elections finding that Daniel J. Sullivan's candidacy was filed to confuse or mislead voters, and relies on the National Voter Registration Act; Daniel J. Sullivan appears on the general-election ballot without a party affiliation. Election-law scholar Rick Hasen wrote that the claim \"won't go anywhere.\" No ruling has been reported. Catalog point: a same-name candidacy can confuse voters at the ballot and then become grounds to contest the result itself. Oct. 28, 2026 update: A New York Times investigation by Kellen Browning reported that in summer 2025 a staff member for Democrat Mary Peltola was told by top campaign aides to \"find as many people named Dan Sullivan in Alaska as you can,\" and produced a list from voter records. The Times reported, based on interviews with 12 people, dozens of text messages it viewed, and documents prepared for a potential lawsuit against the campaign, that \"Ms. Peltola's team work[ed] with people trying to recruit Mr. Sullivan to run for Senate,\" in an internal effort called the \"ballot composition project\" that also involved the campaign's lawyers (Elias Law Group) and senior Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee aides. Former campaign manager Elisa Rios said DSCC aides introduced operative Jerid Kurtz, who later told the team he had contacted the Petersburg Dan Sullivan and described him as willing to run \"if it was going to help Mary\"; Rios said Peltola was not directly involved but \"definitely aware.\" Rios later asked to retract her statements; the Times published them, saying they were on the record and consistent with its other reporting. The Times also reported that the same effort pressed Anchorage resident Matthew Salisbury to run (he identified Kurtz as the man who called himself \"Zane\"), that Kurtz urged Democrat David Leslie to withdraw after the primary, and that Gerald Heikes, who took Leslie's place on the ballot, said he was recruited \"by a guy from the Midwest.\" The Peltola campaign said it \"did not recruit any candidates into the race,\" the DSCC said it had \"no involvement,\" and Daniel J. Sullivan has said he entered the race on his own; neither he nor Kurtz responded to the Times. The Times noted such ballot-stacking is \"generally considered legal\" and has been used by both parties in Alaska. The Times did not report any payment to Daniel J. Sullivan, and no source reports that any vote or vote count was changed. On Election Day, Nov. 3, the Justice Department sent at least 20 letters to people or groups it says are targets of its investigation into how Daniel J. Sullivan was recruited, or asking them to preserve records, and has served at least 120 subpoenas, according to a law enforcement source cited by USA Today; Marc Elias, whose firm represents the Peltola campaign and the DSCC, said he and his firm's leadership received letters and called it \"a sham investigation.\" A target letter is not a charge, and no one has been charged. Update (Nov. 19, 2026): in a Ninth Circuit brief (No. 26-7304, DktEntry 39) opposing summary affirmance of Judge Gleason's dismissal of the certification suit, the Justice Department told the court the case \"is now moot\" and asked it to vacate the dismissal and remand for dismissal on that ground. The brief says that because the district court denied ballot segregation, ballots for Daniel J. Sullivan were commingled with all others, and the United States \"reluctantly acknowledges that there no longer exists any means\" of determining whether those votes were meant for Sen. Dan S. Sullivan. Politico's Kyle Cheney and law professor Ilya Somin (Reason, Volokh Conspiracy) described the filing as DOJ abandoning its effort to block certification; the Ninth Circuit had not ruled on vacatur or sanctions as of Nov. 19. Catalog point: once the same-name ballots were mixed with all others, no one could tell which voters were confused. Status remains Partially confirmed: the same-name candidacy is Confirmed, and a coordinated campaign and DSCC effort to place spoilers on the ballot is now reported by the Times from texts and named witnesses; that this effort caused Daniel J. Sullivan's candidacy rests on a retracted second-hand account and is denied. The broader spoiler effort is cataloged as Alleged on its own card (https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-163642-01).", "sources": [{"title": "CNN — Man with same name as Sen. Dan Sullivan eligible for Alaska primary ballot", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/27/politics/man-with-same-name-as-us-sen-dan-sullivan-is-eligible-for-alaskas-primary-ballot-judge-rules"}, {"title": "NBC News — Same-name Dan Sullivan eligible for Alaska primary, judge rules", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/dan-sullivan-eligible-alaska-primary-ballot-senate-same-name-rcna352048"}, {"title": "Courthouse News Service — Trump administration sues Alaska over two Dan Sullivans on ballot (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-administration-sues-alaska-over-two-dan-sullivans-on-ballot/"}, {"title": "Complaint, United States v. State of Alaska and Carol Beecher (D. Alaska, Oct. 22, 2026; via Courthouse News)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/sullivan-ak-fed-suit.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Trump administration sues to block certification of Alaska Senate race if Sullivan loses (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/alaska-senate-race-sullivan-name-lawsuit-certification-d8f4a3c7b5247cc427a05f796d7c0d82"}, {"title": "CNBC — DOJ lawsuit over Alaska Senate election and the two Sullivans (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/23/alaska-senate-election-doj-lawsuit-sullivan.html"}, {"title": "Election Law Blog (Rick Hasen) — Citing preamble to NVRA, DOJ sues to enjoin certification of Alaska's Senate race; it won't go anywhere (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://electionlawblog.org/2026/citing-preamble-to-nvra-doj-sues-to-enjoin-certification-of-alaskas-senate-race-it-wont-go-anywhere/"}, {"title": "NBC News — Trump says he directed Justice Department lawsuit over Alaska Senate race (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/trump-justice-department-lawsuit-alaska-senate-rcna605229"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ preemptively sues to block Alaska Senate results (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/US/doj-preemptively-sues-block-alaska-senate-results-republican/story?id=137512876"}, {"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (No. 26-7304, DktEntry 39, via CourtListener) — DOJ concedes certification suit moot (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.ca9.8a0b432c-0e24-4384-bbb1-a17023532ab5/gov.uscourts.ca9.8a0b432c-0e24-4384-bbb1-a17023532ab5.39.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Reason (The Volokh Conspiracy, Ilya Somin) — DOJ concedes certification suit moot (2026-11-19)", "url": "https://reason.com/volokh/2026/11/19/trump-justice-department-drops-attempt-to-block-certification-of-alaska-senate-election-result-in-voter-confusion-case/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Alaska DOJ suit to block Senate certification over same-name candidate (ei-2026-10-140)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "ABC News — DOJ investigates Alaska candidate with same name as sitting senator", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/doj-launches-investigation-alaska-candidate-same-sitting-senator/story?id=134442958"}, {"title": "The New York Times — Inside Democrats' Secret Effort to Stack Alaska's Ballot (Kellen Browning, Oct. 28, 2026) (NYT page returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; archived copy is the syndicated full text from the Juneau Empire)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/28/us/politics/alaska-dan-sullivan-conspiracy-peltola.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__nyt-via-juneau-empire-2026-10-28.pdf"}, {"title": "Juneau Empire — Inside Democrats' Secret Effort to Stack Alaska's Ballot, syndicated New York Times full text (Oct. 28, 2026; screenshot)", "url": "https://www.juneauempire.com/2026/10/28/inside-democrats-secret-effort-to-stack-alaskas-ballot/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__juneau-empire-nyt-syndicated-2026-10-28.png"}, {"title": "AP News — Second Dan Sullivan in Alaska Senate race recruited by Democrats, report says (Oct. 28, 2026) (returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; not archived; URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/alaska-peltola-senate-dan-sullivan-democrats-743677c9fb0d6696af7901504df2be3e"}, {"title": "The Hill — Peltola denies New York Times report her campaign recruited other Sullivan (Oct. 28, 2026) (returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; not archived; URL retained)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/6178270-peltola-denies-sullivan-recruitment-alaska-senate-report/"}, {"title": "The Guardian — Democrat Mary Peltola's campaign reportedly recruited second Dan Sullivan in Alaska Senate race (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/28/mary-peltola-dan-sullivan-alaska-senate", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__guardian-2026-10-28.html"}, {"title": "Reuters via Investing.com — Democrats recruited spoilers in Alaska Senate race, NYT says (Oct. 28, 2026) (returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; not archived; URL retained)", "url": "https://www.investing.com/news/politics-news/democrats-recruited-spoilers-in-alaska-senate-race-nyt-says-4980417"}, {"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — Election Candidates, U.S. Senator list (captured Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/election-candidates/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__alaska-doe-election-candidates-2026-10-28.html"}, {"title": "Alaska Beacon — Dan J. Sullivan switches from Republican to 'undeclared' ahead of general election (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/10/26/dan-j-sullivan-switches-from-republican-to-undeclared-ahead-of-general-election/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__alaska-beacon-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "Geiger Capital on X, post of Oct. 28, 2026, 12:07 PM ET that prompted this update (screenshot; the post overstates the Times report, see notes)", "url": "https://x.com/Geiger_Capital/status/2115475472117080366", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026__x-geiger-capital-2115475472117080366.png"}, {"title": "USA Today — DOJ letters in Alaska ballot probe (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/11/03/alaska-dan-sullivan-ballot-probe-justice-department-letters/92595476007/"}, {"title": "The Center Square via Just the News — DOJ sends letters in Alaska spoiler-candidate probe (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/nation/states/center-square/doj-sends-letters-alaska-spoiler-candidate-probe"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-20 12:16 PM ET (2026-11-20 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-140 Nov. 19 update: DOJ Ninth Circuit brief concedes mootness). Label unchanged. Refreshed 2026-11-04 midday ingest: added DOJ target letters and subpoenas (EMon ei-2026-10-140 Nov. 3 update). Gather 2026-10-28 PM (Mark sent Geiger Capital X post 2115475472117080366): NYT investigation added; label unchanged (Partially confirmed); research copies in /workspace/research/alaska-decoy-2026-10-28/ (NYT direct 403; syndicated full text archived). The X post overstates the Times report: it says campaign staff secretly searched Alaska to find and recruit a man named Dan Sullivan and put him on the ballot to steal votes, while the Times reports a list drawn from voter records, an operative's claim of contact relayed second-hand by a source who later sought to retract it, denials by the campaign and the DSCC, and Daniel J. Sullivan's own statement that he entered the race on his own; no source shows who recruited him or that anyone other than he placed him on the ballot. AP, The Hill and the NYT page returned HTTP 403 (not archived). EMon refresh 2026-10-23 PM: Trump says he directed the suit (NBC), DOJ spokesperson statement (ABC); curl 200; label unchanged. EMon ei-2026-10-140 refresh 2026-10-23 AM: DOJ federal suit to block certification (Courthouse News, CNBC, ELB curl 200); label unchanged. Fill-15c leaf 7. Same-name on ballot Confirmed; decoy intent Alleged.", "related": ["ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie"]}
{"id": "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-13", "uid": "C20261028-132233-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-13", "old_ids": ["ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates"], "seq": "C01608", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail a ballot to every record, including phantom ones"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-03", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-06-11", "state": "CA", "description": "The New York Post reported on June 11, 2026, that families in Los Angeles County kept receiving primary ballots for dead relatives, including ballots for Francesco Altavilla arriving five years after his death, and that the Post verified the registrations of Brown's late wife and Reynolds' mother remained active in county records after death certificates were filed. [1] The Post cited a 2025 Public Interest Legal Foundation review that it said found 94,516 registrants flagged as deceased, 57,725 potential duplicate registrations across state lines, 3,104 same-address duplicates, and 7,677 records with placeholder or fictitious birth dates. [1] Status Partially confirmed: the Post says it checked the individual records; the statewide figures are PILF's own claims and have not been verified by state officials.", "sources": [{"title": "New York Post — Families outraged after dead loved ones in Los Angeles received primary election ballots (June 11, 2026)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/06/11/us-news/families-outraged-after-dead-loved-ones-in-los-angeles-received-primary-election-ballots/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. PILF statewide numbers are cited as PILF claims only.", "related": ["ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "ncsl-permanent-absentee-mail-ballot-lists", "ballotpedia-all-mail-voting-states", "hi-act-136-2019-statewide-elections-by-mail"]}
{"id": "sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-34", "uid": "C20261020-160717-34", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-34", "old_ids": ["sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video"], "seq": "C01027", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-06-09", "state": "SC", "description": "On June 9, 2026, primary day, U.S. Senate candidate Mark Lynch (R) posted a 24-second video on X: \"WATCH as this machine in the Saluda precinct in Greenville County flips a vote intended for Mark Lynch is flipped to another candidate, and ultimately to Lindsey Graham!\" (about 433,000 views). The video shows a finger pressing at the far left of Lynch's field, near the small checkbox, three times; the field of the candidate listed above (Pat Herrmann) highlights instead. Lynch finished second with about 29 percent; Graham won without a runoff. Greenville County interim elections director Patty Roach told AFP the person appears to hit the field above Lynch with a fingernail, but said she was aware of technicians being called to service machines for screen calibration problems during the June 9 election. The SC State Election Commission advised voters to touch the center of their choice rather than the edge and check the review screen. ES&S's Katina Granger said \"touch screen voting machines do not flip votes\" and that the voter was \"attempting to touch the tiny check box.\" Officials noted the ExpressVote prints a paper ballot to review before scanning, and that filming one's ballot is unlawful. No machine-specific test, recalibration record, or affected vote was published. Status Partially confirmed: the county confirmed calibration service calls that day but attributed this clip to touch placement. 2026 instance. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Mark Lynch (@MarkLynchSC) video post (June 9, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/MarkLynchSC/status/2064388337587089442"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — No evidence machine flipped votes in South Carolina (June 2026)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.B6ND2ZQ"}, {"title": "RTL Today — Fact Check: No evidence machine flipped votes in South Carolina (AFP copy, June 2026)", "url": "https://today.rtl.lu/news/fact-check/no-evidence-machine-flipped-votes-in-south-carolina-855366103", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__rtl2026.html"}, {"title": "WYFF 4 — Mark Lynch alleges voter fraud after losing primary (June 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wyff4.com/article/mark-lynch-voter-fraud-lindsey-graham-sc-primary/71549154", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__wyff2026.html"}, {"title": "ABC News 4 (TNND) — Lindsey Graham's GOP primary opponent claims election machines are corrupt (June 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews4.com/news/local/lindsey-grahams-gop-primary-opponent-claims-election-machines-are-corrupt-south-carolina-mark-lynch-donald-trump", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__abc4_2026.html"}, {"title": "X — Mark Lynch post: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-20)", "url": "https://x.com/MarkLynchSC/status/2064388337587089442", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Mark Lynch post: fxtwitter JSON (posted June 9, 2026 12:45 PM ET; ~433K views at capture)", "url": "https://x.com/MarkLynchSC/status/2064388337587089442", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X — Mark Lynch post: video file (unredacted MP4)", "url": "https://x.com/MarkLynchSC/status/2064388337587089442", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-video.mp4"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (rtl2026, wyff2026, abc4_2026). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): AFP Fact Check. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted. Video archived with capture_video.py (unredacted). 2026 instance: flagged for EMon.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote BMD"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/MarkLynchSC/status/2064388337587089442", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 24.32, "bytes": 196758, "sha256": "f4fbf0c88b108d0f51234daed550c4a31d986417a3afce481ad1a62188c0768e", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/sc-greenville-2026-lynch-saluda-expressvote-flip-video__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-009", "permanent_id": "C20261007-181236-01", "uid": "C20261007-181236-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-181236-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-009"], "seq": "C01283", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-46", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-46", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-06 to 2026-10", "state": "US (TX, PA, CA, NJ, MN, MI, AZ, FL, GA, OH)", "description": "A 166-page ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) FOIA production released Oct. 7, 2026 by Democracy Forward shows HSI treated suspected noncitizen registration and voting as a \"strategic line of effort\" ahead of the 2026 midterms. A June 1 HSI report says investigators ingested about 50.6 million voter-roll records from a Justice Department dataset and another 48.4 million records that Heather Honey (now a senior DHS/ICE adviser) obtained from \"independent sources of information,\" plus 26,235 USCIS-derived records. Listed priority states include Texas, Pennsylvania, California, New Jersey, Minnesota, Michigan, Arizona, Florida, Georgia and Ohio. Weekly reports describe a network-based approach aimed at voter-registration nonprofits, and HSI considered undercover agents, initially in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Democracy Forward and Democracy Docket also report that state voter-roll data may have been loaded into Palantir's ELITE immigration-enforcement app and that HSI may be examining voting machines in \"counties with 2020 results\"; those two points are not independently confirmed. The roughly 99 million figure counts records, not unique people or confirmed noncitizens, and ProPublica's review of HSI records found few leads converted into prosecutions. Oct. 15 update: the League of Women Voters, the Electronic Privacy Information Center and LULAC, represented by Democracy Forward and CREW, sued DHS in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia over its collection, maintenance and use of voter registration records from at least 47 states. The complaint cites the same HSI ingest totals (about 50.6 million records via DOJ and about 48.4 million from other sources as of June 2026), alleges the records were combined with commercial data-broker information including Social Security numbers, and seeks to halt the program, bar use or sharing of the data and require deletion of unlawfully collected records (Democracy Forward; LWV; Democracy Docket; AP). Status Partially confirmed: the record counts and priority-state list come from the FOIA documents and are corroborated by Scripps News and Democracy Docket; the Palantir and voting-machine items are Alleged. Democracy Forward is an advocacy litigant and its framing is partisan. This card documents a federal voter-roll data effort and does not establish how many registrants, if any, are ineligible. Related: Pennsylvania noncitizen-voter crackdown (ei-2026-10-008), Nevada DHS-flagged voters (ei-2026-09-020), Maricopa SAVE/MVD referrals (ei-2026-09-024), DOJ Georgia voter-roll suit (ei-2026-09-025).", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Forward — Records detailing ICE HSI voter-record effort (Oct. 7, 2026; advocacy/FOIA requester)", "url": "https://democracyforward.org/news/press-releases/democracy-forward-obtains-groundbreaking-records-detailing-ices-attempts-to-silence-voters/"}, {"title": "Scripps News — Records show ICE reviewed tens of millions of voter records looking for noncitizen voters", "url": "https://www.scrippsnews.com/politics/immigration/records-show-ice-reviewed-tens-of-millions-of-voter-records-looking-for-noncitizen-voters"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — ICE amassed millions of voter records in sweeping fraud hunt, documents reveal", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/ice-amassed-millions-of-voter-records-in-sweeping-fraud-hunt-documents-reveal/"}, {"title": "ProPublica — HSI noncitizen-voting investigations produced few prosecutions", "url": "https://www.propublica.org/article/noncitizen-voting-trump-homeland-security-investigations"}, {"title": "Democracy Forward — Voting-rights and privacy organizations sue over DHS collection of voter records (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://democracyforward.org/news/press-releases/voting-rights-and-privacy-organizations-sue-trump-vance-administration-over-secretive-collection-of-millions-of-americans-voter-records/"}, {"title": "League of Women Voters — press release on suit against DHS voter-record collection (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.lwv.org/newsroom/press-releases/voting-rights-and-privacy-organizations-sue-trump-vance-administration-over"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — case page: DHS voter data collection challenge (D.D.C.)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/dhs-voter-data-collection-challenge/"}, {"title": "AP — Lawsuit challenges DHS voter-data collection (Oct. 15, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/lawsuit-dhs-voter-data-privacy-noncitizens-election-98365a44e96e46de14ad44e62ac7dd70"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — ICE/HSI voter-record ingestion (ei-2026-10-009)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: LWV/EPIC/LULAC v. DHS filed Oct. 15 in D.D.C.; EMon status emerging to active. Advocacy-litigant sources labeled; stays Partially confirmed. EMon ei-2026-10-009 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-07; EMon status emerging, confidence high). Record counts from FOIA production corroborated by Scripps + Democracy Docket; Palantir ELITE use and HSI voting-machine examination Alleged. X trending headline not used as a primary source. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration; Registration > NGO's performing voter registration (HSI targeting of registration groups). Watch DHS/ICE response, state SOS reactions, Palantir confirmation, any undercover probes. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's...'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's instruction?)' to 'Illegal Immigration > Protections against this are inadequate (most likely by design).'.", "related": ["ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "multi-paquette-2026-jiw-system-reliability-clone-rates-ny-az-ga-wi-vs-ks-ok", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-08", "uid": "C20261014-201922-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-08", "old_ids": ["multi-paquette-2026-jiw-system-reliability-clone-rates-ny-az-ga-wi-vs-ks-ok"], "seq": "C01404", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-04", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Andrew Paquette's \"System Reliability Analysis: Impact of Structural Anomalies in State Voter Registration Systems\" was published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Information Warfare (Vol. 25, No. 2, 2026, pp. 126–144; expanded from an ICCWS 2025 conference paper). Its abstract reports irreconcilable state–county record discrepancies, widespread record duplication (cloning), retroactive historical modifications, and algorithmically obscured data relationships that, it argues, leave these systems unable to reliably track voter participation regardless of cause. Paquette's announcement summarizes estimated excess voter IDs of about 1.47 million in New York (6.9%), 590,530 in Arizona (8.6%), 588,323 in Georgia (8.1%), and 437,228 in Wisconsin (5.6%), versus 0.06% in Kansas and 0.20% in Oklahoma, states where he found no complex statewide ID algorithm. Status Partially confirmed: peer-reviewed synthesis; state clone counts are the author's estimates and are officially disputed where states have responded (e.g., New York's 2023 rebuttal; Georgia's 2026 State Auditor found 1,210 duplicate registrants, not hundreds of thousands). Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Journal of Information Warfare — System Reliability Analysis: Impact of Structural Anomalies in State Voter Registration Systems (Vol. 25 No. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.jinfowar.com/journal/volume-25-issue-2/system-reliability-analysis-impact-structural-anomalies-state-voter-registration-systems"}, {"title": "ICCWS 2025 — conference version", "url": "https://papers.academic-conferences.org/index.php/iccws/article/view/3496"}, {"title": "Paquette (Substack) — Peer-reviewed article #7 is out (Apr. 21, 2026; per-state figures)", "url": "https://zarkfiles.substack.com/p/peer-reviewed-article-7-is-out"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Partially confirmed. Per-state numbers from the author's announcement (the full article was not read)."}
{"id": "fed-2026-04-actblue-legal-compliance-exodus-misled-congress", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-03", "uid": "C20261020-221915-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-03", "old_ids": ["fed-2026-04-actblue-legal-compliance-exodus-misled-congress"], "seq": "C01476", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-04-20", "state": "Federal", "description": "On April 2, 2026, The New York Times reported that ActBlue's own outside lawyers had warned that CEO Regina Wallace-Jones's 2023 response to Congress may have overstated how the platform vetted foreign donations. On April 20, 2026, the House Administration, Judiciary and Oversight Committees released \"Fraud on ActBlue, Part II,\" which found from subpoenaed documents that by March 2025 every member of ActBlue's legal and compliance team had resigned, been fired or gone on extended leave, including Associate General Counsel Aaron Ting, who quit abruptly. The five current or former ActBlue employees deposed by the committees invoked their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in response to every substantive question, 146 times in total. The committees concluded that the departures followed ActBlue's \"knowing and willful\" acceptance of illegal foreign contributions and a cover-up; that conclusion is the majority staff's characterization and has not been adjudicated. Status Partially confirmed: the departures, the Fifth Amendment invocations and the outside counsel's warning are documented; the claim of knowing and willful acceptance of illegal foreign money is not established. Catalog point: the people responsible for checking whether money on the platform was lawful left the platform, and those deposed declined to answer questions under oath.", "sources": [{"title": "The New York Times — ActBlue May Have Misled Congress on Vetting Foreign Donations, Its Lawyers Warned (April 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2026/04/02/us/politics/actblue-democrat-fundraising-foreign-donations.html"}, {"title": "archive.ph — copy of the New York Times article", "url": "https://archive.ph/yAd2P"}, {"title": "House Committees — Fraud on ActBlue, Part II (April 20, 2026)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/2026-04/04-20-26-FRAUD-ON-ACTBLUE-PART-II.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-04-actblue-legal-compliance-exodus-misled-congress__house-04-20-26-fraud-on-actblue-part-ii.pdf"}, {"title": "Committee on House Administration — New Report Details Illicit Foreign Donations and Mass Resignations at ActBlue (April 20, 2026)", "url": "https://cha.house.gov/2026/4/new-report-details-illicit-foreign-donations-and-mass-resignations-at-actblue"}, {"title": "Committee on House Administration — Chairmen's statement following the Times report (April 2026)", "url": "https://republicans-cha.house.gov/2026/4/chairmen-steil-jordan-and-comer-issue-statement-following-new-york-times-reporting-that-actblue-may-have-misled-congress"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. This card concerns foreign-donation vetting rather than smurfing itself, but it bears on whether the platform screens who is actually giving. Figures verified in the Part II PDF text. NYT may block the archiver; use the archive.ph copy."}
{"id": "tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected", "permanent_id": "C20261021-140608-03", "uid": "C20261021-140608-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-140608-03", "old_ids": ["tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected"], "seq": "C01512", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-03-03", "state": "TX", "description": "On Election Day of the March 3, 2026 Texas primaries, Dallas County voted at assigned precincts after the county Republican Party opted out of countywide polling sites. According to the county Democratic chair's emergency petition to extend voting hours, the Texas Secretary of State's online voter lookup gave incorrect polling-place information to some Dallas County voters through the morning and into the afternoon, a warning banner was added only later, and check-in pollbooks were not updated with the correct voting locations. County data obtained by Votebeat show that at least 12,674 voters went to the wrong site and were sent text messages redirecting them, and Elections Administrator Paul Adams said poll workers redirected others who are not counted. Commissioner Andy Sommerman said some voters gave up. A district judge extended voting by two hours, the Texas Supreme Court stayed that order, and provisional ballots cast after 7 p.m. were not counted. Earlier, in February, Votebeat reported that problems with the state's TEAM voter registration system, overhauled in July 2025, together with mid-decade redistricting had delayed the voter registration certificates that tell voters their precinct, and the Brennan Center reported that online databases with precinct assignments lacked accurate information. Status Partially confirmed: that the state lookup gave incorrect polling-place information and that check-in pollbooks showed wrong locations are the petitioner's claims in a court filing, not official findings; the county data reported by Votebeat show at least 12,674 voters at the wrong site, and Votebeat ties that to the elimination of countywide polling sites; the specific claim that TEAM misassigned voters' precincts, and therefore ballot styles, is not stated by an official source. No intent is alleged. Catalog point: according to the petition, the state's public lookup and the county pollbooks gave voters wrong polling locations, and a voter could not tell which source was right. The alleged failure was in the shared data, not in precinct voting; a printed precinct list checked before Election Day exposes such errors in advance.", "sources": [{"title": "Dallas County Democratic Party v. Adams — Emergency petition to extend polling hours (March 3, 2026; via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/1-2026-03-03-Emergency-petition-to-extend-voting-hours.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected__dallas-dems-emergency-petition-2026-03-03.pdf"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune / Votebeat — Thousands of Dallas County voters went to wrong polling site (March 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2026/03/24/dallas-county-primary-polling-locations-texas/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected__texastribune-votebeat-2026-03-24.html"}, {"title": "KERA — At least 13,000 Dallas County residents showed up at the wrong primary polling place (March 17, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-21, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.kera.org/2026/03/17/at-least-13000-dallas-county-residents-showed-up-at-the-wrong-primary-polling-place/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Texans' voter registration cards delayed for 2026 elections (Feb. 5, 2026; TEAM and redistricting)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2026/02/05/voter-registration-card-mailing-delayed-by-redistricting-team-problem/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected__votebeat-team-certificates-2026-02-05.html"}, {"title": "Brennan Center — Chaos and Voter Suppression in the Texas Primary (March 2026)", "url": "https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/chaos-and-voter-suppression-texas-primary", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected__brennan-texas-primary.html"}, {"title": "NAACP — Statement following primary election chaos in Dallas and Williamson Counties, Texas (March 2026)", "url": "https://naacp.org/articles/naacp-releases-statement-following-primary-election-chaos-dallas-and-williamson-counties", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-dallas-2026-03-primary-wrong-polling-place-data-12674-redirected__naacp-statement.html"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), reply to Mark Cook listing Texas ballot-on-demand failures (Oct. 21, 2026, 1:54 PM ET; no media)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112965849451827224", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--reply__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Lead: Mark Cook, 2026-10-21 2:00 PM ET, X post by Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm, Texas citizen auditor) 2112965849451827224, a reply to Mark's questions in her Bexar thread (root 2112933307159609699). Mark asked that each issue in the post be handled separately. Issue 4 of the post. Peer TEAM cards: tx-2026-team-civix-registrations-stuck-pending-gregg-346 and tx-2026-texas-gov-address-validation-error-15000-updates-backlog-civix (Outsourcing leaf); this card sits on No data consistency because the documented failure is disagreement among the state lookup, the pollbooks and the actual assignments. The Brennan and NAACP pieces are advocacy sources and are cited only for what they report. Archived: petition PDF (8.1 MB, under the 25 MiB limit), Tribune, Votebeat, Brennan, NAACP, X capture. KERA 403. No vendor named in the sources (Civix is not named in these sources). Nothing redacted. Moved 2026-10-26 (Mark pt445u) from 5 > Voter Rolls > \"No data consistency\" (the placement reason given above is superseded) to 6 > Polling Places > \"Incorrect or altered polling-location data\".", "related": ["ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies", "fl-2026-vr-systems-php-flaw-county-voter-lookup-tools-offline-nine-hours", "pa-2026-knowink-pollpad-4-2-1-sure-extract-vendor-conversion-data-inconsistencies-no-epulse-during-polling"]}
{"id": "mi-macomb-2026-q3-nine-self-reported-noncitizen-jurors-on-rolls-one-voted", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-17", "uid": "C20261019-123505-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-17", "old_ids": ["mi-macomb-2026-q3-nine-self-reported-noncitizen-jurors-on-rolls-one-voted"], "seq": "C01448", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2026-01 to 2026-10-16", "state": "MI", "description": "On Oct. 16, 2026, The Daily Signal reported new figures from the Macomb County, Michigan Clerk's Office: in the third quarter of 2026, 236 people summoned for jury duty, out of about 20,000 summonses, identified themselves as noncitizens; nine of them were registered to vote, and one had a voting history. County Clerk Anthony Forlini said he turned the information over to the Michigan Secretary of State's office. According to the report, the county website listed 40 earlier self-reported noncitizens on the rolls from 2025 through the second quarter of 2026, five with a voting history. The jury pool is drawn from Secretary of State driver's license and state ID records, which noncitizens can hold. When Forlini first raised the issue in January, Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson called the announcement \"reckless,\" and her office's review confirmed four of the people were noncitizens and three were citizens (Daily Signal). In May, a Secretary of State spokesperson said the office could not yet confirm any referred person was a noncitizen while records were under review, but that referral to the Bureau of Elections is the process it encourages (Macomb Daily). Forlini is the Republican candidate for Secretary of State. Status Partially confirmed: the clerk's referral program is documented by the county's own releases, and the state's January review reportedly confirmed some flagged people were noncitizens; the third-quarter figures are self-reports not yet verified by the state, and no charges have been announced for them. Catalog point: a county found possible noncitizen registrations only because its jury questionnaire asks the question that registration did not verify. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, and local checks like this one, catch records the state system lets through.", "sources": [{"title": "The Daily Signal — More noncitizens found on Michigan voter rolls (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/10/16/exclusive-more-noncitizens-found-on-michigan-voter-rolls-ahead-of-high-stakes-election/"}, {"title": "Just The News — Michigan county finds more noncitizens on voter rolls (Oct. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/government/congress/michigan-county-finds-more-noncitizens-voter-rolls-ahead-election"}, {"title": "Macomb County Clerk — Clerk alarmed about citizenship affecting jury (Jan. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.macombgov.org/departments/clerk-register-deeds/news/macomb-county-clerk-alarmed-about-citizenship-affecting-jury"}, {"title": "Macomb Daily via Macomb County Clerk (May 13, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://macombgovdocs.org/clerk/pdfs/news/2026-05-13-macomb-daily.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Macomb jurors self-reported noncitizens on rolls (ei-2026-10-056)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-056 (first_seen 2026-10-16; EMon status emerging, confidence medium; official_error unknown). County pages, Macomb Daily PDF and Just The News curl 200; Daily Signal 403. Daily Signal and Just The News are right-leaning outlets reporting the clerk's figures, and the clerk is a candidate. Cross-leaf: Motor-Voter gateway (driver's license and ID records)."}
{"id": "nj-paquette-2025-jiw-shift-cipher-102854-problem-records", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-07", "uid": "C20261014-201922-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-07", "old_ids": ["nj-paquette-2025-jiw-shift-cipher-102854-problem-records"], "seq": "C01403", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025", "state": "NJ", "description": "Andrew Paquette's article \"New Jersey Voter ID Numbers Reconfigured with Shift Cipher\" was published in the peer-reviewed Journal of Information Warfare (Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2025; preprint January 2025, also hosted by GodsFiveStones.com). The abstract reports complex obfuscation patterns, including shift ciphers, in New Jersey's public-facing voter ID numbers, and approximately 102,854 potentially erroneous or falsified records. The abstract itself says no direct link was found between those problem records and the algorithmic modifications, and that the purpose of the obfuscation is unclear. Status Partially confirmed: peer-reviewed publication documenting the record problems; the fraud-enabling purpose is the author's concern, not an official finding, and no New Jersey Division of Elections response was located. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Journal of Information Warfare — New Jersey Voter ID Numbers Reconfigured with Shift Cipher (Paquette, Vol. 24 Issue 1)", "url": "https://www.jinfowar.com/journal/volume-24-issue-1/new-jersey-voter-id-numbers-reconfigured-shift-cipher"}, {"title": "GodsFiveStones — NJ report PDF", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/AP-NJ-Report.pdf"}, {"title": "ResearchGate — New Jersey Voter ID Numbers Reconfigured with Shift Cipher", "url": "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388195111_New_Jersey_Voter_ID_Numbers_Reconfigured_with_Shift_Cipher"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Partially confirmed (peer-reviewed; author's own abstract disclaims a direct link). Peer: nj-2020-x-jencie3131 citizen card."}
{"id": "tx-sos-2025-save-2724-potential-noncitizens-578-later-proved-citizenship", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-04", "uid": "C20261016-123449-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-04", "old_ids": ["tx-sos-2025-save-2724-potential-noncitizens-578-later-proved-citizenship"], "seq": "C01423", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Allows creation of voter registration records that need not be tied to a real citizen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-44", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-10-20 to 2026-09-15", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 20, 2025, the Texas Secretary of State announced that it had run the entire voter list of more than 18 million registrants through the USCIS SAVE database and identified 2,724 potential noncitizens registered to vote. The files went to county registrars for investigation under Election Code Chapter 16 (notice; cancellation if no proof of citizenship within 30 days). An earlier SAVE review of the November 2024 election had produced 33 referrals to the Attorney General in June 2025. On Sept. 15, 2026, Secretary of State Robert Howden referred 117 cases of potential noncitizen voting to the Attorney General ahead of the Nov. 3, 2026 election. The office reported that a DPS manual review and county follow-up had narrowed the list: 578 of the 2,724 had demonstrated citizenship, 506 of them because passport data was added to SAVE after the initial run, and counties were told to reinstate those registrations. Status Partially confirmed: official SAVE hits and AG referrals are confirmed, while individual noncitizen findings are still under investigation, and the record shows the federal check itself produced hundreds of false positives. Catalog note: the 2025–2026 Texas record shows both sides of the problem. Registrations not tied to verified citizens were on the rolls, and the centralized database used to find them was itself lagging. Both are reasons to favor in-person precinct voting and public hand counts, where humans verify humans.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Texas Completes Citizenship Verifications in the SAVE Database (Oct. 20, 2025; 2,724 potential noncitizens)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2025/102025.shtml"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Refers 117 Cases for Investigation of Noncitizen Voting (Sept. 15, 2026; 578 proved citizenship, 506 via late passport data)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2026/091526.shtml"}, {"title": "TPR / The Texas Newsroom — Texas flags more than 2,700 'potential noncitizens' on voter rolls (Oct. 21, 2025)", "url": "https://www.tpr.org/news/2025-10-21/texas-flags-more-than-2-700-potential-noncitizens-on-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Texas SOS refers 117 noncitizen-voting cases (ei-2026-10-039)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/?id=ei-2026-10-039"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Partially confirmed. Distinct from tx-2024-abbott-6500-potential-noncitizens-removed-sos-581-confirmed (2024 DPS/jury data), which is the existing peer on this leaf. Sept. 15, 2026 referral is current pre-election activity (EMon-forward candidate in sweep notes). EMon added it as ei-2026-10-039 (first_seen 2026-10-16; confidence high; official_error no); 2026-10-16 PM ingest matched it to this card (same two TX SOS releases and figures) rather than creating a duplicate. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration > not adequate protections."}
{"id": "ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed", "permanent_id": "C20261020-165133-02", "uid": "C20261020-165133-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-165133-02", "old_ids": ["ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed"], "seq": "C01469", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fear and Discredit Tactics", "Target, attack, and discredit anyone who reports or discusses election crimes, making examples of them to deter others from reporting."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-30", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-10-16 to 2026-08-07", "state": "NY", "description": "On Oct. 16, 2025, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund (NYCA), executive director Marly Hornik, five volunteers and former U.S. Senate candidate Diane Sare sued Attorney General Letitia James, two of her staff, the State Board of Elections and eleven Board officials in the Northern District of New York (NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund, Inc. v. James, No. 1:25-cv-1447). The complaint alleges that after NYCA petitioned the Board in May 2022 with more than 5,000 signatures about mismatches between 2020 vote totals and NYSVoter voter history, and reported apparent voter-ID manipulation to the State Police, the FBI and the Legislature without any response, officials retaliated with a statewide \"False Claims Explained\" letter, an \"election imposters\" warning, a cease-and-desist letter that reached the press first, an 11-month investigation citing the Ku Klux Klan Act, and written statements calling NYCA's work \"malicious\" and \"embellished.\" It also alleges that two FOIL requests for NYSVoter audit logs were denied. On Aug. 7, 2026, U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino denied the State's motion to dismiss NYCA's First Amendment free-speech and petition claims against the officials in their individual capacities. The court found that NYCA plausibly alleged retaliatory motive, citing the timing of the Board and Attorney General actions and the remark the complaint attributes to Co-Executive Director Kristen Zebrowski Stavisky at a Sept. 6, 2023 public meeting that the Board was \"on the offensive now.\" It also found plausible concrete harm in NYCA's allegations of \"financial exhaustion and an exodus of volunteers, which essentially shut down NYCA.\" The court dismissed the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and the official-capacity claims for lack of jurisdiction, dismissed the voter-intimidation claim under 52 U.S.C. § 10101(b) with prejudice for lack of a private right of action, dismissed the defamation, due-process and Composition Clause claims, and dismissed the Board itself and Co-Chair Henry Berger. The defendants were ordered to answer the two surviving claims. Status Partially confirmed: a federal judge has held that the retaliation account states a plausible claim, but that is a pleading-stage ruling on the complaint's allegations, and no finding on the merits has been made.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court, N.D.N.Y. — Memorandum-Decision and Order, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund, Inc. v. James, No. 1:25-cv-1447 (MAD/MJK), Dkt. 23 (Aug. 7, 2026; Justia copy)", "url": "https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyndce/1:2025cv01447/150584/23/0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__ndny-mdo-2026-08-07.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — docket page for Document 23, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund v. James (N.D.N.Y. 2026)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nyndce/1:2025cv01447/150584/23/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — New York Voter Roll Maintenance Challenge, NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund v. James (case page; updates through Aug. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/new-york-voter-roll-maintenance-challenge/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__democracydocket-case.html"}, {"title": "Law.com — Decision digest: NY Citizens Audit Civic Fund Inc. v. James (2026)", "url": "https://www.law.com/almID/1786545751NY125CV14/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__lawcom-digest.html"}, {"title": "NY Attorney General — Memorandum of law in support of motion to dismiss (Dec. 23, 2025)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/15-1-2025-12-23-NYs-memorandum-of-law-in-support-of-motion-to-dismiss.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__ny-mtd-memo-2025-12-23.pdf"}, {"title": "Andrew Paquette (Zark Files) — NYCA fights back (Oct. 22, 2025)", "url": "https://zarkfiles.substack.com/p/nyca-fights-back", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__zarkfiles-nyca-fights-back.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — RealAmericaVote, \"Press Conference on lawsuit filed against Letitia James, NYSAG and NYSBOE\" (press conference held Oct. 28, 2025, 2 PM ET, Hay-Adams Hotel, Washington, D.C.; Rumble description says Oct. 29; 1:16:04)", "url": "https://rumble.com/v71096s-press-conference-on-lawsuit-filed-against-letitia-james-nysag-and-nysboe.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-nyca-press-conference-2025-10-28.png"}, {"title": "Rumble — LindellTV, \"The Case Against Letitia James\" (streamed Oct. 29, 2025, 1:00 PM EDT; Cara Castronuova with Marly Hornik; 1:17:43)", "url": "https://rumble.com/v70yad8-the-case-against-letitia-james.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-case-against-letitia-james-2025-10-28.png"}, {"title": "X — RealAmerica.Vote (@RealAmericaVote), \"Join us live TODAY at 2pm Eastern time!\" with press-conference flyer: Oct. 28, 2025, 2:00 PM, Hay-Adams Hotel (posted Oct. 28, 2025, 12:03 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/RealAmericaVote/status/1983203061716939196", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__realamericavote-x-post-2025-10-28-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "Joe Hoft — LIVESTREAM Today at 2PM Eastern Announcing NY Citizens Audit vs. Letitia James (Oct. 28, 2025)", "url": "https://joehoft.com/livestream-today-at-2pm-eastern-announcing-ny-citizens-audit-vs-letitia-james/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__joehoft-livestream-2025-10-28.html"}, {"title": "Gab — NC ForGab (@nc4gab), \"Welcome to blink/once\" link hub for New York Citizens Audit / United Sovereign Americans material (first posted May 21, 2023; revised May 26, 2026) — lead source only", "url": "https://gab.com/nc4gab/posts/110409012711518164", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__gab-nc4gab-hub.json"}], "notes": "nc4gab Gab archive review (2026-10-20). 2025-2026 case; flagged for EMon. The Archiver captured both Rumble videos on 2026-10-24 (full-page screenshots and posters published; the MP4s, 1.18 GB and 1.56 GB, exceed the 25 MiB Cloudflare limit and are archived off-line in local-archives-offline/2026/10/). Date check 2026-10-24: the RealAmerica.Vote press conference was held Tuesday, Oct. 28, 2025 at 2 PM ET (its own flyer and X post that day, and Joe Hoft's Oct. 28 livestream notice); the Rumble description's \"Oct 29, 2025\" reflects the upload, not the event. The Lindell TV segment was streamed Oct. 29, 2025 at 1:00 PM EDT, so that source is dated Oct. 29. Unlisted Vimeo copies (embedding disabled) were added 2026-10-24; each appears as a \"Watch archived copy (Vimeo)\" link directly under its video poster; the Vimeo titles say \"Oct 29 2025\". File names keep the Archiver's 2025-10-28 slug. The Gab hub is a lead source only. Nothing redacted.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/v71096s-press-conference-on-lawsuit-filed-against-letitia-james-nysag-and-nysboe.html", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-nyca-press-conference-2025-10-28.poster.jpg", "duration_s": 4563.909, "bytes": 1177507307, "sha256": "3e48f2bfc56bb79d0536f62799b1d8b8a929016ca6ad850f6907c2b5e8bc391c", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-nyca-press-conference-2025-10-28.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-nyca-press-conference-2025-10-28.json"}, {"original_url": "https://rumble.com/v70yad8-the-case-against-letitia-james.html", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-case-against-letitia-james-2025-10-28.poster.jpg", "duration_s": 4662.791, "bytes": 1557855875, "sha256": "ccbf7a7738057979ff753fbf5b85fe13ec48bd082b8bbf049d2a9dc297e4e202", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-case-against-letitia-james-2025-10-28.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ny-2025-nyca-v-james-ndny-first-amendment-retaliation-claims-proceed__rumble-case-against-letitia-james-2025-10-28.json"}]}
{"id": "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-02", "uid": "C20261028-132233-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-02", "old_ids": ["ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations"], "seq": "C01597", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-10-07 to 2025-10-13", "state": "CA", "description": "Before the Nov. 4, 2025, Proposition 50 special election, Sacramento County voters raised concerns that the holes in the mail-ballot return envelope could show their vote. CBS13 reported on Oct. 7, 2025, that voter Allen Wegat said: \"If someone were unscrupulous and didn't like how I voted, they could double-mark it, which would invalidate my vote... It makes it too easy for bad actors.\" County spokesperson Ken Casparis told CBS13, \"It is a non-issue,\" and said the county had received \"a handful of emails.\" [2] In its written response, Sacramento County said there are \"at least eight ways to insert a ballot card into the return envelope, and only two of these might result in a bubble being visible through the hole,\" and also said, \"There is no way to determine how a voter voted through this small hole.\" The ballot card had a single question printed on one side; the county advised folding the blank side outward and said the holes, introduced in 2008, serve as a tactile guide and let staff confirm that all ballot cards were removed. [1] On Oct. 12, 2025, Libs of TikTok posted on X: \"If California voters vote 'NO' on Gavin Newscum's redistricting plan, it will show their answer through a hole in the envelope. All Democrats do is cheat\" (6,073,331 views when archived); the video it quoted, from the account Bubblebathgirl, now returns 404. [3][4] The Secretary of State's Oct. 13 response is on the California FAQ card. Status Partially confirmed: the county itself admits a bubble may be visible in two of eight orientations, which supports the voters' concern; the claim that this was a scheme to cheat is unsupported, and no source shows any ballot was discarded or altered.", "sources": [{"title": "Sacramento County — Response to Special Election Ballot Envelope Posts (Oct. 2025)", "url": "https://www.saccounty.gov/content/saccounty/us/en/articles/2025-articles/response-to-special-election-ballot-envelope-posts.html"}, {"title": "CBS13 Sacramento (Steve Large) — Sacramento County ballot envelope holes raise concerns ahead of Prop 50 election (Oct. 7, 2025)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/sacramento-county-ballot-envelope-holes-concerns-prop-50-election/"}, {"title": "Libs of TikTok on X — Prop 50 envelope-hole post (Oct. 12, 2025, 9:40 PM ET; 6,073,331 views at capture; quoted post by Bubblebathgirl now returns 404)", "url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/1977550033001042028", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Archived X post metadata (fxtwitter JSON) for the Libs of TikTok Prop 50 post", "url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/1977550033001042028", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. The brief refers to the CBS13 segment as \"The Hole Problem\"; the article text was verified, the on-air graphic was not re-checked.", "related": ["ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope", "ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought", "az-ars-16-545-return-envelopes-must-not-reveal-selections-or-party"]}
{"id": "la-sos-2025-save-390-noncitizens-registered-79-voted-preliminary", "permanent_id": "C20261016-123449-03", "uid": "C20261016-123449-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-123449-03", "old_ids": ["la-sos-2025-save-390-noncitizens-registered-79-voted-preliminary"], "seq": "C01422", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-09-04", "state": "LA", "description": "At a Sept. 4, 2025 news conference, Louisiana Secretary of State Nancy Landry announced \"preliminary findings\" of an investigation her office opened in May 2025 after gaining access to the federal SAVE database. Investigators ran nearly all of the roughly 2.9 million registered voters through SAVE, worked with the FBI to confirm citizenship status, and reviewed voting records back to the 1980s. Landry said they identified 390 noncitizens on the voter rolls, 79 of whom had voted in one or more elections. Letters were sent to those flagged, who can prove citizenship; nonresponders may be removed and referred for prosecution. Landry said noncitizen voting is \"not a systemic problem\" in Louisiana, but noted that local races can turn on a handful of votes (her own first race in 2007 was decided by 33 votes). She also acknowledged that some hits could reflect errors or outdated data. Status Partially confirmed: official preliminary findings with the investigation ongoing and individual cases not yet adjudicated. Catalog note: noncitizen registrations that sat on the rolls for years and produced votes are exactly the kind of record a centralized roll keeps issuing ballots to. Precinct-level in-person voting with ID, counted by hand in public, narrows that window.", "sources": [{"title": "Louisiana Illuminator — Louisiana election investigation finds 79 noncitizens have voted since 1980s (Sept. 4, 2025)", "url": "https://lailluminator.com/2025/09/04/louisiana-election-investigation-finds-79-noncitizens-have-voted-since-1980s/"}, {"title": "Louisiana Radio Network — Investigation by the Louisiana Secretary of State's Office determines that 79 non-citizens have voted (Sept. 5, 2025)", "url": "https://louisianaradionetwork.com/2025/09/05/43508/"}, {"title": "NPR — Trump's SAVE system checks citizenship of millions of voters (Sept. 10, 2025; Louisiana 390/79 figures)", "url": "https://www-s1.npr.org/2025/09/10/nx-s1-5477367/save-election-citizenship-data-trump"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-16 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Partially confirmed (Landry's 'preliminary findings'; investigation ongoing; no interviews of those flagged as of the announcement). Peer to the Iowa SOS 2025 card on this leaf. Not InfluenceWatch/FairVote."}
{"id": "fed-2025-05-27-ap-trump-committees-winred-problematic-donations", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-21", "uid": "C20261020-221915-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-21", "old_ids": ["fed-2025-05-27-ap-trump-committees-winred-problematic-donations"], "seq": "C01494", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-05-27", "state": "Federal", "description": "On May 27, 2025, an Associated Press review of five years of donations to President Trump's political committees found 1,600 contributions from donors who live abroad, have close ties to foreign interests, or failed to disclose basic information, \"often making it difficult, if not impossible, to identify them and verify the legality of their donations.\" AP found only two of more than 200 overseas donors whose U.S. citizenship was listed as verified, more than 1,000 contributions from 150 donors who omitted their city, state, address or country, and at least 90 from donors listed without a full name or as \"anonymous,\" including four from \"999 Anonymous Dr.\" Many of these donors gave through WinRed. One donor, listed only as \"Alex, A,\" gave nearly $5,000 through WinRed in more than 40 separate transactions in 2024, listing a vacant former funeral home in Washington as the address; a Chinese businessman's $5,000 WinRed gift listed a La Quinta Inn in California as his address. Only about three dozen of the contributions were rejected, mostly unknown-source cryptocurrency payments. WinRed did not respond to AP's request for comment, and the White House pointed instead to the House findings on ActBlue. Status Partially confirmed: the contributions and their missing or implausible donor information are documented in the campaigns' own FEC reports, but no finding has been made that any of them was a straw or foreign contribution. Catalog point: the same unverified-identity gap cited against ActBlue appears in WinRed contributions.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Trump wants an investigation of Democrats' fundraising. His own campaign has issues (May 27, 2025)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-actblue-winred-fundraising-justice-department-3e73d4022bb47e0533f9dcfd35d37371"}, {"title": "PBS News — same AP report (May 27, 2025; readable copy)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/trump-wants-to-investigate-democrats-fundraising-but-his-own-campaign-has-issues", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-05-27-ap-trump-committees-winred-problematic-donations__pbs-trump-wants-to-investigate-democrats-fundraising-but-his-own-campaign-has-is.html"}, {"title": "The Washington Post (AP) — Takeaways: Trump's campaign has received scores of donations from problematic donors (May 27, 2025)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2025/05/27/trump-campaign-donations-actblue-winred/ebea8cce-3ab0-11f0-912d-d5f4792db3e4_story.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue/WinRed smurfing research 2026-10-20. WinRed card. Facts verified in the PBS copy of the AP text (AP itself blocks curl). The \"Alex, A\" entry is the closest WinRed example of the many-small-gifts pattern under an unverifiable identity."}
{"id": "organized-charter-bus-protest-transport-common-practice-not-proof-paid", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-06", "uid": "C20260926-001426-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-06", "old_ids": ["organized-charter-bus-protest-transport-common-practice-not-proof-paid"], "seq": "C00599", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Bus-in tactics"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-26", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-04-11", "state": "Federal", "description": "PolitiFact and related fact-checks on viral 'Hands Off' / protest bus videos note that charter buses and coordinated travel are common legitimate organizing tools (participants often buy their own tickets) and are frequently misread as proof of paid plants. Status Partially confirmed: Bus-In / non-local organized transport is a real, documented political practice; equating every charter bus with paid artificial opposition remains Alleged/often false without further evidence.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Hands Off protest bus / paid-protester claims examined", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2025/apr/11/tweets/critics-of-hands-off-protests-mislead-with-photos/"}, {"title": "USA Today — 2016 fake-protest / paid-protester allegations alongside real marches", "url": "https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2016/11/12/fake-protests-anti-trump/93665092/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 3 companion. Weaker clue labeled Partially confirmed per Mark preference."}
{"id": "fec-mur-8248-2025-fgcr-ccm-scam-pac-trump-voice-attention-siphon-rtb", "permanent_id": "C20260926-025634-01", "uid": "C20260926-025634-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-025634-01", "old_ids": ["fec-mur-8248-2025-fgcr-ccm-scam-pac-trump-voice-attention-siphon-rtb"], "seq": "C01106", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Fake Groups", "Monopolize attention."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-44", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025-03-26", "state": "Federal", "description": "FEC MUR 8248 First General Counsel's Report (Mar. 26, 2025) and attached draft Factual & Legal Analysis document Campaign for a Conservative Majority (CCM) robocalls that opened with an unauthorized Trump voice-over and language that 'President Trump, along with [CCM] PAC, needs our support now,' while OGC recommends reason-to-believe findings for knowing/willful fraudulent misrepresentation under 52 U.S.C. §30124(b), missing independent-expenditure reports, and missing disclaimers—on a PAC that raised ~$473k in the 2020 cycle while routing large sums to treasurer-owned Expert Vendor and only ~11% to candidate contributions. Status Partially confirmed for the official OGC FGCR/F&LA enforcement record documenting the attention-siphon robocall pattern (Commission final vote/certification not asserted here); peer to OpenSecrets cycle inventory and CLC PAL/CCM complaint cards already on this leaf—FEC OGC escalation file, not those remounted. PEP framing: fake groups that monopolize donor attention divert energy from transparent hand-count reform.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — MUR 8248 First General Counsel's Report (Campaign for a Conservative Majority) (Mar. 26, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8248/8248_10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-mur-8248-2025-fgcr-ccm-scam-pac-trump-voice-attention-siphon-rtb__fec-mur-8248-fgcr-campaign-for-a-conservative-majority-scam-pac-allegations.pdf"}, {"title": "CLC — Uncovers Two 'Scam PACs' Defrauding Donors (PAL/CCM context) (Apr. 2024)", "url": "https://campaignlegal.org/update/clc-uncovers-two-scam-pacs-defrauding-donors"}], "notes": "Enrich-b16 third on Fake Groups Suck up attention leaf."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-010", "permanent_id": "C20261007-181236-02", "uid": "C20261007-181236-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-181236-02", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-010"], "seq": "C01284", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "No supply-chain control or chain of custody"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-38", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2025 to 2026-10-07", "state": "US (GA)", "description": "On Oct. 6, 2026, lawyer Cleta Mitchell and former Mesa County, Colorado clerk Tina Peters (convicted over a voting-system breach) publicly urged Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick to use supply-chain authority under the May 2019 ICT supply-chain executive order to seize or replace voting machines, arguing that foreign-made components make them a national-security risk. On Steve Bannon's War Room, Mitchell said Lutnick has \"not only the authority but the duty to act\" and called for the Dominion software in Georgia's systems to be replaced. The push follows a May 2026 Reuters report (via Global News) that the administration's election-security lead Kurt Olsen sought in 2025 to have Commerce declare Dominion components a security risk, an effort that stalled for lack of evidence; a teardown of seized Puerto Rico machines reportedly found known vulnerabilities but no Venezuelan-origin code. Legal experts cited by Democracy Docket say the cited authorities do not reach voting equipment owned and operated by state or local election officials. No Commerce action had been reported as of Oct. 7. Status Partially confirmed: the public calls (Democracy Docket, Media Matters) and the 2025 official inquiry (Reuters) are documented; the claim that foreign components have compromised U.S. voting machines is unsubstantiated, and the seizure proposal is Disputed on legal grounds. The underlying supply-chain concern (no controllable chain of custody for voting-system components) is the catalog leaf this card illustrates; a federal seizure is not a remedy any source supports, and paper ballots counted by hand remain a viable path that does not depend on vendor hardware. Related: Georgia SEB seeks DOJ/DHS help on Dominion update (ei-2026-10-001).", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — Cleta Mitchell and Tina Peters want Commerce Secretary to seize voting machines (Oct. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/election-deniers-cleta-mitchell-and-tina-peters-want-trumps-commerce-secretary-to-seize-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "Media Matters — Guests on Steve Bannon's podcast call on Commerce Secretary to act on voting machines", "url": "https://www.mediamatters.org/election-denial-voter-fraud-and-suppression/guests-steve-bannons-podcast-call-commerce-secretary"}, {"title": "Global News (Reuters) — Trump election-security lead sought Commerce action on voting-machine components (May 22, 2026)", "url": "https://globalnews.ca/news/11860433/trump-election-voting-machines-kurt-olsen-us-midterms/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Legal memo behind national voting-emergency claim; no authority to seize state machines", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/read-the-laughable-legal-memo-behind-the-claim-that-trump-can-declare-a-national-voting-emergency/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Commerce voting-machine seizure push (ei-2026-10-010)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-010 (first_seen 2026-05-22, last_updated 2026-10-07; EMon status emerging, confidence medium). Calls and 2025 inquiry documented; foreign-parts compromise claim unsubstantiated; seizure authority disputed by legal experts; no federal action. Cross-leaf: Electronic Voting Machines; Software > Update Scam (ei-2026-10-001). X trending headline not used as a primary source. Watch Commerce/BIS statement or order, Georgia SOS response, litigation.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "colorado-crs-1-7-5-106-mail-ballot-agent-relationship-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-14", "uid": "C20260926-000015-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-14", "old_ids": ["colorado-crs-1-7-5-106-mail-ballot-agent-relationship-companion"], "seq": "C00527", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["County Clerks' Association", "Instruct clerks that they serve as \"agents of the Secretary of State.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-67", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-67", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Election Code also creates specific agency relationships for mail-ballot administration (e.g., C.R.S. §1-7.5-106 family) alongside the general §1-1-110 duty to follow SOS rules—supporting the leaf's 'agents of the SOS' framing without proving CCCA trains clerks with that exact slogan. Status Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado public.law — C.R.S. §1-7.5-106 mail ballot duties", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7.5-106"}, {"title": "C.R.S. §1-1-110 companion (SOS rules/orders)", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-1-110"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 7 companion."}
{"id": "doj-crt-nvra-quiet-period-va-al-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-15", "uid": "C20260925-183614-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-15", "old_ids": ["doj-crt-nvra-quiet-period-va-al-2024"], "seq": "C00103", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-15", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "VA/AL", "description": "In 2024 the DOJ Civil Rights Division sued Virginia and Alabama over systematic voter-roll removals near the election under the National Voter Registration Act's 90-day quiet-period provision; federal courts issued preliminary relief, and the Virginia matter was later dropped after the 2025 administration change (Tennessee Star / DOJ case pages). The states had framed removals as noncitizen / ineligible-voter list maintenance. Status Partially confirmed: Confirmed DOJ/state litigation over noncitizen-related list-maintenance timing; not a finding that large-scale noncitizen voting occurred. Distinct from the June 2025 Orange County DOJ suit already logged.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ CRT — Cases Raising Claims Under The National Voter Registration Act", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-national-voter-registration-act"}, {"title": "CourtListener — U.S. memorandum opposing dismissal (E.D. Va. NVRA quiet-period suit)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.vaed.561386/gov.uscourts.vaed.561386.128.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-crt-nvra-quiet-period-va-al-2024__courtlistener-u-s-memorandum-opposing-dismissal-e-d-va-nvra.pdf"}, {"title": "Tennessee Star — Trump DOJ drops Biden-era Virginia noncitizen-removal suit (Jan 2025)", "url": "https://tennesseestar.com/justice/trump-doj-drops-biden-era-lawsuit-against-virginia-over-removing-noncitizens-from-voter-rolls/tpappert/2025/01/30/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/doj-crt-nvra-quiet-period-va-al-2024__tennessee-star-trump-doj-drops-biden-era-virginia-noncitizen.png"}], "notes": "Part A enrich doj-orange-county Illegal Immigration leaf. Litigation Confirmed; outcome Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "dvsorder-dominion-cvr-order-privacy-shuffle-guidance-contrast", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-22", "uid": "C20260925-212129-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-22", "old_ids": ["dvsorder-dominion-cvr-order-privacy-shuffle-guidance-contrast"], "seq": "C00319", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Randomize ballot order within batches, destroying the scan-order record and hiding manipulation patterns (Montgomery County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-27", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "USENIX Security 2024 DVSorder research showed Dominion ICP/ICE CVRs can retain reconstructible cast order threatening privacy — and recommends securely rerandomizing identifiers / shuffling records and images. That privacy guidance is the same operational class as batch/order randomization the leaf describes. Status Partially confirmed on this physical-batch leaf (primary finding is CVR/image order; related Records-leaf cards already cover CVR shuffle claims).", "sources": [{"title": "USENIX Security 2024 — DVSorder: Ballot Randomization Flaws", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-crimmins.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dvsorder-dominion-cvr-order-privacy-shuffle-guidance-contrast__usenix-security-2024-dvsorder-ballot-randomization-flaws.pdf"}, {"title": "DVSorder.org — vulnerability summary", "url": "https://dvsorder.org/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dvsorder-cvr-shuffle-privacy-guidance__dvsorder-org-the-dvsorder-vulnerability-cvr-order-privacy-sa.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 13 companion. Near-dupe note vs Records>randomize CVR cards — different leaf (physical batch order vs CVR privacy).", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-152500-01", "uid": "C20261020-152500-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-152500-01", "old_ids": ["ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video"], "seq": "C00993", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "KY", "description": "On Oct. 31, 2024, the first day of Kentucky's no-excuse in-person early voting, a voter at the Laurel County early-voting center (a courthouse annex in London, KY) recorded a roughly 16-second phone video of an ES&S ExpressVote touchscreen ballot-marking device and posted it on TikTok captioned \"Thoughts?? Kentucky.\" In the video, a finger presses the Donald J. Trump / J.D. Vance field several times with no response. On a later press, near the boundary below the small Trump checkbox, the screen highlights the Kamala D. Harris / Tim Walz field instead, and a two-finger press on the Trump and RFK Jr. fields leaves Harris highlighted. The clip went viral (Secretary of State Michael Adams put it at about 19 million TikTok views) and was reposted widely, including by Nick Sortor on X and, on Oct. 31, 2024, as the Rumble short \"Kentucky voting voting Machine Recorded not Allowing the Selection of Donald Trump\" (MJTruth channel). Official response: Laurel County Clerk Tony Brown (R) took the machine out of service the same day and called the Kentucky Attorney General's office. Brown said staff first could not reproduce the problem; an AG investigator came that evening, and after several minutes of trying \"it did occur... by hitting some area in between the boxes,\" after which they \"tried for several minutes to do it again and could not.\" Brown said the device is set for a voter to touch inside the whole candidate box, that there were no complaints before or after, and that the machine went back into service after the AG review. The State Board of Elections (Nov. 1, 2024) said the clerk could not get a press directly inside the Trump box to highlight Harris, but a press between the two fields did. It said the voter told the clerk she then highlighted Trump and all her choices, the ExpressVote printed a paper ballot with those selections, and she cast it in the ES&S DS200 scanner, showing staff the video only afterward. It said more than 1,700 Laurel County voters cast ballots that day with no other ExpressVote or DS200 complaints, and it told voters to press firmly in the middle of the candidate field. Adams's office called it an \"isolated incident\" of \"voter error\"; Adams wrote \"There is no 'vote-switching.'\" RNC co-chair Lara Trump said the GOP legal team called officials, who \"separated the machine, conducted proper testing, didn't find any errors.\" No recalibration, vendor finding or written AG report was made public. Comparable Kentucky reports: in the Nov. 2023 general election, LEX 18 found touchscreen reports in at least six of the 23 ExpressVote counties (Madison, Floyd, Powell, Johnson, Clay, Magoffin). Most were voters choosing straight-ticket Democrat who were shown straight-ticket Republican, and one Johnson County voter saw the reverse. ES&S notified all the counties about the touchscreen issue; officials said voters could correct their choices and the results were accurate. No other comparable 2024 Kentucky report was found. (The 2023 straight-ticket reports now have their own card on the straight-ticket leaf: ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican.) Status Partially confirmed: officials confirmed the touchscreen highlighted Harris when the screen was pressed between fields (reproduced once by the AG investigator), and the machine was pulled, examined and returned to service. Officials attributed it to touch placement (user error), not a calibration fault or tampering, and said no vote was affected: the voter's printed ballot showed her intended choices. Nothing established shows deliberate miscalibration or any changed vote. Catalog point: on a touchscreen, a wrong-candidate highlight caused by an innocent touch-placement or calibration error looks the same as a deliberately shifted touch target. Because the honest explanation is plausible, the same \"calibration/user error\" answer is available for any such report. Here the safeguard was the voter-verified paper ballot she reviewed before scanning; voters who do not check their printout would not catch an error the screen introduced.", "sources": [{"title": "Kentucky State Board of Elections — Statement Regarding Laurel County Viral Video (Nov. 1, 2024)", "url": "https://elect.ky.gov/Documents/SBE%20Statement%20Regarding%20Laurel%20County%20Viral%20Video.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__ky-sbe-statement-laurel-viral-video-2024-11-01.pdf"}, {"title": "Laurel County Clerk Tony Brown — Facebook update after AG investigator's visit (Oct. 31, 2024; Ghostarchive copy)", "url": "https://ghostarchive.org/archive/hr9y2"}, {"title": "Lexington Herald-Leader — Laurel Co. pulls ballot-marking machine after viral video claims Trump vote went to Harris (Oct. 31, 2024; updated Nov. 4)", "url": "https://www.kentucky.com/news/politics-government/article294842374.html"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — No, this video doesn't show Kentucky voting machines blocking votes for Trump (Nov. 1, 2024; Brown's Facebook posts quoted)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2024/nov/01/social-media/no-this-video-doesnt-show-kentucky-voting-machines/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__politifact.html"}, {"title": "FactCheck.org — Video Shows 'Voter Error,' Not 'Election Interference' in Kentucky (Nov. 2024; SOS spokesperson Michon Lindstrom)", "url": "https://www.factcheck.org/2024/11/video-shows-voter-error-not-election-interference-in-kentucky/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__factcheckorg.html"}, {"title": "Reuters Fact Check — Kentucky ballot marking machine issue misrepresented as proof of fraud (Nov. 5, 2024; machine returned to service after AG review)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/fact-check/kentucky-ballot-marking-machine-issue-misrepresented-proof-fraud-2024-11-05/"}, {"title": "AP News — Fact checking false and misleading claims about the 2024 election (Laurel County item: user error per Clerk Tony Brown)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/fact-check-misinformation-houston-rally-confrontation-99af1f80eb43d31966cae8e68dbc3415"}, {"title": "Kentucky Lantern — Kentuckians set early voting record ahead of Election Day (Nov. 4, 2024; SBE statement on Laurel County)", "url": "https://kentuckylantern.com/2024/11/04/kentuckians-set-early-voting-record-ahead-of-election-day-polls-open-at-6-a-m-tuesday/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__ky-lantern.html"}, {"title": "KET / PBS Kentucky Edition — Sec. Adams: Viral Voting Video is Misleading (Nov. 2024)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/video/sec-adams-viral-voting-video-is-misleading-tidww7/"}, {"title": "LEX 18 — At least 6 Kentucky counties saw reports of issues with ballot-marking machine touchscreens (Nov. 2023; comparable earlier ExpressVote reports)", "url": "https://www.lex18.com/news/kentucky-votes/at-least-6-kentucky-counties-saw-reports-of-issues-with-ballot-marking-machine-touchscreens", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__lex18-2023.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Kentucky voting voting Machine Recorded not Allowing the Selection of Donald Trump\" (short, uploaded Oct. 31, 2024 4:03 PM ET; 15 s; repost of the voter's TikTok)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5kz5uy", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-page-capture.png"}, {"title": "Rumble short — saved page HTML (archived 2026-10-20)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5kz5uy", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-page.html"}, {"title": "Rumble short — video file (720p MP4, unredacted)", "url": "https://hugh.cdn.rumble.cloud/video/s8/2/Q/b/T/h/QbThu.gaa.mp4", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.mp4"}, {"title": "Rumble short — poster frame (original size, unredacted)", "url": "https://hugh.cdn.rumble.cloud/video/s8/6/Q/b/T/h/QbThu.aG-v.1.jpg", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-poster-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Mark dropped the Rumble short 2026-10-20. It is a 2024 event, not a 2026 one (no EMon ping needed). Short v5kz5uy was uploaded 2024-10-31 20:03:19 UTC = 4:03 PM ET, 15.8 s, about 3.3K views. The channel is MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk), not TronAnon: TronAnon appears in the saved page only as another short in the feed. The footage matches the Laurel County voter's TikTok (\"Thoughts?? Kentucky\" overlay; KY ballot with State Rep. 89th District and 27th Judicial Circuit races). Machine: ES&S ExpressVote BMD with a DS200 scanner. Established: the screen highlighted Harris on a press between fields (reproduced once by the AG investigator); the machine was pulled, the AG examined it, and it went back into service; the voter's printed and cast ballot was correct per her statements to the clerk. Unproven/not reported: any calibration fault, recalibration or vendor diagnosis, a written AG finding, or any affected vote. Lara Trump's 'testing found no errors' is a secondhand account. The SBE's remarks about the voter tagging election-fraud influencers are kept only as context; the voter is unnamed here. Comparable: the 2023 six-county ExpressVote straight-ticket reports (LEX 18) now have their own card on the straight-ticket leaf (ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican, added 2026-10-20). Archived: Rumble page HTML, rendered capture PNG, MP4, and poster frame (orig + 320px WebP thumb), plus the SBE PDF and the PolitiFact, FactCheck.org, KY Lantern and LEX 18 pages. Herald-Leader and Reuters block curl (000/401) and are linked only. The Ghostarchive copy of Brown's Facebook post did not render without JS and is linked only. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-poster-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Rumble short poster frame: a finger pressing an ES&S ExpressVote touchscreen at the President and Vice President race, showing Donald J. Trump / J.D. Vance above Kamala D. Harris / Tim Walz, with a 'Thoughts?? Kentucky' caption overlay"}], "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote", "ES&S DS200"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5kz5uy", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-poster-orig.jpg", "duration_s": 15.816, "bytes": 4101087, "sha256": "63bc3f85b9f93a5824f5023091686b0b8e775f026fbfb5e4ac7ec8e84d58192d", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-04", "uid": "C20261020-161446-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-04", "old_ids": ["nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville"], "seq": "C01463", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "NJ / PA", "description": "In mid-October 2024, a Shop-Rite surveillance camera in Brodheadsville, Pennsylvania recorded a woman in a U.S. Postal Service uniform pull up beside the store's dumpster, take several postal bins out of her car's trunk and throw their contents in before driving off. The roughly 300 pieces were campaign mailers supporting Rep. Thomas Kean Jr. (R-NJ-7), sent by an independent-expenditure committee tied to the national GOP and addressed to voters in Succasunna (Roxbury Township, Morris County), one of the most Republican towns in the district, during Kean's close race with Democrat Sue Altman. A store security official said \"We saw her dump it\" and noted a Pennsylvania plate on mail \"from Jersey\"; the recording was turned over to USPS investigators, and the New Jersey Globe reported it on Nov. 2, 2024. USPS spokesman Xavier Hernandez said the Postal Service was \"aware of the allegation of mishandled political mail\" and had referred it to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and USPS Office of Inspector General; a postal employee said the woman had been suspended. On March 2, 2026, USPS-OIG assistant special agent in charge Jonathan Jimenez told the New Jersey Globe that \"the OIG completed the investigation and referred the case to the United States Attorney's Office\" in New Jersey. No charge has been reported. The MJTruth Rumble short \"N.J. Republican Congressman mailers Dumped by USPS worker at Pennsylvania Shop-Rite\" (Nov. 3, 2024) is a phone recording of the surveillance monitor; a voice on it says \"He's taking the mail out of the garbage now.\" Status Partially confirmed: the dumping is on video and USPS-OIG investigated and referred it to prosecutors, but no charge, finding or motive has been made public, and it is not established whether other trays were dumped elsewhere. Comparable: in 2020 Kearny, NJ carrier Nicholas Beauchene admitted dumping mail including 99 West Orange ballots (card nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea); in 2026 Utah carrier Damon Seei was indicted for allegedly dumping about 300 primary ballots (card ei-2026-09-022).", "sources": [{"title": "New Jersey Globe — N.J. congressman mailers dumped by USPS worker at Pennsylvania Shop-Rite (Nov. 2, 2024; updated Nov. 3 with USPS comment)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/congress/n-j-congressman-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-at-pennsylvania-shop-rite/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__njglobe-2024.html"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — Investigation of Kean mailers still ongoing", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/congress/investigation-of-kean-mailers-still-ongoing/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__njglobe-ongoing.html"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — U.S. Postal Service completes probe of Kean mail dump in '24, sends it to Justice Department (Mar. 2, 2026; USPS-OIG ASAC Jonathan Jimenez)", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/congress/u-s-postal-service-completes-probe-of-kean-mail-dump-in-24-sends-it-to-justice-department/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__njglobe-2026-referral.html"}, {"title": "New York Post — Postal worker tosses 300 pro-NJ Rep. Tom Kean Jr. election mailers in dumpster (Nov. 4, 2024)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2024/11/04/us-news/postal-worker-tosses-300-pro-nj-rep-tom-kean-jr-election-mailers-in-dumpster/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__nypost.html"}, {"title": "Washington Times — N.J. GOP congressman mailers trashed by USPS worker at Pennsylvania supermarket (Nov. 2, 2024)", "url": "https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/nov/2/nj-gop-congressman-mailers-trashed-usps-worker-pen/"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"N.J. Republican Congressman mailers Dumped by USPS worker at Pennsylvania Shop-Rite\" (short, uploaded Nov. 3, 2024 7:56 PM ET; 75 s)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5lqp3y"}], "notes": "MJTruth page-30 review (2026-10-20). Short v5lqp3y, Nov. 3, 2024 (ET), 75.3 s (19.4 MB, under the 20 MB publish limit). New leaf under 7 > USPS (Mark authorized new leaves for distinct tactics): postal workers dumping election mail. 2026 development (Mar. 2, 2026 OIG referral to the U.S. Attorney) flagged for EMon. Washington Times linked only (403). MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (75 s): phone recording of a Shop-Rite surveillance monitor in Brodheadsville, PA showing a car parked beside the store dumpster; a voice says 'He's taking the mail out of the garbage now'"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5lqp3y", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 75.325, "bytes": 19417607, "sha256": "b95e982f49350c94be3cafef95a898ce3212cffa13ceb27722a2feb47b6465a5", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville__rumble-video.json"}], "related": ["ei-2026-09-022"]}
{"id": "tn-shelby-2024-checkbox-touch-registers-candidate-above", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-30", "uid": "C20261020-160717-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-30", "old_ids": ["tn-shelby-2024-checkbox-touch-registers-candidate-above"], "seq": "C01023", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "TN", "description": "After early voting began Oct. 16, 2024 in Shelby County, Tennessee, Democratic state legislators and social-media posts said touchscreens registered candidates voters had not chosen; an Instagram post claimed votes were being swapped from Harris to Trump. Shelby County Election Commission administrator Linda Phillips said there was no malfunction: the ballot has a small box at the upper left inside each larger candidate field, and a finger on that small box can touch part of the field above, which on this ballot lists the Republican first. \"Whichever pressure is heavier, it'll pick that one, and that might be the one above it.\" She advised using the stylus or touching the candidate's name and demonstrated it to WATN-TV. The commission received three direct complaints at polling sites, and each voter cast a ballot for their choices. Similar reports came from Davidson and Williamson counties. PolitiFact rated the swapping claim Pants on Fire. Direction reported: Democrat to Republican. Status Partially confirmed: officials confirmed that a touch on the checkbox can select the candidate above, but called it a layout and touch issue, not a malfunction. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Votes in Shelby County, Tennessee, not swapped by voting machines (Oct. 24, 2024)", "url": "https://politifact.com/factchecks/2024/oct/24/instagram-posts/votes-in-shelby-county-tennessee-not-swapped-by-vo/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-shelby-2024-checkbox-touch-registers-candidate-above__pftn2024.html"}, {"title": "Local Memphis (ABC24) — Shelby County election voting issues (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.localmemphis.com/article/news/politics/elections/shelby-county-election-voting-issues/522-47a336f3-4b52-4fd9-bdfa-149fb43bfaad"}, {"title": "Local Memphis (ABC24) — Voting machine issues: use the stylus, Shelby County says (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.localmemphis.com/article/news/politics/elections/voting-machine-issues-stylus-shelby-county/522-82b329cf-3491-49b5-8ce7-e940ca4a35aa"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (pftn2024). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Local Memphis (ABC24), Local Memphis (ABC24). Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-cis-2024-tilting-balance-immigrants-in-census-shift-17-house-seats", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-01", "uid": "C20261012-125218-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-01", "old_ids": ["us-cis-2024-tilting-balance-immigrants-in-census-shift-17-house-seats"], "seq": "C01359", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Mass immigration, combined with a census that counts immigrants, justifies a higher population, creates headroom for more registered voters, and enables gerrymandering."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-43", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-10-31", "state": "US", "description": "The census apportionment count includes every resident, citizen or not, including illegal immigrants the Census Bureau captures; the 14th Amendment's \"whole number of persons\" language is read that way today. A Center for Immigration Studies analysis by Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler (\"Tilting the Balance,\" Oct. 31, 2024) estimates that counting all immigrants, legal and illegal, in the 2020 census shifted 17 U.S. House seats and Electoral College votes among the states (22 counting their U.S.-born minor children). On their numbers California gained eight seats and New York three, while Ohio lost two and states such as Pennsylvania, Michigan, Georgia, Arizona and North Carolina each lost one. Illegal immigrants alone redistributed an estimated two seats in 2020 (three with children), possibly rising to seven by 2030 if current growth continues. Status Partially confirmed: the fact that apportionment counts non-citizens is settled, but the seat-shift figures are a think-tank estimate built on survey data, and CIS (an immigration-restriction research group) itself notes legal immigrants drive most of the effect and that illegal-population estimates carry significant uncertainty. Catalog note: population counted in the census sets seats, district sizes and the denominator election offices plan against, so a larger counted population gives more \"justifiable\" room on the voter rolls. That room is only safe when rolls are checked locally and publicly against real, verifiable voters.", "sources": [{"title": "Center for Immigration Studies — Tilting the Balance: Estimating the impact of legal and illegal immigration on apportionment (Camarota & Zeigler, Oct. 31, 2024)", "url": "https://cis.org/Report/Tilting-Balance"}, {"title": "Center for Immigration Studies — Press release: Immigration Shifts Political Power", "url": "https://cis.org/Press-Release/Immigration-Shifts-Political-Power"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Partially confirmed: counting rule settled; seat estimates are CIS modeling (advocacy-leaning think tank). Related existing cards on Population leaf: crs-census-apportionment-population-includes-noncitizens-headroom, scotus-2020-trump-v-new-york-apportionment-noncitizens, census-bureau-apportionment-total-population-includes-noncitizens-soft."}
{"id": "utah-county-signature-rejection-rates-review-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-12", "uid": "C20260925-184601-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-12", "old_ids": ["utah-county-signature-rejection-rates-review-2024"], "seq": "C00130", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Citizens are fired if they reject too many signatures"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-28", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-09", "state": "UT", "description": "A 2024 Utah Lieutenant Governor / state election review of Utah County found abnormally high signature-rejection rates by some workers (one incorrectly rejecting roughly a quarter of ballots reviewed) and other discrepancies, with reporting that management had not taken strong remedial action. This is the inverse of 'fired for rejecting too many,' but documents that rejection behavior is a managed workforce control point where incentives/oversight can skew accept/reject rates. Status Partially confirmed for rejection-rate workforce dynamics; the specific 'fired if reject too many' claim is not established here.", "sources": [{"title": "Utah News Dispatch — State review finds high signature rejection rates in Utah County", "url": "https://utahnewsdispatch.com/2024/09/17/state-election-review-high-signature-rejection-rates-utah-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/utah-county-signature-rejection-rates-review-2024__utah-news-dispatch-state-review-finds-high-signature-rejecti.png"}, {"title": "Daily Herald — State election review high signature rejection rates", "url": "https://www.heraldextra.com/news/local/2024/sep/18/state-election-review-finds-high-signature-rejection-rates-other-discrepancies-in-utah-county/"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 5. Documents reject-rate control dynamics; not a confirmed firing-for-rejecting case.", "related": ["ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error"]}
{"id": "tx-2024-abbott-6500-potential-noncitizens-removed-sos-581-confirmed", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-02", "uid": "C20261012-125218-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-02", "old_ids": ["tx-2024-abbott-6500-potential-noncitizens-removed-sos-581-confirmed"], "seq": "C01360", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Allows creation of voter registration records that need not be tied to a real citizen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-44", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-44", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-08-26 to 2024-10-15", "state": "TX", "description": "On Aug. 26, 2024, Texas Gov. Greg Abbott announced that more than 1.1 million ineligible registrations had been removed since the 2021 SB 1 reforms, including \"over 6,500 potential noncitizens,\" about 1,930 of whom had a voting history and were being referred to the Attorney General for investigation. The Texas Secretary of State compares DPS noncitizen data and jury-duty noncitizen excusals against the statewide voter file and sends hits to county registrars, who remove anyone shown ineligible or who fails to answer a citizenship notice. A Votebeat/Texas Tribune/ProPublica public-records review (Oct. 15, 2024) found the Secretary of State's own late-August report to the governor identified 581 people as noncitizens; the 6,500 figure combined those with people removed for not answering citizenship letters, which can include citizens (the release was edited from \"6,500 noncitizens\" to \"6,500 potential noncitizens\"). Status Partially confirmed: hundreds of noncitizens were documented on the Texas rolls and removed, and nearly 2,000 removed records carried voting history, but the headline number is inflated and how many of those votes were illegal was not established in these sources. Catalog note: each year a state's own data matching finds noncitizen registrations that were accepted on an attestation checkbox, which shows records can be created without being tied to an eligible citizen. Both the inflated count and the real cases argue for transparent, locally verifiable list maintenance rather than trusting a press-release number either way.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of the Texas Governor — Governor Abbott Announces Over 1 Million Ineligible Voters Removed From Voter Rolls (Aug. 26, 2024)", "url": "https://gov.texas.gov/news/post/governor-abbott-announces-over-1-million-ineligible-voters-removed-from-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Texas Leads the Way Against Noncitizen Voting (Aug. 12, 2024)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2024/081224-2.shtml"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Abbott likely inflated how many noncitizens were removed from voter rolls (Oct. 15, 2024)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2024/10/15/greg-abbott-noncitizen-voter-roll-removal-investigation/"}, {"title": "Dallas Morning News — Texas dropped 1.1 million names from voter rolls since 2021, governor says (Aug. 26, 2024)", "url": "https://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/2024/08/26/texas-dropped-11-million-names-from-voter-rolls-in-the-past-three-years-governor-says/"}, {"title": "CBS Austin — Gov. Abbott boasts TX removed 6,500 noncitizens from voter rolls, number likely inflated", "url": "https://cbsaustin.com/news/local/gov-greg-abbott-boasted-that-texas-removed-6500-noncitizens-from-its-voter-rolls"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Partially confirmed: 581 SOS-identified noncitizens + 1,930 referrals documented; 6,500 headline inflated per records review. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Injection of bad records; Registration; Voter Rolls."}
{"id": "house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-05", "uid": "C20260926-000015-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-05", "old_ids": ["house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation"], "seq": "C00518", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "The Biden administration's use of foreign laws, such as the European Union (EU) Digital Services Act, to censor domestic opposition on social media"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-41", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-41", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-08-15", "state": "Federal", "description": "House Judiciary letters (Aug–Sep 2024) document EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Breton invoking the Digital Services Act against X over a U.S. Trump interview, and press the Biden-Harris State Department on whether EU DSA pressure is used to chill American political speech via global platform policies. Status Partially confirmed: DSA-driven EU pressure on U.S. platforms Confirmed; specific Biden Admin 'using DSA to censor domestic opposition' remains contested/Alleged per Committee inquiry framing—not adjudicated as proven coordination.", "sources": [{"title": "House Judiciary — JDJ letter to Breton re DSA/X (Aug 15, 2024)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-08-15%20JDJ%20to%20Breton%20-%20EC%20re%20X.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation__house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation.pdf"}, {"title": "House Judiciary — follow-up letter to Breton re DSA response (Sep 10, 2024)", "url": "https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-09-10%20JDJ%20to%20Breton%20re%20response.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation__house-judiciary-2024-dsa-breton-x-trump-interview-eu-pressure-global-moderation.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 3. Honest Partially confirmed — DSA/EU pressure yes; Biden-using-DSA claim Alleged within same leaf framing."}
{"id": "mn-2024-hoff-felony-yard-sign-theft-suppression-reinforcement", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033715-08", "uid": "C20260926-033715-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033715-08", "old_ids": ["mn-2024-hoff-felony-yard-sign-theft-suppression-reinforcement"], "seq": "C01233", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Forced Opposition Projection", "How It Works", "Suppression reinforcement"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-28", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-08-11", "state": "MN", "description": "FOX 9 / Star Tribune reporting on Douglas County (MN) charges (Aug. 2024) documents DFL House candidate Judd Hoff and wife Wendy Hoff charged with felony theft / aiding after a search warrant recovered ~242 stolen signs—including political signs (Trump, Fischbach, opponents)—with some painted over as 'Vote Hoff' campaign signs, illustrating systematic removal of visible political support as suppression reinforcement. Status Partially confirmed primary charging documents + contemporaneous local reporting (charges filed; not treated here as final conviction); peer to WaPo/FindLaw 2020 yard-sign theft spectrum and TAL Crowds on Demand suppression-companion cards already on this leaf—Hoff felony yard-sign instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: suppressing visible support distorts perceived sentiment; precinct hand counts still reconcile to present voters' paper.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX 9 — Couple charged with stealing over 240 signs for state representative campaign (Aug. 11, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fox9.com/news/couple-charged-stealing-over-240-signs-state-representative-campaign"}, {"title": "Star Tribune — Charges: DFL House candidate and wife stole hundreds of yard signs", "url": "https://www.startribune.com/charges-dfl-house-candidate-from-alexandria-and-wife-stole-hundreds-of-yard-signs/601077428"}], "notes": "Enrich-b24 third on Forced Opposition Suppression Reinforcement leaf (non-WaPo/COD)."}
{"id": "ga-seb-july-12-2024-short-notice-open-meetings", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-22", "uid": "C20260925-194013-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-22", "old_ids": ["ga-seb-july-12-2024-short-notice-open-meetings"], "seq": "C00206", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Public Meetings", "Meetings are rescheduled to create conflicts."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-92", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-07-12", "state": "GA", "description": "Georgia State Election Board's July 12, 2024 meeting proceeded on roughly 24 hours' notice rather than the generally required seven days under the Open Meetings Act, without a properly published agenda; the Attorney General's Office warned members the meeting could be unlawful and questioned any emergency rationale. American Oversight sued; AP reported the board later walked back/reconsidered rules advanced at the challenged meeting. Status Partially confirmed: short-notice / irregular scheduling that conflicts with public-participation expectations is documented; a proven intent 'to cause conflicts' is not established.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Georgia election board rolls back actions after lawsuit claimed meeting illegal", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/georgia-state-election-board-voting-558bdf5cd8f7572b44322f0b55f781bb"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — American Oversight v. GA SEB motion (Open Meetings Act)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/motion-american-oversight-v-georgia-state-election-board-motion-for-interlocutory-injunction-filed-july-14-2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-seb-july-12-2024-short-notice-open-meetings__democracy-docket-american-oversight-v-ga-seb-motion-open-mee.pdf"}, {"title": "GPB — Georgia election board walks back rules approved at meeting flagged by AG", "url": "https://www.gpb.org/news/2024/07/31/georgia-election-board-walks-back-rules-approved-at-meeting-flagged-by-state-ag"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 11. Short-notice SEB meeting Partially confirmed; intent Alleged."}
{"id": "rio-grande-dominion-future-ballot-size-claim-partially-confirmed-weak-source", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-36", "uid": "C20260926-000809-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-36", "old_ids": ["rio-grande-dominion-future-ballot-size-claim-partially-confirmed-weak-source"], "seq": "C00589", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Dominion claimed the existing systems could not handle a future ballot size, so the county needed to \"upgrade\" (Rio Grande County, Colorado)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-49", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-49", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-06", "state": "CO", "description": "Open reporting confirms Rio Grande's Dominion 5.17 upgrade push and Colorado's broader ballot-length/printer pressures on Dominion ICX equipment (SOS printer grants for ballots longer than 14\"). Independent open-source confirmation of the exact vendor quote 'cannot handle a future sized ballot' as the Rio Grande justification was not located this sweep—treated as Partially confirmed (upgrade + ballot-size ecosystem pressure yes; verbatim Dominion claim Alleged pending stronger primary). Status Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Rocky Mountain Voice — Rio Grande Dominion upgrade work session", "url": "https://rockymountainvoice.com/2024/06/14/in-rio-grande-county-commissioners-hear-update-on-voting-system/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-process__rio-grande-county-co-2024-dominion-democracy-suite-5-17-upgrade-proces.png"}, {"title": "Prowers Journal — CO SOS grants to upgrade ballot printers (length >14\" / Dominion ICX context)", "url": "https://theprowersjournal.com/2023/05/secretary-of-state-griswold-awards-grants-to-upgrade-ballot-printers-including-prowers-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/rio-grande-dominion-future-ballot-size-claim-partially-confirmed-weak-source__rio-grande-dominion-future-ballot-size-claim-partially-confirmed-weak.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 18 companion. Weak/honest-label: exact 'future sized ballot' quote not independently verified.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "fec-mur8206-2024-phillips-advisors-superpac-control-spy", "permanent_id": "C20260926-032103-05", "uid": "C20260926-032103-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-032103-05", "old_ids": ["fec-mur8206-2024-phillips-advisors-superpac-control-spy"], "seq": "C01185", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "Many campaign managers are controlled opposition who try to control and spy on citizen candidates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-97", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-01-29", "state": "Federal / MN", "description": "FEC MUR 8206 (Campaign Legal Center complaint filed Jan. 29, 2024) documents that high-level Dean Phillips 2024 presidential campaign advisors Matt and Scott Krisiloff—privy to leadership-group texts, focus groups, and internal polling—organized We Deserve Better, a pro-Phillips super PAC, within days of leaving the campaign and spent millions on ads using campaign-tested messaging; OGC later recommended dismissal for insufficient proof of illegal coordination, but the dual-role advisory→super-PAC path remains documented. Status Partially confirmed: Confirmed dual-role advisor/super-PAC control path and FEC complaint record; illegal coordination allegation not sustained by OGC recommendation. Peer to APT 2026 Sullivan-consultant and FEC MUR 5814 campaign-manager embezzlement cards already on this leaf—Phillips/Krisiloff dual-loyalty instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: dual-hatted campaign controllers who spy on strategy and money flows can steer citizen candidates away from hand-count transparency platforms.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC MUR 8206 — Campaign Legal Center complaint (Dean Phillips / We Deserve Better advisors dual role)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8206/8206_01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-mur8206-2024-phillips-advisors-superpac-control-spy__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC MUR 8206 — First General Counsel's Report (dismissal recommendation companion)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8206/8206_13.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-mur8206-2024-phillips-advisors-superpac-control-spy__untitled.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b21 third on Campaigns controlled-opposition managers leaf."}
{"id": "ncsl-nass-address-confidentiality-protected-voter-records", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-35", "uid": "C20260926-003520-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-35", "old_ids": ["ncsl-nass-address-confidentiality-protected-voter-records"], "seq": "C00748", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "\"Private\" or \"protected\" status, meant to protect some records, abused to covertly inject phantom registrations"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-81", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-81", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2024-01-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "NCSL/NASS materials on Address Confidentiality / Safe-at-Home and related address-protection programs document lawful 'protected' or confidential voter-record statuses that shield residential addresses from public voter-file disclosure—creating a class of registrations with reduced public inspectability. Catalog claim that such status is abused to covertly inject phantom registrations is Alleged beyond the existence of the programs. Status Partially confirmed: protected/confidential status Confirmed; phantom-injection abuse Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "NCSL — Address Protections for Public Officials and Employees", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/civil-and-criminal-justice/address-protections-for-public-officials-and-employees"}, {"title": "Washington SOS — Address Confidentiality Program / Protected Records Voter registration", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/statewide-programs/address-confidentiality-program-acp/participants/voter-registration-acp", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ncsl-nass-address-confidentiality-protected-voter-records__washington-sos-address-confidentiality-program-protected-records-voter-registration.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 18. Honest: program existence Confirmed; abuse-to-inject-phantoms Alleged. Weaker evidence on abuse labeled."}
{"id": "ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-27", "uid": "C20261020-160717-27", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-27", "old_ids": ["ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican"], "seq": "C01020", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-11", "state": "KY", "description": "Starting Nov. 2, 2023 (in-person early voting) and through the Nov. 7, 2023 general election, voters in at least six of Kentucky's 23 ES&S ExpressVote counties reported that choosing straight-ticket Democrat produced straight-ticket Republican on the screen. Madison County Clerk Kenny Barger confirmed it; about 10 voters at the Madison County Public Library alone had it corrected. LEX 18's survey found one report each in Floyd, Powell and Johnson, three in Clay and five in Magoffin; in Johnson County a straight-Republican voter was shown Democrats. Barger said he reproduced it by touching the small checkbox \"off by less than an eighth of an inch\" and it marked R; the machine read a touch on the Democratic checkbox as the Republican straight-party field just above. He first tied it to the touchscreens and \"a recent software update,\" called in a vendor technician, and concluded the equipment worked but \"the programming that laid this ballot could have been a better job done.\" He also said separate cases occurred where picking one race selected other races, and that machine was taken out of service. ES&S notified all 23 counties and said the ExpressVotes \"are working as designed\": voters must touch the name in the center of the selection area, the checkbox is only a visual indicator, and it \"has been removed from the selection area in future versions.\" Barger countered that a touch on the box is \"a crapshoot.\" Counties posted ALERT signs. Secretary of State Michael Adams said that to his knowledge \"not a single vote was cast in error.\" Direction mostly Democrat to Republican, one the reverse. Status Partially confirmed: the clerk and vendor confirmed straight-ticket touches registering the other party, attributed to ballot layout and touch placement rather than a fault. Related: ky-laurel-2024-expressvote-trump-tap-highlights-harris-viral-video. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "LEX 18 — Multiple Ky. counties face ballot-marking machine issues; clerk confident in results (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.lex18.com/news/kentucky-votes/multiple-kentucky-counties-face-ballot-marking-machine-issues-clerk-confident-in-results", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican__lex18c.html"}, {"title": "LEX 18 — At least 6 Kentucky counties saw reports of issues with ballot-marking machine touchscreens (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.lex18.com/news/kentucky-votes/at-least-6-kentucky-counties-saw-reports-of-issues-with-ballot-marking-machine-touchscreens", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican__lex18.html"}, {"title": "LEX 18 — 'Working as designed': County clerk pushes back against ballot-marking machine manufacturer claims (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.lex18.com/news/working-as-designed-county-clerk-pushes-back-against-ballot-marking-machine-manufacturer-claims", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican__lex18b.html"}, {"title": "WTVQ — Ballot problem during early voting (Nov. 3, 2023)", "url": "https://www.wtvq.com/ballot-problem-during-early-voting/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ky-2023-expressvote-straight-democrat-touch-shows-straight-republican__wtvq2023.html"}, {"title": "Richmond Register — Issue with ExpressVote machines discussed during 2023 Election Recap at Fiscal Court (Nov. 2023)", "url": "https://www.richmondregister.com/news/issue-with-expressvote-machines-discussed-during-2023-election-recap-at-fiscal-court/article_eb0c47ac-83e1-11ee-8f88-03690a9b4b20.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (lex18c, lex18, lex18b, wtvq2023). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Richmond Register. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "pa-expressvote-xl-remedy-delay-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-67", "uid": "C20260925-155410-67", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-67", "old_ids": ["pa-expressvote-xl-remedy-delay-2023"], "seq": "C00067", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Delay Tactics in Fixing Election Issues"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-21", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-08", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania certified ES&S ExpressVote XL in 2018; advocates petitioned for re-examination in 2019 citing code/security/privacy flaws, and Northampton County suffered severe XL problems in Nov 2019. A Commonwealth Court suit filed Dec 2019 survived a 2021 motion to dismiss. Only in August 2023 did plaintiffs settle with Secretary Al Schmidt: counties must upgrade to latest certified software (fixing some sued issues) by March 1, 2024, implement certification 'conditions for use,' and the Commonwealth must collect/publish statewide malfunction reports. Status Partially confirmed for multi-year gap between documented defects/litigation and mandated remediation; settlement improves transparency rather than proving intentional stalling.", "sources": [{"title": "Free Speech For People — PA ExpressVote XL settlement with Secretary Schmidt", "url": "https://freespeechforpeople.org/advocates-win-security-transparency-improvements-in-pennsylvania-elections-settlement-reached-with-secretary-of-state-schmidt-in-voting-machine-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Voting machine malfunctions in Pennsylvania will be tracked", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2023/8/18/23837562/voting-machine-malfunction-reports-public-database-election-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "WHYY — Judge delays voting machine case against Pa. state department", "url": "https://whyy.org/articles/federal-judge-delays-voting-machine-case-against-pa-department-of-state/"}], "notes": "Priority empty leaf: Delay Tactics in fixing election issues.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "latimes-ap-2023-cagop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-change-executive-committee", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-18", "uid": "C20260926-000015-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-18", "old_ids": ["latimes-ap-2023-cagop-winner-take-all-delegate-rules-change-executive-committee"], "seq": "C00531", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Cheating Through the Voting System", "Add \"anonymous\" votes during the voting process (see the California GOP)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-09", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-07", "state": "CA", "description": "LA Times / AP coverage of the July 2023 CA GOP winner-take-all delegate-allocation rules change described executive-committee process and grassroots transparency complaints—supporting opacity concerns around CA GOP internal voting/rules, without documenting literal anonymous ballot stuffing. Status Partially confirmed for contested opaque process; 'add anonymous votes' cheat Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Times — California GOP primary changes flare tensions", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2023-07-29/california-republican-primary-delegates-trump-desantis-presidential-election-2024"}, {"title": "AP — Trump early work on CA GOP delegate rules", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-desantis-republican-delegates-california-0473edbb20a8f18dcb0aa0a181794a7b"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 9 companion. Honest weak-source labeling."}
{"id": "ny-paquette-2023-jiw-caesar-cipher-voter-roll-clones", "permanent_id": "C20261014-200753-01", "uid": "C20261014-200753-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-200753-01", "old_ids": ["ny-paquette-2023-jiw-caesar-cipher-voter-roll-clones"], "seq": "C01393", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-05", "state": "NY", "description": "In May 2023 the peer-reviewed Journal of Information Warfare (Vol. 22, Issue 2) published Andrew Paquette's article \"The Caesar Cipher and Stacking the Deck in New York State Voter Rolls.\" Paquette, working with New York Citizens Audit (NYCA) data, defines a \"clone\" as a voter who has two or more unique State Board of Elections ID (SBOEID) numbers—something he says New York Election Law §6217.6 forbids—and reports large clone counts (for example, tens of thousands of pre- and post-2007 clones in Nassau County). He also argues that SBOEID and county ID numbers contain algorithmic structure (a \"Spiral\" / Caesar-cipher-like rearrangement) that could steganographically tag records. Status Partially confirmed: the article is a peer-reviewed publication that documents and defines the clone / excess-ID problem on New York rolls, and the clone concept is the research root of this leaf. The algorithmic-manipulation and fraud-purpose claims are Paquette's analysis, not findings by a court or the New York State Board of Elections. In April 2023 the State Board (Co-Director Kristen Zebrowski Stavisky) circulated a \"False Claims Explained\" letter to county officials disputing NYCA's clone-fraud framing: it said many multi-ID examples were purged re-registrations or ordinary multi-county overlap when voters move, that only voting or attempting to vote in two places is a crime, and that the group's underlying list had not been shared for verification. The Altamont Enterprise (Aug. 15, 2023) reported that rebuttal; an Ontario County BOE letter quoted there said the group's data \"have been debunked by our peers.\" Catalog point: whether the cause is re-registration lag, bad matching, or something worse, same-person multi-ID records are the substrate Modified Clones exploit.", "sources": [{"title": "Journal of Information Warfare — The Caesar Cipher and Stacking the Deck in New York State Voter Rolls (Paquette, Vol. 22 Issue 2, 2023)", "url": "https://www.jinfowar.com/journal/volume-22-issue-2/caesar-cipher-stacking-deck-new-york-state-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "Paquette — The Caesar Cipher and Stacking the Deck (author PDF, April 2023 version)", "url": "https://assets.zyrosite.com/A8545O85L4F8k7l4/paquette-thecaesarcipherandstackingthedeck11aprilapversion-YleyG6DVkBiVMJG0.pdf"}, {"title": "The Altamont Enterprise — Don't fall for fuzzy election math (reports NYSBOE April 2023 False Claims Explained letter; Aug. 15, 2023)", "url": "https://altamontenterprise.com/08152023/dont-fall-fuzzy-election-math"}, {"title": "American Thinker — Information Warfare in New York (Paquette, May 2023; companion essay)", "url": "https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2023/05/information_warfare_in_new_york.html"}], "notes": "Modified Clones leaf seed (Mark 2026-10-14). Peer-reviewed JIW publication Confirmed as published; clone counts and algorithm/fraud purpose remain researcher claims with official NYSBOE rebuttal → Partially confirmed overall. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Duplicate maiden/married; Feedback Loop > duplicating existing records. Watch any court findings on NYCA/Paquette claims."}
{"id": "ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-08", "uid": "C20261028-132233-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-08", "old_ids": ["ok-cherokee-nation-2023-05-absentee-envelopes-see-through-heavier-stock-sought"], "seq": "C01603", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-05", "state": "OK", "description": "Before the June 3, 2023, Cherokee Nation general election, Tribal Council District 1 candidate Trae Ratliff complained that the absentee return envelopes were too thin: \"You can hold this up to the light and you can see through this.\" [1] News On 6 reported that the Election Commission tested the concern privately and resolved it; Commission Chairman Rick Doherty said: \"The commission has investigated its ability to obtain heavier envelopes for the run off and future elections and has been advised that it's supplier can provide such envelopes.\" [1] The commission said it had never received such a complaint before and that the envelopes are the same ones used in state and local government elections. [1] Status Partially confirmed: one outlet, but the commission's own response (seeking heavier stock) supports the complaint. This was a tribal election, not a state election.", "sources": [{"title": "News On 6 (Lex Rodriguez) — Cherokee Nation concerned with security regarding absentee ballots (May 14, 2023)", "url": "https://www.newson6.com/story/64617c1f3f9cb50742d93df2/cherokee-nation-concerned-with-security-regarding-absentee-ballots"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. Tribal election; included because the envelopes are described as the same stock used in state and local elections.", "related": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ca-orange-2025-10-registrar-tested-flashlight-mark-visible-through-envelope"]}
{"id": "heritage-2023-eric-rehabilitate-interstate-crosscheck-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-30", "uid": "C20260926-005107-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-30", "old_ids": ["heritage-2023-eric-rehabilitate-interstate-crosscheck-companion"], "seq": "C00823", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Move immediately to the next cluster of states whose rolls have not yet received \"voted\" flags from previous states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-72", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-72", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-04-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Heritage Foundation's ERIC rehabilitation report and the shutdown of Interstate Crosscheck document longstanding gaps and false-positive problems in interstate duplicate/multi-vote detection — i.e., imperfect, delayed cross-state voted-flag sharing that a traveling scheme could in theory race. Status Partially confirmed: detection-gap / program-turmoil Confirmed; successful scaled exploitation Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Heritage — Maintaining Accurate Voter Registration Rolls: Rehabilitate ERIC", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/election-integrity/report/maintaining-accurate-voter-registration-rolls-the-need-rehabilitate-the", "local": "/archives/2026/09/heritage-2023-eric-rehabilitate-interstate-crosscheck-companion__heritage---maintaining-accurate-voter-registration-rolls--rehabilitate-eric.png"}, {"title": "Wikipedia — Interstate Voter Registration Crosscheck Program (shutdown context)", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Interstate_Voter_Registration_Crosscheck_Program", "local": "/archives/2026/09/heritage-2023-eric-rehabilitate-interstate-crosscheck-companion__wikipedia---interstate-voter-registration-crosscheck-program--shutdown-context.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 15 companion."}
{"id": "hep-locke-2023-alliance-election-excellence-funding-capture-leaders", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-11", "uid": "C20260926-002008-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-11", "old_ids": ["hep-locke-2023-alliance-election-excellence-funding-capture-leaders"], "seq": "C00644", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Infiltration of Grassroots Organizations", "The cabal may co-opt the leader of a grassroots election organization to pass and receive information, monitoring and controlling its efforts. The leader or organization may not know they are being used."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-54", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-54", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2023-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Honest Elections Project / Locke analysis of the U.S. Alliance for Election Excellence and related private-funding ecosystems documents how large philanthropic/NGO funding streams can shape priorities, data flows, and operational relationships of election-adjacent organizations—creating a pathway where leaders receive money/info and may be steered without framing themselves as 'captured.' Soft companion to CTCL/private-funding cards. Status Partially confirmed: funding/influence architecture Confirmed in reporting and org materials; specific 'cabal co-ops unknowing grassroots EI leader' cases often Alleged/anecdotal.", "sources": [{"title": "Honest Elections Project / Locke — Alliance for Election Excellence report (2023)", "url": "https://honestelections.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/HEP_Locke_Alliance-for-Election-Excellence-REPORT1.pdf"}, {"title": "CRS — Private Funding for Election Administration (IF12501)", "url": "https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF12501.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/hep-locke-2023-alliance-election-excellence-funding-capture-leaders__crs-private-funding-for-election-administration-if12501.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 6. Weaker/advocacy-leaning HEP source labeled Partially confirmed for capture motive."}
{"id": "antrim-mi-2020-halderman-ems-database-election-definition-files-manipulable", "permanent_id": "C20260925-233150-30", "uid": "C20260925-233150-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-233150-30", "old_ids": ["antrim-mi-2020-halderman-ems-database-election-definition-files-manipulable"], "seq": "C00423", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Change the database outside the voting-system software."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-31", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman's Antrim County analysis describes how Dominion election-definition / EMS database artifacts drive tabulator behavior and can be replaced or mismatched outside ordinary voter-facing software—producing wrong totals until corrected (Halderman attributes Antrim's night-of anomaly to an outdated election definition, not proven intentional fraud). Status Partially confirmed: database/definition files are externally mutable configuration; intentional malicious DB edit in Antrim not established.", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman — Antrim Michigan forensics paper (IEEE S&P 2022)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-mi-2020-halderman-ems-database-election-definition-files-manipulable__antrim-mi-2020-halderman-ems-database-election-definition-files-manipulable__halderman-antrim-michigan-forensics-paper-ieee-s-p-2022.pdf"}, {"title": "CourtListener — Coffee County EMS SQL-edit capability exhibit (architecture parallel)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.1630.25.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20b leaf 15 companion. Soft companion to fill-20a Antrim Induce-error card.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "harris-county-tx-ballot-paper-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-04", "uid": "C20260925-155410-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-04", "old_ids": ["harris-county-tx-ballot-paper-2022"], "seq": "C00004", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "TX", "description": "Harris County, TX, experienced ballot-paper shortages at multiple Election Day 2022 polling locations. A Texas Rangers investigation and DA Kim Ogg's office announced that shortages stemmed from an employee's misallocation of paper (alleged second-job neglect), with prosecutors stating there was no evidence of intentional suppression or intent to sway the election; an employee faced theft/tampering charges. Judge David Peeples upheld 2022 results while criticizing the county's paper-allocation law compliance. Catalog seed: \"Deprive voting centers of enough ballots or ballot paper (eg Harris County TX).\" Shortage and administrative failure are Confirmed; intentional partisan fraud is Disputed/denied by the official investigation—hence Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "NYT — Inquiry Finds No Politics Behind Ballot Paper Shortages", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/13/us/harris-county-elections-ballots-investigation-charges.html"}, {"title": "Houston Chronicle — Rangers find no evidence of fraud", "url": "https://www.houstonchronicle.com/politics/houston/article/ogg-corruption-election-texas-harris-no-fraud-19653715.php"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Judge criticizes 2022 ballot paper shortage", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/texas/2023/11/16/harris-county-election-changes-teneshia-hudspeth/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/harris-county-tx-ballot-paper-2022__votebeat-judge-criticizes-2022-ballot-paper-shortage.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b remount 2026-09-25.16: stub Early Voting; Election Day → exact Deprive leaf. Operational failure Confirmed; intentional fraud claim not established."}
{"id": "luzerne-pa-2022-ballot-paper-shortage", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-20", "uid": "C20260925-183614-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-20", "old_ids": ["luzerne-pa-2022-ballot-paper-shortage"], "seq": "C00108", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "PA", "description": "Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, ran out of ballot paper at multiple Election Day 2022 polling places, prompting a court-ordered roughly two-hour extension. A district attorney public report and AP/Votebeat coverage blamed staff turnover, inexperience, and failure to follow supply procedures—not proven intentional fraud. Status Partially confirmed operational ballot-paper shortage parallel to Harris County, TX 2022.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Probe blames Luzerne County ballot paper shortage on inexperience, poor training", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/election-pennsylvania-luzerne-paper-ballots-fe33709066fb2613b3e07a5778620b68"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Luzerne 2022 ballot paper shortage investigation", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2023/6/16/luzerne-county-2022-ballot-paper-shortage-da-investigation/"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — Luzerne poll workers overtime amid paper shortage scrutiny", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/news/luzrene-county-voting-election-paper-shortage-20221109.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/luzerne-pa-2022-ballot-paper-shortage__philadelphia-inquirer-luzerne-poll-workers-overtime-amid-pap.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15b remount 2026-09-25.16: stub Early Voting; Election Day → exact Deprive leaf. Part A enrich harris paper-shortage style Early Voting leaf."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-ballot-printer-paper-failure", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-15", "uid": "C20260925-185839-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-15", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-ballot-printer-paper-failure"], "seq": "C00166", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Deprive vote centers of enough ballots or ballot paper to serve voters (e.g., Harris County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-17", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "On Election Day 2022, Maricopa County experienced widespread ballot-printer failures that delayed or disrupted voting at many vote centers. County and media investigations (Votebeat, FactCheck.org, county after-action) attributed the failures primarily to ballot length and heavier 100-lb paper exceeding some on-site printer capabilities—i.e., a ballot-paper/printer provisioning failure that left centers unable to issue readable ballots promptly. Ballots were later counted from secure deposit boxes. Status Partially confirmed: Election Day ballot-paper/printer deprivation of service Confirmed; intentional sabotage Alleged and not established by official findings.", "sources": [{"title": "Votebeat — Why Maricopa County's ballot printers failed on Election Day", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2022/12/8/23500457/maricopa-county-ballot-printer-tabulator-voting-problems-phoenix/"}, {"title": "FactCheck.org — Ballot printer delayed Maricopa voting", "url": "https://www.factcheck.org/2022/11/ballot-printer-delayed-maricopa-voting-contrary-to-unfounded-claims/"}, {"title": "Maricopa County — 2022 General Election report", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 7. Alongside remounted Harris TX / Luzerne PA cards."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-faint-toner", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-06", "uid": "C20260925-155410-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-06", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-faint-toner"], "seq": "C00006", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Light printing and poor toner adhesion"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-61", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-61", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Same McGregor investigation found Oki B432 fusers failed to maintain heat needed to fuse toner onto 20-inch, 100-pound ballots, leaving timing marks too faint; print could flake onto tabulators. County attributed issues to equipment/paper combination, not malice. Catalog seed: print ballot image lighter so tabulators cannot scan. Equipment/paper failure Confirmed; intentional light-printing scheme not established.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__maricopa-county-election-report-and-attachments-mcgregor-inv.pdf"}, {"title": "CNN — Investigation finds equipment failure at fault", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2023/04/11/politics/maricopa-county-printer-investigation-2022-election", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-faint-toner__cnn-investigation-finds-equipment-failure-at-fault.png"}], "notes": "Companion to fit-to-page instance."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-mcgregor-fit-to-page-printing-mistakes-induce-tabulator-rejects", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-26", "uid": "C20260925-220029-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-26", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-mcgregor-fit-to-page-printing-mistakes-induce-tabulator-rejects"], "seq": "C00379", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Introduce errors (ballot programming mistakes, printing mistakes, misspellings, etc.) to obscure manipulation; these are not all accidents."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-30", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's McGregor investigation documented Election Day 2022 'fit to page' printing that shrunk/relocated timing marks so tabulators could not read ballots, plus faint toner issues—printing mistakes that induced mass tabulator rejects and forced duplication/central tabulation. Status Partially confirmed: printing-induced error Confirmed by official report; intentional manipulation not established.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments (McGregor)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__maricopa-county-election-report-and-attachments-mcgregor-inv.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — Paper changes caused printer failure", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maricopa-county-ballot-printers-mcgregor-kari-lake-9edeef525b8afacb767a4960bf951ea1"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 13 companion. Soft cross-leaf to Ballots shrink/light-print cards."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-05", "uid": "C20260925-155410-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-05", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page"], "seq": "C00005", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Shrunken or misaligned ballot images"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-64", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-64", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's independent investigation (former AZ Supreme Court Chief Justice Ruth McGregor, report released April 2023) documented that some Election Day 2022 ballots were printed \"fit to page,\" shrinking/relocating timing marks so tabulators could not read them; testing reproduced sporadic fit-to-page prints on four printers without determining a definitive cause. Separately, faint/flaking toner from Oki B432 fusers on thicker/longer paper caused tabulator rejects. Misread ballots were duplicated or centrally tabulated. Catalog seed: shrink ballot image to force adjudication/'re-create.' Physical printing anomalies Confirmed by the official report; intentional manipulation not established—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments (McGregor investigation)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__maricopa-county-election-report-and-attachments-mcgregor-inv.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — Paper changes caused printer failure", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/maricopa-county-ballot-printers-mcgregor-kari-lake-9edeef525b8afacb767a4960bf951ea1"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Investigation of Maricopa ballot problems", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/4/10/23678055/maricopa-county-election-day-investigation-oki-printers/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__votebeat-investigation-of-maricopa-ballot-problems.png"}], "notes": "Also maps to light-printing leaf."}
{"id": "maricopa-paper-weight-routing-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-41", "uid": "C20260925-155410-41", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-41", "old_ids": ["maricopa-paper-weight-routing-2022"], "seq": "C00041", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Paper thickness and scanner routing"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-62", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "AZ", "description": "Maricopa County's McGregor investigation linked 2022 Election Day printer/tabulator problems in part to 20-inch, 100-pound ballot stock interacting poorly with Oki B432 fusers (insufficient heat/fusion), producing faint timing marks and rejects requiring central duplication/tabulation. Catalog also alleges thickness-based routing to different scanners elsewhere (Sacramento seed). For Maricopa, paper-weight/equipment interaction is Confirmed by the official report; intentional routing-for-fraud scheme not established—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Maricopa County — Election Report and Attachments (McGregor)", "url": "https://www.maricopa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/82599/Maricopa-Election-Report-and-Attachments", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__maricopa-county-election-report-and-attachments-mcgregor-inv.pdf"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Maricopa ballot printer investigation", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2023/4/10/23678055/maricopa-county-election-day-investigation-oki-printers/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2022-printer-fit-to-page__votebeat-investigation-of-maricopa-ballot-problems.png"}], "notes": "Companion to faint-toner instance; distinct leaf for paper thickness."}
{"id": "nm-2022-pesc-precinct-selection-tool-sort-error-nonrandom-selections", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-01", "uid": "C20261012-141825-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-01", "old_ids": ["nm-2022-pesc-precinct-selection-tool-sort-error-nonrandom-selections"], "seq": "C01368", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-11 (analyses 2023-2024)", "state": "NM", "description": "New Mexico's rule (1.10.23.9 NMAC) requires precincts for the post-election voting system check to be chosen by a visually observable random process such as dice, with selection probability proportional to precinct size. In the 2022 general-election check, dice were rolled publicly but the numbers were translated into precincts by a Secretary of State spreadsheet \"precinct selection tool.\" Former candidate Clay Pryor obtained the 2022 and 2023 tools from the SOS and documented that in 2022 the cumulative ballot totals used to build each precinct's selection bracket were out of order (first visible at precincts 100 and 126), apparently because the rows were re-sorted after the totals were calculated. Random dice rolls therefore did not map to random precinct selections. Computer engineer Tim Ragsdale (M.S. computer systems and software engineering, 30+ years modeling and simulation) wrote a separate report, \"Election Audit Precinct Selection 2022, Three Anomalies Proving It Was Not Random.\" Physicist Erik DeBenedictis independently describes the 2022 \"software fixup\" to the dice values as not working correctly. Pryor calls it human error that did not recur in 2023. Status Partially confirmed: two independent analyses using the SOS's own tool show the 2022 selection was not random as the rule requires; the specific figures attributed to Ragsdale's report (one precinct drawn three times in a row, never seen in 300,000 simulated runs; 82% of precincts never selected) could not be checked against the report itself and are not independently confirmed here. Catalog note: dice in front of cameras look random, but the hidden step that turns dice into precincts decides what gets audited. If that step can't be checked by the public, the audit is random in name only. Publishing the tool and the bracket table before the roll closes this gap.", "sources": [{"title": "Clay Pryor for NM — Understanding what happened in the 2022 Post Election System Check (precinct selection tool error)", "url": "https://claypryorfornm.com/pesc2022error.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/rhino-nm-pesc-2022-error__clay-pryor-for-nm-post-election-system-check-pesc-2022-error.png"}, {"title": "Clay Pryor for NM — Tabulators / 2022 non-random precinct selection (cites Tim Ragsdale report)", "url": "https://claypryorfornm.com/tabulators.html"}, {"title": "Erik DeBenedictis — Rumor, Reality, and Math Errors in Elections (NM 2022 audit)", "url": "https://debenedictis.org/erik/NM22Audit/"}, {"title": "1.10.23.9 NMAC — Voting system check procedures (random, observable, size-proportional selection)", "url": "https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/new-mexico/N-M-Admin-Code-SS-1.10.23.9"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). Ragsdale report not located online; its 3-in-a-row / 300k-sim / 82% figures are unverified and kept out of the status basis."}
{"id": "az-ars-16-449-la-testing-public-notice-carter-center-2022-county-gaps", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-08", "uid": "C20260925-214102-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-08", "old_ids": ["az-ars-16-449-la-testing-public-notice-carter-center-2022-county-gaps"], "seq": "C00331", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Legislation", "They create laws that give people a sense of security, which proves false because the laws are not followed."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-24", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-24", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-10", "state": "AZ", "description": "A.R.S. §16-449 requires logic-and-accuracy testing of election equipment/programs with public notice (at least 48 hours) and openness to party representatives, candidates, press, and the public — a statutory transparency safeguard. The Carter Center's preliminary nonpartisan observation statement on 2022 Arizona L&A testing documented notice/access problems in some counties (including Apache and Navajo), even while other counties conducted noticed testing. Status Partially confirmed: statute Confirmed; imperfect compliance / notice gaps documented by observers in named counties (not a finding that Maricopa skipped testing).", "sources": [{"title": "A.R.S. §16-449 — Required test of equipment and programs; notice", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00449.htm"}, {"title": "Carter Center — Preliminary statement on Arizona L&A testing (2022 PDF)", "url": "https://cartercentee50c07c05.blob.core.windows.net/blobcartercentee50c07c05/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/logic-and-accuracy-testing-arizona-statement-2022.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-ars-16-449-la-testing-public-notice-carter-center-2022-county-gaps__carter-center-preliminary-statement-on-arizona-l-a-testing-2.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 4 companion. Statutory security theater fails when notice/access duties are skipped."}
{"id": "pew-2022-election-confidence-parties-fail-constituents-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-30", "uid": "C20260926-004030-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-30", "old_ids": ["pew-2022-election-confidence-parties-fail-constituents-companion"], "seq": "C00783", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Fail their constituents by not demanding honest elections."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-88", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-88", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-10-31", "state": "Federal", "description": "Pew's 2022 election-administration confidence data show large shares of partisans—especially Republicans—lacking confidence in vote counts even as party organizations often prioritize messaging over shared software-independent verification methods. Partially confirmed: constituent demand for honest/verifiable elections is Confirmed in surveys; specific party failure-to-demand as institutional choice is Alleged where not documented for a given committee. PEP: properly-run public hand count offers a concrete demand parties could unite on (https://handcountroadshow.org/pep).", "sources": [{"title": "Pew Research — Views of election administration and confidence in vote counts (2022)", "url": "https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2022/10/31/views-of-election-administration-and-confidence-in-vote-counts/"}, {"title": "Gallup — Partisan split on election integrity companion", "url": "https://news.gallup.com/poll/651185/partisan-split-election-integrity-gets-even-wider.aspx"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 15 companion. Partially confirmed — survey demand Confirmed; party refusal Alleged."}
{"id": "ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-training-curriculum-acceptance-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-12", "uid": "C20260926-005107-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-12", "old_ids": ["ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-training-curriculum-acceptance-companion"], "seq": "C00805", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Law Enforcement", "The county attorney's office trains sheriffs, which usurps the people's protection against government officials acting unlawfully."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-74", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-74", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-10-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "AP's Howard Center investigation documented CSPOA and related constitutional-sheriff curricula seeking state continuing-education credit while county/state training pipelines (often prosecutor- or POST-linked) remain the default channel for sheriff legal education — illustrating the contested control of 'who trains the sheriff' that the leaf frames as usurpation when county attorneys dominate. Texas TCOLE later revoked CSPOA credit. Status Partially confirmed: competing training pipelines and state credit fights Confirmed; every county-attorney training hour as intentional usurpation Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "AP News — Constitutional sheriffs group gaining acceptance / training credits", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/constitutional-sheriffs-5568cd0b6b27680a28de8a098ed14210"}, {"title": "SPLC Hatewatch — Texas Commission bans CSPOA training credit", "url": "https://www.splcenter.org/resources/hatewatch/texas-commission-bans-training-constitutional-sheriffs-group/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ap-2022-cspo-sheriff-training-curriculum-acceptance-companion__splc-hatewatch---texas-commission-bans-cspoa-training-credit.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 6 companion. Honest: training-control fight Confirmed; usurpation intent Alleged."}
{"id": "just-news-counties-flooded-2020-records-after-22month-window-2022", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-17", "uid": "C20260925-205354-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-17", "old_ids": ["just-news-counties-flooded-2020-records-after-22month-window-2022"], "seq": "C00232", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Deliberately misinterpret the 22-month federal retention minimum to restrict access to election records for 22 months."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-55", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-55", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-09", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Just the News reported counties nationwide flooded with 2020 election-record requests as the federal 22-month preservation window expired, with some jurisdictions preparing destruction after the floor elapsed and requesters racing the deadline. Status Partially confirmed for the documented pattern that practical public access often clusters at/after the 22-month boundary — consistent with retention-floor dynamics constraining earlier examination — without adjudicating every county's legal theory for prior denials.", "sources": [{"title": "Just the News — Counties flooded with 2020 election-record requests as preservation window expires", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/counties-flooded-requests-2020-election-records-federal-preservation", "local": "/archives/2026/09/just-news-counties-flooded-2020-records-after-22month-window-2022__just-the-news-counties-flooded-with-2020-election-record-req.png"}, {"title": "Michigan MCL 168.811 — retention aligned to federal 22 months", "url": "https://www.legislature.mi.gov/Laws/MCL?objectName=MCL-168-811", "local": "/archives/2026/09/just-news-counties-flooded-2020-records-after-22month-window-2022__michigan-mcl-168-811-retention-aligned-to-federal-22-months.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 8. Access timing tied to 22-month floor Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "texas-abbott-2022-2024-migrant-buses-cities-demographic-shift", "permanent_id": "C20260926-033041-11", "uid": "C20260926-033041-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-033041-11", "old_ids": ["texas-abbott-2022-2024-migrant-buses-cities-demographic-shift"], "seq": "C01221", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Move people into cities to run for office and begin shifting political demographics at the county and state levels."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-47", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-47", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-04", "state": "TX / Multi-state", "description": "From April 2022 onward Texas Gov. Greg Abbott's Operation Lone Star bused tens of thousands of migrants from the border to Democratic-led destination cities (NYC, Chicago, D.C., Denver, and others), with Reuters, NBC, and city reporting documenting shelter strain, multi-billion-dollar local costs, and acute political conflict inside destination cities—i.e., an explicit state program moving people into cities and shifting local political/demographic pressure. Status Partially confirmed: Confirmed for organized intercity demographic relocation at scale; Alleged (not claimed here) that the purpose was to seat relocated persons in offices. Peer to Pew 2024 urban-rural partisanship and Pew 2018 urban demographic-trends cards already on this leaf—Abbott migrant-bus instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: rapid managed inflows into cities change who is present on soft registration rolls that machine systems tabulate; public hand counts still require present humans and paper.", "sources": [{"title": "Reuters Investigates — The toll on migrants of a free bus north from the border", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/migration-usa-bus/"}, {"title": "NBC News — How Texas Gov. Greg Abbott divided Democrats on immigration with migrant busing (companion)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/texas-gov-greg-abbott-divided-democrats-immigration-migrant-busing-rcna128815"}], "notes": "Enrich-b23 third on Demographic manipulation Move people into cities leaf. Honest Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "cpr-2022-party-switch-unaffiliated-poll-worker-pose-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-36", "uid": "C20260926-004030-36", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-36", "old_ids": ["cpr-2022-party-switch-unaffiliated-poll-worker-pose-companion"], "seq": "C00789", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Party-affiliation changes before becoming poll workers, to pose as members of a different party"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-82", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-82", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado Public Radio and CO SOS reporting on mass party-affiliation switches around primaries (e.g., Democrats switching unaffiliated in Boebert's district) confirms that voters do change affiliation on the rolls strategically around election roles/primaries. Soft remount of existing CO affiliation-switch cards onto the poll-worker-pose pathKey. Partially confirmed: strategic affiliation change Confirmed; specifically to become poll workers posing as another party Alleged for this episode.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Radio — Democrats switching unaffiliated in Boebert district primary context (2022)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2022/06/13/lauren-boebert-primary-democrats-unaffiliated/"}, {"title": "Colorado Public Radio — Democrats switching unaffiliated in Boebert district primary context (2022)", "url": "https://www.cpr.org/2022/06/07/lauren-boebert-2022-elections-democrats-unaffiliated-voters/"}, {"title": "NCSL — Poll workers party-distribution companion", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/election-poll-workers"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 18 companion. Partially confirmed — switch Confirmed; poll-worker pose purpose Alleged."}
{"id": "ktar-2022-maricopa-other-top-registrations-pnd-shift", "permanent_id": "C20260926-003520-33", "uid": "C20260926-003520-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-003520-33", "old_ids": ["ktar-2022-maricopa-other-top-registrations-pnd-shift"], "seq": "C00746", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "They change voters' party from their designated party to PND (party not designated) status in order to use their records to inject votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-66", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2022-01-01", "state": "AZ", "description": "KTAR/Maricopa reporting documented 'Other' (including party-not-designated / unaffiliated-style) registrations overtaking major parties as the top registration category in Maricopa County—confirming large-scale movement into non-party-designated status on the roll. Catalog's 'changing people…to PND…to inject votes' motive is Alleged beyond the registration-mix facts. Status Partially confirmed: PND/Other growth Confirmed; intentional injection-via-PND Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "KTAR — 'Other' takes over as top voter registrations in Maricopa County", "url": "https://ktar.com/arizona-news/other-takes-over-as-top-voter-registrations-in-maricopa-county/4926841/"}, {"title": "Maricopa County Elections — Voter Registration Totals", "url": "https://elections.maricopa.gov/voter-registration/voter-registration-totals.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ktar-2022-maricopa-other-top-registrations-pnd-shift__maricopa-county-elections-voter-registration-totals.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20j leaf 17. Honest status: Partially confirmed — mix shift Confirmed; phantom-injection purpose Alleged."}
{"id": "nv-mail-ballot-counting-15-days-before-ed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-22", "uid": "C20260925-184601-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-22", "old_ids": ["nv-mail-ballot-counting-15-days-before-ed"], "seq": "C00140", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes during early voting to establish a 50/50 ratio, allowing later adjustments to stay under the radar (Colorado, Washington, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-22", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-2026", "state": "NV", "description": "Nevada statutes authorize the mail-ballot central counting board to begin counting received mail ballots 15 days before Election Day (publicly), with results withheld until polls close. Early counting creates running electronic tallies inside EMS well before Election Night—the process substrate the catalog labels 'preload'—but does not by itself prove a 50/50 manipulation scheme. Status Partially confirmed (early count Confirmed; 50/50 fraud Alleged/unverified).", "sources": [{"title": "Election Law Navigator — NRS 293.269931 (mail ballot counting period)", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/nevada/statute/293.269931/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-mail-ballot-counting-15-days-before-ed__election-law-navigator-nrs-293-269931-mail-ballot-counting-p.png"}, {"title": "NV SOS approved regulation R011-23 (mail ballot procedures)", "url": "https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Register/2023Register/R011-23AP.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nv-mail-ballot-counting-15-days-before-ed__nv-sos-approved-regulation-r011-23-mail-ballot-procedures.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 10. NV early count window."}
{"id": "coos-county-or-hard-drive-crash-ballot-images-prr-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-26", "uid": "C20260925-194013-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-26", "old_ids": ["coos-county-or-hard-drive-crash-ballot-images-prr-2021"], "seq": "C00210", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Blocking Evidence", "Delay releasing information until it is suddenly gone for some reason (hard-drive crash, backup failure, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-33", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-2023", "state": "OR", "description": "After Coos County, Oregon quoted thousands of dollars for 2020 ballot images under public-records request, requesters paid a reduced fee for adjudicated images; county counsel then said a hard-drive crash had destroyed the images and returned the money, refusing fulfillment. Litigation (Coos County Circuit Court 22CV29383) followed; Audit Oregon's contemporaneous reporting states the court rejected re-running the election as recreation but compelled production of images from paper ballots, with images finally produced Aug 2023 after heavy PDF redaction; outside counsel costs ~$20,639. Requesters allege the crash explanation was false because original adjudication timestamps appeared in later data. Status Partially confirmed: hard-drive-crash excuse used to deny/delay election-record release is documented; whether the crash itself was genuine remains Disputed.", "sources": [{"title": "Audit Oregon — Curious Case of Coos County ballot images (hard-drive crash PRR)", "url": "https://auditoregon.org/the-curious-case-of-coos-county-ballot-images/"}, {"title": "Audit Oregon — Curious Case of Coos County 2020", "url": "https://auditoregon.org/the-curious-case-of-coos-county-2020/"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 13. Crash-excuse delay Partially confirmed; authenticity Disputed."}
{"id": "ga-curling-halderman-barcode-tabulated-not-voter-readable-text", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-28", "uid": "C20260925-214102-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-28", "old_ids": ["ga-curling-halderman-barcode-tabulated-not-voter-readable-text"], "seq": "C00351", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-07", "state": "GA", "description": "Expert reporting in Curling v. Raffensperger (including Halderman analyses) documented that Georgia's scanners counted BMD barcodes/QR payloads, creating a definitional split between what voters read and what the tabulators summed — enabling early/central machine tabulation of non-human-readable encodings. Status Partially confirmed for the expert/technical record of barcode-as-tabulated-vote (litigation expert evidence; not a final appellate holding that every barcode altered outcomes).", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — Curling materials discussing BMD barcode tabulation", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.751.0_5.pdf"}, {"title": "Courthouse News — Curling opinion/order discussing Georgia BMD system", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/ga-voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-curling-halderman-barcode-tabulated-not-voter-readable-text__courthouse-news-curling-opinion-order-discussing-georgia-bmd.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 14 companion."}
{"id": "ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-21", "uid": "C20260925-155410-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-21", "old_ids": ["ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021"], "seq": "C00021", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Hand-marked paper ballots deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-07", "state": "GA", "description": "In Curling v. Raffensperger litigation, expert J. Alex Halderman's July 2021 report argued Georgia's near-universal in-person Ballot Marking Device (BMD) model produces barcode-bearing printouts that scanners tabulate, while voters rarely verify printed text; malware could in principle alter barcodes without matching human-readable contests. Catalog linguistic leaf criticizes marketing BMDs/printouts as equivalent to hand-marked paper ballots. Status Partially confirmed for documented expert/security critique of BMD-as-hand-marked equivalence and barcode/auditability concerns in the federal record; does not establish statewide outcome fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "Expert Report of J. Alex Halderman (Curling litigation PDF mirror)", "url": "http://clearinghouse-umich-production.s3.amazonaws.com/media/doc/153377.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021__expert-report-of-j-alex-halderman-curling-litigation-pdf-mir.pdf"}, {"title": "Princeton CITP — Security Analysis of the Dominion ImageCast X", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2023/06/14/security-analysis-of-the-dominion-imagecast-x/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ga-curling-halderman-bmd-handmarked-2021__princeton-citp-security-analysis-of-the-dominion-imagecast-x.png"}], "notes": "Court expert report + academic follow-on; advocacy reuse of findings is secondary.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote ImageCast"]}
{"id": "loudoun-antiracist-parents-hit-list-targeting-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-02", "uid": "C20260926-005107-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-02", "old_ids": ["loudoun-antiracist-parents-hit-list-targeting-2021"], "seq": "C00795", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Targeting of conservative and Republican officials and activists"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-36", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-36", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-06-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Loudoun County (VA) Sheriff's Office and a parallel FBI Public Corruption unit investigated the Facebook group 'Anti-Racist Parents of Loudoun County' after complaints that members solicited names, addresses, and occupations to build a 'hit list' targeting parents who opposed Critical Race Theory — a multi-target intimidation roster pattern matching the leaf's 'ranks … already considerable.' Investigators confirmed at least one post asking for names; no criminal charges were ultimately filed. Status Partially confirmed: organized compilation of target lists Confirmed by LE investigation; successful criminal prosecution of the network not established.", "sources": [{"title": "WJLA 7News — No charges filed against Loudoun Co. group accused of targeting parents", "url": "https://wjla.com/news/local/no-charges-filed-against-loudoun-county-group-accused-of-targeting-parents-that-oppose-crt", "local": "/archives/2026/09/loudoun-antiracist-parents-hit-list-targeting-2021__wjla-7news-no-charges-filed-against-loudoun-co-group-accused.png"}, {"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics (Loudoun Democrats named among attackers)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 1 companion. Honest: investigation Confirmed; charges declined."}
{"id": "ssrn-goel-double-voting-prevalence-presidential-elections", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-32", "uid": "C20260926-005107-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-32", "old_ids": ["ssrn-goel-double-voting-prevalence-presidential-elections"], "seq": "C00825", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Repeat across the country, hitting battleground states in waves (Midwest → Southeast → Southwest → West Coast) over the two- to six-week early-voting calendar."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-73", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-06-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Goel et al. SSRN paper 'One Person, One Vote: Estimating the Prevalence of Double Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections' estimates measurable double-voting incidence using administrative data — establishing that multi-jurisdiction double voting occurs at detectable (if debated-magnitude) rates across the national calendar. Status Partially confirmed: academic detection of double-voting phenomenon Confirmed; organized cabal wave operations Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "SSRN — One Person, One Vote: Estimating Prevalence of Double Voting", "url": "https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3872769"}, {"title": "ERIC — Voter Participation Report multi-state detection companion", "url": "https://ericstates.org/how-does-it-work/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ssrn-goel-double-voting-prevalence-presidential-elections__eric-voter-participation-report-multi-state-detection-compan.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 16 companion."}
{"id": "ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-11", "uid": "C20261009-105430-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-11", "old_ids": ["ga-fulton-2020-enet-absentee-status-entry-failures-seb"], "seq": "C01344", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2021-01-12", "state": "GA", "description": "The Georgia State Election Board's Fulton County post-election executive summary (Jan. 12, 2021) found workers sometimes failed to update voter-status records in ENet. Voters who had voted absentee or early were shown with the wrong status, which the SEB attributed to data-entry errors, and it ordered more training. Accurate status in the absentee log is what lets poll workers and registrars cancel or reject the second ballot under O.C.G.A. §21-2-388. Later SEB double-voter matters are open: SEB2022-068 (Fulton County Double Voter) was continued on Feb. 18, 2026, and SEB2024-251 (Cobb County Double Voter, Nov. 2024) was referred to the Attorney General. Partially confirmed: the status-entry failures are documented, but the summary does not quantify any resulting double counts.", "sources": [{"title": "Georgia State Election Board — Fulton County post-election executive summary (Jan. 12, 2021, PDF)", "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/20484973/fulton-county-state-election-board-report.pdf"}, {"title": "Georgia State Election Board — Minutes, Feb. 18, 2026 meeting (SEB2022-068; SEB2024-251)", "url": "https://seb.ga.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/20260218__minutes.pdf"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. GA rule (2026) on ga-2020-primary card.", "related": ["oh-franklin-2021-epollbook-vendor-omitted-13604-absentee-records-double-votes", "mn-electronic-roster-guide-real-time-roster-file-extract-is-file-to-vendor-supplements-unposted-history-entered-manually", "ga-2018-curling-order-46-voter-accounts-pollbook-errors-enet-removable-media-plan-to-fix-database-discrepancies", "nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered"]}
{"id": "abc-trump-campaign-pass-through-vendors-obscure-consulting-spend", "permanent_id": "C20260926-001426-24", "uid": "C20260926-001426-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-001426-24", "old_ids": ["abc-trump-campaign-pass-through-vendors-obscure-consulting-spend"], "seq": "C00617", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Consultants", "Drain campaign funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-92", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-92", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Federal", "description": "Contemporaneous reporting alleged the Trump campaign routed large consulting/ad spends through pass-through vendors that obscured ultimate payees and markup—consistent with a suck-money opacity pattern around campaign consultants. Status Partially confirmed: reporting and FEC disclosure structure Confirmed; intentional 'covert subversion of the candidate' motive remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "ABC News — pass-through vendors obscure ~$170M payments", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-campaign-accused-pass-vendors-obscure-170-million/story?id=72020510"}, {"title": "OpenSecrets — fundraising/consultant fee patterns in scam-PAC context", "url": "https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2023/08/how-scam-pacs-line-their-pockets-by-deceiving-political-donors/"}], "notes": "Fill-20g leaf 12 companion. Weaker motive labeled Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "early-vote-public-files-plus-epb-central-sync-feedback-control-architecture", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-19", "uid": "C20260925-220029-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-19", "old_ids": ["early-vote-public-files-plus-epb-central-sync-feedback-control-architecture"], "seq": "C00372", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Election \"Day\"", "Together, this turns the election into a feedback control system that bad actors can use to control results with high precision."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-16", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Combining (a) public early-vote / who-voted files and daily early-turnout analytics with (b) networked EPB central check-in databases creates a continuous observation → targeting loop during the multi-week voting window—an architecture that matches the catalog's 'feedback control system' description at the process level. Status Partially confirmed: the sensing/feedback components are Confirmed; high-precision outcome control by bad actors is not established by these sources (Alleged).", "sources": [{"title": "Gothamist — public early-vote files usable by campaigns", "url": "https://gothamist.com/news/yang-campaign-knows-who-voted-early-and-board-elections-says-you-can-too"}, {"title": "EAC — KNOWiNK ePulse central sync Scope of Certification", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-02/KNOWiNK_Poll_Pad_v.3.6_Scope_of_Certification_VEPBCR_1.0_508.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. Elections Project — daily early vote analyses 2020", "url": "https://electproject.github.io/Early-Vote-2020G/Early_Vote_Analysis_10_4.html"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 10. Architecture Partially confirmed; precision-control claim Alleged.", "vendor": ["KnowInk"]}
{"id": "pa-poll-watcher-county-residency-limits-who-can-watch-what", "permanent_id": "C20260925-214102-18", "uid": "C20260925-214102-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-214102-18", "old_ids": ["pa-poll-watcher-county-residency-limits-who-can-watch-what"], "seq": "C00341", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They mistrain poll watchers so they do not know what to look for."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-05", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "PA", "description": "Pennsylvania's county-residency poll-watcher rule (25 P.S. §2687(b)), upheld in 2020 litigation, structurally limits which trained observers may be present in a county — reducing the pool of experienced out-of-county watchers who know what anomalies to look for. Status Partially confirmed as a personnel/training-pipeline constraint related to watcher effectiveness (primary card pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020 remains on Poll Watchers stub; this companions the mis-train leaf as access/experience gating).", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener — PA poll watcher residency litigation materials", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736/gov.uscourts.pawd.268736.574.0_2.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020__w-d-pa-trump-v-boockvar-materials-courtlistener.pdf"}, {"title": "PA Courts media PDF — related watcher litigation", "url": "https://www.pacourts.us/Storage/media/pdfs/20210510/224838-file-9888.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-poll-watcher-residency-2020__pa-supreme-court-docket-materials-republican-committee-answe.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15g leaf 9 companion. Softer map — residency gate ≠ literal false training curriculum."}
{"id": "stark-cgg-georgia-2020-audit-incomplete-accounting-cannot-establish-outcome", "permanent_id": "C20260925-220029-30", "uid": "C20260925-220029-30", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-220029-30", "old_ids": ["stark-cgg-georgia-2020-audit-incomplete-accounting-cannot-establish-outcome"], "seq": "C00383", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "Audits are engineered to avoid catching fraud (easy when the fraud is algorithmic)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-65", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-65", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "GA", "description": "Stark/CGG reports on Georgia's 2020 audit document duplicated/missing ballots, incomplete accounting, and omitted audit records such that the audit could not rigorously establish the reported outcome—illustrating how audit procedures can be structured or executed in ways that fail to catch errors/fraud. Status Partially confirmed for incomplete/inadequate audit accounting (process); not a finding that 2020 outcomes were fraudulent.", "sources": [{"title": "Stark preprint — CGG report on Georgia audit issues PDF", "url": "https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/cgg-rept-10.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-cgg-georgia-2020-audit-incomplete-accounting-cannot-establish-outcome__stark-preprint-cgg-report-on-georgia-audit-issues-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Stark preprint — related CGG report PDF", "url": "https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Preprints/cgg-rept-7.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/stark-cgg-georgia-2020-audit-incomplete-accounting-cannot-establish-outcome__stark-preprint-related-cgg-report-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20a leaf 15 companion. Careful: process inadequacy ≠ outcome fraud Confirmed."}
{"id": "unite-america-tides-rcv-funding-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-32", "uid": "C20260925-155410-32", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-32", "old_ids": ["unite-america-tides-rcv-funding-2020"], "seq": "C00032", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "Tides Foundation and Unite America"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-15", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020", "state": "AK / MA / Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia's compilation of 2020 RCV ballot-measure funding shows Unite America as a top donor (e.g., ~$3.4M toward Alaska Ballot Measure 2's Alaskans for Better Elections; six-figure support for Massachusetts Question 2). InfluenceWatch and advocacy trackers also list Tides Foundation among FairVote/RCV ecosystem funders. Status Partially confirmed for Unite America's large disclosed contributions to 2020 RCV campaigns via Ballotpedia reporting; Tides→FairVote amounts rely more on secondary aggregators pending 990 line-item cross-check. Does not establish that RCV enables covert tabulation fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia News — Who funded RCV ballot measures in 2020?", "url": "https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/02/22/who-funded-the-campaigns-for-and-against-ranked-choice-voting-ballot-measures-in-2020/"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Alaska Ballot Measure 2 (2020)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Ballot_Measure_2,_Top-Four_Ranked-Choice_Voting_and_Campaign_Finance_Laws_Initiative_(2020)"}, {"title": "InfluenceWatch — Unite America Institute", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/unite-america-institute/"}], "notes": "Disclose InfluenceWatch as advocacy-adjacent research."}
{"id": "seed-maricopa-ngo-api", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-18", "uid": "C20260925-155410-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-18", "old_ids": ["seed-maricopa-ngo-api"], "seq": "C00018", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration", "In at least Maricopa County, the county gave registration NGOs direct URL and application programming interface (API) access to its voter registration system."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-62", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-62", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona Secretary of State operates an Online Voter Registration Unique URL Program under which approved political parties and nonprofit voter-outreach groups receive trackable URLs that send applicants into ServiceArizona (MVD-backed online registration) for eligibility checks. AZCIR (Oct. 2024) and SOS statements confirm the program's existence and that registrations process through ServiceArizona subject to state/federal rules; SOS materials describe tracking of referral volume, not NGO write access into county voter databases. Catalog seed claiming Maricopa gave NGOs direct API/write access to the county registration system remains unverified and is disputed by SOS/AZCIR framing. Status Partially confirmed for Unique URL NGO/party referral program; Alleged portion (two-way API write access) not established.", "sources": [{"title": "AZCIR / Gigafact — Unique URL Program fact brief", "url": "https://azcir.org/news/2024/10/11/fact-brief-does-arizona-secretary-of-state-unique-url-program-allow-noncitizens-register-to-vote-no/"}, {"title": "EIN Presswire / AZ SOS — Unique URL Program applications (2022)", "url": "https://www.einpresswire.com/article/561686453/applications-available-for-the-online-voter-registration-unique-url-program", "local": "/archives/2026/09/seed-maricopa-ngo-api__ein-presswire-az-sos-unique-url-program-applications-2022.png"}, {"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__hand-count-road-show-cabal-tactics-catalog-definition.png"}], "notes": "Catalog API-write claim still unverified; Unique URL program Confirmed as public SOS program. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls > NGO registration / API access' to 'Registration > Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations > Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) Conducting Voter Registration > In at least Maricopa County, the county provided registration NGO's URL/API a...'."}
{"id": "action-now-gehl-rcv-funding-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-33", "uid": "C20260925-155410-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-33", "old_ids": ["action-now-gehl-rcv-funding-2020"], "seq": "C00033", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "GEHL and Action Now"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-16", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-16", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-2022", "state": "AK / MA / NV / Multi-state", "description": "Ballotpedia reporting identifies the Action Now Initiative (Arnold-affiliated) as a leading funder of 2020 RCV campaigns, including ~$2.9M to Alaska's Alaskans for Better Elections and ~$3.66M to Massachusetts Ranked Choice Voting 2020. Katherine Gehl's Final Five / Institute for Political Innovation network is frequently paired with Action Now on open-primary/RCV measures (e.g., Nevada coverage). Status Partially confirmed for Action Now Initiative's disclosed RCV ballot funding; Gehl organizational pairing documented in contemporaneous reporting—exact catalog \"GEHL / Action Now\" structure is advocacy taxonomy.", "sources": [{"title": "Ballotpedia News — Who funded RCV ballot measures in 2020?", "url": "https://news.ballotpedia.org/2021/02/22/who-funded-the-campaigns-for-and-against-ranked-choice-voting-ballot-measures-in-2020/"}, {"title": "Nevada Independent — Open primary/RCV measure fundraising (Action Now)", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/open-primary-ranked-choice-ballot-measure-raises-2-2-million-in-2022-first-quarter"}, {"title": "InfluenceWatch — Final Five Fund Inc.", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/political-party/final-five-fund-inc/"}], "notes": "Campaign-finance reporting Confirmed for Action Now amounts via Ballotpedia."}
{"id": "pa-metcalfe-wolf-election-challenge-timing-barriers-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-24", "uid": "C20260925-205354-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-24", "old_ids": ["pa-metcalfe-wolf-election-challenge-timing-barriers-2020"], "seq": "C00239", "category": "4. Legislative & Legal Barriers", "tactic_path": ["Lawfare", "Use delay tactics to stall until no time is left to fix anything."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-35", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-35", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-12", "state": "PA", "description": "Post-2020 Pennsylvania election challenges (including Metcalfe-related and companion canvassing/observer suits) repeatedly collided with statutory deadlines, mootness after certification/electors, and courts' refusal to unwind completed processes — a pattern in which delayed filing left no practical remedial window. Status Partially confirmed for the documented timing-bar pattern across multiple PA dockets (individual case dispositions vary).", "sources": [{"title": "Pennsylvania Courts / case materials context (Metcalfe v. Wolf prelim. objections packet)", "url": "https://electioncases.osu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Metcalfe-v-Wolf-Executive-Respondents-Preliminary-Objections.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pa-metcalfe-wolf-election-challenge-timing-barriers-2020__pennsylvania-courts-case-materials-context-metcalfe-v-wolf-p.pdf"}, {"title": "Justia — In re Canvassing Observation (timing of observer fights during canvass)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2020/30-eap-2020.html"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 12."}
{"id": "antrim-mi-2020-halderman-election-definition-resync-changed-reported-totals", "permanent_id": "C20260925-234437-18", "uid": "C20260925-234437-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-234437-18", "old_ids": ["antrim-mi-2020-halderman-election-definition-resync-changed-reported-totals"], "seq": "C00451", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Record the votes properly in the database initially, then change them later."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-39", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-39", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "MI", "description": "Halderman's independent forensic investigation of Antrim County, MI (Nov 2020) shows outdated scanner election-definition cards versus a later-updated EMS configuration produced wildly wrong initial reported totals that were later corrected after reconfiguration/rescans—illustrating how EMS/database-side definition changes after initial recording/reporting can flip published numbers. Status Partially confirmed: mechanism of post-initial-report change via election-definition/database mismatch is documented; intentional fraud not established (Halderman attributes error to configuration mismanagement).", "sources": [{"title": "Halderman et al. — The Antrim County 2020 Election Incident (USENIX Security 2022 PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/antrim-sec22.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan SOS — Analysis of the Antrim County November 2020 Election Incident", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/-/media/Project/Websites/sos/30lawens/Antrim.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20c leaf 9 companion."}
{"id": "maricopa-2020-ag-interim-report-ballot-transport-forms-missing-seal-numbers", "permanent_id": "C20261007-123654-02", "uid": "C20261007-123654-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261007-123654-02", "old_ids": ["maricopa-2020-ag-interim-report-ballot-transport-forms-missing-seal-numbers"], "seq": "C01330", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Broken physical seals that destroy the chain of custody of paper ballots"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-43", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "In an April 6, 2022 interim report to Arizona Senate President Karen Fann, Attorney General Mark Brnovich's Election Integrity Unit said its review of Maricopa County's 2020 general election confirmed that 381 of 1,895 Early Voting Ballot Transportation Statements (about 20%) were missing required information. The gaps included missing courier, auditor, and receiver signatures, missing ballot counts, missing documentation of security seals, and missing the two required seal numbers. The AG estimated that 100,000 to 200,000 early ballots may have moved from drop boxes to the central tabulation center without a proper documented chain of custody. Maricopa County's Recorder and Board of Supervisors disputed the AG's conclusions in a May 2022 response, and the report did not find that any ballots were altered or added. Status Partially confirmed: a state law-enforcement review documented the missing seal and custody records, while the county contests what those gaps mean. Without recorded seal numbers there is no way to prove a container's seal was never broken, which is the weakness centralized drop-box-to-tabulator pipelines create and precinct-level PEP counting avoids.", "sources": [{"title": "Arizona Attorney General — Interim report to Senate President Fann on Maricopa County 2020 general election (Apr. 6, 2022; DocumentCloud copy)", "url": "https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21579815/2022-04-06-fann-letter.pdf"}, {"title": "Courthouse News (hosted PDF) — Maricopa County Recorder and Board of Supervisors response to AG, with exhibits (May 3, 2022)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Recorder-BOS-AG-Response-with-Exhibits-5-3-22_202205041209112867.pdf"}, {"title": "Verity Vote — Maricopa drop box chain of custody (complaint that prompted the review, Jan. 2022)", "url": "https://verityvote.us/maricopa-dropbox-chain-of-custody/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-07. Partially confirmed (AG review documented missing seal records; county disputes conclusions; no finding of altered ballots). Verity Vote's larger 740,000 estimate not adopted. Not a Hudson CVR remount."}
{"id": "maricopa-az-2020-front-back-printer-calibration", "permanent_id": "C20260925-181533-05", "uid": "C20260925-181533-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-181533-05", "old_ids": ["maricopa-az-2020-front-back-printer-calibration"], "seq": "C00077", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Misalignment between the front and back of the ballot causes misreads, easily diverting ballots to adjudication for manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-63", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-63", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "AZ", "description": "The 2021 Maricopa County forensic review (Cyber Ninjas Vol. 3) reported that many ballots appeared printed on printers not properly calibrated so the front page was not consistently aligned with the back, and discussed how miscalibration plus bleed-through could in theory push marks toward opposite-side ovals or confuse tabulators toward adjudication. Reviewers stated they did not find images where bleed-through filled an oval or an immediate adjudication correlation. Status Partially confirmed for observed front/back miscalibration on ballots; causal adjudication/manipulation pathway not established in that review.", "sources": [{"title": "Cyber Ninjas / Maricopa Forensic Election Audit Vol. 3 (archived)", "url": "https://archive.amarkfoundation.org/the2020election/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/cyber-ninjas-vol3.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-az-2020-front-back-printer-calibration__cyber-ninjas-maricopa-forensic-election-audit-vol-3-archived.pdf"}], "notes": "Partially confirmed for observed front/back miscalibration; adjudication/manipulation pathway not established in that review."}
{"id": "philadelphia-pa-canvass-observer-distance-in-re-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-06", "uid": "C20260925-205354-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-06", "old_ids": ["philadelphia-pa-canvass-observer-distance-in-re-2020"], "seq": "C00221", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11", "state": "PA", "description": "In In re Canvassing Observation (Pa. 2020), Trump campaign representatives challenged Philadelphia Board rules that positioned authorized representatives far from mail-ballot pre-canvass/canvass tables. Commonwealth Court found the distance prevented meaningful observation; the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding the Election Code requires only that representatives be 'present in the room,' not a minimum viewing distance. Status Partially confirmed for the documented practice of distancing observers from ballot processing (event Confirmed) while the legal claim that distance violated the Code was rejected (Upheld for the Board).", "sources": [{"title": "Justia — In re: Canvassing Observation (Pa. 2020)", "url": "https://law.justia.com/cases/pennsylvania/supreme-court/2020/30-eap-2020.html"}, {"title": "ABC News — Trump lawsuits allege lack of access for poll observers", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/trump-files-election-lawsuits-michigan-pennsylvania-alleging-lack/story?id=74032924"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 3. Distance/meaningful-observation dispute; PA SC: presence suffices.", "related": ["mi-wayne-2020-11-04-detroit-tcf-center-counting-room-windows-covered"]}
{"id": "nv-clark-2020-district-c-139-discrepancies-6-voted-twice", "permanent_id": "C20261009-105430-07", "uid": "C20261009-105430-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-105430-07", "old_ids": ["nv-clark-2020-district-c-139-discrepancies-6-voted-twice"], "seq": "C01340", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11-16", "state": "NV", "description": "In the Nov. 2020 Clark County Commission District C race, decided by 10 votes, Registrar Joe Gloria told the commission he could not explain 139 discrepancies, including mail-ballot tracking and in-person check-in issues. He said six voters had been identified as voting twice. The commission first voted to seek a new election, then certified Ross Miller on Dec. 1, 2020. Statewide, the Secretary of State's Apr. 21, 2021 review of NV GOP double-voter claims found 2,828 of the named people had cast one ballot. The rest did not match the state's multiple-vote report; 10 records were referred to law enforcement. Nevada rule then and as of 2026 (NRS 293.269917(3), unchanged since all-mail became permanent under AB 321 (2021)): a voter sent a mail ballot may vote a regular in-person ballot by surrendering the mail ballot or signing an affirmation under penalty of perjury that they have not voted. The mailed ballot must then be rejected if it arrives (mail accepted through the 4th day after ED). Partially confirmed: whether the six were mail-plus-in-person and whether both ballots counted is not specified.", "sources": [{"title": "Las Vegas Review-Journal — Special election could decide close Clark County Commission race (139 discrepancies)", "url": "https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/clark-county/special-election-could-decide-close-clark-county-commission-race-2184993/"}, {"title": "KNPR — Clark County Commission certifies Miller's win in District C (Dec. 2, 2020)", "url": "https://knpr.org/knpr/2020-12-02/clark-county-commission-certifies-millers-win-district-c"}, {"title": "Nevada Secretary of State — Election Integrity Violation Reports letter to NV GOP (Apr. 21, 2021, PDF)", "url": "https://americanliberty.news/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/4212021-Letter-to-NVGOP-w.pdf"}, {"title": "NRS 293.269917 — Voting in person after mail ballot sent: surrender or affirmation (Election Law Navigator)", "url": "https://electionlawnavigator.org/state/nevada/statute/293.269917/"}], "notes": "Provisional/absentee leaf 2026-10-09. NV rule rechecked 2026-10-09 (NRS 293.269917(3); Clark/Washoe county pages)."}
{"id": "mi-2020-general-board-of-state-canvassers-shinkle-party-chair-spouse-trump-suit-affiant-abstained", "permanent_id": "C20261111-123004-04", "uid": "C20261111-123004-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-123004-04", "old_ids": ["mi-2020-general-board-of-state-canvassers-shinkle-party-chair-spouse-trump-suit-affiant-abstained"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Certification", "Seat an election official with a conflict of interest on the canvassing or recount board."], "leaf_id": "L20261109-123201-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261109-123201-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11-11 (Bridge report); 2020-11-23 (state certification vote)", "state": "MI", "description": "Michigan's Board of State Canvassers, a four-member, intentionally partisan body that certifies statewide results and needs at least three votes to do so, included Republican Norm Shinkle when it met on Nov. 23, 2020 to certify the Nov. 3 general election. Bridge Michigan reported on Nov. 11, 2020 that Shinkle, a former state senator, was chairman of Michigan's 8th Congressional District Republican Committee and had 'actively worked to re-elect President Donald Trump,' and that his wife, Mary Shinkle, a Republican poll challenger at Detroit's TCF Center absentee count, was a witness who had filed an affidavit in the Trump campaign's federal lawsuit, which asked the court to bar the Board of State Canvassers from certifying until ballots were verified. Shinkle told Bridge 'She saw a lot of strange things going on' and that he would wait to hear both sides; asked about the scrutiny, he told The Washington Post (as reported by The Hill) 'That's almost an accusation against marriage. My wife can do whatever she wants to do.' Democratic member Julie Matuzak said 'I don't blame anybody for their spouse's actions.' At the Nov. 23 meeting the board certified 3-0, with Republican Aaron Van Langevelde joining the two Democrats; Shinkle abstained after urging a delay and an audit of Wayne County, and the board voted 4-0 to ask the Legislature to review election procedures. The campaign's suit had been withdrawn. Status Partially confirmed: Shinkle's seat, party role, his wife's affidavit and his abstention are confirmed by Bridge Michigan, the Detroit Free Press (via the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel), The Hill and the Monroe News; no recusal requirement or official conflict-of-interest finding was reported, and Shinkle rejected the conflict suggestion. Catalog point: the board that makes results official is staffed by party officials, and here one certifier's household was a sworn witness in a suit aimed at that board's own vote; whether that is a conflict was left to the member himself. Counting and posting results at the precinct, in public, makes the final certifiers' personal stakes matter far less.", "sources": [{"title": "Bridge Michigan — Four partisans must certify Michigan's election. One makes no promises. (Jonathan Oosting, Nov. 11, 2020)", "url": "https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/four-partisans-must-certify-michigans-election-one-makes-no-promises/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/bridgemi-four-partisans-certify-shinkle-2020-11-11.html"}, {"title": "Bridge Michigan — Canvassers certify election. Joe Biden wins Michigan, its 16 electoral votes (Nov. 23, 2020)", "url": "https://bridgemi.com/michigan-government/canvassers-certify-election-joe-biden-wins-michigan-its-16-electoral-votes/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/bridgemi-canvassers-certify-shinkle-abstains-2020-11-23.html"}, {"title": "Detroit Free Press via Milwaukee Journal Sentinel — Michigan board votes to certify election results despite GOP calls to delay (Nov. 23, 2020)", "url": "https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/23/did-michigan-certify-election-results-board-canvassers/6399753002/"}, {"title": "The Hill — Michigan election official leaning toward audit, delay in vote certification (Nov. 2020)", "url": "https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/526818-michigan-election-official-leaning-towards-audit-delay-in-vote/"}, {"title": "Monroe News — The Shinkles' roles in presidential election (Nov. 21, 2020)", "url": "https://www.monroenews.com/story/news/2020/11/21/shinklesrsquo-roles-in-presidential-election/115018294/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-11 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-11 12:30 PM ET). Thin leaf (1 -> 2), peer Miami-Dade CD-27 2026. Bridge pages read via WebFetch and archived (curl 200); JSOnline and Monroe News returned 402 and The Hill 403 to curl, so linked only (content read via search). Party labels stated because the sources state them; the card takes no position on the 2020 fraud claims. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "chicago-otis-school-sprinkler-flood-polling-2020", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-03", "uid": "C20260925-194013-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-03", "old_ids": ["chicago-otis-school-sprinkler-flood-polling-2020"], "seq": "C00187", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Chain-of-Custody Sleight of Hand", "Water main breaks"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-30", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-30", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03", "state": "IL", "description": "On Election Day 2020, a sprinkler/pipe water flood at James Otis School (Chicago Precinct 37, Ward 1) forced evacuation of the polling room, standing water among voting equipment, and redirection of voters to the Goldblatt's Building; the Chicago Board of Election Commissioners said it was working to recover ballots and reported no ballots deemed damaged as of late afternoon. Status Partially confirmed: water flooding disrupted custody/continuity of a live polling place (sibling to water-main-break leaf); cause was sprinkler activation rather than a municipal water-main break.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS Chicago — Sprinkler system floods West Town polling place; no damaged ballots reported", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/chicago/news/pipe-bursts-at-polling-place-in-west-town/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/chicago-otis-school-sprinkler-flood-polling-2020__cbs-chicago-sprinkler-system-floods-west-town-polling-place.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 1. Water flood at poll; sprinkler not municipal main."}
{"id": "ga-spalding-morgan-2020-11-03-knowink-pollpads-fail-encode-dominion-voter-cards-vendor-overnight-update-disputed", "permanent_id": "C20261118-122125-03", "uid": "C20261118-122125-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-122125-03", "old_ids": ["ga-spalding-morgan-2020-11-03-knowink-pollpads-fail-encode-dominion-voter-cards-vendor-overnight-update-disputed"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-12", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-12", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-11-03 (general election)", "state": "GA", "description": "On the morning of Nov. 3, 2020, poll workers in Spalding and Morgan counties, Georgia, could not use the KnowInk electronic poll books to encode the voter access cards that load each voter's ballot on the Dominion ballot-marking devices, so voters could not cast machine ballots for a couple of hours. Spalding County rushed thousands of provisional and emergency paper ballots to its precincts, many voters stood in line much of the morning, and a Superior Court judge extended voting hours (WSB-TV; AP). Morgan County Elections Director Jennifer Doran said poll workers moved to emergency backup procedures and that Dominion technicians fixed the issue. Spalding Elections Supervisor Marcia Ridley said the companies 'uploaded something last night, which is not normal, and it caused a glitch,' and board chair Margaret Bentley said a Dominion representative had notified the office at 7:05 a.m. of a problem with an overnight update: 'why in the world would they do it last night?' The Secretary of State's office investigated. Nine days later, Ridley told POLITICO the poll-book log files showed no update on the night before Election Day, but she stood by her statement that a Dominion representative had told her office an update was uploaded; state officials and Dominion acknowledged a poll-book problem but disputed the overnight-update account, and the cause was publicly unexplained at that time. Status Partially confirmed: the county-wide poll-book failure, the emergency ballots and the court-ordered extension are confirmed by officials and a court order; the cause, including whether a vendor update was pushed the night before, is disputed and was not publicly resolved in the sources found. Catalog point: an electronic poll book that must encode a card before a voter can use the machine is a single point of failure controlled by vendors; paper poll books and hand-marked paper ballots counted at the precinct keep voting going without vendor intervention.", "sources": [{"title": "WSB-TV — Spalding County extends voting hours after issues with machines (Nov. 3, 2020)", "url": "https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/spalding-county-experiencing-county-wide-glitch-bringing-down-voting-machines/EPCV6RSBRFBLTJUVQXJZAIFO2U/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/wsbtv-spalding-ga-2020-11-03-pollpad-glitch-extended-hours.html"}, {"title": "The GRIP — Spalding voting machine 'glitch' under investigation by Secretary of State (Sheila A. Mathews, Nov. 3, 2020)", "url": "https://the-grip.net/2020/11/03/spalding-voting-machine-glitch-under-investigation-by-secretary-of-state/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/thegrip-spalding-ga-2020-11-03-dominion-overnight-update-glitch.html"}, {"title": "Citizens for Voting Integrity New York — Georgia election official: Machine glitch caused by last-minute vendor upload (republishes AP report, Nov. 2020)", "url": "https://citizensvotingny.org/news-blog/georgia-election-official-machine-glitch-caused-by-last-minute-vendor-upload", "local": "/archives/2026/11/cvi-ny-repost-ap-spalding-morgan-ga-2020-vendor-upload.html"}, {"title": "POLITICO — Cause of Election Day glitch in Georgia counties still unexplained (Nov. 2020)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2020/11/04/georgia-election-machine-glitch-434065"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-18 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-18 12:21 PM ET). WSB-TV, The GRIP and the CVI-NY republication archived (curl 200); POLITICO returned 403 to curl and timed out on WebFetch, so it is linked only (content seen in search extract). Vendor tags KnowInk and Dominion because the sources name both. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["KnowInk", "Dominion"], "vendor_models": ["Poll Pad"]}
{"id": "dallas-tx-2020-sypho-pollbook-someone-voted-in-name-high-propensity-catch", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-03", "uid": "C20260926-034259-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-03", "old_ids": ["dallas-tx-2020-sypho-pollbook-someone-voted-in-name-high-propensity-catch"], "seq": "C01243", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "High-propensity voters: very risky and a last resort, because voters are likely to catch the use of their records."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-13", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-10-23", "state": "TX", "description": "NBC 5 Investigates (Oct. 23, 2020): Dallas County early voter Rashad Sypho—hospitalized for ~two weeks—was told at a DeSoto site that records showed he already voted Oct. 13 at Harry Stone Rec Center ~20 miles away; County Judge Clay Jenkins confirmed a system/pollbook-data error affecting ~30 ES&S electronic pollbooks with potential to affect ~72–100 voters and said it appeared 2–4 voters actually cast ballots in another person's name; Sypho voted provisional. Texas SOS 2020 election audit later verified Dallas pollbook 'phantom voter' check-ins affected 188 voters (could not bound upper limit due to incomplete records). Status Partially confirmed: high-engagement registrant catching an 'already voted in my name' event plus audit-verified pollbook identity mismatches are documented; intentional phantom-association motive is not established. Peer to Dutchess Miner and Tarrant Lorant cards already on this leaf—Dallas 2020 Sypho/pollbook instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: when high-propensity voters catch opaque electronic check-in mismatches, hand-marked paper counted in public removes the invisible 'already voted' machine gate.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC 5 DFW — At least two Dallas County voters learn someone else voted in their name (Oct. 23, 2020)", "url": "https://www.nbcdfw.com/investigations/at-least-two-dallas-county-voters-learn-someone-else-voted-in-their-name/2465939/"}, {"title": "Texas SOS — Final Report on Audit of 2020 General Election (Dallas pollbook 'phantom voters,' 188 verified)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/elections/fad/2020-Audit-Full.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dallas-tx-2020-sypho-pollbook-someone-voted-in-name-high-propensity-catch__texas-sos-final-report-on-audit-of-2020-general-election-dallas-pollbook-phantom-voters-188-verified.pdf"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on high-propensity catch leaf (non-Miner/Lorant).", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style", "permanent_id": "C20261021-140608-01", "uid": "C20261021-140608-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-140608-01", "old_ids": ["tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style"], "seq": "C01510", "category": "8. Physical Ballot & Printing Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Ballots", "Voters are given the wrong ballot styles to affect whom they can vote for, which is then excused as a \"mistake.\""], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-60", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-60", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-10-13 to 2020-11-03", "state": "TX", "description": "During early voting (Oct. 13–30, 2020) and on Election Day, Nov. 3, 2020, Williamson County, Texas, ran vote centers in which Tenex Software Solutions electronic pollbooks printed each voter's ballot card, with a barcode that set the ballot style, for use on ES&S ExpressVote ballot-marking devices. In a Feb. 16, 2023 analysis for Princeton's Center for Information Technology Policy, computer scientist Andrew Appel wrote that, based on poll-worker affidavits and county e-mails obtained through Texas Public Information Act requests by Lori Gallagher, voters and poll workers reported from about Oct. 18 through Election Day that voters were being handed the wrong ballot. The mechanism he described was the pollbook print queue: when a poll worker pressed Print more than once, an extra card was queued, and each following voter could receive the previous voter's ballot style, so a voter could vote in another district's local contests and miss their own. Appel quotes an Oct. 18, 2020 e-mail from Elections Administrator Christopher J. Davis to his staff: \"if there was some kind of mishap with the previous voter at that station, it might be possible that the [ballot style] for them is repeated for the next voter. I have to wonder how many voters are voting an incorrect ballot.\" Appel also quotes the Morris County, New Jersey elections administrator, who said in October 2022 that Tenex had stated the incident resulted from a pop-up timer the Texas county did not have turned on, and that the reprint button is now grayed out for 10 seconds. The county's public account was different. In a Nov. 6, 2020 release, it said early-voting ballots carried the correct ballot style but lacked precinct associations, so they had to be rescanned for precinct-level reports, and Davis told a court on Nov. 10 that voters received the correct ballot style. An election-contest petition in the 2020 sheriff's race attached a poll watcher's affidavit describing the same multiple-print queue. Appel concluded that no recount can repair a ballot cast in the wrong contest, and he wrote that some voters again received wrong ballots in the March 2022 primary. Status Partially confirmed: the county acknowledged a Tenex pollbook programming error, the vendor's statement acknowledges the print-queue incident, and the administrator's own e-mail anticipated wrong ballots; the county publicly denied that wrong ballot styles were issued, and the number of affected voters is unknown. No intent is alleged, and Gallagher has said she believes it was an error. Catalog point: when software picks the ballot at the moment of check-in, a misfire is invisible to the voter and cannot be undone after the ballot is cast. Each confirmed \"mistake\" anywhere makes the excuse credible everywhere. Pre-printed precinct ballots, checked by the presiding judge before the polls open and counted by hand in that precinct, cannot be swapped by a print queue.", "sources": [{"title": "Princeton CITP Blog — Andrew Appel, Unrecoverable Election Screwup in Williamson County TX (Feb. 16, 2023)", "url": "https://blog.citp.princeton.edu/2023/02/16/unrecoverable-election-screwup-in-williamson-county-tx/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style__citp-appel-2023.html"}, {"title": "Election Law Blog — Rick Hasen, Must-read from Andrew Appel on Williamson County TX (Feb. 16, 2023)", "url": "https://electionlawblog.org/?p=134756", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style__electionlawblog-2023.html"}, {"title": "Austin American-Statesman — Williamson County finds glitch in early voting system that will not affect results (Nov. 6, 2020; county and Tenex statements)", "url": "https://www.statesman.com/story/news/local/2020/11/06/williamson-county-finds-glitch-in-early-voting-system-that-will-not-affect-results/114720144/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style__statesman-2020-11-06.html"}, {"title": "Community Impact — Williamson County certifies election results but continues to field claims of voter fraud (Nov. 2020)", "url": "https://communityimpact.com/georgetown/government/williamson-county-certifies-election-results-but-continues-to-field-claims-of-voter-fraud/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-williamson-2020-tenex-epollbook-print-queue-previous-voter-ballot-style__communityimpact-2020.html"}, {"title": "Scribd — 2020 Williamson County sheriff election-contest petition with poll-watcher affidavits (print-queue account)", "url": "https://www.scribd.com/document/489523708/Chody-Lawsuit"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), reply to Mark Cook listing Texas ballot-on-demand failures (Oct. 21, 2026, 1:54 PM ET; no media)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112965849451827224", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--reply__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm), thread post reproducing the Appel article (Oct. 21, 2026, 12:00 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Lorionafarm/status/2112937114295750758", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-lorionafarm-2026-10-21-ballot-on-demand-thread--appel-paste__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Lead: Mark Cook, 2026-10-21 2:00 PM ET, X post by Lori Gallagher (@Lorionafarm, Texas citizen auditor) 2112965849451827224, a reply to Mark's questions in her Bexar thread (root 2112933307159609699). Mark asked that each issue in the post be handled separately. Issue 1 of the post. Appel credits Gallagher's records requests, so his article is not independent of her; the corroboration rests on the county administrator's quoted e-mail, the Tenex statement relayed by Morris County, and the contest affidavits. Her further claim that a county e-mail that month logged a local contest left off a ballot style entirely is not in the Appel article and is held in the research queue (tx-williamson-2020-county-email-local-contest-left-off-ballot-style). Archived: CITP, ELB, Statesman, Community Impact, X captures. Scribd not archived (script-rendered). Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Tenex", "ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "fl-hillsborough-2020-soe-ctcl-grant-2-6m-no-bid-vistra-gotv-campaign-targeting-black-hispanic-youth", "permanent_id": "C20261116-122653-03", "uid": "C20261116-122653-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-122653-03", "old_ids": ["fl-hillsborough-2020-soe-ctcl-grant-2-6m-no-bid-vistra-gotv-campaign-targeting-black-hispanic-youth"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Publicly funded voter outreach targeted by race or ethnicity"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-233450-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-233450-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-09-11 (grant request); 2020-09-21 (CTCL award); 2020-09-22 (Vistra contract); 2022-05-25 (records lawsuit filed)", "state": "FL", "description": "In September 2020 the Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections Office (Supervisor Craig Latimer) received a grant of about $2.9 million from the Center for Tech and Civic Life (CTCL), funded by Mark Zuckerberg and Priscilla Chan, and paid about $2.6 million of it to Lutz-based Vistra Communications for a six-week campaign before the Nov. 3, 2020 election. On Sept. 2, 2020, SOE spokesperson Gerri Kramer had told Florida Politics the office would not apply: 'That won't happen in Hillsborough. We're good.' A public-records lawsuit filed May 25, 2022 in the 13th Judicial Circuit by Lakeland attorney Hardam Tripathi (counsel Jeff Childers) against the SOE and Vistra attaches records showing Vistra presenting a six-week, $2.6 million 'Get out the Vote' proposal whose campaign concept targeted 'Youth: Black/African American, Hispanic/Latinx, and Mainstream' audiences, and alleges the SOE told Vistra to rename it a 'Voter Education' campaign; the suit argues the targeted groups are disproportionately registered Democrats in the county and seeks Vistra's withheld records (Tampa Free Press; Eye on Tampa Bay). Vistra's own case study confirms the SOE hired it for the 2020 campaign, aimed at boosting early and mail voting and reaching new and infrequent voters, with 121 million impressions. The SOE's chief of staff declined comment on pending litigation. Status Partially confirmed: the grant, the contract and the campaign are confirmed by the contractor's own case study and the records attached to the suit; the race-and-ethnicity audience targeting rests on a proposal document as reported from the lawsuit exhibits, and the partisan purpose is the plaintiff's allegation. No court ruling on the claims was found in this sweep. Florida later banned private funding of election offices. Catalog point: grant money routed through a public election office paid for a turnout campaign aimed at chosen racial and ethnic groups, so the office itself worked some voters and not others.", "sources": [{"title": "Tampa Free Press — Lakeland attorney files suit against Supervisor of Elections in Hillsborough, allegations of 'Zuck Bucks,' violating Florida Sunshine Law (Deborah Childress, June 11, 2022)", "url": "https://www.tampafp.com/lakeland-attorney-files-suit-against-supervisor-of-elections-in-hillsborough-allegations-of-zuck-bucks-violating-florida-sunshine-law/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/tampafp-hillsborough-vistra-ctcl-lawsuit-2022-06-11.html"}, {"title": "Vistra Communications — Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections case study (2020 voter education campaign)", "url": "https://www.consultvistra.com/integrated-marketing-case-studies/hillsborough-county-supervisor-of-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/vistra-hillsborough-soe-2020-campaign-case-study.html"}, {"title": "Eye on Tampa Bay — 'ZuckBucks' related lawsuit filed against Hillsborough County Supervisor of Elections and PR firm Vistra Communications (June 2022; reproduces lawsuit exhibits)", "url": "http://www.eyeontampabay.com/2022/06/zuckbucks-related-lawsuit-filed-against.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-16 (open web, zero X API; added 2026-11-16 12:26 PM ET). Lead from the 2026-11-13 sweep notes. Tampa Free Press read via WebFetch and archived (curl 200); Vistra case study archived (curl 200); Eye on Tampa Bay returned HTTP 500 to curl and is linked only (content seen in search extract). No vendor. Compare Harris TX 2026 and Riverside/San Diego CA 2026 cards on this leaf. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ctcl-2020-zuckerberg-grants-party-adjacent-admin-money", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-19", "uid": "C20260926-005107-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-19", "old_ids": ["ctcl-2020-zuckerberg-grants-party-adjacent-admin-money"], "seq": "C00812", "category": "2. Infiltration, Controlled Opposition & Institutional Capture", "tactic_path": ["Political Parties", "Are likely gaining power or money through complicity in election manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-89", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-89", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "CTCL's 2020 privately funded election-administration grants (~$350M Zuckerberg/Chan network) flowed to local election offices for drop boxes, staffing, and outreach — documented in the corpus and in WILL/Wisconsin reporting — creating monetary and turnout-infrastructure benefits adjacent to party-aligned urban jurisdictions. Wisconsin voters later (Apr 2024) passed constitutional amendments banning private election-administration grants. Soft remount of CTCL/Zuckerbucks family onto this party-complicity/monetary-benefit pathKey. Status Partially confirmed: private money into election admin and subsequent bans Confirmed; 'party complicity in election manipulation' as fraud Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "WILL — Finger on the Scale / Wisconsin CTCL grants report (PDF)", "url": "https://will-law.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/WillLawFINGER-ON-THE-SCALE.6.pdf"}, {"title": "AP News — Wisconsin judge upholds legality of private election grants (2022 context)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/2022-midterm-elections-covid-health-chicago-lawsuits-4f9318cf7cbc01cd117a21395b44615d"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 10. Soft remount CTCL family; honest Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "pilf-2020-critical-condition-deceased-registrations-national", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-24", "uid": "C20260926-005107-24", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-24", "old_ids": ["pilf-2020-critical-condition-deceased-registrations-national"], "seq": "C00817", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "People take names from tombstones in graveyards."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-70", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "Public Interest Legal Foundation's 'Critical Condition' national voter-roll study reported hundreds of thousands of potentially deceased registrants across dozens of states and thousands apparently credited with voting after death in prior cycles — documenting the dead-name inventory that tombstone/deceased-identity schemes would exploit. Status Partially confirmed: large deceased-registration inventories reported with named methodology; each 'voted after death' hit requires case-level verification and is not itself a fraud conviction.", "sources": [{"title": "PILF — Critical Condition report landing", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/research/critical-condition-american-voter-rolls-filled-with-errors-dead-voters-and-duplicate-registrations/"}, {"title": "PILF — Critical Condition PDF", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/pilf-files/Report-Critical_Condition-Web-FINAL-FINAL.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 12 companion."}
{"id": "pilf-critical-condition-duplicate-registrations-multi-address-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-26", "uid": "C20260926-005107-26", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-26", "old_ids": ["pilf-critical-condition-duplicate-registrations-multi-address-companion"], "seq": "C00819", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Pre-register them in multiple early-voting states using forwarding addresses, sympathetic roommates, or vacant properties (a practice already documented in some voter-roll studies)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-11", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "PILF Critical Condition and follow-on state reports document tens of thousands of likely duplicate / interstate-duplicate registrations — the raw material for multi-state pre-registration using alternate addresses. Status Partially confirmed: duplicate-registration inventories Confirmed as research findings; each duplicate is not proof of intentional traveling-voter fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "PILF — Critical Condition (duplicate registrations)", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/research/critical-condition-american-voter-rolls-filled-with-errors-dead-voters-and-duplicate-registrations/"}, {"title": "PILF — North Carolina deceased and duplicative registrations after 2020", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/press/report-tens-of-thousands-of-deceased-and-duplicative-voter-registrations-found-after-2020-election-in-north-carolina/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 13 companion."}
{"id": "pilf-critical-condition-voted-after-death-phantom-priority-companion", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-38", "uid": "C20260926-005107-38", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-38", "old_ids": ["pilf-critical-condition-voted-after-death-phantom-priority-companion"], "seq": "C00831", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "Phantom records: best used first, because no one will show up to vote and be told they already voted."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-11", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-11", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-09-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "PILF Critical Condition reported thousands of registrants apparently credited with voting after death dates in prior cycles — the statistical signature expected if phantom/deceased records are preferentially used. Status Partially confirmed: research flags Confirmed as published findings; each flag needs case adjudication and is not automatically fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "PILF — Critical Condition PDF", "url": "https://publicinterestlegal.org/pilf-files/Report-Critical_Condition-Web-FINAL-FINAL.pdf"}, {"title": "Heritage — Deceased-voter fraud cases filter", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud/search?combine=&state=All&year=&case_type=All&fraud_type=24493", "local": "/archives/2026/09/pilf-critical-condition-voted-after-death-phantom-priority-companion__heritage-deceased-voter-fraud-cases-filter.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 19 companion."}
{"id": "early-vote-files-campaign-feedback-opaque-to-poll-observers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-05", "uid": "C20260926-010219-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-05", "old_ids": ["early-vote-files-campaign-feedback-opaque-to-poll-observers"], "seq": "C00838", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "If done properly, manipulation through the feedback loop remains hidden from county officials."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-17", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-17", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-06-01", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Soft remount of the early-vote who-voted files + networked e-pollbook / BallotTrax feedback architecture onto this leaf: campaigns and party VAN/Catalist/TargetSmart stacks ingest daily early-vote and mail-status files (NYC BOE/Gothamist; FL Rule 1S-2.043 EV lists; TX party EV roster pipelines) to model results and retarget remaining voters — a control loop that runs on data products and vendor hubs outside what county poll observers see when watching openers, scanners, and closing tapes. County officials may publish or transmit the files as routine administration without observing how outside actors associate specific registration records with subsequent ballot injections. Status Partially confirmed: public who-voted feedback architecture Confirmed; that a cabal uses it to hide illicit injections from county officials remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Gothamist — Yang campaign knows who voted early; BOE says you can too", "url": "https://gothamist.com/news/yang-campaign-knows-who-voted-early-and-board-elections-says-you-can-too", "local": "/archives/2026/09/early-vote-files-campaign-feedback-opaque-to-poll-observers__untitled.png"}, {"title": "EAC — Electronic Poll Book Report Final (2023) realtime VR/mail-status feedback", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-07/Electronic_Poll_Book_Report_Final_508.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/early-vote-files-campaign-feedback-opaque-to-poll-observers__untitled.pdf"}, {"title": "Catalist — Analytics & Modeling (results models without looking at ballots)", "url": "https://catalist.us/analytics-models/"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 3. Soft remount EV-files + EPB feedback family. Architecture Confirmed; cabal hide Alleged → Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "doj-2020-arthur-dam-ddos-caforio-campaign-online-assets-hire-hackers", "permanent_id": "C20260926-034259-07", "uid": "C20260926-034259-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-034259-07", "old_ids": ["doj-2020-arthur-dam-ddos-caforio-campaign-online-assets-hire-hackers"], "seq": "C01247", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Criminal hackers hired to attack campaigns' online assets, which the source says Virginia Democrats have conspired to fund"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-38", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-02-20", "state": "CA", "description": "U.S. Attorney CDCA / FBI (Feb. 2020) charged Arthur Jan Dam with intentionally damaging a protected computer after four DDoS attacks took down Bryan Caforio's 2018 Democratic primary campaign website (~21 hours downtime; $27–30k remediation; donation drop); investigators tied attacks to Dam's AWS account and IPs at his home/workplace—Dam was a consultant whose spouse worked as a Katie Hill fundraiser; prosecutors said they found no evidence Hill or the spouse directed the attacks. Status Partially confirmed: federal charging and FBI attribution of criminal DDoS against a campaign's online assets are documented; conspiracy-to-hire by a campaign organization is not established. Peer to Virginia Project Loudoun 'hire hackers' Alleged and Reuters Iranian APT42 Trump-campaign email theft cards already on this leaf—Dam/Caforio domestic DDoS prosecution instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: attacks on campaign online assets are irrelevant to precinct hand counts of paper that do not depend on candidate websites.", "sources": [{"title": "Ars Technica — California man arrested on charges his DDoSes took down candidate's website (Feb. 21, 2020)", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2020/02/california-man-arrested-on-charges-his-ddoses-took-down-candidates-website/"}, {"title": "CyberScoop — Feds charge California man for 2018 DDoS attacks on congressional candidate", "url": "https://cyberscoop.com/arthur-dam-katie-hill-ddos-election-security/"}], "notes": "Enrich-b25 third on Intimidation hire-hackers-online-assets leaf (non-VP/non-APT42 Reuters)."}
{"id": "usps-pub632-uaa-billing-vs-returned-count-soft-remount", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-35", "uid": "C20260926-005107-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-35", "old_ids": ["usps-pub632-uaa-billing-vs-returned-count-soft-remount"], "seq": "C00828", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "County staff do not notice, know why, or care that they received fewer undelivered ballots than they were billed for."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-50", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-50", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2020-01-01", "state": "Federal", "description": "USPS Publication 632 and DMM rules (already in corpus on the billing-by-weight undelivered-ballots leaf) show counties can be charged for UAA/return-service election mail by piece or weight separately from how they tally physical returned ballots in canvass/EAVS reporting — creating a structural opportunity for billed-vs-returned mismatches if officials do not reconcile postage invoices to returned-ballot inventories. Soft remount onto this 'don't notice … billed for' pathKey. Status Partially confirmed: separate billing vs inventory channels Confirmed; widespread intentional non-reconciliation Alleged. Did NOT use Mark Cook USPS worker anecdotes (standing skip).", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Pub 632 — State and Local Election Mail User's Guide", "url": "https://about.usps.com/publications/pub632.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-marketing-mail-return-by-weight__usps-publication-632-state-and-local-election-mail-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EAC — 2020 EAVS undeliverable reporting companion", "url": "https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/usps-pub632-uaa-billing-vs-returned-count-soft-remount__eac-2020-eavs-undeliverable-reporting-companion.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 18. Standing skip Mark anecdotes honored."}
{"id": "unclearballot-mark-sense-pixel-density-scanners-detect-marks-humans-may-miss-marginal", "permanent_id": "C20260925-235207-16", "uid": "C20260925-235207-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-235207-16", "old_ids": ["unclearballot-mark-sense-pixel-density-scanners-detect-marks-humans-may-miss-marginal"], "seq": "C00489", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "If the \"random\" dot approach is discovered, use a very light color such as yellow that the scanner can detect but the human eye cannot without a magnifying glass."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-91", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-91", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2019", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "UnclearBallot (Bernhard/Halderman et al., E-Vote-ID 2019) details how mark-sense scanners detect votes via pixel-density thresholds on scanned images—machine vision that can register marks differently than casual human inspection of paper. Status Partially confirmed for scanner-vs-human detection asymmetry on light/marginal marks; not a demonstration of intentional yellow steganographic vote encoding on US ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "UnclearBallot — Automated Ballot Image Manipulation (jhalderm PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/unclear-evoteid19.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unclearballot-mark-sense-pixel-density-scanners-detect-marks-humans-may-miss-marginal__unclearballot-automated-ballot-image-manipulation-jhalderm-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "EFF yellow-dot contrast / scanner recovery", "url": "https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/printers/ccc.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/unclearballot-mark-sense-pixel-density-scanners-detect-marks-humans-may-miss-marginal__eff-yellow-dot-contrast-scanner-recovery.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20d leaf 8 companion. Partially confirmed — mechanism yes; yellow-instruction PoC no."}
{"id": "union-county-nc-2019-wrong-polling-place-info-hours-extended", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-07", "uid": "C20260925-212129-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-07", "old_ids": ["union-county-nc-2019-wrong-polling-place-info-hours-extended"], "seq": "C00304", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2019-09-10", "state": "NC", "description": "In the Sept. 10, 2019 special election for North Carolina's Ninth Congressional District, the North Carolina Republican Party and candidate Dan Bishop moved the State Board of Elections to extend voting hours at Union County Precinct 030 by one hour and forty-five minutes. The motion states that the precinct's polling place moved on July 23, 2019 from Grace United Methodist Church to Cornerstone Community Church, both on Secrest Short Cut Road in Monroe, but that in multiple places the Union County Board of Elections website still showed the former location; one source of inaccurate information was corrected at about 8:15 a.m. and another remained on the website into the afternoon, and voters arrived at the old site. The motion also says the county board made significant efforts to tell voters of the change through mailers and other media. WCNC reported that the State Board held an emergency meeting and took no action on the request, so the precinct closed at 7:30 p.m. Status Partially confirmed: the inaccurate county website information is documented in the movants' motion and its website exhibits; the State Board made no finding, and no hours extension was granted. No intent is alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Motion to Extend Voting Hours — Union County Precinct 030 (PDF)", "url": "https://gallery.mailchimp.com/f3100bc5464cbba2f472ddf2c/files/e994ff7b-080b-48f3-a56a-2520dec4aa83/Motion_to_Extend_Voting_Hours_for_Union_County_Precinct_030.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/union-county-nc-2019-wrong-polling-place-info-hours-extended__motion-to-extend-voting-hours-union-county-precinct-030-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "WCNC — \"No action taken\" on Bishop request for extended voting time in Union County (Sept. 10, 2019)", "url": "https://www.wcnc.com/article/news/politics/elections/gop-union-extend-voting-request/275-4df10ff9-e4e1-4662-b89f-e25cdd5adc78"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 3 companion. Wrong place/time public info → missed event; Confirmed via official hours-extension remedy. Moved 2026-10-26 (Mark pt445u) from 6 > Event Date and Time Misdirection > \"They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events…\" to 6 > Polling Places > \"Incorrect or altered polling-location data\". Corrected 2026-10-26 against the motion and WCNC: the election was the Sept. 10, 2019 special election (not November), and the State Board took no action, so hours were not extended (the earlier text said they were); status changed from Confirmed to Partially confirmed. The card id is kept for link stability."}
{"id": "tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-22", "uid": "C20261020-160717-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-22", "old_ids": ["tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties"], "seq": "C01015", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2018-10", "state": "TX", "description": "During the first week of October 2018 early voting, straight-ticket voters in Texas counties using Hart InterCivic eSlate machines (dial-and-button units, not touchscreens) reported that their pick in the U.S. Senate race (Ted Cruz or Beto O'Rourke) had been changed or deselected on the summary page; reports came from voters of both parties, including in Travis, Hays, Comal, Harris and Tarrant counties. Election Advisory No. 2018-35 (Oct. 23, 2018, Director of Elections Keith Ingram) said the effect \"can be caused by the voter taking keyboard actions before a page has fully appeared on the eSlate, thereby de-selecting the pre-filled selection of that party's candidate,\" and told counties to have voters wait for each page to render and review the summary page. On Oct. 27 Secretary of State Rolando Pablos issued further guidance to the 78 eSlate counties, saying fewer than 20 instances were reported and that in each case voters cast a ballot reflecting their choices. Hart said the eSlate \"simply records the voter's inputs. It does not, and cannot, 'flip' or 'switch' votes.\" The eSlate system had been certified in 2009; Texas abolished straight-ticket voting starting in 2020. Video: an ABC13 Houston (KTRK) segment, \"Straight Ticket Voting Issues,\" reposted on Rumble on Oct. 27, 2018 as \"Texas voters claim voting machine are flipping their choices\" (3:11). It shows the eSlate's selection dial and Enter button, a sample straight-ticket Republican ballot with the Cruz / O'Rourke / Dikeman Senate race, and the text of Advisory 2018-35. Status Partially confirmed: the state confirmed that the straight-ticket pre-fill could be deselected by the machine's handling of early inputs, but attributed it to voter input timing, not a fault. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Election Advisory No. 2018-35: Voting on Hart eSlate Machines (Oct. 23, 2018)", "url": "https://www.sos.texas.gov/elections/laws/advisory2018-35.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__txsos2018.html"}, {"title": "Texas Secretary of State — Secretary Pablos provides additional guidance re: Hart eSlate systems in 78 Texas counties (Oct. 27, 2018)", "url": "https://www.sos.state.tx.us/about/newsreleases/2018/102718.shtml", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__txsos2018b.html"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Here's how to avoid problems with straight-ticket voting in Texas (Oct. 26, 2018)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2018/10/26/texas-voting-machines-2018-straight-ticket-midterm-elections/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__tt2018.html"}, {"title": "Austin American-Statesman — Texas straight-ticket voters report ballot concerns (Oct. 26, 2018)", "url": "https://www.statesman.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/26/texas-straight-ticket-voters-report-ballot-concerns/9444893007/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__statesman2018.html"}, {"title": "Snopes — Are Texas Voting Machines Switching Straight-Party Votes? (Oct. 2018)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/texas-voting-machines-party-switching/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__snopestx2018.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — BPR, \"Texas voters claim voting machine are flipping their choices\" (uploaded Oct. 27, 2018 2:35 PM ET; 3:11; ABC13 Houston segment)", "url": "https://rumble.com/v6mvvb-texas-voters-claim-voting-machine-are-flipping-their-choices.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-page-capture.png"}, {"title": "Rumble — saved page HTML (archived 2026-10-20)", "url": "https://rumble.com/v6mvvb-texas-voters-claim-voting-machine-are-flipping-their-choices.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-page.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — video file (480p MP4, unredacted)", "url": "https://hugh.cdn.rumble.cloud/video/s8/2/x/d/H/Q/xdHQa.caa.1.mp4", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-video.mp4"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 5 (txsos2018, txsos2018b, tt2018, statesman2018, snopestx2018). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted. Video archived with capture_video.py (unredacted).", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["eSlate"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/v6mvvb-texas-voters-claim-voting-machine-are-flipping-their-choices.html", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 191.125, "bytes": 19451758, "sha256": "4c1b1796f25c4dad08de521cabffcfdae26379cb16714c9c1e9315c0371d96ba", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-2018-hart-eslate-straight-ticket-sos-advisory-78-counties__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "tarrant-tx-2018-lorant-high-propensity-someone-voted-in-place", "permanent_id": "C20260926-010219-02", "uid": "C20260926-010219-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-010219-02", "old_ids": ["tarrant-tx-2018-lorant-high-propensity-someone-voted-in-place"], "seq": "C00835", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Choose which voter registration records to associate with phantom votes", "Record Selection Priority", "High-propensity voters: very risky and a last resort, because voters are likely to catch the use of their records."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-13", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-13", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2018-10-31", "state": "TX", "description": "Tarrant County (TX) voter Melanie Bell Lorant reported being turned away at early voting after poll workers said someone had already voted in her name at Southlake Town Hall (Sun Oct 28, 11:32 a.m.). She contacted the county early-voting coordinator; options reduced to a provisional/signature comparison while the earlier cast ballot could not be uncast. Illustrates the leaf's risk that associating an illicit ballot with a real, show-up registrant produces immediate voter detection. Status Partially confirmed: contemporaneous voter+county-coordinator report Confirmed; whether the prior check-in was fraud vs poll-worker mis-sign-in not adjudicated in the cited coverage.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Scorecard — In-person voter fraud alleged in Tarrant County (Lorant 2018)", "url": "https://texasscorecard.com/local/in-person-voter-fraud-alleged-in-tarrant-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/tarrant-tx-2018-lorant-high-propensity-someone-voted-in-place__untitled.png"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — Stolen Identities (impersonators prefer newly registered / unlikely voters)", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/report/stolen-identities-stolen-votes-case-study-voterimpersonation", "local": "/archives/2026/09/dutchess-ny-2024-miner-high-propensity-caught-already-voted__untitled.png"}], "notes": "Fill-20m leaf 1 companion. Honest Partially confirmed — detection event Confirmed; fraud vs error open."}
{"id": "greitens-2018-blackmail-allegations-resignation-compromise-control", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-25", "uid": "C20260926-002008-25", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-25", "old_ids": ["greitens-2018-blackmail-allegations-resignation-compromise-control"], "seq": "C00658", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Bad Candidates: they deliberately support candidates on our side who:", "Are controllable through compromise."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-02", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2018-05-29", "state": "MO", "description": "Missouri Gov. Eric Greitens resigned in 2018 amid felony computer-tampering charges and widely reported blackmail/sextortion allegations involving an affair—illustrating how compromise material can force a 'our side' officeholder out or into deals. Status Partially confirmed: resignation and criminal case Confirmed; whether party elites purposely elevated him because he was compromisable remains Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "LA Times — Unusual deal: Greitens resignation for dropped felony charge", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-missouri-governor-20180530-story.html"}, {"title": "PBS NewsHour — Prosecutor to drop felony charge against outgoing Greitens", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/prosecutor-to-drop-felony-charge-against-outgoing-missouri-gov-eric-greitens"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 13. Compromise vulnerability Confirmed; engineered elevation Alleged."}
{"id": "fec-v-rivera-straw-candidate-sternad-split-vote-secret-funding-allegations", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000809-17", "uid": "C20260926-000809-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000809-17", "old_ids": ["fec-v-rivera-straw-candidate-sternad-split-vote-secret-funding-allegations"], "seq": "C00570", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Primaries", "Bribe others to run to split the vote"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-04", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-04", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2017-07-14", "state": "FL", "description": "FEC v. Rivera alleged former Rep. David Rivera secretly funded ~$76k in-kind to Justin Lamar Sternad as a Democratic primary 'straw' candidate to weaken Joe Garcia—classic pay-to-run/split-the-vote theory. District court initially entered summary judgment and a $456k penalty; 11th Circuit vacated (Jul 2024) for disputed facts; case dismissed with prejudice Jan 2025 without trial. Status Partially confirmed: FEC charged the split-vote funding scheme (Confirmed as allegation + evidence record); ultimate liability not finally adjudicated after dismissal.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — FEC v. Rivera court case summary", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/fec-v-rivera/"}, {"title": "FEC — district court MSJ order (Feb 23, 2021) PDF", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/rivera_dc_order_msj.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fec-v-rivera-straw-candidate-sternad-split-vote-secret-funding-allegations__fec-v-rivera-straw-candidate-sternad-split-vote-secret-funding-allegat.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20f leaf 9. Honest Partially confirmed after 11th Cir vacatur + dismissal."}
{"id": "az-early-ballot-processing-ars-16-550", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-21", "uid": "C20260925-184601-21", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-21", "old_ids": ["az-early-ballot-processing-ars-16-550"], "seq": "C00139", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes during early voting to establish a 50/50 ratio, allowing later adjustments to stay under the radar (Colorado, Washington, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-22", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "AZ", "description": "Arizona law authorizes county recorders/early boards to process and count early ballots on an ongoing basis before Election Day while prohibiting public release of tabulated results before the statutory Election Day threshold (see A.R.S. §§ 16-550, 16-551). Catalog '50/50 preload' claims treat early tabulation as a manipulation platform; early legal processing/counting authority is Confirmed, while intentional preload-to-50/50 fraud is not established by primary sources reviewed—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — A.R.S. § 16-550", "url": "https://codes.findlaw.com/az/title-16-elections-and-electors/az-rev-st-sect-16-550/"}, {"title": "AZ Legislature — A.R.S. § 16-551 (early election board)", "url": "https://www.azleg.gov/ars/16/00551.htm", "local": "/archives/2026/09/az-early-ballot-processing-ars-16-550__az-legislature-a-r-s-16-551-early-election-board.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 10. Early counting authority ≠ confirmed 50/50 fraud."}
{"id": "co-early-mail-processing-statute", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-07", "uid": "C20260925-155410-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-07", "old_ids": ["co-early-mail-processing-statute"], "seq": "C00007", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "CO", "description": "Colorado law (C.R.S. § 1-7.5-107.5) authorizes processing/counting of mail ballots beginning up to 15 days before Election Day (with larger counties required to start earlier), while prohibiting release of count information until 7 p.m. Election Day. Catalog seed claims Colorado/Washington \"pre-load votes during early voting\" to establish a 50/50 ratio as a manipulation technique. Early legal processing/counting authority is Confirmed; the specific \"50/50 preload\" manipulation claim lacks a verified primary finding in this pass—Partially confirmed (statute/process Confirmed; fraud mechanism Alleged/unverified).", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado Public Law — C.R.S. § 1-7.5-107.5", "url": "https://colorado.public.law/statutes/crs_1-7.5-107.5", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-early-mail-processing-statute__colorado-public-law-c-r-s-1-7-5-107-5.png"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Absentee/mail-in ballot processing timelines", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Timelines_related_to_absentee/mail-in_ballot_processing_and_counting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-early-mail-processing-statute__ballotpedia-absentee-mail-in-ballot-processing-timelines.png"}], "notes": "Treat carefully per brief: do not treat advocacy 50/50 charts as Confirmed fraud."}
{"id": "fl-absentee-canvass-before-election-day-101-68", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-23", "uid": "C20260925-184601-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-23", "old_ids": ["fl-absentee-canvass-before-election-day-101-68"], "seq": "C00141", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Preload votes during early voting to establish a 50/50 ratio, allowing later adjustments to stay under the radar (Colorado, Washington, etc.)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-22", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-22", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "FL", "description": "Florida Statute § 101.68 allows canvassing boards to begin canvassing absentee/mail ballots after public logic-and-accuracy testing of tabulation equipment—often many days before Election Day—while forbidding release of results until polls close. Again Confirms early electronic tabulation authority; does not Confirm intentional 50/50 preload fraud. Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "Florida Senate — § 101.68 (2026)", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2026/101.68", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fl-absentee-canvass-before-election-day-101-68__florida-senate-101-68-2026.png"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Absentee/mail-in ballot processing timelines", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Timelines_related_to_absentee/mail-in_ballot_processing_and_counting"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 10. FL early canvass example."}
{"id": "wa-early-processing-wac", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-08", "uid": "C20260925-155410-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-08", "old_ids": ["wa-early-processing-wac"], "seq": "C00008", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Redefine \"tabulation\" to legally allow early machine tabulation as long as results are not \"human-readable\"; this still feeds the feedback loop."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-20", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-20", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2026", "state": "WA", "description": "Washington administrative rules (e.g., WAC 434-250-110) permit early ballot processing/scanning while prohibiting tabulation release before 8 p.m. Election Day. Catalog seed groups Washington with Colorado on 50/50 preload claims. Early processing authority Confirmed; intentional preload-to-50/50 manipulation not established by primary sources reviewed—Partially confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "WAC 434-250-110", "url": "https://apps.leg.wa.gov/wac/default.aspx?cite=434-250-110&pdf=true", "local": "/archives/2026/09/wa-early-processing-wac__wac-434-250-110.pdf"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Absentee/mail-in ballot processing timelines", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Timelines_related_to_absentee/mail-in_ballot_processing_and_counting", "local": "/archives/2026/09/co-early-mail-processing-statute__ballotpedia-absentee-mail-in-ballot-processing-timelines.png"}], "notes": "Advocacy batch-ratio charts (e.g., WhoCountsTheVotes) are partisan analyses, not official findings."}
{"id": "fairvote-open-society-funding", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-10", "uid": "C20260925-155410-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-10", "old_ids": ["fairvote-open-society-funding"], "seq": "C00010", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV)", "Organizations Behind RCV", "Open Society and FairVote"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-14", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-14", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-2024", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "FairVote is a leading national RCV advocacy organization. InfluenceWatch and Capital Research Center (right-of-center research outlets) list Open Society Foundations and related Soros-affiliated foundations among FairVote funders, alongside Arnold, Hewlett, Democracy Fund, and Tides. Catalog seed: \"Behind RCV: Open Society – 'Fair Vote'.\" Funding relationship is documented by secondary research aggregators; FairVote's own archived funding-disclosure page (c. 2015) also lists Open Society Institute among its recent major charitable funders. exact grant amounts/years were not fully verified from OSF or FairVote primary 990 line-items. Status Partially confirmed for funder listing claims; does not establish that RCV systems enable covert tabulation fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "InfluenceWatch — FairVote (funder list incl. Open Society Foundations)", "url": "https://www.influencewatch.org/non-profit/fairvote/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fairvote-open-society-funding__influencewatch-fairvote-profile-mark-screenshot-2026-10-27.png"}, {"title": "Capital Research Center — Ranked-Choice Voting: Biggest Advocates", "url": "https://capitalresearch.org/article/ranked-choice-voting-part-4/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fairvote-open-society-funding__capital-research-center-ranked-choice-voting-biggest-advocates-mark-screenshot-2026-10-27.png"}, {"title": "FairVote — Financials", "url": "https://fairvote.org/who-we-are/financials/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fairvote-open-society-funding__fairvote-financials-mark-screenshot-2026-10-27.png"}, {"title": "FairVote (archived site) — Funding Disclosures and Financial Information: recent major charitable funders include Open Society Institute (c. 2015)", "url": "https://archive3.fairvote.org/who-we-are/donations-to-fairvote/financial-information/"}], "notes": "InfluenceWatch/CRC are advocacy-adjacent research; cross-check IRS 990s in future sweeps. Refresh evidence-sweep-2026-10-26: added FairVote's own archived funding-disclosure page, which names Open Society Institute among its recent major charitable funders (first-party acknowledgment of the relationship; amounts and years still not itemized, and the page predates 2016, so status stays Partially confirmed). Archived copies: full-page screenshots supplied by Mark on 2026-10-27 are attached to the InfluenceWatch, Capital Research Center and FairVote Financials sources; the archived FairVote disclosure page has no local copy."}
{"id": "vr-systems-2016-gru-vendor-impersonation-spearphish-florida-counties-higher-order", "permanent_id": "C20261005-123049-02", "uid": "C20261005-123049-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261005-123049-02", "old_ids": ["vr-systems-2016-gru-vendor-impersonation-spearphish-florida-counties-higher-order"], "seq": "C01326", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Data Breaches", "Beyond the original breach, there are usually hidden higher-order breaches that bad actors can leverage."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-73", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-73", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2016-11", "state": "FL", "description": "The July 2018 Netyksho indictment (Special Counsel) charges that in August 2016 GRU officers targeted a voter-registration software vendor (Vendor 1, widely reported as Florida-based VR Systems), and that in November 2016, before the presidential election, they used an email account designed to look like Vendor 1 to send more than 100 spearphishing emails, carrying malware in Word documents bearing the vendor's logo, to election personnel in numerous Florida counties. The Mueller report adds that the FBI believes the operation gave the GRU access to at least one Florida county government network, and in 2019 Florida officials said two counties were breached. VR Systems confirms the spearphishing attempts but denies that its own network was compromised or that malware was installed. Status Partially confirmed: the vendor-impersonation follow-on campaign against counties is documented in federal charging papers and the Mueller report, while the vendor disputes the underlying breach. It shows how information from one vendor intrusion was used to reach many county offices.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. DOJ — United States v. Netyksho et al. indictment (¶¶ 75–76, Vendor 1 spearphishing of Florida counties)", "url": "https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/4599181/Indictment.pdf"}, {"title": "NACo — Russian hackers targeted Florida counties (Mueller report: 120+ emails; FBI believes access to at least one county)", "url": "https://www.naco.org/articles/russian-hackers-targeted-florida-counties"}, {"title": "NPR — Russian hackers broke into election systems in 2 Florida counties in 2016 (May 14, 2019)", "url": "https://www.npr.org/2019/05/14/723215498/florida-governor-says-russian-hackers-breached-two-florida-counties-in-2016"}, {"title": "WRAL — Pollbook vendor pushes back amid questions over software security (VR Systems denial)", "url": "https://legacy.wral.com/pollbook-vendor-pushes-back-amid-questions-over-software-security/18341279/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-10-05. Partially confirmed (vendor disputes network compromise); distinct from vr-systems-evid-windows-laptops-tablets e-pollbook hardware card.", "vendor": ["VR Systems"], "related": ["nc-durham-2016-evid-laptops-usb-loaded-from-state-data-voters-shown-already-voted-or-unregistered-paper-pollbooks-ordered"]}
{"id": "co-2014-general-intermittent-loss-of-connectivity-vspcs-to-score-387-of-981-provisional-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261026-180010-08", "uid": "C20261026-180010-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-180010-08", "old_ids": ["co-2014-general-intermittent-loss-of-connectivity-vspcs-to-score-387-of-981-provisional-ballots"], "seq": "C01573", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2014-11-04 (report dated 2015-03-19)", "state": "CO", "description": "A report for the Colorado Secretary of State, \"The Colorado General Election 2014: Intermittent Loss of Connectivity between VSPCs and the Colorado Statewide Voter Registration Database\" (Bipartisan Policy Center, March 19, 2015), is reported to say that on Election Day 2014 the web connection between voter service and polling centers and the statewide registration database (SCORE) failed intermittently, that counties used backup procedures and provisional ballots, and that 387 of 981 provisional ballots were attributed to connectivity loss or problems verifying eligibility. Status Partially confirmed: the report's title and publisher are confirmed by library and state records [1] [2], but the figures come from search summaries, because the full text could not be opened on 2026-10-26 (the state archive link returned a gateway timeout through the fetch tool and a TLS error through curl). The card should be raised to Confirmed once the full report is read, and the exact wording and figures checked.", "sources": [{"title": "Colorado State Publications Library, report record (full text link)", "url": "https://hermes.cde.state.co.us/islandora/object/co%3A27500/datastream/OBJ/view"}, {"title": "Library catalog record", "url": "https://broomfieldkids.flatironslibrary.org/ColoGovDoc/on1018473916"}], "notes": "The full report could not be opened on Oct. 26, 2026; the 387 and 981 figures come from search summaries and remain to be checked against the full text.", "related": ["co-8ccr1505-1-rule-17-1-2-lost-connectivity-score-eligibility-from-data-within-24-hours-mail-ballot-else-provisional-alc", "colorado-vote-centers-require-centralized-statewide-voter-registration-access", "ncsl-same-day-registration-realtime-epollbook-statewide-database-updates"]}
{"id": "il-rock-island-2014-moline-accuvote-anderson-touch-lights-jacobs", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-16", "uid": "C20261020-160717-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-16", "old_ids": ["il-rock-island-2014-moline-accuvote-anderson-touch-lights-jacobs"], "seq": "C01009", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2014-10", "state": "IL", "description": "In late October 2014 early voting in Moline (Rock Island County, Illinois), an anonymous video (373,000 views within days) showed a voter touching Republican state Senate candidate Neil Anderson while the light for Democratic Sen. Mike Jacobs, listed just above, came on instead; Moline Republicans Christina Kirik and Joyce Glassner said they had similar problems and corrected them. County Clerk Karen Kinney said she knew of a complaint about only one of about 20 early-voting AccuVote touchscreens (bought 2006), which staff recalibrated, refused to recalibrate all machines, and held a public logic-and-accuracy demonstration. County GOP chair Bill Bloom sued to force recalibration of every machine; on Nov. 3, 2014 a judge ruled there was not enough proof of a problem that could affect the outcome and not enough time before the election. Direction reported: Republican to Democrat. Status Partially confirmed: the clerk recalibrated the reported machine; a court found no systemic problem proven. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Dispatch-Argus (QC Online) — Moline voting machine video goes viral (Oct. 2014)", "url": "https://qconline.com/news/local/moline-voting-machine-video-goes-viral/article_1c1b0bf7-9132-59c9-8321-d9abe299e65b.html"}, {"title": "WVIK Quad Cities NPR — Testing the Voting Machines for Accuracy (Oct. 30, 2014)", "url": "https://www.wvik.org/election-2014/2014-10-30/testing-the-voting-machines-for-accuracy", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-rock-island-2014-moline-accuvote-anderson-touch-lights-jacobs__wvik2014.html"}, {"title": "WQAD — Battle over voting machines goes to court in Rock Island County (Nov. 3, 2014)", "url": "https://www.wqad.com/article/news/politics/battle-over-voting-machines-goes-to-court-in-rock-island-county/526-242cb391-1758-4a02-a2f9-61af0d9ac5ad"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (wvik2014). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Dispatch-Argus (QC Online), WQAD. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["AccuVote touchscreen"]}
{"id": "fl-cabrera-hialeah-assisted-living-ballot-broker-2012", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-05", "uid": "C20260925-185839-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-05", "old_ids": ["fl-cabrera-hialeah-assisted-living-ballot-broker-2012"], "seq": "C00156", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Retirement communities"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-23", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2012-2013", "state": "FL", "description": "Miami-Dade / Hialeah absentee-ballot broker Deisy Penton de Cabrera was arrested after detectives followed her into a nursing home and then multiple assisted-living facilities; police said she illegally collected dozens of absentee ballots (reports cited at least 31) and obtained a ballot from a terminally ill nursing-home resident. She later took a plea resolving misdemeanor ordinance counts for possessing more than two other voters' ballots (felony fraud count dropped) and received probation. Status Partially confirmed: multi-facility senior/assisted-living ballot collection Confirmed by arrest affidavits and plea; felony fraud charge was not sustained.", "sources": [{"title": "Miami Herald — Hialeah absentee-ballot broker Cabrera arrested (nursing home / ALFs)", "url": "https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/article1941717.html"}, {"title": "NBC 6 — Accused Hialeah ballot broker gets year of probation", "url": "https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/accused-hialeah-ballot-broker-gets-probation/1930587/"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 2. Assisted-living facility circuit + nursing-home stop."}
{"id": "oh-marion-2012-romney-touch-registers-obama-recalibrated", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-12", "uid": "C20261020-160717-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-12", "old_ids": ["oh-marion-2012-romney-touch-registers-obama-recalibrated"], "seq": "C01005", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2012-10", "state": "OH", "description": "In late October 2012 early voting in Marion County, Ohio, Joan Stevens told the Marion Star and Fox News that the touchscreen marked Barack Obama three times when she pressed Mitt Romney; she said a board member told her the machine had had problems all day. Board of Elections director Sophia Rogers suggested Stevens hit the screen too hard or off-target, but took the machine out of service and had it recalibrated; Rogers later told TheBlaze the vendor's technicians found it calibrated correctly. Dominion spokesman Chris Riggall said the county's machines are legacy units, up to 10 years old, built by companies Dominion acquired, and \"it is certainly possible\" for them to get out of calibration. Direction reported: Republican to Democrat. Status Partially confirmed: the machine was pulled and recalibrated and the vendor acknowledged calibration drift is possible, but officials attributed this case to the voter. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC24 — Ohio's 'hanging chad': some Ohio electronic voting machines switching votes (Marion Star report, Oct. 2012)", "url": "https://nbc24.com/news/local/ohios-hanging-chad-some-ohio-electronic-voting-machines-switching-votes", "local": "/archives/2026/10/oh-marion-2012-romney-touch-registers-obama-recalibrated__nbc24_2012.html"}, {"title": "Fox News — Claims increase of machines switching votes in Ohio, other battlegrounds (Nov. 2012)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/claims-increase-of-machines-switching-votes-in-ohio-other-battlegrounds", "local": "/archives/2026/10/oh-marion-2012-romney-touch-registers-obama-recalibrated__foxoh2012.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (nbc24_2012, foxoh2012). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["legacy touchscreen DRE (Dominion-supported)"]}
{"id": "nv-clark-2010-2016-sequoia-edge-reid-prechecked-flip-reports", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-10", "uid": "C20261020-160717-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-10", "old_ids": ["nv-clark-2010-2016-sequoia-edge-reid-prechecked-flip-reports"], "seq": "C01003", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2010-10/2016-10", "state": "NV", "description": "In October 2010 early voting in Boulder City (Clark County, Nevada), Joyce Ferrara told Fox 5 that when she, her husband and several others went to vote for Republican Sharron Angle, Sen. Harry Reid's name was already checked on the county's Sequoia AVC Edge touchscreens (which print a paper trail). Registrar Larry Lomax said there was no fraud, that the screens are extremely sensitive and a lingering finger can select a candidate, and demonstrated on camera that tapping the English option too many times checks Angle, not Reid. A state investigation (Carolyn Ellsworth for Secretary of State Ross Miller) found no machine tampering, only \"occasional human error.\" In October 2016 several Clark County early voters again told KTNV their touch clicked a different candidate; officials called it user error (dragging a finger or holding the screen) and pointed to the printed paper record. Status Partially confirmed: the registrar confirmed an oversensitive screen that can preselect a candidate but called it voter-caused. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "Los Angeles Times — Touch-screen voting machine issues pop up in Nevada to the benefit of Reid (and Angle) (Oct. 26, 2010)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/archives/blogs/top-of-the-ticket/story/2010-10-26/opinion-touch-screen-voting-machine-issues-pop-up-in-nevada-to-the-benefit-of-reid-and-angle", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nv-clark-2010-2016-sequoia-edge-reid-prechecked-flip-reports__lat2010.html"}, {"title": "The Voting News — NV touchscreens flip votes (Fox 5 Las Vegas, Oct. 2010; Sequoia AVC Edge w/VVPAT)", "url": "https://thevotingnews.com/nv-touchscreens-flip-votes-internet-voting-security-debate-grows-ontario-i-vote-probs/"}, {"title": "Las Vegas Review-Journal — Official's report says no evidence of voter fraud in Clark, Washoe counties (2010)", "url": "https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/officials-report-says-no-evidence-of-voter-fraud-in-clark-washoe-counties/"}, {"title": "KTNV 13 Action News — Early Clark County voters concerned about vote flipping (Oct. 2016)", "url": "https://www.ktnv.com/news/political/early-voters-concerned-about-vote-flipping", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nv-clark-2010-2016-sequoia-edge-reid-prechecked-flip-reports__ktnv2016.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (lat2010, ktnv2016). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): The Voting News, Las Vegas Review-Journal. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["AVC Edge"]}
{"id": "encryption-linguistic-seed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-17", "uid": "C20260925-155410-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-17", "old_ids": ["encryption-linguistic-seed"], "seq": "C00017", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Encryption deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-03", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-2026", "state": "Federal / Multi-state", "description": "Catalog asserts vendors/officials promote \"encryption\" as security while opaque crypto can impede public auditability. Foundational NIST/Rivest discourse on software independence argues election outcomes must be detectable as incorrect without relying solely on correct software—prioritizing evidence (e.g., voter-verifiable paper + audits) over trust in software/crypto alone. MIT Voatz analysis (USENIX Security 2020) further showed that encrypted mobile-ballot submission packets could still leak vote choices via packet-length metadata (CVE-2020-8989), illustrating that \"encrypted\" is not synonymous with private or auditable. Status Partially confirmed for the academic/engineering tension between encryption marketing and audit/privacy properties; not a finding that any named vendor intentionally deceived a specific jurisdiction in this entry.", "sources": [{"title": "NIST — On the notion of software independence in voting systems (Rivest/Wack)", "url": "https://www.nist.gov/system/files/si-in-voting.pdf"}, {"title": "USENIX Security 2020 — Specter et al. Voatz analysis", "url": "https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity20/presentation/specter", "local": "/archives/2026/09/encryption-linguistic-seed__usenix-security-2020-specter-et-al-voatz-analysis.png"}, {"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (catalog definition)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__hand-count-road-show-cabal-tactics-catalog-definition.png"}], "notes": "Software-independence literature + Voatz metadata leak Confirmed; catalog motive framing not adjudicated.", "vendor": ["Voatz"]}
{"id": "tn-decatur-2008-ivotronic-mccain-touch-registers-obama", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-06", "uid": "C20261020-160717-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-06", "old_ids": ["tn-decatur-2008-ivotronic-mccain-touch-registers-obama"], "seq": "C00999", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-10", "state": "TN", "description": "In October 2008 early voting in Decatur County, Tennessee, at least three voters (including Franklin Boroughs and Barney Blasingim) said the county's paperless ES&S iVotronic touchscreens registered their John McCain selection as Barack Obama; both fixed it on a second touch and said they had touched the center of the box. Deputy elections director Teresa Bedingfield said two technicians examined the three early-voting machines and found nothing wrong and blamed touch placement; the voters said officials told them the cause was ballot design (races too close together) and voter height. The machines had no paper trail, only the review screen. Direction reported: Republican to Democrat. Status Partially confirmed: officials acknowledged wrong selections and cited ballot layout and touch placement, not a calibration fault. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — ES&S Voting Machines in Tennessee Flip Votes (Oct. 23, 2008)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ess-voting-mach/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-decatur-2008-ivotronic-mccain-touch-registers-obama__wiredtn2008.html"}, {"title": "Salon — Early e-voting results in vote flipping in three states so far (Oct. 27, 2008)", "url": "https://www.salon.com/2008/10/27/early_voting_2/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-decatur-2008-ivotronic-mccain-touch-registers-obama__salon2008.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 2 (wiredtn2008, salon2008). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-05", "uid": "C20261020-160717-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-05", "old_ids": ["wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain"], "seq": "C00998", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-10", "state": "WV", "description": "In October 2008 early voting, at least three Jackson County, West Virginia voters (including Virginia Matheney, interviewed by Ars Technica) said ES&S iVotronic touchscreens repeatedly marked John McCain when they touched Barack Obama, and marked the Republican in the governor and state Senate races too; three Putnam County voters reported the same. Jackson County Clerk Jeff Waybright blamed voters brushing the line between candidates and said poll workers could not replicate it, but recalibrated the machines after the Secretary of State's office called, and sent pencils for voters to use as styluses. Secretary of State Betty Ireland directed all counties to recalibrate every machine each morning of early voting. The machines had a paper trail and review screen; no affected vote was established. Direction reported: Democrat to Republican. Status Partially confirmed: officials acknowledged the behavior and ordered recalibration statewide, but attributed it to touch technique. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — Voting Machines Switch Votes; Officials Blame Voters (Oct. 2008)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2008/10/voting-machine-2/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain__wiredwv2008.html"}, {"title": "Ars Technica — Who's to blame for jumping votes on WV touchscreen machines? (Oct. 2008)", "url": "https://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2008/10/whos-to-blame-for-jumping-votes-on-wv-touchscreen-machines/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain__arswv2008.html"}, {"title": "CNN — Long lines, glitches reported during early voting (Oct. 24, 2008)", "url": "https://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/24/voting.problems/index.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain__cnn2008.html"}, {"title": "Network World — E-voting snag fixed as early voting starts (Oct. 2008)", "url": "https://www.networkworld.com/article/792170/applications-e-voting-snag-fixed-as-early-voting-starts.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wv-jackson-putnam-2008-ivotronic-obama-touch-registers-mccain__nww2008.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (wiredwv2008, arswv2008, cnn2008, nww2008). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "gao-sarasota-ivotronic-calibration-2008", "permanent_id": "C20260925-183614-28", "uid": "C20260925-183614-28", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-183614-28", "old_ids": ["gao-sarasota-ivotronic-calibration-2008"], "seq": "C00116", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-02", "state": "FL", "description": "GAO testimony on testing of ES&S iVotronic DREs used in Sarasota County's 2006 CD-13 race (large undervote controversy) examined whether miscalibration could cause votes to register for the wrong candidate; GAO reported that in its tests, deliberately miscalibrated machines still recorded the candidate displayed on-screen rather than silently switching to another—while still documenting that calibration state is a critical machine-integrity variable for touchscreen DREs. Status Partially confirmed: official testing engaged the wrong-candidate/calibration failure mode as a real engineering concern around paperless DREs (even where GAO's specific switch hypothesis was not reproduced).", "sources": [{"title": "GAO-08-425T — Testing of voting systems used in Sarasota County (PDF)", "url": "https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-08-425t.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/gao-sarasota-ivotronic-calibration-2008__gao-08-425t-testing-of-voting-systems-used-in-sarasota-count.pdf"}], "notes": "Part B DRE calibration leaf. Landmark federal testing of calibration/wrong-selection risk.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S iVotronic"]}
{"id": "ca-fresno-2008-one-percent-manual-tally-selection-before-election-day", "permanent_id": "C20261012-141825-03", "uid": "C20261012-141825-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-141825-03", "old_ids": ["ca-fresno-2008-one-percent-manual-tally-selection-before-election-day"], "seq": "C01370", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Auditing", "RHINO (Random In Name Only): audit precinct or batch selection that is claimed to be random but is not, or is not provably random"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-66", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-66", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2008-02-05", "state": "CA", "description": "California's 1% manual tally requires election officials to hand count ballots in 1% of precincts chosen at random. In their 2008 USENIX/ACCURATE EVT paper on California's manual tally procedures, Joseph Lorenzo Hall and co-authors reviewed the county manual-tally reports the Secretary of State published, and noted that in one case a county \"seems to have even performed the selection before election day\": Fresno County, for the Feb. 5, 2008 presidential primary, citing Fresno's own March 2008 Summary Information—Post-Election Manual Tally. A selection known before ballots are cast is not unpredictable, so anyone who knew it could alter only unselected precincts. California now bars this: Elections Code 15360(c) and the SOS regulation say officials \"shall not randomly choose the initial precincts ... until after the close of the polls on election day.\" Status Partially confirmed: documented by peer-reviewed researchers from the county's own report, but worded as \"seems to,\" and the \"two months early\" timing in circulating summaries was not verified. Catalog note: if selection happens before the election, timing alone defeats an audit. Public notice and selection only after polls close, observed live, keep the check honest.", "sources": [{"title": "Hall et al., Improving the Security, Transparency and Efficiency of California's 1% Manual Tally Procedures (USENIX EVT 2008), fn. 25", "url": "https://static.usenix.org/events/evt08/tech/full_papers/hall/hall.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/rhino-evt08-hall-ca-1pct-tally__usenix-evt08-hall-california-1-percent-manual-tally-procedures-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "California Elections Code §15360 (selection not before polls close)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?article=5.&chapter=4.&division=15.&lawCode=ELEC&part=&title="}, {"title": "California Secretary of State — One Percent Manual Tally regulations", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/regulations/current-regulations/elections/one-percent-manual-tally"}], "notes": "rhino-2026-10-12 (Mark request; WebSearch/curl verified; zero X). Fresno county report URL cited in paper (sos.ca.gov/elections/county_manual_count_reports/Fresno/Fresno.pdf) is dead; '2 months early' unverified."}
{"id": "air-gapped-linguistic-seed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-16", "uid": "C20260925-155410-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-16", "old_ids": ["air-gapped-linguistic-seed"], "seq": "C00016", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Linguistic Deception", "Exploit public unfamiliarity with technical terms and their ambiguous meanings. Examples:", "Air-gapped systems deception"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-02", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2006-2026", "state": "Multi-state / Federal", "description": "Catalog asserts officials misuse \"air-gapped\" to imply total isolation despite memory cards, USB, modem/wireless, or administrative transfers. Peer-reviewed Princeton Diebold analysis (2006/EVT'07) demonstrated a self-propagating voting-machine virus via memory cards used in normal procedures even without network connectivity. CISA election-system best practices separately emphasize network segmentation, limiting internet connectivity for election hosts, and treating elections VLANs as high-sensitivity—implicitly acknowledging that \"disconnected\" systems still require layered controls around removable media and connected components. Status Partially confirmed for the technical premise that network isolation alone does not equal full isolation; specific jurisdiction marketing claims paired 1:1 with contradictory connectivity still vary.", "sources": [{"title": "Princeton / USENIX EVT'07 — Diebold AccuVote-TS security analysis (PDF)", "url": "https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/ts-evt07.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__princeton-usenix-evt-07-diebold-accuvote-ts-security-analysi.pdf"}, {"title": "CISA — Best Practices for Securing Election Systems", "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/best-practices-securing-election-systems", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__cisa-best-practices-for-securing-election-systems.png"}, {"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (catalog definition)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__hand-count-road-show-cabal-tactics-catalog-definition.png"}], "notes": "Technical attack-surface Confirmed in literature; linguistic misuse as a deliberate tactic remains framing analysis.", "vendor": ["Diebold/Premier"], "vendor_models": ["Diebold/Premier AccuVote"]}
{"id": "milwaukee-sandburg-2004-traveling-recruit-college", "permanent_id": "C20260926-004030-33", "uid": "C20260926-004030-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-004030-33", "old_ids": ["milwaukee-sandburg-2004-traveling-recruit-college"], "seq": "C00786", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Traveling Voter Operations", "Recruit individuals willing to travel (college students, transient workers, activists, or paid operatives)."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-10", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-10", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2005-05-10", "state": "WI", "description": "Milwaukee PD's 2004 election investigation found Sandburg Hall listed ~5,217 registered voters vs ~2,600 residents and Ward 39 ballot/voter mismatches—documenting college-dorm registration inflation involving a mobile student population. Soft remount of existing Milwaukee Sandburg card onto this Traveling Voter 'recruit willing to travel (college students…)' pathKey. Partially confirmed: dorm/student registration excess Confirmed in investigative record; organized multi-state paid traveling-voter scheme Alleged beyond that episode. Foundational 2004 OK (catalog cites college/transient traveling ops).", "sources": [{"title": "Milwaukee PD — 2004 Voter Fraud Investigation report (PDF via Badger Blogger mirror)", "url": "https://badgerblogger.com/wp-content/uploads/2004_VoterFraudInvestigation.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Guide to Student Residency (2022 PDF)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/StudentWIGuide2022_0.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-20k leaf 17. Soft remount of Milwaukee Sandburg family. Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "milwaukee-sandburg-hall-dorm-registration-excess-2004", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-09", "uid": "C20260925-194013-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-09", "old_ids": ["milwaukee-sandburg-hall-dorm-registration-excess-2004"], "seq": "C00193", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "College dorms and fraternities"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-21", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-21", "status": "Partially confirmed", "date": "2004", "state": "WI", "description": "Milwaukee Police Department's 2004 voter-fraud investigation materials (widely cited in subsequent analyses) identified roughly 5,217 voter registrations associated with UW–Milwaukee Sandburg Hall versus a resident capacity just over ~2,600 — a classic dormitory address over-registration anomaly creating a pool of low-propensity / stale campus records. The investigation described procedural failures that prevented definitive fraud conclusions on many records. Status Partially confirmed for over-capacity dorm registrations documented by law enforcement review; proven ballot casting from phantom dorm residents not established in the cited materials.", "sources": [{"title": "Milwaukee Police Department — 2004 voter fraud investigation materials (Sandburg Hall citations)", "url": "https://badgerblogger.com/wp-content/uploads/2004_VoterFraudInvestigation.pdf"}, {"title": "Wisconsin Elections Commission — Guide to student residency (campus address registration allowed)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/StudentWIGuide2022_0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/milwaukee-sandburg-hall-dorm-registration-excess-2004__wisconsin-elections-commission-guide-to-student-residency-campus-address-registration-allowed.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 4. Dorm over-registration anomaly Partially confirmed."}
{"id": "nj-2026-10-30-two-passaic-county-noncitizens-charged-voting-federal-elections", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-04", "uid": "C20261102-121503-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-04", "old_ids": ["nj-2026-10-30-two-passaic-county-noncitizens-charged-voting-federal-elections"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "Alleged votes in federal elections; 2026-10-30 (charges announced)", "state": "NJ", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey announced separate criminal complaints against two Passaic County men. Prosecutors allege that Morzetta, 72, an Italian national from North Haledon, voted in person in the November 2024 federal election, and that Antonio Mitchell, 54, a Jamaican national from Paterson who entered the United States on a B-2 visitor visa, voted in person in the November 2022 federal election. Each is charged with voting by a non-citizen in a federal election and with unlawfully attempting to obtain citizenship after applying for naturalization; Mitchell is also charged with making false statements. Mitchell appeared in court on Oct. 28 and Morzetta on Oct. 29 before U.S. Magistrate Judge Leda Dunn Wettre. The voting charge carries a maximum of one year in prison, the citizenship charge up to 10 years, and the false-statements charge up to five years. U.S. Attorney Robert Frazer said the cases came from the office's Election Integrity Task Force. The charges are accusations only, and both men are presumed innocent. No election-office error is alleged. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by federal prosecutors; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was not a citizen was accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "NJ Today — Passaic County, NJ noncitizen-voting charges (2) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://njtoday.news/2026/10/30/2-passaic-county-men-charged-with-voting-in-federal-elections-as-noncitizens/"}, {"title": "Paterson Times — Passaic County, NJ noncitizen-voting charges (2) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://patersontimes.com/2026/10/30/paterson-man-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-2022-federal-election/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Passaic County, NJ noncitizen-voting charges (2) (ei-2026-10-218)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-218 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tn-edtn-2026-10-30-two-bradley-county-noncitizens-charged-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-03", "uid": "C20261102-121503-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-03", "old_ids": ["tn-edtn-2026-10-30-two-bradley-county-noncitizens-charged-voting"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "Alleged votes in federal elections; 2026-10-30 (charges announced)", "state": "TN", "description": "On Oct. 30, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Tennessee announced criminal complaints charging two non-citizens who live in Cleveland, Tennessee, with illegal voting in a federal election. Prosecutors allege that Mark Adwar Odisho, 30, an Iraqi national, and Frederic Jean Rene Sicard, 50, a French national, each voted in the U.S. presidential election on Nov. 5, 2024. Odisho made his initial court appearance on Oct. 29 and Sicard on Oct. 30. U.S. Attorney Francis M. Hamilton III said the theft of the privilege of voting \"by a non-citizen will be prosecuted.\" The case came from an FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigation. The charges are accusations only, and both men are presumed innocent. No election-office error is alleged. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by federal prosecutors; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was not a citizen was accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "Chattanoogan.com — Cleveland, TN noncitizen-voting charges (2) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.chattanoogan.com/2026/10/30/525445/2-Cleveland-Men-Who-Are-Not-U.S..aspx"}, {"title": "WTVC NewsChannel 9 — Cleveland, TN noncitizen-voting charges (2) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://newschannel9.com/news/local/us-attorney-2-immigrants-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-federal-elections-in-tennessee"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Cleveland, TN noncitizen-voting charges (2) (ei-2026-10-208)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-208 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-harris-2026-10-paxton-arrests-parolees-illegally-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-07", "uid": "C20261102-121503-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-07", "old_ids": ["tx-harris-2026-10-paxton-arrests-parolees-illegally-voting"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Alleged", "date": "Alleged illegal votes; 2026-10 (arrests announced)", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton announced on Oct. 31, 2026, that his Election Integrity Unit arrested convicted felons accused of illegally casting ballots in Harris County. According to the office, a citizen reported on Oct. 27 that people who were incarcerated, on parole, or on probation had voted; investigators verified identities and registration and voting records, and the Texas Department of Criminal Justice confirmed that multiple individuals were on parole when they voted, which makes them ineligible under Texas law. Arrest warrants were issued in Montgomery County on Oct. 30 and the arrests followed (KTRH reports they were made Friday, Oct. 30). The office did not release the number of people arrested, their names, or the specific charges, and says it is investigating additional reports. These are accusations only; no one has been convicted. Status Alleged: the arrests are confirmed by the Texas Attorney General's Office; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: when people serving a sentence remain on the rolls or are registered anyway, their records can draw ballots that enter the count unless a check against corrections records catches them first.", "sources": [{"title": "Office of the Texas Attorney General — TX AG parole-voting arrests (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-announces-arrests-convicted-felons-illegally-voting-texas"}, {"title": "NewsRadio 740 KTRH — TX AG parole-voting arrests (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://ktrh.iheart.com/featured/houston-texas-news/content/2026-10-31-arrests-made-for-illegal-voting-ag-paxton-says/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — TX AG parole-voting arrests (ei-2026-10-216)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-216 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ny-broome-2026-11-18-ndny-vestal-lpr-charged-voting-by-alien-2024-presidential", "permanent_id": "C20261118-180645-01", "uid": "C20261118-180645-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-180645-01", "old_ids": ["ny-broome-2026-11-18-ndny-vestal-lpr-charged-voting-by-alien-2024-presidential"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-18 (defendant appeared on the charge); alleged vote cast in the November 2024 presidential election", "state": "NY", "description": "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York announced that on Nov. 18, 2026, Inna Opatska, 31, a Ukrainian national of Vestal, New York, appeared on a charge of voting by an alien in connection with the 2024 presidential election. According to the announcement, Opatska is a lawful permanent resident. The Justice Department's X account said Homeland Security Investigations and the Northern District of New York brought the case, and it quoted First Assistant U.S. Attorney John A. Sarcone III. The charge is an accusation only, and the defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Justice Department, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged in the announcement. Catalog point: as charged, a lawful permanent resident's registration record was accepted and used to cast a ballot in a federal election, and it was federal investigators, not any routine check by the election office, that brought the case two years later.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of New York — Vestal non-citizen voting charge (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/ukrainian-national-charged-illegally-voting-2024-united-states-presidential-election"}, {"title": "Vaquill (DOJ News mirror) — Vestal non-citizen voting charge (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://news.vaquill.com/item/8d99471c-caa6-4d30-a394-6762f6d60a6b"}, {"title": "X post by @TheJusticeDept (U.S. Department of Justice) — Vestal non-citizen voting charge (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://x.com/TheJusticeDept/status/2123162972159914476"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NDNY Vestal non-citizen voting charge (ei-2026-10-448)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-448 (added 2026-11-18 6:06 PM ET, 2026-11-18 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed, high confidence). Description taken from the EMon summary. The justice.gov release body did not load from the box (curl returned a 2.5 KB block page; WebFetch empty); the defendant's details come from the Vaquill mirror of the release and the DOJ X post. Queue cross-check: related noncitizen-voting queue items (rq-2026-11-17-tx-harris-west-gray-noncitizen-voting-for-years-trahan, rq-2026-10-29-md-cheverly-aclj-noncitizen-registry-names-voted-federal, rq-2026-10-28-citizenship-flag-changed-after-registration-no-audit-trail) concern other people and places, so this charge does not corroborate any of them. No vendor named. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "oh-delaware-2026-11-16-sos-refers-former-board-member-leneghan-false-registration-illegal-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261118-121028-02", "uid": "C20261118-121028-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261118-121028-02", "old_ids": ["oh-delaware-2026-11-16-sos-refers-former-board-member-leneghan-false-registration-illegal-voting"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-16 (Secretary of State referral announced); 2026 (county board residency ruling and 2026-Ohio-1598)", "state": "OH", "description": "The Columbus Dispatch reported on Nov. 18, 2026, that the Ohio Secretary of State's office referred alleged election-law violations by Republican Melanie Leneghan, a former Delaware County Board of Elections member and former Ohio Republican Party State Central Committee member, for criminal prosecution, accusing her of illegal voting and false voter registration. The referral was among more than a dozen Election Integrity Unit dispositions announced Nov. 16; it was the only Delaware County case and the only criminal referral among the central Ohio cases the Dispatch reported, the others being fines. The Delaware County Prosecutor's Office will decide whether to file charges; the Dispatch said it had sought comment from Leneghan and the prosecutor. Background: after a Feb. 20 challenge by Delaware County Republican Central Committee member Velva Dunn alleging Leneghan lived in South Carolina, the county board voted 2-1 to cancel her registration, remove her as a state central committee candidate, and refer her to the county prosecutor and the Secretary of State, based on her having been registered at a Delaware address where the Ohio Supreme Court opinion says she never lived. The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously denied her mandamus petition (2026-Ohio-1598), finding the board did not abuse its discretion in concluding she lacked a fixed habitation in Delaware County, and Secretary of State Frank LaRose then removed her from the board. Leneghan previously told the Dispatch she split time between South Carolina and Ohio but lived locally most of the time. A referral is an accusation only; no charges have been filed, and she is presumed innocent. EMon has not independently verified the Secretary of State's disposition record. No election-office error has been alleged. Status Alleged: the criminal referral is an accusation, and no charges have been filed. The underlying residency finding is official: the Delaware County Board of Elections cancelled her registration, and the Ohio Supreme Court unanimously upheld the board's conclusion that she lacked a fixed habitation in Delaware County (2026-Ohio-1598). Catalog point: a sitting county elections board member stayed registered and voting at an address the state's highest court found she never lived, and it took a party member's challenge, not any routine residency check, to bring it to light.", "sources": [{"title": "The Columbus Dispatch — Leneghan residency and criminal referral (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/local/delaware/2026/11/18/former-delaware-county-elections-official-accused-of-voting-illegally/92832841007/"}, {"title": "Yahoo News (Columbus Dispatch syndication) — Leneghan residency and criminal referral (2026-11-18)", "url": "https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/former-delaware-county-elections-board-100727424.html"}, {"title": "NewsForce247 (citing Columbus Dispatch) — Leneghan residency and criminal referral (2026-11-17)", "url": "https://newsforce247.com/more-than-a-dozen-central-ohio-candidates-face-fines-one-criminal-referral/"}, {"title": "Supreme Court of Ohio, State ex rel. Leneghan v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Elections, 2026-Ohio-1598 — Leneghan residency and criminal referral (2026-05)", "url": "https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/rod/docs/pdf/0/2026/2026-Ohio-1598.pdf"}, {"title": "Delaware Gazette — Leneghan residency and criminal referral (2026-05-04)", "url": "https://www.delgazette.com/2026/05/04/leneghan-removed-from-boe-after-court-ruling/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Delaware Co. OH ex-board member referred (ei-2026-10-446)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-446 (added 2026-11-18 12:10 PM ET, 2026-11-18 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon investigating/unconfirmed, high confidence). Description taken from the EMon summary. The @ACTIdgit post overstates the referral as a charge and is not used. No vendor named. Queue cross-check: no related research-queue items. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ak-2026-11-06-peltola-campaign-sues-division-of-elections-for-rejected-absentee-records", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-06", "uid": "C20261109-121807-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-06", "old_ids": ["ak-2026-11-06-peltola-campaign-sues-division-of-elections-for-rejected-absentee-records"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "Push citizens to the point of filing a lawsuit for records, then claim the records cannot be provided because of the pending lawsuit."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-58", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-58", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-06", "state": "AK", "description": "On Friday, Nov. 6, 2026, Alaskans for Mary, the campaign of Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Mary Peltola, sued the Alaska Division of Elections, its director and Lt. Gov. Nancy Dahlstrom in Anchorage Superior Court, according to the Anchorage Daily News, Alaska Beacon and Alaska Public Media. The suit, brought under the Alaska Public Records Act, seeks a copy of the absentee register showing the \"accept or reject code\" for each returned absentee ballot, or other records showing whose absentee ballots were rejected or questioned and why. The campaign first asked the division's regional offices on Oct. 27, sent a demand letter on Nov. 4, and says state attorneys declined on Nov. 5 to turn the records over immediately. It has asked for expedited consideration, a temporary restraining order and an injunction. The campaign says it \"cannot ensure that its voters' lawful votes were properly counted without knowing whose absentee ballots were rejected or questioned, and why.\" The Alaska Department of Law, representing the division, said the information is \"preliminary, subject to change, and not yet available to affected voters,\" that authorized observers may view certain daily records under confidentiality agreements, that state law does not require release in the form requested, and that releasing it could delay the count. Alaska Beacon reports that absentee ballots may arrive as late as Nov. 18 and that rejected voters are normally notified only after certification. The lawsuit does not claim any ballot was wrongly rejected and does not ask the court to stop the count. The Senate race between Peltola and Sen. Dan Sullivan was separated by roughly 600 votes in preliminary results. This is separate from the Justice Department's dismissed suit over candidate Daniel J. Sullivan. No ruling had been reported as of Nov. 7. Status Alleged: the campaign's account in a public-records lawsuit filed in Anchorage Superior Court, reported by the Anchorage Daily News, Alaska Beacon and Alaska Public Media. The Division of Elections' reasons for withholding and any ruling are not yet reported. Catalog point: a candidate had to go to court to obtain the list of whose absentee ballots were rejected or questioned and why — the record needed to check that lawful votes were counted — after the state declined to hand it over during the count. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): The Sullivan campaign asked to intervene before Anchorage Superior Court Judge Thomas Matthews, and the state moved to oppose the request, arguing it would violate absentee voters' privacy, that the preliminary records do not exist in the requested form, and that campaigns already have view-only access to the absentee review board; oral arguments were set for 10 a.m. Nov. 10 (Anchorage Daily News). No ruling had been reported. Update (Nov. 10, 2026): At the hearing, Judge Thomas Matthews let the Sullivan campaign intervene on the state's side and said he would issue a written decision by Wednesday afternoon, Nov. 11, calling the motion one \"about access to public records.\" Peltola attorney Abha Khanna said there was no indication of any irregularity in the count; the state argued the data is not a public record and would expose voters' privacy (Anchorage Daily News). No ruling had been reported. Update (Nov. 11, 2026): Anchorage Superior Court Judge Thomas Matthews ruled against the Peltola campaign, holding that the Division of Elections does not have to produce a report of rejected absentee voters and rejection reasons while ballots are still being counted; he found the requested information was preliminary and not a public record, writing, \"Given that the DOE is currently busy processing ballots from the 2026 general election, it is understandable that the division simply lacks the capacity to generate the report.\" The Alaska Beacon reported that rejection decisions can change until certification on Nov. 25, after which the division must notify voters whose ballots were rejected.", "sources": [{"title": "Anchorage Daily News — Alaska: Peltola campaign sues for rejected-absentee records (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.adn.com/politics/2026/11/06/peltola-campaign-sues-alaska-election-officials-seeking-information-about-rejected-absentee-ballots/"}, {"title": "Alaska Beacon — Alaska: Peltola campaign sues for rejected-absentee records (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/11/06/peltola-campaign-sues-alaska-seeking-to-reveal-the-names-of-rejected-absentee-voters/"}, {"title": "Alaska Public Media — Alaska: Peltola campaign sues for rejected-absentee records (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://alaskapublic.org/news/2026-11-06/peltola-campaign-demands-information-about-rejected-absentee-ballots"}, {"title": "X post by @77WABCradio (2026-11-07T15:20:02Z)", "url": "https://x.com/77WABCradio/status/2119087487955927065"}, {"title": "X post by @PowerIndexMedia (2026-11-07T14:08:09Z)", "url": "https://x.com/PowerIndexMedia/status/2119069397176504781"}, {"title": "Anchorage Daily News — Sullivan campaign seeks to join court battle over absentee ballot data (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.adn.com/politics/2026/11/09/sen-sullivan-campaign-seeks-to-join-alaska-court-battle-over-absentee-ballot-data/"}, {"title": "Anchorage Daily News — In court, Peltola campaign asks judge to allow release of absentee ballot data (Nov. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.adn.com/politics/2026/11/10/in-court-peltola-campaign-asks-alaska-judge-to-allow-release-of-absentee-ballot-data/"}, {"title": "Alaska Beacon — Judge dismisses Peltola campaign petition seeking names of rejected absentee voters (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://alaskabeacon.com/2026/11/11/judge-dismisses-petition-by-peltola-campaign-seeking-names-of-rejected-absentee-voters/"}, {"title": "Anchorage Daily News — Judge denies Peltola campaign request for absentee ballot data (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.adn.com/politics/2026/11/11/judge-denies-request-by-peltola-campaign-for-absentee-ballot-data-from-alaska-division-of-elections/"}, {"title": "AP — Alaska Senate: Peltola absentee ballot ruling (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/alaska-senate-peltola-absentee-ballots-sullivan-f42a49a45a2870786f36086c7ad02824"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Alaska: Peltola campaign sues for rejected-absentee records (ei-2026-10-357)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-357 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET (2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-357 Nov. 9 update; zero X API. Refreshed 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-357 update; zero X API. Refreshed 2026-11-12 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-12 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-357 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "ny-rockland-2026-11-04-aidan-rowan-arrested-stony-point-primary-absentee-forgery-alleged", "permanent_id": "C20261105-181625-02", "uid": "C20261105-181625-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-181625-02", "old_ids": ["ny-rockland-2026-11-04-aidan-rowan-arrested-stony-point-primary-absentee-forgery-alleged"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Feedback Loop", "Inject ballots into the system", "Mail them in."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-15", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-15", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-04", "state": "NY", "description": "On Nov. 4, 2026, Rockland County Sheriff Louis Falco III announced that Aidan Rowan, 25, of Stony Point, a member of the Stony Point Republican County Committee and a candidate in the June 23, 2026, Stony Point Republican County Committee primary, surrendered on an arrest warrant issued Oct. 23 by the Town of Clarkstown Court. The Sheriff's Office said the investigation began after both the Republican and Democratic commissioners of the Rockland County Board of Elections reported that \"a voter's ballot may have been cast without their knowledge.\" Rowan is charged with second-degree forgery, four counts of second-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument, tampering with public records, four counts of first-degree offering a false instrument for filing, and two counts of first-degree making an apparently sworn false statement (six Class D and six Class E felonies). He was arraigned in Clarkstown Justice Court and released on his own recognizance. The sheriff said the evidence did not support action against anyone else and found no evidence that any candidate, campaign or elected official directed or participated in the alleged conduct. Rockland County Business Journal, citing unnamed sources, reported that an absentee ballot may have been submitted with a forged signature of a former Stony Point voter who had moved to New Jersey; the Sheriff's Office has not said how many ballots were involved or whether any result was affected. The allegations concern the June primary, not the Nov. 3 general election. Charges are accusations only; Rowan is presumed innocent. Status Alleged: Rockland County Sheriff Louis Falco III announced the arrest and charges, reported by Rockland News, Mid-Hudson News, Daily Voice, the Rockland County Business Journal and The Journal News (lohud). The charges are accusations only; Rowan is presumed innocent. Catalog point: both parties' Board of Elections commissioners reported a ballot that may have been cast without the voter's knowledge, and a local committeeman was charged with forging and filing absentee instruments from a June primary.", "sources": [{"title": "Rockland News — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://rocklandnews.com/stony-point-rep-ballot-fraud-2026/"}, {"title": "Mid-Hudson News — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://midhudsonnews.com/2026/11/05/stony-point-gop-committeeman-arrested-in-primary-ballot-fraud-investigation/"}, {"title": "Daily Voice — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://dailyvoice.com/article/aidan-rowan-accused-of-ballot-fraud-in-stony-point-sheriff/"}, {"title": "Rockland County Business Journal — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://rcbizjournal.com/2026/11/04/aidan-rowan-arrested-on-ballot-fraud-forgery-tampering-with-a-public-record/"}, {"title": "The Journal News (lohud) — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://www.lohud.com/story/news/crime/2026/11/04/rockland-gop-operative-charged-with-felonies-related-to-ballot-fraud/92612277007/"}, {"title": "X post by @Randyluv5 (2026-11-05T16:13:55Z)", "url": "https://x.com/Randyluv5/status/2118376272007147607"}, {"title": "X post by @MGanjafairy (2026-11-05T17:06:44Z)", "url": "https://x.com/MGanjafairy/status/2118389562942849432"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Rockland County NY GOP committeeman charged in primary ballot fraud (ei-2026-10-313)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-313 (added 2026-11-05 pm EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-2026-11-10-scsj-2504-provisional-ballots-voters-appear-validly-registered-46-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-06", "uid": "C20261111-120609-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-06", "old_ids": ["nc-2026-11-10-scsj-2504-provisional-ballots-voters-appear-validly-registered-46-counties"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-03 (provisional ballots); 2026-11-06 to 2026-11-10 (letters and report)", "state": "NC", "description": "NC Newsline reported on Nov. 10, 2026 that the Southern Coalition for Social Justice (SCSJ), a voting rights organization, told the North Carolina State Board of Elections in a letter that it found 2,504 potential matches between provisional ballot records from the Nov. 3 election and the state's voter registration files. According to the group, 1,562 voters were listed on provisional records as having no record of registration or as previously removed even though SCSJ matched them to active or inactive registrations in the same county, and 942 more had been removed through list maintenance and then tried to vote in the county where they were previously registered. SCSJ says it sent letters and county-specific lists to 46 counties on Nov. 6, that its matching required an identical first and last name, and that election workers could have made errors such as misspelled names that make records hard to match. SCSJ is asking that eligible provisional ballots be approved and that the State Board change procedures so eligible voters can cast regular ballots. The State Board says county boards research each provisional ballot and add eligible ones to results during the canvass; county canvasses are set for Nov. 13 and the state canvass for Nov. 24. This is the group's analysis; no county or State Board determination on these ballots or response to the letter has been reported, so whether the voters were wrongly required to vote provisionally is not yet established. Status Alleged: the Southern Coalition for Social Justice's documented match analysis and letters to the State Board and 46 county boards, reported by NC Newsline; no official determination yet. Catalog point: thousands of voters who appear to be on the rolls were reportedly listed at check-in as unregistered or removed and pushed to provisional ballots, whose acceptance then depends on later county review.", "sources": [{"title": "NC Newsline — NC 2,504 provisional ballots flagged (SCSJ) (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://ncnewsline.com/2026/11/10/voting-rights-group-flags-thousands-of-nc-provisional-ballots-for-review/"}, {"title": "Southern Coalition for Social Justice (press release) — NC 2,504 provisional ballots flagged (SCSJ) (2026-11-09)", "url": "https://southerncoalition.org/scsj-alerts-election-officials-to-provisional-ballots-that-must-be-approved/"}, {"title": "North Carolina State Board of Elections — NC 2,504 provisional ballots flagged (SCSJ) (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.ncsbe.gov/news/press-releases/2026/11/05/state-board-releases-number-provisional-ballots-cast-county-voting-method-2026-general-election"}, {"title": "X post by @j3669 (2026-11-11T11:41:46Z)", "url": "https://x.com/j3669/status/2120482112784712177"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NC 2,504 provisional ballots flagged (SCSJ) (ei-2026-10-400)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-400 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status emerging/medium). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-sacramento-2026-11-02-usps-carrier-charged-withholding-1020-pieces-campaign-mail", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-04", "uid": "C20261103-121512-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-04", "old_ids": ["ca-sacramento-2026-11-02-usps-carrier-charged-withholding-1020-pieces-campaign-mail"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-02", "state": "CA", "description": "On Nov. 2, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of California announced a federal criminal complaint charging Antoine Rashad Polite, 35, of Sacramento, with delaying and obstructing the delivery of U.S. mail. According to court documents, Polite was a U.S. Postal Service letter carrier in Sacramento County who, between Sept. 23 and Oct. 27, 2026, withheld political mail meant for residents on his route. Postal managers first found about 493 pieces of political mail placed with undeliverable bulk business mail even though the addresses were valid. Investigators then found about 527 more pieces in undeliverable mail containers and in his postal vehicle, many with addresses crossed out and marked vacant or undeliverable. Prosecutors say the mail included campaign materials about candidates and ballot propositions on the Nov. 3 California ballot. The sources describe campaign mail, not ballots. Postal officials say most of the mail was later recovered and delivered. The Postal Service Office of Inspector General investigated. If convicted, he faces up to six months in prison for obstruction of mail and one year for delay or destruction of mail. The charges are accusations only, and he is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. CBS News Sacramento shared the story on Instagram on Nov. 2. Status Alleged for the charge, which is an accusation only; the U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of California, announced the complaint and CBS News Sacramento reported it. The sources describe campaign mail, not ballots. Catalog point: a single carrier withheld election-season mail for five weeks before it was caught, and it was found only because postal managers noticed it mixed in with undeliverable bulk mail.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of California (press release, via Public) — Sacramento carrier charged over campaign mail (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://pubt.io/view/E490CAC1DA5AA740D7C6F920867CE6E7CC7CBDB3"}, {"title": "CBS News Sacramento — Sacramento carrier charged over campaign mail (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/sacramento/news/sacramento-postal-worker-charged-withholding-political-mail/"}, {"title": "Instagram post by @cbssacramento — Sacramento carrier charged over campaign mail (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.instagram.com/p/DfREZ1lF8HA/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Sacramento carrier charged over campaign mail (ei-2026-10-237)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-237 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-11-02-63-charged-15-states-noncitizen-voting-false-citizenship-claims", "permanent_id": "C20261103-121512-03", "uid": "C20261103-121512-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261103-121512-03", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-11-02-63-charged-15-states-noncitizen-voting-false-citizenship-claims"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-02", "state": "US", "description": "On Monday, Nov. 2, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges involving 63 people in federal districts in Georgia, Texas, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, New Jersey, Wisconsin, New York, Utah, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, California, Arkansas and Pennsylvania. The charges include voting by a non-citizen in federal elections, false claims of U.S. citizenship to register or vote, false statements on naturalization applications, and, in one New Mexico case, a fraudulent out-of-state voter registration. The department describes four defendants as illegal aliens: Benito Covarrubias Iniguez, 64, of Mexico (Northern District of Georgia); Ali Khan, 33, of Trinidad and Tobago (Southern District of Texas); Mohammad Hachibur Rahman, 33, of Bangladesh (District of Maryland); and Selvin Porfidio Gonzalez Escobar, 43, of Guatemala, living in Robeson County, North Carolina. It describes nearly all of the others as lawful permanent residents (non-citizens). The largest groups are in North Carolina (18 defendants across three districts), California (12, in the Central and Eastern Districts), Texas (5), Pennsylvania (5) and Nevada (4). The department alleges that some defendants voted repeatedly over many years; for example, it says Elizabeth Margaret Crudup in eastern North Carolina registered in 2008 and voted in nine general and nine primary elections, and Gregory Eugene Wade registered in 2000 and voted in 12 general elections. Attorney General Todd Blanche called it \"the largest surge of voter-fraud arrests since President Trump returned to office.\" The department also says it has charged 195 non-citizens in 25 states with illegal voting and registration offenses in the last nine weeks, and 239 people with voting fraud-related offenses since the administration began. Several of these cases were already on this monitor when local prosecutors first announced them: Southern District of Texas, North Carolina, Bradley County, Tennessee, Passaic County, New Jersey, Northern District of New York, Nevada and New Mexico. The department's X post includes a 24-second video with no narration, showing footage of agents making arrests, the words \"ONLY AMERICANS\" and the department seal; it does not identify any defendant. The charges are accusations only, and all defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. No election-office error is alleged. Nov. 2 update: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement said that Monique Gignac-Yochum, a Canadian lawful permanent resident charged in the Western District of Wisconsin, was arrested in Arizona on Oct. 28 by Homeland Security Investigations agents in Tucson after a warrant was issued on Oct. 23. ICE said she allegedly voted in the 2022 and 2024 elections after falsely claiming U.S. citizenship. The charges are accusations only. Update (Nov. 12, 2026): Taking questions at the Justice Department, Attorney General Todd Blanche said, as quoted by The Patriot Oasis, \"We've charged, I don't know the exact number, but close to 300 individuals with illegal voting,\" and that \"hundreds of ongoing criminal investigations\" into voting and election fraud continue; he said that apart from the Alaska matter the department had not opened new probes arising from the Nov. 3 results. The figure is approximate by his own description; the Nov. 2 release gave 239 charged since the administration began, and no updated release or defendant list was found. Status Alleged: these are federal charges, the defendants are presumed innocent, and no convictions are reported in this announcement. Catalog point: noncitizens appear on voter rolls and, according to the charges, some voted in many federal elections over many years before anyone caught it. Several defendants here already have their own cards from local announcements.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs — DOJ Nov. 2 charges against 63 people (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-63-individuals-election-related-crimes"}, {"title": "X post by @TheJusticeDept (U.S. Department of Justice) — DOJ Nov. 2 charges against 63 people (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://x.com/TheJusticeDept/status/2117371732285640969"}, {"title": "U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement — DOJ Nov. 2 charges against 63 people (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/maple-leaf-meet-ballot-thief-ice-hsi-tucson-arrests-canadian-voter-fraud"}, {"title": "The Patriot Oasis — Blanche: close to 300 charged with illegal voting (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://thepatriotoasis.com/article/blanche-close-to-300-charged-with-illegal-voting-investigations-continue/"}, {"title": "The Right Scoop — Todd Blanche on election fraud prosecutions (video) (2026-11-12)", "url": "https://therightscoop.com/breaking-video-todd-blanche-reveals-hundreds-of-cases-of-election-fraud-being-prosecuted/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ Nov. 2 charges against 63 people (ei-2026-10-236)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-13 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-13 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-236 update). EMon ei-2026-10-236 (added 2026-11-03 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-los-angeles-2026-11-09-cd9-mazariegos-complaint-canvassers-took-blank-ballots-registrar-refers-to-da", "permanent_id": "C20261116-120630-03", "uid": "C20261116-120630-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-120630-03", "old_ids": ["ca-los-angeles-2026-11-09-cd9-mazariegos-complaint-canvassers-took-blank-ballots-registrar-refers-to-da"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-11-02 to 2026-11-04 (video circulated); 2026-11-09 (complaint filed); 2026-11-13 (recording provided; DA evaluating)", "state": "CA", "description": "On Nov. 4, 2026, the X account @EagleSignalUsa posted a video with the claim that it shows a campaign assistant for Jose Ugarte, a candidate for Los Angeles City Council District 9, dropping off ballots that had been collected (\"harvested\") across the district, and that there was no chain of custody for those ballots. A similar allegation was circulating on other social platforms from about Nov. 2. The post does not identify the person, the drop-box location, the date or the number of ballots, and the original source of the video has not been identified. California law allows a voter to designate another person to return a mail ballot, so the act described is not by itself illegal; whether any law was broken would depend on facts not shown, such as compensation per ballot or a missing designation. No statement from the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, the Ugarte campaign, or any news report has been found. Not confirmed by a news outlet or election official. Update (Nov. 9–13 reporting): On Monday, Nov. 9, the campaign of Ugarte's opponent, Estuardo Mazariegos, filed a complaint with the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk alleging ballot tampering in Council District 9 (NBC Los Angeles/City News Service, LAist, CityWatch LA). The campaign says CD9 residents reported that canvassers took their blank or unfilled ballots and said they would do the voting for them, that ballots were collected without the returner signing the identification envelope, and that it received photos of collected ballots from various CD9 addresses, some open and filled in for Ugarte. In a Nov. 13 statement it said it gave the registrar a recording of a resident whose ballot appears in the photos, who says canvassers took the blank ballots of three household members without asking whom they wanted to vote for. Photos the campaign gave reporters include one of Ugarte campaigner Amir King, a USC student and political director of Trojan Democrats, returning a stack of ballots at a drop box; whether that photo is the same footage as the Nov. 4 X video is not established. Registrar spokesperson Mike Sanchez said the office forwarded the campaign's release to the District Attorney for review, and noted that state law says a ballot \"shall not be disqualified solely because\" the person returning it did not sign the envelope. Central News Live reports the District Attorney's office confirmed it is evaluating the evidence but no formal investigation is underway. Loyola Marymount law professor Justin Levitt told KPCC's AirTalk that there is no limit on how many ballots one person may return if not paid per ballot, but that filling out a ballot someone else signed would be illegal. King called the allegations bullying and false, defamatory attacks; Ugarte called them categorically false and defamatory. As of Nov. 13, Ugarte led 19,434 to 19,393 (41 votes) with ballots still being counted. The allegations are unproven; no charge or official finding has been made. Status Alleged: the complaint, the registrar's referral to the District Attorney and the DA's evaluation are reported by NBC Los Angeles (City News Service), LAist, CityWatch LA, Central News Live and the Los Angeles Times, and the accused campaign and campaigner have responded and deny the allegations; no charge or official finding has been made. No source states that collectors were paid per ballot; the leaf is used for bulk collection and return of other voters' ballots. California permits designated third-party ballot return. Catalog point: when campaign canvassers can collect stacks of ballots door to door, the voter loses sight of the ballot, and a complaint arrives only after the ballots are already in the count.", "sources": [{"title": "@EagleSignalUsa (X), post with video — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://x.com/EagleSignalUsa/status/2118087087270367474"}, {"title": "NBC Los Angeles (City News Service), Nov. 13, 2026 — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/ugarte-lead-drops-to-41-votes-in-la-council-district-9-race-amid-ballot-tampering-allegations/3970557/"}, {"title": "LAist — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://laist.com/news/politics/south-la-race-city-council-candidate-accuses-other-of-alleged-voter-fraud"}, {"title": "Central News Live — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://centralnewslive.com/article/los-angeles-council-candidate-mazariegos-files-fraud-complaint-against-ugarte/"}, {"title": "CityWatch LA — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://www.citywatchla.com/la-election-2022/33732-ugarte-campaign-draws-complaint-over-ballot-collection"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times, Nov. 11, 2026 — Los Angeles CD9 ballot-collection complaint (2026-11-11)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-11-11/just-156-votes-separate-two-candidates-in-l-a-s-9th-district-council-race"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — LA CD9 ballot-harvesting video claim (unconfirmed) (ei-2026-10-307)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Promoted 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from research queue item rq-2026-11-04-ca-los-angeles-cd9-ugarte-assistant-harvested-ballots-video (EMon ei-2026-10-307): news reports that reached the people involved (Ugarte and King responded) plus an official action (registrar referral to the DA; DA confirms it is evaluating), per Mark's 2026-10-20 rule. Labeled Alleged because tampering is unproven. Whether the campaign's drop-box photo is the same as the Nov. 4 X video is not established. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle", "permanent_id": "C20261016-010629-01", "uid": "C20261016-010629-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-010629-01", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle"], "seq": "C01419", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "On October 15, 2026, Amy Reichert (@amyforsandiego) posted that five wet ballots were \"reportedly\" found on top of a vehicle in Chula Vista that morning. The two attached photos show a small stack of white San Diego County Registrar of Voters envelopes marked \"OFFICIAL ELECTION BALLOTING MATERIAL\" and \"OFFICIAL ELECTION MAIL,\" resting on a dew-covered vehicle hood or roof; the top envelope shows election date 11/03/2026 and address text consistent with Chula Vista (\"CHULA VI\"). Any blacked-out names or addresses in the photos were applied by the poster; the tracker applied no redaction. The post uses \"reportedly,\" so this is a secondhand account, not a first-hand finder statement. As of about 1:10 AM ET on October 16, 2026, web search and free X search found no first-hand poster naming themselves as the finder, and no statement from the Chula Vista Police Department, the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, or local news confirming this Chula Vista vehicle find. Distinct from the Oct. 8 Lake Wohlford / Valley Center roadside election-mail case (cards ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video and ca-san-diego-2026-valley-center-12-unvoted-mail-ballots-strewn-rov-confirmed). Status Alleged: the photos plausibly show San Diego County outbound ballot envelopes on a wet vehicle surface in Chula Vista, but the find, the count of five, and any official recovery are not independently verified. The photos do not show whether the envelopes still held ballots, whether any ballot was voted or counted, or how they came to be on the vehicle. Reichert's further assertion that California lets voters who cannot sign mark an X with a witness and that \"no one verifies the witness signature\" is her unverified claim and is not independently checked here.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Amy Reichert (@amyforsandiego), secondhand report (posted 2026-10-15 12:14 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/amyforsandiego/status/2110766257436057871", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 (stack of San Diego County ROV Official Election Balloting Material envelopes on a dew-covered vehicle surface; recipient name/address blacked out by poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUryuVnaIAAEL8L.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X media — photo 2 close-up (as posted; no redaction by tracker)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUryuVmbMAAmExy.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-2-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen tip Mark linked 2026-10-16; secondhand (\"reportedly\"), so Alleged rather than Citizen Testimony (no first-hand finder or news/ROV confirmation). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Photos verified: SD County ROV Official Election Balloting Material / Official Election Mail envelopes on wet vehicle surface; 11/03/2026; Chula Vista address fragment. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (same leaf as ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash; peers Valley Center Amy CT + ROV Confirmed). Neutral wording omits Prop 39 / blank-checks advocacy. Witness-signature claim kept only as her unverified assertion. Watch Chula Vista PD / SD ROV / local news.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Stack of San Diego County Registrar of Voters Official Election Balloting Material envelopes on a dew-covered vehicle surface; recipient name and street address blacked out by the poster"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-chula-vista-wet-ballots-on-vehicle__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Close-up of San Diego County Official Election Mail envelope, as posted"}]}
{"id": "co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years", "permanent_id": "C20261019-150313-01", "uid": "C20261019-150313-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-150313-01", "old_ids": ["co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years"], "seq": "C01431", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CO", "description": "On October 19, 2026, Wade Miller (@WadeMiller), executive director of the Center for Renewing America, posted on X that a friend's daughter moved out of Colorado in 2014, filed change-of-address forms, and has tried multiple times to get off Colorado's voter rolls, yet \"in the past 12 years Colorado has sent her 20 ballots anyways.\" The attached photo shows a fan of more than 20 envelopes on a wooden table. Most carry the return address of the Douglas County (Colorado) Clerk and Recorder in Castle Rock, with the clerk names Merlin Klotz and Sheri Davis visible on different envelopes, which suggests the mail spans more than one clerk's term. At least one envelope is marked \"Official Ballot Enclosed\" with a \"Vote Early!\" panel and Official Election Mail branding. Other envelopes come from the City of Lone Tree (City Clerk Patricia Leyva), South Metro Fire Rescue Fire Protection District, a fire protection district, and Park Meadows Metropolitan District. These appear to be special-district or municipal mailings, possibly special-district election ballots, rather than county general-election ballots. The tracker did not redact anything; the photo is archived exactly as posted. Status Alleged: this is a secondhand account (Miller relays a friend's daughter's experience; she is not named and has not spoken publicly). As of this capture, no statement from Douglas County Elections or the Colorado Secretary of State confirms this voter's record history or the 20-ballot count, and the photo does not show recipient names or dates for every envelope. Colorado mails a ballot to every active registered voter, so a record that is never cancelled or moved to inactive status keeps producing ballots at the old address. Ballots arriving for someone who moved away show possible roll inaccuracy; they do not show that any of these ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Wade Miller (@WadeMiller), secondhand account of a friend's daughter receiving 20 Colorado ballots in 12 years after moving out in 2014 (posted 2026-10-19 12:52 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/WadeMiller/status/2112225358573420774", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 (fan of 20+ envelopes, mostly Douglas County Clerk and Recorder, Castle Rock CO, incl. Official Ballot Enclosed; plus City of Lone Tree, South Metro Fire Rescue and Park Meadows Metropolitan District mailers; original size, unredacted)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVAhxH6XIAEUiWZ.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen tip Mark linked 2026-10-19 (posted 2026-10-19 16:52 UTC = 12:52 PM ET). Secondhand (friend's daughter, unnamed), so Alleged rather than Citizen Testimony per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md. County: Douglas (from envelope return addresses: Douglas County Clerk and Recorder, Castle Rock CO; clerks Merlin Klotz and Sheri Davis named on envelopes). Post text and media via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Archived with capture_x_post.py (capture PNG, fxtwitter JSON, orig photo, 320px WebP thumb); nothing redacted (Mark standing no-redaction rule 2026-10-16). Special-district/municipal mailers (City of Lone Tree, South Metro Fire Rescue, Park Meadows Metropolitan District) noted as possibly special-district election ballots, not county general-election ballots. Partisan closing line (\"Democrats know this and they don't fix it\") omitted from card text. 20-ballots/12-years count and change-of-address/removal attempts are Miller's secondhand claims, not independently verified. Peers on leaf: Curt Webbe CO (Jefferson), morcarwork CO, Margo Logan OR. Watch for Douglas County Elections statement.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-wademiller-douglas-friends-daughter-20-ballots-12-years__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Fan of more than 20 envelopes on a wooden table, mostly Douglas County Clerk and Recorder (Castle Rock, Colorado) mail naming clerks Merlin Klotz and Sheri Davis, including an Official Ballot Enclosed envelope, plus City of Lone Tree, South Metro Fire Rescue and Park Meadows Metropolitan District mailers"}]}
{"id": "or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls", "permanent_id": "C20261018-193726-01", "uid": "C20261018-193726-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261018-193726-01", "old_ids": ["or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls"], "seq": "C01430", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10", "state": "OR", "description": "On October 18, 2026, Margo Logan (@MargoLogan) reposted text she labeled \"From Facebook post\" about an unnamed household in Clackamas County, Oregon. The quoted Facebook text says a household of two received four ballots; that a neighbor's former grandson resident (present about three months more than three years ago, now living in North Carolina) remains on the Clackamas County voter roll; and that another neighbor who died four years ago remains listed as an active voter at the new neighbor's address. The Facebook text blames Motor Voter for the grandson remaining on the roll. The attached photo shows four teal-and-white Clackamas County \"Vote by Mail Official Ballot Enclosed\" envelopes stacked on a dark granite countertop, with return address \"CLACKAMAS COUNTY CLERK, PO BOX 1080, OREGON CITY OR 97045,\" Official Election Mail markings, nonprofit postage paid Portland, OR, and \"Election Day: November 3, 2026\" visible on the bottom envelope. A piece of cardboard covers the recipient names and street addresses; that cover was applied by the poster, and the tracker applied no redaction. Status Alleged: this is a secondhand X repost of an unnamed Facebook author's claims, not a first-hand citizen statement. As of about 7:35 PM ET on October 18, 2026, web search and free X search found no identified Facebook author, no original Facebook URL, and no statement from Clackamas County Elections or Oregon news confirming this household's four-ballot receipt or the neighbor roll claims. The claim that a deceased person remains active on the roll is the Facebook author's assertion and is not independently verified. Extra ballots or election mail at an address can show roll inaccuracy; they do not show that any ballot was voted or counted. Mapped to Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (stale/moved/deceased records), not the Motor-Voter gateway leaf: the photo and neighbor claims describe failure to purge, while the Motor Voter blame is the Facebook author's unverified explanation.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Margo Logan (@MargoLogan), secondhand Facebook repost (posted 2026-10-18 19:26 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/MargoLogan/status/2111962034556588476", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 (four Clackamas County Vote by Mail Official Ballot Enclosed envelopes for Election Day November 3, 2026; recipient names/addresses covered by cardboard applied by the poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HU8xdcRagAARdQn.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen tip Mark linked 2026-10-18; secondhand (\"From Facebook post\" / unnamed household), so Alleged rather than Citizen Testimony (no identified first-hand Facebook author; no Clackamas Elections or news confirmation). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Photo verified: four Clackamas County Clerk Vote by Mail Official Ballot Enclosed envelopes, Election Day November 3, 2026, Oregon City return address; cardboard over recipient block is poster-applied; archived exactly as posted (Mark standing no-redaction rule 2026-10-16). Tagged politicians and the rhetorical question about Oregon elections omitted from card text per Mark. Deceased-still-active claim noted as unverified. Motor Voter blame retained only as the Facebook author's attribution; leaf is Leaving bad records in (better fit than Motor-Voter gateway). County: Clackamas.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-margologan-clackamas-four-ballots-stale-rolls__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Four Clackamas County Vote by Mail Official Ballot Enclosed envelopes (Election Day November 3, 2026) on a granite countertop; recipient names and street addresses covered by cardboard applied by the poster"}]}
{"id": "ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report", "permanent_id": "C20261031-103152-01", "uid": "C20261031-103152-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261031-103152-01", "old_ids": ["ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report"], "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Account-lockout exploits on social media platforms"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-40", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-40", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-30", "state": "AK", "description": "On the evening of Oct. 30, 2026, X suspended @DanSullivan_AK, the campaign account of U.S. Sen. Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska), four days before Alaska's Nov. 3 general election. The Sullivan campaign gave The Alaska Landmine two screenshots, which the outlet posted on X. The first shows the profile, with a verified badge and 9.4K followers, marked \"Account suspended.\" The second is X's notice, which reads: \"Your account, DanSullivan_AK, was reported and has been suspended for violating the X Rules. Specifically, for: Violating our rules against inauthentic accounts. Specifically, our rule against impersonation.\" The notice does not identify who filed the report, and the suspension appears to have been an automated response to reports rather than a reviewed finding. Chris Olmstead, a regional political director at the National Republican Senatorial Committee, posted on X that Democratic candidate Mary Peltola's campaign and its allies had reported the account for impersonation. Alaska's News Source reporter Wil Courtney relayed the Peltola campaign's denial: \"These are silly and unsubstantiated claims from the Sullivan campaign. I can confirm our campaign did not make any effort to suspend Sullivan's twitter account.\" X later reinstated the account. No source has identified who filed the report. Context: the suspension came two days after The New York Times reported that Peltola-aligned operatives worked to place a second Dan Sullivan (Daniel J. Sullivan) on the Senate ballot, which the Peltola campaign denies; the related cards are https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-163642-01 and https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-16 on this tracker. A same-name candidate on the ballot also gives a ready pretext for impersonation reports against the incumbent's account. Status Alleged: the suspension, its timing and X's stated ground are documented by the notice and the profile screenshot; the claim that an opposing campaign or its allies filed the reports is unverified and denied.", "sources": [{"title": "The Alaska Landmine on X — post with the Sullivan campaign's screenshots of the suspension notice and suspended profile (Oct. 31, 2026, 2:44 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/alaskalandmine/status/2116421103635829222", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "Chris Olmstead (NRSC) on X — claim that the Peltola campaign and allies reported the account (Oct. 31, 2026, 12:55 AM ET; image archived)", "url": "https://x.com/ct_olmstead/status/2116393507808297320", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-olmstead-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "Townhall — The real Dan Sullivan's social media was just temporarily suspended for impersonation (Joseph Chalfant, Oct. 31, 2026)", "url": "https://townhall.com/news/josephchalfant/2026/10/31/the-real-dan-sullivans-social-media-was-just-temporarily-suspended-for-impersonation-n2685649", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__townhall-2026-10-31.html"}, {"title": "Hindustan Times — Dan Sullivan's X campaign account suspended ahead of midterm vote; campaign blames Mary Peltola (Oct. 31, 2026)", "url": "https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-news/dan-sullivans-x-campaign-account-suspended-ahead-of-midterm-vote-alaska-senators-campaign-blames-mary-peltola-101793428409848.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__hindustan-times-2026-10-31.html"}], "notes": "Mark pt527u (2026-10-31). Peltola denial relayed by Wil Courtney (Alaska's News Source, @wil_court) on X, as quoted in the secondary reports. Landmine post archived via fxtwitter JSON and both original photos; the rendered capture PNG timed out in headless Chrome and was skipped. Olmstead fxtwitter JSON fetch failed; his attached image is archived. Townhall and Hindustan Times curl 200, text-verified. Related: C20261028-163642-01, C20260925-194013-16. No vendor named. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Screenshot provided by the Sullivan campaign and posted by The Alaska Landmine: the @DanSullivan_AK profile (Dan Sullivan, verified, 551 following, 9.4K followers) marked \"Account suspended\""}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-10-30-dan-sullivan-x-campaign-account-suspended-impersonation-report__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Screenshot provided by the Sullivan campaign and posted by The Alaska Landmine: X's notice that DanSullivan_AK \"was reported and has been suspended\" for violating its rule against impersonation"}]}
{"id": "az-usao-2026-10-30-three-registration-groups-noncitizen-registration-fbi-referral", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-01", "uid": "C20261102-121503-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-01", "old_ids": ["az-usao-2026-10-30-three-registration-groups-noncitizen-registration-fbi-referral"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "Illegal or \"gray-area\" voter registration drives"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-59", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-59", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-30 (letters and referral announced)", "state": "AZ", "description": "In letters dated Oct. 26, 2026, U.S. Attorney Timothy Courchaine of the District of Arizona asked Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes and Maricopa County Recorder Justin Heap to review voter registrations submitted by three groups: Stand Indivisible Arizona, Worker Power and When We Count, a voter-registration program of the Democratic National Committee. The letters say that, based on a cursory review of written and video reports, the groups and their volunteers or employees may have violated Arizona law by knowingly registering people who are not entitled to vote. On Oct. 30, his office announced that it had opened a case and referred the matter to the FBI. The reports appear to include an Oct. 22 undercover video from Muckraker, which described its video as showing canvassers 'willing to allow non-citizens and a felon to vote.' Axios reported that the video does not show anyone being registered, and Muckraker says it stopped before any registration form was submitted. A Democratic National Committee spokesperson told Axios that it is not aware of any of its fellows registering a noncitizen and called the allegations fabricated. The other two groups and the two election offices had not responded publicly. No charges have been filed, and no ineligible registration has been confirmed. These are allegations only. Status Alleged: the U.S. Attorney's Office confirms it sent the letters and referred the allegations to the FBI; no charges have been filed and no finding has been made against the groups. Catalog point: third-party registration drives can submit registrations that election offices accept on attestation alone, and any problem records surface only if someone later checks them.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Arizona — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-az/pr/district-arizona-responds-allegations-non-citizen-voter-registration"}, {"title": "Axios Phoenix — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/local/phoenix/2026/10/31/doj-arizona-voter-registration-probe-election"}, {"title": "AZFamily — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.azfamily.com/2026/10/31/are-these-arizona-groups-registering-non-citizens-vote-feds-investigating/"}, {"title": "Muckraker (source of the undercover claim) — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (2026-10-22)", "url": "https://www.muckraker.com/articles/democrat-canvassers-allow-illegal-registrations/"}, {"title": "X post by @bullfrog35 (image of the letter) — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://x.com/bullfrog35/status/2116294914418074101"}, {"title": "X post by @USAO_AZ (2026-10-30T22:11:12Z)", "url": "https://x.com/USAO_AZ/status/2116291856619475115"}, {"title": "X post by @Muckraker (2026-10-22)", "url": "https://x.com/i/status/2113363733598654664"}, {"title": "X post by @bullfrog35 (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://x.com/bullfrog35/status/2116294914418074101"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Arizona: U.S. Attorney asks review of three groups' registrations (ei-2026-10-206)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-206 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nc-2026-10-29-doj-18-more-noncitizens-indicted-illegal-voting-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261030-120852-04", "uid": "C20261030-120852-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-120852-04", "old_ids": ["nc-2026-10-29-doj-18-more-noncitizens-indicted-illegal-voting-2024"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-29 (indictments announced); alleged votes mostly 2024, some as far back as 2000", "state": "NC", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2026, the Justice Department announced that federal grand juries in North Carolina indicted 18 noncitizens for illegally voting: nine in the Eastern District, five in the Middle District and four in the Western District. DOJ says one Eastern District defendant, Selvin Porfidio Gonzalez Escobar, 43, of Robeson County, is a Guatemalan national in the country illegally; the rest are described as lawful permanent residents. Most are charged with falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to vote and with voting by an alien, and most of the alleged votes were cast in the 2024 general election. DOJ alleges some defendants voted for many years; one Wake County defendant registered in 2000 and voted in 12 general elections from 2000 through 2024. Eastern District defendants live in or voted in Robeson, New Hanover, Harnett, Wake and Duplin counties; Middle District defendants live in Seagrove, Reidsville, Salisbury, Winston-Salem and Concord; Western District defendants live in Charlotte and Conover. DOJ's release is headed \"DOJ Has Charged 30 People in North Carolina this Year for Illegally Voting,\" and Eastern District U.S. Attorney Ellis Boyle said the nine new cases add to the 10 indicted earlier this month (see the Oct. 15 card) and two from earlier in the year. A false claim of citizenship to vote carries up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine; voting by an alien carries up to one year and a $100,000 fine. The FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigated. The charges are accusations only, and all defendants are presumed innocent. Status Alleged: the indictments are confirmed by DOJ; no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Public Affairs — DOJ Has Charged 30 People in North Carolina this Year for Illegally Voting (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-charges-18-more-north-carolina-illegally-voting-2024-election"}, {"title": "WRAL — 18 more North Carolina noncitizens charged with illegal voting (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wral.com/news/nccapitol/immigrant-voter-fraud-illegal-ballot-election-charge-north-carolina-trump-october-2026/"}, {"title": "Carolina Journal — Feds indict 18 more noncitizens for illegal voting in NC (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/feds-indict-18-more-noncitizens-for-illegal-voting-in-nc/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NC: 18 more noncitizen-voting charges (ei-2026-10-197)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-197 (added 2026-10-30 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). DOJ, WRAL and Carolina Journal curl 200; DOJ text-verified (18 aliens, Gonzalez Escobar, 2000 registrant with 12 general elections). Peer: EDNC Oct. 15 ten-indictment card. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request", "permanent_id": "C20261027-121429-01", "uid": "C20261027-121429-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261027-121429-01", "old_ids": ["wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request"], "seq": "C01578", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-26", "state": "WA", "description": "On Oct. 26, 2026, acting U.S. Attorney Neil Floyd of the Western District of Washington and First Assistant U.S. Attorney Pete Serrano of the Eastern District of Washington said at a Seattle press conference that their offices had identified 405 noncitizens, many of them lawful permanent residents, who are registered to vote in Washington and who together cast more than 1,500 ballots in past elections, some voting repeatedly over years. In a letter, the Justice Department asked the Washington Secretary of State's Office to set aside any ballots those people cast in the Nov. 3 midterm until their eligibility is confirmed. Floyd said many may have been registered through the state's motor-voter program without realizing it, called the list \"the tip of the iceberg,\" and said criminal charges would follow where warranted. Secretary of State Steve Hobbs has said the state recorded 15 noncitizen-voting cases from 1982 to 2025. Update (Oct. 26, 2026): FOX 13 Seattle reported that federal authorities believe thousands of noncitizens have been voting in Washington and anticipate sending an additional list of suspected noncitizens before Election Day; that Secretary of State Steve Hobbs confirmed his office is reviewing the administration's demand after receiving roughly 60 federal subpoenas seeking voter records over the past month; that, according to data Hobbs' office released earlier this year, Washington recorded 15 cases of noncitizen voting between 1982 and 2025, about 0.000006% of all ballots cast, and Hobbs has said in a statement addressing federal election scrutiny that \"voting fraud is incredibly rare\"; and that the Justice Department has not specified any legal action it might take if the state does not comply with the request [5]. Update (Oct. 27, 2026): The Western District of Washington U.S. Attorney's Office press release of Oct. 26 states that in July the head of the Justice Department's Civil Rights Division wrote to the Secretary of State warning that the department was examining records to see whether noncitizens were registered to vote; it lists the possible criminal charges as making false statements in a naturalization application and, for some, fraudulent voter registration, both felonies carrying a maximum of five years in federal prison, and it announces no charges [7]. Just the News (Kevin Killough, Oct. 27, 2026) reported the request and Floyd's statement [9], and John Solomon shared that article on X on Oct. 27, 2026, at 8:48 AM ET without further comment [11]. Update, Oct. 29, 2026: In DSCC v. Trump (D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-03674), filed Oct. 20 by Democratic congressional leaders and party committees, Chief U.S. District Judge James Boasberg ordered the Justice Department to identify by noon Oct. 30 every state, beyond California and Washington, whose officials it has contacted since July demanding that alleged noncitizens be removed from the rolls, refused ballots, or have their ballots set aside; he said he would rule by Nov. 2 on a request to block further letters before Election Day. A DOJ attorney told the court the letters only notify states of potential violations of federal law (Roll Call; AP). Update: on Nov. 5, 2026, U.S. District Judge Jamal N. Whitehead (W.D. Wash., No. 2:26-cv-04223-JNW) granted a temporary restraining order blocking DOJ/DHS coercive demands that Washington set aside alleged non-citizen ballots or face prosecution threats; the TRO lasts 14 days unless extended, a preliminary-injunction hearing is set for Nov. 18, and the court denied a stay pending appeal. The order does not stop investigation or prosecution of unlawful voting. Just the News and Democracy Docket reported the ruling; Democracy Docket is affiliated with Elias Law Group, which represents the plaintiffs. Status Alleged: the figures are federal prosecutors' allegations; no charges had been announced, and the names and counties had not been released.", "sources": [{"title": "KUOW — Federal attorneys allege hundreds of non-citizens are voting in Washington elections (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kuow.org/elections/2026-10-26/federal-attorneys-allege-hundreds-of-non-citizens-are-voting-in-washington-elections"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Washington noncitizen voting (Oct. 26, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/washington-noncitizen-voting-63c17a3eadc9ed232fbd897afbd29b9d"}, {"title": "Seattle Red 770 AM (Jason Rantz) — Neil Floyd: 405 non-citizens on Washington voter rolls", "url": "https://seattlered.com/legal/neil-floyd-405-non-citizens-washington-voter-rolls-hobbs"}, {"title": "Washington Secretary of State — Steve Hobbs statement (source of the 15-cases-since-1982 figure)", "url": "https://www.sos.wa.gov/about-office/news/2026/secretary-steve-hobbs-statement-regarding-latest-overreaching-federal-executive-order-elections"}, {"title": "FOX 13 Seattle (Taylor Winkel) — Feds ask WA to set aside 400 ballots from suspected noncitizens (Oct. 26, 2026, 11:52 AM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027171814/https://www.fox13seattle.com/news/washington-noncitizen-voter-registration)", "url": "https://www.fox13seattle.com/news/washington-noncitizen-voter-registration"}, {"title": "FOX 13 Seattle — Oct. 26, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27; web.archive.org save succeeded)", "url": "https://www.fox13seattle.com/news/washington-noncitizen-voter-registration", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request__fox13seattle-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Washington — Federal data shows hundreds of non-citizens registered to vote in Washington (press release, Oct. 26, 2026; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027175018/https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/federal-data-shows-hundreds-non-citizens-registered-vote-washington)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/federal-data-shows-hundreds-non-citizens-registered-vote-washington"}, {"title": "USAO WDWA — Oct. 26, 2026 press release: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/federal-data-shows-hundreds-non-citizens-registered-vote-washington", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request__usao-wdwa-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "Just the News — Justice Department uncovers hundreds of Washington registered voters it believes may be noncitizens (Kevin Killough, Oct. 27, 2026, 8:42 AM; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027175140/https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/justice-department-uncovers-hundreds-washington-registered-voters-it)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/justice-department-uncovers-hundreds-washington-registered-voters-it"}, {"title": "Just the News — Oct. 27, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/justice-department-uncovers-hundreds-washington-registered-voters-it", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request__justthenews-2026-10-27.html"}, {"title": "X — John Solomon (@jsolomonReports), post sharing the Just the News article (Oct. 27, 2026, 8:48 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/jsolomonReports/status/2115063040269746492"}, {"title": "X — @jsolomonReports post: text and metadata (local copy 2026-10-27; Wayback save failed)", "url": "https://x.com/jsolomonReports/status/2115063040269746492", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-10-26-us-attorneys-405-noncitizens-registered-1500-ballots-set-aside-request__x-jsolomonreports-2115063040269746492.json"}, {"title": "Roll Call — Judge orders Justice Department to disclose noncitizen voter letters (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://rollcall.com/2026/10/29/judge-orders-justice-department-to-disclose-noncitizen-voter-letters/"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Judge orders Trump administration to identify states pressed on noncitizen voters (Oct. 29, 2026; AP 403 to curl, linked only)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-elections-democrats-lawsuit-boasberg-3604f1201f80c50629e6416d8ee771d3"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, W.D. Wash. — Order Granting TRO, No. 2:26-cv-04223-JNW (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Order-granting-TRO.pdf"}, {"title": "Just the News — Judge demands DOJ stop pressuring Washington election officials (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/government/courts-law/judge-demands-doj-stop-pressuring-washington-state-election-officials"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket (Elias Law Group–affiliated; ELG represents plaintiffs) — Federal judge blocks Trump DOJ (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/federal-judge-blocks-trump-doj-from-interfering-with-washington-states-elections-ballot-counting/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — WA 405 noncitizen voters allegation (ei-2026-10-167)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-06 midday ingest: added Judge Whitehead Nov. 5 TRO (EMon ei-2026-10-167 update); stays Alleged. 2026-10-30 AM ingest (EMon ei-2026-10-199): added Boasberg Oct. 29 order in DSCC v. Trump requiring DOJ to list every state sent noncitizen set-aside letters; label unchanged. Refresh 2026-10-27 (Mark; EMon claims): USAO WDWA release (WebFetch and Wayback copy text-verified) confirms the July Civil Rights Division warning and the two possible felony charges at up to five years each; it announces no charges. Just the News (Wayback copy text-verified) confirms the request and the Floyd quote; it calls the source the \"state attorney's office\", but the release is from the U.S. Attorney's Offices. The Solomon X post (read through the X API) only shares the headline and link. Label stays Alleged. Nothing redacted. Refresh 2026-10-27 (FOX 13 Seattle): added the second-list, 60-subpoena, Hobbs and no-stated-legal-action points, verified against the article (curl 200; Wayback 20261027171814). The article attributes the planned second list to federal authorities generally, not by name to Floyd, and gives the 15-case figure from data Hobbs' office released earlier this year, so the card says that. Label stays Alleged. EMon ei-2026-10-167 (added 2026-10-27 PM ingest). KUOW and Seattle Red curl 200; AP 403. Motor-voter is the registration path named by the prosecutor; see also Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter Registration. Nothing redacted.", "related": ["ncsl-2023-19-states-dc-drivers-licenses-without-proof-of-lawful-presence", "ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "ca-slo-2026-10-29-da-investigating-63-dhs-flagged-registrations-clerk-referrals", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-06", "uid": "C20261102-121503-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-06", "old_ids": ["ca-slo-2026-10-29-da-investigating-63-dhs-flagged-registrations-clerk-referrals"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-22 (federal letter); 2026-10-29 (DA investigation announced)", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2026, San Luis Obispo County District Attorney Dan Dow announced that his Bureau of Investigation is investigating two sets of election matters: a list of 63 people registered in the county whom the Department of Homeland Security identified as likely non-citizens, and separate referrals from the county Clerk-Recorder about possible unlawful voting in the current election. The list came with an Oct. 22 letter from Bilal A. Essayli, First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Central District of California, asking the Clerk-Recorder to set aside those voters' mail ballots until citizenship is confirmed. Dow said that \"being named on a list is not proof of a crime\" and that any charges will be based on evidence his office gathers independently. Clerk-Recorder Elaina Cano told KCBX on Oct. 26 that the names she checked with active registrations were \"confirmed U.S. citizens\" and that most others were inactive or canceled, and she said the federal letter does not authorize her office to set aside ballots. No charges have been filed. Status Alleged: the District Attorney confirms the investigation; no charges have been filed, and the Clerk-Recorder says the active registrants she checked are citizens. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was not a citizen was accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): on Nov. 2 the District Attorney announced the first case from the list, charging John Ruel S. Ambos, 31, with illegally registering to vote, illegally voting in 2021 and perjury for stating he was a U.S. citizen on a registration form, and said decisions on 16 similar cases were close; the Clerk-Recorder said her office will cooperate. Charges are accusations only (KCBX; SLO County Clerk-Recorder statement).", "sources": [{"title": "San Luis Obispo County District Attorney — SLO County DA probe of 63 flagged registrants (2026-10-29)", "url": "https://www.slocounty.ca.gov/departments/district-attorney/latest-news/2026/october/district-attorney-investigating-63-federally-identified-registrations-and-local-election-referrals"}, {"title": "KCBX — SLO County DA probe of 63 flagged registrants (2026-10-26)", "url": "https://www.kcbx.org/government-and-politics/2026-10-26/slo-county-official-says-dojs-noncitizen-voter-list-includes-citizens"}, {"title": "KPRL — SLO County DA probe of 63 flagged registrants (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://kprl.com/das-office-investigating-alleged-unlawful-elections-matters-10-30-2026/"}, {"title": "KCBX — SLO County DA announces voter fraud charges right before election (Nov. 3, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kcbx.org/government-and-politics/2026-11-03/slo-county-da-announces-voter-fraud-charges-right-before-election"}, {"title": "San Luis Obispo County Clerk-Recorder — statement on charges related to registration and voting (Nov. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.slocounty.ca.gov/departments/clerk-recorder/news-announcements/clerk-recorder-statement-on-today-s-announcement-of-charges-related-to-registration-and-voting"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — SLO County DA probe of 63 flagged registrants (ei-2026-10-220)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-220 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET (2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon updates; zero X API."}
{"id": "fl-duval-2026-expressvote-unresponsive-touchscreens-early-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261023-121426-04", "uid": "C20261023-121426-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-121426-04", "old_ids": ["fl-duval-2026-expressvote-unresponsive-touchscreens-early-voting"], "seq": "C01524", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "FL", "description": "Action News Jax reported on Oct. 21, 2026, that some Duval County, Florida early voters had reported a stubborn, unresponsive touchscreen on ES&S ExpressVote ballot-marking devices, and that Supervisor of Elections Jerry Holland's office had received a similar complaint. Holland said early voting had gone smoothly overall, with nearly 45,000 early votes cast, and said, \"It could be the way you're touching it, you know, but we want to make sure there's not any problems with the equipment, so let us know immediately.\" He said the ExpressVote prints a ballot the voter can review before scanning, that a voter who sees a mistake can get another ballot, and that voters having trouble selecting a candidate should use the stylus or move to a machine that has one. No equipment fault has been confirmed, and no incorrectly marked or counted ballot has been reported; the voters who complained were not named. Status Alleged: the report reached the supervisor, who acknowledged a complaint, but the cause is undetermined. It is part of the October 2026 multi-state wave of touchscreen reports (Johnson County, Kansas; Williamson and Davidson counties, Tennessee). Catalog point: a touchscreen that resists a selection is caught only by voters who notice and keep trying, and the printed ballot is only a safeguard if the voter reads it. A hand-marked paper ballot counted by hand puts nothing between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Action News Jax — Duval voters report touch-screen issues with ExpressVote machines during early voting (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.actionnewsjax.com/news/local/duval-voters-report-touch-screen-issues-with-expressvote-machines-during-early-voting/C7RV4IMSXZFK5AYUA52MDUXMLA/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Duval County, FL ExpressVote touchscreen reports (ei-2026-10-137)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-137 (added 2026-10-23 daily review; EMon status emerging, confidence medium). Carded rather than queued because the news report reached the Supervisor of Elections, who acknowledged a similar complaint on the record. Voters unnamed, so Alleged rather than Citizen Testimony. Vendor ES&S ExpressVote named in the article. Curl 200, text-verified (45,000, stylus quote). Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "tx-dallas-2026-10-21-duncanville-voter-checked-in-twice-two-poll-books-roster-changed-complaint", "permanent_id": "C20261029-121023-01", "uid": "C20261029-121023-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261029-121023-01", "old_ids": ["tx-dallas-2026-10-21-duncanville-voter-checked-in-twice-two-poll-books-roster-changed-complaint"], "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Poll Books", "Database gap exploitation"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-180010-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-180010-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-21", "state": "TX", "description": "A complaint dated Oct. 27, 2026, addressed to the Texas attorney general and copied to the Texas secretary of state, alleges that the same voter was checked in on Poll Book 137 at 4:49 p.m. and on Poll Book 138 at 4:54 p.m. on Oct. 21, 2026, at Poll Center 3202, the Duncanville Library early-voting site in Dallas County, Texas, The Dallas Express reported on Oct. 28. According to the complaint, one of the two poll books served curbside voters. The complaint also alleges that during a paperwork audit on Oct. 24, after the discrepancy was raised, an early voting ballot board judge added the voter's name to the paper roster for Poll Book 137 so that it would match the electronic record, which the complainant says may have concealed the discrepancy. A separate request bearing the name of Dallas County Republican Party Chair Monty Montanez asks Elections Administrator Paul Adams to determine whether a second ballot was accepted or counted, to preserve rosters, check-in data, audit logs and curbside records, and to seek court relief under Section 87.127 of the Texas Election Code if a ballot was wrongly accepted. Texas secretary of state spokeswoman Alicia Pierce told The Dallas Express that the office could not comment on or confirm receipt of \"an active, formal complaint\" because \"it is subject to an active investigation.\" No response from the Dallas County Elections Department had been reported as of Oct. 28. Status Alleged: The Dallas Express confirmed that the complaint exists but says it has not verified the underlying records or established whether the two entries represent two ballots cast or counted. Catalog point: two poll books at one site recorded the same voter minutes apart without either device stopping the second check-in, and the paper record was allegedly edited afterward to match the electronic one.", "sources": [{"title": "The Dallas Express — Dallas County complaint alleges double voting and roster change (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://dallasexpress.com/city/dallas-county-complaint-alleges-double-voting-and-roster-change/"}, {"title": "WBAP 820 AM — republished Dallas Express report (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbap.com/2026/10/28/dallas-county-complaint-alleges-double-voting-and-roster-change/"}, {"title": "X post by @Carlos__Turcios (Carlos Turcios) linking The Dallas Express (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/Carlos__Turcios/status/2115564736465236034"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dallas County, TX alleged double check-in at Duncanville (ei-2026-10-188)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-188 (added 2026-10-29 AM ingest; EMon emerging, low confidence). Complaint existence reported by The Dallas Express (curl 200) with a Texas SOS statement acknowledging an active formal complaint under investigation; allegations unverified, so Alleged. Complainant and voter not named in sources. Peers: Database gap exploitation cards (Franklin OH 2021 e-pollbook absentee history, Durham NC 2016). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ky-franklin-2026-ag-indicts-felon-registered-five-times-voted-three", "permanent_id": "C20261023-121426-03", "uid": "C20261023-121426-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-121426-03", "old_ids": ["ky-franklin-2026-ag-indicts-felon-registered-five-times-voted-three"], "seq": "C01523", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-21 to 2026-10-22", "state": "KY", "description": "On Oct. 22, 2026, Kentucky Attorney General Russell Coleman announced that Jeffery Woodard, 62, had been indicted on five counts of wrongful registration, three counts of convicted-felon voting and one count of being a second-degree persistent felony offender. He is accused of registering to vote on five separate occasions between 2023 and 2026 despite a prior felony conviction, and of voting in the November 2023 and November 2024 general elections and the May 2026 primary. He was arrested on Oct. 21, and a Franklin County judge set bond at $25,000 (WKYT). The charges are accusations only, and he is presumed innocent; no election-office error is alleged. Status Alleged: the indictment is confirmed by the Attorney General's announcement and three news outlets, but no court has found guilt. Catalog point: as alleged, an ineligible registrant was accepted five times and cast ballots in three elections before a check caught it, which shows how a record the system should have flagged can keep producing ballots. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give such records more chances to be caught.", "sources": [{"title": "WKYT — Previously convicted felon indicted in connection with voter fraud (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wkyt.com/2026/10/22/previously-convicted-felon-indicted-connection-with-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "WBKO — Kentucky Attorney General Coleman indicts convicted felon for voter fraud (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbko.com/2026/10/22/kentucky-attorney-general-coleman-indicts-convicted-felon-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "WHAS11 — Jeffery Woodard indicted on multiple voter fraud felonies (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.whas11.com/article/news/crime/jeffery-woodard-indicted-multiple-voter-fraud-felonies/417-39080f19-982d-4a4f-94e1-41872a4e0529"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Franklin County, KY felon-voting indictment (ei-2026-10-136)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-136 (added 2026-10-23 daily review). Mapped to 5 Accessibility Sleight of Hand > Felon Voting Rights. County from WKYT (Franklin County judge set bond). Indictment only; Alleged. WKYT, WBKO curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-20", "uid": "C20261020-221915-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-20", "old_ids": ["fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026"], "seq": "C01493", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-20", "state": "Federal", "description": "The researchers' site fecvisual.com, built to find smurfing patterns in FEC data, ranks the individual contributors named in conduit earmark memos for the 2025-2026 cycle (5,185,113 names in 112,350,506 Schedule B rows). As viewed on October 20, 2026, after an unnamed EMILY's List earmark row, every one of the next 24 names ranked by transaction count gave through WinRed, mostly to the Trump National Committee JFC, Inc., with top campaigns including Sen. Dan Sullivan, President Trump, Rep. Derrick Van Orden and Speaker Mike Johnson. The top entries are \"SYL\" (57,603 transactions, $796,248), Bruce Makowski (56,926; $49,852), Roger Jeffery (41,706; $341,576), Michael J Burnd (35,329; $938,393) and Carroll Bonner (34,829; $99,080). Three near-identical names, Peggy Jerom, Peggy Jjerome and Peggy Jetome, appear with 34,618, 33,866 and 32,733 transactions, a variant-spelling pattern the researchers also cite in ActBlue data. The first ActBlue name in this ranking is 26th. Peter Bernegger's own published anomaly views likewise list Republican-leaning donors among those with the most gifts, including Robert Amick of Texas with 63,093. Balance: these rows come from conduit and joint-fundraising-committee memo reporting, which records one gift separately for each committee that shares in it, and recurring gifts multiply the count, so a high row count is not by itself proof that a person did not give. No named donor in this ranking has been shown to deny the gifts. Status Alleged: the ranking is a researchers' presentation of public FEC data. It shows the same high-count pattern on WinRed that is cited against ActBlue, but it does not establish smurfing on either platform.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC Visual — Un-Itemized / Conduit tab, 2025-2026, Names ranked by transactions (viewed Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://fecvisual.com/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__fecvisual-conduit-2025-2026-orig.png"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger, preview of the smurfing site with anomaly screenshots (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2111242534403915932", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "FEC — WinRed (C00694323) committee filings", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/committee/C00694323/"}], "notes": "ActBlue/WinRed smurfing research 2026-10-20. WinRed card. Figures read from the screenshot fecvisual-03-unitemized-conduit.png taken Oct. 20, 2026; the site refreshes weekly, so counts will change. Names are printed as the site shows them; no redactions. Robert Amick figure is from Bernegger's own screenshot (fecvisual-bernegger-*.jpg).", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__fecvisual-conduit-2025-2026-orig.png", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__fecvisual-conduit-2025-2026-thumb.webp", "alt": "fecvisual.com Un-Itemized / Conduit tab, 2025-2026 cycle, names ranked by transactions; rows 2 to 25 are WinRed donors (screenshot Oct. 20, 2026)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 1 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 2 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-3-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-3-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 3 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-4-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-20-fecvisual-winred-top-conduit-donors-2025-2026__x-photo-4-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 4 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}]}
{"id": "mo-mcdonald-2026-south-african-lpr-charged-voting-2024-general", "permanent_id": "C20261023-121426-02", "uid": "C20261023-121426-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-121426-02", "old_ids": ["mo-mcdonald-2026-south-african-lpr-charged-voting-2024-general"], "seq": "C01522", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-20", "state": "MO", "description": "On Oct. 20, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri announced that Hanlie Venter, 67, a lawful permanent resident from South Africa, was charged by criminal complaint with one count of unlawful voting by an alien. Prosecutors allege that she registered to vote in September 2024 and voted in the November 2024 federal election at a polling place in McDonald County, Missouri. Homeland Security Investigations investigated, with help from USCIS. If convicted she faces up to one year in prison and a $100,000 fine. The charge is an accusation only, and she is presumed innocent; no election-office error is alleged. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's release and USCIS, but no court has found guilt. Catalog point: as alleged, a registration by a noncitizen was accepted and produced a ballot that entered a federal count two years before it was caught. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give such records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, Western District of Missouri — Lawful permanent resident from South Africa charged with unlawful voting by an alien (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/lawful-permanent-resident-south-africa-charged-unlawful-voting-alien"}, {"title": "USCIS — Alien from South Africa charged with unlawful voting (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/alien-from-south-africa-charged-with-unlawful-voting"}, {"title": "KTTN — South African resident charged with illegal Missouri vote in 2024 (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kttn.com/south-african-resident-charged-with-illegal-missouri-vote-in-2024/"}, {"title": "Newstalk KZRG — South African charged with illegally voting in McDonald County (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.newstalkkzrg.com/2026/10/20/south-african-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-mcdonald-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — McDonald County, MO noncitizen voting charge (ei-2026-10-135)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-135 (added 2026-10-23 daily review). Mapped to 5 Illegal Immigration > registration records allow ballots (peers: Vigo IN, CA Operation Protect the Vote). Charge only; label Alleged per peer convention. DOJ, USCIS, KTTN curl 200. Names as in sources; nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nm-bernalillo-2026-10-20-maryland-man-indicted-false-new-mexico-residency-registration", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-08", "uid": "C20261028-121857-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-08", "old_ids": ["nm-bernalillo-2026-10-20-maryland-man-indicted-false-new-mexico-residency-registration"], "seq": "C01590", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-20", "state": "NM", "description": "A federal grand jury in New Mexico indicted Robert Glenn Johnson, 63, of Annapolis, Maryland, on Oct. 20, 2026, on one count of submitting a materially false voter registration application, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of New Mexico announced, as reported by The Paper., the Albuquerque Journal and the Capital Gazette on Oct. 27. Prosecutors allege that on or about Sept. 18, 2022, he submitted a registration to the Bernalillo County Clerk's Office Bureau of Elections falsely claiming New Mexico residency. He was arrested in Milwaukee on Oct. 26 and released on bond. Neither the indictment nor the announcement says whether he cast a ballot in New Mexico. The Bernalillo County Clerk's Office said it is cooperating, and prosecutors credited its elections bureau with helping the FBI. Status Alleged: the charge is an accusation, and he is presumed innocent. Catalog point: a registration resting on a claimed residency stayed on the rolls for four years before it was charged.", "sources": [{"title": "The Paper. (nm.news) — Feds charge Maryland man with falsely registering to vote in Bernalillo County (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://nm.news/2026/10/27/feds-charge-maryland-man-with-falsely-registering-to-vote-in-bernalillo-county/"}, {"title": "Albuquerque Journal — Maryland man indicted in alleged New Mexico voter fraud (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.abqjournal.com/news/maryland-man-indicted-in-alleged-new-mexico-voter-fraud/3149565"}, {"title": "Capital Gazette — Annapolis man charged in New Mexico voter fraud case (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.capitalgazette.com/2026/10/27/annapolis-charged-new-mexico-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NM federal charge for false residency registration (ei-2026-10-184)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-184 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). All three sources curl 200. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-cdca-2026-operation-protect-the-vote-two-dozen-lprs-charged-noncitizen-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-18", "uid": "C20261019-123505-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-18", "old_ids": ["ca-cdca-2026-operation-protect-the-vote-two-dozen-lprs-charged-noncitizen-voting"], "seq": "C01449", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-19", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 19, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Central District of California announced that 28 lawful permanent residents (green-card holders, not U.S. citizens) have been charged in \"Operation Protect the Vote,\" a coordinated sweep by all four California-based U.S. Attorney's Offices (Central, Eastern, Northern and Southern Districts), and that 11 of them were arrested that day. By district, DOJ lists 13 defendants in the Central District, 6 in the Eastern District, 5 in the Northern District and 4 in the Southern District. Charges include false statements on naturalization applications and, for some defendants, fraudulent voter registration (felonies carrying up to five years), voting by an alien (a misdemeanor in the Eastern District cases), and false claim to citizenship to vote. DOJ says the defendants falsely claimed U.S. citizenship on voter registration applications that were approved, that many then voted in recent elections, and that they later told naturalization officials they had never claimed citizenship or voted. One named example: Omar Alexander Muñoz, 72, a Belizean national living in Commerce, is alleged to have registered in September 2019 by claiming citizenship, voted in 2020, twice in 2022 and in 2024, and lied on his naturalization application; ABC7 reported HSI's early-morning operation in Commerce. Acting Deputy Attorney General Trent McCotter said each of the 28 defendants appears on the list of more than 20,000 likely noncitizen registrants DOJ gave California on Oct. 13; that list and DOJ's lawsuit over it are on their own card. First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli said the arrests show California is mailing ballots to noncitizens. Prosecutors say 22 of the 28 are accused of voting in at least one election, as recently as the June 2026 primary, five of registering only, and one of submitting a provisional ballot in 2020 (CalMatters). Essayli said federal prosecutors have charged about 113 noncitizens in 20 states with illegal voting and registration offenses over the last two months. California Attorney General Rob Bonta said voter fraud is wrong and anyone found guilty should be held accountable, but that 28 out of 23 million registered voters \"makes the point that there is no widespread voter fraud.\" Several defendants who appeared in court on Oct. 19 said they did not recall registering or were confused about their eligibility (Los Angeles Times; CBS Sacramento). The advocacy group NorCal Resist said uniformed, masked federal agents were seen at the Sutter County elections office on Oct. 19 and called it intimidation; Sutter County Registrar of Voters Donna Johnston said she did not believe they were there to intimidate anyone (CBS Sacramento). The same day, DOJ asked the court in the related civil case to order California to set aside mail ballots from people on its list. Oct. 20 update: in an interview with FOX 11 Los Angeles after his release on bond, Muñoz denied registering to vote or ever voting, said someone had once worked at a chocolate factory using his name and Social Security number, and, asked whether someone could have voted in his name, answered \"Could be.\" At one of four other homes FOX 11 visited, a person said the accused resident was not there and had never registered or was unaware of any registration. These are charges only. As DOJ's release states, criminal complaints and informations merely contain allegations, and every defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law. Oct. 23, 2026 update: the Associated Press reported that most of the immigrants charged that week had applied for U.S. citizenship and now face charges related to lying on forms or in interviews, which could lead to prison time and block their naturalization. Update: on Nov. 4, 2026, a federal grand jury in Santa Ana returned indictments against 10 of these lawful permanent residents in Los Angeles and Orange counties, nine of them also accused of lying on naturalization applications, according to KESQ (City News Service) and the New York Post; the total remains 28 defendants, and U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli announced the indictments. Update: on Nov. 2, 2026, the Central District charged six more Los Angeles County lawful permanent residents (Camua, Capi Valle, Dahan, Goertz, Nikzad and Ruiz) with false statements about voting or citizenship on naturalization applications, bringing the Operation Protect the Vote total to 34, according to CBS Los Angeles, NBC Los Angeles and MyNewsLA; prosecutors said five were in custody. The Nov. 4 Santa Ana grand-jury indictments of 10 earlier defendants remain as previously noted. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the DOJ release, AP and ABC7, but no court has found guilt. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued. Update (Nov. 9, 2026): The Sacramento Bee reported that two Sacramento-area defendants, Juan Antonio Rivas Garcia of Sacramento and Giezell Viduya Adawag of Vacaville, each pleaded not guilty in federal court in Sacramento to a single misdemeanor charge of voting as an alien and requested jury trials; a Homeland Security Investigations affidavit says Rivas Garcia registered four times between 2018 and 2022 and voted in 2022 and 2024. The paper said they are among about 40 California green-card holders charged statewide. The charges are accusations only, and the defendants are presumed innocent. Update (Nov. 11, 2026): Patch reported that Amandeep Kaur, 30, an Indian national and lawful permanent resident of Rancho Palos Verdes, is among the 10 people indicted on Nov. 4; prosecutors allege she registered in December 2022, voted in the November 2024 general election and later falsely denied on her naturalization application that she had registered or claimed citizenship. Her arraignment is set for Nov. 20. Her husband told the Associated Press the couple believed they were submitting a voter registration form rather than a ballot; that is his own account. The charges are accusations only.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, C.D. Cal. — 11 Foreign Nationals Arrested in California on Federal Charges Alleging They Illegally Registered and Voted in U.S. Elections (Oct. 19, 2026; 28 LPRs charged across all four California districts)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/11-foreign-nationals-arrested-california-federal-charges-alleging-they-illegally"}, {"title": "ABC7 (KABC) — Federal operation targeting alleged noncitizen voter registration underway in Commerce area (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://abc7.com/post/federal-operation-targeting-alleged-noncitizen-voter-registration-underway-commerce-area/19954916/"}, {"title": "Spectrum News 1 (AP) — Justice Department charges more than 2 dozen in California sweep targeting noncitizen voters (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://spectrumnews1.com/ca/la/politics/2026/10/19/justice-department-charges-more-than-2-dozen-in-california-sweep-targeting-noncitizen-voters"}, {"title": "New York Post — Federal sweep of alleged noncitizen voters in Los Angeles (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/10/19/us-news/fbi-smash-huge-california-voter-fraud-ring-in-los-angeles-days-after-feds-issued-ultimatum-to-state/"}, {"title": "AP — California election / Justice Department sweep (Oct. 19, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/california-election-justice-department-60e3dd468f43e0e8a32e6bf69341f189"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department charges 28 foreign nationals in California with election crimes (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-charges-28-foreign-nationals-california-election-crimes"}, {"title": "CalMatters — Federal arrests over alleged voter fraud in California (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/10/california-federal-arrests-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — California voter fraud defendants react to charges (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-10-19/california-voter-fraud-charges-defendants-react"}, {"title": "CBS Sacramento / CBS San Francisco — Vacaville and Sacramento residents charged in California voter fraud cases (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/sanfrancisco/news/vacaville-sacramento-residents-charged-california-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Most immigrants charged with voter fraud in California had applied for citizenship (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/california-election-naturalization-voting-62ebeea82da863d93ee4e112e5b9f86e"}, {"title": "KESQ (City News Service) — 10 non-citizens indicted by grand jury (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://kesq.com/news/california/2026/11/04/10-non-citizens-indicted-by-grand-jury-on-voter-fraud-charges/"}, {"title": "New York Post — 10 alleged noncitizens indicted in California voter fraud investigation (2026-11-04)", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/11/04/us-news/10-alleged-noncitizens-indicted-in-massive-california-voter-fraud-investigation/"}, {"title": "CBS Los Angeles — DOJ charges 6 more Southern California green-card holders (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/losangeles/news/doj-charges-6-southern-california-green-card-holders-accused-voting-illegally/"}, {"title": "NBC Los Angeles — Federal prosecutors charge 6 more LA County residents (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.nbclosangeles.com/news/local/federal-prosecutors-charge-6-more-la-county-residents-in-illegal-voting-probe/3964628/"}, {"title": "MyNewsLA — 6 foreign nationals in LA accused of illegally registering to vote (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://mynewsla.com/crime/2026/11/02/6-foreign-nationals-in-la-accused-of-illegally-registering-to-vote/"}, {"title": "FOX 11 Los Angeles (Matthew Seedorff) — One of 11 arrested in California voter fraud crackdown speaks out (Oct. 20, 2026, 11:13 PM PT)", "url": "https://www.foxla.com/news/one-11-arrested-california-voter-fraud-crackdown-speaks-out", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__fox11-munoz-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "Mediaite — 'I'm not a killer!' Man nabbed in crackdown on illegal voters rips 'excessive' feds (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.mediaite.com/media/im-not-a-killer-man-nabbed-in-trump-crackdown-on-illegal-voters-rips-excessive-feds/"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), \"Noncitizen arrested in DOJ California voter fraud raid speaks out…\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 12:48 PM ET; 3:48 video: narration around the FOX 11 report of Oct. 20)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2112949061548417417", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation--scif__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "The Sacramento Bee — Sacramento-area defendants plead not guilty to voting as aliens (Nov. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sacbee.com/news/politics-government/election/article317999644.html"}, {"title": "Patch (Palos Verdes) — Rancho Palos Verdes woman indicted in federal voter fraud case (2026-11-11)", "url": "https://patch.com/california/palosverdes/rancho-palos-verdes-woman-indicted-federal-voter-fraud-case"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — C.D. Cal. Operation Protect the Vote (ei-2026-10-057)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-13 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-13 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-057 update). Refreshed 2026-11-06 midday ingest: added Nov. 2 six more CDCA charges / total 34 (EMon ei-2026-10-057 update); stays Alleged. Refreshed 2026-11-05 midday ingest: added Nov. 4 grand jury indictments (EMon ei-2026-10-057 update); stays Alleged. EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: AP naturalization angle (AP curl 403, linked only). Refresh 2026-10-21 3:15 PM ET from Mark's @TheSCIF lead (post 2112949061548417417, issue 1): +FOX 11 Muñoz interview (curl 200), +Mediaite, +SCIF post. Muñoz's identity-misuse explanation is his own statement and is unverified. Stays Alleged. Refresh 2026-10-20 AM EDS/EMon ingest: CalMatters 22/5/1 breakdown, Essayli ~113 in 20 states, Bonta response, defendants' court statements, Sutter County agent-presence allegation and registrar response, DOJ OPA release; all sources curl 200. Stays Alleged. Refresh 2026-10-19 PM (EMon ei-2026-10-057 update): C.D. Cal. USAO release confirms 28 LPRs charged across all four California federal districts (CD 13, ED 6, ND 5, SD 4), 11 arrested Oct. 19; named example Omar Alexander Muñoz (Belizean, Commerce). +DOJ release (WebFetch 200; curl returns bot shell), +ABC7 (curl 200). McCotter: all 28 appear on the >20,000-name list. Stays Alleged with presumption of innocence. Card id retains 'two-dozen' slug for link stability. EMon ei-2026-10-057 (first_seen 2026-10-19; EMon status active, severity high, confidence high). Spectrum (AP text-verified: more than two dozen, Operation Protect the Vote, all LPRs) and NY Post curl 200; apnews.com 403. Count and named defendants pending the Essayli press conference; refresh when DOJ posts a release. Related: CA DOJ noncitizen-list suit card (ei-2026-10-032). Refreshed 2026-11-10 12:13 PM ET (2026-11-10 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-057 Nov. 9 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "tx-bell-2026-10-23-touchscreen-selections-changing-county-says-no-votes-altered", "permanent_id": "C20261024-102612-04", "uid": "C20261024-102612-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261024-102612-04", "old_ids": ["tx-bell-2026-10-23-touchscreen-selections-changing-county-says-no-votes-altered"], "seq": "C01540", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-23 (first week of early voting)", "state": "TX", "description": "KCEN 6 reported on Oct. 23, 2026 that Bell County, Texas voters said touchscreen voting machines were selecting the wrong candidate or appearing to change their selections during the first week of early voting. Some voters said they had to press low on a selection box so the machine would not mark the opposing party's choice; others said their selections changed on screen. County spokesperson James Stafford said \"no votes are being altered\" but acknowledged that some machines are not responding the way voters want: \"When someone reports that they had issues with the touchscreen, that can quickly turn into machines changing [votes]. That is not happening.\" He said in one case a voter used multiple machines before being satisfied, that the county keeps both a digital record and the printed paper ballot, and that voters should review the paper ballot and have it spoiled if it is wrong. More than 28,000 people checked in during the first four days of early voting. The report does not name the voters or the voting-system vendor. Status Alleged: the reports come from unnamed voters through a news outlet; the county denies that votes are altered but acknowledges touchscreen responsiveness problems, and no equipment fault has been confirmed. Separate from the Killeen early-voting smoke evacuation (skipped as not a tactic). Catalog point: a voter who must learn to press low on a box to avoid the opposing candidate is doing the machine's quality control; only voters who notice catch the error. A hand-marked paper ballot counted by hand at the precinct puts no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "KCEN 6 — Bell County voters raise concerns over ballot machines: Here's what officials say (Ashley Henderson, Oct. 23, 2026, 11:46 PM ET; kcentv.com 403 to curl, text via WebSearch extract)", "url": "https://www.kcentv.com/article/news/local/bell-county-voters-raise-concerns-midterms-ballot-machines-changing-what-officials-say/500-f7d5253d-5518-4383-a1fa-ab1857950739"}, {"title": "KCEN 6 — Voters raise concerns over ballot machine (video, Oct. 23, 2026, 6:13 PM ET; 403 to curl)", "url": "https://www.kcentv.com/video/news/politics/elections/voter-concerns-over-ballot-machine/500-1b5c2317-b547-4ad6-9a84-5ee9d6a1d5ae"}, {"title": "KCEN 6 — Bell County encourages residents to speak up about ballot machine concerns (video, Oct. 23, 2026, 7:14 PM ET)", "url": "https://www.kcentv.com/video/news/politics/elections/bell-county-encourages-residents-to-speak-up-about-ballot-machine-concerns/500-e8510d48-63f7-46e8-8cd1-ea931159dc7c"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bell County, TX touchscreen selection reports (ei-2026-10-148)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-148 (2026-10-24 AM). New card; distinct from the skipped Bell County Killeen smoke item. Same leaf as Bexar, Duval, Johnson and Palm Beach. Alleged rather than Citizen Testimony because no voter is named; not Disputed because the county acknowledges touchscreen problems and denies only that votes are altered. No vendor tagged: no source names one. KCEN pages return 403 to curl and WebFetch; text verified from WebSearch extracts. 2026 midterm-window item: EMon priority true. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "in-vigo-2026-daca-recipient-charged-registering-voting-six-elections", "permanent_id": "C20261022-121034-01", "uid": "C20261022-121034-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-121034-01", "old_ids": ["in-vigo-2026-daca-recipient-charged-registering-voting-six-elections"], "seq": "C01515", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-18 to 2026-10-21", "state": "IN", "description": "Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita announced on Oct. 21, 2026, that his office and Vigo County Prosecutor Terry Modesitt filed felony charges on Oct. 18 in Vigo Superior Court 1 against Francisco Aguilar Romero, 41, of Terre Haute. The charges are one count of fraudulent voter registration, one count of perjury, and three counts of voting or offering to vote while ineligible, all Level 6 felonies (Tribune-Star). According to the charging papers, Romero was born in Mexico, is in the United States illegally, and holds DACA status. Prosecutors say state records show he voted in Vigo County in the 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024 general elections and the 2019 and 2023 municipal elections, after first registering in February 2018 and updating or re-verifying his registration in August 2023. The Attorney General's release says that when Romero registered, neither federal nor Indiana law required proof of citizenship, so he registered \"simply by completing a form that stated he was a citizen,\" and that Indiana's new proof-of-citizenship statute, which is under litigation, helped identify him. Rokita said it is the first time Indiana has prosecuted a person in the country illegally for illegal voting. If convicted, Romero faces up to 11.5 years in prison. These are charges only, and the defendant is presumed innocent. According to the probable-cause affidavit reported by WTHI-TV, Romero registered at the Terre Haute Bureau of Motor Vehicles in 2018 and 2023, both times signing forms affirming that he was a U.S. citizen; he told investigators that he told BMV employees he was not a citizen and that supervisors said he was eligible after he showed his DACA documents. That is his account and has not been verified; BMV officials told investigators the standard process requires customers to verbally confirm citizenship before the system lets registration proceed. The affidavit also states that the U.S. Attorney's Office previously declined to prosecute the case. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the Attorney General's release and the Tribune-Star, but no court has found guilt. Catalog point: as alleged, a registration record backed only by a checked citizenship box produced ballots in six elections over five years before any check caught it. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give such records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "WBIW — Felony charges filed against an alleged illegal alien for registering and voting multiple times in Indiana elections (Indiana Attorney General release, Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbiw.com/2026/10/21/felony-charges-filed-against-an-alleged-illegal-alien-for-registering-and-voting-multiple-times-in-indiana-election/"}, {"title": "Tribune-Star (Terre Haute) — Charges allege non-citizen voted illegally in Vigo County (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.tribstar.com/news/indiana_news/charges-allege-non-citizen-voted-illegally-in-vigo-county/article_33071c1f-70a0-48be-a55c-3816b2670a06.html"}, {"title": "State of Indiana — Attorney General Todd Rokita and Vigo County Prosecutor Terry Modesitt file felony charges (events.in.gov listing)", "url": "https://events.in.gov/event/attorney-general-todd-rokita-and-vigo-county-prosecutor-terry-modesitt-file-felony-charges-against-an-alleged-illegal-alien-for-registering-and-voting-multiple-times-in-indiana-elections"}, {"title": "WTHI-TV (Terre Haute) — Terre Haute man accused of voting illegally in six elections (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wthitv.com/2026/10/21/terre-haute-man-accused-voting-illegally-six-elections/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Vigo County, IN noncitizen voting charges (ei-2026-10-129)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: WTHI affidavit details on BMV motor-voter registration (curl 200). EMon ei-2026-10-129 (first_seen 2026-10-22). Mapped to 5 Illegal Immigration > registration records allow ballots (peer: CA Operation Protect the Vote card). Charges only; label Alleged per peer convention. WBIW and Tribune-Star text-verified, curl 200. Names as in sources; nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-18", "uid": "C20261020-221915-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-18", "old_ids": ["fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis"], "seq": "C01491", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-17", "state": "Federal", "description": "On October 17, 2026, Peter Bernegger (@PeterBernegger), Chris Gleason (@immutablechrist) and Phillip Allison (@TheTVConsPiracy) released fecvisual.com, a free interactive site that maps public FEC Schedule A and Schedule B contribution data so anyone can look for smurfing patterns. The site plots each donor as a spike on a 3-D map, with height for the donor's transaction count, from 2004 to 2026. For ActBlue's lifetime view it plots 818,136 donor units that had 60 or more transactions in at least one cycle. It lists anomalies, including donors with the most transactions, tiny repeat transactions, the most committees, and ZIP codes that do not match the filed state. It also lists contributors named in conduit earmark memos, with links to the FEC filing images, and maps the links among donors, conduits, committees and campaigns. For the 2025-2026 cycle, its conduit tab counts 5,185,113 names in 112,350,506 Schedule B rows. On September 15, 2026, Bernegger wrote that his Election Watch analysis finds ActBlue accepted 178,204,660 \"Smurfed donor transactions\" totaling $3,543,266,360 from 281,434 donors, which is 39.7 percent of ActBlue's transactions and 29.3 percent of its dollars, and he called it criminally laundered money. Gleason says he first identified the pattern and that The Gateway Pundit first reported it in April 2023. The same views show WinRed conduit donors at the top of the 2025-2026 transaction counts, so the pattern the tool flags appears on both platforms. Status Alleged: these are researchers' classifications of public data. Their criteria for calling a donor a \"smurf\" have not been published or independently tested, and conduit double-reporting, split gifts, recurring gifts and shared names can inflate counts.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC Visual — Campaign Contributions (fecvisual.com; data refreshed weekly from FEC bulk files)", "url": "https://fecvisual.com/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__fecvisual-home.html"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger, release of fecvisual.com with usage tips (Oct. 17, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2111596515965727232", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger, preview of the smurfing site with screenshots (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2111242534403915932", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger, ActBlue \"Smurfed\" transaction totals from electionwatch.info (Sept. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2099874741800567289", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x3__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Chris Gleason (@immutablechrist), account of the research's origin (Aug. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/immutablechrist/status/2091283063649255830", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x4__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Chris Gleason, on the SmurfHunter tools behind fecvisual (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/immutablechrist/status/2111120770772439408", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x5__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "The Gateway Pundit — Democrat Party Reportedly Received Half Its Donations from Unemployed Americans (April 3, 2023)", "url": "https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/04/breaking-exclusive-corrupt-and-criminal-democrat-party-receives-half-its-donations-from-unemployed-who-are-likely-elderly-voters-whose-identities-are-stolen-wheres-the-money-really-coming-from/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__thegatewaypundit-breaking-exclusive-corrupt-and-criminal-democrat-party-receives.html"}, {"title": "Election Watch (Peter Bernegger) — electionwatch.info", "url": "http://www.electionwatch.info"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Mark's lead. fecvisual methodology was read from its public JavaScript (Schedule A by cycle from FEC bulk files; 60-row plotting threshold; anomaly tables; compliance screening against 2025-26 limits of $3,500 per candidate per election, $44,300 national party, $10,000 other party, $5,000 PAC). Screenshots are in /workspace/actblue-smurfing/. electionwatch.info returned an empty page to curl. Gleason's posts also claim a Chinese Communist Party ('iGas') influence operation funneled money through ActBlue, WinRed, Democracy Engine and The Action Network; no source verifying that claim was found, so it is not carded.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 1 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-17"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 2 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-17"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-3-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-3-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 3 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-17"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-4-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis__x-photo-4-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 4 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-17"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 1 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 2 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-3-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-3-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 3 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-4-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x2__x-photo-4-thumb.webp", "alt": "Image 4 attached to Peter Bernegger's X post of 2026-10-16"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/immutablechrist/status/2111120770772439408", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x5__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x5__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 39.432, "bytes": 4528177, "sha256": "24fcee9fec0c45f6fecae3ff6c003335410b285d3ac5107221555c636be695d4", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-10-17-fecvisual-researchers-smurfing-fec-data-analysis--x5__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "nc-ednc-2026-ten-noncitizens-indicted-false-citizenship-claims-vote-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-12", "uid": "C20261019-123505-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-12", "old_ids": ["nc-ednc-2026-ten-noncitizens-indicted-false-citizenship-claims-vote-2024"], "seq": "C01443", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-15", "state": "NC", "description": "On Oct. 15, 2026, U.S. Attorney Ellis Boyle of the Eastern District of North Carolina announced that a federal grand jury indicted 10 noncitizens, one described as an illegal alien and nine as lawful permanent residents, under 18 U.S.C. 611 and 1015. The indictments allege all 10 falsely claimed U.S. citizenship to register and vote in the 2024 general election, and nine are also charged with voting by an alien. Defendants and counties per the releases and WNCN: Eduardd Omar Majano Sosa, Ramona Abreu-Exia, Karl Fout, James Edward Herrmann and Ludgardys Olena Matthews (Cumberland); Gjina Gojcaj McDonald (Robeson); Lawton Caswell McKenzie (Wayne); Lionel Paul (Granville); Mervin Sylvester Bogle (Harnett); and Robert Harold Corbett (Wake). Some are alleged to have voted as far back as 1998. The FBI and HSI investigated, and Carolina Journal reports eight defendants appeared in federal court in Raleigh on Oct. 15 and were released on conditions. Falsely claiming citizenship to vote carries up to five years, and voting by an alien up to one year. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the indictments are confirmed by the USAO and DOJ releases, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, E.D.N.C. — EDNC unveils ten federal indictments alleging noncitizens voted in 2024 election (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ednc/pr/ednc-unveils-ten-federal-indictments-alleging-noncitizens-voted-2024-election"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 16 aliens for illegal voting (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-16-aliens-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "Carolina Journal — 10 noncitizens indicted for lying about citizenship, illegally voting (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/10-noncitizens-indicted-for-lying-about-citizenship-illegally-voting/"}, {"title": "CBS 17 (WNCN) — 10 indicted for illegally voting in North Carolina as non-citizens (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.cbs17.com/news/local-news/10-indicted-for-illegally-voting-in-north-carolina-as-non-citizens-federal-prosecutors/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — EDNC ten noncitizen voting indictments (ei-2026-10-051)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-051 (first_seen 2026-10-15; EMon status active, confidence high). USAO, DOJ and Carolina Journal curl 200 (DOJ text-verified: Majano Sosa); WNCN 403; News & Observer timed out and was omitted. Peer: NC SBE 2016 audit (41 noncitizens) card."}
{"id": "ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county", "permanent_id": "C20261014-120744-01", "uid": "C20261014-120744-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-120744-01", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-doj-48-hour-noncitizen-mail-ballot-list-la-county"], "seq": "C01378", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-13 to 2026-10-27", "state": "CA", "description": "On Oct. 13, 2026, acting Deputy Attorney General R. Trent McCotter sent California Secretary of State Shirley Weber a letter, first reported by Reuters, giving state officials 48 hours to review a list of people the Justice Department \"believes are likely noncitizens\" who were sent November mail ballots. The letter says DOJ gave Los Angeles County officials a \"password-protected thumb drive\" containing the names. It demands that California not send ballots to listed voters until their citizenship is confirmed, that ballots returned by listed voters be \"segregated,\" and that already-returned ballots not be tabulated \"until citizenship has been determined\"; otherwise the federal government \"will have no choice but to seek emergency relief.\" DOJ spokesperson Kiersten Pels confirmed the letters to Democracy Docket. The number of names and how the list was compiled were not disclosed, and it is unclear whether supporting evidence was provided. California, a universal vote-by-mail state, began mailing ballots to more than 20 million voters on Oct. 5. The letter cites a July 16 notice from DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin; in July, Weber said she had \"serious doubts about the reliability\" of the federal data. NBC News and POLITICO reported on Oct. 14 that McCotter sent separate letters to Weber and to Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder Dean Logan, set the review deadline at noon Thursday, Oct. 15, and asked officials to \"segregate — not cancel\" the listed voters' ballots. Both then responded on Oct. 14. Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder Dean Logan said his office received the letter with a USB drive \"purportedly containing the referenced records\" and a handwritten password note, and has not accessed the drive because \"we do not consider the device a secure medium\"; he said the letter does not say how many people are involved, that the county is reviewing it with the Secretary of State and Attorney General, and that any removal must rest on \"verifiable information, not assertions of unconfirmed data matching.\" The county posted the letter and note publicly. Secretary of State Weber said DOJ never gave the list to her office, that the drive's password came on a sticky note, and that federal officials refused her July request for the methodology behind their claim of 190,000 noncitizens on California's rolls; she called DOJ's effort a source of \"chaos\" and distrust. Oct. 15 update: after the noon deadline passed, the Justice Department, working with DHS, sued the State of California, Secretary of State Weber, and Registrar-Recorder Logan in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California (United States v. State of California, No. 2:26-cv-12025), seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint asks the court to order officials to set aside mail ballots from voters \"identified by the Federal Government likely to be noncitizens\" and not to tabulate them until each voter's citizenship can be determined. DOJ says DHS and Homeland Security Investigations compared publicly available California voter-registration files with federal immigration data and identified more than 20,000 people who are \"likely aliens\" registered to vote, and it describes the analysis as preliminary and ongoing. In an Oct. 15 statement, Weber's office said DOJ refused to provide its methodology and data sources and is demanding that California \"blindly trust\" the administration \"without any evidence or legal authority\" (DOJ press release; CNBC; complaint). Later on Oct. 15, after the suit was filed, Registrar-Recorder Logan said Los Angeles County had formally responded that morning to DOJ's Oct. 13 letter, that the list \"referenced individuals throughout California, not specifically in Los Angeles County,\" that DOJ sued \"without regard for, or acknowledgment of, the County's timely response,\" and that the county \"cannot withhold or refuse to count ballots based solely on unverified allegations\" (Los Angeles County statement). Also on Oct. 15, in a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights and Pedro Trujillo v. DHS, No. 1:26-cv-03072-SLS, filed Sept. 2), CHIRLA and California voter Pedro Trujillo, represented by the UCLA Voting Rights Project, filed an emergency application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop DOJ and DHS from using the list to press California officials to withhold or segregate ballots. They argue the demand exceeds executive authority and would force officials to violate the National Voter Registration Act's 90-day limit on systematic list-maintenance programs. The court directed the parties to file a joint status report by Oct. 16 proposing a briefing schedule; the motion is pending, and no order has been granted (UCLA Voting Rights Project; TRO application PDF). Oct. 16 update: in a letter to Los Angeles County Assistant County Counsel Peter Bollinger, copied to Secretary of State Weber and Registrar-Recorder Logan, acting Deputy Attorney General Trent McCotter warned that \"if persons knowingly tabulate ballots cast by individuals identified by federal agencies as noncitizens, they risk becoming aiders and abettors to a federal crime,\" citing 18 U.S.C. 611 and 18 U.S.C. 2. AP and Reuters report the list covers more than 20,000 people the administration says are probably noncitizens; McCotter said DOJ used internal immigration records and data matching, acknowledged the list includes people outside Los Angeles County, and called segregating ballots a standard practice. On Oct. 15, SIREN and Mi Familia en Acción moved to intervene as defendants in the federal case (C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025, Doc. 11). On Oct. 19, federal authorities separately charged more than two dozen alleged noncitizen voters in California in a sweep called Operation Protect the Vote, which has its own card. Oct. 19 update: the Justice Department filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order and an order to show cause (Doc. 22-1), asking the court to require California to set aside vote-by-mail ballots from the more than 20,000 people on the federal list until their citizenship is verified. DOJ argued that California may begin counting mail ballots 29 days before the election and that the harm could not be undone once ballots are counted and commingled; the filing states that the defendants oppose the request. McCotter tied the motion to the same-day Operation Protect the Vote charges (CalMatters). No hearing date or ruling had been reported as of the morning of Oct. 20. Oct. 20 update: Los Angeles County opposed the TRO application (Doc. 32-1), saying 7,035 listed records bear county addresses and that a 200-record sample showed many canceled or inactive registrations and a substantial share recording a U.S. birthplace; its registrar's declaration that it cannot verify citizenship beyond the voter's attestation has its own card (ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation). Update Oct. 21–22, 2026: California asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing DOJ had not shown that any voter cast an unlawful ballot. Judge Carter did not rule by the noon Oct. 22 deadline DOJ had requested and set a hearing for the week of Oct. 26. On Oct. 22 DOJ filed a notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit, calling the lack of a ruling a \"constructive denial\" of its emergency request, an unusual step taken before the district judge ruled (Reuters via NBC News; Democracy Docket). Los Angeles County says it has processed more than 331,000 mail ballots since Oct. 11 and that opened ballots cannot be traced back to individual voters. Update (Oct. 23, 2026): U.S. Attorneys sent letters to county registrars across California giving them 48 hours to provide identifying information on voters DOJ believes are noncitizens and to set aside (sequester) their returned ballots until citizenship is verified, warning that \"Any election official who knowingly processes the ballot of a noncitizen is opening themselves to legal jeopardy\" (First Assistant U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli). A spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office in Los Angeles told the Los Angeles Times that 57 of 58 counties were served (Los Angeles had already received notice); according to the L.A. County registrar's office, at least 18 counties had received letters (CBS/AP). Letters from U.S. Attorney Craig Missakian (N.D. Cal.) listed 407 \"likely aliens\" for Contra Costa and asked for Social Security numbers, ID and registration records; San Bernardino's list had 1,133 names, Merced's 177, Santa Cruz's 81. Contra Costa's Kristin Connelly called the letter \"intended to intimidate\"; Dean Logan said it reflects \"a posture of intimidation.\" The same day DOJ asked the Ninth Circuit to rule on its lawsuit; the district-court hearing is set for Tuesday, Oct. 27. Status Alleged: the letter, the federal demand, and the lawsuit are confirmed by DOJ itself and several outlets, but no state, county, or court has verified that anyone on the list is a noncitizen, and DOJ calls its own count preliminary. Catalog point: in a universal mail-ballot state, a live ballot is mailed to every active record before anyone confirms eligibility, so any ineligible record that remains on the roll already has a ballot in the mail. Whether the federal list proves accurate or not, the dispute shows how hard it is to recall or quarantine ballots once they are mailed, and why precinct check-in with identification and hand-countable paper keep eligibility questions resolvable. Related: ei-2026-10-009 (ICE/HSI voter-record ingestion), ei-2026-09-020 (Nevada DHS-flagged voters later found to be citizens), ei-2026-10-008 (Pennsylvania noncitizen charges). Update Oct. 25, 2026: In a rare Sunday hearing of nearly two hours, a Ninth Circuit panel (Judges Mark Bennett, Patrick Bumatay and Gabriel Sanchez) heard DOJ's emergency request to block California from tabulating ballots tied to roughly 20,000 people on the federal list. Judge Bennett questioned the court's jurisdiction while the district court has said it will rule promptly, and Judge Sanchez asked what showed the list matches California's 2026 voter roll; DOJ attorney Matthew Donnelly had difficulty explaining the methodology, including an unidentified third party's role (Democracy Docket). DOJ said more than 300,000 mail ballots had already been processed. The panel did not rule, and coverage described it as skeptical of DOJ's request (Los Angeles Times; CNN; POLITICO). Judge Carter's district court hearing remains set for Oct. 27. Update Oct. 25–28, 2026: In its Oct. 25 Ninth Circuit brief, DOJ quoted the county's statement that a separated ballot cannot be associated with the voter and said about 219,000 more Los Angeles County ballots had become untraceable since Oct. 20 (331,000 to 550,000); that admission has its own card (us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation). On Oct. 26 the Ninth Circuit dismissed DOJ's appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the district court had not yet ruled; Judge Bumatay dissented (Ninth Circuit order; CBS News). At the Oct. 27 district-court hearing, Judge Carter did not rule, said he would likely appoint a special master to weigh the evidence, and said \"any threats to state and county elected employees cease immediately\"; a final ruling may not come until after Election Day (ABC News; CalMatters; Los Angeles Times; Democracy Docket). Update, Oct. 29, 2026: In DSCC v. Trump (D.D.C. No. 1:26-cv-03674), filed Oct. 20 by Democratic congressional leaders and party committees, Chief U.S. District Judge James Boasberg ordered the Justice Department to identify by noon Oct. 30 every state, beyond California and Washington, whose officials it has contacted since July demanding that alleged noncitizens be removed from the rolls, refused ballots, or have their ballots set aside; he said he would rule by Nov. 2 on a request to block further letters before Election Day. A DOJ attorney told the court the letters only notify states of potential violations of federal law (Roll Call; AP). Stays Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "HuffPost (Reuters wire) — DOJ gives California 48 hours to review list of alleged noncitizen voters or face legal action (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.huffpost.com/entry/doj-california-mail-in-ballots-citizenship_n_6acf00d6e4b0649434797b89"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Trump administration threatens to sue California over alleged noncitizens on rolls; DOJ spokesperson confirms letters (Oct. 14, 2026; advocacy outlet; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/trump-administration-threatens-to-sue-california-over-alleged-noncitizens-on-rolls/"}, {"title": "Just The News — Justice Department demands California review list of suspected noncitizens (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/politics-policy/elections/justice-department-demands-california-review-list-suspected-noncitizens"}, {"title": "NBC News — Justice Department threatens legal action against California over alleged noncitizens; separate letters to Weber and LA Registrar Dean Logan, noon Oct. 15 deadline (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/justice-department-threatens-legal-action-california-noncitizens-rcna603536"}, {"title": "POLITICO — DOJ gives California 48 hours to review thumb drive of alleged noncitizen voters (Oct. 14, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-14, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/14/department-of-justice-california-voter-rolls-demand-01118028"}, {"title": "Los Angeles County RR/CC — Statement on DOJ letter; USB drive not accessed as an insecure medium (Oct. 14, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://content.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/documents/20261014-statement_doj_letter-2.pdf"}, {"title": "California Secretary of State — Weber statement responding to the U.S. Department of Justice letter (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sos.ca.gov/administration/news-releases-and-advisories/2026-news-releases-and-advisories/california-secretary-state-shirley-n-weber-phd-issues-statement-response-us-department-justice-letter"}, {"title": "DOJ letter to Secretary Weber (Oct. 13, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/CA-DOJ-letter-DD.pdf"}, {"title": "Axios — DOJ demands California review alleged noncitizen mail-ballot recipients (Oct. 14, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-15, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/2026/10/14/doj-california-noncitizen-voters-mail-ballots"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department sues State of California over voter list; more than 20,000 \"likely aliens\" claimed (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-state-california-over-voter-list"}, {"title": "Complaint — United States v. State of California, No. 2:26-cv-12025 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 15, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-15-Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "CNBC — DOJ sues California to block counting of mail ballots from alleged noncitizens (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cnbc.com/2026/10/15/california-mail-ballots-voting-lawsuit.html"}, {"title": "Los Angeles County — Statement from Dean Logan regarding the U.S. Department of Justice lawsuit; list covers individuals statewide (Oct. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://lacounty.gov/2026/10/15/statement-from-dean-logan-regarding-u-s-department-of-justice-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "UCLA Voting Rights Project — CHIRLA and UCLA VRP ask court to stop DOJ from segregating California ballots (Oct. 15, 2026; advocacy counsel for plaintiffs)", "url": "https://vrp.ucla.edu/chirla-and-ucla-voting-rights-project-ask-court-to-stop-justice-department-from-segregating-california-ballots/"}, {"title": "Emergency Application for TRO and Preliminary Injunction — CHIRLA and Trujillo v. DHS, No. 1:26-cv-03072-SLS (D.D.C., Oct. 15, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://vrp.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-15-Doc-21-Plaintiffs-Emergency-Application-for-TRO-and-Preliminary-Injunction.pdf"}, {"title": "PBS News (AP) — DOJ says California officials who process ballots from suspected noncitizens risk prosecution (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/doj-says-california-officials-who-process-ballots-from-suspected-noncitizens-risk-prosecution"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Trump DOJ threatens California election officials with criminal exposure (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/trump-doj-threatens-california-election-officials-with-criminal-exposure/"}, {"title": "Reuters via Investing.com — DOJ letter to California officials over mail ballots (Oct. 16, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.investing.com/news/politics-news/trump-threatens-california-officials-with-imprisonment-over-stance-on-mail-ballots-4955135"}, {"title": "SIREN and Mi Familia en Acción motion to intervene, C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025, Doc. 11 (Oct. 15, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://elias.law/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/US-v-CA-MTI.pdf"}, {"title": "United States' ex parte application for TRO, C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025, Doc. 22-1 (Oct. 19, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-19-Application-for-TRO.pdf"}, {"title": "Memorandum supporting the United States' TRO application (Oct. 19, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-19-TRO-memo.pdf"}, {"title": "Election Law Blog (Rick Hasen) — DOJ seeks TRO requiring California to set aside mail ballots from people it identifies as likely noncitizens (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://electionlawblog.org/2026/doj-ups-the-ante-further-seeks-temporary-restraining-order-that-would-require-california-to-set-aside-vote-by-mail-ballots-from-persons-identified-by-the-federal-government-likely-to-be-noncitizens/"}, {"title": "CalMatters — Federal arrests over alleged voter fraud in California (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/10/california-federal-arrests-voter-fraud/"}, {"title": "NBC News (Reuters) — Justice Department asks appeals court to intervene in California ballot case (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/justice-department-asks-appeals-court-intervene-california-ballot-case-rcna605157"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Trump DOJ appeals California ballot case before judge even rules (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/trump-doj-appeals-california-ballot-case-before-judge-even-rules/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — DOJ lawsuit failed to prove any voter cast an unlawful ballot, California says in motion to dismiss (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/doj-lawsuit-failed-to-prove-any-voter-cast-an-unlawful-ballot-california-says-in-motion-to-dismiss/"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Ninth Circuit hears arguments on 20,000 ballots in California (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2026-10-25/9th-circuit-hears-arguments-on-20-000-ballots-in-california"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Appeals court appears skeptical of DOJ's emergency bid to block 20,000 ballots in California (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/appeals-court-appears-skeptical-of-dojs-emergency-bid-to-block-20000-ballots-in-california/"}, {"title": "CNN — California midterm voting fight before appeals judges (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://us.cnn.com/2026/10/25/politics/california-midterm-voting-judges"}, {"title": "POLITICO — DOJ, appeals court and the California ballot fight (Oct. 25, 2026; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.politico.com/news/2026/10/25/doj-appeals-court-california-ballot-fight-01134996"}, {"title": "NBC News — U.S. appeals court appears skeptical of Trump DOJ's lawsuit over California voters (Oct. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2026-election/us-appeals-court-appears-skeptical-trump-dojs-lawsuit-california-voter-rcna605625"}, {"title": "Roll Call — Judge orders Justice Department to disclose noncitizen voter letters (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://rollcall.com/2026/10/29/judge-orders-justice-department-to-disclose-noncitizen-voter-letters/"}, {"title": "Associated Press — Judge orders Trump administration to identify states pressed on noncitizen voters (Oct. 29, 2026; AP 403 to curl, linked only)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/trump-elections-democrats-lawsuit-boasberg-3604f1201f80c50629e6416d8ee771d3"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ sues CA / LA over noncitizen list (ei-2026-10-032)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025, Doc. 32-1 — Defendant Dean C. Logan's opposition to the ex parte TRO application (Oct. 20, 2026; cites the Flores and Bhullar declarations; PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-20-TRO-Opposition.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation__la-county-tro-opposition-doc-32-1-2026-10-20.pdf"}, {"title": "CBS News (AP) — DOJ letters tell California counties to set aside and verify ballots it says may belong to noncitizens; 48-hour deadline (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/doj-california-counties-set-aside-verify-certain-ballots-noncitizens/"}, {"title": "AP News — DOJ demands California counties set aside suspected noncitizen ballots (Oct. 23, 2026; apnews.com 403 to curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/california-department-of-justice-noncitizen-voting-election-0a70161dba31a833fa75507a7484853b"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — 'This is not normal': Feds demand California counties set aside 'likely' noncitizen ballots (Oct. 23, 2026; 57 of 58 counties served)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-10-23/trump-administration-election-letters-california-counties"}, {"title": "San Francisco Chronicle — DOJ gives local California registrars 48 hours to quarantine suspected noncitizen ballots (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/doj-registrar-demand-voters-22491688.php"}, {"title": "U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit — Order, United States v. State of California, No. 26-7070 (Oct. 26, 2026; per curiam; Bennett and Sanchez concurring; Bumatay dissenting)", "url": "https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/26/26-7070.pdf"}, {"title": "CBS News — Appeals court dismisses DOJ's request to force California to set aside ballots (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/appeals-court-dismisses-doj-trump-california-ballots/"}, {"title": "ABC News — Judge to appoint special master in California voting case in setback to DOJ (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/judge-appoint-special-master-california-voting-case-setback/story?id=137622503"}, {"title": "CalMatters — Federal judge unlikely to rule on Trump noncitizen voting claim until after Election Day (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://calmatters.org/politics/2026/10/trump-noncitizen-voting-court/"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times (Brittny Mejia and Kevin Rector) — Judge in L.A. weighs feds' request to block 20,000 California votes with skepticism (Oct. 27, 2026)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2026-10-27/judge-carter-los-angeles-justice-department-request-to-block-20000-california-votes"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Election worker threats must 'cease immediately,' judge tells DOJ ahead of crucial California voter ruling (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/election-worker-threats-must-cease-immediately-judge-tells-doj-ahead-of-crucial-california-voter-ruling/"}], "notes": "2026-10-30 AM ingest (EMon ei-2026-10-199): added Boasberg Oct. 29 order in DSCC v. Trump requiring DOJ to list every state sent noncitizen set-aside letters; label unchanged. Gouveia gap-fill 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u, preview): +Oct. 25 DOJ brief (home: new untraceability card), Oct. 26 Ninth Circuit dismissal, Oct. 27 Carter hearing (special master likely, no ruling); ABC, CalMatters, LA Times, Democracy Docket, CBS curl 200. Stays Alleged. EMon refresh 2026-10-26 AM (ei-2026-10-032): Oct. 25 Ninth Circuit argument, no ruling yet (LAT, Democracy Docket curl 200; POLITICO 403). Stays Alleged. EMon refresh 2026-10-24 AM (ei-2026-10-032 update): Oct. 23 DOJ letters to counties, 48-hour sequester demand (CBS/AP, LAT, SF Chronicle curl 200; AP 403). Date extended to Oct. 23. Stays Alleged: no county or court has verified any listed voter as a noncitizen. EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: CA motion to dismiss, hearing week of Oct. 26, DOJ Ninth Circuit notice of appeal (NBC/Reuters, Democracy Docket curl 200). Refresh 2026-10-21 3:15 PM ET (@TheSCIF lead): +LA County opposition Doc. 32-1 (curl 200); cross-ref new card ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation. Stays Alleged. Refresh 2026-10-20 AM EDS/EMon ingest: DOJ Oct. 19 ex parte TRO/OSC application (Doc. 22-1) to set aside >20,000 listed voters' mail ballots; defendants oppose; no hearing or ruling; all sources curl 200. Stays Alleged. Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: McCotter Oct. 16 aiding-and-abetting letter (AP/PBS, Reuters, Democracy Docket); >20,000-name list; SIREN/Mi Familia motion to intervene; cross-ref to Operation Protect the Vote card. Stays Alleged. EMon ei-2026-10-032 (first_seen/last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status emerging, severity high, confidence high, trending; official_error unknown). EMon flagged it to CTE as a mail-ballot handling issue. Alleged: federal claims unverified; no state or county finding. Mapped to Registration; Voter Rolls (peer: Pennsylvania ei-2026-10-008). Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration > voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated; Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (segregating returned ballots). Watch the ~Oct. 15 deadline, any California SOS or LA County response, and any DOJ emergency filing. Refreshed 2026-10-14 PM ingest: +NBC News and POLITICO (separate letter to LA RR/CC Dean Logan; noon Oct. 15 deadline; \"segregate — not cancel\"). Stays Alleged. Refreshed 2026-10-15 AM ingest: +LA RR/CC Logan statement (drive not accessed), +Weber statement, +DOJ letter PDF, +Axios; noon ET Oct. 15 outcome not yet known. Stays Alleged. Refreshed 2026-10-15 PM ingest: DOJ sued (C.D. Cal. No. 2:26-cv-12025) after the deadline; +DOJ press release, +complaint PDF, +CNBC (all curl 200); Weber Oct. 15 response; DOJ claims more than 20,000 likely noncitizens, described as preliminary. Stays Alleged. Watch TRO/PI motion and hearing date. Refreshed 2026-10-16 AM ingest: +LA County Logan post-filing statement (list is statewide, not LA-specific; county will not withhold ballots on unverified allegations), +UCLA VRP release and TRO/PI application PDF in CHIRLA v. DHS, D.D.C. 1:26-cv-03072-SLS (pending; joint status report due Oct. 16); all curl 200. Stays Alleged. Watch C.D. Cal. TRO/PI and D.D.C. briefing schedule. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's...'.", "related": ["us-v-california-2026-10-la-county-219k-ballots-untraceable-after-envelope-separation", "nv-clark-2020-06-primary-all-mail-223k-undeliverable-inactive-voters-mailed", "ca-la-county-2025-10-ballot-mailed-for-voter-dead-since-1994", "ca-la-county-2026-06-ny-post-ballots-keep-arriving-for-deceased-despite-death-certificates", "ca-la-county-2026-10-20-registrar-declaration-no-citizenship-check-beyond-attestation", "ca9-2026-10-25-argument-california-counsel-noncitizen-ballot-will-be-counted"]}
{"id": "ny-ndny-2026-five-lawful-permanent-residents-charged-voting-by-alien", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-11", "uid": "C20261019-123505-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-11", "old_ids": ["ny-ndny-2026-five-lawful-permanent-residents-charged-voting-by-alien"], "seq": "C01442", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-13 to 2026-10-16", "state": "NY", "description": "On Oct. 16, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York announced that five lawful permanent residents appeared in court on Oct. 13 and 14 on charges of voting by an alien: Vikki Bradt, 51, a British national of Ballston Spa; Samantha Merkle, 55, a British national of Glens Falls; Suad Sasic, 30, a Bosnian national of Clifton Park; Jacques Patry, 64, a Canadian national of Tupper Lake; and Paula Stitt, 57, a Canadian national of Albany. The complaints allege each knew they were not a U.S. citizen and voted in an election that included federal candidates; the Times Union reports court papers allege three voted in 2024, one in 2024 and 2022, and one in 2022. The misdemeanor carries up to one year in prison and a $100,000 fine. The cases were part of DOJ's Oct. 16 announcement of charges against 16 noncitizens in New York, North Carolina and Idaho. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charges themselves are confirmed by the USAO and DOJ releases, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, N.D.N.Y. — Five non-citizens arrested for voter fraud across the Northern District (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/five-non-citizens-arrested-voter-fraud-across-northern-district"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 16 aliens for illegal voting (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-16-aliens-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "Times Union — DOJ accuses 5 non-citizens in upstate New York (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/doj-accuses-5-non-citizens-upstate-new-york-22480190.php"}, {"title": "CBS 6 Albany (WRGB) — Five non-citizens arrested, charged with voting illegally (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://cbs6albany.com/news/local/five-non-citizens-arrested-charged-with-voting-illegally-vikki-bradt-samantha-merkle-suad-sasic-jacques-patry-paula-stitt-aliens"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NDNY five noncitizen voting charges (ei-2026-10-048)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-048 (first_seen 2026-10-18 via Mark's @TheSCIF tip; EMon status active, confidence high). USAO/DOJ releases curl 200 and text-verified (Bradt). @TheSCIF editorial framing not repeated. Peer: PA noncitizen crackdown (ei-2026-10-008). Watch indictments and pleas."}
{"id": "mi-lansing-2026-rnc-suit-poll-worker-appointments-140-dem-71-gop", "permanent_id": "C20261012-123213-02", "uid": "C20261012-123213-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-123213-02", "old_ids": ["mi-lansing-2026-rnc-suit-poll-worker-appointments-140-dem-71-gop"], "seq": "C01289", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Election Workers", "They make it appear that anyone can apply, but they choose who becomes an election worker; the election workers are their people."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-09", "state": "MI", "description": "On Oct. 9, 2026, the Republican National Committee, the Michigan Republican Party and the Ingham County Republican Party sued the Election Commission of the City of Lansing (Ingham County Republican Party v. Election Commission of the City of Lansing). They allege Lansing appointed about 140 Democratic and 71 Republican Election Day election inspectors (poll workers), nearly 2-to-1, even though Michigan law requires appointments to be split as evenly as possible between the major parties (MCL 168.674), and even though Republicans supplied qualified candidates. They also allege Lansing refused to let a Republican representative review inspector applications that should be public records. The suit asks the court to order bipartisan appointment procedures and access to the records. Status Alleged: the filing itself is confirmed by Democracy Docket's case page and coverage; the staffing counts and records refusal come from the plaintiffs' complaint and RNC press release, with no ruling yet. On Oct. 13, WILX News 10 independently reported the suit, which names the Lansing Election Commission, City Clerk Chris Swope, City Assessor Stacey Bassi, and City Attorney Gregory Venker, and reported that the 140-to-71 split concerned poll-worker staffing for the August 2026 primary. A city spokesperson said the city cannot comment on active litigation but looks forward to answering the complaint in court, and that \"elections in Lansing have always been safe and fair.\" The complaint itself is now publicly posted. Democracy Docket characterizes the suit as anti-voting; the RNC characterizes it as fighting a stacked deck. Both are partisan framings. Catalog point: whoever controls poll-worker appointments controls who is watching the ballots. Party-balanced inspectors and open application records are a basic control that does not depend on trusting the appointing office.", "sources": [{"title": "Republican National Committee — RNC sues Michigan election officials over poll-worker appointments (Oct. 9, 2026; plaintiff press release; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-12, URL retained)", "url": "https://gop.com/press-release/rnc-sues-michigan-election-officials-for-illegally-stacking-poll-worker-positions-in-democrats-favor/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Case page: Michigan Ingham County Election Inspectors Challenge (complaint filed Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/michigan-ingham-county-election-inspectors-challenge/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Republicans sue over poll workers in key Michigan city (Oct. 10, 2026; advocacy outlet)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/republicans-sue-for-more-poll-watchers-in-key-michigan-city/"}, {"title": "WILX News 10 — Republican Party sues Lansing claiming city packed polls with Democratic workers; city response (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wilx.com/2026/10/13/republican-party-sues-lansing-claiming-city-packed-polls-with-democratic-workers/"}, {"title": "Complaint — Ingham County Republican Party v. Election Commission of the City of Lansing (filed Oct. 9, 2026; PDF hosted by Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/2026-10-09-Complaint-1.pdf"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Lansing MI poll-worker parity suit (ei-2026-10-016)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-016 (first_seen 2026-10-09, last_updated 2026-10-14; EMon status emerging, confidence high). Refresh 2026-10-14 AM: independent WILX coverage, complaint PDF, and city no-comment response; counts remain plaintiff claims, so status stays Alleged. Alleged: counts and records refusal are plaintiff claims; filing confirmed via Democracy Docket case page (free WebSearch 2026-10-12). Mapped to Election Workers > 'they choose who becomes election workers' (peers: TX/MN/IL party-list appointment statutes). Distinct from MI EPB deletion case (ei-2026-10-017). Raise to Partially confirmed/Upheld if the court or city confirms the 140/71 split. Watch city response and any order before Nov. 3."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-oct-12-election-crimes-charges-11-districts-noncitizen-double-voting-deceased-spouse", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-14", "uid": "C20261019-123505-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-14", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-oct-12-election-crimes-charges-11-districts-noncitizen-double-voting-deceased-spouse"], "seq": "C01445", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-09 to 2026-10-13", "state": "NM, AL, NC, MO, NJ, OH, HI, KY", "description": "On Oct. 12, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges against 16 people in 11 federal districts for alleged illegal voting, fraudulent registration and related election crimes. Four Eastern District of Pennsylvania defendants are on the Pennsylvania card and one Idaho defendant is on the Idaho card, so this card covers the other 11. District of New Mexico: Patrick Perea, 62, of Tijeras, indicted for allegedly submitting his deceased wife's absentee ballot in November 2024; the Bernalillo County Clerk's Office intercepted it before it could be counted. Southern District of Alabama: Silvia Delgado Phelps, 78, a Peruvian lawful permanent resident, charged with voting as an alien in multiple elections in Baldwin County, and Staciann Pollion Davis, 42, a Jamaican lawful permanent resident, charged over the November 2024 election in Clarke County. Northern District of Alabama: Forrest Scott Woody, 68, of Hendersonville, N.C., indicted for allegedly voting twice in the 2024 general election, in Henderson County, N.C. and Calhoun County, Ala. Western District of Missouri: Andrés Garcia, 64, a Cuban lawful permanent resident, charged over the 2022 and 2024 federal elections; DOJ alleges he voted in at least 15 elections over 20 years. District of New Jersey: Lizabeth Almonte Rosa, 24, a naturalized citizen, charged with voting before she was naturalized and unlawfully procuring citizenship. Southern District of Ohio: Cary Ann Patterson, 59, a British lawful permanent resident; DOJ says Gallia County records show at least 10 elections. Northern District of Ohio: Arshed Zuberi, 69, a Pakistani lawful permanent resident (at least six elections per Cuyahoga County records), and Eliza M. Moss, 63, a Filipino lawful permanent resident, who allegedly told investigators the person who helped her register said she could vote. District of Hawaii: Dawid Nalepa, 45, a Polish national. Western District of Kentucky: Sandra Madeline Watson, 59, a Canadian lawful permanent resident. On Oct. 13, Alabama Secretary of State Wes Allen confirmed the three Alabama arrests. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by DOJ and USAO releases, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: one release shows three different gaps at once: noncitizen registrations that lasted through many elections, one person allegedly voting in two states, and a ballot sent in for a dead spouse that a county clerk caught. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, and in-person check-in with identification, give each of these more chances to be stopped before a ballot counts.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 16 individuals for election crimes (Oct. 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-16-individuals-election-crimes"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, D.N.M. — Tijeras man indicted for attempting to cast deceased wife's absentee ballot (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nm/pr/tijeras-man-indicted-attempting-cast-deceased-wifes-absentee-ballot-2024-election"}, {"title": "Alabama Secretary of State — Election integrity update: multiple arrests made across Alabama (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sos.alabama.gov/newsroom/election-integrity-update-secretary-state-wes-allen-multiple-arrests-made-across-alabama"}, {"title": "Albuquerque Journal — Man accused of casting dead wife's vote in 2024 election (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.abqjournal.com/news/man-accused-of-casting-dead-wifes-vote-in-2024-election/3139671"}, {"title": "USCIS — Cuban alien arrested for unlawfully voting (Oct. 9, 2026)", "url": "https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/cuban-alien-arrested-for-unlawfully-voting"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ Oct. 12 election-crimes charges, 11 districts (ei-2026-10-053)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-053 (first_seen 2026-10-12; EMon status active, severity medium, confidence high). All five sources curl 200. Counts the 11 non-PA, non-Idaho defendants to avoid double counting. Cross-leaves: deceased-voter ballot (Perea) under Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in; interstate double voting (Woody) under Traveling Voter Operations."}
{"id": "oh-ashland-2026-10-08-indicted-false-registration-deceased-mother", "permanent_id": "C20261028-121857-10", "uid": "C20261028-121857-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-121857-10", "old_ids": ["oh-ashland-2026-10-08-indicted-false-registration-deceased-mother"], "seq": "C01592", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "People take names from tombstones in graveyards."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-70", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-08", "state": "OH", "description": "Deborah Lynn Hughes, 68, of Ashland, Ohio, was indicted on Oct. 8, 2026, on charges of false voter registration and identity fraud, both fifth-degree felonies, Ashland County Pictures reported on Oct. 9. Prosecutors allege that between Aug. 12 and Aug. 17, 2026, she mailed voter registration forms for herself and for her deceased mother. At her bond hearing, Hughes said she was updating addresses after a move and called it a mistake made while grieving; she disputes intending any wrongdoing. She was released on a personal recognizance bond. No ballot is alleged to have been cast. Status Alleged: the charges are accusations, and she is presumed innocent. Catalog point: a mailed registration form in a deceased person's name reached the county and was caught there.", "sources": [{"title": "Ashland County Pictures — Ashland woman charged in voter registration case (Oct. 9, 2026; curl 406, URL retained)", "url": "https://ashlandcountypictures.com/ashland-woman-charged-in-voter-registration-case-magistrate-repeatedly-urges-her-to-consult-attorney/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Ashland County, OH charges over deceased mother's registration (ei-2026-10-186)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-186 (added 2026-10-28 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). Source curl 406 (URL retained); facts from EMon's source record. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ks-crawford-2026-11-03-pittsburg-usps-carrier-indicted-4404-pieces-394-gop-mailers", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-16", "uid": "C20261104-121522-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-16", "old_ids": ["ks-crawford-2026-11-03-pittsburg-usps-carrier-indicted-4404-pieces-394-gop-mailers"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-07", "state": "KS", "description": "A federal grand jury in Wichita indicted Kelly R. Cram, 59, of Baxter Springs, Kansas, a U.S. Postal Service rural route carrier at the Pittsburg post office, on Nov. 3, 2026, on one count of unlawful secretion, destruction and delay of mail (18 U.S.C. § 1703(a)). According to the indictment, USPS Office of Inspector General agents visited her home on Oct. 7, 2026, and found about 4,404 pieces of mail in her garage, including about 394 political mailers, all related to Republican candidates or Republican-affiliated political action committees; agents found no political mail for any other party. She was placed on administrative leave on Oct. 7. The sources describe campaign mail, not ballots. An indictment is an accusation only; she is presumed innocent, and her initial appearance is set for Nov. 18 in Wichita. Status Alleged: the federal indictment is public (justice.gov) and was reported by the Wichita Eagle, KWCH, KSN and Fox News. An indictment is an accusation only; she is presumed innocent. Catalog point: a carrier is accused of keeping thousands of pieces of mail at home, including only Republican political mailers.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court, District of Kansas, indictment (via justice.gov) — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/media/1470146/dl"}, {"title": "Wichita Eagle — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kansas.com/news/local/crime/article317906199.html"}, {"title": "KWCH 12 — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.kwch.com/2026/11/03/kansas-postal-worker-indicted-mail-theft-accused-stealing-keeping-republican-mailers/"}, {"title": "KSN/KSNT — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.ksn.com/news/your-local-election-hq/kansas-postal-worker-accused-of-stealing-over-4400-pieces-of-mail-including-gop-political-mailers/"}, {"title": "Fox News — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/kansas-postal-worker-indicted-stealing-mail-including-hundreds-republican-election-flyers"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pittsburg KS carrier indicted over GOP mailers (ei-2026-10-295)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-295 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "id-2026-two-canadian-nationals-charged-voting-2022-general-election", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-13", "uid": "C20261019-123505-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-13", "old_ids": ["id-2026-two-canadian-nationals-charged-voting-2022-general-election"], "seq": "C01444", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-07 to 2026-10-13", "state": "ID", "description": "On Oct. 13, 2026, U.S. Attorney Bart Davis of the District of Idaho announced that his office filed charges on Oct. 7 alleging that two Canadian citizens living in eastern Idaho voted in the 2022 general election although they were not U.S. citizens: Taralynn Kathleen Bosco, 48, who was living in Rexburg, and Stanley Richard Walton, 82, of Chubbuck. Each is charged with illegal voting by an alien, which carries up to one year in prison and a fine of up to $100,000, and initial appearances are set for Oct. 26. The Idaho State Police and Homeland Security Investigations investigated. DOJ's Oct. 16 national release listed Bosco as its Idaho case. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the USAO release and DOJ, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 16 aliens for illegal voting (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-16-aliens-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Idaho — release via Public (Oct. 13, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.publicnow.com/view/449B1E7C7E77683235382F3EC527C988AF0CF69E"}, {"title": "Local News 8 (KIFI) — Canadians charged with illegal voting (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://localnews8.com/news/2026/10/13/canadians-charged-illegal-voting/"}, {"title": "CBS2 Idaho News — Two Canadian citizens charged with illegally voting in Idaho's 2022 election (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://idahonews.com/news/local/two-canadian-citizens-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-idahos-2022-election"}, {"title": "KXLY 920 — Two Canadians charged in Idaho for illegally voting in 2022 election (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://kxly920.com/2026/10/13/two-canadians-charged-in-idaho-for-illegally-voting-in-2022-election/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Idaho two Canadian nationals charged (ei-2026-10-052)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-052 (first_seen 2026-10-13; EMon status active, confidence high). DOJ, KIFI, CBS2 and KXLY curl 200 (DOJ text-verified: Bosco); Public 403. EMon's ei-2026-10-053 summary says Walton is covered by the Idaho item; this card follows the USAO release. Watch Oct. 26 initial appearances."}
{"id": "fl-mdfl-2026-catanese-indicted-voting-2024-denied-on-naturalization", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-16", "uid": "C20261019-123505-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-16", "old_ids": ["fl-mdfl-2026-catanese-indicted-voting-2024-denied-on-naturalization"], "seq": "C01447", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10-02", "state": "FL", "description": "On Oct. 2, 2026, U.S. Attorney Gregory W. Kehoe of the Middle District of Florida announced an indictment charging Andrea Catanese, 60, an Italian national, with voting by an alien, attempting to procure naturalization unlawfully and making a false statement related to naturalization. The indictment alleges that Catanese voted in the 2024 general election although he was not a U.S. citizen, then falsely stated on his naturalization application, and again to an immigration official reviewing it, that he had never voted in a federal election. He faces up to 10 years if convicted on all counts. HSI investigated with help from USCIS and the Pasco County Supervisor of Elections. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the indictment is confirmed by the USAO and USCIS releases, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, M.D. Fla. — Alien from Italy charged with voting in 2024 general election and lying about it (Oct. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdfl/pr/illegal-alien-italy-charged-voting-2024-general-election-and-lying-about-it"}, {"title": "USCIS — Italian alien charged with voting in 2024 general election and lying about it (Oct. 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/italian-alien-charged-with-voting-in-2024-general-election-and-lying-about-it"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — MDFL Catanese noncitizen voting indictment (ei-2026-10-055)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-055 (first_seen 2026-10-02; EMon status active, confidence high). Both sources curl 200. County (Pasco) per the Supervisor of Elections' named assistance."}
{"id": "pa-dauphin-2026-10-canvasser-charged-falsified-mail-ballot-applications", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-08", "uid": "C20261102-121503-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-08", "old_ids": ["pa-dauphin-2026-10-canvasser-charged-falsified-mail-ballot-applications"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Overall Manipulation Methodology", "Injection of Votes for Existing Voters (Identity Theft)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-53", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-53", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-10 (applications caught; charges filed)", "state": "PA", "description": "On Friday, Oct. 30, 2026, Dauphin County District Attorney Fran Chardo filed charges against Kelly Heather Richardson, 31, of Idaho Falls, Idaho, for allegedly submitting 10 falsified mail-in ballot applications to the county elections office. She is charged with 10 felony counts of identity theft, 10 misdemeanor counts of forgery, and one misdemeanor for breaking election rules, and a warrant for her arrest was issued on Oct. 30 because she is no longer in the county's jurisdiction. According to the affidavit, a worker for Mobilize the Message, a Florida-based company that provides door-knocking and signature collection, turned in the forms on Sept. 25 and told a county detective that Richardson had filled them out. The affidavit states that Richardson admitted in an Oct. 8 phone call to forging the signatures. Elections Director Chris Spackman noticed suspicious signatures, including repeated signatures, when the forms arrived, rejected the applications, and referred them to the district attorney, and no ballots were sent. Each of the 10 registered voters named on the forms confirmed that the signature and Social Security number were not theirs, and eight of them are over 60 years of age. The group's attorney, Anthony Sabatini, said Richardson was a part-time contractor, that the group fired her, and that it worked closely with investigators. WITF reported no indication in the filings or in officials' statements that the conduct was politically motivated. On Oct. 14, U.S. Rep. Scott Perry said during a televised debate that forged ballots had been turned in, which county officials said was inaccurate because only applications were involved and no ballots were delivered. The charges are accusations only, and Richardson is presumed innocent. Status Alleged: the county caught the applications and charges are filed; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: a mail-ballot application filed in a real voter's name, if accepted, sends a ballot that someone other than the voter can cast. Here the county's check of the applications caught them before ballots were issued.", "sources": [{"title": "WITF — Dauphin County, PA forged mail-ballot applications charges (Richardson) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2026/10/30/criminal-charges-filed-after-county-catches-falsified-applications-to-vote-by-mail/"}, {"title": "WITF — Dauphin County, PA forged mail-ballot applications charges (Richardson) (2026-10-14)", "url": "https://www.witf.org/2026/10/14/dauphin-county-stops-10-false-mail-ballot-applications-investigates/"}, {"title": "X post by @TheSCIF (2026-10-31)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2116545777778512207"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Dauphin County, PA forged mail-ballot applications charges (Richardson) (ei-2026-10-214)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-214 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "pa-allegheny-2026-09-michelle-ziolkowski-charged-forgery-deceased-mother-voter-registration", "permanent_id": "C20261106-181036-03", "uid": "C20261106-181036-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261106-181036-03", "old_ids": ["pa-allegheny-2026-09-michelle-ziolkowski-charged-forgery-deceased-mother-voter-registration"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Registration", "Increasing the Number of Independent Registrations", "People take names from tombstones in graveyards."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-70", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09", "state": "PA", "description": "According to WPXI (Nick Papantonis, Nov. 6, 2026), Michelle Ziolkowski, 54, of Mt. Lebanon was charged Thursday with forgery and tampering with public records (misdemeanors) on accusations that she mailed a voter-registration application to the Allegheny County Elections Division in late September under the name of her mother, Fern Winans, who died in September 2021 and whose registration had been canceled in October 2021 after a Department of Health death notice. Investigators said Ziolkowski attempted to re-register Winans as a Democrat at Ziolkowski's address; the Winans signature on the application resembled Ziolkowski's handwriting. Officers wrote that Ziolkowski later admitted submitting the form by mail \"to test if voter fraud was possible.\" She told WPXI she was never arrested. Allegheny County spokeswoman Abigail Gardner said this was the only voter-fraud instance flagged by the elections team this cycle. Charges are accusations only; no adjudication is reported in the WPXI piece. No ballot cast under the deceased name is stated. Status Alleged: charged with forgery and tampering with public records (misdemeanors) as reported by WPXI on Nov. 6, 2026; Allegheny County spokeswoman Abigail Gardner said this was the only voter-fraud instance flagged by the elections team this cycle. Charges are accusations only; no adjudication is reported, and no ballot cast under the deceased name is stated. Officers wrote that Ziolkowski later admitted submitting the form by mail \"to test if voter fraud was possible.\" Catalog point: a canceled deceased registration was the target of an attempted re-registration under the dead mother's name, and the elections office caught it before any ballot under that name is reported to have been cast.", "sources": [{"title": "WPXI — Allegheny PA charge: register as deceased mother (2026-11-06)", "url": "https://www.wpxi.com/news/local/pittsburgh-bank-executive-charged-with-voter-fraud/HN6HZR5XKJAKVBD5QTNMB77VW4/"}, {"title": "X post by @WPXI (2026-11-06T22:41:20Z)", "url": "https://x.com/WPXI/status/2118836158046019987"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Allegheny PA charge: register as deceased mother (ei-2026-10-351)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-351 (added 2026-11-06 PM EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "fl-2026-09-24-ag-uthmeier-fdle-20-charged-noncitizen-and-felon-voting-sweep", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-08", "uid": "C20261109-121807-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-08", "old_ids": ["fl-2026-09-24-ag-uthmeier-fdle-20-charged-noncitizen-and-felon-voting-sweep"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-24", "state": "FL", "description": "On Sept. 24, 2026, Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier and Gov. Ron DeSantis announced 20 arrests from a statewide voter fraud operation run by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, the Department of State's Office of Election Crimes and Security, the Office of Statewide Prosecution and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Officials said 16 defendants are lawful permanent residents accused of falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to register and vote, and four are people with felony convictions accused of voting while on probation. The 12 publicly named defendants are from Lee, Hillsborough, Marion, Polk, Okeechobee, Columbia, Collier, DeSoto and Brevard counties; most are charged with unqualified non-citizen voting, some also with false swearing, for votes cast in 2024. A Tampa Bay 28 (WFTS) I-Team review of charging documents found that eight of the 12 named defendants are charged under Florida Statute 104.155, which took effect Feb. 13, 2025, for votes allegedly cast before that date. The newer statute does not require proof that the person knew they were ineligible and bars a defense based on a mistaken belief about citizenship, unlike the older Section 104.15. The attorney for one defendant, Astrid Navarrete Quintana of Fort Myers, who voted Nov. 5, 2024, has moved to dismiss her voting count on that ground; she has pleaded not guilty, and her attorney says she believed she could vote after the state mailed her a voter registration card. The Attorney General's office said the cases remain under investigation and did not answer why the newer law was used. Officials said more charges and arrests are expected. The charges are accusations only; all defendants are presumed innocent. Update (Nov. 13, 2026): after repeated requests, the Attorney General's office released the full list of all 20 defendants, nearly seven weeks after the September announcement that named 12; the cases span 13 counties, with Duval County having four and Hillsborough County three (WFTS Tampa Bay 28). At least eight of the non-citizen cases cite the law enacted after the alleged voting; a spokesperson said those investigations are still pending. The attorney for Donta White, a Hillsborough County defendant on probation whom the state says registered twice and voted early in 2024, said White was also sent a voter ID card and raised an entrapment concern. Status Alleged: arrests and charges announced by Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier and Gov. Ron DeSantis, reported by WFLA, Tampa Bay 28 (WFTS), Tampa Free Press and the Ocala Gazette. Charges are accusations only. Catalog point: officials say 16 lawful permanent residents registered and voted by falsely claiming citizenship — a self-attested checkbox that let the registrations into the rolls.", "sources": [{"title": "WFLA — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (2026-09-24)", "url": "https://www.wfla.com/news/florida/desantis-uthmeier-announce-20-arrests-in-voter-fraud-operation/"}, {"title": "Tampa Bay 28 (WFTS) I-Team — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.tampabay28.com/news/local-news/i-team-investigates/recent-voter-fraud-cases-cite-law-enacted-after-votes-were-cast"}, {"title": "Tampa Free Press — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.tampafp.com/florida-targets-illegal-ballots-20-nabbed-in-statewide-voter-fraud-sweep/"}, {"title": "Ocala Gazette — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.ocalagazette.com/three-marion-county-residents-charged-with-illegal-voting/"}, {"title": "The Florida Senate (Florida Statutes 104.155) — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.flsenate.gov/Laws/Statutes/2024/104.155"}, {"title": "X post by @@Irlandia (2026-11-08T11:15:27Z)", "url": "https://x.com/Irlandia/status/2119388322980098336"}, {"title": "WFTS Tampa Bay 28 — Florida releases full list of 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (2026-11-13)", "url": "https://www.tampabay28.com/news/local-news/i-team-investigates/florida-releases-full-list-of-20-charged-in-voter-fraud-sweep-some-arrests-spark-questions"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Florida AG: 20 charged in voter fraud sweep (ei-2026-10-360)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refreshed 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET (2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest, EMon ei-2026-10-360 update). EMon ei-2026-10-360 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-oct-5-charges-15-lprs-mn-la-wi-fl-noncitizen-voting", "permanent_id": "C20261020-120650-05", "uid": "C20261020-120650-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-120650-05", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-oct-5-charges-15-lprs-mn-la-wi-fl-noncitizen-voting"], "seq": "C01459", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-24 to 2026-10-05", "state": "MN, LA, WI, FL", "description": "On Oct. 5, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges involving 16 lawful permanent residents in four federal districts. Andrea Catanese of the Middle District of Florida already has her own card, so this card covers the other 15. Middle District of Florida: Terrance Patrick Evans, 37, a Bahamian national, charged by information with voting by an alien in the 2024 general election. Eastern District of Louisiana: Pedro Pablo Ruiz, 68, of Cuba, and Zianya Yllaly Zamorano, 34, of Mexico, each indicted for allegedly voting in the 2024 general election, and Dudley Francisco Zeledon, 56, of Nicaragua, indicted on two counts for allegedly voting in the 2024 primary and general elections. Eastern District of Wisconsin: Sara Luma, 30, of North Macedonia, charged by complaint with registering on Election Day, falsely certifying that she was a citizen, and voting on Nov. 5, 2024; the complaint says she admitted this to a federal agent. District of Minnesota: ten defendants were indicted separately by a federal grand jury on Sept. 24 and first announced on Sept. 30 (Bhator Konah Bryant, Edvile Vaidoto Edmunds, Joshua Frederick Kofi Edzie, Alan Barbu Kargbo, Paul Kras, Fadil Rasim Ozegovic, Aparecido Donizetti Padovan, Chris Adam Pettiquoi, Christian Liam Schenk and Hester Sophia Weihmann), charged with falsely claiming citizenship to register or vote, voting by an alien, or both, mostly tied to the Nov. 5, 2024 election; Edmunds is accused of voting in November 2022, and Edzie is accused of voting in the Aug. 11, 2026 Minnesota primary. Homeland Security Investigations investigated the Minnesota cases. These are charges only, and every defendant who has not pleaded guilty is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by two DOJ releases, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: two of these cases involve same-day registration, where a person allegedly signed a citizenship statement at the polling place and voted the same day, and one alleged vote came in a primary held just two months ago. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, and identification checked at registration and check-in, give records like these more chances to be stopped before a ballot counts.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 16 aliens for election crimes (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-16-aliens-election-crimes"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Department of Justice indicts ten aliens for voter fraud in Minnesota (Sept. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-indicts-ten-aliens-voter-fraud-minnesota"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ Oct. 5 charges (MN ten, LA three, WI, FL) (ei-2026-10-063)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-063 (first_seen 2026-09-30; backfill). Catanese is on the ei-2026-10-055 card; MN Chaudhari (ei-2026-10-054) is a separate case. None of the 15 on other cards, checked by name. DOJ release text-verified (Evans, Zeledon, Luma, Padovan, Edzie); both sources curl 200."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-022", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-04", "uid": "C20261001-094909-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-04", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-022"], "seq": "C01260", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["U.S. Postal Service (USPS)", "Postal workers dump election mail (mail ballots, campaign mailers) in the trash instead of delivering it, so voters never receive it."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-161446-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-161446-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-22", "state": "UT", "description": "On Sept. 22, 2026, the Justice Department unsealed a Sept. 16 federal indictment charging former U.S. Postal Service letter carrier Damon Matai Seei, 34, of Payson, Utah, with unlawful secretion, destruction, and delay of mail (18 U.S.C. § 1703(a)). Prosecutors allege that on June 3, 2026, while delivering in Eagle Mountain, Utah, Seei threw advertisements and approximately 300 mail-in ballots for the June 23 primary into a church parking-lot dumpster to \"lighten his workload,\" and that some voters never received ballots. He pleaded not guilty; next appearance is scheduled for Nov. 30, 2026. Case investigated by USPS-OIG and HSI; prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Utah. Update (Oct. 27, 2026): The Associated Press reported that Seei was arrested on Sept. 22, entered a not guilty plea that day, and was accused of throwing out more than 300 mail ballots; U.S. Attorney Melissa Holyoak said Seei indicated to authorities that there was no political agenda, and officials said the investigation remains ongoing [4]. KSL.com reported that Acting Deputy Attorney General Trent McCotter said Seei threw the ballots into the dumpster \"even though he knew that they were ballots, and they were clearly marked as ballots\"; that Holyoak said \"He did not deliver a single one\" and that Seei \"indicated that he had discarded other mail as well\"; and that investigators did not recover the ballots [6]. On Oct. 27, 2026, at 1:31 PM ET, the X account @CauseAmerica (Cause of America) posted a video repeating the September indictment, saying the carrier \"just got indicted\" for allegedly dumping more than 300 ballots; the post adds no new facts, and the indictment was unsealed on Sept. 22 [8]. Status Alleged (indictment / charging document)—defendant presumed innocent until proven guilty; indictment is not a conviction.", "sources": [{"title": "DOJ OPA — Former postal worker indicted for disposing of hundreds of Utah mail ballots", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-postal-worker-indicted-after-allegedly-disposing-hundreds-mail-ballots-utah"}, {"title": "CBS News — DOJ charges Utah postal worker over mail ballots in trash", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-department-charges-utah-postal-worker-mail-ballots-trash/"}, {"title": "The Hill — USPS employee indictment over mail-in ballots", "url": "https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/6105303-usps-employee-indictment-mail-in-ballots/"}, {"title": "AP — US Justice Department charges Utah postal worker with dumping mail ballots in trash during primary (Mike Catalini and Hannah Schoenbaum, Sept. 22, 2026; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20260922231508/https://apnews.com/article/postal-worker-mail-ballots-trash-utah-d693b5c842575964ece4f25c6e5586c0)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/postal-worker-mail-ballots-trash-utah-d693b5c842575964ece4f25c6e5586c0"}, {"title": "AP — Sept. 22, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27 from the Wayback snapshot of Sept. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/postal-worker-mail-ballots-trash-utah-d693b5c842575964ece4f25c6e5586c0", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ei-2026-09-022__ap-2026-09-22.html"}, {"title": "KSL.com — Utah postal worker accused of throwing away 300 mail-in ballots in church parking lot (Bridger Beal-Cvetko, Sept. 22, 2026; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027175241/https://www.ksl.com/article/51627290/utah-postal-worker-accused-of-throwing-away-300-mail-in-ballots-in-church-parking-lot)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51627290/utah-postal-worker-accused-of-throwing-away-300-mail-in-ballots-in-church-parking-lot"}, {"title": "KSL.com — Sept. 22, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.ksl.com/article/51627290/utah-postal-worker-accused-of-throwing-away-300-mail-in-ballots-in-church-parking-lot", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ei-2026-09-022__ksl-2026-09-22.html"}, {"title": "X — @CauseAmerica (Cause of America), post repeating the Seei indictment (Oct. 27, 2026, 1:31 PM ET; 97-second video)", "url": "https://x.com/CauseAmerica/status/2115134179553710233"}, {"title": "X — @CauseAmerica post: text and metadata (local copy 2026-10-27; Wayback save failed)", "url": "https://x.com/CauseAmerica/status/2115134179553710233", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ei-2026-09-022__x-causeamerica-2115134179553710233.json"}, {"title": "X — @CauseAmerica post: attached video, 640x360 MP4 (local copy 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://x.com/CauseAmerica/status/2115134179553710233", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ei-2026-09-022__x-causeamerica-2115134179553710233-video.mp4"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Utah USPS carrier indictment (ei-2026-09-022)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-27 (Mark): AP (Wayback snapshot of Sept. 22 text-verified: arrest, not guilty plea, more than 300 ballots, no political agenda, investigation ongoing), KSL (curl 200; quotes text-verified) and the @CauseAmerica X post of Oct. 27 (read through the X API; it repeats the September indictment and adds nothing new) added. The DOJ release was rechecked: Nov. 30 next appearance and McCotter's title confirmed. The figure is \"approximately 300\" (DOJ), \"more than 300\" (AP, McCotter) and about 304 voters (detention memo). Related links added to the Utah October 2026 cards and the USPS dumping peers. Label stays Alleged. Nothing redacted. EMon ei-2026-09-022. Alleged for indictment only (not conviction). Moved 2026-10-20 (Mark approved) from the USPS heading to the postal-dumping leaf. Cross-leaf: Mail ballots / Chain of Custody.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots", "ut-utah-county-2026-10-6144-first-time-voter-id-notices-sent-in-error", "ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash", "wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park", "nj-pa-2024-kean-campaign-mailers-dumped-by-usps-worker-brodheadsville", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "az-maricopa-2022-07-outbound-envelope-window-shows-ballot-party"]}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-009", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-44", "uid": "C20260925-155410-44", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-44", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-009"], "seq": "C00044", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-160524-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-160524-19", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-22 to 2026-10-23", "state": "NC", "description": "On Sept. 22, 2026 the North Carolina Alliance for Retired Americans and others sued over State Board of Elections policies announced Sept. 4 that plaintiffs say will invalidate absentee ballots for technical envelope/seal and related issues unrelated to eligibility (Democracy Docket case summary). Oct. 19, 2026 update: U.S. District Judge Thomas Schroeder (M.D.N.C.) denied the preliminary injunction in a 72-page memorandum opinion and order, so the State Board's inner-envelope sealing and signature-verification provisions stay in effect for the Nov. 3 election. He cited the Supreme Court's caution against changing election rules once voting is underway (the Purcell principle), the plaintiffs' delay in suing, and their failure to make the required clear showing that they were likely to win, and noted that the State Board's guidance gives voters notice and a chance to cure a deficiency or to vote early or on Election Day (Carolina Journal; Courthouse News; court order).Oct. 21–23, 2026 update (rejection data): a State Board of Elections spokesperson told WBTV on Oct. 21 that 3.1% of absentee ballots had been spoiled statewide, up from 2.6% at the same point in 2022, and WBTV noted this differs from claims that the rate had doubled. Mecklenburg County elections director Mike Dickerson told WBTV that about 250 of 572 spoiled absentee ballots had been rejected under the new sealing requirements; all 250 voters had been contacted and about 50 had already sent compliant replacements or voted early. Democracy Docket reported on Oct. 23 that Wake County had received 7,629 mail ballots and rejected 277 (3.5%), 147 of them, over half, for an unsealed inner envelope, according to county board figures; 53 Wake voters had cured by replacement ballot or in-person vote. It reported a 4.22% rejection rate across the 27 counties whose data it reviewed (3.2% on Oct. 21 per Common Cause NC data: 628 of 15,035), against 2.2% statewide in all of 2022 (EAC). The State Board told Democracy Docket the rules \"follow the plain text of state law, which requires ballots to be 'sealed in the container-return envelope.'\" Official county counts therefore confirm that ballots are being rejected under the inner-envelope rule, while voters can still cure.  The case itself remains pending. Status Alleged for plaintiffs' characterization of disqualifying impact: the court denied emergency relief but has not ruled on the merits. Included because tags/summary expressly implicate absentee verification mechanics adjacent to signature/envelope curing fights.", "sources": [{"title": "Democracy Docket — North Carolina absentee ballot voting restrictions challenge", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/cases/north-carolina-absentee-ballot-voting-restrictions-challenge/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/ei-2026-09-009__democracy-docket-north-carolina-absentee-ballot-voting-restr.png"}, {"title": "Carolina Journal — Judge rejects injunction in federal NC mail-in ballot lawsuit (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.carolinajournal.com/judge-rejects-injunction-in-federal-nc-mail-in-ballot-lawsuit/"}, {"title": "Courthouse News Service — Federal judge shoots down request to halt mail-in ballot changes in North Carolina (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/federal-judge-shoots-down-request-to-halt-mail-in-ballot-changes-in-north-carolina/"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (M.D.N.C.) — Memorandum opinion and order denying preliminary injunction (Oct. 19, 2026, PDF via Democracy Docket)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/Memorandum-Opinion-And-Order-Oct.-19-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "WBTV — Are thousands of absentee ballots in North Carolina being rejected? Here's what we know (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wbtv.com/2026/10/21/are-thousands-absentee-ballots-north-carolina-being-rejected-heres-what-we-know/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — North Carolina mail ballot rejection rates keep rising (Natalie Hausmann, Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/north-carolina-mail-ballot-rejection-rates-keep-rising/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — GOP-backed ballot rules plague North Carolina voters in Democratic stronghold (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/gop-backed-ballot-rules-plague-north-carolina-voters-in-democratic-stronghold/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NC absentee ballot policy lawsuit (ei-2026-09-009)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-24 early AM EDS/EMon: added State Board 3.1% vs 2.6% (WBTV, Oct. 21), Mecklenburg ~250 of 572 under the new rule, and Wake 277 of 7,629 with 147 unsealed inner envelopes (Democracy Docket, Oct. 23); all three sources curl 200 and text-verified. Stays Alleged: the lawsuit's merits are pending and the rejections are curable; the counts themselves come from election officials.  Refresh 2026-10-20 AM EDS/EMon ingest: Oct. 19 PI denied (Schroeder, 72 pages; Purcell, delay, no clear showing); provisions in force; case pending; Carolina Journal text-verified, all sources curl 200. Stays Alleged. EMon ei-2026-09-009. Advocacy docket; Alleged pending court findings."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-sept-18-charges-16-seven-districts-noncitizen-voting-false-name", "permanent_id": "C20261020-120650-03", "uid": "C20261020-120650-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-120650-03", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-sept-18-charges-16-seven-districts-noncitizen-voting-false-name"], "seq": "C01457", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-15 to 2026-09-18", "state": "TX, ID, GA, MA, WI, NJ, MI", "description": "On Sept. 18, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges against 16 people in seven federal districts for alleged illegal voting, illegal voter registration and related crimes. Northern District of Texas: Moises Anwar Arellano-Alba, 36, of Mexico (described by DOJ as in the country illegally with a final order of removal), Helen Sayen Adams, 67, of Nigeria, Khalwinder Singh Bhengura, 69, of India, Celestin Katubadi, 20, of the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Rocio Thrasher, 38, of Mexico, each charged with voting by an alien in a federal election and a false claim of citizenship to register or vote; Carlos Salas Barrios, 41, of Mexico, charged by complaint with voting by an alien; and Joshua Nmelichukwu Akpom, 27, of Nigeria, charged with false statements related to naturalization. Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton announced these seven arrests on Sept. 15 and said his office's findings led to the cases. Western District of Texas: Monica Carzoli, 46, of Mexico, arrested in Del Rio, whom DOJ says admitted registering and voting in November 2024. District of Idaho: Avila Gomez, of Mexico (described as in the country illegally), indicted for allegedly claiming citizenship to register and voting in May 2022 and November 2024, along with wire fraud, passport, identification-document and firearm counts. Northern District of Georgia: Pauline Lewis, 65, of Antigua and Barbuda, charged with voting as a noncitizen; Gabriel Covarrubias, 44, of Mexico, accused of voting in person under a false name in November 2024 and of a false statement on a passport application; and Analiea Milliscent Eccles, 44, of Venezuela, a DACA recipient accused of voting nine times between 2008 and 2024. District of Massachusetts: Gladys Adaeze Okafor, 56, of Nigeria, charged with voting in 2022 and allegedly in 2024. Western District of Wisconsin: Julieta Englestad, 53, of Colombia, charged with falsely claiming citizenship to register in November 2022. District of New Jersey: Santana Coulibaly, accused of registering in 2016, voting in 2018 and 2020, and casting a provisional ballot in 2024. Eastern District of Michigan: Victoria Viktorivna Aquilina, 43, of Russia, charged with voting in the 2024 general election. DOJ describes most of the remaining defendants as lawful permanent residents. These are charges only, and every defendant who has not pleaded guilty is presumed innocent unless proven guilty in court. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the DOJ release and the Texas Attorney General, but no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: the release shows registrations accepted on a false claim of citizenship, one record allegedly used for nine elections over 16 years, and one person allegedly voting in person under a false name. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, and in-person check-in with identification, give each of these more chances to be stopped before a ballot counts.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Department of Justice charges 16 individuals with illegal voting and related election crimes (Sept. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-charges-16-individuals-illegal-voting-and-related-election-crimes"}, {"title": "Office of the Texas Attorney General — Paxton announces arrest of foreign nationals who voted illegally in 2024 election (Sept. 15, 2026)", "url": "https://oag.state.tx.us/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-announces-arrest-foreign-nationals-who-voted-illegally-2024-election"}, {"title": "Fox News — Justice Department charges 16 across multiple states in alleged illegal voting and election crimes (Sept. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/justice-department-charges-16-across-multiple-states-alleged-illegal-voting-election-crimes"}, {"title": "News 4 San Antonio (WOAI) — Mexican national charged with illegally voting in November 2024 election arrested (Sept. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://news4sanantonio.com/news/local/mexican-national-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-november-2024-election-arrested"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ Sept. 18 charges against 16 in seven districts (ei-2026-10-061)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-061 (first_seen 2026-09-18; backfill of a DOJ charging round not previously carried; none of the 16 on other cards, checked by name). DOJ release text-verified (Arellano-Alba, Carzoli, Eccles 'nine times', Okafor, Englestad, Coulibaly, Aquilina); all sources curl 200. Fox and WOAI dates from EMon search listing."}
{"id": "apt-2026-decoy-dan-sullivan-consultant-coordination-control-spy", "permanent_id": "C20260926-002008-23", "uid": "C20260926-002008-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-002008-23", "old_ids": ["apt-2026-decoy-dan-sullivan-consultant-coordination-control-spy"], "seq": "C00656", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaigns", "Many campaign managers are controlled opposition who try to control and spy on citizen candidates."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-97", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-97", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-08", "state": "AK", "description": "Americans for Public Trust's Sep 2026 FEC complaint alleges Alaska Senate candidate Daniel J. Sullivan's campaign consultant Amber Lee simultaneously directed/secretary'd 907 Initiative while that group spent ~$1.5M attacking incumbent Sen. Dan Sullivan—i.e., overlapping manager/consultant control across a 'decoy' candidacy and an opposing independent spender. Status Alleged (complaint filed; not an FEC finding). Companion Confirmed card covers the more general consultant conflict-of-interest problem.", "sources": [{"title": "Americans for Public Trust — FEC complaint vs Daniel J. Sullivan / 907 Initiative", "url": "https://americansforpublictrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/APT_DanielJ.SullivanFECComplaint.pdf"}, {"title": "NY Post — 'Decoy Dan' illegally colluded with liberal group, watchdog alleges", "url": "https://nypost.com/2026/09/08/us-news/decoy-dan-sullivan-illegally-colluded-with-liberal-group-attacking-alaska-gop-sen-sullivan-watchdog-alleges/"}], "notes": "Fill-20h leaf 12. Honest Alleged — FEC complaint not adjudicated."}
{"id": "wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-16", "uid": "C20261020-221915-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-16", "old_ids": ["wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default"], "seq": "C01489", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-09-08", "state": "WI", "description": "Peter Bernegger of New London, Wisconsin, president of Election Watch, Inc., filed a sworn FEC complaint received May 21, 2025 (MUR 8378), alleging that Tammy Baldwin for Senate and 16 related committees accepted about $36,820,755 in unlawful contributions from 2017 to 2024 through \"smurfing,\" which he defined as fragmenting large contributions into thousands of small transactions under the names of elderly or unemployed people without their knowledge. The complaint cites groups of donor profiles with the same first name contributing identical totals at the same timestamp from different states, individual donors with tens of thousands of contributions, and retirees exceeding the per-cycle limit by more than 500 percent. After the FEC did not act within 120 days, he sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on November 20, 2025 (No. 25-cv-04072). The FEC filed a notice that it lacked a quorum, and on September 8, 2026, the clerk entered a default because the Commission had not answered. He has filed similar suits over complaints against Sen. Lindsey Graham's committee and WinRed (about $11,090,385), Amy Klobuchar's committees, Friends of John Thune, Elissa Slotkin's committees, and Warnock for Georgia, so his allegations reach both parties. Status Alleged: the default concerns the FEC's failure to respond, not a finding that any contribution was unlawful.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (25-4072), Tammy Baldwin for Senate, MUR 8378", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-25-4072/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-25-4072.html"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC — Complaint (Nov. 20, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/bernegger-v-fec-pls-compl-declaratory-injunctive-relief-11-20-25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-pls-compl-declaratory-injunctive-relief-11-20-25.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court (D.D.C.) — Clerk's Entry of Default against the FEC (Sept. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/documents/6306/usdabcdc-clerks-entry-of-default-09-08-2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-usdabcdc-clerks-entry-of-default-09-08-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC — Statement of undisputed material facts, renewed motion for default (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/bernegger_v_fec_pls-stmt_undisputed_facts_supp_renew_mot_default-10-14-26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-pls-stmt-undisputed-facts-supp-renew-mot-default-10-14-26.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (25-4563), Lindsey Graham / Team Graham / WinRed", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-25-4563/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-25-4563.html"}, {"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (25-4559), Amy Klobuchar committees", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-25-4559/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-25-4559.html"}, {"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (26-106), Friends of John Thune", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-26-106/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-26-106.html"}, {"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (26-213), Elissa Slotkin committees", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-26-213/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-26-213.html"}, {"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (26-2194), Warnock for Georgia", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-26-2194/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2025-2026-bernegger-fec-smurfing-complaints-baldwin-default__fec-bernegger-v-fec-26-2194.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Mark's lead. All case facts are from FEC court-case pages and filings. The complaint's description of Immasche conflicts with her own words on video (see the Colorado card). The FEC's lack of a quorum is why these complaints have gone unanswered."}
{"id": "milwaukee-wi-2026-la-test-notice-posted-after-testing-completed", "permanent_id": "C20260925-212129-06", "uid": "C20260925-212129-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-212129-06", "old_ids": ["milwaukee-wi-2026-la-test-notice-posted-after-testing-completed"], "seq": "C00303", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Event Date and Time Misdirection", "They advertise incorrect dates and times so people miss events (for example, publishing a logic and accuracy test for 9 a.m. but starting at 8 a.m., so poll watchers miss the first hour)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-95", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-95", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-08", "state": "WI", "description": "WEC complaint Gavery v. Harris et al. (EL 26-58, filed Sept 2026) alleges Milwaukee Election Commission conducted August 1, 2026 pre-election tabulator/L&A testing beginning 8:00 a.m. but posted public notice only on August 4 — after testing ended — so observers could not attend, contrary to Wis. Stat. §5.84(1)'s ≥48-hour public notice requirement for open equipment tests. Status Alleged (complaint allegations; adjudication pending at note time).", "sources": [{"title": "WEC docket PDF — Gavery v. Harris complaint (EL 26-58)", "url": "https://elections.wi.gov/sites/default/files/documents/01%20-%20Complaint%20-%20Justin%20Gavery%20v.%20Maricha%20Harris%20et%20al.%20%28EL%2026-58%29%20-%209.10.26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/milwaukee-wi-2026-la-test-notice-posted-after-testing-completed__wec-docket-pdf-gavery-v-harris-complaint-el-26-58.pdf"}, {"title": "Election Confidence — mirrored complaint PDF", "url": "https://electionconfidence.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/WEC-Complaint-Gavery-v.-Harris-09.10.2026_Redacted.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15f leaf 3. Catalog example is LAT start-time mismatch; late/after-the-fact notice is the same miss-the-event tactic class."}
{"id": "ct-bridgeport-2026-10-06-dennis-bradley-charged-absentee-ballot-probate-primary", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-12", "uid": "C20261026-121625-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-12", "old_ids": ["ct-bridgeport-2026-10-06-dennis-bradley-charged-absentee-ballot-probate-primary"], "seq": "C01558", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-08-11 to 2026-10-21", "state": "CT", "description": "On Oct. 6, 2026, Connecticut Chief State's Attorney Patrick Griffin announced the arrest of former Democratic state Sen. Dennis A. Bradley on two counts of illegal possession of absentee ballots and envelopes, being present when an absentee-ballot applicant executes a ballot, and an additional absentee-ballot violation, stemming from the Aug. 11, 2026, Bridgeport Democratic primary for judge of probate, in which his brother Mark Bradley challenged incumbent Paul Ganim (NBC Connecticut). Voter Alesia Dennis told police and the State Elections Enforcement Commission that Bradley came to her apartment, opened the absentee ballot she had completed and told her to change her vote; she later voted at the Registrar of Voters. The commission referred the case to the Chief State's Attorney. Bradley was released on a promise to appear in court on Oct. 21. Status Alleged: these are charges, not a conviction.", "sources": [{"title": "NBC Connecticut — Ex-state senator charged in investigation into handling of absentee ballots during Bridgeport primary (Oct. 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbcconnecticut.com/news/local/ex-state-senator-charged-in-investigation-into-handling-of-absentee-ballots-during-bridgeport-primary/3782270/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bridgeport CT Dennis Bradley absentee charges (ei-2026-10-162)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-162 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200. Placed on the same Ballot Harvesting leaf as the 2023 Bridgeport primary card; no payment is alleged here. Third Bridgeport absentee case on the tracker (2019, 2023, 2026)."}
{"id": "ok-cleveland-2026-10-02-sara-polston-charged-illegal-voting-june-august-primaries-felony-sentence", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-04", "uid": "C20261111-120609-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-04", "old_ids": ["ok-cleveland-2026-10-02-sara-polston-charged-illegal-voting-june-august-primaries-felony-sentence"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-06-16 and 2026-08-25 (alleged votes); 2026-10-02 (charges filed)", "state": "OK", "description": "The District 21 District Attorney's Office (Cleveland, McClain and Garvin counties) announced on Oct. 2, 2026, that it filed two counts of illegal voting under 26 O.S. 16-102 against Sara Polston in Cleveland County District Court (case CF-2026-1008). Prosecutors allege she voted in Oklahoma's June 16 primary and Aug. 25 runoff primary while still serving a felony sentence for a 2023 drunken-driving crash in Norman, which made her ineligible to vote under Oklahoma law. The DA said he received information about the voting and referred it to the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation; KOCO reports that investigators used her GPS monitor location to place her at her Norman polling place on both election days and obtained the sign-in signatures, and that her voter history shows she voted in both elections. Her attorney told the Department of Corrections that she 'did not know she was ineligible to vote,' and Oklahoma law requires prosecutors to prove she voted knowing she was not eligible. The Department of Corrections returned her to prison on Oct. 1 and revoked sentence credits; a not-guilty plea was entered for her on Oct. 30, and a preliminary hearing conference was set for Nov. 10. These are accusations only; she has not been convicted of illegal voting. Status Alleged: two felony counts filed by the District 21 District Attorney (OSCN docket CF-2026-1008), reported by KOCO, The Oklahoman and FOX 25; the charges are accusations only, and she is presumed innocent. Catalog point: a person still serving a felony sentence allegedly voted twice in 2026 primaries, and it was caught through a tip and GPS-monitor records rather than by any roll check. Update (Nov. 11, 2026): FOX 25 (KOKH) reported that Polston pleaded not guilty and her next court date is Jan. 5. Cleveland County officials said her name did appear on the court clerk's monthly felony report to the county election board, but the report lacked enough identifying information to match her registration, and Oklahoma requires at least three matching identifiers to cancel one. The Court Clerk's Office found four people with missing identifiers on 2026 felony lists, including Polston; Court Clerk Marilyn Williams said her office is auditing the past 11 years of monthly felony lists and adding a new check before lists go to the election board. The State Election Board said more than 1,600 registrations were canceled from January through October.", "sources": [{"title": "District 21 District Attorney's Office (Oklahoma) — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (2026-10-02)", "url": "https://district21da.com/sara-polston-charged-for-illegal-voting/"}, {"title": "Oklahoma State Courts Network (Cleveland County docket CF-2026-1008) — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (2026-10-02)", "url": "https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?cmid=2540533&db=cleveland&number=CF-2026-1008"}, {"title": "KOCO 5 News — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (2026-10-02)", "url": "https://www.koco.com/article/sara-polston-charged-illegal-voting-serving-felony-sentence/73998960"}, {"title": "The Oklahoman — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.oklahoman.com/story/news/crime/2026/10/30/sara-polston-loses-drunk-driving-credit-voting/92520024007/"}, {"title": "FOX 25 (KOKH) — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (2026-11-10)", "url": "https://okcfox.com/news/local/sara-polston-heading-to-court-on-illegal-voting-charges"}, {"title": "X post by @GrandpaHarris65 (2026-11-10T22:49:25Z)", "url": "https://x.com/GrandpaHarris65/status/2120287744350142733"}, {"title": "FOX 25 — Cleveland County clerk audits 11 years of felony lists after illegal-voting case (Nov. 11, 2026)", "url": "https://okcfox.com/news/local/cleveland-county-clerk-audits-11-years-of-felony-lists-after-illegal-voting-case"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — OK Polston illegal-voting charges (ei-2026-10-392)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-392 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status developing/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted. Refreshed 2026-11-12 12:05 PM ET (2026-11-12 midday EDS/EMon ingest) from EMon ei-2026-10-392 update; zero X API."}
{"id": "la-edla-2026-06-11-migliore-australian-lpr-indicted-false-citizenship-voted-2022-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261109-121807-09", "uid": "C20261109-121807-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-121807-09", "old_ids": ["la-edla-2026-06-11-migliore-australian-lpr-indicted-false-citizenship-voted-2022-2024"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-06-11 (indictment); 2022-11-08 and 2024-11-05 (votes alleged)", "state": "LA", "description": "A federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana indicted Denise Nataly Migliore, 51, of Franklinton, an Australian national and lawful permanent resident, on June 11, 2026 on two counts of making false statements to register to vote and two counts of illegal voting in a federal election. Prosecutors allege she falsely claimed U.S. citizenship when registering in October 2022 and October 2024 and then cast ballots in the Nov. 8, 2022 and Nov. 5, 2024 federal elections; Civic Intelligence, citing the indictment, says the 2024 ballot was cast in person at the St. Tammany Parish Government Building. Homeland Security Investigations arrested her July 1, 2026 at the federal courthouse in New Orleans, and DHS announced the arrest July 7. Nola.com reports the case is the first criminal prosecution from Louisiana's practice of checking all registered voters against the federal SAVE citizenship database; the Secretary of State's office said SAVE identified 403 non-citizens registered in Louisiana, 83 of whom voted in at least one election. Migliore told nola.com she had a pending citizenship application, \"just considered myself a citizen,\" and did not know non-citizen voting was illegal. ABC News (Australia) reported in July that a jury trial was set for September 2026; no plea, verdict or later case outcome was found in this check. She faces up to five years in prison and a $250,000 fine if convicted. The charges are accusations only; she is presumed innocent. The case recirculated on X on Nov. 8, 2026. Status Alleged: federal grand-jury indictment in the Eastern District of Louisiana, announced by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and reported by nola.com and ABC News (Australia). An indictment is an accusation only. Catalog point: as alleged, a noncitizen registered twice by claiming citizenship and voted in two federal elections before anyone checked.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Homeland Security — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (2026-07-07)", "url": "https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/07/07/ice-investigation-leads-arrest-australian-alien-who-illegally-voted-multiple"}, {"title": "nola.com — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.nola.com/news/louisiana-illegal-voting-australian/article_6b2627da-6468-4ee8-89ff-023b03ca7d0d.html"}, {"title": "nola.com — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.nola.com/news/politics/australian-woman-louisiana-illegal-voter-fraud-federal-charges/article_ac7d9263-ce1b-4ade-80ab-8c38a51bf431.html"}, {"title": "ABC News (Australia) — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (2026-07-08)", "url": "https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-08/australian-accused-of-illegally-voting-in-us-elections/106893092"}, {"title": "ABC News (Australia) — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (2026-07-10)", "url": "https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-07-10/australian-charged-with-illegal-us-voting-faces-jury-trial/106901330"}, {"title": "Fox News — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.foxnews.com/politics/noncitizen-accused-falsely-claiming-us-citizenship-before-casting-federal-ballots"}, {"title": "Civic Intelligence — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (n.d.)", "url": "https://civicintelligence.news/society/drain-the-swamp/noncitizen-federal-ballot-fraud"}, {"title": "X post by @@OBBMNetwork (2026-11-08T18:01:52Z)", "url": "https://x.com/OBBMNetwork/status/2119490602333085858"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Louisiana: Australian LPR indicted for non-citizen voting (ei-2026-10-361)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-361 (added 2026-11-09 12:18 PM ET, 2026-11-09 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops", "permanent_id": "C20261023-183126-01", "uid": "C20261023-183126-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-183126-01", "old_ids": ["us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops"], "seq": "C01534", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Fake Polling Results"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-06", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-05 to 2026-10-22", "state": "US", "description": "On Oct. 22, 2026, the polling aggregator FiftyPlusOne (Mary Radcliffe, G. Elliott Morris, Cooper Burton) published \"More pollster funny business uncovered,\" a parallel investigation into SoCal Strategies, a pollster linked to Wedgewood Polls, the firm that admitted on Oct. 20 to fabricating its polls. The anonymous source who first tipped FiftyPlusOne about Wedgewood also cast doubt on some, not all, SoCal Strategies polls. FiftyPlusOne reported that SoCal was registered in Florida in March 2025 to Jack Sims, one of the two people Wedgewood named as behind it; that Sims dissolved the entity in May 2026, writing \"ITS TIME FOR THIS TO END AND FOR US TO MOVE ON. I JUST WANT TO PUT THIS ALL BEHIND,\" after which three more SoCal polls were released; and that the person who answered as lead pollster Wilson Rochford (a Boston University student and former Probolsky Research intern whom FiftyPlusOne staff had vetted for FiveThirtyEight in 2024) said Sims had left nearly a year earlier. FiftyPlusOne also received allegations that Rochford was not involved at all and that others, possibly Sims, used his name and profile; the phone number it was given was said by one source to belong to Sims, but it is a TextNow number that could not be verified. After FiftyPlusOne interviewed a SoCal-affiliated person on Oct. 20 and then tried to reach Rochford at his student email, SoCal's website, its X account @SocalStrategies and its Substack went offline on Oct. 22 (The Washington Post Pollwatcher; The National Desk). FiftyPlusOne said it will no longer collect SoCal surveys and removed two May 2026 polls whose legitimacy is disputed: they lack the crosstab link the firm usually published and use a different release format, although the person identified as Rochford \"explicitly denied any problems with the data.\" It kept SoCal's older polls (mostly before May 2026), saying it had not seen credible evidence that they were falsified. BETINT reported on Oct. 22 that a Kalshi account it assesses likely belongs to the man pollster Lester Tellez says ran SoCal (known to Tellez as \"Wilson Rochford,\" \"Jack Sims\" and \"Andrew\") bet in the direction of three SoCal polls 3 to 9 hours before release, including a $99 bet on May 16 against Rep. Thomas Massie before SoCal's KY-4 poll showing Ed Gallrein 49%, Massie 42%, and bets on a large Ken Paxton margin before SoCal's May Texas Senate runoff poll; only Kalshi can confirm the account owner. SoCal told Axios and the Washington Examiner that Sims had not worked there for a year and that Andrew Prater never did. Silver Bulletin already excluded SoCal as a \"nonprofessional\" pollster. Rasmussen Reports amplified the story on X on Oct. 23 (\"And Yet Another Firm - SoCal Strategies - Has Been Busted for Peddling Fake Polls\"), linking Townhall. The \"another firm\" framing is accurate as to the 2026 cycle: Median Strategies admitted fake polls in August and Wedgewood Polls admitted fabrication on Oct. 20 (both carded on this leaf). SoCal Strategies offer to prediction-market traders: on Oct. 22, 2026 (2:05 PM ET), prediction-market trader CSPTrading.eth (@CSP_Trading) replied to G. Elliott Morris's post about the FiftyPlusOne investigation, \"never had a polling firm dm me to try to help me game prediction markets before,\" with a screenshot of an X direct-message thread from the verified account \"SoCal Strategies\" (\"Joined June 2024\"). The first message, dated Wed., Sep. 16 at 7:36 PM, reads: \"Hey, reaching out from SoCal Strategies. We're offering our private election models and polling data to Kalshi/Polymarket traders. Our models caught the Michigan Senate and Wisconsin governor races early, and our polling was rated 3rd-most accurate in 2024. With the amount of volume you trade with, this could generate 10s of thousands of dollars. If you're interested in getting access to the data/models, I can send over pricing and details.\" A second message on Sat., Oct. 3 at 6:19 PM reads \"Just following up on this.\" The screenshot shows no year, but the weekdays match 2026 and the message refers to the 2026 Michigan Senate and Wisconsin governor primaries. The uncropped original also shows that the trader accepted the message request on Tue., Oct. 6 and answered with a profane, abusive refusal. Politics & Poll Tracker (@PollTracker2024) reposted a cropped copy at 2:45 PM ET the same day (\"SoCal Strategies offered private election data to prediction market traders.\"; about 64,500 views), and Townhall embedded that post on Oct. 23. The September offer came from SoCal's own account months after the firm told Axios and the Washington Examiner that Jack Sims had left about a year earlier. Corroboration: no outlet has independently verified the DM. FiftyPlusOne's public text, Axios, and BETINT do not report it; BETINT separately documents a Kalshi account it ties to the man Tellez says ran SoCal trading ahead of SoCal polls. The offer is a first-hand screenshot from its recipient, archived here as posted. Status Alleged: the aggregator's removal of two polls and the firm's disappearance are confirmed, but SoCal has not admitted fabrication, the person presenting as its lead pollster denied any data problems, and no regulator or court has made a finding. Catalog point: a poll that cannot be traced to a verifiable business, named staff and full crosstabs can still enter aggregates and move prediction markets and donor money; aggregators, not voters, are the only filter. Results counted openly at the precinct do not depend on any poll.", "sources": [{"title": "FiftyPlusOne — More pollster funny business uncovered: SoCal Strategies (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://blog.fiftyplusone.news/p/more-pollster-funny-business-uncovered-socal-strategies"}, {"title": "The Washington Post — The Pollwatcher: Another fraudulent pollster is out of business, and a third group just disappeared (Oct. 22, 2026; curl timeout, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/10/22/pollwatcher-another-fraudulent-pollster-is-out-business-third-group-just-disappeared/"}, {"title": "Mediaite — Polling company goes dark as investigative report suggests they're yet another fake (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.mediaite.com/media/news/polling-company-goes-dark-as-investigative-report-suggests-theyre-yet-another-fake/"}, {"title": "The National Desk — Polling firm disappears amid media questioning surveys, employees (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://thenationaldesk.com/news/americas-news-now/polling-firm-disappears-amid-media-questioning-surveys-employees-socal-wedgewood-races-rrt"}, {"title": "The Washington Times — Aggregator FiftyPlusOne drops SoCal Strategies after polling firm vanishes online (Oct. 23, 2026; curl 403 bot-block, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/oct/23/aggregator-fiftyplusone-drops-socal-strategies-polling-firm-vanishes/"}, {"title": "Legal Insurrection — SoCal Strategies drops offline after questions emerge about Wedgewood Polls ties (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://legalinsurrection.com/2026/10/socal-strategies-drops-offline-after-questions-emerge-about-wedgewood-polls-ties/"}, {"title": "BETINT — Kalshi account tied to fake pollster bet ahead of his firm's polls (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.betint.net/p/kalshi-account-tied-to-fake-pollster"}, {"title": "Townhall (Matt Vespa) — Another firm has been busted for peddling fake polls (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://townhall.com/news/mattvespa/2026/10/23/another-firm-has-been-busted-for-peddling-fake-polls-n2685168"}, {"title": "Rasmussen Reports on X — \"And Yet Another Firm - SoCal Strategies - Has Been Busted for Peddling Fake Polls\" (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/Rasmussen_Poll/status/2113605238821363825"}, {"title": "Silver Bulletin (Nate Silver) — Fake polls are a real problem (Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.natesilver.net/p/fake-polls-are-a-real-problem"}, {"title": "X — CSPTrading.eth (@CSP_Trading), reply to @gelliottmorris: \"never had a polling firm dm me to try to help me game prediction markets before\" with screenshot of the SoCal Strategies DM offer (posted 2026-10-22 2:05 PM ET; recipient's first-hand screenshot, uncropped original)", "url": "https://x.com/CSP_Trading/status/2113330888872218744", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-reply-2113330888872218744-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X media — uncropped DM screenshot attached to the @CSP_Trading reply (original size; includes the trader's Oct. 6 reply, unredacted)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVQPIqvXYAAa1W0.png?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-reply-2113330888872218744-photo-1-orig.png"}, {"title": "X — Politics & Poll Tracker (@PollTracker2024): \"SoCal Strategies offered private election data to prediction market traders.\" (posted 2026-10-22 2:45 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/PollTracker2024/status/2113340931705393619", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the @PollTracker2024 post (original size; screenshot of the @CSP_Trading quote with the SoCal DM)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVQYYHOWUAAg0Ox.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "fxtwitter JSON — @PollTracker2024 post data (text, time, metrics; no X API spend)", "url": "https://api.fxtwitter.com/PollTracker2024/status/2113340931705393619", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "Axios — Fake polling scandal hits election industry (Oct. 21, 2026; SoCal statement that the Wedgewood-linked person had not worked there for a year; curl 403, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.axios.com/2026/10/21/fake-polls-midterms-wedgewood-investigation"}], "notes": "Update 2026-10-24 early AM from Mark's link (@PollTracker2024 post): added the SoCal DM offer to prediction-market traders, with the full offer text, the original @CSP_Trading reply (status 2113330888872218744, found via X public search) and the PollTracker repost; the PollTracker post capture, both fxtwitter JSONs and both original-size photos are archived locally; image thumbnail added; nothing redacted. Corroboration check: FiftyPlusOne (public portion), Axios, BETINT, TNND, Mediaite and the UW Center for an Informed Public do not report the DM; Townhall only embeds the PollTracker post. The offer is a single first-hand recipient screenshot, so it is presented as such inside this card rather than as a new card. Label re-evaluated: stays Alleged. The offer shows SoCal marketing private data to traders, not fabricated polls, and the fabrication allegations remain unadmitted and unadjudicated. Recheck for a SoCal, Kalshi or Polymarket statement on the DM. Evening sweep 2026-10-23 from Mark's link (Rasmussen Reports X post -> Townhall). Existing leaf 1 > Fake polling results fits; no structural change. Alleged: removal and disappearance confirmed; fabrication not admitted and denied by the person identified as Rochford; allegations come from anonymous sources and Tellez's evidence file; Kalshi-account attribution is BETINT's assessment. FiftyPlusOne, Mediaite, TNND, Legal Insurrection, BETINT, Townhall, Silver Bulletin curl 200; WaPo curl timeout and Washington Times 403 (text via search extracts). Names as in sources; nothing redacted. Peers on this leaf: Wedgewood Polls (Oct. 2026) and Median Strategies (Aug. 2026). Recheck for a SoCal statement, Kalshi action, or other aggregators dropping SoCal.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/us-2026-socal-strategies-polls-disputed-firm-vanishes-fiftyplusone-drops__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Screenshot posted by @PollTracker2024: @CSP_Trading quote \"never had a polling firm dm me to try to help me game prediction markets before\" over the SoCal Strategies DM offering private election models and polling data to Kalshi/Polymarket traders (Sep. 16, follow-up Oct. 3)"}]}
{"id": "fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-17", "uid": "C20261020-221915-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-17", "old_ids": ["fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint"], "seq": "C01490", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2026-01-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "Julie Seegers filed a sworn FEC complaint on August 29, 2025, against ActBlue (FEC ID C00401224) and its treasurer, George Gilmer, alleging that they accepted unlawful contributions and filed inaccurate reports. When the FEC did not act within 120 days, she sued pro se in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on January 30, 2026 (Seegers v. FEC, No. 1:26-cv-00276-JMC), asserting an informational injury from the lack of accurate disclosure of contributor identity, and on July 28, 2026, she moved for a default judgment against the FEC. Status Alleged: the case concerns the FEC's failure to act, and no ruling on the underlying allegations has been made.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Seegers v. FEC (26-276)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/seegers-v-fec-26-276/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint__fec-seegers-v-fec-26-276.html"}, {"title": "Seegers v. FEC — Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Jan. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/js-pls-compl-for-dec-and-inj-relief-01-30-2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint__fec-js-pls-compl-for-dec-and-inj-relief-01-30-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Seegers v. FEC — Plaintiff's Motion for Default against the FEC (July 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/seegers_v_fec_pls_mot_default_against_fec-07-28-26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint__fec-seegers-v-fec-pls-mot-default-against-fec-07-28-26.pdf"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger, on the Seegers suit (Sept. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2100251942937133379", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2026-01-30-seegers-v-fec-actblue-complaint__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Seegers' state of residence is not given in the filings read. The FEC's case summary was verified directly."}
{"id": "sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-19", "uid": "C20261020-221915-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-19", "old_ids": ["sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit"], "seq": "C01492", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2025-12-31", "state": "SC", "description": "Peter Bernegger filed a verified FEC complaint on July 31, 2025 (MUR 8386) against Sen. Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, his committee Team Graham, Inc. (FEC ID C00458828), affiliated committees, and WinRed \"as a fundraising conduit and intermediary for online contributions.\" He alleged that they accepted contributions made in the name of another (\"smurfing\" or \"straw donor\" contributions) under 52 U.S.C. 30122, filed reports with inaccurate contributor information, and accepted contributions that circumvent the limits. His committee-level analysis states that Team Graham accepted 156,039 alleged \"smurfed\" transactions totaling $11,090,385 from 18,040 donors, which he says is 39.2 percent of the committee's transactions analyzed and 17.2 percent of their value; the exhibits include a \"Top 50\" table of high-frequency donors and penny and one-dollar transfer entries. When the FEC did not act within 120 days, he sued in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on December 31, 2025 (No. 1:25-cv-04563-TNM). The FEC filed a notice that it lacked a quorum, and on June 7, 2026, Judge Trevor N. McFadden directed the clerk to enter a default, noting that a default is not a default judgment; Bernegger moved for a default judgment on June 15, 2026. No public response from Sen. Graham's campaign or WinRed to the complaint was located. Status Alleged: the default concerns the FEC's failure to respond, not a finding that any contribution was unlawful, and the \"smurfing\" classification is Bernegger's own and has not been independently tested.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — Bernegger v. FEC (25-4563): Lindsey Graham, Team Graham, Inc., WinRed (MUR 8386)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/legal-resources/court-cases/bernegger-v-fec-25-4563/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__fec-bernegger-v-fec-25-4563.html"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC, No. 25-cv-4563 — Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Dec. 31, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/documents/6082/pb-compl-for-decl-and-inj-relief-12-31-2025.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__fec-pb-compl-for-decl-and-inj-relief-12-31-2025.pdf"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC (25-4563) — Minute Order directing entry of default (June 7, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/documents/6218/bernegger_v_fec_25-4563_minute_order-default_judgment-06-07-26.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__fec-bernegger-v-fec-25-4563-minute-order-default-judgment-06-07-26.pdf"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC (25-4563) — Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment (June 15, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/documents/6238/pb-pls-mot-for-def-judg-fed-r-civ-p-55b2-d-06-15-2026.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__fec-pb-pls-mot-for-def-judg-fed-r-civ-p-55b2-d-06-15-2026.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC Record — Bernegger v. FEC alleges failure to act on administrative complaint (25-4563)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/updates/bernegger-v-fec-alleges-failure-to-act-on-administrative-complaint-25-4563/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__fec-bernegger-v-fec-alleges-failure-to-act-on-administrative-complaint-25-4563.html"}, {"title": "CDM — Bernegger: Federal lawsuit filed against U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (Dec. 31, 2025; advocacy framing)", "url": "https://cdm.press/news/politics/2025/12/31/bernegger-federal-lawsuit-filed-against-us-senator-lindsey-graham-for-criminally-laundering-over-11m-into-campaign/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2025-12-31-bernegger-graham-winred-smurfing-suit__cdm-bernegger-federal-lawsuit-filed-against-us-senator-lindsey-graham-for-crimin.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue/WinRed smurfing research 2026-10-20. WinRed card. All case facts verified in the FEC court-case page, the complaint (paras. 17-24) and the minute order. The CDM headline's 'criminally laundering' is Bernegger's characterization. Leaf is platform-neutral."}
{"id": "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-06", "uid": "C20261028-132233-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-06", "old_ids": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk"], "seq": "C01601", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped.", "Discard ballots seen marked for the \"wrong\" candidate"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-05", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2025-10-15 to 2025-10-17", "state": "VA", "description": "On Oct. 17, 2025, Fairfax County Republican Committee Chair Katie Gorka wrote to General Registrar Eric Spicer that the absentee return envelope \"potentially exposes the voter's selection for Republican Attorney General candidate Jason Miyares,\" and that the design created \"a risk that mailed ballots could be selectively removed before being tabulated.\" [1] The letter said that as of Oct. 15, 84,062 absentee ballots had been sent, with 29,106 returned by mail and 3,366 by drop box, and it asked the office to tell voters to vote in person or confirm that returned ballots were received. [1] The committee's page also quotes an Oct. 15 post by voter Mark Moran: \"it is possible to see my vote selection… I find it VERY interesting that this dot is for the AG selection.\" [1] Status Alleged: the visibility itself is confirmed by the county (linked card), but the selective-removal risk is the party's allegation, and no removed ballot has been documented.", "sources": [{"title": "Fairfax County Republican Committee — Letter to Fairfax County Office of Elections regarding concerns over mail-in balloting (Chair Katie Gorka, Oct. 17, 2025; party source)", "url": "https://fairfaxgop.org/fairfax-gops-letter-to-fairfax-county-office-of-elections-regarding-concerns-over-mail-in-balloting/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. Party source; the selective-removal risk is not corroborated by any documented removal.", "related": ["va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ei-2026-09-022", "nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea", "wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park"]}
{"id": "mi-hamtramck-2025-08-council-member-drop-box-ballot-stacks-video-msp-investigation", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-18", "uid": "C20261102-121503-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-18", "old_ids": ["mi-hamtramck-2025-08-council-member-drop-box-ballot-stacks-video-msp-investigation"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-09", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2025-07 and 2025-08-01 (video); 2026-11-01 (recirculated)", "state": "MI", "description": "On Nov. 1, 2026, the X account Capitol Leaks posted a 79.6-second video and claimed that Hamtramck City Council Member Abu Musa was \"caught\" having \"stuffed\" a ballot drop box with \"dozens\" of ballots, and that he \"won his race last week by 76 votes.\" These are the poster's claims. The video is not new. It is a Local 4 (WDIV, ClickOnDetroit) news segment from August 2025 that shows city surveillance footage from outside Hamtramck City Hall, obtained by the station through a public-records request. The segment says that, in the first clip, a black pickup truck arrives at night with three men inside, including a man who appears to be Musa in the back seat, and the driver pushes several stacks of ballots into the drop box. In a second clip about four days later, a man who appears to be Musa sits in the passenger seat and hands three large stacks to the driver, who deposits them. WXYZ dates that second clip to Aug. 1, 2025, three days before the city primary. Michigan State Police confirmed in August 2025 that the videos were part of an ongoing investigation, including an inquiry into whether Musa lives in Hamtramck, which he denied, and said its findings would go to prosecutors. Musa did not respond to the stations' requests for comment, and the city clerk's office declined to comment. Oakland County Clerk Lisa Brown told WXYZ that Michigan sets no limit on how many ballots one person may return, but the ballots must belong to the person's household or immediate family; it has not been reported whose ballots were in the bundles. No charges against Musa over the footage were found. He was named in the Attorney General's 2025 petition for a special prosecutor in a separate 2023 absentee-ballot case but was not charged. The 76-vote margin is not supported: no Hamtramck council race took place last week, and in the certified Nov. 4, 2025 results Musa finished first with 1,698 votes, 290 ahead of the fourth-place candidate for three seats. Status Alleged: Michigan State Police confirmed the footage was part of an investigation; whose ballots were in the stacks has not been reported, and no charges were found. The recirculated post's '76 votes' and 'last week' claims are not supported. Catalog point: one person depositing stacks of other people's ballots into a drop box is the delivery step of ballot harvesting; the voter's chain of custody ends when someone else carries the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Local 4 / ClickOnDetroit — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (2025-08-13)", "url": "https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2025/08/13/video-appears-to-show-hamtramck-councilmember-dropping-off-stacks-of-ballots-before-primary-election/"}, {"title": "Local 4 / ClickOnDetroit — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (2025-08-15)", "url": "https://www.clickondetroit.com/news/local/2025/08/15/video-appears-to-show-late-night-ballot-drop-off-by-hamtramck-council-member-under-investigation/"}, {"title": "WXYZ Detroit — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (2025-08)", "url": "https://www.wxyz.com/news/investigation-into-hamtramck-city-council-members-wrapping-up-soon-msp-says"}, {"title": "Votebeat — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (2025-08-11)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/michigan/2025/08/11/hamtramck-city-council-election-forgery/"}, {"title": "Wayne County official results (posted by City of Hamtramck) — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (2025-11-18)", "url": "https://hamtramckcity.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/offsumn11425-Copy.pdf"}, {"title": "X post by @CapitolLeaks1 (2026-11-02T00:32:12Z)", "url": "https://x.com/CapitolLeaks1/status/2117052116560715993"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Hamtramck 2025 drop-box clip reposted (ei-2026-10-231)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-231 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status unconfirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "rnc-never-resident-voter-suits-az-va-ne-co-nv-nj-2025-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-06", "uid": "C20261009-100620-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-06", "old_ids": ["rnc-never-resident-voter-suits-az-va-ne-co-nv-nj-2025-2026"], "seq": "C01270", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2025-06-30/2026-09-30", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "Beyond Michigan and North Carolina, the RNC and state GOP partners have sued to end never-resident voting in Arizona (filed June 30, 2025), Virginia (Apr. 6, 2026; Va. Code 24.2-452), Colorado (June 26, 2026; RNC v. Griswold), Nevada (June 29, 2026), and New Jersey (July 9, 2026; Overseas Residents Absentee Voting Law, federal races). They also challenged Nebraska's 2005 law, which a trial court upheld in August 2026; the Nebraska Supreme Court heard argument on Sept. 30, 2026. The Guardian counts nine states in all. The suits claim state constitutions require personal residence, and that UOCAVA protects citizens who left a state but does not require states to admit citizens who never lived there. The NJ complaint also asks to remove already-registered never-residents and not count their future ballots. States answer that UOCAVA and the state statutes allow these voters and that plaintiffs lack standing. Status Alleged: the filings are confirmed, but the constitutional claims are unresolved in AZ, VA, CO, NV, and NJ and were rejected at trial in NE, which is on appeal. Results so far: NC succeeded; MI and NE trial courts rejected the claims.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia complaint — RNC v. Virginia State Board of Elections (Apr. 6, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-04-06-Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado complaint — RNC v. Griswold, C.R.S. 1-1-113 petition (June 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/republican-national-committee-jena-griswold-complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "Nevada complaint (June 29, 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/2026-06-29-Complaint.pdf"}, {"title": "New Jersey Globe — RNC, NJGOP sue to block voting by overseas citizens who never lived in NJ", "url": "https://newjerseyglobe.com/judiciary/rnc-njgop-sue-to-block-voting-by-overseas-citizens-who-never-lived-in-new-jersey/"}, {"title": "Nebraska Examiner — Justices consider appeal in challenge to Nebraska overseas voter law (Sept. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://nebraskaexaminer.com/2026/09/30/justices-consider-appeal-in-challenge-to-nebraska-overseas-voter-law/"}, {"title": "American Emigration — Never-resident voters now face court challenges in 8 states (case tracker)", "url": "https://americanemigration.com/news/never-resident-voters-lawsuits-eight-states"}], "notes": "Tracker counts differ (8 per American Emigration/Greenback; 9 per The Guardian Oct. 1, 2026). Update status per state as rulings land; split into per-state cards when merits rulings issue."}
{"id": "ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie", "permanent_id": "C20261028-163642-01", "uid": "C20261028-163642-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-163642-01", "old_ids": ["ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie"], "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Stack the ballot with spoilers to split the opponent's vote"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-163642-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-163642-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2025 to 2026-08-31", "state": "AK", "description": "The New York Times (Kellen Browning, Oct. 28, 2026) reported that an internal effort called the \"ballot composition project,\" involving aides to Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Mary Peltola, the campaign's lawyers at the Elias Law Group, and senior Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) aides, worked from the summer of 2025 to bring additional candidates onto Alaska's four-candidate general-election ballot who would draw support from Republican Sen. Dan S. Sullivan. [1] The Times based its account on interviews with 12 people, dozens of text messages it viewed, and documents prepared for a potential lawsuit against the campaign; former campaign manager Elisa Rios, who was fired in August, was a principal source. [1] The Times reported that, beginning with a call in December, Anchorage resident Matthew Salisbury was pressed over several months by a man who called himself \"Zane\" and said his backers would support Salisbury with outside spending; Salisbury identified a photograph of Democratic operative Jerid Kurtz as that man, and Salisbury did not run. [1] It reported that after the Aug. 18, 2026 primary, Kurtz was among those who urged Democrat David Leslie, who had advanced in fourth place, to withdraw, and that on Aug. 31, the day Leslie withdrew, Kurtz texted him, \"I'm really proud of the action you took today.\" [1] Leslie's withdrawal gave the fourth general-election place to Republican Gerald Heikes, a Palmer drywall contractor, who told the Times he had been recruited in the spring \"by a guy from the Midwest\" whose name he did not remember and who, he said, did not resemble Kurtz; he quoted the man as saying, \"We can't give you money or anything, but we'll make things happen for you.\" [1] Rios said consultant Jim Lottsfeldt agreed in March to lead outside spending for the long-shot candidates; federal filings by Alaska Values, a new super PAC supporting Heikes, show that Lottsfeldt requested radio advertising time, and Lottsfeldt denied any knowledge of or involvement in the effort and suggested that his name may have appeared on the forms in error. [1] Texts viewed by the Times show a campaign aide proposing a new \"MAGA party\" in January and the DSCC's director of campaigns replying \"Smart\"; the idea, which Rios said also involved an Elias Law Group attorney, was dropped in May. [1] Federal Election Commission records cited by the Times show that 49th State PAC, a pro-Peltola super PAC, paid Wingspan Strategies, a firm co-owned by Kurtz, about $87,000 this fall; the PAC said it had never hired or paid Kurtz for any services. [1] Rios later asked to retract her statements; the Times published them, saying they were on the record and consistent with its other reporting. [1] The Peltola campaign said it \"did not recruit any candidates into the race,\" and the DSCC said it had \"no involvement\" in recruiting Sullivan \"or any other Republican candidate.\" [1][3] Kurtz did not respond to the Times. [1] The Times noted that ballot-stacking tactics are \"generally considered legal\" and have been used by both parties in Alaska. [1] No source reports a payment to any candidate, and no source reports that any vote or vote count was changed. Status Alleged: the account rests on one investigation, part of it on statements that the source later sought to retract; the campaign, the DSCC and Lottsfeldt deny it, and Heikes did not identify the man who recruited him. The related same-name candidacy of Daniel J. Sullivan is covered on its own card (https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-16).", "sources": [{"title": "The New York Times — Inside Democrats' Secret Effort to Stack Alaska's Ballot (Kellen Browning, Oct. 28, 2026) (NYT page returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; archived copy is the syndicated full text from the Juneau Empire)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2026/10/28/us/politics/alaska-dan-sullivan-conspiracy-peltola.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie__nyt-via-juneau-empire-2026-10-28.pdf"}, {"title": "Juneau Empire — Inside Democrats' Secret Effort to Stack Alaska's Ballot, syndicated New York Times full text (Oct. 28, 2026; screenshot)", "url": "https://www.juneauempire.com/2026/10/28/inside-democrats-secret-effort-to-stack-alaskas-ballot/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie__juneau-empire-nyt-syndicated-2026-10-28.png"}, {"title": "The Guardian — Democrat Mary Peltola's campaign reportedly recruited second Dan Sullivan in Alaska Senate race (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2026/oct/28/mary-peltola-dan-sullivan-alaska-senate", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie__guardian-2026-10-28.html"}, {"title": "AP News — Second Dan Sullivan in Alaska Senate race recruited by Democrats, report says (Oct. 28, 2026) (returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; not archived; URL retained)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/alaska-peltola-senate-dan-sullivan-democrats-743677c9fb0d6696af7901504df2be3e"}, {"title": "Reuters via Investing.com — Democrats recruited spoilers in Alaska Senate race, NYT says (Oct. 28, 2026) (returns HTTP 403 to automated fetch; not archived; URL retained)", "url": "https://www.investing.com/news/politics-news/democrats-recruited-spoilers-in-alaska-senate-race-nyt-says-4980417"}, {"title": "Alaska Division of Elections — Election Candidates, U.S. Senator list (captured Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.elections.alaska.gov/election-candidates/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ak-2026-senate-nyt-ballot-composition-project-spoilers-heikes-salisbury-leslie__alaska-doe-election-candidates-2026-10-28.html"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 4:36 PM ET (Mark t519u/pt519u: \"yes, make a new leaf\"). Sources: NYT investigation (NYT page 403; syndicated full text from the Juneau Empire archived), Guardian; AP and Reuters via Investing.com returned HTTP 403 (not archived). Not verified independently: the FEC record of 49th State PAC payments to Wingspan Strategies, the Alaska Values PAC filing naming Lottsfeldt, and the potential-lawsuit documents (research queue, to be verified).", "related": ["ak-dan-sullivan-same-name-senate-primary-2026"]}
{"id": "milwaukee-wi-rnc-poll-watcher-limits-lawsuit-2024", "permanent_id": "C20260925-205354-07", "uid": "C20260925-205354-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-205354-07", "old_ids": ["milwaukee-wi-rnc-poll-watcher-limits-lawsuit-2024"], "seq": "C00222", "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Poll Watchers", "They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing, so they cannot see anything that matters."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-06", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-06", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11", "state": "WI", "description": "The day before the November 2024 general election, the RNC sued the Milwaukee Election Commission alleging guidance that arbitrarily limited observers (e.g., one per party in small rooms) at early-voting sites including Serb Hall, Good Hope Library, and Capitol Drive. The Commission replied that observers may be subject to reasonable limitations under Wisconsin law and denied arbitrary exclusion. Status Alleged for the unlawful-limitation claim; Confirmed only that the lawsuit and competing guidance statements exist.", "sources": [{"title": "Wisconsin Public Radio — RNC lawsuit alleges Milwaukee limiting poll watchers", "url": "https://www.wpr.org/news/rnc-lawsuit-milwaukee-election-commission-limiting-poll-watchers"}], "notes": "Fill-15d leaf 3. Lawsuit Alleged; Commission disputes."}
{"id": "pa-beaver-2026-bulwark-out-of-state-operatives-voted-from-presler-home-address", "permanent_id": "C20261023-180749-01", "uid": "C20261023-180749-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-180749-01", "old_ids": ["pa-beaver-2026-bulwark-out-of-state-operatives-voted-from-presler-home-address"], "seq": "C01533", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Proof of residence not required or confirmed"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-79", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-79", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11-05 to 2026-10-23", "state": "PA", "description": "The Bulwark reported on Oct. 23, 2026, that a review of voter registration records shows three people outside Republican organizer Scott Presler's family registered and cast 2024 Pennsylvania ballots using the Beaver County home he bought in April 2024. The report names political consultant Heather Langley, who it says referred to Louisiana as her home in 2024 posts, was paid by Presler's PAC at a Florida address in FEC filings, and voted in Florida in April 2025; Alfred Ashley of Oklahoma, whom it quotes posting on Sept. 20, 2024, \"As an out of state resident, I can not legally register voters here,\" and later that he \"Moved to Pennsylvania JUST to vote for Trump\"; and Joseph Albert Petriella, who listed Arlington, Virginia, addresses on federal donation forms. It also reports that Braden Douglas Sisk, a Washington state RNC delegate, registered at the address in June 2026 and appears to have voted. Pennsylvania law requires 30 days' residence in the election district and says a person present \"for temporary purposes only\" does not gain a residence there; election lawyers quoted by The Bulwark said such stays do not qualify. In a statement to The Bulwark, Presler's PAC, Early Vote Action, confirmed that his residence was used as a voting address by friends while they were \"actively working and residing in Pennsylvania\" and blamed Pennsylvania's voter rolls for still listing those who have since left. No election official, prosecutor, or court has made any finding, and no charges have been filed. Status Alleged: the use of the address is acknowledged by the PAC, but whether these registrants met Pennsylvania's residency requirement is disputed and unadjudicated. Catalog point: a registration is accepted on a stated address without any check that the registrant actually lives there, and the record keeps producing ballots after the person leaves. Precinct rolls that neighbors and citizens can inspect, with in-person identification at check-in, give such records more chances to be caught.", "sources": [{"title": "The Bulwark — GOP operative Scott Presler's Pennsylvania home used as voting address by out-of-state houseguests (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.thebulwark.com/p/gop-operative-scott-presler-out-of-state-voters-pennsylvania-houseguests"}, {"title": "DNYUZ (republishing The Bulwark) — Out-of-state GOP operatives voted from swing-state home, report says (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://dnyuz.com/2026/10/23/maga-fraud-crusader-let-out-of-state-gop-operatives-vote-from-his-swing-state-home-report/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Beaver County, PA Presler home address voter registrations (ei-2026-10-143)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-143 (added 2026-10-23 PM ingest; EMon status emerging, confidence medium). Carded rather than queued: the news report reached the people involved and Presler's PAC (Early Vote Action) confirmed on the record that the address was used as a voting address. Alleged because residency is disputed and no official finding or charge exists. Mapped to 5 Voter Rolls > Proof of residence not required or confirmed. Bulwark and DNYUZ curl 200; PAC statement text-verified; registrant names from EMon's verified summary of The Bulwark. Names as in source; nothing redacted. Recheck for a Beaver County Board of Elections, Department of State, or DA response."}
{"id": "mn-fillmore-2026-chaudhari-indicted-false-citizenship-claim-vote-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261019-123505-15", "uid": "C20261019-123505-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261019-123505-15", "old_ids": ["mn-fillmore-2026-chaudhari-indicted-false-citizenship-claim-vote-2024"], "seq": "C01446", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11-05 to 2026-10-16", "state": "MN", "description": "On Oct. 16, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security announced that Homeland Security Investigations had arrested Mukeshkumar Somabhai Chaudhari, an Indian national, who was indicted by a federal grand jury in the District of Minnesota on Sept. 10, 2026 on one count of false information in voting and one count of making a false claim of citizenship to register or vote. The indictment alleges that on or about Nov. 5, 2024 he signed the voter signature certificate required by Minnesota law, swearing he was a U.S. citizen, when he was not. Each count carries up to five years. FOX 9 reported in April that Chaudhari, 39, of Spring Valley, also faced state perjury and voting charges; according to the state complaint, he told investigators he filled out a voter registration notice the state sent after he got a driver's license, and learned during his green-card process that he should not have voted. The Minnesota Secretary of State's office said that before April 29, 2024, people who applied for a state ID were mailed a postcard on how to register that stated the citizenship requirement. These are charges only, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the indictment and arrest are confirmed by DHS and DOJ, but no court has found guilt. Catalog point: as alleged, a registration notice mailed after a driver's-license application led a noncitizen to register and vote on a sworn statement alone, which is the motor-voter path this catalog describes. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, and identification at check-in, give such records more chances to be caught.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Homeland Security — ICE HSI arrests non-citizen for illegally voting in 2024 election (Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/10/16/ice-hsi-arrests-non-citizen-illegally-voting-2024-election"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Indian national charged with making false claim of U.S. citizenship to vote in 2024 election (Sept. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/indian-national-charged-making-false-claim-us-citizenship-vote-2024-election"}, {"title": "FOX 9 — Noncitizen registered to vote, cast ballot in Minnesota's 2024 election, charges say (Apr. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox9.com/news/noncitizen-registered-vote-cast-ballot-minnesotas-2024-election-charges"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Minnesota Fillmore County false citizenship claim (ei-2026-10-054)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-054 (first_seen 2026-10-16; EMon status active, confidence high). All three sources curl 200. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Motor-Voter gateway (state ID mailing led to registration, as alleged)."}
{"id": "wi-douglas-2026-11-02-superior-canadian-lpr-todd-malpass-charged-voting-2024-general", "permanent_id": "C20261112-120511-01", "uid": "C20261112-120511-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261112-120511-01", "old_ids": ["wi-douglas-2026-11-02-superior-canadian-lpr-todd-malpass-charged-voting-2024-general"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11-05 (alleged vote); 2026-10-30 (complaint filed); 2026-11-02 (unsealed)", "state": "WI", "description": "The U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, Chadwick M. Elgersma, announced that Todd W. Malpass, 59, a Canadian citizen living in Superior, Wisconsin, is charged with illegally voting as a non-citizen in the Nov. 5, 2024 general election, which included the presidential race. A one-count criminal complaint was filed on Oct. 30, 2026 and unsealed on Nov. 2 after his initial appearance in federal court, and he was released pending further proceedings. According to reporting on the complaint by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and The Wisco Wire, Malpass became a lawful permanent resident in February 2021; in an October 2026 interview with Homeland Security Investigations agents at a Michigan port of entry, he said he had voted in Wisconsin's 2018 and 2022 elections because a county clerk had advised him he could vote for county clerk and treasurer, and that he knew he could not vote in federal or state elections. He denied voting in 2024, but the complaint says Wisconsin Elections Commission and Douglas County Clerk's Office records show he voted in the Nov. 5, 2024 election. He faces up to one year in prison if convicted. He is the third Canadian citizen charged with illegal voting in Wisconsin in recent days, after Monique Gignac-Yochum and Rodger Dedrick; Gignac-Yochum's case is also described on ei-2026-10-236. The investigation was conducted by Homeland Security Investigations. The charge is an accusation only, and he is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. The reported advice from a county clerk is Malpass's own account and has not been confirmed. Status Alleged: one-count federal criminal complaint in the Western District of Wisconsin announced by the U.S. Attorney's Office and reported by the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel and The Wisco Wire; the charge is an accusation only, and he is presumed innocent. Catalog point: a lawful permanent resident was on the rolls and, according to state and county records cited in the complaint, his 2024 ballot was cast and counted; by his own account he had voted in 2018 and 2022 as well, and nothing in the registration process stopped it.", "sources": [{"title": "DrydenWire (republishing U.S. Attorney's Office, W.D. Wis. press release) — Superior, WI non-citizen voting charge (Malpass) (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://drydenwire.com/news/canadian-citizen-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-2024-u.s-election/"}, {"title": "Milwaukee Journal Sentinel — Superior, WI non-citizen voting charge (Malpass) (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/crime/2026/11/02/third-canadian-charged-illegal-voting-wisconsin-2024-election/92576167007/"}, {"title": "The Wisco Wire — Superior, WI non-citizen voting charge (Malpass) (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://thewiscowire.com/stories/superior-man-third-canadian-charged-illegally-voting-wisconsin/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Superior, WI non-citizen voting charge (Malpass) (ei-2026-10-404)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-404 (added 2026-11-12 12:05 PM ET, 2026-11-12 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ga-paquette-2024-prelim-489k-clone-registrations-gariv-algorithm", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-03", "uid": "C20261014-201922-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-03", "old_ids": ["ga-paquette-2024-prelim-489k-clone-registrations-gariv-algorithm"], "seq": "C01399", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11-03", "state": "GA", "description": "Andrew Paquette's preliminary report on Georgia's voter rolls (version 1.0, Nov. 3, 2024, analyzing a 7,219,904-record statewide file dated Oct. 8–9, 2024), published by GodsFiveStones.com and posted on ResearchGate, reports 1,176,645 last-name/first-name/birth-year matches against about 680 expected false positives, 691,109 matches when middle initial is added, and an estimated 489,560 clone registrations (6.78%). It says 87.5% of matched pairs are simultaneously active and that Georgia uses a sophisticated statewide ID-distribution algorithm. His 2026 peer-reviewed synthesis gives 588,323 (8.1%) for Georgia. Official counterpoint: the Georgia Department of Audits and Accounts' August 2026 special examination (Report 25-09) found duplicate registrations and invalid dates together under 1% of active registrations, and identified 1,210 individuals with more than one registration (955 with both active, three cases where both were used to vote) — so the State Auditor confirms the phenomenon but at a far smaller scale than Paquette estimates. Georgia provides only birth year, not full date of birth, which raises the false-match risk in name/birth-year matching. Status Alleged: Self-published preliminary report hosted by GodsFiveStones.com (Corsi's foundation); no official corroboration of the clone count or the algorithm-purpose claim → Alleged. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Paquette — Georgia voter roll ID numbers, preliminary report v1.0 (Nov. 3, 2024, PDF)", "url": "http://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ANDREW-PAQUETTE-preliminary-report-GEORGIA-STATE-BOARD-OF-ELECTION-VOTER-REGISTRATION-IRREGULARITIES-vers-1.0-Nov-3-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "ResearchGate — Georgia voter roll ID numbers Preliminary Report (Paquette)", "url": "https://www.researchgate.net/publication/385527955_Georgia_voter_roll_ID_numbers_Preliminary_Report"}, {"title": "Georgia Dept. of Audits and Accounts — Special Examination 25-09, Voter Registration and List Maintenance (Aug. 2026, PDF)", "url": "https://www.audits.ga.gov/ReportSearch/download/34351"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Alleged with official scale rebuttal. Peer: ga-doaa-2026-25-09-1210-duplicate-registrants-three-double-votes (this leaf)."}
{"id": "nv-2026-moore-charged-voting-by-alien-nov-2024-federal-election", "permanent_id": "C20261024-102612-01", "uid": "C20261024-102612-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261024-102612-01", "old_ids": ["nv-2026-moore-charged-voting-by-alien-nov-2024-federal-election"], "seq": "C01537", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11-02 (alleged vote); 2026-10-23 (charged)", "state": "NV", "description": "On Oct. 23, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Nevada announced that Jullie Ann Sumalinog Moore was charged by criminal information with one count of voting by an alien. The information alleges that on or about Nov. 2, 2024, she voted in an election held in part to elect candidates for President, Vice President, U.S. Senate and U.S. House of Representatives while not a U.S. citizen. First Assistant U.S. Attorney Sigal Chattah said: \"if you are a noncitizen and you cast a ballot in our elections, you are committing a federal crime.\" HSI Los Angeles (Special Agent in Charge Erin Burke) and FBI Las Vegas (Special Agent in Charge Christopher S. Delzotto) investigated. The maximum penalty is one year in prison and a $100,000 fine; no initial appearance had been scheduled. The release does not state her county, nationality, or how she came to be registered. An information is only an allegation, and she is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, D. Nev. — Alien charged with illegal voting (Oct. 23, 2026; justice.gov bot-challenges curl, release text quoted by KTNV and News 3)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/alien-charged-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "KTNV 13 Action News — Individual charged with illegal voting in Nevada federal elections, U.S. Attorney's Office says (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ktnv.com/news/individual-charged-with-illegal-voting-in-nevada-federal-elections-u-s-attorneys-office-says"}, {"title": "News 3 Las Vegas (KSNV) — Noncitizen charged with illegally voting in federal election in Nevada, DOJ says (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://news3lv.com/news/local/noncitizen-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-federal-election-in-nevada-doj-says"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Nevada noncitizen voting charge, Moore (ei-2026-10-145)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-145 (2026-10-24 AM). New card; no prior card names Moore (checked all noncitizen-voting cards, including the DOJ multi-district roundups). Peer leaf: 5 > Illegal Immigration (with NDNY five, CDCA, NC, ID, FL, MO cards). KTNV and News 3 curl 200; DOJ release verified via WebFetch. 2026 midterm-window item: EMon priority true. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-corsi-paquette-2025-modified-duplicates-vs-doubles-wec", "permanent_id": "C20261014-200753-03", "uid": "C20261014-200753-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-200753-03", "old_ids": ["wi-corsi-paquette-2025-modified-duplicates-vs-doubles-wec"], "seq": "C01395", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-11 to 2025-04", "state": "WI", "description": "Jerome Corsi (Apr. 28, 2025 Substack) and Andrew Paquette's Wisconsin preliminary report define the Modified Clones pattern in plain terms for Wisconsin's WisVote file. \"Modified duplicates\" (Paquette/Corsi) are multiple records for the same voter altered by birthdate, address, or similar fields so they appear to be different people, each with a legitimate state voter ID. Separately, Corsi labels \"doubles\" as two different voters sharing one ID when the ID ends in zero—a distinct claim from modified clones. Paquette's preliminary report (GodsFiveStones, Nov. 2024 PDF) says a name+phone and name+email match on the August 2024 WEC extract (7,744,986 records) yielded about 874,455 suspicious records and at least 437,227 likely clones. Status Alleged: the definition of modified duplicates is the researchers' published terminology for this leaf; the Wisconsin clone counts and the \"doubles\"/algorithm-penetration claims are not confirmed by the Wisconsin Elections Commission or by a court on this card. A separate Confirmed card on this leaf (WI LAB 21-19) documents an official audit finding of same-person dual active registrations at a much smaller scale. Catalog point: this is the clearest published definition of Modified Clones as slight field alterations that defeat matching.", "sources": [{"title": "Jerome Corsi Substack — A Newly Discovered Algorithm in Wisconsin Voter File… (defines modified duplicates vs doubles; Apr. 28, 2025)", "url": "https://jeromecorsiphd.substack.com/p/a-newly-discovered-algorithm-in-wisconsin"}, {"title": "Andrew Paquette — Wisconsin voter roll ID numbers, preliminary report (GodsFiveStones PDF, Nov. 2024; fetch 403 at archive time, URL retained)", "url": "https://godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ANDREW-PAQUETTE-preliminary-report-WISCONSIN-Report.pdf"}, {"title": "American Thinker — Wisconsin's Supreme Court Election Screams for DOJ Criminal Investigation (cites Paquette 874,455 figure; 2025)", "url": "https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2025/04/wisconsin_s_supreme_court_election_screams_for_department_of_justice_criminal_investigation.html"}], "notes": "Modified Clones leaf (Mark 2026-10-14). Definitional + Alleged counts. Do not conflate modified duplicates (same person, altered fields) with Corsi's \"doubles\" (shared ID). Peer: wi-lab-21-19 Confirmed dual-registration finding."}
{"id": "fortune-chaos-labs-inca-polymarket-2024-presidential-wash-trading-allegations", "permanent_id": "C20260926-000015-08", "uid": "C20260926-000015-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-000015-08", "old_ids": ["fortune-chaos-labs-inca-polymarket-2024-presidential-wash-trading-allegations"], "seq": "C00521", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Manipulated Betting Markets"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-203948-07", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-203948-07", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-30", "state": "Federal", "description": "Fortune (citing Chaos Labs / Inca Digital on-chain analyses) reported pervasive wash-trading on Polymarket's 2024 presidential market (~1/3 of volume per Chaos Labs), while NBC separately confirmed a single French trader controlled four accounts with >$28M Trump positions—Polymarket denied manipulation intent. Status Alleged for wash-trading / odds-manipulation claims; Confirmed only that concentrated whale positions and wash-trade research were publicly reported.", "sources": [{"title": "Fortune — Polymarket wash trading research (Chaos Labs / Inca)", "url": "https://fortune.com/crypto/2024/10/30/polymarket-trump-election-crypto-wash-trading-researchers/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/fortune-chaos-labs-inca-polymarket-2024-presidential-wash-trading-allegations__fortune-polymarket-wash-trading-research-chaos-labs-inca.png"}, {"title": "NBC — French trader $28M Trump Polymarket accounts", "url": "https://www.nbcnews.com/business/markets/french-trader-bet-28-million-trump-election-win-4-polymarket-accounts-rcna177106"}], "notes": "Fill-20e leaf 4 companion. Weaker/research-lab clue sources labeled Alleged per Mark preference."}
{"id": "nv-2026-10-28-yousif-safi-charged-voting-by-alien-2024-general-election", "permanent_id": "C20261030-120852-02", "uid": "C20261030-120852-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-120852-02", "old_ids": ["nv-2026-10-28-yousif-safi-charged-voting-by-alien-2024-general-election"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-29 and 2024-11-05 (alleged votes); 2026-10-28 (charged)", "state": "NV", "description": "On Oct. 28, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Nevada announced that two lawful permanent residents were each charged by criminal information with one count of voting by an alien. Prosecutors allege that Moneir Elzobier Ali Yousif, a national of Sudan, voted on or about Oct. 29, 2024, and that Khalida Safi, a national of Afghanistan, voted on or about Nov. 5, 2024, in an election that included federal races. The release does not name the county where either vote was cast. The FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigated. The maximum penalty for each charge is one year in prison, a fine of up to $100,000, or both; no initial appearances had been scheduled. The Reno Gazette Journal counts them as Nevada's second and third such cases this month, after Jullie Ann Sumalinog Moore (Oct. 23) and before a Washoe County resident charged Oct. 29 (see related cards). An information is only an allegation, and both are presumed innocent. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, D. Nev. — Two aliens from Sudan and Afghanistan charged with illegal voting (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/two-aliens-sudan-and-afghanistan-charged-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "KOLO 8 — Sudanese, Afghani nationals charged with illegally voting in Nevada election (Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kolotv.com/2026/10/28/sudanese-afghani-nationals-charged-with-illegally-voting-nevada-election/"}, {"title": "Reno Gazette Journal — Washoe County resident is 4th Nevadan accused of illegal voting (Oct. 29, 2026; paywall, linked only)", "url": "https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/29/washoe-county-resident-is-4th-nevadan-accused-of-illegal-voting/92503815007/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Nevada noncitizen-voting charges, Yousif and Safi (ei-2026-10-196)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-196 (added 2026-10-30 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). USAO and KOLO curl 200; RGJ returns 402 (paywall), linked only. Peer: Moore card (ei-2026-10-145). Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "sc-lexington-2024-secondhand-printout-mismatch-claim", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-33", "uid": "C20261020-160717-33", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-33", "old_ids": ["sc-lexington-2024-secondhand-printout-mismatch-claim"], "seq": "C01026", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-28", "state": "SC", "description": "In late October 2024, Lexington-Richland 5 school board member Catherine Huddle posted on Facebook that there had been \"some instances of voter selections not matching the final review ... on the machine screen and on the printed ballot.\" She told The State that a voter approached her at the Midlands Tech precinct on Harbison Boulevard on Monday (Oct. 28) and said her printed ballot was not accurate, after it was already scanned; Huddle could not provide the voter's contact and said \"It very well could be human error.\" One commenter said the same happened to her. Lexington County elections director Lenice Shoemaker said she was unaware of any such case (\"I've never seen that\"); Richland County director Travis Alexander said there were no reports; the State Election Commission (John Michael Catalano) said it had \"not found any issue that would cause a ballot-marking device to print any selections on a voter's ballot other than the ones made by the voter.\" South Carolina uses the ES&S ExpressVote statewide. Status Alleged: a secondhand account, no named voter, not confirmed by officials. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "The State — Issues with voting machines in 2024 election claimed in SC (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/election/article294788159.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 0 (none). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): The State. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote BMD"]}
{"id": "az-paquette-2024-prelim-590k-cloned-records-all-15-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-02", "uid": "C20261014-201922-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-02", "old_ids": ["az-paquette-2024-prelim-590k-cloned-records-all-15-counties"], "seq": "C01398", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-27", "state": "AZ", "description": "Andrew Paquette's preliminary report on Arizona's voter rolls (version 2.0, Oct. 27, 2024, analyzing an Oct. 9, 2024 copy of the statewide file), published by GodsFiveStones.com, reports a minimum of about 590,529 cloned records and says all 15 counties, including Maricopa and Pima, use a complex algorithm mapping VRAZ numbers to registration ID numbers. It says only about 47% of the identified clone records are still active, and recommends Arizona investigate when and by whom the algorithm was introduced and remove excess records. Paquette's 2026 peer-reviewed Journal of Information Warfare synthesis repeats the Arizona figure (590,530; 8.6%). Status Alleged: Self-published preliminary report hosted by GodsFiveStones.com (Corsi's foundation); no official corroboration of the clone count or the algorithm-purpose claim → Alleged. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Paquette — Arizona voter roll ID numbers, preliminary report v2.0 (Oct. 27, 2024, PDF)", "url": "http://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/ANDREW-PACQUETTE-preliminary-report-ARIZONA-STATE-BOARD-OF-ELECTION-VOTER-REGISTRATION-IRREGULARITIES-vers-2.0-Oct-27-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "Journal of Information Warfare — System Reliability Analysis (Paquette, Vol. 25 No. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.jinfowar.com/journal/volume-25-issue-2/system-reliability-analysis-impact-structural-anomalies-state-voter-registration-systems"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Alleged. No AZ SOS response located. Cross-leaf: AZ MVD proof-of-citizenship coding error card (Illegal Immigration)."}
{"id": "multi-corsi-paquette-2024-american-thinker-clones-ghosts-algorithms", "permanent_id": "C20261014-200753-02", "uid": "C20261014-200753-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-200753-02", "old_ids": ["multi-corsi-paquette-2024-american-thinker-clones-ghosts-algorithms"], "seq": "C01394", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-16", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "On October 16, 2024, Jerome R. Corsi and Andrew Paquette co-authored an American Thinker article summarizing research published on GodsFiveStones.com. They claim New York's rolls contain nearly 2 million \"clone\" (duplicate) records, thousands of excess votes tied to people with multiple ID numbers, and \"ghost\" voters with ten or more registrations, of which canvassing confirmed three cases covering 57 ID numbers. They further claim cryptographic / steganographic algorithms appear in New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin voter databases (with unreported findings in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas) and could facilitate mail-in ballot fraud by tagging records of interest. Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose is described as having agreed to look into their claims but as not having announced corrective action; the authors criticize a \"wait for voter fraud\" stance. Status Alleged: these are the researchers' published counts and interpretations. No secretary of state, court, or peer-reviewed confirmation of the ~2 million New York clone figure or of a fraud-purpose algorithm is cited on this card. The New York State Board of Elections' April 2023 rebuttal to related NYCA clone claims (purged re-registrations / multi-county overlap) remains the principal official counter-view. Catalog point: this is the public Corsi–Paquette framing of Modified Clones at multi-state scale.", "sources": [{"title": "American Thinker — Officials in States with Cryptographic Algorithms in Voter Rolls Are Not Taking the Problem Seriously (Corsi & Paquette, Oct. 16, 2024)", "url": "https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2024/10/officials_in_states_with_cryptographic_algorithms_in_voter_rolls_are_not_taking_the_problem_seriously.html"}, {"title": "GodsFiveStones.com — Corsi/Paquette voter-roll research hub (referenced in article)", "url": "https://godsfivestones.com/"}], "notes": "Modified Clones leaf (Mark 2026-10-14). Alleged for researcher multi-state clone/ghost/algorithm claims; NYSBOE rebuttal noted via peer Paquette JIW card. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in; Mail ballots > chain-of-custody. Watch any official investigation outcomes in OH/NY/WI."}
{"id": "pa-paquette-2024-prelim-115k-cloned-records-lid-algorithm-nine-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-01", "uid": "C20261014-201922-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-01", "old_ids": ["pa-paquette-2024-prelim-115k-cloned-records-lid-algorithm-nine-counties"], "seq": "C01397", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-10-14", "state": "PA", "description": "Andrew Paquette's preliminary report on Pennsylvania's voter rolls (dated Oct. 14, 2024, analyzing a 9/8/2024 copy of the statewide file with 8,846,634 records), published by Jerome Corsi's GodsFiveStones.com, reports 115,434 \"cloned records\" and says nine of 67 counties (including Allegheny and Philadelphia, about 22.45% of registrations) use a complex algorithm mapping Legacy ID numbers to state ID numbers. The same report says a strict last-name/first-name/date-of-birth match finds only 9,924–19,846 potential clones (about 0.11%), and separately flags 228,997 active records with no activity since Jan. 1, 2018 that state law says should be inactive. Status Alleged: Self-published preliminary report hosted by GodsFiveStones.com (Corsi's foundation); no official corroboration of the clone count or the algorithm-purpose claim → Alleged. The report's own two clone figures differ by an order of magnitude, which the card states plainly. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Paquette — Pennsylvania voter roll ID numbers, preliminary report (Oct. 14, 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/ANDREW-PAQUETTE-preliminary-report-PENNSYLVANIA-Oct-14-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "GodsFiveStones — Andrew Paquette finds cryptographic algorithms in the Pennsylvania voter registration database", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/andrew-paquette-finds-cryptographic-algorithms-in-the-pennsylvania-state-board-of-elections-voter-registration-data-base/"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Alleged. No PA DOS response located. Distinct from multi-corsi-paquette-2024 (which only mentions PA in passing)."}
{"id": "oh-paquette-2024-prelim-filed-with-sos-cid-algorithm-franklin-lucas-montgomery", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-05", "uid": "C20261014-201922-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-05", "old_ids": ["oh-paquette-2024-prelim-filed-with-sos-cid-algorithm-franklin-lucas-montgomery"], "seq": "C01401", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-09-16", "state": "OH", "description": "Andrew Paquette's preliminary report on Ohio's voter rolls (version 5.0, dated Sept. 14, 2024) was submitted to Ohio Secretary of State Frank LaRose's office and the Ohio Attorney General on Sept. 16, 2024, after Paquette and Jerome Corsi presented voter-ID scatterplots to the Secretary's office. It reports an unusual, unnecessarily complex county voter-ID assignment system in Franklin, Lucas, and Montgomery counties and concludes that a plausible explanation is that the algorithm was designed for covert data manipulation; it frames this as the machinery that could track clone records like those he reported in New York. Corsi and Paquette later wrote that the Secretary agreed to investigate but announced no corrective action, and that LaRose suggested focusing on identifying specific voters who committed fraud. No public SOS finding on the algorithm was located; LaRose's later double-vote and noncitizen referrals (e.g., June 2025) do not address it. Status Alleged: self-published analysis; filed with officials, not corroborated by them. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Paquette — Preliminary report: Analysis of Ohio voter rolls, v5.0 (Sept. 14, 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ANDREW-PAQUETTE-preliminary-report-OHIO-SEC-STATE-vers-5.0-Sept-14-2024-FI.AL-PDF.pdf"}, {"title": "GodsFiveStones — Paquette report filed with Ohio Secretary of State", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/jerome-corsi-reveals-dr-andrew-paquettes-report-has-been-filed-with-ohio-secretary-of-state-on-cryptographic-algorithm-secretly-embedded-in-ohios-board-of-election-voter-registratio/"}, {"title": "American Thinker — Officials in states with cryptographic algorithms in voter rolls are not taking the problem seriously (Corsi & Paquette, Oct. 16, 2024)", "url": "https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2024/10/officials_in_states_with_cryptographic_algorithms_in_voter_rolls_are_not_taking_the_problem_seriously.html"}, {"title": "Ohio SOS — LaRose refers election fraud cases for prosecution (June 3, 2025; unrelated to algorithm claim)", "url": "https://www.ohiosos.gov/media-center/press-releases/2025/2025-06-03/"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Alleged. Peer: oh-* double-vote cards; Ohio 597 noncitizen card (Illegal Immigration)."}
{"id": "ok-paquette-2024-prelim-3534-clones-no-mapping-algorithm-control", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-06", "uid": "C20261014-201922-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-06", "old_ids": ["ok-paquette-2024-prelim-3534-clones-no-mapping-algorithm-control"], "seq": "C01402", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-09-06", "state": "OK", "description": "Andrew Paquette's preliminary report on Oklahoma's voter rolls (revised Sept. 6, 2024), published by GodsFiveStones.com, found that Oklahoma uses a single voter ID (no separate county ID), ruling out a New York–style mapping algorithm. Matching last name, first name, and date of birth, it identified 7,057 records statewide as potential clones — about 3,534 excess registrations built on 3,523 other records — and notes that because Oklahoma does not keep purged records in its rolls, each could in principle be used to double vote; it says Tulsa County alone has about 567. Paquette's 2026 peer-reviewed synthesis uses Oklahoma (0.20%) and Kansas (0.06%) as low-clone comparison states against much higher rates in New York, Arizona, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Status Alleged (self-published, no official response located). Catalog point: Oklahoma's simpler single-ID design shows clone rates are not an unavoidable cost of keeping rolls; they vary sharply with how a state builds its system. Catalog point: whatever the cause, a roll that carries more than one live ID for the same person can mail more than one ballot to that person, and the excuse of a matching \"mistake\" is only credible because such mistakes are confirmed elsewhere (see the WI LAB and GA State Auditor cards on this leaf). Precinct-level rolls that citizens can check, with one in-person ballot per voter counted by hand where it is cast, take duplicate IDs out of play.", "sources": [{"title": "Paquette — Oklahoma Voter Roll ID Numbers, preliminary report (revised Sept. 6, 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://www.godsfivestones.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/ANDREW-PACQUETTE-preliminary-report-OKLAHOK-STATE-BOARD-OF-ELECTION-VOTER-REGISTRATION-IRREGULARITIES-Sept-6-2024-REVISED.pdf"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Alleged; small-number finding, useful as control."}
{"id": "sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-07", "uid": "C20261020-221915-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-07", "old_ids": ["sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter"], "seq": "C01480", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-08-22", "state": "SC", "description": "On August 22, 2024, South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson wrote to ActBlue CEO Regina Wallace-Jones that the platform may have allowed \"smurfing,\" meaning large donations split into small ones to avoid contribution limits, as well as straw donors and donations made without the named donors' knowledge. He cited South Carolina donors listed as unemployed or with modest occupations who were reported as making implausibly frequent contributions, and he asked for ActBlue's verification procedures by September 6. In an eight-page reply dated September 6, 2024, Wallace-Jones called the claims part of an \"outside disinformation campaign,\" stated that ActBlue scores every donation for fraud on about 140 factors, explained that the employment field reads \"retired or currently unemployed,\" and said that conduit reporting and split donations make one contribution appear several times in federal records. Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita announced a similar inquiry in August 2024. Status Alleged: no public finding followed.", "sources": [{"title": "South Carolina Attorney General — Wilson sends letter to ActBlue (Aug. 2024)", "url": "https://www.scag.gov/about-the-office/news/attorney-general-alan-wilson-sends-letter-to-actblue-demanding-answers-on-allegations-of-fraudulent-political-fundraising/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter__scag-attorney-general-alan-wilson-sends-letter-to-actblue-demanding-answers-on-a.html"}, {"title": "SC Attorney General — Letter to ActBlue (Aug. 22, 2024; PDF)", "url": "https://3c06aba1-bb5b-4989-bcf9-62da466d33bc.cc04.conves.io/wp-content/uploads/securepdfs/2024/08/final-letter-to-actblue.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter__conves-final-letter-to-actblue.pdf"}, {"title": "ActBlue — Reply to the SC Attorney General (Sept. 6, 2024; PDF via SC Daily Gazette)", "url": "https://scdailygazette.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/SC-AG-Letter-9-6-2024.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter__scdailygazette-sc-ag-letter-9-6-2024.pdf"}, {"title": "SC Daily Gazette — Democratic fundraising platform says allegations of fraud are 'disinformation' (Sept. 13, 2024)", "url": "https://scdailygazette.com/2024/09/13/democratic-fundraising-platform-says-allegations-of-fraud-are-disinformation/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter__scdailygazette-democratic-fundraising-platform-says-allegations-of-fraud-are-dis.html"}, {"title": "SC Daily Gazette — SC attorney general says Democratic platform may have broken rules (Aug. 26, 2024)", "url": "https://scdailygazette.com/2024/08/26/sc-attorney-general-says-democratic-platform-may-have-broken-rules-democrats-dismiss-claims/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/sc-2024-08-22-wilson-actblue-smurfing-letter__scdailygazette-sc-attorney-general-says-democratic-platform-may-have-broken-rule.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. The letter PDF is hosted on a third-party CDN domain linked from scag.gov; archive it. A Rokita card can be added if Mark wants Indiana separately."}
{"id": "va-2024-08-02-miyares-actblue-facially-implausible-donations", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-06", "uid": "C20261020-221915-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-06", "old_ids": ["va-2024-08-02-miyares-actblue-facially-implausible-donations"], "seq": "C01479", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-08-02", "state": "VA", "description": "On Friday, August 2, 2024, Virginia Attorney General Jason Miyares sent ActBlue a letter, posted on X, citing \"hundreds of thousands of dollars of contributions through individual donors in the Commonwealth in volumes that are facially implausible and appear suspicious,\" including donors reported as \"making multiple daily contributions over the course of multiple years amounting to tens of thousands of dollars in aggregate.\" He demanded a description of ActBlue's procedures for verifying donor and contribution information, first by August 12 and later by August 19, 2024. ActBlue called the inquiry \"nothing more than a partisan political attack and scare tactic to undermine the power of Democratic and progressive small-dollar donors.\" The Virginia Mercury reported that the letter named no specific donors and that the high-volume Richmond-area donor who had drawn attention on social media gave mostly to Republicans through WinRed, not through ActBlue. Status Alleged: the attorney general's inquiry did not produce a public finding.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Mercury — Miyares takes aim at Democratic fundraising platform ActBlue (Aug. 5, 2024)", "url": "https://virginiamercury.com/2024/08/05/miyares-takes-aim-at-democratic-fundraising-platform-actblue/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/va-2024-08-02-miyares-actblue-facially-implausible-donations__virginiamercury-miyares-takes-aim-at-democratic-fundraising-platform-actblue.html"}, {"title": "WRIC — ActBlue calls Miyares investigation a partisan political attack (Aug. 2024)", "url": "https://www.wric.com/news/virginia-news/actblue-calls-miyares-investigation-into-fraud-claims-a-partisan-political-attack-and-scare-tactic/"}, {"title": "WRIC — Miyares gives ActBlue more time to respond (Aug. 2024)", "url": "https://www.wric.com/news/virginia-news/miyares-gives-actblue-more-time-to-respond-to-claims-of-donation-irregularities/"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. The WRIC article is already a context source on virginia-project-loudoun-democrats-hire-hackers-alleged. The outcome of the inquiry was not found."}
{"id": "mo-jackson-2026-11-03-independence-lpr-indicted-false-citizenship-registration-voted-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-17", "uid": "C20261104-121522-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-17", "old_ids": ["mo-jackson-2026-11-03-independence-lpr-indicted-false-citizenship-registration-voted-2024"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-04-02", "state": "MO", "description": "On Nov. 3, 2026, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services announced that Christopher Doucet, 68, was arrested and indicted by a federal grand jury in the Western District of Missouri for allegedly falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to register to vote. According to the release, Doucet was born in Canada, came to the United States as a child, and is a lawful permanent resident. He allegedly registered in Jackson County, Missouri, on Jan. 30, 2024, answering \"Yes\" to the citizenship question and signing the citizenship certification, and then voted in the April 2, 2024, general municipal election in Independence. If convicted, he faces up to five years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000. The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri is prosecuting the case, and USCIS assisted the investigation. The charges are accusations only, and Doucet is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: arrest and indictment announced by USCIS, with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Missouri prosecuting, reported by KTTN. The charges are accusations only. It is not stated whether this case is among the 63 announced by the DOJ on Nov. 2. Catalog point: the registration rested on a self-attested 'Yes' to the citizenship question, and the record then drew a ballot in a municipal election.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services — Independence MO noncitizen registration charge (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.uscis.gov/newsroom/news-releases/alien-from-canada-charged-with-falsely-claiming-to-be-a-us-citizen-to-register-to-vote"}, {"title": "KTTN News — Independence MO noncitizen registration charge (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.kttn.com/canadian-immigrant-accused-of-false-voter-registration-in-missouri/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Independence MO noncitizen registration charge (ei-2026-10-297)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-297 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "san-luis-az-gadsden-recall-forged-sigs-ycso-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-20", "uid": "C20261001-094909-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-20", "old_ids": ["san-luis-az-gadsden-recall-forged-sigs-ycso-2024"], "seq": "C01314", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Recalls", "Fake recall booths are set up, then the signatures are thrown out."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-70", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-70", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024-02-02", "state": "AZ", "description": "Yuma County Sheriff's Office (press PR-2024-55, reported Aug. 13–14, 2024) opened a Criminal Investigations Bureau inquiry after the Yuma County Recorder contacted YCSO on Feb. 2, 2024 about forged signatures on a petition to recall Gadsden Elementary School District Board President in San Luis, Arizona. Of 895 submitted signatures, the Recorder accepted only 135 and rejected 760 for various reasons including duplicates; plainclothes investigators later visited residential addresses to ask listed signers whether the signatures were theirs. Status Alleged: official forgery investigation and mass signature rejection are documented; no charging/conviction result was reported in the cited coverage. Peer to Voice of OC Buena Park 33-felony, LA Times Gascón dead-person, and Press-Enterprise San Jacinto Hill cards—San Luis/Gadsden 2024 YCSO instance, not those remounted. PEP framing: forged recall signatures that registrars throw out show petition theater manufacturing then discarding public 'consent.'", "sources": [{"title": "KYMA — YCSO investigates forged signatures on recall petition (Aug. 13–14, 2024)", "url": "https://kyma.com/news/top-stories/2024/08/13/ycso-investigates-forged-signatures-on-recall-petition/"}], "notes": "Evidence-sweep-2026-09-30. Alleged ongoing investigation; distinct AZ school-board recall forgery surface."}
{"id": "ny-ndny-2026-10-pawse-kheil-charged-voting-2024-general-election", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-05", "uid": "C20261102-121503-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-05", "old_ids": ["ny-ndny-2026-10-pawse-kheil-charged-voting-2024-general-election"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024 general election (alleged votes); 2026-10 (charges announced)", "state": "NY", "description": "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of New York announced that on Oct. 30, 2026, Pooja Pawse, 31, of Lake Placid, an Indian national, and Mobin Tora Kheil, 33, of Troy, an Afghan national, appeared on separate federal complaints charging each with voting by an alien. The complaints allege that each voted in the 2024 general election while knowing that they were not U.S. citizens. Both are lawful permanent residents. Homeland Security Investigations conducted the investigation. The charges are accusations only, and both defendants are presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by federal prosecutors; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was not a citizen was accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS6 Albany (WRGB) — NDNY two noncitizen-voting charges (2026-11-01)", "url": "https://cbs6albany.com/news/local/two-charged-with-voting-illegally-in-2024-general-election-alien-permanent-resident-pooja-pawse-mobin-tora-kheil"}, {"title": "WPTZ NBC5 — NDNY two noncitizen-voting charges (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.mynbc5.com/article/2-arrested-voter-fraud-new-york/74305900"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NDNY two noncitizen-voting charges (ei-2026-10-230)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-230 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "nv-2026-10-mendoza-argentine-national-charged-voting-2024-clark-county", "permanent_id": "C20261102-121503-02", "uid": "C20261102-121503-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261102-121503-02", "old_ids": ["nv-2026-10-mendoza-argentine-national-charged-voting-2024-clark-county"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024 general election (alleged vote); 2026-10 (charge announced)", "state": "NV", "description": "On Oct. 30, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Nevada announced that Mariela Delia Mendoza, an Argentine national and lawful permanent resident living in Las Vegas, was charged by criminal information with one count of voting by an alien. Prosecutors allege that on or about Nov. 5, 2024, she voted in Clark County in an election that included federal races while not a U.S. citizen. The maximum penalty is one year of imprisonment, a fine of up to $100,000, or both, and no initial court appearance had been scheduled. First Assistant U.S. Attorney Sigal Chattah called it a \"catastrophic failure to protect the ballot box.\" News reports describe it as the fifth such Nevada charge this month, after Jullie Ann Sumalinog Moore (see ei-2026-10-145), Moneir Elzobier Ali Yousif and Khalida Safi (see ei-2026-10-196), and Mlebinge Riziki Ramadhani (see ei-2026-10-195). The charge is an accusation only, and Mendoza is presumed innocent. No election-office error is alleged. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by federal prosecutors; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: a registration record for a person who was not a citizen was accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Nevada — Clark County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Mendoza) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/fifth-alien-charged-illegally-voting-nevada"}, {"title": "News 3 Las Vegas — Clark County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Mendoza) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://news3lv.com/news/local/argentine-national-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-2024-election-in-clark-county"}, {"title": "KOLO 8 — Clark County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Mendoza) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.kolotv.com/2026/10/30/doj-charges-argentine-national-with-illegally-voting-clark-county/"}, {"title": "Just the News — Clark County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Mendoza) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/government/federal-agencies/department-justice-charges-fifth-foreigner-voting-illegally-nevada"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Clark County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Mendoza) (ei-2026-10-207)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-207 (added 2026-11-02 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmation_status confirmed). Description taken from the EMon summary; primary source URLs checked by curl (403 to curl noted where applicable). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "id-ada-2026-11-10-boise-man-yehle-booked-felony-illegal-voting-2024-while-on-felony-probation", "permanent_id": "C20261113-120546-02", "uid": "C20261113-120546-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261113-120546-02", "old_ids": ["id-ada-2026-11-10-boise-man-yehle-booked-felony-illegal-voting-2024-while-on-felony-probation"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Felon voting rights: this is not really about letting felons vote."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-51", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-51", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024 (alleged vote); 2026-11-10 (booked)", "state": "ID", "description": "CBS2 Idaho News reported that Scotty Yehle, 44, of Boise was booked into the Ada County Jail at about 9:25 p.m. on Nov. 10, 2026, on a charge of felony illegal voting. According to the report, an investigation found that he allegedly voted in the 2024 elections while still serving felony probation; under Idaho law, people serving a felony sentence, including probation, cannot vote until their civil rights are restored. Court records cited by the station show he was charged in 2018 with two counts of felony domestic battery with traumatic injury. Context: in October 2025, the Ada County Sheriff's Office said audits of the 2020 and 2024 elections by the county clerk, with the Secretary of State's support, led to about 37 investigations and eight arrests, seven of them involving people under a felony sentence at the time they voted; this arrest has not been officially linked to that review. The charge is an accusation only, and he is presumed innocent. No election-office error has been alleged. Status Alleged: a criminal charge reported by CBS2 Idaho News from jail and court records; no conviction. Catalog point: a person still serving a felony sentence was allegedly issued and cast a ballot in 2024, caught only by a later clerk audit, which means the roll did not stop it at the time.", "sources": [{"title": "CBS2 Idaho News — Boise, ID felony-probation illegal-voting arrest (2026-11-11)", "url": "https://idahonews.com/news/local/boise-man-arrested-for-illegal-voting"}, {"title": "Ada County Sheriff's Office (context, Oct. 2025) — Boise, ID felony-probation illegal-voting arrest (2025-10-24)", "url": "https://adacounty.id.gov/sheriff/news/clarifying-illegal-voting-cases-in-ada-county/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Boise, ID felony-probation illegal-voting arrest (ei-2026-10-407)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-407 (added 2026-11-13 12:05 PM ET, 2026-11-13 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tn-mdtn-2026-10-30-three-noncitizens-charged-voting-2024-false-citizenship-registration", "permanent_id": "C20261116-120630-01", "uid": "C20261116-120630-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261116-120630-01", "old_ids": ["tn-mdtn-2026-10-30-three-noncitizens-charged-voting-2024-false-citizenship-registration"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2024 (alleged registrations and votes); 2026-10-30 (charges announced)", "state": "TN", "description": "On Oct. 30, 2026, U.S. Attorney Braden H. Boucek of the Middle District of Tennessee announced charges against three non-citizens accused of illegally voting in federal elections. According to the release, Garfield St. Vincent Bruce, 48, a citizen of Jamaica; Mariela Elizabeth Avila Ortiz, 33, a citizen of Honduras; and Allison Melissa Wilkes, 49, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, each allegedly voted in the 2024 federal election and falsely and willfully represented themselves as U.S. citizens on Tennessee voter registration applications in 2024. The release uses the term \"aliens\" but does not state the defendants' immigration status, so this card classifies the cases as non-citizen voting. The FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigated the cases with assistance from the Tennessee Secretary of State's Office, and Assistant U.S. Attorney F. Dalton Thompson III is prosecuting them. The release does not name the defendants' counties of residence. The charges are accusations only, and all three defendants are presumed innocent. No election-office error is alleged. These cases were announced on the same day as the two Eastern District of Tennessee cases on ei-2026-10-208 and fall within the Justice Department's Nov. 2 national roundup on ei-2026-10-236. Status Alleged: the charges are announced by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Tennessee (release reprinted by WJJM) and reported by WSMV and the Tennessee Star; no court has found guilt. Catalog point: as alleged, three registrations from people who were not citizens were accepted on a self-attested citizenship statement and used to cast ballots that entered the 2024 count. Compare the Eastern District of Tennessee card filed the same day.", "sources": [{"title": "WJJM Radio (reprint of U.S. Attorney's Office, Middle District of Tennessee release) — Middle Tennessee noncitizen-voting charges (3) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.wjjm.com/three-aliens-in-middle-tennessee-charged-with-illegal-voting-in-federal-elections/"}, {"title": "WSMV — Middle Tennessee noncitizen-voting charges (3) (2026-10-30)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/30/3-charged-with-allegedly-voting-illegally-2024-federal-election-middle-tennessee-heres-what-we-know/"}, {"title": "Tennessee Star — Middle Tennessee noncitizen-voting charges (3) (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://tennesseestar.com/elections/election-integrity/six-foreign-nationals-accused-of-illegally-voting-in-elections-across-tennessee-federal-prosecutors-say/tpappert/2026/11/02/"}, {"title": "Englebrook Independent News — Middle Tennessee noncitizen-voting charges (3) (2026-11-14)", "url": "https://englebrookindependentnews.com/2026/11/14/three-foreign-nationals-charged-with-illegally-voting-in-tennessee-election/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Middle TN noncitizen-voting charges (3) (ei-2026-10-434)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-434 (added 2026-11-16 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-16 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon confirmed/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Related card tn-edtn-2026-10-30-two-bradley-county-noncitizens-charged-voting (different defendants). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-09", "uid": "C20260925-155410-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-09", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation"], "seq": "C00009", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Inorganic intimidation and hate spam"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-33", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-33", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2023", "state": "VA", "description": "The Virginia Project newsletter \"Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush\" (David Gordon) describes \"inorganic intimidation\"—sustained hate spam and related swarm tactics—and mailing-list stuffing attacks intended to flag campaign emails as spam, citing targeting of Republican campaigns including Virginia's Lieutenant Governor. Source is partisan advocacy describing claimed patterns; no court adjudication reviewed in this pass—Alleged.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics and You: Beating the Zerg Rush", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072", "local": "/archives/2026/09/virginia-project-inorganic-intimidation__virginia-project-intimidation-tactics-and-you-beating-the-ze.png"}], "notes": "Partisan advocacy primary narrative; catalog quotes this piece extensively."}
{"id": "virginia-project-loudoun-democrats-hire-hackers-alleged", "permanent_id": "C20260926-005107-05", "uid": "C20260926-005107-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260926-005107-05", "old_ids": ["virginia-project-loudoun-democrats-hire-hackers-alleged"], "seq": "C00798", "category": "1. Psychological, Perception & Influence Operations", "tactic_path": ["Intimidation", "Criminal hackers hired to attack campaigns' online assets, which the source says Virginia Democrats have conspired to fund"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212323-38", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212323-38", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2023-11-01", "state": "VA", "description": "Virginia Project states as lived experience that 'from the second [Loudoun Democrats attack] we know that Virginia Democrats will, in fact, conspire amongst themselves to raise money to hire criminal hackers to attack your online assets,' and that the Project rebuilt virginiaproject.com with forensic firewalling after those incidents. This is the leaf's primary narrative source. Status Alleged: concrete partisan primary describes the fundraising-for-hackers conspiracy; independent court adjudication or LE charging package tying named Virginia Democratic committees to hired criminal hackers was not located in this sweep.", "sources": [{"title": "Virginia Project — Intimidation Tactics (Loudoun Democrats / hire criminal hackers passage)", "url": "https://myemail.constantcontact.com/Intimidation-Tactics---You.html?aid=ZqJF0ge1UVE&soid=1135298864072"}, {"title": "WRIC — ActBlue responds to VA AG Miyares probe amid Virginia Project ActBlue claims (context)", "url": "https://www.wric.com/news/virginia-news/actblue-calls-miyares-investigation-into-fraud-claims-a-partisan-political-attack-and-scare-tactic/"}], "notes": "Fill-20l leaf 3. Honest Alleged for VA-Dems-hire-hackers claim."}
{"id": "ok-tulsa-2026-11-02-broken-arrow-lpr-charged-false-citizenship-registration-voted-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261104-121522-07", "uid": "C20261104-121522-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-121522-07", "old_ids": ["ok-tulsa-2026-11-02-broken-arrow-lpr-charged-false-citizenship-registration-voted-2022"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-11-08", "state": "OK", "description": "The U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma announced on Nov. 2, 2026, that Maria Elenor Lopez Rios, 45, a citizen of the Philippines and a lawful permanent resident of the United States, was charged by criminal complaint with falsely claiming U.S. citizenship, making false statements in relation to voter registration, submitting a fraudulent voter registration, and unlawfully voting in a federal election. According to the complaint, she registered to vote in Tulsa County in March 2022 by affirming she was a U.S. citizen and voted in the November 2022 federal midterm election in Broken Arrow, and her naturalization application in March 2026 allegedly said she had never voted or claimed citizenship. The case began after the Tulsa County Election Board referred non-citizens removed from jury duty lists, and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Tulsa investigated. ICE announced the arrest on X and in a Nov. 3 release that dates the arrest Oct. 28, while the U.S. Attorney's release says she was arrested on the day of the Nov. 2 announcement. News On 6 reported that the Oklahoma State Election Board removed 33 non-citizens from the rolls ahead of the election, and it is not known how many of them voted. She faces up to five years in prison if convicted. The charges are accusations only, and she is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty. Status Alleged: charged by criminal complaint, announced by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma and reported by News On 6 and FOX 25. A complaint is an accusation only; she is presumed innocent. Catalog point: the alleged registration rested on a self-affirmed citizenship answer, and the vote was found only when her own naturalization application years later conflicted with the record.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, Northern District of Oklahoma (press release via Public) — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (2026-11-02)", "url": "https://www.publicnow.com/view/813D399915FBEF5AEBBB5ABD2DA46C8E96F1493C"}, {"title": "U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ice-arrests-citizen-philippines-federal-election-fraud"}, {"title": "News On 6 — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (n.d.)", "url": "https://www.newson6.com/crime/oklahoma-broken-arrow-woman-voting-charges"}, {"title": "FOX 25 Oklahoma City (KOKH) — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (n.d.)", "url": "https://okcfox.com/news/local/jury-duty-list-review-leads-to-tulsa-county-voter-fraud-charges-against-non-citizen"}, {"title": "918update.com — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (n.d.)", "url": "https://918update.com/philippine-national-from-broken-arrow-charged-with-voting-illegally-as-an-alien-in-federal-election/"}, {"title": "X post by @ICEgov (2026-11-03T14:23:50Z)", "url": "https://x.com/ICEgov/status/2117623791904043356"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Broken Arrow OK noncitizen-voting charge (ei-2026-10-280)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-280 (added 2026-11-04 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "us-doj-2026-oct-26-48-noncitizens-charged-new-mdfl-edny-defendants", "permanent_id": "C20261026-121625-14", "uid": "C20261026-121625-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261026-121625-14", "old_ids": ["us-doj-2026-oct-26-48-noncitizens-charged-new-mdfl-edny-defendants"], "seq": "C01560", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-11-08 to 2026-10-26", "state": "FL; NY", "description": "On Monday, Oct. 26, 2026, the Justice Department announced charges involving 48 noncitizens in Pennsylvania, California, Florida, New York and Nevada for alleged voting by aliens in federal elections, fraudulent voter registration and false claims of U.S. citizenship; it says 47 are lawful permanent residents and one, Alfredo Santiesteban, 73, of Cuba, is in the country illegally. Most of these cases are already on the tracker (the 28 California defendants, nine Pennsylvania defendants, Jullie Ann Sumalinog Moore in Nevada and Marva Cook in the Northern District of New York). This card covers the nine newly reported cases. Middle District of Florida: Jamie Orlando Sosa Sardina, 60 (Cuba), and Martha Haydee Desantis, 81 (Ecuador), each indicted for a false citizenship claim to vote and illegal voting by an alien, allegedly voting in 2022 and 2024; Lise Marie Johnson, 69 (Canada), indicted on the same charges for an alleged 2022 vote; and Luis Manuel Perez, 72 (Cuba), Diane Wendy Curley, 55 (Canada), and Pedro Igor A. Franco, 37 (Brazil), charged by information with illegal voting by an alien. Eastern District of New York: Eoin Cranney, 35 (Ireland), Ronald Sheldon Baird, 47 (Guyana), and Karlene Daniels Samuels, 55 (Jamaica), each charged with voting by an alien in the 2024 federal general election after allegedly submitting fraudulent registrations; DOJ says each admitted in a voluntary interview to knowingly voting as a noncitizen. On Oct. 26, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security said that, according to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida, HSI arrested five of the Middle District of Florida defendants on Oct. 21 and 22: Diane Wendy Curley (Canada), charged for voting in 2022 and 2024; Luis Manuel Perez (Cuba), charged for voting in 2022 and 2024; \"Jaimie\" Orlando Sosa Sardina (Cuba; \"Jaime Sosa-Sardina\" in a photo caption), charged for registering in 2022 and voting in 2022 and 2024; Pedro Igor Almeida Franco (Brazil), charged for voting in 2024; and Lise Marie Johnson (Canada), charged for registering in 2021 and voting in 2022 [4]. DHS listed prior criminal histories for some of them, including Curley's conviction for battery on a law enforcement officer and Sosa Sardina's convictions for two counts of aggravated battery on a police officer [4]. DHS Secretary Markwayne Mullin said that \"five more non-citizens have been arrested and charged for illegally voting in past elections\" [4]. The DHS release does not mention Martha Haydee Desantis or the Eastern District of New York cases, and its spellings and charge years differ in places from the Justice Department release [1][4]. Status Alleged: these are charges; all defendants are presumed innocent.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Department of Justice — Justice Department announces charges involving 48 aliens for election-related crimes (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-charges-involving-48-aliens-election-related-crimes"}, {"title": "Washington Examiner — DOJ charges 48 noncitizens with federal voting crimes (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/justice/4779587/doj-charges-48-noncitizens-federal-voting-crimes/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — DOJ 48 noncitizens charged (9 new MDFL/EDNY) (ei-2026-10-164)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "U.S. Department of Homeland Security — \"ICE HSI Arrests Five Non-Citizens Charged with Illegally Voting in Florida\" (Oct. 26, 2026; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121921/https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/10/26/ice-hsi-arrests-five-non-citizens-charged-illegally-voting-florida)", "url": "https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/10/26/ice-hsi-arrests-five-non-citizens-charged-illegally-voting-florida"}, {"title": "DHS — Oct. 26, 2026 release: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.dhs.gov/news/2026/10/26/ice-hsi-arrests-five-non-citizens-charged-illegally-voting-florida", "local": "/archives/2026/10/us-doj-2026-oct-26-48-noncitizens-charged-new-mdfl-edny-defendants__dhs-2026-10-26.html"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-164 (added 2026-10-26 AM ingest). Curl 200 for both. Only the nine new defendants are carded to avoid double counting ei-057, ei-008, ei-145 and ei-146; the release names no counties. Update 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET (EMon item): added the DHS Oct. 26, 2026 release (curl 200; local copy and Wayback) on the HSI arrests of five Middle District of Florida defendants. All five were already on this card, so no new card. Discrepancies noted: DHS spells \"Jaimie\" (list) and \"Jaime Sosa-Sardina\" (caption) where the card follows DOJ's \"Jamie\"; DHS gives \"Almeida\" for the card's \"A.\"; DHS lists Johnson's registration in 2021. The DHS release does not mention the Eastern District of New York, contrary to the EMon brief. Label unchanged (Alleged)."}
{"id": "nv-washoe-2026-10-29-ramadhani-charged-voting-by-alien-nov-2022-federal-election", "permanent_id": "C20261030-120852-03", "uid": "C20261030-120852-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-120852-03", "old_ids": ["nv-washoe-2026-10-29-ramadhani-charged-voting-by-alien-nov-2022-federal-election"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-11-08 (alleged vote); 2026-10-29 (charged)", "state": "NV", "description": "On Oct. 29, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Nevada announced that Mlebinge Riziki Ramadhani, a Democratic Republic of Congo national and lawful permanent resident living in Washoe County, was charged by criminal information with one count of voting by an alien. Prosecutors allege that on or about Nov. 8, 2022, Ramadhani voted in a federal election while not a U.S. citizen. The FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigated. The maximum penalty is one year in prison, a fine of up to $100,000, or both; no initial appearance had been scheduled. The release describes this as the fourth such Nevada charge, and the Reno Gazette Journal identifies the earlier three as Jullie Ann Sumalinog Moore and the two people charged Oct. 28 (see related cards). An information is only an allegation, and Ramadhani is presumed innocent. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, D. Nev. — Fourth alien charged with illegally voting (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-nv/pr/fourth-alien-charged-illegally-voting"}, {"title": "Las Vegas Sun — Democratic Republic of Congo national accused of illegally voting (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://lasvegassun.com/news/2026/oct/29/democratic-republic-of-congo-national-accused-of-i/"}, {"title": "Reno Gazette Journal — Washoe County resident is 4th Nevadan accused of illegal voting (Oct. 29, 2026; paywall, linked only)", "url": "https://www.rgj.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/29/washoe-county-resident-is-4th-nevadan-accused-of-illegal-voting/92503815007/"}, {"title": "2 News Nevada (KTVN) — Man living in Washoe County charged with voting illegally in federal election (Oct. 29, 2026)", "url": "https://www.2news.com/news/local/man-living-in-washoe-county-charged-with-voting-illegally-in-federal-election/article_e08e8696-d8bc-4c18-9f05-35172e69c597.html"}, {"title": "X post by @USAO_NV (U.S. Attorney's Office, District of Nevada), Oct. 29, 2026", "url": "https://x.com/USAO_NV/status/2115916878711607678"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Washoe County, NV noncitizen-voting charge (Ramadhani) (ei-2026-10-195)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-195 (added 2026-10-30 AM ingest; EMon confirmed). USAO and Las Vegas Sun curl 200; RGJ 402 paywall, linked only. X post linked from EMon record; no X API used. Peers: Moore card; Yousif/Safi card. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "wi-burnett-2026-11-05-webb-lake-man-charged-voted-absentee-wisconsin-and-in-person-georgia-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261111-120609-05", "uid": "C20261111-120609-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261111-120609-05", "old_ids": ["wi-burnett-2026-11-05-webb-lake-man-charged-voted-absentee-wisconsin-and-in-person-georgia-2022"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-11-08 (alleged double vote); 2026-07 (charged); 2026-11-05 (reported)", "state": "WI", "description": "The Burnett County Sentinel reported on Nov. 5, 2026 that James Shepard, 65, of the Town of Webb Lake, faces a felony charge of voting more than once in an election. According to the criminal complaint filed in Burnett County Circuit Court, he voted absentee in Webb Lake in the 2022 election and then voted in person on Election Day, Nov. 8, 2022, at the Pooler, Georgia, polling place in Chatham County, which investigators confirmed. Charges were first filed in late July. He missed a September initial appearance, which led to a bench warrant and a $518 cash bond; he later waived a preliminary hearing, was bound over for trial, and was arraigned on Oct. 21. He is reportedly weighing a plea deal, with a status conference set for Nov. 18 before Judge Melissia Mogen. If convicted, he faces up to 3.5 years in prison and a fine of up to $10,000. The charge is an accusation only; he has not been convicted. Status Alleged: felony criminal complaint in Burnett County Circuit Court, reported by the Burnett County Sentinel; investigators confirmed the Georgia in-person vote per the complaint; the charge is an accusation only, and he is presumed innocent. Status conference Nov. 18. Catalog point: an absentee ballot cast in one state and an in-person vote cast in another in the same 2022 election were both counted, and charges came only about four years later.", "sources": [{"title": "Burnett County Sentinel — Burnett Co. WI double-voting charge (2026-11-05)", "url": "https://www.burnettcountysentinel.com/news/local-man-faces-election-fraud-charge/article_39369fb9-6a08-4a00-8996-eaa670608ab7.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Burnett Co. WI double-voting charge (ei-2026-10-399)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-399 (added 2026-11-11 12:06 PM ET, 2026-11-11 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active/high). Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "maricopa-lake-signature-reviewers-sent-home-2023", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-11", "uid": "C20260925-184601-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-11", "old_ids": ["maricopa-lake-signature-reviewers-sent-home-2023"], "seq": "C00129", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Signature Verification", "Designed to be defective to enable manipulation:", "Citizens are fired if they reject too many signatures"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-28", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-28", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-11 / 2023-05", "state": "AZ", "description": "In Kari Lake's 2023 Maricopa County signature-verification trial, Level-1 reviewers testified they were sent home early despite remaining ballots, and counsel argued many signatures were approved in under 2–3 seconds—alleging pressure against thorough rejection. County witnesses described multi-level review; Judge Thompson found signature review occurred and rejected Lake's challenge. Separately, reporting noted a reviewer accused of rubber-stamping was removed for inadequate verification (i.e., approving too freely)—the opposite of being fired for rejecting too many. Status Alleged for the catalog claim that citizens are fired specifically for rejecting too many signatures; process-pressure testimony is disputed and was not upheld as fraud.", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Lake signature-verification trial day one", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/kari-lake-arizona-governor-election-ballots-signatures-359821ab558edf42c25244510accb0f2", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-lake-signature-reviewers-sent-home-2023__ap-lake-signature-verification-trial-day-one.png"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — Lake v. Hobbs trial findings excerpt (PDF)", "url": "http://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/CV2022-095403-926-05222023-PDF.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/maricopa-lake-signature-reviewers-sent-home-2023__democracy-docket-lake-v-hobbs-trial-findings-excerpt-pdf.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 5. Careful Alleged: no upheld finding of firing-for-rejecting-too-many."}
{"id": "tx-frio-2022-2023-paid-vote-harvesting-15-indicted-county-judge-camacho", "permanent_id": "C20261104-122254-02", "uid": "C20261104-122254-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261104-122254-02", "old_ids": ["tx-frio-2022-2023-paid-vote-harvesting-15-indicted-county-judge-camacho"], "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-155410-09", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-155410-09", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022-05 to 2023 (alleged harvesting); 2024-08 (search warrants); 2025-05-01 and 2025-06-30 (indictments); 2026 (cases pending)", "state": "TX", "description": "After a contested May 2022 Democratic primary runoff for Frio County judge, losing candidate Mary Moore and former election judge Margarita \"Margie\" Gonzales complained to the Texas Attorney General, and 81st District Attorney Audrey Louis referred the matter to the AG's Criminal Investigation Division in November 2022. Investigators said a paid harvester targeted elderly and disabled voters for their mail ballots, including at the Pine Hills Estates II complex in Pearsall, helping them apply for ballots by mail in return for compensation from candidates and officials. After search warrants in Frio, Atascosa and Bexar counties in August 2024, a Frio County grand jury on May 1, 2025, indicted County Judge Rochelle Camacho (3 counts of vote harvesting), Pearsall council members Ramiro Trevino and Racheal Garza, Pearsall ISD trustee Adriann Ramirez, Rosa Rodriguez, and former Elections Administrator Carlos Segura (tampering with evidence, accused of concealing 2023 applications to vote by mail). The indictments allege payments by Cash App and in money, gas, lunches or county employment. On June 30, 2025, nine more were indicted, including Commissioner Raul Carrizales, former Dilley Mayor MaryAnn Obregon, former House District 80 candidate Cecilia Castellano, and Manuel Medina, chief of staff to state Rep. Elizabeth Campos, for 15 defendants in all. All pleaded not guilty. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct suspended Camacho without pay on May 12, 2025, and she lost the March 2026 primary to Moore. In February 2026 five defendants sued Moore and Gonzales for defamation and malicious prosecution, calling the case politically motivated; a judge dismissed that suit in May 2026, and the defendants said they would appeal. The district attorney said in February 2026 that court dates were on hold while the Fourth Court of Appeals ruled on whether the Texas vote-harvesting statute is constitutional. Earlier, in August 2022, District Judge Susan Reed denied Moore's election contest, finding \"massive\" systemic mistakes by election officials but not clear and convincing proof that the result would have been different. Status Alleged: grand jury indictments obtained by the Attorney General and District Attorney; no convictions, and the statute is under constitutional challenge. Catalog point: mail ballots of elderly and disabled voters became a paid commodity worked by officeholders, the election administrator is accused of hiding the applications, and the court that heard the contest found the mistakes systemic yet could not undo the result.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas Attorney General — Six indictments and arrests in Frio County for illegal vote harvesting scheme (May 2025)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-announces-six-indictments-and-arrests-frio-county-illegal-vote", "local": "/archives/2026/11/tx-oag-frio-six-indictments-2025-05.html"}, {"title": "Texas Attorney General — Indictments and arrests of nine individuals for illegal vote harvesting scheme (July 2025)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-releases-information-indictments-and-arrests-nine-individuals-including", "local": "/archives/2026/11/tx-oag-frio-nine-indictments-2025-07.html"}, {"title": "81st Judicial District Attorney — Voter fraud in Frio County press release (May 8, 2025)", "url": "https://www.81stda.org/press-releases-news/2025/5/8/voter-fraud-in-frio-county-press-release"}, {"title": "KSAT — Payments, lunches, a job: Indictments reveal allegations against Frio County officials (May 6, 2025)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/ksat-investigates/2025/05/06/payments-lunches-a-job-indictments-reveal-allegations-against-frio-county-officials-in-voting-investigation/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ksat-frio-indictments-2025-05-06.html"}, {"title": "Frio-Nueces Current — Nine arrested in continuing election misconduct case (July 9, 2025)", "url": "https://www.frio-nuecescurrent.com/2025/07/09/nine-arrested-in-continuing-election-misconduct-case/"}, {"title": "Frio-Nueces Current — Voter fraud case turns with civil lawsuit (Feb. 25, 2026)", "url": "https://www.frio-nuecescurrent.com/2026/02/25/voter-fraud-case-turns-with-civil-lawsuit/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/frio-nueces-current-frio-civil-suit-2026-02-25.html"}, {"title": "KSAT — Judge dismisses $50M defamation lawsuit tied to Frio County vote harvesting probe (May 6, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/ksat-investigates/2026/05/06/judge-dismisses-50m-defamation-lawsuit-tied-to-frio-county-vote-harvesting-probe/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ksat-frio-defamation-suit-dismissed-2026-05-06.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-11-04 (open web, zero X API). Thin leaf (1 -> 2), peer Hamtramck 2025 card. Both AG releases, KSAT x2 and Frio-Nueces Current Feb. 2026 archived (curl 200); DA release and July 2025 Current linked only. No trial outcome or Fourth Court of Appeals ruling found by WebSearch on 2026-11-04. Party label stated because sources state it. No vendor named. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "tx-sdtx-2026-10-30-five-noncitizens-charged-illegal-voting-false-citizenship-naturalization", "permanent_id": "C20261030-180510-01", "uid": "C20261030-180510-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261030-180510-01", "old_ids": ["tx-sdtx-2026-10-30-five-noncitizens-charged-illegal-voting-false-citizenship-naturalization"], "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022 and 2024 (alleged votes); 2026-10-30 (charges announced)", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 30, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas, led by U.S. Attorney Aaron Reitz, announced federal charges against five noncitizens, KPRC 2 and the San Antonio Express-News reported. Ali Khan, 33, of La Porte, a DACA recipient and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago described as the only defendant in the country illegally, and Mohammed Omar Hassan, 61, of Houston, a citizen of Nigeria, are each charged in Houston with voting by an alien in a federal election. Diego Benavides Rodriguez, 29, of Laredo and Jose Vasquez-Mendoza, 51, of Port Isabel face charges out of Laredo and Brownsville; prosecutors say Vasquez-Mendoza voted in the 2022 special election for Texas's 34th Congressional District. A McAllen grand jury indicted Karen Hinojosa-Martinez, 37, of McAllen for allegedly making a false statement under oath on her May 2025 naturalization application when asked whether she had ever registered or voted in a U.S. election. The four defendants other than Khan are or were lawful permanent residents; all but Hassan are Mexican citizens. The Express-News reports that Hassan, Khan and Rodriguez are accused of voting in the 2024 presidential election, and that the Port Isabel defendant (spelled Vazquez-Mendoza there) was first accused in mid-October. The FBI and Homeland Security Investigations investigated, with help from the Texas Attorney General's Office and USCIS. The charges are accusations only, and all five are presumed innocent. Status Alleged: the charges are confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; no court has found guilt. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, in one case surfacing only when the person later applied to naturalize. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "KPRC 2 (click2houston) — Houston prosecutors charge 5 noncitizens with voting in federal election (Oct. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.click2houston.com/news/local/2026/10/30/houston-prosecutors-charge-5-noncitizens-with-voting-in-fed-election/"}, {"title": "San Antonio Express-News — Federal prosecutors charge five people with election-related crimes ahead of midterms (Oct. 30, 2026)", "url": "https://www.expressnews.com/politics/article/illegal-voting-charges-texas-22502746.php"}, {"title": "Forth — mirror of the U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D. Tex. release (Oct. 30, 2026; justice.gov page blocked to curl)", "url": "https://www.forth.news/lists/doj/CgYeCrPgMhzMyXG14hHfz"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — SDTX: five noncitizen-voting charges (ei-2026-10-201)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-201 (added 2026-10-30 PM ingest; EMon confirmed). KPRC and Express-News curl 200 and text-verified (all five names, Reitz, Hinojosa-Martinez naturalization count); Forth mirror 429 to curl, linked only; justice.gov SDTX page blocked per EMon. KPRC spells Vasquez-Mendoza, Express-News Vazquez-Mendoza; the card uses the KPRC (release) spelling and notes both. Peers: NV Moore, Yousif/Safi, Ramadhani; NC DOJ 18 cards. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ny-ndny-2026-marva-cook-syracuse-charged-voting-by-alien-2022", "permanent_id": "C20261024-102612-02", "uid": "C20261024-102612-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261024-102612-02", "old_ids": ["ny-ndny-2026-marva-cook-syracuse-charged-voting-by-alien-2022"], "seq": "C01538", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Illegal Immigration", "Those voter registration records allow ballots to be created, mailed, cast, and tabulated."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2022 (alleged vote); 2026-10-21 (arrest and initial appearance)", "state": "NY", "description": "On Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026, Marva Cook, 66, of Syracuse (Onondaga County), New York, surrendered at the ICE office in Mattydale and appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Mitchell Katz in the Northern District of New York on a federal misdemeanor charge of voting by an alien. The U.S. Attorney's Office release (headlined \"Syracuse Woman and German National Arrested for Voter Fraud\"; both descriptions refer to Cook herself, not a second defendant) calls her a German national and lawful permanent resident and says she voted in an election that included U.S. Senate and House races; AP and WRVO report that the charge stems from her vote in the 2022 midterms. First Assistant U.S. Attorney John A. Sarcone III said: \"Voter fraud is rampant in New York State.\" HSI Special Agent in Charge Anthony J. Patrone's office investigated; AUSA Tamara Thomson is prosecuting. Prosecutors allege her adoptive parents applied for an immigrant visa for her in 1962, when she was two, and that she applied for a green card in 2020, when she also changed her legal name from Mona Maria Kuehn (Central Current). She told HSI agents on Oct. 5 that she was adopted as a toddler, had always assumed she was a citizen, and learned she was born in Germany while searching for her birth mother (AP, citing the complaint). Onondaga County records show she voted in 14 primary and general elections from 1999 to 2022 and has not voted since 2022 (syracuse.com). She was released on her own recognizance; the maximum penalty is one year in prison and a $100,000 fine. Her supporters, including her pastor, call the prosecution intimidation; she says she will fight the charge. Onondaga's Democratic elections commissioner said HSI has subpoenaed voter records for at least five people. She is presumed innocent unless proven guilty. Status Alleged: the charge is confirmed by the U.S. Attorney's Office; no court has found guilt, and her defense is that she did not know she was not a citizen. No election-office error is alleged. Catalog point: each case shows a registration record for a person who was not a citizen being accepted and, as alleged, used to cast a ballot that entered the count, often for years before anyone checked. Precinct rolls that citizens can inspect, with identification at check-in, give these records more chances to be caught before a ballot is issued.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, N.D.N.Y. — Syracuse woman and German national arrested for voter fraud (Oct. 22, 2026; release prints the arrest date as \"October 21, 2025\"; justice.gov bot-challenges curl, text via WebFetch)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/syracuse-woman-and-german-national-arrested-voter-fraud"}, {"title": "AP News — Prosecutors say a Syracuse woman voted illegally. She says she just learned she wasn't a citizen. (Philip Marcelo, Oct. 23, 2026; apnews.com 403 to curl, text via WebSearch extract)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/syracuse-noncitizen-voting-arrest-charges-1e36b0d416c444f6aabfb5327adf8082"}, {"title": "syracuse.com — ICE's voter fraud crackdown snares Syracuse woman who just learned she wasn't born here (Michelle Breidenbach, Oct. 21, 2026, updated Oct. 23; text via WebFetch)", "url": "https://www.syracuse.com/news/2026/10/ices-voter-fraud-crackdown-snares-syracuse-woman-who-just-learned-she-wasnt-born-here.html"}, {"title": "Central Current — She's lived her life as an American. ICE considers her an 'alien' (Patrick McCarthy, Oct. 21, 2026; name change, visa and Oct. 5 interview from charging documents)", "url": "https://centralcurrent.org/shes-lived-her-life-as-an-american-ice-considers-her-an-alien/"}, {"title": "WRVO Public Media (AP) — Syracuse woman charged with voting illegally says she recently learned she wasn't a citizen (Oct. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wrvo.org/2026-10-24/syracuse-woman-charged-with-voting-illegally-says-she-recently-learned-she-wasnt-a-citizen"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — NDNY noncitizen voting charge, Marva Cook (Syracuse) (ei-2026-10-146)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-146 (2026-10-24 AM). New card. The 'German national' in the release headline is Cook herself; there is no second defendant. The release's 'October 21, 2025' is a typo for 2026 (syracuse.com, AP: Wednesday, Oct. 21, 2026). Distinct from ny-ndny-2026-five-lawful-permanent-residents-charged-voting-by-alien (Albany/Adirondack defendants, Oct. 16). No known relation to Mark Cook. Name change and visa details from Central Current citing the charging documents. 2026 midterm-window item: EMon priority true. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections", "permanent_id": "C20261101-112734-01", "uid": "C20261101-112734-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261101-112734-01", "old_ids": ["ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Records", "More ballots are scanned than voters checked in at a poll site, and the board offers a scanner-counter explanation instead of reconciling."], "leaf_id": "L20261101-120338-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261101-120338-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2021-06-16 to 2021-06-17", "state": "NY", "description": "SMART Elections, a New York election-observer group, reported that at the close of early voting on June 16, 2021, at the FDR High School poll site at 5800 20th Ave. in Brooklyn, its poll watchers counted 1,178 ballots scanned but only 480 voters checked in, a difference of 698. The check-in figure came from the site coordinator and one electronic poll book the watchers were allowed to view, and the group said it read the scanner counts itself. The count was part of its Brooklyn Transparency Pilot Project for the June 2021 New York City primary. When a different watcher returned on June 17, the group reported 1,505 voters checked in and 1,491 ballots scanned, so the totals had nearly caught up, but it said 1,025 new check-ins against 313 new ballots on the public counter left a 712-ballot gap for the day. It also reported a 39-page difference between the scanners' public and protective counters. According to the group, the Board of Elections replied by email that its \"concerns may stem from the public count on scanners vs. pieces of paper,\" because the public counter counts the first sheet of a two-page ballot. SMART Elections disputes that scanner explanation: it answered that a two-page ballot would give 960 sheets for 480 voters, not 1,178. It said the Board then removed its project leader as a poll watcher and changed what its watchers could see. In an Oct. 28, 2026 video, SMART Elections co-founder and executive director Lulu Friesdat repeated that she had found a polling place with almost 700 more ballots than voters and said the Board did not look into it. This card rests on SMART Elections' own report. No Board of Elections record, audit or news report confirms the counts or the Board's reply.", "sources": [{"title": "SMART Elections — FDR High School 2021 (preliminary report, June 2021; page archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://smartelections.us/fdr-high-school-2021", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__smartelections-report.html"}, {"title": "SMART Elections — About Us (archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://smartelections.us/about-us", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__smartelections-about.html"}, {"title": "SMART Elections on X (@SMART_elections) — video post, Oct. 28, 2026, 5:05 AM ET (MP4 archived; machine transcript beside it)", "url": "https://x.com/SMART_elections/status/2115369339926814944", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__x-video.mp4"}, {"title": "Machine transcript of the Oct. 28, 2026 video (archived 2026-11-01)", "url": "https://x.com/SMART_elections/status/2115369339926814944", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__x-video-transcript.txt"}, {"title": "Same post on Instagram (@smartelections) — screenshot supplied by Mark, archived unredacted", "url": "https://www.instagram.com/smartelections/", "local": "/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__instagram-screenshot.png"}], "notes": "Added 2026-11-01 from Mark's message pt547u. Alleged: SMART Elections is the only source for the counts and the Board's reply. Also filed under Records > Poll-book and ballot-container counts do not reconcile, making precincts ineligible for a recount. Secondary leaf: Poll Watchers > They keep watchers and observers from accessing polling places and testing. The report says the project covered City Council District 45; whether FDR High School is in that district is not confirmed. Video under 25 MiB, hosted on the site. Queue item rq-2026-11-01-ny-fdr-2021-698-boe-records. Nothing redacted.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/SMART_elections/status/2115369339926814944", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 138.35, "bytes": 18749284, "sha256": "d27afb7218015232db8cef8cbceaefdcb431c852659ef3bfe3af0d061815257f", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/11/ny-brooklyn-2021-primary-fdr-hs-early-voting-698-more-scanned-ballots-than-check-ins-smart-elections__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "antrim-dominion-cleartext-key-cyber-ninjas-alleged", "permanent_id": "C20260925-184601-18", "uid": "C20260925-184601-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-184601-18", "old_ids": ["antrim-dominion-cleartext-key-cyber-ninjas-alleged"], "seq": "C00136", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Thumb or flash drives can easily be modified by bad actors in transit", "For example, Dominion encryption keys are stored in cleartext in the database and can be reused across counties and states."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-45", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-45", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2021-04", "state": "MI", "description": "Allied Security Operations Group / Cyber Ninjas-related forensic materials circulating from the Antrim County, MI litigation claimed Dominion's master cryptographic key for tabulator results/configurations was stored in plaintext inside the election SQL database (and known to a dealer), arguing possession plus file-format knowledge could enable altered result files. Michigan officials and subsequent court findings attributed Antrim's initial wrong reporting to human election-definition error, not proven key-based manipulation; independent analysts disputed the fraud narrative. Status Alleged for cleartext-key storage/reuse claims in partisan forensic writeups; not Confirmed as adjudicated fact.", "sources": [{"title": "CourtListener RECAP — Antrim-related exhibit (gov.uscourts.mied.379593.14.8)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.379593/gov.uscourts.mied.379593.14.8.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-dominion-cleartext-key-cyber-ninjas-alleged__courtlistener-recap-antrim-related-exhibit-gov-uscourts-mied.pdf"}, {"title": "Election Crime Bureau — Antrim County MI Findings (hosts ASOG materials)", "url": "https://electioncrimebureau.com/antrim-county-mi-findings/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/antrim-dominion-cleartext-key-cyber-ninjas-alleged__election-crime-bureau-antrim-county-mi-findings-hosts-asog-m.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15 leaf 8. Label Alleged; opposing official findings exist.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "seed-montgomery-tx-batch-randomization", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-19", "uid": "C20260925-155410-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-19", "old_ids": ["seed-montgomery-tx-batch-randomization"], "seq": "C00019", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Randomize ballot order within batches, destroying the scan-order record and hiding manipulation patterns (Montgomery County, Texas)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-27", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "TX", "description": "No verified instance yet (seed from catalog). Catalog asserts Montgomery County, TX, randomized ballot order inside batches (destroying time-series) and increased batch size. No primary county procedure, CVR order policy, or official audit finding confirming intentional evidence-destroying randomization was located in this pass.", "sources": [{"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__hand-count-road-show-cabal-tactics-catalog-definition.png"}], "notes": "Seed placeholder."}
{"id": "seed-sacramento-thin-thick-paper", "permanent_id": "C20260925-155410-20", "uid": "C20260925-155410-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-155410-20", "old_ids": ["seed-sacramento-thin-thick-paper"], "seq": "C00020", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Use ballot paper of different thicknesses for different areas or voters", "Use paper thickness as an excuse to route ballots to particular tabulators (Sacramento, California)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-23", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-23", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2020-2024", "state": "CA", "description": "No verified instance yet (seed from catalog). Catalog claims Sacramento County routes \"thin\" ballots to smaller desktop scanners (not Hi-Pro) based on jam excuses, attributed to first-hand statement to Mark Cook. No official Sacramento procedure or contemporaneous news confirmation located in this pass.", "sources": [{"title": "Hand Count Road Show — Cabal Tactics (seed language)", "url": "https://HandCountRoadShow.org/cabal-tactics", "local": "/archives/2026/09/air-gapped-linguistic-seed__hand-count-road-show-cabal-tactics-catalog-definition.png"}], "notes": "Anecdotal seed; needs FOIA/official procedure."}
{"id": "il-gonzales-madigan-sham-candidates-barboza-rodriguez-2016", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-17", "uid": "C20260925-194013-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-17", "old_ids": ["il-gonzales-madigan-sham-candidates-barboza-rodriguez-2016"], "seq": "C00201", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Candidate Engineering", "Run a candidate B with a name similar to candidate A's to confuse voters and siphon votes."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-05", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2016-03", "state": "IL", "description": "In the March 2016 Illinois House District 22 Democratic primary, challenger Jason Gonzales alleged Michael Madigan allies recruited Joe Barboza and Grasiela Rodriguez as Hispanic-surnamed 'sham' candidates to confuse voters and dilute Gonzales's support (Madigan ~65%, Gonzales ~27%, Rodriguez ~5.8%, Barboza ~2%). Federal courts granted Madigan summary judgment and the Seventh Circuit affirmed (2021), holding voters were not hoodwinked in part because Gonzales publicized the alleged scheme; SCOTUS declined review. Status Alleged for coordinated similar-name/decoy candidacies; civil claim failed.", "sources": [{"title": "FindLaw — Gonzales v. Madigan (N.D. Ill. summary judgment)", "url": "https://caselaw.findlaw.com/court/us-dis-crt-n-d-ill-eas-div/2017263.html"}, {"title": "HallApproved — Gonzales v. Madigan, 990 F.3d 561 (7th Cir. 2021)", "url": "https://hallapproved.com/us/cases/ca7/2021/4861995/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-gonzales-madigan-sham-candidates-barboza-rodriguez-2016__hallapproved-gonzales-v-madigan-990-f-3d-561-7th-cir-2021.png"}, {"title": "Florida Law Review — Allen, 'It's a Sham!' (sham-candidate doctrine discussion)", "url": "https://www.floridalawreview.com/article/88760-it-s-a-sham-how-sham-political-candidates-are-threatening-democracy.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/il-gonzales-madigan-sham-candidates-barboza-rodriguez-2016__florida-law-review-allen-it-s-a-sham-sham-candidate-doctrine.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 7. Alleged sham similar-surname slate; claim rejected."}
{"id": "nc-cherry-hospital-disability-rights-absentee-assist-2012", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-07", "uid": "C20260925-194013-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-07", "old_ids": ["nc-cherry-hospital-disability-rights-absentee-assist-2012"], "seq": "C00191", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "Mental health institutions"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-26", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2012-10", "state": "NC", "description": "Carolina Journal obtained Wayne County Board of Elections records showing 34 voters registered to Cherry Hospital (state adult inpatient psychiatric facility, Goldsboro) plus 144 more using addresses of Central Regional (Butner) and Broughton (Morganton) state mental hospitals. A Cherry clinical-director memo congratulated Disability Rights North Carolina and hospital staff for assisting patients completing general-election ballots; CJ argued that assisting non-guardian absentee applications/ballots at hospitals without a county multipartisan assistance team may violate N.C.G.S. 163-226.3. Disability Rights and DHHS described lawful NVRA/access assistance. Status Alleged for unlawful harvesting/assistance; Confirmed that psych-hospital addresses appear on voter rolls and that an outside group assisted patients with ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Carolina Journal — Mental hospital voter sign-up questioned (Cherry Hospital)", "url": "https://carolinajournal.com/mental-hospital-voter-sign-up-questioned/", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-cherry-hospital-disability-rights-absentee-assist-2012__carolina-journal-mental-hospital-voter-sign-up-questioned-ch.png"}, {"title": "N.C. Gen. Stat. § 163-226.3 (absentee assistance limits at hospitals/nursing homes)", "url": "https://www.ncleg.gov/EnactedLegislation/Statutes/HTML/BySection/Chapter_163/GS_163-226.3.html", "local": "/archives/2026/09/nc-cherry-hospital-disability-rights-absentee-assist-2012__n-c-gen-stat-163-226-3-absentee-assistance-limits-at-hospita.png"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 3. Alleged unlawful assist; roll presence Confirmed."}
{"id": "mn-crow-wing-clark-lake-incapacitated-wards-absentee-2010", "permanent_id": "C20260925-194013-08", "uid": "C20260925-194013-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-194013-08", "old_ids": ["mn-crow-wing-clark-lake-incapacitated-wards-absentee-2010"], "seq": "C00192", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Low-Propensity Voter Record Harvesting", "Mental health institutions"], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-26", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2010-10", "state": "MN", "description": "A 2011 investigative report on Crow Wing County, Minnesota documented that group-home workers brought Clark Lake Homes residents who were court-adjudicated mentally incapacitated wards (guardianship orders stating they were incapable of exercising voting rights) to the courthouse to cast in-person absentee ballots in the 2010 election. The report concluded ballots were cast in names of ineligible wards and flagged possible improper-assistance felonies under Minn. Stat. 204C.15/204C.16, while noting no charges had been filed and operators denied knowing intent. Status Alleged (no conviction); documentation of incapacitated-ward ballots from a mental-disability residential setting is the evidentiary core.", "sources": [{"title": "Report — Ineligible Wards Voting in Crow Wing County (Clark Lake Homes, Oct 2011)", "url": "https://danmcgrath.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/2011-10-27-Report-On-Wards-Voting.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mn-crow-wing-clark-lake-incapacitated-wards-absentee-2010__report-ineligible-wards-voting-in-crow-wing-county-clark-lak.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15c leaf 3. Alleged; no charges filed per report."}
{"id": "nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-09", "uid": "C20261020-160717-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-09", "old_ids": ["nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit"], "seq": "C01002", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Alleged", "date": "2010-10", "state": "NC", "description": "In October 2010 the North Carolina Republican Party said voters choosing a straight Republican ticket on touchscreens had their votes recorded as straight Democratic, and on Oct. 29 filed a federal lawsuit. Chairman Tom Fetzer argued that when an iVotronic is unsure what was touched the vote \"is defaulted to the top line,\" usually the Democratic line. State Board deputy director Johnnie McLean said there is no default, that the machines are recalibrated every morning, and that the board had only \"isolated\" complaints, from New Hanover and Craven counties, some from Democrats; 35 counties used touchscreens in early voting. The Wilmington StarNews editorialized that the problems were simple human error. Status Alleged: complaints compiled by a party, not individually documented; officials disputed the default theory and found no machine fault. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "WRAL — GOP files suit over touch-screen voting machines (Oct. 28-29, 2010)", "url": "https://wwwcache.wral.com/news/local/politics/story/8528102/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit__wral2010.html"}, {"title": "NC GOP — complaint to the State Board of Elections on iVotronic straight-ticket votes (Oct. 28, 2010; PDF)", "url": "https://bradblog.com/Docs/NCGOP_iVotronicComplaint_NCSBOE_102810.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit__ncgop2010.pdf"}, {"title": "NC State Board of Elections — response to the NC GOP iVotronic complaint (Oct. 28, 2010; PDF)", "url": "https://bradblog.com/Docs/NCSBOE_iVotronicComplaint_ReponseToNCGOP_102810.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit__ncsboe2010.pdf"}, {"title": "NC Newsline — Touch-screen voting flaw aids Democrats, GOP says (Oct. 29, 2010)", "url": "https://ncnewsline.com/2010/10/29/touch-screen-voting-flaw-aids-democrats-gop-says/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nc-2010-ivotronic-straight-gop-ticket-complaints-gop-federal-suit__ncnl2010.html"}, {"title": "Wilmington StarNews editorial — Voting-machine problems caused by simple human error (Oct. 28, 2010)", "url": "https://www.starnewsonline.com/story/opinion/editorials/2010/10/28/editorial-voting-machine-problems-caused-by-simple-human-error/30844139007/"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (wral2010, ncgop2010, ncsboe2010, ncnl2010). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): Wilmington StarNews editorial. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic"]}
{"id": "ca-x-commonsense2007-sf-and-sonoma-ballots-after-move", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-16", "uid": "C20261014-201922-16", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-16", "old_ids": ["ca-x-commonsense2007-sf-and-sonoma-ballots-after-move"], "seq": "C01412", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "unspecified (posted 2026-09)", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster @CommonSense2007 (profile location Nor Cal) says that after moving from San Francisco to Sonoma County, they received two ballots, one from each county, for three election cycles, and ripped up the San Francisco ones. That is the pattern of one person carried as two live records in two counties at old and new addresses. Election years not stated. Posted Sept. 20, 2026 (10:31 PM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @CommonSense2007, citizen report (posted 2026-09-20 22:31 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/CommonSense2007/status/2101861916465676365", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-x-commonsense2007-sf-and-sonoma-ballots-after-move__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Timing unclear; dual-county records same person → Modified Clones (address variant)."}
{"id": "ca-x-exittheleft-wife-maiden-orange-married-riverside-two-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-19", "uid": "C20261014-201922-19", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-19", "old_ids": ["ca-x-exittheleft-wife-maiden-orange-married-riverside-two-ballots"], "seq": "C01415", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "unspecified (posted 2026-08)", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster @_ExitTheLeft says his wife received one ballot in Orange County under her maiden name at her old address and another in Riverside County under her legal married name at their current address: \"Same person. Two counties. Two names. Two ballots.\" Election not stated. Posted Aug. 26, 2026 (12:07 PM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report (secondhand: about the poster's spouse). Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @_ExitTheLeft, citizen report (posted 2026-08-26 12:07 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/_ExitTheLeft/status/2092645073909670119", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-x-exittheleft-wife-maiden-orange-married-riverside-two-ballots__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Secondhand (spouse). Name + address + county variant → Modified Clones."}
{"id": "or-2026-x-cerulean58-two-ballots-in-my-name", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-13", "uid": "C20261014-201922-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-13", "old_ids": ["or-2026-x-cerulean58-two-ballots-in-my-name"], "seq": "C01409", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026", "state": "OR", "description": "Poster @cerulean58 (profile location Southern Oregon), replying to Sen. Ron Wyden, says, \"You sent me two ballots in my name this year!!!\" The post does not say which election, county, or whether the names differed. Posted Sept. 17, 2026 (12:22 PM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @cerulean58, citizen report (posted 2026-09-17 12:22 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/cerulean58/status/2100621443788841194", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-cerulean58-two-ballots-in-my-name__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Election/county unspecified (Southern Oregon from profile); 'this year' read as 2026."}
{"id": "ca-los-angeles-2026-11-03-santa-monica-candidates-townsend-negrete-not-on-roster-confidential-registration", "permanent_id": "C20261105-120646-03", "uid": "C20261105-120646-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261105-120646-03", "old_ids": ["ca-los-angeles-2026-11-03-santa-monica-candidates-townsend-negrete-not-on-roster-confidential-registration"], "category": "6. Procedural & Oversight Interference", "tactic_path": ["Polling Places", "Incorrect or altered polling-location data"], "leaf_id": "L20261026-182719-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261026-182719-01", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-11-03", "state": "CA", "description": "On Election Day, Nov. 3, 2026, at 1:40 PM ET, Santa Monica City Council candidate Derrick Townsend posted on X that he was \"denied my right to vote locally.\" He wrote that when he showed up to vote, he was told he had to drive to Norwalk, about 35 miles away, to vote in person because \"all candidates have to vote there,\" and he called this incorrect. In his 37-second video he says a \"new confidentiality privacy law for candidates\" was cited, that he was never offered a provisional ballot and was refused one, and that he will instead fill out his mail ballot and return it to a box. The specific incident rests on his own account; Los Angeles County has not commented on it. The underlying rule is documented: Assembly Bill 1392 (Elections Code section 2166.9), in effect since Jan. 1, 2026, makes candidates' voter registrations confidential by default unless they opt out, and requires county officials to exclude them from any roster. In June 2026 the Los Angeles Times reported that several candidates were unable to vote in person in the primary for this reason, and a county registrar spokesman said candidates who do not opt out are limited to voting by mail. The Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk is headquartered in Norwalk. Whether a provisional ballot should have been offered at the vote center has not been confirmed by officials. Santa Monica Patch interviewed Townsend on Nov. 3 and separately spoke with fellow council candidate Lana Negrete, who reported similar confidential-registration confusion but said she ultimately cast a provisional ballot; Townsend said he returned home and deposited his vote-by-mail ballot in a drop box rather than driving to Norwalk. The Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk's office had not responded by publication. Charges or fraud are not alleged; the dispute is about poll-worker handling of confidential candidate registrations under California AB 1392. Status Citizen Testimony: first-hand accounts from two named candidates, Derrick Townsend and Lana Negrete, reported by Santa Monica Patch; the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk had not responded. The confidentiality rule itself (AB 1392) is documented by state law and the Los Angeles Times. Catalog point: a new confidentiality rule kept candidates' own registrations off the vote-center rosters, so candidates on the ballot were turned away or pushed to a provisional ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "@Derrick_NOLA (X), Santa Monica City Council candidate, post with video — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://x.com/Derrick_NOLA/status/2117688268041175220"}, {"title": "Los Angeles Times — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026-06-02)", "url": "https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2026-06-02/their-names-were-on-ballot-but-not-on-rolls-of-registered-voters"}, {"title": "California Elections Code section 2166.9 (AB 1392) — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026-01-01)", "url": "https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=ELEC&sectionNum=2166.9."}, {"title": "LA County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Nov. 3, 2026 candidate handbook — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026)", "url": "https://content.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/documents/candidate-handbook-general-election-complete-v-12.pdf"}, {"title": "Ballotpedia — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026)", "url": "https://ballotpedia.org/Derrick_Townsend_(Santa_Monica_City_Council_At-large,_California,_candidate_2026)"}, {"title": "Santa Monica Patch — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (2026-11-03)", "url": "https://patch.com/california/santamonica/santa-monica-council-candidates-report-voting-problems-election-day"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Santa Monica candidate told to vote in Norwalk (ei-2026-10-259)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-259 (added 2026-11-05 midday EDS/EMon ingest; EMon status active). Promoted from research queue item rq-2026-11-03-ca-santa-monica-candidate-townsend-told-to-vote-in-norwalk. Description taken from the EMon summary. Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-6thjenerationca-son-army-2019-prior-owners-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-06", "uid": "C20261008-221804-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-06", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-6thjenerationca-son-army-2019-prior-owners-ballots"], "seq": "C00287", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster (profile location Rescue, California) says her household's ballots arrived along with a ballot for her son, who has not lived there since he joined the Army in 2019, and ballots for previous owners of the house. The post is partly sarcastic: it also lists the family's pets and people she assumes sleep in a nearby park. Only the son and prior-owner claims are carded here. Posted October 8, 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Jennifer C Perez (@6thJenerationCA), citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 12:10 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/6thJenerationCA/status/2108228669076554056", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-6thjenerationca-son-army-2019-prior-owners-ballots__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Partly sarcastic post; pets/park/'we all voted Republican' lines not carded. Son (Army 2019) and prior-owner claims only."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video", "permanent_id": "C20261009-015734-01", "uid": "C20261009-015734-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-015734-01", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video"], "seq": "C01281", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster Amy Reichert (@amyforsandiego), a San Diego County advocate for Proposition 39 (California voter ID), posted a video on October 8, 2026 captioned \"EXCLUSIVE VIDEO: More ballots were discovered this morning in Valley Center, California,\" urging a yes vote on Prop 39. The video shows election mail scattered along a dirt road shoulder that an on-screen map places on Lake Wohlford Road near Valley Center, in San Diego County. The narration says there were \"27 total\" and calls them \"lost and stolen ballots.\" Most visible items are San Diego County voter information pamphlets, one cover reading \"Gubernatorial General Election\" (consistent with the November 2026 election), plus a few envelopes marked Official Election Mail / sdvote. No names are readable. Voter information pamphlets are informational and cannot be voted, and the video does not show whether any envelope held a ballot, so the count of 27 ballots is unconfirmed. As of about 2 AM ET on October 9, 2026, no statement from the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, USPS or the Sheriff, and no news coverage, had been found. This is a single unverified citizen report. Election mail lying outside the postal stream shows a chain-of-custody gap; it does not show that any ballot was stolen, voted or counted. The poster is an advocate for a pending ballot measure. The post had about 205.8K views when archived. Update (Oct. 11, 2026): the San Diego County Registrar of Voters later confirmed the scene. It recovered 12 unvoted, unfilled mail-ballot packets and 14 voter information pamphlets from Lake Wohlford Road, and USPS redelivered them to Pauma Valley and Valley Center addresses, with the Postal Inspection Service notified (ABC 10News). The poster's \"27 ballots\" resolves to 26 items, 12 of them ballot packets. See the Confirmed card ca-san-diego-2026-valley-center-12-unvoted-mail-ballots-strewn-rov-confirmed.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Amy Reichert (@amyforsandiego), citizen video report (posted 2026-10-08 13:14 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/amyforsandiego/status/2108244680324616431", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — video attached to the post (MP4, archived copy)", "url": "https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2108244625895104512/vid/avc1/1080x1920/Kfo47FoYaj07t6dv.mp4", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video.mp4"}, {"title": "ABC 10News / KGTV — ROV confirms 12 unvoted mail-ballot packets and 14 VIPs found on North County road (Oct. 9, 2026; later official confirmation)", "url": "https://www.10news.com/news/local-news/mail-in-ballots-strewn-along-north-county-road"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-09 (per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; Mark approved). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; pamphlets not votable; '27 ballots' unconfirmed; no official/news confirmation as of 2026-10-09 ~2 AM ET. Poster is a Prop 39 advocate. Thumbnails are two frames from the video (no readable names). Watch for SD ROV/USPS/Sheriff statement. Refresh 2026-10-12 AM EDS/EMon ingest: ROV/USPS confirmation via EMon ei-2026-10-021 (ABC 10News, Oct. 9) added; status kept Citizen Testimony for the post itself; companion Confirmed card ca-san-diego-2026-valley-center-12-unvoted-mail-ballots-strewn-rov-confirmed.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video-frame-1.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video-frame-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Frame 1 from Amy Reichert's video (election mail on a roadside)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video-frame-2.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video-frame-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Frame 2 from Amy Reichert's video (election mail on a roadside)"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/amyforsandiego/status/2108244680324616431", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video-frame-1.jpg", "duration_s": 22.895, "bytes": 12994179, "sha256": "57e96280a92a24084f1e89eba8aab6d39e4c67b5037dfff4db57365ef3277a80", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-amyforsandiego-valley-center-election-mail-roadside-video__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann", "permanent_id": "C20261014-200551-01", "uid": "C20261014-200551-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-200551-01", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann"], "seq": "C01392", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster Cherie Currie (@CherieCurrie3, profile location Los Angeles, California) says she received two mail-in ballots again, posting the day after she says California Attorney General Rob Bonta called mail ballots safe and secure. Her attached photo shows two County of Los Angeles Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk Official Vote by Mail envelopes marked for Election Date 11/3/2026: one addressed to CHERIE CURRIE and one to CHERIE ANN CURRIE (same surname; middle name present on one envelope and absent on the other). Street addresses on both envelopes are blacked out in the photo. California mails a ballot to every active registered voter. That middle-name present/absent pattern is the kind of slight name alteration Paquette and Corsi call a \"modified clone\": two records for one person that look unique enough that each can receive a ballot. This is a single unverified citizen report. Two envelopes under name variants show the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently named records; they do not show that both ballots were voted or counted. Her claims of incompetence, corruption, and fraud are her opinion and are not adopted here. Posted October 14, 2026 (4:02 PM ET).", "sources": [{"title": "X — Cherie Currie (@CherieCurrie3), citizen report (posted 2026-10-14 16:02 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/CherieCurrie3/status/2110461164618719647", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size; street addresses already blacked out by poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUndPnLbYAAslyt.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — Cherie Currie (@CherieCurrie3), first post of the same two envelopes: \"I got TWO mail-in ballots! One with my middle name too!\" (posted 2026-10-10 21:31 ET; same photo)", "url": "https://x.com/CherieCurrie3/status/2109094421086249210", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann-oct11__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-14 (per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; Mark sent the post). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Photo verified: two LA County VBM envelopes, CHERIE CURRIE vs CHERIE ANN CURRIE; street addresses pre-redacted by poster (no further redaction). County Los Angeles from envelopes. Mapped to Voter Rolls > Modified Clones (Mark: name-variant duplicate records brought to light by Paquette/Corsi). Visible fact pattern: two LA County VBM envelopes for CHERIE CURRIE vs CHERIE ANN CURRIE (middle name present/absent). Peers: Paquette JIW / Corsi-Paquette cards on this leaf. Single unverified citizen report; do not adopt fraud claim. Watch for LA RR/CC confirmation or denial.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-cheriecurrie3-la-two-vbm-name-variants-cherie-ann__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Two Los Angeles County Vote by Mail envelopes addressed to CHERIE CURRIE and CHERIE ANN CURRIE; street addresses blacked out"}]}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-johnm-extra-ballots-people-left-ca-years-ago", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-07", "uid": "C20261008-221804-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-07", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-johnm-extra-ballots-people-left-ca-years-ago"], "seq": "C00288", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster says, in a sarcastic reply, that he received extra ballots in the mail for people who have not lived in California for years. Posted October 8, 2026 (10:02 PM ET) as a reply to @amyforsandiego. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @JohnM736992750, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 22:02 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/JohnM736992750/status/2108377584350437697", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-johnm-extra-ballots-people-left-ca-years-ago__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Sarcastic tone; factual claim = extra ballots for people gone from CA for years."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-karjeda-daughter-out-of-state-10-years-ballot-at-home", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-04", "uid": "C20261008-221804-04", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-04", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-karjeda-daughter-out-of-state-10-years-ballot-at-home"], "seq": "C00285", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster says her daughter received a ballot at the poster's California home, although the daughter has not lived there since she married and has not lived in California for 10 years. California mails a ballot to every active registered voter. Posted October 8, 2026 as a reply to @PattyMorin. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @karjeda195841, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 11:26 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/karjeda195841/status/2108217591181513151", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-karjeda-daughter-out-of-state-10-years-ballot-at-home__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-kevintbailey-ballot-for-never-resident-second-owner", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-08", "uid": "C20261008-221804-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-08", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-kevintbailey-ballot-for-never-resident-second-owner"], "seq": "C00289", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster says that along with his own mail-in ballot, he received a ballot for someone who has never lived at his address; he is the home's second owner. The post does not name a state; California is inferred from the poster's display name (\"CaPatriot\"). Posted October 8, 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @kevintbailey, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 15:37 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/kevintbailey/status/2108280630865998069", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-kevintbailey-ballot-for-never-resident-second-owner__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. State CA inferred from display name 'CaPatriot' only; post text has no state."}
{"id": "ca-2026-x-slaughtertrades-sister-3-grown-kids-moved-out-of-state-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-05", "uid": "C20261008-221804-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-05", "old_ids": ["ca-2026-x-slaughtertrades-sister-3-grown-kids-moved-out-of-state-ballots"], "seq": "C00286", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster says his sister in California received unsolicited mail-in ballots for her three grown children, all of whom moved out of California years ago. This is a secondhand account: the poster relays what happened to his sister. Posted October 8, 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @Slaughtertrades, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 08:00 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Slaughtertrades/status/2108165588564525123", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2026-x-slaughtertrades-sister-3-grown-kids-moved-out-of-state-ballots__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Secondhand (sister's household)."}
{"id": "co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-01", "uid": "C20261008-203914-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-01", "old_ids": ["co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad"], "seq": "C00270", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CO", "description": "In an X post on October 8, 2026, Colorado voter Curt Webbe (@CWebbe) said that in \"yet another Colorado election\" he again received mail ballots addressed to both of his sons, although neither has lived with him for more than five years and the oldest has lived in another country for the past four years. Colorado mails a ballot to every active registered voter, so a registration that is never updated or moved to inactive status keeps producing a live ballot at the old address each election. It is a single first-hand citizen report, not verified by election officials. It does not show that any of those ballots were returned or counted. The account fits the pattern Mark has seen in many similar complaints on X. His attached photo shows three Jefferson County (Colorado) Clerk and Recorder envelopes marked \"Official Ballot Enclosed\" (barcodes partly blacked out). The PEP-relevant point is that in a universal-mail system, every stale record is a ballot in circulation with no voter attached to it.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Curt Webbe (@CWebbe), ballots for sons who moved out years ago (Oct. 8, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/CWebbe/status/2108282961930142083", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUIgLhpaAAAiYYM.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — Curt Webbe (@CWebbe), reply to @morcarwork: \"Same here. Gold Standard\" (posted 2026-10-08 15:48 ET; same photo as original post)", "url": "https://x.com/CWebbe/status/2108283460309971056", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad__x-reply-2108283460309971056-capture.png"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Text pulled via api.fxtwitter.com (posted 2026-10-08 3:46 PM ET); no X API spend. Single citizen report; companion to the Colorado Griswold settlement card on this leaf. Second source: his 2026-10-08 reply to @morcarwork (same photo, byte-identical; archived capture + fxtwitter JSON).", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-cwebbe-ballots-for-sons-moved-out-5-years-one-abroad__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Photo attached to Curt Webbe's post"}]}
{"id": "co-2026-x-351win-daughter-out-of-state-4-years-ballot-arrived", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-02", "uid": "C20261008-221804-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-02", "old_ids": ["co-2026-x-351win-daughter-out-of-state-4-years-ballot-arrived"], "seq": "C00283", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CO", "description": "Poster (profile location Greeley, Colorado) says, in a reply posted October 7, 2026, that his daughter has not lived in Colorado for four years, yet her ballot arrived in the mail the day before. Colorado mails a ballot to every active registered voter. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @351Win, citizen report (posted 2026-10-07 09:15 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/351Win/status/2107822104808710408", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-351win-daughter-out-of-state-4-years-ballot-arrived__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. State CO from post text and profile."}
{"id": "co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address", "permanent_id": "C20261009-015902-01", "uid": "C20261009-015902-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-015902-01", "old_ids": ["co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address"], "seq": "C00271", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CO", "description": "Poster \"Clint Not Eastwood\" (@morcarwork, profile location Colorado) says that, as in many past years, more ballots arrived in his mailbox than there are voters at his address. His attached photo shows three Jefferson County, Colorado Clerk and Recorder envelopes marked \"Official Ballot Enclosed\"; no addressee names are visible. He does not say how many voters live at the address or whose names were on the extra ballots. Colorado mails a ballot to every active registered voter. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted. Posted October 7, 2026 (8:47 PM ET); about 9K views when archived.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Clint Not Eastwood (@morcarwork), citizen report (posted 2026-10-07 20:47 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/morcarwork/status/2107996329100337652", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUEbfOQbIAAhske.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-09 (per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; Mark approved). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. State CO / Jefferson County from envelopes. Photo distinct from Webbe's (also JeffCo). No private names visible (only the County Clerk's official return address); no redaction needed.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-morcarwork-jeffco-more-ballots-than-voters-at-address__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Photo attached to Clint Not Eastwood's post"}]}
{"id": "co-2026-x-stephaniep1916-douglas-two-ballots-in-my-name", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-12", "uid": "C20261014-201922-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-12", "old_ids": ["co-2026-x-stephaniep1916-douglas-two-ballots-in-my-name"], "seq": "C01408", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "CO", "description": "Poster @StephanieP1916, replying to Sen. Hickenlooper and the Colorado Secretary of State, says she got two ballots in her name, that one includes a county tax question the other apparently does not, and that she did not open the second and expects to visit a Douglas County elections office to sort it out. Two ballots for one voter with different contests would suggest two records in different ballot styles or districts. Posted Oct. 8, 2026 (10:06 PM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @StephanieP1916, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 22:06 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/StephanieP1916/status/2108378508179452227", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2026-x-stephaniep1916-douglas-two-ballots-in-my-name__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Douglas County from poster's 'DougCo'. Not shown which names appear on the envelopes → duplicate-ballot leaf, not Modified Clones."}
{"id": "dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total", "permanent_id": "C20261016-144739-01", "uid": "C20261016-144739-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-144739-01", "old_ids": ["dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total"], "seq": "C01429", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "DC", "description": "Poster Virginia Grace McKinnon (@virginiagmck, profile location Washington, DC; bio \"VB now DC\") posted on October 16, 2026 that she \"just received more mail-in-ballots addressed to strangers with my address on them,\" and that this makes \"eight total this year, two different elections, all different names.\" The attached photo shows four white District of Columbia Board of Elections envelopes fanned on a quilted placemat, each with return address \"DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ELECTIONS, 1015 HALF ST SE STE 750, WASHINGTON DC 20003-4735,\" a brown \"Your Official Ballot\" band, Official Election Mail markings, and \"OFFICIAL ABSENTEE BALLOTING MATERIAL — FIRST-CLASS MAIL\"; the top envelope shows \"Election Date: November 3, 2026.\" Recipient names and street addresses in the photo are covered with solid red rectangles applied by the poster; the tracker applied no redaction and archived the photo exactly as posted. She asks what she is supposed to do with them. Oct. 21 update: in a Daily Signal article published Oct. 21, 2026, McKinnon, a Daily Signal writer, reported that the outlet obtained the D.C. voter registration list, confirmed the identities of the four addressees and reached one of them, a former tenant of her residence. That voter, who was granted anonymity and is registered as unaffiliated, said he had voted in person at his assigned polling place, later moved within the District without updating his registration, and did not know that D.C. mails a ballot to every registered voter. He said, \"It's concerning that anyone could just take that, theoretically, and vote in my place.\" The photo with her Oct. 21 post shows the same four envelopes as the Oct. 16 photo, so it is not a new batch. The D.C. Board of Elections did not respond to multiple requests for comment, and McKinnon said she has filed a voting-rights complaint with the Justice Department; its outcome is pending. The voter-list check and the former tenant's account support her report, but both come from her own reporting, and no official has acknowledged it. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who does not live at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that any ballot was voted or counted. DC has no counties; jurisdiction is the District of Columbia Board of Elections. The post had about 45.4K views when archived.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Virginia Grace McKinnon (@virginiagmck), citizen report (posted 2026-10-16 08:47 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/virginiagmck/status/2111076460655968374", "local": "/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size; recipient names/addresses already redacted by poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUwD2iJX0AAAYoa.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — Virginia Grace McKinnon (@virginiagmck), \"EXCLUSIVE: The Midterm Elections are 'Completely Unsecured'\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 1:05 PM ET; Daily Signal graphic of the same four envelopes)", "url": "https://x.com/virginiagmck/status/2112953511591727135", "local": "/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total--ds__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo attached to the Oct. 21 post (original size; red marks applied by the poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HVK4BDHXwAAlPbv.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total--ds__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "The Daily Signal (Virginia Grace McKinnon) — 2 Weeks Before the Midterms, DC Sent Me 4 Other People's Ballots (Oct. 21, 2026; voter-list check, former-tenant interview, no DCBOE response)", "url": "https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/10/21/d-c-sent-me-four-peoples-ballots/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-21 3:45 PM ET from Mark's lead (post 2112953511591727135, 1:05 PM ET): +Daily Signal article (read via WebFetch; curl gets a Cloudflare 403, so no local copy), +Oct. 21 post capture and photo. Same four envelopes as Oct. 16 (side-by-side check). Stays Citizen Testimony: no DCBOE acknowledgment; corroboration is the poster's own reporting. The Cuccinelli and Mitchell quotes in the article are opinion and are not entered. Watch for a DCBOE response and the DOJ complaint outcome. Nothing redacted. Citizen-X-2026-10-16 (per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; Mark sent the post). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Photo verified: four DC Board of Elections Official Absentee Balloting Material envelopes for Election Date November 3, 2026; state DC from envelopes (and profile Washington, DC / bio VB now DC). No county (DC is a single jurisdiction). Poster applied red rectangles over recipient names/addresses; archived exactly as posted (Mark standing no-redaction rule 2026-10-16). SAVE Act advocacy omitted from card text per Mark. Mapped to Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (peers: other wrong-address mail-ballot citizen cards). Eight-total / two-elections / all-different-names claims are the poster's and are not independently verified. Watch for DC Board of Elections statement.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Four District of Columbia Board of Elections Official Absentee Balloting Material envelopes (Election Date November 3, 2026) on a quilted placemat; recipient names and street addresses covered with red rectangles by the poster"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total--ds__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/dc-2026-x-virginiagmck-stranger-mail-ballots-eight-total--ds__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Daily Signal graphic posted Oct. 21, 2026: the same four District of Columbia Board of Elections \"Your Official Ballot\" envelopes, with red marks applied by the poster, under the headline \"Two Weeks Before the Midterms, DC Sent Me 4 Other People's Ballots\""}]}
{"id": "md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-01", "uid": "C20261008-221804-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-01", "old_ids": ["md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents"], "seq": "C00282", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "MD", "description": "Poster says that on October 8, 2026 she received four specimen ballots in the mail, none in her name and none for anyone who lives in her home, and that the election board told her only the people named on them can request a change. Her attached photo shows four Harford County (Maryland) Board of Elections mailers marked \"Specimen Ballot – 2026 General Election,\" with names and barcodes blacked out. A specimen ballot is a sample ballot for information only and cannot be voted. Maryland boards mail them to registered voters, so the mailers suggest four registrations still list her address. Her closing remark, that anyone could use an address to vote at the polls, is her opinion and is not documented here. The post had about 26.8K views when archived. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Patty Morin (@PattyMorin), citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 09:20 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/PattyMorin/status/2108185704841044313", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUHHrJwWcAAO8fx.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Specimen ballot = sample, not votable; indicates registrations at her address. State MD from photo (Harford County BOE, Forest Hill MD).", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2026-x-pattymorin-harford-4-specimen-ballots-non-residents__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Photo attached to Patty Morin (@PattyMorin)'s post"}]}
{"id": "nj-x-patlnks-ballots-for-father-died-2008-siblings-moved-1990s", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-11", "uid": "C20261008-221804-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-11", "old_ids": ["nj-x-patlnks-ballots-for-father-died-2008-siblings-moved-1990s"], "seq": "C00292", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "NJ", "description": "Poster says his mother received ballots in New Jersey for his father, who died in 2008, and for two siblings who moved out in the 1990s \"when we tried this nonsense.\" When this happened is unclear; the wording suggests New Jersey's 2020 all-mail election. The post also makes broader claims about 2020 that are not carded here. Posted October 5, 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @Patlnks, citizen report (posted 2026-10-05 19:33 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Patlnks/status/2107252852452176019", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-x-patlnks-ballots-for-father-died-2008-siblings-moved-1990s__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Timing unclear (likely NJ 2020 all-mail general); card date = post date. Ballot-stuffing remark not carded."}
{"id": "nv-2026-x-douglas-walton-ballot-for-resident-gone-since-2010", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-09", "uid": "C20261008-221804-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-09", "old_ids": ["nv-2026-x-douglas-walton-ballot-for-resident-gone-since-2010"], "seq": "C00290", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "NV", "description": "Poster (profile location Las Vegas, Nevada) says he continues to receive a ballot at his address for someone who has not lived there since 2010. He addressed the post to @nvsos (Nevada Secretary of State). Nevada mails a ballot to every active registered voter. Posted October 7, 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Douglas J. Walton (@douglas_walton), citizen report (posted 2026-10-07 19:08 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/douglas_walton/status/2107971231035383980", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nv-2026-x-douglas-walton-ballot-for-resident-gone-since-2010__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted."}
{"id": "or-2026-x-theise-5-ballots-for-former-residents", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-10", "uid": "C20261008-221804-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-10", "old_ids": ["or-2026-x-theise-5-ballots-for-former-residents"], "seq": "C00291", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "OR", "description": "Poster (profile location Veneta, Oregon) says he receives five different ballots at his address for people who have not lived there for years. Posted October 3, 2026 as a reply to @RepSalinas (Oregon congresswoman). Oregon mails a ballot to every active voter. A separate card on this leaf documents that Oregon stopped cancelling inactive registrations from 2017 to 2026. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Tim Heise (@THeise13), citizen report (posted 2026-10-03 17:31 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/THeise13/status/2106497409253830952", "local": "/archives/2026/10/or-2026-x-theise-5-ballots-for-former-residents__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Cross-ref or-sos-2026-directive card."}
{"id": "tn-madison-2026-early-voting-selections-changed-complaints-naacp", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-35", "uid": "C20261020-160717-35", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-35", "old_ids": ["tn-madison-2026-early-voting-selections-changed-complaints-naacp"], "seq": "C01028", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "TN", "description": "During October 2026 early voting in Madison County (Jackson), Tennessee, voters said their selections appeared to change on the voting machines. Lisa White told 39 News that when she reviewed her ballot \"a Republican was done, so I had to go all the way back.\" Community groups gathered at the early-voting site on Saturday, Oct. 17; Harrell Carter, president of the Jackson-Madison County NAACP, said \"We have several complaints that has indicated that the machine is changing some votes.\" Madison County Administrator of Elections Lori Lott said no changes had been made to voters' ballots and that the machines are extensively tested by Republican and Democratic machine technicians appointed by the election commission. No calibration finding, pulled machine, or vendor statement was reported as of Oct. 19, 2026. Direction reported: toward Republican. Status Citizen Testimony: first-hand voter accounts; officials deny any change. 2026 instance, ongoing. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "39 News (Jackson, TN) — Madison Co. Election Commission addresses voter change complaints (Oct. 19, 2026)", "url": "https://www.nbc39.com/news/madison-co-election-commission-address-voter-change-complaints/article_b392cf88-b52c-47ad-b355-567db8b8c8a6.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-madison-2026-early-voting-selections-changed-complaints-naacp__nbc39_2026.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (nbc39_2026). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted. 2026 instance: flagged for EMon."}
{"id": "ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash", "permanent_id": "C20261016-002740-01", "uid": "C20261016-002740-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261016-002740-01", "old_ids": ["ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash"], "seq": "C01418", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Mail ballots create many chain-of-custody vulnerabilities, which make it easy for error and manipulation to occur."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-27", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-27", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "UT", "description": "Poster Alex (@oftenmoreso, profile location Utah, USA) posted on October 15, 2026 that he \"found dozens of ballots in the trash yesterday in Utah.\" The attached photo shows the interior of a dark plastic bin holding junk mail (including Alaska Airlines, GEICO, and Closets by Design flyers) and at least two yellow Salt Lake County Clerk, Election Division envelopes marked \"Official Ballot Enclosed\" and \"2026 GENERAL ELECTION,\" with \"Official Election Mail\" logos and \"DO NOT FORGET TO SIGN YOUR RETURN ENVELOPE\" in red. Recipient name and street address in each window are blacked out in the photo. The poster's further claims that \"thousands are thrown away every election,\" that \"anyone can vote with these ballots,\" and that mail voting puts Utah \"among the least secure in the nation\" are his opinion and are not independently verified here. This is a single unverified citizen report. Official Salt Lake County ballot envelopes lying in a trash bin show a chain-of-custody gap for outbound mail ballots; the photo does not show whether the envelopes still held ballots, whether any ballot was voted or counted, or who put them there. Salt Lake County mails ballots to active registered voters (ballots for the Nov. 3, 2026 general began mailing about October 13). No county clerk statement or news story confirming this October trash find was located as of October 16, 2026. Distinct from the June 2026 Eagle Mountain / Damon Matai Seei indictment (card ei-2026-09-022), which is a separate, charged USPS dump of about 300 primary ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Alex (@oftenmoreso), citizen report (posted 2026-10-15 12:36 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/oftenmoreso/status/2110771684798288339", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — photo 1 attached to the post (original size; recipient names/addresses already blacked out by poster)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/media/HUr3qHxbUAA1SS-.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-16 (per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; Mark sent the post). Post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Photo verified: ≥2 Salt Lake County yellow Official Ballot Enclosed / 2026 GENERAL ELECTION envelopes in a trash/recycle-style bin with junk mail; address windows pre-redacted by poster (no further redaction). County Salt Lake from envelopes; event date ~Oct. 14 per \"yesterday\" relative to Oct. 15 post. Mapped to Mail ballots > chain-of-custody vulnerabilities (peers: San Diego Lake Wohlford Amy Reichert citizen card + ROV Confirmed card; Sacramento mail-truck theft). Cross-leaf: USPS (ei-2026-09-022 Seei Eagle Mountain indictment — already carded; not duplicated). Web + free x search_posts_all found no news/clerk confirmation of this Oct. trash find; \"thousands\" / \"least secure\" claims marked as poster's unverified opinion. Watch for Salt Lake County Clerk or USPS statement.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ut-2026-x-oftenmoreso-salt-lake-ballots-in-trash__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Yellow Salt Lake County Official Ballot Enclosed 2026 GENERAL ELECTION envelopes in a dark bin with junk mail; address windows blacked out"}], "related": ["ei-2026-09-022"]}
{"id": "wa-2026-x-diana-smig-son-gone-25-years-notified-5-times-ballots-resume", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221804-03", "uid": "C20261008-221804-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221804-03", "old_ids": ["wa-2026-x-diana-smig-son-gone-25-years-notified-5-times-ballots-resume"], "seq": "C00284", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10", "state": "WA", "description": "Poster (profile location Eastern Washington) says she just received a ballot for her son, who has not lived in Washington for 25 years. She says the family has notified the appropriate officials five times; each time the ballots stop for an election or two, then start coming again. If accurate, the record is being suppressed for an election or two and then reactivated instead of being cancelled, which is the kind of failure this leaf describes. Washington mails a ballot to every active voter. Posted October 8, 2026 as a reply to @CWebbe. This is a single unverified citizen report. A ballot or election mailer arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that the ballot was voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Diana Smigaj (@diana_smig21201), citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 22:10 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/diana_smig21201/status/2108379454397719017", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-x-diana-smig-son-gone-25-years-notified-5-times-ballots-resume__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post text via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address ballot = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Reactivation pattern after 5 notifications is notable; would merit a records request to the county auditor."}
{"id": "tx-bexar-2026-10-22-early-voting-selections-switched-hinojosa-abbott-talarico-paxton-ksat", "permanent_id": "C20261023-123356-07", "uid": "C20261023-123356-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261023-123356-07", "old_ids": ["tx-bexar-2026-10-22-early-voting-selections-switched-hinojosa-abbott-talarico-paxton-ksat"], "seq": "C01532", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10-22", "state": "TX", "description": "KSAT reported on Oct. 22, 2026 that three Bexar County, Texas, early voters told the station on Thursday, Oct. 22, that the touchscreen voting machines changed or dropped their selections. Ashton Lasater said that at the Converse Community Events Center her choice for governor changed from Gina Hinojosa (D) to Greg Abbott (R) after she had made it and while her hand was away from the screen, and that on review her choice of Jon Rosenthal (D) for Railroad Commissioner had changed to Bo French (R) and took two taps to correct. Letty Gonzales said her vote for James Talarico (D) in the U.S. Senate race changed to Ken Paxton (R) twice on her machine at Macedonia Baptist Church; she reported it to the Elections Department, where a staff member said the machine would be pulled, but an election judge at the site told KSAT that afternoon nothing was wrong with it and it had not been pulled. A third voter at Wonderland of the Americas, who declined to give her name, said several selections she made were not recorded. All three said they caught the problems and that their final ballots showed their choices. A county spokesman said in an emailed statement that \"in nearly all cases where discrepancy is reported, it is the result of a voter's inadvertent selection of a candidate or not reviewing their selections before finalizing it,\" and urged voters to check the printed ballot summary. The same report notes tabulator outages at at least three early-voting sites, where ballots were placed in emergency ballot boxes. The Associated Press reported the same day that a Bexar County X user, whom it did not name, said she had to tap the screen forcefully to get the machine to register Talarico instead of Paxton; county assistant public information officer John Moreno told AP that officials could not confirm any equipment issues and that \"this could possibly be user error,\" and advised voters with concerns to tell the on-site election judge. Update (Oct. 23, 2026): KSAT reported receiving dozens of viewer messages from several voting locations (not independently verified). Two more named voters gave first-hand accounts: Margie Garcia said that after voting Monday at McCreless Library her printed ballot showed a different Senate candidate than the one she had chosen on screen, and she spoiled it and verified a second ballot; Christine Castro said that at the Northside Activity Center on Culebra Road, selections changed on the touchscreen two to three times before she printed. Elections Administrator Michele Carew said the department is communicating with the voting-machine manufacturer to determine whether any action is needed, while describing mismatched selections as \"almost always\" related to user touchscreen sensitivity. ES&S told KSAT it has no widespread reports of voting-technology issues. The county said there is no recourse under state law once a ballot is cast. Status Citizen Testimony: two named voters and one unnamed voter gave first-hand accounts to a news outlet, and the county responded by attributing such reports to voter error; no machine fault has been found and no machine was reported removed from service. Consulting the manufacturer is not an acknowledgment of a fault, so the label stays Citizen Testimony; it would move to Partially confirmed if the county or ES&S reports a calibration or equipment problem. Update (Oct. 26, 2026): KSAT reported that voters were still contacting the station about touchscreen problems and that it \"has not independently verified every viewer report\" [5]. Christine Welde, co-chair of the Bexar County Democratic Party's Election Integrity and Voter Protection Committee and a former county poll worker, said her group had received similar reports and gave a first-hand account: at Cornerstone Church she \"selected up to five times\" before the machine registered a selection, \"and then it registered, not the candidate that I intended to select\" [5]. Welde said she had seen no evidence that machines were intentionally changing votes and that touchscreen sensitivity or calibration could explain it [5]. Bexar County Republican Party chair Kris Coons said her party had received no calls reporting such problems [5]. Elections Administrator Michele Carew again said such reports are \"almost always\" related to touchscreen sensitivity, that the county is communicating with the manufacturer, and that voters should verify their printed ballot; the county said the machines are not connected to the internet and cited logic-and-accuracy testing, chain of custody and audits [5]. The label stays Citizen Testimony. Catalog point: the burden of catching a moved selection falls on each voter at the review screen, and the official explanation of user error can be given for any such report without a machine test. Hand-marked paper ballots leave no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot, and a public hand count at the precinct lets voters see their ballots counted.", "sources": [{"title": "KSAT — Bexar County voters claim voting machines switched or removed selections (Garrett Brnger, Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/23/bexar-county-voters-claim-voting-machines-switched-or-removed-selections/"}, {"title": "Associated Press (via ABC News) — Reported challenges with touchscreen voting machines (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/Politics/wireStory/reported-challenges-touchscreen-voting-machines-signal-election-rigging-137493899"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Bexar County TX selection complaints (ei-2026-10-141)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "KSAT — Bexar County elections office monitoring reports of voting-screen selection issues; administrator consulting manufacturer (Hunter King, Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/23/bexar-county-elections-office-monitoring-reports-of-voting-screen-selection-issues/"}, {"title": "KSAT — Hunter King, \"Bexar County voters report polling location concerns as early voting continues; local party leaders respond\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 6:51 PM ET; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121747/https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/26/bexar-county-voters-report-polling-location-concerns-as-early-voting-continues-local-party-leaders-respond/)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/26/bexar-county-voters-report-polling-location-concerns-as-early-voting-continues-local-party-leaders-respond/"}, {"title": "KSAT — Oct. 26, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.ksat.com/news/local/2026/10/26/bexar-county-voters-report-polling-location-concerns-as-early-voting-continues-local-party-leaders-respond/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-bexar-2026-10-22-early-voting-selections-switched-hinojosa-abbott-talarico-paxton-ksat__ksat-2026-10-26.html"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-24 AM (ei-2026-10-141 update): Carew statement that the office is consulting the manufacturer; two more named first-hand voters, including a printed-ballot mismatch (KSAT curl 200). Label reconsidered and kept as Citizen Testimony: manufacturer consultation is not confirmation of a fault. EMon refresh 2026-10-23 PM: EMon logged this card as ei-2026-10-141; added AP account and county PIO Moreno quote (ABC/AP curl 200). Label unchanged. evidence-sweep-2026-10-23 (Fri open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Citizen Testimony (two named first-hand accounts plus news coverage reaching the county, which responded). 2026 midterm-window item: send to EMon with priority true. Peer to tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn and ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton on this leaf. Lasater's Rosenthal-to-French account is in Bexar County and does not by itself satisfy the Travis County requirement on research item tx-travis-2026-10-19-wheatsville-touchscreen-rosenthal-to-french. Source does not name the machine vendor or model, so no vendor tag. KSAT curl 200, text verified. Names as in source; nothing redacted. EMon refresh 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET: added KSAT Oct. 26, 2026 (Hunter King; curl 200; local copy and Wayback): first-hand account from Christine Welde (Democratic Party committee co-chair, former poll worker); Republican chair Coons reports no calls; KSAT has not verified every report. Label unchanged (Citizen Testimony).", "vendor": ["ES&S"]}
{"id": "fl-palm-beach-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-switched-friedenthal-mathis", "permanent_id": "C20261024-102612-03", "uid": "C20261024-102612-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261024-102612-03", "old_ids": ["fl-palm-beach-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-switched-friedenthal-mathis"], "seq": "C01539", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10-20 (Friedenthal); October 2026 early voting (Mathis); reported 2026-10-22 to 2026-10-23", "state": "FL", "description": "Palm Beach County, Florida early voters reported that ES&S ExpressVote ballot-marking devices registered a different candidate than the one they touched. Boca Raton resident Ceil Friedenthal told WPTV that when she voted on Tuesday, Oct. 20, 2026 at the South County Civic Center, \"a couple of times it defaulted to something I wasn't voting for\": she tried to select a Democratic candidate and the Republican listed above was selected instead. She called a poll worker over three times to correct three selections, said she used the pad of her finger rather than her nail (while acknowledging her nails are a little long), did not see a stylus and was not told to use one, and said two other women told her of the same experience. Amanda Mathis told CBS12 that at the Jupiter Community Center the machine kept showing another candidate in the first race on her ballot and took about four attempts to show her choice: \"Did I fat finger it? Well no.\" She reported it to a poll worker and then emailed the elections office, and said the reply was \"a copy pasted blow off, telling me I didn't follow protocol.\" Supervisor of Elections Wendy Sartory Link said her office had received only a couple of reports directly from voters, that there is no setting that defaults a voter to a candidate, and that \"we have not been able to recreate the problem.\" She said one machine a voter identified was replaced as a precaution, tested at the office \"using fingers,\" and could not be made to fail. She attributed such reports to sensitive screens, long fingernails or large fingers touching the selection above, and to the older equipment's slight response delay (\"These machines are a little bit older. We're actually getting new ones\"), and urged voters to use the stylus and check the printed ballot; voters may also ask for a hand-marked oval ballot instead of the ExpressVote. The ExpressVote marks a paper ballot and does not tabulate. The Palm Beach Post reported that the complaints came from voters backing Democrats, mostly secondhand. The Lakeland News Chief reported that Duval County had received four similar complaints. Status Citizen Testimony: two named voters gave first-hand accounts to news outlets, and the supervisor acknowledged the reports and replaced one machine, but could not reproduce a fault; no equipment fault has been confirmed. It belongs to the October 2026 multi-state wave of touchscreen reports (Bexar TX, Duval FL, Johnson KS, Davidson TN). Update (Oct. 26, 2026): WPBF reported that a resident who declined to appear on camera said the machine selected a candidate she did not intend to choose on three separate attempts [7]. Supervisor Link recommended that voters use a stylus, saying that with many races on the ballot a finger can touch the race above or below [7]. On a claim reported to the Republican Party of Palm Beach County that voters were not given a paper ballot on request, Link said, \"That is just not true. Every polling location has a ballot on demand printer\"; party chair Carl Cascio said the law requires that a paper ballot be provided on request [7]. The label stays Citizen Testimony. Catalog point: when a selection lands on the candidate above, only voters who notice and keep correcting it catch it, and the official explanation of fingers or fingernails can be given for any such report. A hand-marked paper ballot counted by hand at the precinct puts no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "WPTV — Could long fingernails, large fingers impact your vote? (Oct. 23, 2026; Friedenthal, Supervisor Link)", "url": "https://www.wptv.com/news/palm-beach-county/could-long-fingernails-large-fingers-impact-your-vote"}, {"title": "WFLX — Could long fingernails, large fingers impact your vote? (Oct. 23, 2026; same report)", "url": "https://www.wflx.com/2026/10/23/could-long-fingernails-large-fingers-impact-your-vote/"}, {"title": "CBS12 — Jupiter woman raises concerns after voting machine repeatedly displays wrong candidate (Oct. 23, 2026; Amanda Mathis)", "url": "https://cbs12.com/news/local/jupiter-woman-raises-concerns-after-voting-machine-repeatedly-displays-wrong-candidate-florida-news-florida-election-local-news-local-election"}, {"title": "The Palm Beach Post — Thick fingers, long nails switch some touchscreen votes, county says (Oct. 22, 2026; paywall 402, text via WebSearch extract)", "url": "https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/22/thick-fingers-long-nails-switch-some-touchscreen-votes-palm-beach-county-official-says/92383338007/"}, {"title": "The Ledger / News Chief — Florida voters report touch-screen issues. How to check your ballot (Oct. 22, 2026; Duval four complaints; paywall 402, text via WebSearch extract)", "url": "https://www.newschief.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/22/florida-ballot-marking-machine-accuracy-how-check/92381164007/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Palm Beach County, FL ExpressVote selection switching (ei-2026-10-147)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "WPBF — \"Palm Beach County voters report issues with touch voting machines during early voting\" (Oct. 26, 2026, 5:21 PM ET; the article gives no Oct. 20 date; Wayback: https://web.archive.org/web/20261027121831/https://www.wpbf.com/article/palm-beach-county-early-voters-touch-voting-machines-issues/74252409)", "url": "https://www.wpbf.com/article/palm-beach-county-early-voters-touch-voting-machines-issues/74252409"}, {"title": "WPBF — Oct. 26, 2026 article: page HTML (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://www.wpbf.com/article/palm-beach-county-early-voters-touch-voting-machines-issues/74252409", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fl-palm-beach-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-switched-friedenthal-mathis__wpbf-2026-10-26.html"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-10-147 (2026-10-24 AM). New card; no prior Palm Beach 2026 touchscreen card. Placed on the same leaf as the Bexar, Duval and Johnson cards (9 > touchscreen calibration). Citizen Testimony rather than Alleged because two named voters gave first-hand accounts (as on Bexar). Vendor ES&S ExpressVote named by WPTV. WPTV and CBS12 curl 200; Palm Beach Post and News Chief paywalled (402). 2026 midterm-window item: EMon priority true. Nothing redacted. EMon refresh 2026-10-27 8:22 AM ET: added WPBF Oct. 26, 2026 (curl 200; local copy and Wayback): unnamed resident, three attempts; Link's stylus advice and denial of the paper-ballot claim. The WPBF article does not give an Oct. 20 date. Label unchanged (Citizen Testimony).", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"]}
{"id": "ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-07", "uid": "C20261021-121524-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-07", "old_ids": ["ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton"], "seq": "C01503", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10-19 to 2026-10-21", "state": "KS", "description": "Several Johnson County, Kansas voters have described touchscreen selections appearing as candidates they did not choose during advance voting, which began Oct. 17, 2026. Olathe Today reported on Oct. 21 that Joe Kasha of Overland Park said that at the Johnson County Arts & Heritage Center, 8788 Metcalf Ave., he selected Republican candidates but the ballot summary screen showed Democratic candidates instead, and that the problem recurred after he corrected it: \"I knew exactly who I was voting for. I would make my selections, go to review the ballot, and there would be Democrats listed instead of the Republicans I had chosen. I went back and fixed it, but it kept happening.\" He said an election worker told him to return to the previous screens, and that he eventually got the machine to accept his choices. Laura Owen posted an open letter on Facebook saying that while voting on Oct. 19 at the Lenexa City Center Library the machine repeatedly displayed a Democratic candidate instead of the one she intended; she corrected the contests and reviewed her ballot before casting it, and she reported that a friend had the same experience at the Johnson County Election Office in Olathe, where the machine repeatedly displayed Democratic U.S. Senate nominee Adam Hamilton instead of Republican Sen. Roger Marshall. \"These are two voters' accounts, and the cause remains undetermined. They warrant immediate investigation and a public explanation,\" Owen wrote. Earlier, on Oct. 20, Fran Riedemann (@authorFran) of Olathe posted on X a forwarded message from an unnamed voter saying \"most of my selections defaulted to the democrat candidates\" and that Tiffany (no surname given) and Jim Mullinex had texted that their machines \"kept defaulting to Hamilton\"; We The People Kansas (@WeThePeopleKS) said it had received multiple similar reports. At least one other voter, @DGenterd, replied that his printed ballot at Hilltop matched his selection. Johnson County uses Election Systems & Software (ES&S) ExpressVote ballot-marking devices, which print a paper ballot card for the voter to review before it is scanned on a DS200, and hand-marked paper ballots are available on request. Before advance voting began, Deputy Election Commissioner Josh King told KCTV5 that every machine is individually tested and sealed before leaving the warehouse. No response from the Johnson County Election Office to these accounts has been reported. Oct. 22, 2026 update: Election Commissioner Connie Schmidt told The Kansas City Star that more than 50,000 voters had cast early ballots, that her office had heard directly from three voters with ballot-marking-device concerns (all after they had voted and left) and that supervising judges had called in five more; in each case a technician recalibrated the screen and verified its accuracy. She advised voters to tap the candidate's name rather than the small box and to report problems before leaving. A spokesperson for Secretary of State Scott Schwab said the state had received \"a handful of complaints\" and that in each case the voter was able to cast a ballot for the candidates of their choice. Former Kansas commerce secretary Laura Owen told the Star that most of her selections, including for Sen. Roger Marshall, kept defaulting to other candidates. Status Citizen Testimony: named voters have given first-hand accounts, one of them to a local news outlet, but the cause is undetermined, it is not known whether any discrepancy reached a printed ballot, and no official acknowledgment or machine finding has been reported. Catalog point: a touchscreen that moves a selection to another candidate is caught only by voters who check the review screen and keep correcting it. Hand-marked paper ballots, which Johnson County already offers, leave no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Olathe Today — Johnson County voters report Republican selections appearing as Democrats on early-voting machines (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://olathetoday.com/localnews/johnson-county-voters-report-republican-selections-appearing-as-democrats-on-early-voting-machines/"}, {"title": "X — Fran Riedemann (@authorFran), Olathe, Kansas, forwarded prayer-thread message on Johnson County machines \"defaulting to Hamilton\" (Oct. 20, 2026, 7:00 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/authorFran/status/2112680467828768981", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — We The People Kansas (@WeThePeopleKS), quote post: \"Multiple reports to our team\" with two text-message screenshots (Oct. 20, 2026, 8:57 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/WeThePeopleKS/status/2112709728979792079", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x2__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — @DGenterd, reply: voted at Hilltop; printed ballot matched the selection for Marshall (Oct. 20, 2026, 8:50 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/DGenterd/status/2112707997550227482", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x3__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Johnson County Election Office — Voting Systems (ES&S ExpressVote BMDs and DS200 scanners; adopted 2018; pre-election testing)", "url": "https://www.jocoelection.org/voting-election-info/voting-systems", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__jocoelection-voting-systems.html"}, {"title": "Johnson County Election Office — Ballot Information (touchscreen prints a ballot card for review; hand-marked paper ballots always available)", "url": "https://www.jocoelection.org/voting-election-info/ballot-information", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__jocoelection-ballot-information.html"}, {"title": "Johnson County Election Office — Candidate page: Adam Hamilton, Democratic, U.S. Senate (Nov. 3, 2026 General Election)", "url": "https://www.jocoelection.org/candidates-elected-officials/adam-hamilton", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__jocoelection-adam-hamilton.html"}, {"title": "Johnson County Election Office — Advance Voting (12 locations; Oct. 17, Oct. 19-24, Oct. 26-31, Nov. 2)", "url": "https://www.jocoelection.org/voting-election-info/advance-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__jocoelection-advance-voting.html"}, {"title": "KCTV5 — Johnson County advance voting starts Saturday (Oct. 16, 2026; Deputy Election Commissioner Josh King on machine testing and seals)", "url": "https://www.kctv5.com/2026/10/16/johnson-county-advance-voting-starts-saturday-platte-county-no-excuse-absentee-starts-tuesday/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__kctv5-johnson-county-advance-voting-starts-saturday-platte-county-no-e.html"}, {"title": "Kansas Secretary of State — Secretary Schwab Announces the Start of Advance Voting (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.sos.ks.gov/media/press-releases/2026/10-14-26-secretary-schwab-announces-the-start-of-advance-voting.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__sos-10-14-26-secretary-schwab-announces-the-start-of-advance-voting.html"}, {"title": "Johnson County Post — County board awards $10.5 million contract to ES&S for ExpressVote machines (May 18, 2018)", "url": "https://johnsoncountypost.com/2018/05/18/over-protest-from-competitor-who-says-county-may-be-overspending-johnson-county-board-awards-10-5-million-contract-to-ess-for-new-voting-machines-71535/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__johnsoncountypost-over-protest-from-competitor-who-says-county-may-be-.html"}, {"title": "NCSL — Straight Ticket Voting (six states offer it: Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Oklahoma, South Carolina; Kansas does not)", "url": "https://www.ncsl.org/elections-and-campaigns/straight-ticket-voting", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton__ncsl-straight-ticket-voting.html"}, {"title": "Kansas City Star — Johnson County moves two polling places away from Adam Hamilton's church (Sept. 29, 2026; context on the Senate race)", "url": "https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article317426253.html"}, {"title": "KCTV5 — Johnson County advance voting starts Saturday (Deputy Election Commissioner Josh King on testing and seals, Oct. 16, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kctv5.com/2026/10/16/johnson-county-advance-voting-starts-saturday-platte-county-no-excuse-absentee-starts-tuesday/"}, {"title": "The Kansas City Star — Johnson County touchscreen concerns; technicians recalibrated screens (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article317735912.html"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Johnson County, KS touchscreen claim (ei-2026-10-090)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-23 AM: KC Star, commissioner confirms eight concerns and recalibrations (curl timeout, linked only; facts from EMon summary). Label left Citizen Testimony pending Mark review: the recalibrations are now an official acknowledgment of screen issues, so Partially confirmed may be warranted. Promoted from the research queue 2026-10-21 (EDS/EMon ingest, ~12:30 PM ET): Olathe Today Oct. 21 carries a named first-hand account (Joe Kasha, Arts & Heritage Center) and a second named first-hand account (Laura Owen, Lenexa City Center Library, Facebook open letter), independent of the original forwarded X message, which meets Mark's corroboration rule. Label Citizen Testimony per Madison TN / Williamson TN peers. ES&S tag per county Voting Systems page and Olathe Today. Olathe Today text-verified, curl 200. Names as in sources; nothing redacted. EMon ei-2026-10-090.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x2__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x2__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Text-message screenshot posted by We The People Kansas: \"Multiple people reporting the JoCo machines are defaulting to democrats. Have you heard similar? When I go vote I hope I can get video.\" (sender not named)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x2__x-photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ks-johnson-2026-10-20-expressvote-selections-defaulting-to-hamilton--x2__x-photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "Text-message screenshot posted by We The People Kansas: \"Three people have said their votes all defaulted to Democrats.\" (sender not named)"}], "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote BMD", "DS200"]}
{"id": "tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn", "permanent_id": "C20261021-121524-06", "uid": "C20261021-121524-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-121524-06", "old_ids": ["tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn"], "seq": "C01502", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10-17 to 2026-10-20", "state": "TN", "description": "WSMV 4 reported on Oct. 20, 2026, that two Williamson County, Tennessee early voters said ballot-marking machines registered a different candidate than the one they selected in the governor's race. Voter Jackie Herrud said that at the Longview Recreation Center in Spring Hill, \"I kept punching for the Democrat, Jerri Green, and it kept punching back to Marsha Blackburn,\" and that poll workers there had heard of similar complaints. Voter Toni Fitzgerald said she had the same experience at a different Williamson County location on Saturday morning, Oct. 17: \"You try to push the button for the candidate that you're selecting, and it goes to another candidate.\" She said the button was difficult to press and that she did not tell a poll worker. Both said it took several attempts to get their intended selection to appear and that the printed record could be reviewed. The Tennessee Secretary of State's office said it had received one complaint of this nature among approximately 400,000 ballots cast so far and urged voters to check the review screen and paper record and alert a poll official before casting. Oct. 21 update (WSMV): State Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins said his office had received one call before the first report aired and a few more since, including one from a person who was not reporting a personal incident. He said, \"It's not a vote flipping situation. It's normally like an unintended touch that they may not even realize,\" that his office sends a Republican and a Democratic technician to examine equipment when an issue is reported, and that votes are counted from the printed paper ballot, which voters should review before scanning. WSMV describes the two voters as among dozens of Tennessee voters reporting that the selected candidate did not match what registered on the machine. Status Citizen Testimony: two named voters gave first-hand accounts to a news outlet, and the state acknowledged one matching complaint, but no machine fault has been found and no machine was reported removed from service. Catalog point: a touchscreen that moves a selection to another candidate is caught only by voters who notice and keep correcting it. Hand-marked paper ballots leave no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "WSMV 4 Nashville — Early voters report challenges casting their vote at Middle Tennessee locations (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/20/early-voters-report-challenges-casting-their-vote-middle-tennessee-locations/"}, {"title": "WSMV 4 Nashville — Video: Early voters report problems with ballot machines (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/video/2026/10/20/early-voters-report-problems-with-ballot-machines/"}, {"title": "The Nashville Focal — Williamson County voters say ballot machines changed their selections during early voting (Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://focalnews.org/nashville-tn/politics/williamson-county-voters-say-ballot-machines-changed-their-selections-during-early-voting"}, {"title": "WSMV 4 Nashville — We brought early voting concerns to the head of Tennessee elections. Here's what he said (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/21/we-brought-early-voting-concerns-head-tennessee-elections-heres-what-he-said/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Williamson County, TN selection complaints (ei-2026-10-120)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "X — Brooklyn Flowers (@BrooklynFlowe15), \"The voting machine is FLIPPING votes for the Democratic candidate for Governor to Marsha Blackburn in Tennessee\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 2:33 PM ET; 1:30 recirculated copy of the WSMV Oct. 20 Williamson County report, @thetnholler watermark, with a Threads screenshot overlaid)", "url": "https://x.com/BrooklynFlowe15/status/2112975505804701729", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn--brooklynflowe15__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-22 AM EDS/EMon ingest (EMon ei-2026-10-120 change): Goins Oct. 21 response via WSMV; no machine fault found or reported. Text-verified, curl 200. Refresh 2026-10-21 5:00 PM ET from Mark's lead @BrooklynFlowe15 2112975505804701729: the 1:30 clip is the WSMV Oct. 20 report already carded here, recirculated through The Tennessee Holler's Instagram (watermark) with a Threads screenshot by \"dianeab\" overlaid; transcribed, same voters and quotes, no new account. +X post and video (6.1 MB). The overlaid Memphis claim is a separate research-queue item (tn-shelby-2026-10-threads-dianeab-selections-converted-to-republican). Stays Citizen Testimony. EMon ei-2026-10-120 (first_seen 2026-10-21; EMon confirmed as reported). Two named first-hand voters plus SOS acknowledgment of one complaint, so corroborated; Citizen Testimony per Madison TN peer (ei-2026-10-066). Vendor not tagged: sources do not name the machines. Herrud, Fitzgerald and SOS '400,000' quotes text-verified; WSMV and Focal curl 200.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/BrooklynFlowe15/status/2112975505804701729", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn--brooklynflowe15__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn--brooklynflowe15__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 90.256, "bytes": 6123785, "sha256": "b191caf406e0868aba936da1d0429750f7bf3cb23edc211185d3dcc409991ad1", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn--brooklynflowe15__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton", "permanent_id": "C20261022-181344-01", "uid": "C20261022-181344-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261022-181344-01", "old_ids": ["tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton"], "seq": "C01520", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Accessibility Sleight of Hand", "Steering the voter's choices at the point of voting", "On-screen steering: the voting machine's display preselects, defaults to, or prompts toward a candidate, so the voter must notice and correct a choice that was never made."], "leaf_id": "L20261021-170325-03", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261021-170325-03", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-10 (early voting)", "state": "TN", "description": "Two Davidson County, Tennessee early voters have publicly said the ballot-marking machine kept selecting Republican Marsha Blackburn in the governor's race when they chose someone else. Singer Stella Parton, Dolly Parton's sister, wrote on Facebook that at the Hermitage Library in Nashville \"I had to go back three times and correct my vote because it kept defaulting to Marsha Blackburn. I would never vote for her for anything,\" and in a second post (quoted by The Tennessean, Oct. 21, 2026) that \"I finally called over a poll worker when my ballot kept flipping to the wrong candidate on the third try.\" Separately, WKRN News 2 reported on Oct. 22, 2026, that voter Gladys McCowen said that on Monday at the Bellevue Library she \"carefully selected\" Democrat Jerri Green but the machine highlighted Blackburn, that she had to try multiple times to correct it, and that the Davidson County Election Commission told her it had not received such complaints during early voting but that similar complaints had occurred in the August primary. Davidson County elections administrator John Richardson told WKRN that at least 62,755 people had voted early as of Wednesday afternoon, that \"fewer than a handful\" had reported problems, that all machines are tested before voting with technicians from each party certifying them, and that officials believe most reported selection issues come from voters touching the wrong part of the screen; he advised pressing the center of the selection box and checking the green box, the review screen, and the printed ballot. State Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins described the same three checks to The Tennessean. In October 2024 the county's then administrator attributed the same effect to the small checkbox near the candidate listed above (WPLN). Update (Oct. 22, 2026): Davidson County reintroduced narrow stir sticks at polling places so voters can tap a name directly; Deputy Administrator of Elections Lisa Pierce said some voters reported trying to select a Democratic candidate and seeing the Republican listed above become highlighted instead, and that the sticks reduce the chance a finger angled across the screen touches the adjacent selection (Nashville Focal, Oct. 23). The sticks had been discontinued after voters asked that they no longer be provided. Status Citizen Testimony: two named voters gave first-hand accounts, a news outlet reached one of them, and the county acknowledged a small number of reports, but no machine fault has been found and no machine was reported removed from service. Both voters said they corrected their selections before casting. Catalog point: a screen that lands on a candidate the voter did not choose is caught only by voters who notice and keep correcting it. Hand-marked paper ballots, counted by hand at the precinct, leave no screen between the voter's choice and the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "WKRN News 2 — Voters report concerns with voting machines, polling place interactions during Middle TN early voting (Oct. 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wkrn.com/news/local-news/middle-tennessee-early-voting-concerns/"}, {"title": "The Tennessean — Dolly Parton's sister, Stella, reminds voters to double check their ballots after early voting in TN (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/21/dolly-parton-sister-reports-early-voting-issue-how-verify-ballot/92363987007/"}, {"title": "WSMV — 'Don't let them rig this.' Dolly Parton's sister claims she had to correct her ballot selection (Oct. 21, 2026; SOS: one complaint among about 400,000 ballots)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/21/dont-let-them-rig-this-dolly-partons-sister-claims-she-had-correct-her-ballot-selection-while-voting-tennessee-heres-what-we-know/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton__wsmv-2026-10-21.html"}, {"title": "Parade — Dolly Parton's sister says her ballot kept switching to another candidate while voting early in Tennessee (Oct. 21, 2026; curl 403, no local copy)", "url": "https://parade.com/news/dolly-parton-sister-stella-parton-ballot-switching-votes-tennessee-early-voting"}, {"title": "WSMV — Middle Tennessee voters report challenges casting their ballots (Oct. 20, 2026; SOS statement)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/20/early-voters-report-challenges-casting-their-vote-middle-tennessee-locations/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton__wsmv-2026-10-20.html"}, {"title": "WPLN — In Tennessee, your ballot may not show the name you wanted (Oct. 23, 2024; 2024 background: then administrator Jeff Roberts on the checkbox effect; not a response to Parton)", "url": "https://wpln.org/post/in-tennessee-your-ballot-may-not-show-the-name-you-wanted-why-it-happens-and-how-to-fix-it/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton__wpln-2024-10-23.html"}, {"title": "WTVF NewsChannel 5 — Voters have reported trouble with touch screens and now there's a solution (October 2024 background: Davidson County stir sticks restored; not a response to Parton)", "url": "https://www.newschannel5.com/election/voters-have-reported-trouble-with-touch-screens-and-now-theres-a-solution", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton__wtvf-2024-10-davidson-stir-sticks.html"}, {"title": "X — The Tennessee Holler (@TheTNHoller), \"Stella Parton (Dolly's Sister) is among the Tennesseans reporting voting machines tried to flip her @Jerri_M_Green vote to Marsha Blackburn\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 12:26 PM ET; image is the WSMV Instagram graphic)", "url": "https://x.com/TheTNHoller/status/2112943510647103675", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--tnholler__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Instagram — WSMV (@wsmvtv), two-image carousel quoting Parton's Facebook post (Oct. 21, 2026, 11:42 AM ET)", "url": "https://www.instagram.com/wsmvtv/p/DewwVI9ERqw/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--wsmv-ig__caption.txt"}, {"title": "The Tennessean — Dolly Parton's sister, Stella, reminds voters to double check their ballots after early voting in TN (Oct. 21, 2026; quotes her second Facebook post and a statement from Coordinator of Elections Mark Goins; paywalled, no local copy)", "url": "https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/elections/2026/10/21/dolly-parton-sister-reports-early-voting-issue-how-verify-ballot/92363987007/"}, {"title": "X — Jared Weinstein (@jared_weinstein), reply: voted Oct. 21 at the Hermitage Library, all Democrat, \"at no point was my vote for Green flipped\" (Oct. 21, 2026, 4:16 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/jared_weinstein/status/2113001618774114407", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--weinstein__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "WSMV 4 Nashville — We brought early voting concerns to the head of Tennessee elections. Here's what he said (Oct. 21, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wsmv.com/2026/10/21/we-brought-early-voting-concerns-head-tennessee-elections-heres-what-he-said/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Tennessee touchscreen selection reports (ei-2026-10-125)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}, {"title": "The Nashville Focal — Davidson County reintroduces stir sticks as voters report touchscreen selection problems (Oct. 23, 2026; announced Oct. 22; Deputy Administrator Lisa Pierce)", "url": "https://focalnews.org/nashville-tn/politics/davidson-county-reintroduces-stir-sticks-as-voters-report-touchscreen-selection-problems"}], "notes": "EMon refresh 2026-10-24 AM (ei-2026-10-125 update): stir sticks reintroduced Oct. 22 (Focal curl 200). The county changed its procedure in response to the reports, but no machine fault has been found, so the card stays Citizen Testimony. Promoted from the research queue 2026-10-22 (EDS/EMon ingest, ~6:30 PM ET): WKRN (Oct. 22) adds an independent named first-hand Davidson County voter (Gladys McCowen, Bellevue Library) and a Davidson County administrator response (John Richardson: fewer than a handful of reports among at least 62,755 early voters), meeting Mark's corroboration rule. WKRN curl 200, McCowen, Parton and Richardson passages text-verified. Placed on the new On-screen steering leaf per Mark (2026-10-21). Cross-leaf: Touchscreen calibration (peer: tn-williamson-2026-early-voting-selections-switched-green-to-blackburn). Vendor not tagged: sources do not name the machines. Names as in sources; nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--wsmv-ig__photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--wsmv-ig__photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "WSMV Instagram graphic: Stella Parton, headline \"'Don't let them rig this.' Dolly Parton's sister claims she had to correct her ballot selection while voting in Tennessee\""}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--wsmv-ig__photo-2-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tn-davidson-2026-10-hermitage-touchscreen-defaulted-blackburn-parton--wsmv-ig__photo-2-thumb.webp", "alt": "WSMV Instagram graphic quoting Parton: \"In Tennessee last week at the Hermitage Library where I voted, I had to go back three times and correct my vote because it kept defaulting to Marsha Blackburn... Don't let them rig this election.\""}]}
{"id": "wi-2026-x-bun-to-the-gee-dane-two-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-15", "uid": "C20261014-201922-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-15", "old_ids": ["wi-2026-x-bun-to-the-gee-dane-two-ballots"], "seq": "C01411", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-09", "state": "WI", "description": "Poster @Bun_to_the_gee (profile location Madison, Wisconsin), replying to a WisPolitics reporter's post, says, \"I received two ballots as well, but I'm in Dane Co. i just shredded one of them.\" The post does not say which election or whether the names differed. Posted Sept. 9, 2026 (10:40 AM ET), the day the Elections Commission ruled on Green Bay's duplicate ballots. This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @Bun_to_the_gee, citizen report (posted 2026-09-09 10:40 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Bun_to_the_gee/status/2097696720230502742", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wi-2026-x-bun-to-the-gee-dane-two-ballots__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Context post not retrieved; 'as well' likely refers to Green Bay duplicate-ballot coverage. Peer: wi-green-bay-2026-duplicate-absentee-ballots-april-august-wec-probable-cause."}
{"id": "wa-2026-x-hashjtodd-two-primary-ballots-each-self-and-wife", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-14", "uid": "C20261014-201922-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-14", "old_ids": ["wa-2026-x-hashjtodd-two-primary-ballots-each-self-and-wife"], "seq": "C01410", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-08", "state": "WA", "description": "Poster @HashJTodd (profile location WA) says he and his wife each received two ballots by USPS for the primaries. County not stated. Posted Sept. 22, 2026 (11:43 AM ET), in reply to @JimWalshLD19. This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @HashJTodd, citizen report (posted 2026-09-22 11:43 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/HashJTodd/status/2102423519019884885", "local": "/archives/2026/10/wa-2026-x-hashjtodd-two-primary-ballots-each-self-and-wife__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. Primary read as the Aug. 2026 WA primary (unclear). Partly secondhand (spouse)."}
{"id": "mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-08", "uid": "C20261020-221915-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-08", "old_ids": ["mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations"], "seq": "C01481", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-07-22", "state": "MI", "description": "In a video published July 22, 2026, reporter Charlie LeDuff (Michigan Enjoyer / No BS News Hour) showed 88-year-old Elizabeth Waffle of the Milan, Michigan, area FEC records attributing to her about 14,696 contributions totaling nearly $150,000 over five years, about eight a day averaging $9.18, including 47 to U.S. Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed. Waffle lives in a camp trailer on a dirt road after her house burned down two years earlier. Her own words, condensed: \"I doubt it.\" \"Hell no. I don't have that kind of money.\" Asked whether she has internet, she said, \"Sometimes\"; the captioned exchange about owning a computer is unclear (\"Yeah, I have a computer\" followed by \"No\"), and the published reports state that she does not own one. \"No, I don't think I've donated that much.\" \"I can't believe it.\" Shown a candidate she did not know: \"Doesn't ring a bell at all.\" \"$150,000 is very abnormal, and I think it's wrong. I think there's something in there that's off.\" \"No, I do everything through ActBlue.\" She confirmed that she makes small donations through ActBlue, including to El-Sayed, but not at that volume. The records show contributions from her trailer and from an apartment she rented after the fire, sometimes on the same day. The Center Square, using FEC records filtered to ActBlue, counted 12,900 contributions totaling $100,295 across the 2021-2026 cycles, ranging from $0.24 to $107.50, and could not fully reconcile the difference from LeDuff's figures. ActBlue said it had reviewed the data, contacted the donor, and takes corrective action on noncompliant donations, and it pointed to its split (\"tandem\") donation feature, which reports one gift as several transactions. This is a single first-hand account; no official finding has been made. Peter Bernegger later cited it on X as smurfing and elder financial abuse.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — Michigan Enjoyer, \"Democrat 'Mega Donor' Lives in Squalor\" (July 22, 2026; 4:17)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEDxg_NatWE"}, {"title": "Michigan Enjoyer — Is El-Sayed's Campaign Funded by Elderly Fake Donors? (Charlie LeDuff, July 22, 2026)", "url": "https://enjoyer.com/is-el-sayed-s-campaign-funded-by-elderly-fake-donors-actblue/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__enjoyer-is-el-sayed-s-campaign-funded-by-elderly-fake-donors-actblue.html"}, {"title": "No BS News Hour — El-Sayed Scampaign Donors, Episode 427 (July 22, 2026)", "url": "https://nobsnewshour.com/el-sayed-scampaign-donors-3/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__nobsnewshour-el-sayed-scampaign-donors-3.html"}, {"title": "The Center Square — ActBlue faces scrutiny over Michigan woman's $100K+ in donations (July 27, 2026; ActBlue statement)", "url": "https://www.thecentersquare.com/michigan/article_a84c0848-d013-49db-a529-1b45454aeda6.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__thecentersquare-article-a84c0848-d013-49db-a529-1b45454aeda6.html"}, {"title": "The Midwesterner — Woman living in trailer 'gave' $150,000 to Dems over 5 years via ActBlue (July 22, 2026)", "url": "https://www.themidwesterner.news/2026/07/video-abdul-el-sayed-donor-not-aware-she-is-one-woman-living-in-trailer-gave-150000-to-dems-over-5-years-via-actblue/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__themidwesterner-video-abdul-el-sayed-donor-not-aware-she-is-one-woman-living-in-.html"}, {"title": "X — Peter Bernegger (@PeterBernegger), smurfing \"donor\" is 88 (Oct. 10, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/PeterBernegger/status/2108924056644849721", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Quotes taken from the YouTube auto-captions and checked against the Enjoyer and Center Square text. The computer exchange remains unclear in the audio captions, so the card quotes both lines and attributes the no-computer statement to the published reports. Speaker attribution for \"No, I do everything through ActBlue\" is also from captions. County not stated in sources (Milan straddles Washtenaw and Monroe counties). Video archived with capture_video.py (720p MP4 over 20 MB, held off-line; poster published) and X post archived with capture_x_post.py. No redactions.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zEDxg_NatWE", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 257.022, "bytes": 42500372, "sha256": "963568ddf776903bd272cf5cdc93d91da7abc66bb358f099d84d3c7c89540955", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__yt-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mi-2026-07-22-waffle-88-denies-150k-actblue-donations__yt-video.json"}]}
{"id": "tx-2026-05-12-hearst-paxton-winred-complaints-allmon", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-22", "uid": "C20261020-221915-22", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-22", "old_ids": ["tx-2026-05-12-hearst-paxton-winred-complaints-allmon"], "seq": "C01495", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2026-05-12", "state": "TX", "description": "On May 12, 2026, Hearst Newspapers (the Austin American-Statesman and San Antonio Express-News) reported, from a public-records request, that the Texas attorney general's office received 27 consumer complaints about WinRed and 21 about ActBlue from January 2020 to April 27, 2026; in nearly half, donors said small one-time gifts had multiplied into repeated charges. Charlene Allmon of Buda (Hays County), 87, thought she was making a handful of modest one-time donations to Republican candidates, but WinRed drafted more than $15,000 from her bank account in 2024 and 2025, charging her 29 times in a single day. She said she \"didn't realize they were sucking my life savings out of my bank account.\" The report found no public action by the attorney general's office on the WinRed complaints, while the office sued ActBlue. On June 1, 2026, Reps. Jamie Raskin, Sylvia Garcia and Joseph Morelle of the House Judiciary Committee wrote to Attorney General Paxton that Texas residents, many of them seniors or people with disabilities, had reported being defrauded by WinRed, and asked what he had done about it. WinRed did not respond to Hearst's request for comment; its help center states that it does not charge donors without authorization and that recurring contributions or pledges explain most unrecognized charges. These are first-hand complaints by donors who gave some money. They describe unwanted repeat charges on their own accounts, not gifts made by someone else in their names; they are carded here because the same mechanism inflates the high transaction counts that are cited as smurfing on both platforms.", "sources": [{"title": "Austin American-Statesman (Hearst) — Ken Paxton ignored complaints about GOP fundraiser he uses, then sued its Democratic competitor (May 12, 2026)", "url": "https://www.statesman.com/politics/article/ken-paxton-winred-actblue-complaints-22245170.php", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2026-05-12-hearst-paxton-winred-complaints-allmon__statesman-ken-paxton-winred-actblue-complaints-22245170.html"}, {"title": "House Judiciary Committee Democrats — Letter from Reps. Raskin, Garcia and Morelle to Attorney General Paxton regarding WinRed (June 1, 2026)", "url": "https://democrats-judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/democrats-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2026-06-01-raskin-garcia-morelle-to-paxton-tx-oag-re-winred.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2026-05-12-hearst-paxton-winred-complaints-allmon__house-2026-06-01-raskin-garcia-morelle-to-paxton-tx-oag-re-winred.pdf"}, {"title": "WinRed Help Center — What happens when I dispute a WinRed charge?", "url": "https://support.winred.com/en/articles/8796421-what-happens-when-i-dispute-a-winred-charge", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2026-05-12-hearst-paxton-winred-complaints-allmon__winred-8796421-what-happens-when-i-dispute-a-winred-charge.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue/WinRed smurfing research 2026-10-20. WinRed card. Allmon's age, the $15,000, the 29 charges in one day, the complaint counts and WinRed's non-response were verified in the Statesman text. Label: Citizen Testimony (first-hand complaint records), with the mechanism stated plainly. Buda is in Hays County."}
{"id": "ca-2025-x-rainygday-two-ballots-married-and-maiden-name", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-17", "uid": "C20261014-201922-17", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-17", "old_ids": ["ca-2025-x-rainygday-two-ballots-married-and-maiden-name"], "seq": "C01413", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2025", "state": "CA", "description": "Poster @rainygday (profile location Los Angeles, CA) says that last year she got two ballots, one in her married name and one in her maiden name, and that this has happened to multiple friends of hers in California. A married/maiden pair is a name-variant duplicate record for one person. Posted Oct. 8, 2026 (11:54 AM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @rainygday, citizen report (posted 2026-10-08 11:54 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/rainygday/status/2108224455281631369", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-2025-x-rainygday-two-ballots-married-and-maiden-name__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. 'Last year' = 2025 (likely Nov. 2025 CA special election). Friends' cases are secondhand and not counted. Cross-leaf: Voter Rolls > Duplicate entries maiden/married names."}
{"id": "md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years", "permanent_id": "C20261008-221941-01", "uid": "C20261008-221941-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-221941-01", "old_ids": ["md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years"], "seq": "C00293", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2024", "state": "MD", "description": "Poster Matt Post (profile location Baltimore, Maryland), replying on October 8, 2026 to Patty Morin's post about Harford County specimen ballots, says he has lived in his Baltimore house for more than 16 years and periodically receives election mail like this for a name that belongs to no one in his household and was not the previous owner either. He says the envelope in his photo is from 2024. The photo shows a Baltimore City Board of Elections \"Official Election Mail\" envelope with the instruction to return it if the addressee does not live there, marked by hand \"RETURN TO SENDER\" and \"No one by this name here for at least 13 years.\" The envelope's contents (ballot, specimen ballot or other notice) are not shown. This is a single unverified citizen report. Election mail arriving for someone who no longer lives at an address shows the voter roll may be inaccurate; it does not show that any ballot was voted or counted. Returned-undeliverable mail like this is exactly what should trigger NVRA confirmation and eventual removal.", "sources": [{"title": "X — Matt Post (@mjpost), citizen report, reply to @PattyMorin (posted 2026-10-08 12:03 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/mjpost/status/2108226858537857433", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Photo attached to the post (as posted; no redaction by tracker)", "url": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years__x-photo-1-orig.jpg"}], "notes": "Citizen-X-2026-10-08 (Mark approved citizen X reports as evidence/feedback). First-hand post via api.fxtwitter.com; no paid X API. Single unverified citizen report; wrong-address mail = roll inaccuracy, not proof it was voted. Mail dated 2024 per poster; post date 2026-10-08. Envelope = official election mail; contents not shown.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2024-x-mjpost-baltimore-city-boe-mail-for-unknown-name-13-years__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "Photo attached to Matt Post's post (as posted)"}]}
{"id": "multi-2024-08-16-omg-fridrich-bulow-shearer-actblue-donor-interviews", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-11", "uid": "C20261020-221915-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-11", "old_ids": ["multi-2024-08-16-omg-fridrich-bulow-shearer-actblue-donor-interviews"], "seq": "C01484", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2024-08-16", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "In an O'Keefe Media Group video posted August 16, 2024, OMG citizen journalists showed three listed ActBlue donors FEC data in their names. Fernandina Beach, Nassau County, Florida: records attributed more than 11,000 to 16,000 contributions totaling about $384,000 to Heinz Fridrich from 2017 to 2023, with 40 to 50 on a single day. Pam Fridrich, his wife: \"He did not do $300,000 worth of anything in three years.\" Asked whether they made the contributions: \"Not to my knowledge, maybe a few, but not 50 of them, no.\" Heinz Fridrich: \"No.\" Asked about 50 a day: \"No, no, absolutely not.\" Las Vegas, Nevada: Elaina Bulow, attributed with about 830 contributions and $111,000, said, \"What's on that website is a lot of bullsh*t\" (as printed by OMG), \"Not that much,\" and \"Not $111,000,\" but also said she gives small amounts often, checks her bank statements, and that her ActBlue charges are \"always correct.\" Salt Lake City, Utah: Marilyn Shearer, attributed with about 3,600 transactions and $133,000, said, \"I donate quite a bit, probably every day,\" and shook her head when asked whether she had given more than $100,000. These are individual first-hand accounts. Bulow's and Shearer's statements are mixed, and none has been verified by officials.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"BREAKING: Donors Across the U.S. Deny Massive ActBlue Donations Amid Attorney General Investigations\" (Aug. 16, 2024; 9:10)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vB6ztr6R2OE"}, {"title": "O'Keefe Media Group — article version (site dates it April 16, 2024; the YouTube upload is Aug. 16, 2024)", "url": "https://okeefemediagroup.com/breaking-donors-across-the-u-s-deny-massive-actblue-donations-amid-attorney-general-investigations/"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. One card for one video. Mark may prefer three single-state cards (FL, NV, UT); the text splits cleanly. The OMG page's April 16, 2024 date conflicts with its own reference to six attorney-general investigations, which began in August 2024, so the YouTube date is used. Quotes from auto-captions plus the OMG article. Video archived with capture_video.py (720p MP4 over 20 MB, held off-line; poster published).", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vB6ztr6R2OE", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-08-16-omg-fridrich-bulow-shearer-actblue-donor-interviews__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 549.872, "bytes": 56760517, "sha256": "36c42256754da782b7bfd193865c4f672f61b42ce6163cfbf410304bd53f3a03", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/multi-2024-08-16-omg-fridrich-bulow-shearer-actblue-donor-interviews__yt-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-08-16-omg-fridrich-bulow-shearer-actblue-donor-interviews__yt-video.json"}]}
{"id": "in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-09", "uid": "C20261020-221915-09", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-09", "old_ids": ["in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations"], "seq": "C01482", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2024-08-05", "state": "IN", "description": "In an O'Keefe Media Group video posted August 5, 2024, Angi Jones of Indiana recorded her mother, Alberta Jones of Bedford, Lawrence County (her own Republican gifts are listed in FEC records as Alberta Jones and as Mrs. Robert E. Jones), after finding the household's name on more than 30 FEC-reported ActBlue contributions to Bernie Sanders committees from 2019 to 2024. Alberta Jones's own words, condensed: asked whether she gave to Bernie Sanders, \"Absolutely not.\" \"I'm very positive. I have bank records that show where my contributions went.\" \"I feel violated.\" She said she gives about $600 to $700 a year, up to $1,000 near elections, \"to Trump primarily.\" Told that the records show her husband giving $10.30 a month to Friends of Bernie Sanders in April 2024: \"No way.\" \"I can tell you I wouldn't bother to write a check for $10.\" Her husband, Robert, died on July 12, 2018, so contributions attributed to him in 2024 could not have been his. OMG showed bank records she provided, which it said show no ActBlue contributions in 2019. FEC records checked for this card list the Sanders contributions under \"Jones, Robert\" at a different house number on the same street in Bedford, while Alberta Jones's own contributions to Trump committees are listed at her address; the \"Jones, Robert\" ActBlue entries, mostly $5.15 to $10.30, run from 2018 through August 2026 and also go to other Democratic candidates. The records alone do not show whether that address belongs to a different, living Robert Jones or whether the entries were misattributed to the household. This is a single first-hand account, and no official finding has been made.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"Indiana Woman Denies Thousands in ActBlue Donations, Provides Bank Records to OMG Against FEC Claims\" (Aug. 5, 2024; 4:04)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6WrGE0EwbQ"}, {"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"ICYMI: Indiana Woman Denies ActBlue Donations; Bank Records Show Support for Trump PACs\" (Aug. 7, 2024; 1:01)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfzAN3lP9Q4"}, {"title": "O'Keefe Media Group — article covering the Jones, Staples and Henderson accounts (Aug. 7, 2024)", "url": "https://okeefemediagroup.com/tx-woman-denies-actblue-donations-theres-no-way-i-made-all-those-tx-sheriffs-office-responds/"}, {"title": "FEC — Individual contributions: \"Jones, Robert,\" Bedford, Indiana, via ActBlue", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/?contributor_name=jones%2C+robert&contributor_city=bedford&contributor_state=IN&committee_id=C00401224"}, {"title": "FEC — Individual contributions: \"Jones, Alberta,\" Indiana", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/receipts/individual-contributions/?contributor_name=jones%2C+alberta&contributor_state=IN"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Quotes from YouTube auto-captions, condensed to Alberta Jones's words only. FEC rows checked Oct. 20, 2026 through the FEC API: \"Jones, Robert\" ActBlue/Sanders rows list 1717 Windwood Dr., Bedford; Alberta Jones's rows list 2126 Windwood Dr. (also \"Jones, Robert E. Mrs.\" at ZIP+4 47421-3950). The house numbers are recorded here, not in the description. The OMG article spells the daughter's name Angi. Both videos archived with capture_video.py and published.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6WrGE0EwbQ", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 243.879, "bytes": 9615272, "sha256": "a9d6679dcef748dbe2a3f71f4ab68ecd4c1310906c15704e5084c7e4e655469e", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video.json"}, {"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RfzAN3lP9Q4", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video-icymi.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video-icymi-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 61.115, "bytes": 2426488, "sha256": "80ba00728892e4e582b2eeb989f5631779a7189662ce1073f7bf5d2d7c113b64", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/in-2024-08-05-alberta-jones-deceased-husband-actblue-donations__yt-video-icymi.json"}]}
{"id": "nj-2020-x-jencie3131-maiden-name-registration-not-removed-two-ballots", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-18", "uid": "C20261014-201922-18", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-18", "old_ids": ["nj-2020-x-jencie3131-maiden-name-registration-not-removed-two-ballots"], "seq": "C01414", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Modified clones: duplicate voter records of the same person with slightly altered names, birthdates, or addresses, so each looks unique and each can receive a ballot"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-87", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-87", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2020", "state": "NJ", "description": "Poster @jencie3131 (profile location New Jersey), replying to Rep. Frank Pallone, says she got two ballots during COVID because her maiden-name registration was not removed after she registered in a different county, and that she told Newark officials. That is a name-variant, cross-county duplicate record for one person. Posted Sept. 1, 2026 (6:11 PM ET). This is a single unverified citizen report. Receiving two ballots shows the roll may carry duplicate or inconsistently kept records for one person; it does not show that both ballots were voted or counted.", "sources": [{"title": "X — @jencie3131, citizen report (posted 2026-09-01 18:11 ET)", "url": "https://x.com/jencie3131/status/2094911012038217924", "local": "/archives/2026/10/nj-2020-x-jencie3131-maiden-name-registration-not-removed-two-ballots__x-post-capture.png"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Per CITIZEN-CARD-RULE.md; text via api.fxtwitter.com; no photo attached. 2020 per 'during Covid'. Essex County (Newark) inferred for the old record. Peer: nj-paquette-2025-jiw-shift-cipher card."}
{"id": "tx-2008-straight-party-democratic-ticket-shows-republican-seven-counties", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-08", "uid": "C20261020-160717-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-08", "old_ids": ["tx-2008-straight-party-democratic-ticket-shows-republican-seven-counties"], "seq": "C01001", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2008-10", "state": "TX", "description": "During 2008 early voting, voters in at least seven Texas counties (Collin, Dallas, El Paso, Galveston, Harris, Jefferson, Palo Pinto) complained that when they chose a straight-party Democratic ticket, the machine showed Republican choices instead, for the presidential race or the whole ballot. Lona Jones of Mineral Wells told McClatchy-Tribune and WIRED that her straight-Democratic press on an ES&S iVotronic at the Palo Pinto County courthouse returned all Republicans, twice; Democratic Party office manager Teresa Crosier said the same happened to her. The counties used three different systems (ES&S iVotronic, Diebold/Premier AccuVote-TS and Hart InterCivic eSlate). Hart said one described scenario was impossible on its machines; ES&S said poll workers could not replicate the problem. VotersUnite urged voters to skip the straight-party option. No official finding was published. Direction reported: Democrat to Republican. Status Citizen Testimony: first-hand voter accounts; no official confirmation. Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "WIRED — Texas Voters Urged to Avoid Straight-Party Option, After Vote-Flip Complaints (Oct. 29, 2008)", "url": "https://www.wired.com/2008/10/straight-party-2/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2008-straight-party-democratic-ticket-shows-republican-seven-counties__wiredtx2008.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (wiredtx2008). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S", "Diebold/Premier", "Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["iVotronic", "AccuVote-TS", "eSlate"]}
{"id": "nm-2004-bernalillo-sandoval-touchscreen-kerry-bush-voter-reports", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-03", "uid": "C20261020-160717-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-03", "old_ids": ["nm-2004-bernalillo-sandoval-touchscreen-kerry-bush-voter-reports"], "seq": "C00996", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Citizen Testimony", "date": "2004-11-02", "state": "NM", "description": "In the Nov. 2, 2004 general election, voters in Bernalillo and Sandoval counties, New Mexico reported to election-protection hotlines (the Election Incident Reporting System and Vote Protect) that Sequoia touchscreen machines registered a Kerry selection as Bush, sometimes needing up to three tries to correct; a smaller number in Sandoval reported the reverse. The reports were compiled by VotersUnite (Ellen Theisen and Warren Stewart, \"Summary Report on New Mexico State Election Data\"). No county or state official confirmed a calibration fault, no machine-level finding was published, and New Mexico replaced its DREs with hand-marked paper ballots in 2006. Status Citizen Testimony: first-hand voter hotline reports, compiled by an advocacy group, without official confirmation. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "VotersUnite — New Mexico 2004 touchscreen vote-switching reports", "url": "https://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3417"}, {"title": "Theisen & Stewart — Summary Report on New Mexico State Election Data, Nov. 2, 2004 (PDF)", "url": "https://www.democracyfornewmexico.com/democracy_for_new_mexico/files/NewMexico2004ElectionDataReport.pdf"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 0 (none). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): VotersUnite, Theisen & Stewart. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Sequoia"], "vendor_models": ["Sequoia touchscreen DRE"]}
{"id": "ny-bronx-2026-10-24-plaza-rehab-early-voting-observer-friesdat-unsealed-machines-claim-boe-bars-observer", "permanent_id": "C20261109-122834-06", "uid": "C20261109-122834-06", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261109-122834-06", "old_ids": ["ny-bronx-2026-10-24-plaza-rehab-early-voting-observer-friesdat-unsealed-machines-claim-boe-bars-observer"], "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Broken physical seals that destroy the chain of custody of paper ballots"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-43", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-43", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-10-24 to 2026-10-25 (incident); 2026-10-26 (posts); 2026-10-28 (BOE response)", "state": "NY", "description": "SMART Elections co-founder Lulu Friesdat, a credentialed election observer, said in a video and social-media posts on Oct. 25 to 26, 2026 that at a Bronx early-voting site poll workers were dismissed and left while voting machines remained unlocked and unsealed with ballots still inside, that she was told to leave before the machines and ballot bags were sealed in observers' view, and that police became involved when she pressed for details. Uptown Voices (Oct. 28) identified the site as the Plaza Rehab and Nursing Center and reported that the New York City Board of Elections barred Friesdat from all Board-controlled poll sites for the rest of the 2026 general-election voting period; Deputy Executive Director Vincent Ignizio said she was banned 'for engaging in disruptive behavior that impacted the voters and the voting process,' that a Board letter accused her of interfering with site preparations, disregarding lawful instructions and obstructing voter access on Oct. 24 and 25, that there were 'no election-integrity issues in the Bronx,' and that early-voting ballots are removed, counted and sealed nightly and taken by NYPD to a secure location. Separately, Common Cause New York's Susan Lerner, citing the Board, said machines are not shut down and sealed each night during the nine-day early-voting period because moving them daily is not feasible. Friesdat has posted that she is suing the Board; Ignizio cited active litigation. Status Disputed: the observer's first-hand account is contradicted by the Board, which has not addressed her specific description of machines left unsealed with ballots inside; the site, dates and the Board's response are confirmed by news reporting that reached the Board. Catalog point: when the only observer pressing to watch the nightly closing is removed and banned, the public is left with the Board's word that the seals were applied — exactly the custody step observers are there to see.", "sources": [{"title": "Uptown Voices — NYC Board of Elections bans poll watcher after viral Instagram post (Octavio Blanco, Oct. 28, 2026)", "url": "https://www.uptownvoices.nyc/p/breaking-news-nyc-board-of-elections-bans-poll-watcher-after-viral-instagram-post", "local": "/archives/2026/11/uptownvoices-nycboe-bans-friesdat-2026-10.html"}, {"title": "Uptown Voices — Bronx early voting dispute debunked (Common Cause's Susan Lerner citing the NYC Board of Elections; Oct. 2026)", "url": "https://www.uptownvoices.nyc/p/uptown-voices-breaking-news-bronx-early-voting-dispute-debunked", "local": "/archives/2026/11/uptownvoices-bronx-dispute-commoncause-2026-10.html"}, {"title": "X — @WebAddictCanada, shares observer video by Lulu Friesdat (Oct. 26, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/WebAddictCanada/status/2114559707381628953"}, {"title": "Muted News — Bronx poll watcher says she was ordered out as machines sat unlocked (Oct. 28, 2026; retells her video)", "url": "https://muted.news/en/watch-mamdani-tells-new-yorkers-to-bring-nothing-to-vote-while-bronx-poll-watcher-says-she-was-ordered-out-as-machines-sat-unlocked"}], "notes": "Promoted 2026-11-09 12:28 PM ET from research queue item ny-bronx-2026-10-25-observer-friesdat-early-voting-machines-left-unsealed-ballots-inside (EMon ei-2026-10-166): Uptown Voices' Oct. 28 report carries the NYC Board of Elections deputy executive director's on-record response naming the site and dates, a news report that reached the people involved (Mark's 2026-10-20 rule). Labeled Disputed because the Board contradicts the account. Both Uptown Voices pages archived (curl 200). Zero X API. Nothing redacted."}
{"id": "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-03", "uid": "C20261028-132233-03", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-03", "old_ids": ["ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible"], "seq": "C01598", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-32", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-32", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-10-23 to 2026-10-26", "state": "CA", "description": "A video first posted on Instagram by @themidihead on Oct. 23, 2026, and reposted on X by Libs of TikTok on Oct. 25 with the text \"California is rigging the elections\" (1,576,415 views when archived), shows a Ventura County vote-by-mail return envelope with a ballot inside and the oval for gubernatorial candidate Xavier Becerra visible in the envelope hole. [1][2][3] As transcribed by Lead Stories, the narrator says, \"…you're gonna get Xavier Becerra in that hole… That is Xavier Becerra's circle inside the circle. So, again be very careful how you place your ballot in your California envelope.\" [3] Ventura County Registrar of Voters Michelle Ascencion told Lead Stories on Oct. 26 that the hole on the front confirms the envelope is empty and the holes on the back guide the signature, and that \"The holes are NOT positioned in order to see the vote on a particular contest\"; the November ballot has three double-sided cards, about 50 contests, and 187 ballot types. [3] The county's FAQ says the hole lets workers confirm no ballot is left in the envelope and that Ventura also zip-ties envelopes through the holes as a final check. [4] Status Disputed: the video shows that a contest oval can sit in the hole when the ballot is folded a certain way, but the registrar denies the holes are placed to reveal votes, and the rigging claim is unsupported by any evidence of discarded or altered ballots.", "sources": [{"title": "Libs of TikTok on X — \"California is rigging the elections\" (Oct. 25, 2026, 1:00 PM ET; 1,576,415 views at capture; reposts @themidihead video)", "url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/2114401841719153115", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Archived X post metadata (fxtwitter JSON) for the Libs of TikTok Ventura post", "url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/2114401841719153115", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "Lead Stories (Alexis Tereszcuk) — Fact Check: California ballot envelope hole does NOT prove election rigging (Oct. 26, 2026; includes Ventura County registrar statement)", "url": "https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2026/10/fact-check-california-ballot-envelope-hole-does-not-prove-election-rigging.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__lead-stories-2026-10-26.html"}, {"title": "Ventura County Clerk-Recorder / Registrar of Voters — Elections FAQ (hole on the ballot envelope; zip-tied through the hole; AB 37 mailing to every registered voter)", "url": "https://clerkrecorder.venturacounty.gov/elections/elections/frequently-asked-questions/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28. The video shows only the Becerra oval; posts that framed it as Becerra vs. Hilton describe the race, not what the video shows.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/libsoftiktok/status/2114401841719153115", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 51.455, "bytes": 5690641, "sha256": "0be99563a4d51743cdcbc5611e89f5a260f4ebc484ea4a3066b498518793c88b", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible__x-video.json"}], "related": ["ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "va-fairfax-2025-10-return-envelope-hole-punch-oval-visible-electoral-board-minutes", "co-rule-7-2-17-2024-holes-in-return-envelopes-target-area-visibility-ban", "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes"]}
{"id": "il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person", "permanent_id": "C20261020-193806-01", "uid": "C20261020-193806-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-193806-01", "old_ids": ["il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person"], "seq": "C01472", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program touchscreen voting machines to display messages that discourage or steer a voter's choices, such as a warning that the selected candidate is not a popular choice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-84", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-84", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-10-19 (follow-up video 2026-10-20; official denials 2026-10-20 to 2026-10-23)", "state": "IL", "description": "A voter named Mary (TikTok @bauerbabe21) says that while early voting on a touchscreen at the Streamwood Village Hall early-voting site, 351 E. Irving Park Road, Streamwood, in suburban Cook County, Illinois, the screen showed a notification bar reading \"People are not typically choosing this person!\" after she selected a Republican candidate in the circuit judge contest (vote for three). She says the message disappeared once she had selected all three Republicans. She took no photo, because a man she did not know approached her screen and her three children while she was voting. Her father contacted someone at the Illinois \"Office of Voter Integrity,\" who said it would be investigated if she could provide a picture. An Illinois Republican Party staffer called her and said the matter would be raised at a staff meeting and with the party's in-house counsel. She urged Streamwood voters to try to photograph the message. This is a single first-hand citizen report. No screen image exists, and no election official has confirmed it. Mary did not name the machine brand. The vendor tag comes from county records: Cook County's voting equipment is Dominion Voting Systems (ImageCast X touchscreen ballot-marking devices and ImageCast Precinct ICP2 scanners) under a county contract that runs to Sept. 30, 2028, and the Illinois State Board of Elections equipment log lists Dominion for Cook County. The Dominion attribution in the viral reposts came from the reposters, not from her. Cook County Commissioner Sean Morrison (17th District, a former Cook County Republican Party chairman) replied to the Wall Street Apes post: \"I find this 99.99% false …. Did she record it ? Has any other person validated this? NO.\" \n\nTranscript (Mary's words only, lightly condensed; the commentator segments added by the reposters are omitted):\n\nVideo 1 (TikTok, posted Oct. 19, 2026): \"So I voted this morning and I want to tell you guys about something that popped up. For reference, I live in Illinois and I'm actually in the county where Chicago is. It's called Cook County, but I'm in the suburbs in Streamwood. … I still find it to be my civic duty, so I still went out and I voted, early voting. One of the questions was about the judges, and I picked the Republican judges, and once I selected one of the judges, I got a notification on the bar that said, 'People are not typically choosing this person!' You have to select three. So I selected the three Republicans, and then the error message went away. So why is my ballot telling me that who I'm picking isn't the more popular choice?\"\n\nVideo 2 (TikTok, posted Oct. 20, 2026): \"No, I did not get a picture. I didn't get a picture because I had my three kids with me, and while I was trying to fill out the circuit judge thing, there was a man who was coming up trying to look at my screen and talk to my kids. … So I was distracted, but it was enough to register what was going on, and I didn't really think about it being weird until later on in the day. That's when I made the video. So I called my dad … he called somebody he knew who works for the Office of Voter Integrity … and he said that if I could get a picture of it, they would investigate it. Also, from the TikTok I made yesterday, somebody from the Illinois Republican Party reached out to me, and we spoke on the phone. … She said she's going to bring it up at the staff meeting today, and she was going to consult with their in-house counsel about if there was anything they could do. … Why did I not take the second to just take the freaking photo? … If anybody lives in Streamwood and is eligible for early voting at Town Hall in Streamwood on Irving Park Road, I urge you to go this week and try to get a picture of it.\" Update (Oct. 20 to 24, 2026). The Center Square identifies her as Mary Bauer. Race attribution admitted wrong: no Republican filed for any Cook County judgeship in 2026 (Injustice Watch, Feb. 13, 2026), so the circuit judge contest she first named had no Republican candidates. In a third TikTok, posted Oct. 20, 2026 at 10:17 PM ET by TikTok's own timestamp (AFP and the brief give Oct. 22), she read an email from an unnamed Streamwood Township employee. He wrote that the vote-for-three contest she meant was Metropolitan Water Reclamation District (MWRD) Commissioner, 6-year term, whose three Republicans are Michelle Pennington, Timothy E. Rueckert and Jill B. Shestokas, and that the machine flags an undervote on the separate unexpired 2-year MWRD line, where Cameron \"Cam\" Davis (D) is unopposed. She accepted the correction of the race (\"Even though I had the section wrong\") and said she would make the original video private, but she maintained that a different message appeared in the 6-year MWRD contest: after she selected Michelle Pennington, \"a red line of text\" said \"Not a lot of people are voting for this candidate\"; it disappeared when she deselected Pennington and reappeared when she selected Jill Shestokas; she then selected Timothy Rueckert and went back to Pennington (she names the candidates by first name; surnames from the WTTW voter guide). She said she also received undervote notices for contests she left blank and that those were different. At about 3:42 she says: \"I know for a fact that that message still appeared … fewer people or less people are voting for this candidate.\" The email also says Garcia would have poll watchers and other voters try to duplicate it, and that \"we have been so far unable to duplicate what you saw.\" Her original Oct. 19 video is now private (TikTok returns a self-only status); the archived copy remains on this card, and Video 2 is still public. Official responses: Illinois State Board of Elections spokesperson Matt Dietrich told The Center Square (Oct. 23): \"No voting machine in Illinois could display that message. … That post is a hoax.\" Cook County Clerk's Office spokesperson Frank Herrera said on Oct. 20 that the claims \"are patently false and mislead the public as to how voting equipment actually operates in suburban Cook County\" (AFP), and told Snopes this is \"the only report of this type\" in a jurisdiction of nearly 1.8 million registered voters, with more than 54,000 early-voting ballots cast. Clerk Monica Gordon said on Oct. 21: \"Claims that voting equipment attempts to influence voters are false and misleading,\" adding that the equipment may display a notification when a voter leaves a contest blank or does not make all available selections (an undervote). Streamwood Village Clerk and Hanover Township Republican Committeeman Aris Garcia said on Oct. 20: \"We have attempted to recreate the reported message and were unable to reproduce the experience described.\" Liberty Vote (which acquired Dominion in 2025) referred Snopes to the Clerk's statement. David Becker (CEIR) called the claim \"baseless\", and Pamela Smith (Verified Voting) said the device is wiped clean after each voting session (AFP). Fact checks: Snopes (Rae Deng, Oct. 23) rated it false \"with the caveat that it is still unclear what, exactly, the TikTok user experienced,\" and judged a misread undervote prompt the likely explanation. AFP (Cecilia Clemens Vargas Lugo, Oct. 23) called the claims unsubstantiated and reported that she has \"partially backtracked\" on the race while still saying she \"knows for a fact\" the message appeared. Policy Wire (Oct. 23) rated it false but overstates her retraction: she conceded the race, not the message. Caveats: Snopes notes that in her Oct. 19 account the message went away once she had selected all three candidates, which fits an undervote prompt; her later account, in which it reappeared on each reselection, does not fit as neatly. No second voter has reported the message, no photo exists, and no public-records request or device-log review has been reported. The Clerk's public test of the voting equipment is set for Tuesday, Oct. 27, 2026, at 9 AM at the Elections Operations Center, 1330 S. 54th Ave., Cicero. Status Disputed (official denial): state, county and village officials say the equipment cannot display such a message and that it could not be reproduced. Her first-hand claim about the message is unverified, not disproven, because no one has reproduced it and no record of her session has been produced. Her race attribution was wrong, and she has admitted it. Catalog point: an on-screen message seen by one voter leaves no trace once the session ends, so only a photo, a second witness, or the device's logs could settle it. A hand-marked paper ballot shows the voter nothing but the candidates.", "sources": [{"title": "TikTok — Mary (@bauerbabe21), video 1, \"Weird stuff\" (posted Oct. 19, 2026, 3:02 PM ET; 74 s; her original)", "url": "https://www.tiktok.com/@bauerbabe21/video/7698456351596432671", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-1.mp4"}, {"title": "TikTok — Mary (@bauerbabe21), video 2, \"To date my biggest regret\" (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 1:18 PM ET; 118 s; follow-up)", "url": "https://www.tiktok.com/@bauerbabe21/video/7698800503664217375", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-2.mp4"}, {"title": "X — Wall Street Apes (@WallStreetApes), repost of her first video (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 7:00 AM ET; about 990,000 views at capture)", "url": "https://x.com/WallStreetApes/status/2112499073525710907", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__wallstreetapes-x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Wall Street Apes post, fxtwitter JSON (archived Oct. 20, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/WallStreetApes/status/2112499073525710907", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__wallstreetapes-x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), repost of her first video with commentary naming Dominion (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 12:00 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2112574756754948579", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__thescif-x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — @Saveourrepubli3, her follow-up video, sent to Mark (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 5:36 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/Saveourrepubli3/status/2112659142821167290", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__saveourrepubli3-x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Cook County Commissioner Sean Morrison (@SeanMMorrison), reply: \"I find this 99.99% false\" (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 9:22 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/SeanMMorrison/status/2112534805158269293", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__seanmmorrison-x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — Early Voting Sites, Suburban Cook County, Nov. 3, 2026 General Election (map PDF; Streamwood Village Hall, 351 E Irving Park Rd; early voting Oct. 19 – Nov. 2)", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/publication/early-voting-sites-map", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__clerk-ev-sites-nov2026.pdf"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — Early Voting Sites map image, Nov. 3, 2026 (full-size PNG)", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/sites/default/files/2026-09/early-voting-sites---11.03.26.png", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__clerk-ev-sites-nov2026.png"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — 2026 Elections calendar (Oct. 19, 2026: first day of expanded early voting)", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/elections/current-elections/2026-elections", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__clerk-2026-elections.html"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — Early Voting Locations", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/elections/ways-to-vote/early-voting/early-voting-locations", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__clerk-early-voting-locations.html"}, {"title": "Cook County — Contract No. 1718-16167, Amendment No. 1, Election Equipment, Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. (contract Oct. 1, 2018 – Sept. 30, 2028)", "url": "https://opendocs.cookcountyil.gov/procurement/modifications/1718-16167-A1.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__cook-dominion-contract-1718-16167-a1.pdf"}, {"title": "Illinois State Board of Elections — Voting Systems Equipment Log (Cook: Dominion, ImageCastX/ICP2, Democracy Suite 5.6-B IL; copy hosted by FactCheck.org, 2020)", "url": "https://cdn.factcheck.org/UploadedFiles/VotingEquipmentLog_637418065269062066.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__isbe-voting-equipment-log.pdf"}, {"title": "TikTok — Mary (@bauerbabe21), video 3, \"I had what the section was wrong, but I know the error message still …\" (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 10:17 PM ET; 285 s; mp4 held locally, manifest linked)", "url": "https://www.tiktok.com/@bauerbabe21/video/7698939371797581086", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-3.json"}, {"title": "YouTube — Snopes, \"TikTok user clarifies her comments on alleged voter interference\" (re-upload of video 3, Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U_bvyBt71p8", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__youtube-snopes-reupload.mp4"}, {"title": "Snopes — Illinois voting machines aren't flagging Republican picks as unpopular, despite video claiming otherwise (Rae Deng, Oct. 23, 2026; rated false with the caveat that it is unclear what she saw)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/illinois-voting-machines-republicans/"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Illinois county targeted with unsubstantiated claims of 'rigged' voting machines (Cecilia Clemens Vargas Lugo, Oct. 23, 2026; Herrera Oct. 20, Gordon Oct. 21, Becker, Smith; curl 403, text via WebFetch)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.D3WF6NQ"}, {"title": "The Center Square — Illinois elections board calls viral voting machine allegation 'hoax' (Oct. 23, 2026; ISBE's Matt Dietrich)", "url": "https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/article_3a025b76-109e-444d-b4fd-309d58f375d4.html"}, {"title": "Injustice Watch — Dwindling competition in Cook County judicial primary races (Feb. 13, 2026; no Republican filed for any Cook County judgeship)", "url": "https://www.injusticewatch.org/judges/judicial-elections/2026-primary/2026/cook-county-judicial-primary-elections-draw-few-candidates/"}, {"title": "WTTW Voters' Guide — MWRD Commissioner, 6-year term (Pennington, Rueckert, Shestokas R; Brady-Davis, Corral Sepúlveda, McElroy Kirkwood D)", "url": "https://news.wttw.com/elections/voters-guide/2026-general/races/mwrd-commissioner-6-year-term"}, {"title": "WTTW Voters' Guide — MWRD Commissioner, unexpired 2-year term (Cameron \"Cam\" Davis, sole candidate)", "url": "https://news.wttw.com/elections/voters-guide/2026-general/races/mwrd-commissioner-2-year-term"}, {"title": "Policy Wire — Fact check: viral claims of 'biased' voting machines in Cook County debunked (Oct. 23, 2026, 7:13 PM ET; overstates her retraction)", "url": "https://policy-wire.com/policy-wire-fact-check-viral-claims-of-biased-voting-machines-in-cook-county-debunked/"}, {"title": "Cook County Clerk — Notice of Public Test of voting equipment, Nov. 3, 2026 General Election (Tue., Oct. 27, 2026, 9 AM, 1330 S. 54th Ave., Cicero; PDF)", "url": "https://www.cookcountyclerkil.gov/sites/default/files/pdfs/public-test_110326.pdf"}, {"title": "X — JP (@GR7314), reply to The SCIF: \"there are literally no Republican candidates running for that office in that county this year\" (Oct. 24, 2026, 9:38 AM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/GR7314/status/2113988497468178818", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__gr7314-x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X — Mark Cook (@PatriotMarkCook), reply to The SCIF: \"Let's get proof before we throw out accusations.\" (Oct. 20, 2026, 4:00 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/PatriotMarkCook/status/2112635102861971531", "local": "/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__patriotmarkcook-x-post-fxtwitter.json"}], "notes": "Relabeled Citizen Testimony -> Disputed on 2026-10-24 at Mark's direction (official denials by ISBE, the Cook County Clerk and the Streamwood village clerk; not Confirmed). Text states the message claim is unverified rather than disproven and the race attribution was admitted wrong. Leaf kept: 9 > Electronic Voting Machines > Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD) > 'Program touchscreen voting machines to display messages that discourage or steer a voter's choices, such as a warning that the selected candidate is not a popular choice.' That leaf matches a steering-message claim exactly; the related 5 > On-screen steering leaf (Davidson TN card) covers preselection or defaults, not warning messages. Follow-up TikTok 7698939371797581086: createTime 1792549025 = Oct. 20, 2026, 10:17 PM ET; AFP and the brief say Oct. 22, so the TikTok timestamp is used. Its mp4 is 30.5 MB (h264, over the 20 MB limit), so it is held locally rather than re-encoded; the Snopes YouTube re-upload of the same video (360x640 h264) is published. Transcribed by machine (faster-whisper) and checked against Snopes's quotes. MWRD candidates verified against the WTTW voter guide. The name Mary Bauer comes from The Center Square. The Township employee who wrote the email is unnamed. Mark's own Oct. 20 reply: \"Let's get proof before we throw out accusations.\" Sources: Snopes, Center Square, Injustice Watch, Policy Wire and the Clerk PDF return HTTP 200 to curl; AFP returns 403 to curl, so its text was verified via WebFetch. Nothing redacted. Carded as Citizen Testimony at Mark's direction (2026-10-20) after he reviewed both videos and judged her believable. It had been on EMon's hold list as a single unverified post. Date: Oct. 19, 2026. Her first TikTok (\"Weird stuff\") was posted Oct. 19, 2026 at 3:02 PM ET and says \"I voted this morning\"; Oct. 19 was also the first day of suburban early voting at Streamwood, per the Clerk. Her second TikTok (Oct. 20, 1:18 PM ET) refers to \"the TikTok I made yesterday,\" which agrees. The Wall Street Apes repost's video was uploaded to X Oct. 20 at 2:52 AM ET. Location: she says \"Town Hall in Streamwood on Irving Park Road.\" The Clerk's Nov. 2026 map lists Streamwood Village Hall, 351 E Irving Park Rd, Streamwood 60107, as a municipal early-voting site. Vendor: Mary did not name a brand. Dominion was named by Wall Street Apes and by the commentator in The SCIF's version, and it is supported by Cook County's Dominion election-equipment contract and the ISBE equipment log. The specific device she used was not identified. Quote attribution: EMon's hold note called the source of the \"99.99% false\" remark the county GOP chair. The speaker is Sean Morrison, a sitting Cook County Commissioner who chaired the Cook County Republican Party from 2016 to 2025; the current chairman is Terry Carr. Unconfirmed: what the screen showed (no photo), whether any office opened an inquiry, and the identity of the \"Office of Voter Integrity\" contact (no Illinois office by that exact name was verified). Transcripts were checked against Mark's transcripts and a machine transcription. The two TikTok originals are wired as the main videos, and the X reposts are archived too. Nothing redacted. Transcripts (2026-10-24): all seven videos were transcribed locally by the Archiver with faster-whisper large-v3; each .txt lists its corrections, and the matching .transcript.json keeps the raw engine text and timings. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-1-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-1-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of Video 1, Mary's original TikTok (@bauerbabe21, \"Weird stuff,\" Oct. 19, 2026, 74 s): she describes the \"People are not typically choosing this person!\" notification in the circuit judge contest"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-2-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-2-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of Video 2, Mary's follow-up TikTok (@bauerbabe21, Oct. 20, 2026, 118 s): why she took no photo, who she reported it to, and the Streamwood location"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__youtube-snopes-reupload-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__youtube-snopes-reupload-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of Video 3 as re-uploaded by Snopes on YouTube (\"TikTok user clarifies her comments on alleged voter interference,\" Oct. 23, 2026, 285 s)"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__tiktok-video-3-poster.jpg", "thumb": 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"https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__x-video-thescif-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of The SCIF repost of video 1 on X (Oct. 20, 2026, 163 s), with a commentator segment that names Dominion"}, {"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__x-video-saveourrepubli3-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/il-cook-2026-streamwood-early-voting-screen-not-typically-choosing-this-person__x-video-saveourrepubli3-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of Video 2 as posted on X by @Saveourrepubli3 (Oct. 20, 2026, 118 s)"}], "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["Dominion ImageCast X (BMD)", "Dominion ImageCast Precinct (ICP2)"], "videos": [{"original_url": 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{"id": "mi-checkmyvote-2026-668-ballots-sent-twice-hancock-clerk-denies", "permanent_id": "C20261014-201922-11", "uid": "C20261014-201922-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261014-201922-11", "old_ids": ["mi-checkmyvote-2026-668-ballots-sent-twice-hancock-clerk-denies"], "seq": "C01407", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Let mail or absentee voters also vote in person (by signed statement, warning override, or provisional ballot) while reconciliation against the absentee log is manual, delayed, or done after ballots leave their envelopes, so double votes are counted and excused as confusion or error."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-26", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-26", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-10-01 to 2026-10-06", "state": "MI", "description": "Check My Vote, a Michigan election-data group, told the Daily Signal (Oct. 2, 2026) that the Secretary of State's daily absentee report file showed 668 absentee ballots sent at least twice to people with the same name and same voter ID number as of Oct. 1, almost all at the same address, with 635 in the small city of Hancock and Detroit a distant second; it said six cases appear to be the same person returning two ballots. Hancock Deputy Clerk Tara Dulong said the names she checked did not match what she saw and that she saw no duplicate returns; on Oct. 6 City Clerk Linda Kalinec said the office had mailed 649 ballots, each voter was issued only one, and no duplicate ballots were mailed. Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson's office did not respond. Status Disputed: watchdog analysis of official data directly denied by the clerk; no independent resolution yet. Catalog point: when the state's own absentee file and the clerk disagree on whether a voter was issued two ballots, citizens have no way to check — the reconciliation itself is opaque.", "sources": [{"title": "Daily Signal — Election watchdog says system allowed 600 duplicate absentee ballots in Michigan (Oct. 2, 2026; updated with Hancock clerk statement)", "url": "https://www.dailysignal.com/2026/10/02/election-watchdog-says-system-allowed-600-duplicate-absentee-ballots-in-michigan/"}, {"title": "Check My Vote — Michigan current metrics", "url": "https://mi.checkmyvote.org/current-metrics"}, {"title": "X — @DailySignal post (Oct. 5, 2026)", "url": "https://x.com/DailySignal/status/2107173250820116651"}], "notes": "clones-expand-2026-10-14 (Mark-approved Modified Clones expansion; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; X via free x search_posts_all + api.fxtwitter.com). Disputed. Watch for Hancock / Houghton County / MI BOE resolution, and whether the six double returns are rejected.", "related": ["ut-weber-2026-10-printer-envelope-stuffing-error-up-to-167-extra-ballots"]}
{"id": "de-supreme-court-fenwick-entity-voting-arguments-2026-09", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-23", "uid": "C20260925-185839-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-23", "old_ids": ["de-supreme-court-fenwick-entity-voting-arguments-2026-09"], "seq": "C00174", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Demographic Manipulation", "Artificial entities act as \"phantom,\" non-human voters that dilute the weight of real resident votes (for example, Delaware allows LLCs, trusts, and companies to vote in elections)."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-48", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-48", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "DE", "description": "On September 23, 2026 the Delaware Supreme Court heard ACLU of Delaware's appeal seeking to end artificial-entity voting in Fenwick Island municipal elections. Coverage notes ~200 artificial entities among ~900 registered voters, ACLU vote-dilution theory vs. town/property-owner counterarguments, and a pending General Assembly constitutional amendment (first leg passed) that would ban entity voting. Status Disputed pending the Supreme Court's ruling (and possible legislative fix).", "sources": [{"title": "Spotlight Delaware — Delaware Supreme Court weighs voting rights for LLCs, trusts (Sept 24, 2026)", "url": "https://spotlightdelaware.org/2026/09/24/delaware-supreme-court-weighs-voting-rights-for-llcs-trusts/"}, {"title": "State Court Report — ACLU of Delaware opening brief materials", "url": "https://statecourtreport.org/sites/default/files/2026-08/aclu_of_delaware-opening_brief.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/de-supreme-court-fenwick-entity-voting-arguments-2026-09__state-court-report-aclu-of-delaware-opening-brief-materials.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 10. Live dispute as of 2026-09-25."}
{"id": "ei-2026-09-020", "permanent_id": "C20261001-094909-02", "uid": "C20261001-094909-02", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261001-094909-02", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-09-020"], "seq": "C01258", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-09-23", "state": "NV", "description": "After DHS claimed in a July 16, 2026 letter that as many as 15,903 noncitizens were on Nevada's voter rolls, federal officials later said they had manually reviewed a subset and identified 185 people they believed were not U.S. citizens, using a July 2025 copy of Nevada's voter file. In August DHS sent Nevada only voter-registration (\"case\") numbers for those 185 (plus 6,218 unreviewed IDs) and declined to share names, dates of birth, or addresses needed to verify matches. On Sept. 23, 2026, Nevada Deputy Attorney General Greg Ott wrote DHS that state records show the 185 are citizens and that DHS provided \"nothing of substance to suggest otherwise.\" SOS Francisco Aguilar's office also noted that after the county-to-statewide VRAMS transition, the same registration number can have pointed to different people over time, so ID-only matches are unreliable. Status Disputed: federal noncitizen flags vs. state citizenship records; this is an operational/list-maintenance data dispute, not a proven finding of noncitizen voting. Distinct from ei-2026-09-019 (SCOTUS SAVE stay).", "sources": [{"title": "Nevada letter to DHS (PDF via Democracy Docket) — 185 are citizens", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/09/voter-roll-letter-to-dhs.pdf"}, {"title": "The Nevada Independent — 185 flagged voters are likely citizens, state says", "url": "https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/185-noncitizen-voters-flagged-by-trump-admin-in-nevada-are-likely-citizens-state-says"}, {"title": "FOX5 Vegas — SOS disputes DHS noncitizen-voter claims", "url": "https://www.fox5vegas.com/2026/09/25/nevada-secretary-state-disputes-dhs-claims-noncitizen-voters-defends-election-security/"}, {"title": "Democracy Docket — DHS noncitizen claims unravel in Nevada", "url": "https://www.democracydocket.com/news-alerts/dhs-noncitizen-voter-claims-unravel-in-nevada-as-state-confirms-flagged-voters-are-citizens/"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Nevada DHS 185 dispute (ei-2026-09-020)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "EMon ei-2026-09-020. Disputed federal–state voter-roll data fight; not proven noncitizen voting. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's...'."}
{"id": "ei-2026-10-008", "permanent_id": "C20261006-121437-01", "uid": "C20261006-121437-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261006-121437-01", "old_ids": ["ei-2026-10-008"], "seq": "C01282", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-08 to 2026-10", "state": "PA", "description": "Several separate efforts to find noncitizens on Pennsylvania voter rolls converged ahead of the Nov. 3, 2026 midterm. (1) On Sept. 24, 2026, U.S. Attorney David Metcalf (E.D. Pa.) announced election-related charges against four noncitizens, including three Philadelphia residents accused of a fraudulent 2026 registration and/or voting in the 2022 or 2024 elections; WESA reports this was DOJ's second round of Pennsylvania noncitizen-voting charges in September, after Sept. 4 cases in Carlisle and Harrisburg. These are charges, not convictions; defendants are presumed innocent. (2) DHS has claimed 14,576 potential noncitizens on Pennsylvania's rolls (part of a July claim of about 250,000 across four states) and emailed Secretary of the Commonwealth Al Schmidt its methodology with an offer of the full list; as of about Oct. 2–3 the state had not responded or received the list, so the federal figure is unverified. (3) Scott Presler's Early Vote Action group hand-transcribed Philadelphia non-juror (jury-disqualification) records and reported that roughly a quarter of names disqualified for noncitizenship matched active registrations, and is pursuing Allegheny, Butler and Chester county lists. The Pennsylvania Department of State says non-juror lists carry only names and disqualification reasons, not addresses or birth dates, so they cannot accurately be matched to the voter file. An Oct. 6 X trending summary linked the jury-list work to the DOJ charges and to Philadelphia removing tens of thousands of names; per the sources, the DOJ cases are separate and the large Philadelphia removals were routine inactive-voter list maintenance, not citizenship-based. Oct. 12 update: DOJ announced charges against four more Pennsylvania residents (Hacina Saadi, Paulo Silva, Jamil Ahmad, and Nighat Jamil), each with one count of voting by a noncitizen in the 2024 election, as part of 16 noncitizen-voting cases announced nationwide. Votebeat and Spotlight PA report this brings Pennsylvania to 11 people charged since September and found no evidence the cases are related or coordinated. As of Oct. 13, DHS still had not shared its 14,576-name list with Pennsylvania officials. Oct. 14 update: Jamil Ahmad, 50, of Philadelphia, a Pakistani citizen who was a lawful permanent resident at the time, pleaded guilty to one count of voting by an alien in the 2024 general election; sentencing is set for Jan. 26, 2027 per the U.S. Attorney's Office release, and he faces up to one year in prison and a fine. That plea makes his case Confirmed; the other Pennsylvania defendants remain charged only and are presumed innocent. Oct. 16 update: in a separate Middle District of Pennsylvania case, misdemeanor unlawful-voting charges were unsealed against Joyce Donovan and Nina Nyawara of Selinsgrove, Snyder County, Kenyan citizens and lawful permanent residents. According to the affidavit, each admitted voting in the 2024 general election (Donovan said her ballot was blank), and both said they asked Snyder County to cancel their registrations after a USCIS interview. Both were arraigned and released on personal recognizance (PennLive). These are charges only, and the defendants are presumed innocent.Oct. 23 update: the E.D. Pa. and M.D. Pa. U.S. Attorneys (David Metcalf and Brian Miller) jointly announced charges against nine Pennsylvania noncitizens accused of voting in the 2022 and/or 2024 general elections, in an investigation by Homeland Security Investigations. E.D. Pa.: Artur Kopacz, 50, of Philadelphia (Poland; 2022 and 2024, two counts); Alfredo Santiesteban, 73, of Philadelphia (Cuba; 2024); Osmal Loy, 70, of Fountain Hill (Cuba; 2024); Yehuda Peer, 30, of Merion Station (Israel; 2024). M.D. Pa.: Joyce Donovan, 38, and Nina Nyawara, 21, of Selinsgrove (Kenya; 2024; the Oct. 16 Snyder County case above); Joyce Pitts, 80, of Effort (Netherlands; 2024); Inna Henry, 52, of Harrisburg (Russia; 2022 and 2024); and Nourten Kuruju, 64, of Luzerne (Greece; 2022), who was charged by information dated Oct. 15 and pleaded not guilty and was released (Citizens' Voice). Eight of the nine are lawful permanent residents; Santiesteban's status was not listed. Votebeat lists Henry with two counts, while the South Philly Review summary lists only Kopacz with two. Kopacz's attorney, Chuck Peruto, told Votebeat that Kopacz had twice passed the citizenship test, voted while awaiting naturalization because he believed he was eligible, and has lived in the U.S. since age 17. Votebeat counts 20 Pennsylvanians charged with noncitizen-voting crimes since September and found no evidence the cases are related or coordinated. These Oct. 23 charges are Alleged; the defendants are presumed innocent.  Status Disputed overall: DOJ charging documents are Alleged (primary release); DHS's statewide figure and the activist match rate are unverified and disputed by the state. Distinct from Nevada DHS list dispute (ei-2026-09-020), NJ MVC glitch (ei-2026-09-023), and Maricopa SAVE/MVD referrals (ei-2026-09-024).", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, E.D. Pa. (DOJ) — Four aliens charged with election fraud (Sept. 24, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/four-aliens-charged-election-fraud"}, {"title": "90.5 WESA — Pennsylvania noncitizen-voting crackdown (Oct. 3, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wesanews.org/politics-government/2026-10-03/pennsylvania-noncitizen-voting-crackdown"}, {"title": "90.5 WESA — Activists use non-juror lists to challenge voter registrations (Aug. 3, 2026)", "url": "https://www.wesanews.org/politics-government/2026-08-03/activists-non-juror-list-voter-registration"}, {"title": "WVIA — Conservative activists turn to Pennsylvania juror records to purge noncitizens from voter rolls", "url": "https://www.wvia.org/news/local/2026-08-03/conservative-activists-turn-to-pennsylvania-juror-records-to-purge-non-citizens-from-voter-rolls"}, {"title": "Crime Prevention Research Center — Over one-quarter of noncitizens disqualified from Philadelphia juries were registered to vote (advocacy analysis)", "url": "https://crimeresearch.org/2026/08/over-one-quarter-of-non-citizens-disqualified-from-philadelphia-juries-were-registered-to-vote/"}, {"title": "Votebeat / Spotlight PA — DOJ charges four more Pennsylvanians with noncitizen voting in 2024; state total reaches 11 (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2026/10/13/department-of-justice-noncitizen-voting-2024-election-charges/"}, {"title": "Spotlight PA — Department of Justice noncitizen-voting charges tied to the 2024 election (Oct. 13, 2026)", "url": "https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2026/10/department-of-justice-noncitizen-voting-2024-election-charges-elections/"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, E.D. Pa. (DOJ) — Philadelphia man pleads guilty to illegally voting as an alien in the 2024 election (Oct. 14, 2026)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/philadelphia-man-pleads-guilty-illegally-voting-alien-2024-election"}, {"title": "PennLive — Feds say 2 noncitizens voted illegally in Pa. in 2024; Snyder County, M.D. Pa. (Oct. 17, 2026; curl 403 bot-block 2026-10-19, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.pennlive.com/news/2026/10/feds-say-2-noncitizens-voted-illegally-in-pa-in-2024.html"}, {"title": "U.S. Attorney's Office, E.D. Pa. (DOJ) — Nine Pennsylvania non-citizens charged with illegally voting (Oct. 23, 2026; justice.gov JS challenge to curl, URL retained)", "url": "https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/nine-pennsylvania-non-citizens-charged-illegally-voting"}, {"title": "Votebeat — New noncitizen voting charges in Pennsylvania with less than two weeks until Election Day (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.votebeat.org/pennsylvania/2026/10/23/department-of-justice-noncitizen-voting-charges-2026/"}, {"title": "The Citizens' Voice — Luzerne resident, 8 other Pa. non-citizens charged with illegal voting (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.citizensvoice.com/2026/10/23/luzerne-resident-8-other-pa-non-citizens-charged-with-illegal-voting/"}, {"title": "South Philly Review — Two Philadelphia residents among nine non-citizens charged with illegal voting (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://southphillyreview.com/2026/10/23/two-philadelphia-residents-among-nine-non-citizens-charged-with-illegal-voting/"}, {"title": "FOX 29 Philadelphia — 9 Pennsylvania residents charged with illegally voting as non-citizens (Oct. 23, 2026)", "url": "https://www.fox29.com/news/9-pennsylvania-residents-charged-illegally-voting-non-citizens"}, {"title": "EMon live monitor — Pennsylvania noncitizen-voter crackdown (ei-2026-10-008)", "url": "https://monitor.handcountroadshow.org/"}], "notes": "Refresh 2026-10-23 evening EMon ingest: joint EDPA/MDPA release charging nine noncitizens (Oct. 23); new charges Alleged; overall label stays Disputed (DHS list and activist match rate still unverified). Votebeat, Citizens' Voice, South Philly Review, FOX 29 curl 200; DOJ page behind a JS challenge (details from the three news reports). Count discrepancy on Henry noted, not resolved. Nothing redacted. Refresh 2026-10-19 AM EDS/EMon ingest: MDPA Snyder County case (Donovan, Nyawara; unsealed Oct. 16) via PennLive (403 bot-block; from EMon's verified summary). Stays Disputed overall. EMon ei-2026-10-008 (first_seen 2026-08-03, last_updated 2026-10-15; EMon status disputed). Refresh 2026-10-15 AM: Ahmad guilty plea (EDPA release, Oct. 14); one PA case now a conviction-by-plea, rest still charges. Refresh 2026-10-14 AM: third DOJ round (four PA residents, 2024 election; 11 PA total since September); DHS list still unshared. DOJ charges Alleged (not convictions); DHS 14,576 figure and Early Vote Action match rate unverified/disputed by PA DOS. X trending summary not used as a primary source and its conflation of jury-list work, DOJ charges and inactive-voter removals is not repeated. Cross-leaf: Illegal Immigration. Watch PA response to DHS list offer, further EDPA/MDPA charges, Allegheny/Butler/Chester county responses. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Registration; Voter Rolls' to 'Voter Rolls > Leaving bad records in (not purging them - why are they not purging? by who's...'."}
{"id": "tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-05", "uid": "C20261020-221915-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-05", "old_ids": ["tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit"], "seq": "C01478", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2026-04-20", "state": "TX", "description": "Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton opened an investigation of ActBlue in December 2023. In August 2024 he announced that, as a result, ActBlue had begun requiring card verification codes (CVV) for credit-card donations. On October 21, 2024, he sent the FEC a petition for rulemaking stating that straw donations \"apparently are being made on a large scale using false identities, through untraceable payment methods,\" and on October 24, 2024, he made a criminal referral to the U.S. Department of Justice. On April 20, 2026, he sued ActBlue under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, alleging that it misrepresented its donor safeguards and that his investigators proved it still processed gift-card donations. On May 1, 2026, ActBlue sued Paxton in federal court, calling the case politically motivated retaliation, stating that his investigators' three attempts to use an American Express gift card were all rejected, and noting that he has not investigated WinRed. On June 11, 2026, U.S. District Judge Richard Stearns in Massachusetts (No. 1:26-cv-11986) granted ActBlue a preliminary injunction barring Paxton from continuing the Texas case (State of Texas v. ActBlue LLC, Tarrant County) or filing a new one on the same conduct, finding that ActBlue was likely to show the suit was filed in retaliation for its fundraising for Paxton's Senate opponent, James Talarico. Paxton appealed to the First Circuit and filed his opening brief in August 2026, arguing that the federal court improperly interfered with a state consumer-protection case; the appeal is pending. Status Disputed: the CVV change is confirmed, but the gift-card claim and the allegation of large-scale straw donations are contested, the Texas case is enjoined pending appeal, and no court has ruled on whether any straw donations occurred.", "sources": [{"title": "Texas OAG — Investigation yields cooperation on donor credit-card identification (Aug. 8, 2024)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxtons-ongoing-investigation-actblue-yields-cooperation-donor-credit-card", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__texasattorneygeneral-attorney-general-ken-paxtons-ongoing-investigation-actblue-.html"}, {"title": "Texas OAG — Investigation uncovers large number of suspicious donations; petition to the FEC (Oct. 21, 2024)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/investigation-actblue-attorney-general-ken-paxton-uncovers-large-number-suspicious-donations-made", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__texasattorneygeneral-investigation-actblue-attorney-general-ken-paxton-uncovers-.html"}, {"title": "Texas OAG — Criminal referral to DOJ concerning ActBlue (Oct. 24, 2024)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-ken-paxton-makes-criminal-referral-doj-concerning-widespread-suspect-political", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__texasattorneygeneral-attorney-general-ken-paxton-makes-criminal-referral-doj-con.html"}, {"title": "Texas OAG — Lawsuit against ActBlue (April 20, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-paxton-files-landmark-lawsuit-against-actblue-deceiving-americans-lying-about-its", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__texasattorneygeneral-attorney-general-paxton-files-landmark-lawsuit-against-actb.html"}, {"title": "ActBlue — ActBlue Files Federal Lawsuit Against Texas Attorney General (May 1, 2026)", "url": "https://www.actblue.com/press-release/actblue-files-federal-lawsuit-against-texas-attorney-general/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__actblue-actblue-files-federal-lawsuit-against-texas-attorney-general.html"}, {"title": "ActBlue v. Paxton, No. 1:26-cv-11986-RGS (D. Mass.) — Order granting preliminary injunction (June 11, 2026)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mad.299811/gov.uscourts.mad.299811.55.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__courtlistener-gov-uscourts-mad-299811-55-0.pdf"}, {"title": "Reuters — US judge blocks Ken Paxton's lawsuit against ActBlue (June 11, 2026)", "url": "https://www.reuters.com/world/us-judge-blocks-texas-attorney-general-paxtons-lawsuit-against-democratic-2026-06-11/"}, {"title": "Texas OAG — Paxton appeals Massachusetts court order (Aug. 18, 2026)", "url": "https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/attorney-general-paxton-appeals-massachusetts-court-order-unlawfully-blocks-enforcement-texas", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-2023-2026-paxton-actblue-investigation-referral-lawsuit__texasattorneygeneral-attorney-general-paxton-appeals-massachusetts-court-order-u.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Litigation status checked Oct. 20, 2026: preliminary injunction June 11, 2026; First Circuit appeal pending. ActBlue's complaint also says the FEC has questioned about $883,000 in apparently illegal donations to Paxton's own Senate campaign; that claim was not verified here."}
{"id": "fed-2025-04-29-fec-mur-8333-mark-block-alias-actblue-dismissed", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-15", "uid": "C20261020-221915-15", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-15", "old_ids": ["fed-2025-04-29-fec-mur-8333-mark-block-alias-actblue-dismissed"], "seq": "C01488", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2025-04-29", "state": "WI", "description": "Republican strategist Mark Block filed an FEC complaint, received October 21, 2024 (MUR 8333), stating that someone used his alias, \"Bernie Cain,\" without permission and that he received email receipts for 386 ActBlue contributions totaling $890.61 that he did not make, listing a mailing address and card not associated with him. ActBlue responded that a real person named Bernard Cain made the contributions with his own name, card and address, and apparently entered Block's email address, which is why Block received the receipts. On April 29, 2025, the Commission voted 4-0 to dismiss under prosecutorial discretion, citing the low priority rating and the low dollar amount; it made no finding on the merits. On October 14, 2024, Block also sued a \"John Doe\" defendant in Waukesha County Circuit Court, Wisconsin, under the state's organized-crime law, alleging that a California American Express card had been used since May 2024 to make more than 385 donations worth over $884 to 62 committees in his identity, and stating, \"Plaintiff did not make, authorize, or consent to these donations.\" Block later described the matter publicly as a \"Bernie Kane\" smurfing and spoofing scheme. Status Disputed: ActBlue's explanation that another real person made the gifts was not tested by the FEC.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — MUR 8333 (ActBlue; complainants Mark J. Block and Stephanie Holderfield)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/8333/"}, {"title": "FEC — MUR 8333 EPS Dismissal Report (April 15, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8333/8333_06.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-29-fec-mur-8333-mark-block-alias-actblue-dismissed__fec-8333-06.pdf"}, {"title": "Campaign Now — Bernie Kane & the ActBlue Scandal (Aug. 1, 2025)", "url": "https://www.campaignnow.com/blog/bernie-kane-the-actblue-scandal-smurfing-spoofing-and-the-new-frontiers-of-campaign-laundering", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-29-fec-mur-8333-mark-block-alias-actblue-dismissed__campaignnow-bernie-kane-the-actblue-scandal-smurfing-spoofing-and-the-new-fronti.html"}, {"title": "Just the News — GOP consultant files lawsuit alleging identity fraudulently used to make ActBlue donations to Dems (Oct. 14, 2024)", "url": "https://justthenews.com/accountability/political-ethics/tuegop-consultant-files-lawsuit-alleging-his-id-fraudulently-used", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fed-2025-04-29-fec-mur-8333-mark-block-alias-actblue-dismissed__justthenews-tuegop-consultant-files-lawsuit-alleging-his-id-fraudulently-used.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. The FEC summary spells the complainant 'Brock'; the notification letters say Mark J. Block. Just the News article read Oct. 20, 2026: the suit was filed in Waukesha County, Wisconsin, so the card uses WI. The outcome of the state suit was not found."}
{"id": "fl-2025-03-12-fec-mur-8326-frost-actblue-split-dismissed", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-14", "uid": "C20261020-221915-14", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-14", "old_ids": ["fl-2025-03-12-fec-mur-8326-frost-actblue-split-dismissed"], "seq": "C01487", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2025-03-12", "state": "FL", "description": "In FEC Matter Under Review 8326, a complaint received October 9, 2024, alleged that Rep. Maxwell Alejandro Frost's campaign (Orlando, Orange County, Florida) and ActBlue disguised excessive contributions from unknown true contributors as many smaller contributions by people who did not make them. The complaint relied on 229 contributors who gave $7,859 through ActBlue to Frost on June 30, 2023, at the end of a reporting period, mostly below the $200 itemization threshold and many from outside his district, in amounts that matched what the same people gave to a state candidate that day. ActBlue and the campaign answered that the matching amounts came from ActBlue's feature that lets one donor split a gift among several candidates. On March 12, 2025, the Commission voted 4-0 to dismiss under prosecutorial discretion, rating the matter low priority with a low dollar amount; it made no finding on the merits. Status Disputed: the pattern alleged is the smurfing signature, but the FEC did not investigate it, and the respondents gave an innocent explanation.", "sources": [{"title": "FEC — MUR 8326 (Maxwell Alejandro Frost for Congress; ActBlue)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/data/legal/matter-under-review/8326/"}, {"title": "FEC — MUR 8326 Enforcement Priority System Dismissal Report (Feb. 26, 2025)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8326/8326_06.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fl-2025-03-12-fec-mur-8326-frost-actblue-split-dismissed__fec-8326-06.pdf"}, {"title": "FEC — MUR 8326 Complaint (Sept. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/files/legal/murs/8326/8326_01.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/fl-2025-03-12-fec-mur-8326-frost-actblue-split-dismissed__fec-8326-01.pdf"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Complainant listed by the FEC as Anthony Sabatini; a notification also went to Citizens Defending Freedom. Date is the certification of the vote."}
{"id": "overseas-never-resident-voter-fraud-claims-few-documented-cases-2024-2026", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-08", "uid": "C20261009-100620-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-08", "old_ids": ["overseas-never-resident-voter-fraud-claims-few-documented-cases-2024-2026"], "seq": "C01272", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-2026", "state": "Federal", "description": "Claims that overseas or never-resident registration is being used for large-scale fraudulent voting are Disputed on the public record. In 2024 Donald Trump claimed 'anyone can get a ballot emailed to them' under UOCAVA without identity checks. AP called that claim baseless, noting UOCAVA applicants swear to citizenship and eligibility under penalty of perjury and that local officials verify registrations. AFP found that the Heritage Foundation's election-fraud database had no overseas or military-ballot conviction other than the Kimberly Zapata case (a Milwaukee official who ordered fake military ballots; separate card). That is insider misuse of the UOCAVA channel, not never-resident voting. No court in the NC, MI, PA, or other 2024–2026 never-resident cases found fraudulent never-resident ballots; the disputes were over eligibility and procedure. Fairness note for PEP: few prosecutions also reflects how hard it is to verify sworn self-attestation for voters with no U.S. residence history. The lack of findings does not mean the identities were checked; it means no one has shown fraud. Status Disputed for fraud allegations. The verification-gap concern is Confirmed by the forms' design (see the PA and FVAP cards on this leaf).", "sources": [{"title": "AP — Overseas voters are the latest target in Trump's false narrative on election fraud (2024)", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/overseas-abroad-voting-election-false-trump-uocava-2405939da88948a5500a19a04324510c"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Pennsylvania targeted by unfounded claims of overseas voter fraud (Heritage DB: only Zapata)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.36L44P4"}, {"title": "Heritage Foundation — Election Fraud Map / database", "url": "https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud"}], "notes": "Cross-ref kimberly-zapata-milwaukee-military-absentee-2022 (Election Workers leaf). Counter-view card; keep Disputed unless a never-resident fraud conviction or finding surfaces."}
{"id": "tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-154527-01", "uid": "C20261020-154527-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-154527-01", "old_ids": ["tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video"], "seq": "C00992", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-10", "state": "TX", "description": "On Oct. 21, 2024, the first day of Texas early voting, voter James Carpenter (one Fort Worth Star-Telegram story calls him Tony Carpenter) said that after voting at the White Settlement Library early-voting site in Tarrant County, the paper ballot printed by the Hart InterCivic Verity touchscreen showed Kamala Harris for president although he had selected Donald Trump on the screen. Outside the site, campaigner Jess Glover filmed him saying: \"My name is Carpenter. I just voted in the White Settlement election. I voted for one president, checked it on the video screen. When I got the paper ballot, it had the other candidate's name on it. Check your paper ballots, everybody.\" Glover also filmed a second man, Lucas Clark, who said two people had come out saying their ballots were changed; he did not report a problem with his own ballot. Tarrant County GOP Chair Bo French shared the footage that day (\"Reports were that people who selected Trump on the screen were seeing Harris on the printed ballot\") and said it was escalated to the Trump campaign. The @BehizyTweets repost (\"voting machines are flipping their votes from Trump to Kamala Harris\") passed 7 million views within a day. The 16-second Carpenter clip was posted on Rumble as \"Tarrant County TX - Early Voters say their Voted are Being Switched from Trump to Kamala!\" (MJTruth channel, Oct. 21, 2024 8:55 PM ET). Equipment: Tarrant County has used the Hart InterCivic Verity hybrid system since Nov. 2019. The voter makes selections on a touchscreen, reviews a summary screen, gets a printed paper ballot to check, and casts it in a separate scanner. The touchscreen records nothing, so the printed ballot is what is counted. Carpenter told poll workers; his first ballot was spoiled before it was cast, and he re-voted and cast a corrected ballot. Official response: the Tarrant County Elections release (Oct. 22) confirmed that \"in one reported instance, a voter reviewed their printed ballot and found it did not correctly reflect his choice for President.\" It said the ballot was spoiled, that the county \"has no reason to believe that votes are being switched by the voting system,\" and that the matter was reported to the Texas Secretary of State. Elections Administrator Clint Ludwig (he succeeded Heider Garcia in 2023) said in an X video: \"What we believe to have occurred is that the individual did make a selection on the machine and that selection was printed on their ballot,\" and that this is \"not uncommon.\" County Judge Tim O'Hare (R) said \"they did some fairly rigorous testing\" and that Carpenter was the only one of about 58,000 first-day voters to make the claim. Commissioner Alisa Simmons (D) called it \"one unverified allegation.\" Hart InterCivic said its machines \"cannot and do not 'flip' votes,\" that the devices passed local testing before early voting, and that it was in contact with the county. French posted on Oct. 23: \"One person had an issue. Rumors of 'widespread' irregularities are not true.\" On Nov. 1, Lt. Gov. Dan Patrick corrected RNC co-chair Lara Trump's post that the \"error has been corrected with the voting machines\": \"There were actually no errors to correct once we investigated those few cases.\" He said fewer than 10 of about 7 million Texas early voters had reported a switch, and one of 591,885 in Tarrant. The voter's side: Carpenter said he checked his choice for president three times and \"did not press the wrong candidate.\" He said the machine \"should've been shut down and examined right then, but they continued to let people use it,\" and that he watched 30 or more voters scan their printouts without checking them. He said he was considering an attorney. The Star-Telegram asked whether that machine was tested after his report and got no answer. No pulled machine, post-incident test, Secretary of State finding, or Attorney General action was ever made public, and no lawsuit was found. Status Disputed: the voter's first-hand claim is that the printout differed from his screen choice; officials refuted it, attributing it to his own selection, without publishing any examination of the specific machine. The voter rejects that explanation. Established: a printed ballot showing Harris was caught by the voter and spoiled before it was cast; he cast a corrected ballot; no other Tarrant voter made an official report. Unproven: that the machine changed his selection, any calibration fault, and any affected counted vote. Officials did not reproduce or explain the event; they inferred user error. Catalog point: on a touchscreen ballot-marking device, an innocent mis-touch or calibration drift and a deliberately shifted touch target produce the same result, a printout the voter did not intend. Because \"the voter must have pressed the wrong candidate\" is a plausible answer, it can be given for any such report, here without a machine test being disclosed. The only safeguard that worked was the voter reading his printed ballot. By Carpenter's account, many voters scan without reading theirs, so an error the screen introduced would go to the scanner uncaught. Comparable: the Oct. 31, 2024 Laurel County, Kentucky ExpressVote video (separate card), where officials did reproduce a wrong-candidate highlight once and called it voter touch placement. Tip: NcFortwiter on X resurfaced the Rumble clip on Oct. 20, 2026 (\"Don't know if we'll see things like these this year or not\").", "sources": [{"title": "Tarrant County — Tarrant County Elections Update (news release, Oct. 22, 2024: one printed ballot did not reflect the voter's choice for President; spoiled; reported to the Secretary of State)", "url": "https://www.tarrantcountytx.gov/en/news/2024/tarrant-county-elections-update.html"}, {"title": "Tarrant County Elections (@tarrantelection) — Elections Administrator Clint Ludwig video statement on the spoiled ballot (X, Oct. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://x.com/tarrantelection/status/1848846892039643438"}, {"title": "Tarrant County — Election Security (Hart InterCivic Verity hybrid system in use since Nov. 2019)", "url": "https://www.tarrantcountytx.gov/en/elections/election-security.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__tarrant-election-security.html"}, {"title": "CBS Texas (KTVT) — Tarrant County man says his vote wasn't what he expected; urges others to check ballots (Oct. 22, 2024; James Carpenter interview)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/tarrant-county-voter-says-his-vote-was-flipped-urges-others-to-check-paper-ballot/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__cbs-texas.html"}, {"title": "Fort Worth Star-Telegram — Tarrant County voter says printed ballot shows different vote (Oct. 22, 2024; GOP election judge Helen Bundschu)", "url": "https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/election/article294357869.html"}, {"title": "Fort Worth Star-Telegram — Voting machine maker: Tarrant machines 'cannot' change votes (Oct. 2024; Hart InterCivic statement; Carpenter interview Oct. 23; county did not say whether the machine was tested)", "url": "https://www.star-telegram.com/news/politics-government/election/article294423374.html"}, {"title": "NBC 5 DFW — Tarrant County officials clear up ballot controversy (Oct. 22, 2024; Ludwig, O'Hare 'fairly rigorous testing', Simmons)", "url": "https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/tarrant-county-officials-clear-up-ballot-controversy/3677687/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__nbcdfw-2024-10-22.html"}, {"title": "WFAA — Tarrant County Election Administrator says viral claims of votes being 'flipped' are overblown (Oct. 22, 2024; videographer Jess Glover; Bo French; Simmons statement)", "url": "https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/tarrant-county/tarrant-county-election-votes-flipped-trump-harris-video-response/287-d527b989-8d2b-4a2e-ac06-ea278130bfce"}, {"title": "FOX 4 DFW — Tarrant County man's viral voting issue was likely user error, elections officials say (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.fox4news.com/news/tarrant-county-voting-issue-wrong-choice-president", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__fox4.html"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — No, Tarrant County, Texas, voting machines are not changing Donald Trump votes for Kamala Harris (Oct. 24, 2024)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2024/oct/24/facebook-posts/no-tarrant-county-texas-voting-machines-are-not-ch/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__politifact.html"}, {"title": "Snopes — Republican Official Clarifies Overblown Claim of Texas Ballots 'Flipping' Votes from Trump to Harris (Oct. 25, 2024; Bo French Oct. 23 post; Lucas Clark)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/news/2024/10/25/texas-flipping-votes-trump-harris/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__snopes.html"}, {"title": "Texas Tribune — Dan Patrick debunks claims about Texas voting machines switching votes (Nov. 2, 2024)", "url": "https://www.texastribune.org/2024/11/02/texas-voting-machines-dan-patrick-lara-trump/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__texas-tribune-patrick.html"}, {"title": "NBC 5 DFW — Lt. Gov. responds to social rumors of Tarrant Co. vote flipping (Nov. 2024; 1 of 591,885 Tarrant voters)", "url": "https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/lt-gov-responds-trump-campaign-sharing-false-claims-of-tarrant-county-vote-flipping/3687137/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__nbcdfw-patrick.html"}, {"title": "CORRECTIV Faktencheck — Harris statt Trump? (Nov. 7, 2024; the machine footage spliced beside the interviews in some reposts is a 2019 demonstration video)", "url": "https://correctiv.org/faktencheck/2024/11/07/harris-statt-trump-video-belegt-keinen-stimmentausch-durch-wahlautomaten-in-texas/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__correctiv.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Tarrant County TX - Early Voters say their Voted are Being Switched from Trump to Kamala!\" (short, uploaded Oct. 21, 2024 8:55 PM ET; 16 s; ~6.9K views at capture)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5jm4cd", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-page-capture.png"}, {"title": "Rumble short — saved page HTML (archived 2026-10-20)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5jm4cd", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-page.html"}, {"title": "Rumble short — video file (480p MP4, Rumble's top rendition, unredacted)", "url": "https://hugh.cdn.rumble.cloud/video/s8/2/9/z/-/-/9z--t.caa.mp4", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.mp4"}, {"title": "Rumble short — platform thumbnail (original size, unredacted)", "url": "https://hugh.cdn.rumble.cloud/video/s8/6/9/z/-/-/9z--t.qR4e.1.jpg", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-platform-thumb-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X — NcFortwiter (@NcFortwiter), tip: reply resurfacing the Rumble clip with a screenshot of its description (posted 2026-10-20 3:26 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/NcFortwiter/status/2112626635606274103", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — NcFortwiter (@NcFortwiter), parent post linking rumble.com/shorts/v5jm4cd: \"Don't know if we'll see things like these this year or not\" (posted 2026-10-20 3:25 PM ET; fxtwitter JSON)", "url": "https://x.com/NcFortwiter/status/2112626337437438380", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__x-post-parent-fxtwitter.json"}], "notes": "Mark was sent NcFortwiter's posts 2026-10-20 (reply 19:26:55 UTC = 3:26 PM ET with a screenshot of the Rumble description; parent 3:25 PM ET linking the short). This is a 2024 event, not a 2026 one (no EMon ping needed). Rumble short v5jm4cd was uploaded 2024-10-22 00:55:43 UTC = Oct. 21, 2024 8:55 PM ET by MJTruth (c/MJTruthTalk), 16.6 s, 270x480, 6,902 views at capture. Transcript (machine transcription, checked against the CBS/PolitiFact/Snopes quotes): \"My name is Carpenter. I just voted in the White Settlement election. I voted for one president, checked it on the video screen. When I got the paper ballot, it had the other candidate's name on it. Check your paper ballots, everybody.\" The clip does not name either candidate on camera; CBS reports he said the printout showed Harris. Name: CBS, PolitiFact, Check Your Fact and Snopes say James Carpenter; one Star-Telegram story says Tony Carpenter. Site: White Settlement Library. Machine: Hart InterCivic Verity hybrid (touchscreen BMD that prints the ballot, plus a separate scanner); the specific device model at that site was not reported. Status Disputed per catalog rule: officials refuted the switch (user error inferred), and the voter disputes that. It is not Partially confirmed: unlike the Laurel County, KY card, no official reproduced or acknowledged a machine fault, and the county's 'did not correctly reflect his choice' wording describes his report, not a finding. Not reported: the machine being pulled, any post-incident test of that unit (O'Hare's 'rigorous testing' is unspecified and may refer to pre-election L&A testing), any Secretary of State or Attorney General action, or any lawsuit. Same-day county release also disclosed a separate printed-ballot labeling error ('Railroad Commissioner' printed as the heading of the Presiding Judge, Court of Criminal Appeals race); candidates were correct. No separate card. The CBS story says 'two issues were reported' (the voter claim and the label error). Lucas Clark's 'two people' claim is secondhand and unconfirmed. Some reposts spliced a 2019 demonstration video of a machine beside the interviews (CORRECTIV); that footage is not part of this event. Archived: Rumble page HTML, rendered page capture PNG, MP4 (capture_video.py, SHA-256 a4c26799...), poster frame (orig + 320px WebP thumb), and Rumble platform thumbnail. Also archived: the NcFortwiter reply (capture_x_post.py via fxtwitter: capture PNG, JSON, screenshot photo orig + thumb), parent-post fxtwitter JSON, and the CBS, NBC 5 (x2), FOX 4, PolitiFact, Snopes, Texas Tribune, CORRECTIV and Tarrant election-security pages. The Star-Telegram pages time out and WFAA returns 403 to curl, so they are linked only. The county news-release URL returned 404 to curl on 2026-10-20 (its text was verified via search) and is linked only. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__x-photo-1-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__x-photo-1-thumb.webp", "alt": "NcFortwiter's screenshot of the Rumble short's description: 'Tarrant County TX - Early Voters say their Voted are Being Switched from Trump to Kamala!' (MJTruth, almost 2 years ago, 6.9K views)"}], "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["Hart InterCivic Verity"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5jm4cd", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 16.61, "bytes": 2054516, "sha256": "a4c267998a4eca1e63271ba234e48cd88e95ffb7171243a5be0ee6e7c142b546", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2024-white-settlement-printed-ballot-showed-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-161446-01", "uid": "C20261020-161446-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-161446-01", "old_ids": ["ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video"], "seq": "C01460", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-10-31", "state": "AR", "description": "On Oct. 31, 2024, during early voting in Faulkner County, Arkansas, TikTok user @chelsea.miguez posted a roughly 18-second video of an ES&S ExpressVote ballot-marking touchscreen, captioned on screen \"Well, it's not just a conspiracy. It happened to me, too. What do you think?\" Her post said her daughter wanted to touch each selection and that \"even when I tried, it didn't allow the change at first.\" In the clip a child presses toward the small box beside Donald J. Trump while an adult hand hovers over the screen; the Kamala D. Harris field (third on the list) highlights, and a few seconds later Trump is selected. The clip spread on TikTok, X, Rumble, Instagram and Facebook, including the MJTruth Rumble short \"Arkansas Voting Machine won't Allow the Selection of Donald Trump, switches it to Kamala Harris\" (Oct. 31, 2024), and was amplified by Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene. Official response: Faulkner County Election Commission chairman Rob Denning told Lead Stories the county looked into the video and that \"the person voting appears to touch the screen with their knuckle or thumb, which makes an initial selection for Harris... The voting machine (Ballot Marking Device) did not malfunction,\" calling it \"100 percent human error.\" State Board of Election Commissioners director Chris Madison said \"it looks like her knuckle touched the third name,\" that the device selects only one candidate, and that voters get a review screen, a print reminder and the printed card to check; he gave a public demonstration in Pulaski County on Nov. 1. ES&S spokesperson Katina Granger said \"Touch screen voting machines do not flip votes\" and that voters can touch anywhere in the candidate's box rather than the tiny check box. No report says this machine was pulled or tested, and no test result was published. Related Arkansas report: in Fordyce (Dallas County) an Oct. 22, 2024 secondhand complaint led local officials to pull the machine; Madison told PolitiFact \"they went ahead and did the calibration on the marking device\" and a test ballot ran correctly (see card ar-dallas-county-2024-fordyce-flip-claim-machine-examined-no-problem). Status Disputed: the video does show Harris highlighted after a press aimed at Trump, but officials and the vendor attribute it to a second finger or knuckle touching the Harris field, which is consistent with the footage, and no machine fault or changed vote was shown. Catalog point: as with Laurel County, Kentucky, an innocent stray touch, a miscalibrated screen and a deliberately shifted touch target look the same on video; the safeguards are the review screen and the printed card, which only work if the voter checks them.", "sources": [{"title": "Lead Stories — Fact Check: Arkansas Voting Machine Did NOT Flip Trump Vote To Harris (Nov. 1, 2024; Faulkner County Election Commission chair Rob Denning, AR SOS, ES&S quoted)", "url": "https://leadstories.com/hoax-alert/2024/11/fact-check-arkansas-voting-machine-did-not-flip-trump-vote-to-Harris.html", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__leadstories.html"}, {"title": "Arkansas Democrat-Gazette — Chief of state elections board demonstrates marking devices (Nov. 1, 2024; SBEC director Chris Madison on the @chelsea.miguez TikTok)", "url": "https://www.arkansasonline.com/news/2024/nov/01/chief-of-state-elections-board-demonstrates/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__adg.html"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Claims of machines 'flipping' votes in Arkansas are unfounded (Nov. 2024; Madison email Nov. 4)", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.36LD8UM"}, {"title": "PolitiFact — No, Fordyce, Arkansas, voting machines are not flipping votes (Oct. 30, 2024; Dallas County machine pulled, recalibrated, retested)", "url": "https://politifact.com/factchecks/2024/oct/30/facebook-posts/no-fordyce-arkansas-voting-machines-are-not-flippi/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__politifact-fordyce.html"}, {"title": "KATV — Arkansas election officials work to disprove 'vote flip' voting machine conspiracy theory (2024; ExpressVote in Pulaski County since 2018)", "url": "https://katv.com/news/local/arkansas-election-officials-work-to-disprove-vote-flip-voting-machine-conspiracy-theory-ballot-marking-device-machine-rigged-cheat-fraud-paper-integrity-2024-presidential-trump-harris-walz-vance-pulaski-county-state-board-of-election-commissioners", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__katv.html"}, {"title": "Rumble — MJTruth, \"Arkansas Voting Machine won't Allow the Selection of Donald Trump, switches it to Kamala Harris\" (short, uploaded Oct. 31, 2024 6:01 PM ET; 18 s; repost of the @chelsea.miguez TikTok)", "url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l00ft"}], "notes": "Mark asked for a review of every video on rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk/shorts?page=30 (2026-10-20). Short v5l00ft uploaded 2024-10-31 22:01 UTC = 6:01 PM ET, 18.6 s. Footage carries the @chelsea.miguez TikTok watermark; audio: \"Did you push right there?\" \"Yes, I pushed right there.\" Vendor ES&S per Lead Stories/ES&S and KATV (ExpressVote). Kept on the calibration leaf (a touch on one candidate highlighted another), not the straight-ticket leaf. The Fordyce card from the state-by-state batch is a separate event and is cross-referenced, not duplicated. AFP is linked only (403 to curl). 2024 event; no EMon ping. MJTruth (rumble.com/c/MJTruthTalk) is credited only as the host of the repost, not as a source of facts. Nothing redacted.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video-poster-thumb.webp", "alt": "Poster frame of the Rumble short (18 s): a child's finger presses the Trump field on a Faulkner County, Arkansas ES&S ExpressVote touchscreen while an adult hand hovers; the Harris field highlights, then Trump is selected"}], "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ES&S ExpressVote"], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://rumble.com/shorts/v5l00ft", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 18.567, "bytes": 4807845, "sha256": "57f67319d706c42e8e47dd855b8a3f13ae338c5903ffe4599534ca3b11b884b2", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/ar-faulkner-2024-expressvote-knuckle-press-highlights-harris-viral-video__rumble-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ar-dallas-county-2024-fordyce-flip-claim-machine-examined-no-problem", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-31", "uid": "C20261020-160717-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-31", "old_ids": ["ar-dallas-county-2024-fordyce-flip-claim-machine-examined-no-problem"], "seq": "C01024", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-10-22", "state": "AR", "description": "On Oct. 22, 2024, a Facebook screenshot said \"a friend of ours in Fordyce, AR\" (Dallas County, Arkansas) voted early and found the machine had changed his votes in two races from the Republican to the Democratic candidate. Election workers examined the machine after the complaint and found no problems. Chris Madison, director of the Arkansas State Board of Election Commissioners, said such complaints usually come from voter mistakes, such as bumping the wrong name with a finger, and that the ballot is spoiled and the voter votes again; he urged voters to use the stylus. Arkansas uses ES&S equipment. PolitiFact rated the claim Pants on Fire. Status Disputed: a secondhand claim; the machine was examined and no problem was found. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — No, Fordyce, Arkansas, voting machines are not flipping votes from Republican to Democrat (Oct. 30, 2024)", "url": "https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2024/oct/30/facebook-posts/no-fordyce-arkansas-voting-machines-are-not-flippi/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ar-dallas-county-2024-fordyce-flip-claim-machine-examined-no-problem__pfar2024.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 1 (pfar2024). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["ES&S"], "vendor_models": ["ExpressVote BMD"]}
{"id": "multi-2024-10-22-cnn-elderly-donors-winred-actblue-recurring", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-23", "uid": "C20261020-221915-23", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-23", "old_ids": ["multi-2024-10-22-cnn-elderly-donors-winred-actblue-recurring"], "seq": "C01496", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-10-22", "state": "Multi-state", "description": "On October 22, 2024, CNN published an investigation, based on more than 1,000 reports filed with government agencies and consumer groups, campaign-finance data and interviews with dozens of donors and families, showing that hundreds of elderly donors, including people with dementia, gave away millions of dollars through WinRed and ActBlue. From January 2022 through June 2024, the Federal Trade Commission received 803 complaints about WinRed and 120 about ActBlue. One 82-year-old Baltimore woman did not realize she had given Republicans more than $350,000 since 2020; in all, Republican candidates and causes took in nearly $4 million from the elderly donors CNN examined, and Democratic campaigns also received such money. CNN identified pre-checked boxes that authorize weekly or monthly recurring donations as the main cause, and found that both the Trump and Harris campaigns had recently used them. CNN \"found no evidence of money laundering, instead finding that many elderly donors simply didn't realize how much they were giving.\" WinRed did not respond to repeated requests for comment; ActBlue said its platform gives \"donors full control\" over their contributions. Status Disputed: this investigation offers an alternative explanation for the retiree high-count pattern cited as smurfing on both platforms, namely real but unintended recurring gifts; it does not rule out that other entries were made in people's names without their knowledge.", "sources": [{"title": "CNN — Political fundraisers WinRed and ActBlue are taking millions of dollars in donations from elderly dementia patients (Oct. 22, 2024)", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2024/10/politics/political-fundraising-elderly-election-invs-dg", "local": "/archives/2026/10/multi-2024-10-22-cnn-elderly-donors-winred-actblue-recurring__cnn-political-fundraising-elderly-election-invs-dg.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue/WinRed smurfing research 2026-10-20. Balance card covering both platforms. Facts verified in the CNN interactive text. Labeled Disputed because it contests the smurfing interpretation of high-count retiree donors."}
{"id": "ga-whitfield-2024-mtg-dominion-bmd-printout-claim-voter-error", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-29", "uid": "C20261020-160717-29", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-29", "old_ids": ["ga-whitfield-2024-mtg-dominion-bmd-printout-claim-voter-error"], "seq": "C01022", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Change the touchscreen calibration so that selecting one candidate selects another. Many voters will not notice."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-10-18", "state": "GA", "description": "On Oct. 18, 2024, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene posted on X: \"Reports from Whitfield County, GA that Dominion machines are flipping votes.\" Her post shared a screenshot of a secondhand account about a \"family friend\" whose ballot-marking-device printout did not match the selections made; after several attempts the ballot and machine were voided. The Whitfield County Board of Elections said it knew of one instance among more than 6,000 ballots, that a poll worker helped the voter print a corrected ballot, that there was no issue with the machine, and that \"no machines have been taken out of service.\" Gabriel Sterling of the Secretary of State's office called it \"human/user error\" and said there was \"zero evidence of a machine flipping an individual's vote\"; Dominion said it was voter error. PolitiFact rated Greene's claim Pants on Fire. Status Disputed: the one documented case was attributed to voter error and officials said the machine stayed in service. Catalog point: a wrong-candidate selection caused by an honest calibration drift or touch-target error looks exactly like one caused by a deliberately shifted touch target. Because officials accept and repeat the calibration explanation, any such report anywhere can be closed with the same answer. Nothing here shows intent; the safeguard is only the voter's own review.", "sources": [{"title": "PolitiFact — Marjorie Taylor Greene says Dominion voting machines flipped votes in Georgia. That's Pants on Fire! (Oct. 23, 2024)", "url": "https://politifact.com/factchecks/2024/oct/23/marjorie-taylor-greene/marjorie-taylor-greene-says-dominion-voting-machin/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-whitfield-2024-mtg-dominion-bmd-printout-claim-voter-error__pfga2024.html"}, {"title": "ABC News — 'It's a lie': Georgia election official forcefully pushes back on false claims (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://abcnews.com/US/lie-georgia-election-official-forcefully-pushes-back-false/story?id=115107308", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-whitfield-2024-mtg-dominion-bmd-printout-claim-voter-error__abc2024.html"}, {"title": "Whitfield County Board of Elections — press release on the reported ballot (Oct. 2024)", "url": "https://www.whitfieldcountyga.com/news_detail_T15_R43.php", "local": "/archives/2026/10/ga-whitfield-2024-mtg-dominion-bmd-printout-claim-voter-error__whit2024.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; calibration leaf). Archived source copies: 3 (pfga2024, abc2024, whit2024). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"], "vendor_models": ["ImageCast X BMD"]}
{"id": "pa-reschenthaler-v-schmidt-uocava-identity-verification-suit-dismissed-2024", "permanent_id": "C20261009-100620-07", "uid": "C20261009-100620-07", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261009-100620-07", "old_ids": ["pa-reschenthaler-v-schmidt-uocava-identity-verification-suit-dismissed-2024"], "seq": "C01271", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "Allow overseas registrations and votes from identities that claim they've never lived in the U.S."], "leaf_id": "L20261009-100620-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261009-100620-01", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-09-30/2024-10-29", "state": "PA", "description": "Six Republican members of Congress (Reschenthaler v. Schmidt, M.D. Pa. 1:24-cv-01671) sued shortly before the 2024 election. They alleged Pennsylvania let people who 'could purport to be UOCAVA-eligible' register, receive a ballot by email, and vote 'without verification of identity or eligibility'. They also alleged counties were told not to try to verify the driver's-license or SSN-4 numbers given on FPCAs, and that more than 25,000 ballots went out this way. On Oct. 29, 2024 Judge Christopher Conner dismissed the suit: it was filed too late, plaintiffs lacked standing, indispensable county officials were missing, and no viable claim was stated. He noted that federal and Pennsylvania law exempt UOCAVA voters from certain absentee ID requirements. Pennsylvania officials called the overseas-fraud claims false and said rare ineligible votes are investigated and prosecuted. Status Disputed: the identity-verification gap was alleged but not adjudicated on the merits, and officials contest it. Confirmed background: UOCAVA voters register by sworn FPCA, and federal law exempts them from HAVA's first-time mail voter ID copy. That exemption is also why 1,409 Guilford County military/overseas ballots without photo ID were challenged in NC Griffin.", "sources": [{"title": "M.D. Pa. — Reschenthaler v. Schmidt complaint (1:24-cv-01671, PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.pamd.143897/gov.uscourts.pamd.143897.1.0_1.pdf"}, {"title": "M.D. Pa. — Memorandum opinion granting motion to dismiss (Oct. 29, 2024, GovInfo PDF)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-pamd-1_24-cv-01671/pdf/USCOURTS-pamd-1_24-cv-01671-0.pdf"}, {"title": "AP — Judge tosses GOP congressmen's lawsuit over Pennsylvania's overseas and military votes", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/pennsylvania-military-overseas-ballots-1cb8e5b1b4e564482125e1633642c06b"}, {"title": "AFP Fact Check — Pennsylvania targeted by unfounded claims of overseas voter fraud", "url": "https://factcheck.afp.com/doc.afp.com.36L44P4"}], "notes": "Identity-verification-gap card for this leaf. Not specific to never-residents, but never-residents use the same FPCA/self-attestation path. AFP's date for the dismissal ('October 2') is wrong; the GovInfo opinion is dated Oct. 29, 2024."}
{"id": "co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-12", "uid": "C20261020-221915-12", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-12", "old_ids": ["co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers"], "seq": "C01485", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-08-26", "state": "CO", "description": "Sonia Immasche of Fort Collins, Larimer County, Colorado, is among the most frequently cited examples of ActBlue smurfing. Peter Bernegger's FEC complaint (MUR 8378) lists her with 59,847 contributions, The American Spectator and Complete Colorado reported 57,138 ActBlue contributions totaling $234,441 over six years under five spellings of her name, and fecvisual.com shows her with 99,614 lifetime transactions. In an O'Keefe Media Group video posted August 26, 2024, she did not deny the gifts. Her own words, condensed: asked whether she gave that much, \"I may have. I don't know.\" \"I've been donating to ActBlue I think since it was started.\" \"No wonder my son was having a breakdown\"; she said he had told her she was \"donating way too much to politics.\" \"I'm legit as far as I know.\" \"Now I'm down to $10 and $15 at the most.\" \"My money is not being stolen. There's nothing there to steal.\" OMG noted that The New York Times featured her in 2014 as a top ActBlue donor, quoting her as saying giving \"can get addictive.\" Status Disputed: researchers cite her totals as smurfing, but her own account is that she has given frequently for years. The video does not establish whether every reported transaction is hers.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"Top ActBlue Donor Questions $230K in Donations: 'I've Been Retired So I don't Have Steady Income'\" (Aug. 26, 2024; 8:25)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuYZud5zOLA"}, {"title": "Complete Colorado — Colorado woman's 57,000-plus ActBlue donations raise eyebrows (March 19, 2025)", "url": "https://completecolorado.com/2025/03/19/colorado-woman-57000-actblue-donations-raise-eyebrows/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers__completecolorado-colorado-woman-57000-actblue-donations-raise-eyebrows.html"}, {"title": "Bernegger v. FEC, No. 25-cv-4072 — Complaint (Nov. 20, 2025), para. 16(c) citing Immasche", "url": "https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-content/documents/bernegger-v-fec-pls-compl-declaratory-injunctive-relief-11-20-25.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers__fec-bernegger-v-fec-pls-compl-declaratory-injunctive-relief-11-20-25.pdf"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Important for accuracy: Bernegger's court complaint says Immasche is on video stating she gives only $5 to $10 a month, but her words in the OMG video describe frequent giving and do not deny it. That is why the label is Disputed rather than Citizen Testimony. Quotes from auto-captions. Video archived with capture_video.py (720p MP4 over 20 MB, held off-line; poster published).", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KuYZud5zOLA", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 504.918, "bytes": 35059502, "sha256": "45474d2b6ed3998346d53210db638f3ac4f3ef40e56859e473962804f3b740c5", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers__yt-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/co-2024-08-26-immasche-top-actblue-donor-says-gifts-hers__yt-video.json"}]}
{"id": "tx-2024-08-07-montgomery-staples-henderson-actblue-denials-sheriff", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-10", "uid": "C20261020-221915-10", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-10", "old_ids": ["tx-2024-08-07-montgomery-staples-henderson-actblue-denials-sheriff"], "seq": "C01483", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-08-07", "state": "TX", "description": "In an O'Keefe Media Group video posted August 7, 2024, residents of the Spring area of Montgomery County, Texas, were shown FEC data attributing ActBlue contributions to them. Barbara Staples was attributed with more than 1,600 transactions from 2020 to 2022, including 53 in one day (OMG's article gives the total as about $13,000). Her words, condensed: \"That's ridiculous.\" \"There's no way I made all those.\" Asked whether she had ever given through ActBlue: \"No, never.\" \"I would never.\" Gerda Henderson and her husband were attributed with about $33,000. Her words, condensed: \"We had a lot of problems with [ActBlue],\" \"most all of that was all refunded.\" \"I gave $3 or $5 or something, but not everyone was okay by me.\" \"We stopped it all and cancelled it all out,\" and she said she had to shut down the card. The Montgomery County Sheriff's Office told OMG that \"it appears that both donors made voluntary donations through ActBlue; one was reimbursed when some of the charges were contested and the other cannot recall if only some or all donations were authorized.\" FEC data list 3,193 ActBlue report rows under Barbara Staples and 5,603 under Gerda Henderson in Spring, Texas, for 2019 to 2024; a row count can exceed the number of separate gifts because conduit reports can list one gift more than once. Status Disputed: the residents deny the volume, but the sheriff's office found the donations voluntary. Henderson's account describes unwanted repeat charges on her own card rather than gifts made in her name by someone else.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"TX Woman Denies ActBlue Donations: 'There's No Way I Made All Those;' TX Sheriff's Office RESPONDS\" (Aug. 7, 2024; 6:31)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrqQbM3ajcY"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. Spellings confirmed: Barbara Staples and Gerda Henderson (OMG article text and FEC records, city Spring). The video narration was captioned as $113,000 and $133,000 for Staples, while OMG's article says about $13,000; the total was not independently summed, so the card gives the 53-in-a-day figure and the FEC row count instead. Video archived with capture_video.py (720p MP4 over 20 MB, held off-line; poster published).", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rrqQbM3ajcY", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-2024-08-07-montgomery-staples-henderson-actblue-denials-sheriff__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 390.815, "bytes": 33164806, "sha256": "478a57e80cda68e5c015e1dd3745d38f7cf584cda3d2a1f728d2ea84f4fcb223", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/tx-2024-08-07-montgomery-staples-henderson-actblue-denials-sheriff__yt-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/tx-2024-08-07-montgomery-staples-henderson-actblue-denials-sheriff__yt-video.json"}]}
{"id": "pilf-v-benson-mi-2024-27k-deceased-claim-rejected-reasonable-effort", "permanent_id": "C20261008-203914-11", "uid": "C20261008-203914-11", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261008-203914-11", "old_ids": ["pilf-v-benson-mi-2024-27k-deceased-claim-rejected-reasonable-effort"], "seq": "C00281", "category": "5. Demographic & Registration Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Voter Rolls", "Leave bad or stale records in the voter registration database instead of cleaning them up"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212324-83", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212324-83", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-03", "state": "MI", "description": "The Public Interest Legal Foundation (PILF) sued Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson under the NVRA, alleging that about 27,000 potentially deceased registrants remained on Michigan's rolls. On March 1, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan granted Benson summary judgment. The court held that Michigan's death-record removal program was a \"reasonable effort.\" It noted that the 27,000 figure was about 0.3% of 8.2 million registrations and that nearly 8,000 of those records had already been removed. The Sixth Circuit affirmed in May 2025, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on March 2, 2026. Michigan says it has removed more than 1.4 million registrations since 2019. Status Disputed: PILF's claim that Michigan was failing to purge the dead was rejected at every level. The card is included for balance and shows where courts draw the line between stale records and a failure to make reasonable efforts. It is a companion to the Michigan Auditor General card, which documents a real but temporary reconciliation gap.", "sources": [{"title": "U.S. District Court W.D. Mich. — PILF v. Benson opinion and order (Mar. 1, 2024, PDF)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.miwd.103121/gov.uscourts.miwd.103121.180.0.pdf"}, {"title": "Sixth Circuit — PILF v. Benson opinion (2025, PDF)", "url": "https://www.opn.ca6.uscourts.gov/opinions.pdf/25a0116p-06.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan Department of State — Michigan is victorious in legal battle over voter rolls (Mar. 2, 2026)", "url": "https://www.michigan.gov/sos/resources/news/2026/03/02/michigan-is-victorious-in-legal-battle-over-voter-rolls"}], "notes": "Stale-rolls-2026-10-08 (Mark request: stale/moved/deceased/abroad records left on rolls so extra ballots go out). Balance card; courts found the failure-to-purge claim unproven."}
{"id": "mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony", "permanent_id": "C20261021-144406-01", "uid": "C20261021-144406-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261021-144406-01", "old_ids": ["mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony"], "seq": "C01513", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA)", "This system makes it easier for our military and overseas voters to vote, at the expense of making the entire system much more vulnerable to manipulation."], "leaf_id": "L20260925-165100-29", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20260925-165100-29", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2024-02-27/2025-03-25", "state": "MI", "description": "At a March 25, 2025 hearing of the Michigan House Election Integrity Committee, chaired by Rep. Rachelle Smit, Detroit activist Ramon Jackson and Pastor Lorenzo Sewell of 180 Church presented a written packet on Detroit elections, which the committee posted with its testimony records. One section, \"Presentation about Overseas Voters – Mary Beckmann, Ronald Morton,\" states that both are listed as overseas voters in Detroit and that a copy of the ballot mailing list for the February 27, 2024 Detroit presidential primary showed their absentee ballots mailed to Detroit addresses, Beckman's to Sussex Street and Morton's to 12842 Griggs, rather than to their overseas addresses. It says a vote was nevertheless recorded for each, concludes that neither could have lawfully returned a ballot, and adds that the owners of the Sussex house said they did not know Beckman. The supporting exhibit is a phone screenshot of a spreadsheet titled \"202401_Detroit_VotedAVandNCOA…\" with the two rows marked by hand. In the hearing video, Jackson says the residents of the house were immigrants who did not speak English and did not know her; he acknowledges that an overseas voter need not live at the registered address and that its residents need not know the voter, but says the Sussex house was not her last address and that the ballot had to be sent to her overseas. The City of Detroit Department of Elections investigated the Beckman complaint after it was raised at a formal session of City Council on March 5, 2024. Its findings memo to Mayor Mike Duggan, dated March 15, 2024, states that Mary Elain Beckman registered on July 23, 2018 as an overseas civilian living in Germany, has always voted as \"Outside Territorial Limits,\" and has always been registered at 12842 Sussex, which the Election Officials' Manual permits for a protected voter. It found no fraud. The memo does not say where her February 2024 ballot was mailed, and it does not mention Morton. In a separate federal suit, Jackson alleged that former Detroit residents were re-registered and that ballots were cast in their names in the 2017, 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2024 elections. The Eastern District of Michigan dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice on Oct. 18, 2024, chiefly for lack of Article III standing and without fact-finding on the alleged fraud; the Sixth Circuit docket closed the appeal on June 27, 2025. The clip has recirculated on X since August 2026. The Oct. 20, 2026 caption by @LightOnLiberty calls the ballots military ballots, says they were cast by illegal immigrants, and places them in the 2020 election. The testimony concerns two overseas voters, one of whom Detroit records as an overseas civilian, in the February 2024 primary, and neither Jackson nor the packet says who returned the ballots or describes anyone's immigration status. Status Disputed: a named investigator's documented testimony before a legislative committee, met by an official city finding of no fraud that does not address the mailing address. Catalog point: if a ballot for an overseas voter can be mailed to a domestic address the voter no longer occupies, the protected status that keeps the old address on the roll also makes it hard for citizens to confirm who received and returned the ballot.", "sources": [{"title": "Michigan House — Election Integrity Committee: testimony packet, \"Pastor Lorenzo Sewell and Mr. Ramon Jackson\" (March 25, 2025; 41 pp.; overseas-voter section on p. 3, mailing-list screenshot on p. 31)", "url": "https://house.mi.gov/Document/?DocumentId=49499&DocumentType=CommitteeTestimony", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__mi-house-elec-2025-03-25-sewell-jackson-testimony.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan House — Election Integrity Committee: meeting minutes (March 25, 2025)", "url": "https://house.mi.gov/Document/?DocumentId=49504&DocumentType=CommitteeMeetingMinutes", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__mi-house-elec-2025-03-25-minutes.pdf"}, {"title": "Michigan House — Election Integrity Committee page (testimony and minutes index; video archive at house.mi.gov/VideoArchive)", "url": "https://house.mi.gov/Committee/HELEC"}, {"title": "City of Detroit Department of Elections — memo to Mayor Duggan, \"Allegations of Voter Fraud,\" with findings table (March 15, 2024; Beckman entry on p. 8; curl blocked by a Cloudflare challenge 2026-10-21, URL retained)", "url": "https://detroitmi.gov/sites/detroitmi.localhost/files/2024-09/Voter%20Fraud%20Allegations_docs.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, E.D. Mich. — Jackson v. Michigan Secretary of State, No. 24-cv-11072, opinion and order granting motions to dismiss (Oct. 18, 2024)", "url": "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCOURTS-mied-2_24-cv-11072/pdf/USCOURTS-mied-2_24-cv-11072-0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__ed-mich-24-cv-11072-opinion-2024-10-18.pdf"}, {"title": "U.S. District Court, E.D. Mich. — Jackson v. Michigan Secretary of State, judgment (Oct. 21, 2024)", "url": "https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.mied.376572/gov.uscourts.mied.376572.23.0.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__ed-mich-24-cv-11072-judgment-2024-10-21.pdf"}, {"title": "PacerMonitor — Sixth Circuit No. 24-2006, Ramon Jackson v. Michigan Secretary of State (filed Nov. 20, 2024; terminated June 27, 2025)", "url": "https://www.pacermonitor.com/public/case/55933141/Ramon_Jackson_v_Michigan_Secretary_of_State,_et_al"}, {"title": "Michigan House Republicans — Detroit investigators testify before elections committee on systemic voter fraud (March 25, 2025)", "url": "https://gophouse.org/posts/detroit-investigators-testify-before-elections-committee-on-systemic-voter-fraud", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__gophouse-2025-03-25.html"}, {"title": "The Midwesterner — Detroit activists detail voter fraud in Motor City during House committee hearing (March 2025)", "url": "https://www.themidwesterner.news/2025/03/detroit-activists-detail-voter-fraud-in-motor-city-during-house-committee-hearing/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__midwesterner-2025-03.html"}, {"title": "WWMT — Detroit leaders testify before election integrity committee, claim 'systemic voter fraud' (March 2025)", "url": "https://wwmt.com/news/state/detroit-systemic-voter-fraud-testimony-election-integrity-committee-house-republicans-democrats-lansing-politics-ramon-jackson-state-michigan", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__wwmt-2025-03.html"}, {"title": "X — Bridgett Fertig (@LightOnLiberty), \"Overseas military ballots were redirected to Michigan and then filled out and cast by illegal immigrants in the 2020 election\" (Oct. 20, 2026, 7:30 PM ET; 1:28 clip of the March 25, 2025 hearing)", "url": "https://x.com/LightOnLiberty/status/2112687909648400828", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — The SCIF (@TheSCIF), \"MASSIVE overseas absentee BALLOT FRAUD operation EXPOSED in Michigan\" (Oct. 14, 2026, 9:08 PM ET; 3:06 narrated version of the same clip; source of the \"illegal immigrants\" wording)", "url": "https://x.com/TheSCIF/status/2110538144785273237"}, {"title": "X — Midnight Leaks (@MidnightLeaksHQ), earliest repost found of the clip (Aug. 20, 2026, 8:03 PM ET)", "url": "https://x.com/MidnightLeaksHQ/status/2090590502873673784"}], "notes": "Lead: Mark Cook, 2026-10-21 2:34 PM ET, X post by Bridgett Fertig (@LightOnLiberty) 2112687909648400828 (posted Oct. 20, 2026, 7:30 PM ET; 88 s video with a Profilo Politics end card). Mark asked that each issue in the post be handled separately. Issues 1, 3 and 4 of the post are handled on this card; issue 2 is in the research queue (mi-detroit-2024-beckman-ballot-cast-by-sussex-household-immigrant-claim). Issue 1 (overseas ballots mailed to Detroit addresses and voted): carded here as Disputed. Issue 3 (\"military ballots\"): not supported; the testimony names overseas voters, and Detroit records Beckman as an overseas civilian. Issue 4 (\"2020 election\"): misdated; the packet ties the mailing list to the Feb. 27, 2024 presidential primary, and the clip is from the March 25, 2025 hearing (speaker identified from the House banner, the committee minutes and the packet). The years 2017–2024 in other reposts come from Jackson's separate re-registration lawsuit, not from the overseas-voter section. Video transcribed locally (faster-whisper). Address note: the packet's last line reads \"2842 Sussex\"; the city memo gives 12842 Sussex, and the packet gives Morton's mailing address as 12842 Griggs. Neither the packet nor the clip gives a Seven Mile address, although Jackson says \"the west side on Seven Mile\" in the hearing. Jackson's broader re-registration claims (18 Detroit voters, all found \"No Fraud\" in the same city memo) are not carded; they are a separate issue from this post. Recheck: whether the Detroit clerk or the Secretary of State has said where the February 2024 Beckman and Morton ballots were mailed, and who returned them. Archived: House packet PDF (6.2 MB), minutes PDF, district court opinion and judgment, GOP release, Midwesterner, WWMT, X capture and video. Detroit memo blocked by Cloudflare; Wayback unreachable from the box. No vendor named. Nothing redacted.", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/LightOnLiberty/status/2112687909648400828", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 87.655, "bytes": 3683921, "sha256": "cce4a086eb9d38e00d98d15cd7c891b957840626adcdffe03862eb5f6e1a15d9", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mi-detroit-2024-02-uocava-overseas-ballots-mailed-to-detroit-addresses-jackson-testimony__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed", "permanent_id": "C20261020-221915-13", "uid": "C20261020-221915-13", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-221915-13", "old_ids": ["md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed"], "seq": "C01486", "category": "3. Financial, Campaign & Candidate Manipulation", "tactic_path": ["Campaign Finance", "Structure donations through conduit platforms such as ActBlue and WinRed into many small contributions under the names of people who never gave (\"smurfing\") to hide the true source of funds."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-221915-02", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-221915-02", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2023-03-29", "state": "MD", "description": "On March 29, 2023, O'Keefe Media Group released a video alleging a money-laundering scheme in which the names and addresses of Maryland residents were used, without their knowledge, for thousands of ActBlue contributions, using data supplied by the group Maryland 20-20 Watch. One Annapolis (Anne Arundel County) retiree was presented as having made more than 3,000 ActBlue contributions totaling over $32,000 since 2020; the donor did not answer questions. Maryland Matters reported on June 20, 2023, that a more precise FEC search showed 2,213 contributions totaling $21,739.64 over the same period, within federal limits, and that the searches in the video did not filter by transaction type or adjust for conduit double reporting. Adav Noti of the Campaign Legal Center, a former FEC general counsel, said the evidence did not \"even remotely\" suggest a laundering scheme, but he acknowledged that \"a bad actor could exploit the system in the way described.\" Eight Republican delegates, led by Del. Matthew Morgan, asked the State Board of Elections to investigate; the board declined because federal contributions are outside its jurisdiction. Sen. Marco Rubio also wrote to the FEC, which said it could act only on a formal complaint. Status Disputed: the counts were contested, and no donor denial was recorded.", "sources": [{"title": "YouTube — O'Keefe Media Group, \"O'Keefe Media Group Uncovers Potential MASSIVE Money Laundering into Political Campaigns\" (March 29, 2023; 9:22)", "url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnKCPK_OACc"}, {"title": "Maryland Matters — Expert: Claims of campaign finance irregularities are dubious (June 20, 2023)", "url": "https://marylandmatters.org/2023/06/20/expert-claims-of-campaign-finance-irregularities-are-dubious/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed__marylandmatters-expert-claims-of-campaign-finance-irregularities-are-dubious.html"}], "notes": "ActBlue smurfing research 2026-10-20. This is the earliest widely seen ActBlue donor video. Chris Gleason (@immutablechrist) says on X that he gave OMG the identification method; that claim is his own. Video archived with capture_video.py (720p MP4 over 20 MB, held off-line; poster published).", "videos": [{"original_url": "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RnKCPK_OACc", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed__yt-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 562.411, "bytes": 124791646, "sha256": "0b7058fd121c145de1c846b943eb6c143823c2dceca0e163cae9100ff47f97b5", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed__yt-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/md-2023-03-29-okeefe-actblue-maryland-donors-disputed__yt-video.json"}]}
{"id": "ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes", "permanent_id": "C20261028-132233-05", "uid": "C20261028-132233-05", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261028-132233-05", "old_ids": ["ca-2021-08-recall-instagram-claim-envelope-holes-let-workers-throw-away-yes-votes"], "seq": "C01600", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Different colors, holes, windows, or thin paper in outbound or return envelopes let a bad actor see what type of ballot, or even which vote, is inside, so it can be \"lost\" or swapped.", "Discard ballots seen marked for the \"wrong\" candidate"], "leaf_id": "L20261028-132233-05", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261028-132233-05", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2021-08", "state": "CA", "description": "During the September 2021 California recall election, Instagram posts claimed that the holes in mail-ballot return envelopes let election workers see a \"yes\" vote, and that \"they will throw it away if you vote yes.\" [1] FactCheck.org reported that Secretary of State spokesperson Jenna Dresner explained the holes help visually impaired voters find the signature line and let staff confirm the envelope is empty, and that Whitney Quesenbery of the Center for Civic Design said the design had been used in Oregon for more than a decade and \"I do not think there is any intent, or, in fact, probability this could be used to disenfranchise voters or throw out ballots.\" [1] Status Disputed: the discard claim was denied by state officials and no discarded ballot was documented.", "sources": [{"title": "FactCheck.org — Exposing the Holes in a California Recall Election Conspiracy Theory (Aug. 2021)", "url": "https://www.factcheck.org/2021/08/exposing-the-holes-in-a-california-recall-election-conspiracy-theory/"}], "notes": "Added 2026-10-28 (Mark t479u/t480u/t481u, Gouveia video gap-fill; bad-actor playbook framing lives in the leaf detail); facts and quotes re-read from the sources on 2026-10-28.", "related": ["ca-sacramento-2025-10-prop-50-envelope-hole-bubble-visible-2-of-8-orientations", "ca-ventura-2026-10-23-themidihead-envelope-hole-becerra-oval-visible", "ca-counties-envelope-hole-faqs-fold-ballot-so-marks-not-visible", "va-fairfax-2025-10-17-gop-letter-hole-exposes-miyares-oval-selective-removal-risk", "ei-2026-09-022", "nj-2020-usps-carrier-beauchene-dumped-99-west-orange-ballots-guilty-plea", "wa-king-2026-92-ballots-in-usps-bins-dumped-golden-gardens-park"]}
{"id": "mesa-co-trusted-build-ems-logs-overwritten-2021", "permanent_id": "C20260925-185839-31", "uid": "C20260925-185839-31", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20260925-185839-31", "old_ids": ["mesa-co-trusted-build-ems-logs-overwritten-2021"], "seq": "C00182", "category": "10. System-Wide & End-to-End Manipulation Framework", "tactic_path": ["Tabulation", "Wipe hard drives so no evidence of manipulation remains."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212326-37", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212326-37", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2021-05-25", "state": "CO", "description": "Forensic reports commissioned around Mesa County, Colorado's Dominion EMS environment assert that the Secretary of State's May 25, 2021 Trusted Build software update overwrote or destroyed EMS hard-drive data including audit/event/SQL logs needed for later forensic review. Colorado SOS materials describe Trusted Build as a required secure update with expected preservation of appropriate election databases rather than wholesale drive duplication. Status Disputed: forensic claim of destructive overwrite vs. official characterization as standard trusted build; catalogs as evidence-destruction concern without a criminal adjudication that the SOS wiped drives to hide manipulation.", "sources": [{"title": "Mesa County forensic report #3 (Tina Peters archive PDF)", "url": "https://tinapeters.us/documents/archive/2023/08/Mesa-county-forensic-report-no-3-signed.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mesa-co-trusted-build-ems-logs-overwritten-2021__mesa-county-forensic-report-3-tina-peters-archive-pdf.pdf"}, {"title": "Colorado SOS — Secretary's opening brief materials (Trusted Build context)", "url": "https://www.coloradosos.gov/pubs/newsRoom/pressReleases/2021/20210922SecretarysOpeningBrief.pdf", "local": "/archives/2026/09/mesa-co-trusted-build-ems-logs-overwritten-2021__colorado-sos-secretary-s-opening-brief-materials-trusted-bui.pdf"}], "notes": "Fill-15b leaf 14. Disputed overwrite vs. update.", "vendor": ["Dominion/Liberty Vote"]}
{"id": "pa-erie-2020-hopkins-backdating-allegation-usps-oig-no-evidence", "permanent_id": "C20261012-125218-08", "uid": "C20261012-125218-08", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261012-125218-08", "old_ids": ["pa-erie-2020-hopkins-backdating-allegation-usps-oig-no-evidence"], "seq": "C01366", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Mail Ballots", "Fake postmarks (the machine operator can set the postmark to any date)"], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-31", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-31", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2020-11-05 to 2021-03-17", "state": "PA", "description": "Days after the 2020 election, Erie, Pennsylvania letter carrier Richard Hopkins signed an affidavit, later cited by top Republicans, saying he overheard his postmaster telling a supervisor they were backdating mail ballots postmarked after Nov. 3 so they would appear timely. The USPS Office of Inspector General investigated and, in a report made public in March 2021, said it found no evidence that Erie postal workers backdated ballots. It reported that Hopkins had changed his account, saying he had not heard a conversation about ballots and had assumed fraud, and that interviews with postal and election employees, including those responsible for postmark stamps, turned up no backdating. Status Disputed: a first-hand allegation of exactly this tactic exists, but the only official investigation rejected it. Catalog note: the case shows how much rides on a postmark that only postal staff ever see applied, and how few independent ways citizens have to check it. Removing late-arriving mail ballots from the count removes the incentive.", "sources": [{"title": "USPS Office of Inspector General — Investigative memorandum, Case 21INV00469 (redacted; PDF hosted by 21CPW)", "url": "https://www.21cpw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/21INV00469.pdf"}, {"title": "Philadelphia Inquirer — USPS finds 'no evidence' of mail ballot fraud in Erie case cited by top Republicans (Mar. 18, 2021)", "url": "https://www.inquirer.com/politics/nation/usps-mail-ballot-fraud-erie-investigation-20210318.html"}, {"title": "AP News — Agents found no evidence of backdated ballots, report says (Mar. 2021)", "url": "https://apnews.com/agents-found-no-evidence-of-backdated-ballots-report-says-cbde6a7714bc1b7910f9c2c55fed1493"}, {"title": "Erie Times-News — Postal Service investigators: No evidence of mail ballot fraud in Erie (Mar. 18, 2021)", "url": "https://www.goerie.com/story/news/local/2021/03/18/richard-hopkins-erie-mail-ballot-probe-postal-service-finds-no-fraud-investigation/4746818001/"}], "notes": "evidence-sweep-2026-10-12 (Mon open-web fortify; WebSearch/WebFetch/curl; zero X). Disputed: allegation rejected by USPS OIG; OIG PDF via third-party host 21CPW (verify mirror if needed). AP 403 / GoErie 402 to curl (bot-block/paywall), URLs retained."}
{"id": "mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video", "permanent_id": "C20261020-102611-01", "uid": "C20261020-102611-01", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-102611-01", "old_ids": ["mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video"], "seq": "C01302", "category": "7. Voting Methods: Early, Mail & In-Person Exploitation", "tactic_path": ["Ballot Harvesting", "Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-212325-19", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-212325-19", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2020-07 to 2020-09", "state": "MN", "description": "On Sept. 27, 2020, Project Veritas (James O'Keefe) released a video alleging an \"Ilhan Omar connected cash-for-ballots\" scheme in Minneapolis (Hennepin County). Its core footage is Snapchat video posted by Liban Mohamed (also reported as Liban Osman), brother and paid campaign worker of Jamal Osman, who won the Aug. 11, 2020 special election for Minneapolis City Council Ward 6. In the clips he drives with dozens of election envelopes and says, in Somali, \"Just today we got 300 for Jamal Osman . . . I have 300 ballots in my car right now\" and \"You can see my car is full. All these here are absentee ballots.\" A separate clip has him saying \"Money is everything... money is the king of this world.\" The video also featured Omar Jamal of the Somali Watchdog Group, Veritas's main source, who said he believed Liban worked more for Rep. Ilhan Omar, and a face-blurred unnamed man who said people working with Omar and other candidates filled out ballots and that voters were paid. Minnesota law (Minn. Stat. 203B.08, subd. 1) normally limits a person to returning completed absentee ballots for no more than three voters per election. A Ramsey County judge enjoined that limit on July 28, 2020 (DSCC v. Simon). On Sept. 4, 2020 the Minnesota Supreme Court reinstated it (opinion Oct. 28, 2020), so unlimited collection was legal from July 28 to Sept. 4, a window that included the Aug. 11 primary. Paying for votes, filling out another person's ballot, and being paid to collect and return ballots were illegal throughout. Veritas said the clips were recorded July 1-2, when the three-ballot limit was in force, and one clip is stamped July 2; Liban said he thought it was late July. Official response: on Sept. 28, 2020 the Minneapolis Police Department said it was \"looking into the validity\" of the claims. The Hennepin County Attorney's Office said it had received no ballot-harvesting cases and that Veritas should give any evidence to MPD. No charges were ever filed against Liban Mohamed or anyone else over the Veritas footage, and no public MPD finding was released. City and county emails that the Center of the American Experiment obtained through a 2025 records request suggest the matter was handed from MPD to another agency over a conflict involving Council Member Osman, and a December 2020 county email appears to deny that any investigation existed. Disputes: Liban told FOX 9 he was collecting ballots for his brother from sick and elderly voters who had requested them through the campaign. He said he did not fill out or alter any ballots, that the open items on his dashboard were the envelopes the ballots came in, and that the real number was \"closer to 20,\" not 300. He said Veritas spliced a July clip with an unrelated August clip about money, and that Omar Jamal offered him $10,000 to say he was collecting for Ilhan Omar; Veritas called those claims baseless. Rep. Omar's campaign called the story false, and Jamal Osman denied wrongdoing. Researchers at Stanford and the University of Washington (Election Integrity Partnership, reported by the New York Times Sept. 29, 2020) called the rollout a coordinated amplification campaign. Reporters found no direct evidence in the video of money changing hands, and Liban was working for his brother's campaign, not Omar's. Separate case, not the Veritas footage: in a federal grand-jury investigation into misuse of Minnesota's absentee \"agent delivery\" process in the same Aug. 2020 Minneapolis primary, Muse Mohamud Mohamed, a volunteer for state Sen. Omar Fateh's Senate District 62 campaign, was convicted in May 2022 of two counts of lying to the grand jury. City records showed he delivered ballots as agent for three voters, who testified they did not know him or ask him to deliver them. He was sentenced in Nov. 2022 to two years' probation with six months of house arrest. No public court record or official statement links that case to Liban Mohamed, Jamal Osman's campaign, or the Veritas video. 2026 recirculation: on Oct. 15, 2026, Pulse Leaks (@Pulse_Leaks) reposted this 2020 footage on X (about 525K views) as if it were current. On Oct. 26, 2026, at 8:26 PM ET, the Mike Lindell Offense Fund account (@MLindellOffense), whose bio says it is \"leading the fight to secure elections,\" posted the same 10-minute, 25-second edit of the 2020 Veritas video, with the same @MrJohnJnr watermark, under its own text: \"He bragged about hundreds of absentee ballots in his car... 'Just today we got 300 ballots.' Collecting from seniors in their buildings. Campaign workers filling out forms. Picking up unopened ballots. Cash changing hands. Minnesota law says you can collect three.\" The post presents those allegations as established and ends with an appeal for its LindellPlan.com hand-count platform; it gives no date or context for the footage and adds no new evidence [18][19][20][21][22]. Neither 2026 post is a new event. Status Disputed: the footage is real and Liban admits he collected absentee ballots for his brother's campaign. The allegations of illegality (more than three ballots outside the July 28-Sept. 4 window), cash for votes, ballots filled out by campaign workers, and a link to Ilhan Omar were denied by the people involved and were never charged, adjudicated, or officially confirmed. Catalog point: once collectors other than the voter carry ballots in bulk, the public cannot tell from a video or from the count whether a given ballot was voted freely, and enforcement depended on a limit the courts switched off and on in the middle of the 2020 primary season. In this case, the only conviction came from the agent-delivery logs, the one place the process left a paper trail.", "sources": [{"title": "Project Veritas — Ilhan Omar Connected Cash-For-Ballots Voter Fraud Scheme Exposed in Minnesota: 'These Here Are All Absentee Ballots...Look...My Car Is Full...' (released Sept. 27, 2020; the allegation itself)", "url": "https://www.projectveritas.com/news/ilhan-omar-connected-cash-for-ballots-voter-fraud-scheme-corrupts-elections"}, {"title": "Hennepin County Attorney's Office — response to ballot harvesting allegations (Sept. 28, 2020)", "url": "https://www.hennepinattorney.org/news/news/2020/September/cao-ballot-harvesting-9-28-2020"}, {"title": "KARE 11 — Hennepin Co. Attorney: No ballot harvesting cases currently under review; MPD 'aware' of viral allegations (Sept. 28, 2020)", "url": "https://www.kare11.com/article/news/local/hennepin-county-attorney-no-cases-of-ballot-harvesting-currently-under-investigation/89-ac183a11-ef09-4f02-bfd4-f8101446ba4f"}, {"title": "Minnesota Reformer — Right-wing group alleges Minneapolis primary tainted by illegal voting scheme (Sept. 28, 2020; July 1-2 clip dates, July 28-Sept. 4 window, Omar and Osman statements)", "url": "https://minnesotareformer.com/2020/09/28/right-wing-group-alleges-minneapolis-primary-tainted-by-illegal-voting-scheme/"}, {"title": "Star Tribune — Trump seizes on conservative group's claim of fraud in Minneapolis election (Sept. 28, 2020)", "url": "https://www.startribune.com/trump-seizes-on-conservative-group-s-claim-of-fraud-in-minneapolis-election/572566832"}, {"title": "Sahan Journal — Why is President Trump obsessed with last month's primary election in Minneapolis? (Sept. 2020; what the video shows)", "url": "https://sahanjournal.com/digital-disinformation/project-veritas-ballot-harvesting-minneapolis/"}, {"title": "FOX 9 — Subject of Project Veritas voter fraud story says he was offered bribe (Oct. 2020; Liban Osman interview, raw video, Veritas response)", "url": "https://www.fox9.com/news/subject-of-project-veritas-voter-fraud-story-says-he-was-offered-bribe"}, {"title": "New York Times — Project Veritas Video Was a 'Coordinated Disinformation Campaign,' Researchers Say (Sept. 29, 2020)", "url": "https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/us/politics/project-veritas-ilhan-omar.html"}, {"title": "Election Integrity Partnership — Project Veritas #BallotHarvesting Amplification (Sept. 2020)", "url": "https://www.eipartnership.net/2020/project-veritas-ballotharvesting"}, {"title": "Ramsey County District Court — DSCC v. Simon, 62-CV-20-585, temporary injunction against the 3-voter ballot-return limit, Minn. Stat. 203B.08 subd. 1 (July 28, 2020)", "url": "https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/dscc-simon-order.pdf"}, {"title": "Minnesota Supreme Court — DSCC v. Simon, A20-1017 (opinion Oct. 28, 2020; Sept. 4 order reinstated the ballot-delivery limit)", "url": "https://minnlawyer.com/files/2020/10/A20-1017.pdf"}, {"title": "MPR News — Jury convicts DFL campaign volunteer (Muse Mohamud Mohamed) of lying in ballot fraud investigation (May 10, 2022; separate agent-delivery case)", "url": "https://www.mprnews.org/story/2022/05/10/jury-convicts-dfl-campaign-volunteer-of-lying-in-ballot-fraud-investigation"}, {"title": "Minnesota Reformer — State senator's campaign volunteer sentenced for lying to grand jury about delivering ballots (Nov. 7, 2022; separate agent-delivery case)", "url": "https://minnesotareformer.com/2022/11/07/state-senators-campaign-volunteer-sentenced-for-lying-to-grand-jury-about-delivering-ballots/"}, {"title": "Center of the American Experiment (Bill Glahn) — What happened to that 2020 absentee ballot scandal? (Feb. 27, 2025; city and county records on the MPD review)", "url": "https://www.americanexperiment.org/what-happened-to-that-2020-absentee-ballot-scandal/"}, {"title": "X — Pulse Leaks (@Pulse_Leaks), 2026 recirculation of the 2020 Veritas footage presented as current (posted 2026-10-15 4:20 PM ET; ~525K views at capture)", "url": "https://x.com/Pulse_Leaks/status/2110828290281742691", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X media — video thumbnail of the reposted clip (O'Keefe in downtown Minneapolis; original size, unredacted)", "url": "https://pbs.twimg.com/amplify_video_thumb/2110826435623485440/img/dSGBrUzo5aBobggw.jpg?name=orig", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video-thumb-orig.jpg"}, {"title": "X media — video file of the reposted clip (720p MP4, 10:25, 46.9 MB; held off-line, over the 20 MB publish limit; unredacted)", "url": "https://video.twimg.com/amplify_video/2110826435623485440/vid/avc1/1072x720/_bSgdEu8XHsxNILt.mp4?tag=29"}, {"title": "X — Mike Lindell Offense Fund (@MLindellOffense), \"He bragged about hundreds of absentee ballots in his car. 'Money is everything.' 'Just today we got 300 ballots.' Collecting from seniors in their buildings. Campaign workers filling out forms. Picking up unopened ballots. Cash changing hands. Minnesota law says you can collect three...\" (2026 recirculation of the 2020 Veritas footage; posted 2026-10-26 8:26 PM ET; web.archive.org save failed with HTTP 523, local copies kept below)", "url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047"}, {"title": "X — Mike Lindell Offense Fund post: rendered capture (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-post-capture.png"}, {"title": "X — Mike Lindell Offense Fund post: fxtwitter JSON (archived 2026-10-27; 756 views, 65 likes, 27 reposts at capture; no quoted post, no thread replies by the account)", "url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-post-fxtwitter.json"}, {"title": "X media — video attached to the Mike Lindell Offense Fund post (536x360 MP4, 10:25, 18.5 MB, SHA-256 3078807a…8422a; the same @MrJohnJnr-watermarked edit as the Pulse Leaks repost; unredacted)", "url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-video.mp4"}, {"title": "X media — poster frame of the Mike Lindell Offense Fund video (archived 2026-10-27)", "url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047", "local": "/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-video-poster.jpg"}], "notes": "Mark linked the Pulse Leaks post 2026-10-20 (posted 2026-10-15 20:20 UTC = 4:20 PM ET; 524,924 views at capture). The post reposts the 2020 Project Veritas footage as if current; the card is dated to the 2020 event. County: Hennepin (Minneapolis Ward 6 special election and Aug. 11, 2020 primary). Status Disputed per catalog precedent (pa-erie Hopkins): the allegation was denied by the subject, Omar's campaign and Osman, was never charged, and has no official finding. Confirmed sub-facts: the Snapchat footage is authentic, and Liban admits he collected ballots for his brother's campaign. Unproven: the 300 count (he says ~20), cash for votes, ballots filled out by others, the Omar link, and whether the clips predate the July 28 injunction (Veritas says July 1-2). Muse Mohamud Mohamed (convicted 2022, perjury, agent delivery, Fateh SD62 campaign) is a separate federal case; there is no card for him yet. A standalone Upheld card could be added later; it is not linked here. Archived with capture_x_post.py (fxtwitter, no paid X API; capture re-rendered at a taller window so the full post text shows) plus the video poster frame (orig JPG + 320px WebP thumb). Nothing redacted. The 10-min MP4 (720p, 46.9 MB, SHA-256 50f00856…168f) was archived 2026-10-20 with capture_video.py and is held off-line (local-archives-offline/2026/10/; over the 20 MB publish limit), so the card shows its poster frame and the Original link. The thumbnail shows an inset image of Ilhan Omar beside a car trunk overflowing with envelopes and a @MrJohnJnr watermark, both added by the reposter or an earlier editor; the inset's provenance is unverified and it is not established footage of the 2020 events. Pulse Leaks policy lines (SAVE Act etc.) were omitted. StarTribune, NYT and KARE return 429/403 to curl (bot blocks); the content was verified via search. Updated 2026-10-27 12:43 AM ET from Mark's X submission: the Mike Lindell Offense Fund (@MLindellOffense, 2114876229379912047, posted 2026-10-26 8:26 PM ET) reposted the same 2020 Veritas edit (video uploaded to X 2026-10-15 22:32 UTC; same 625 s duration and @MrJohnJnr watermark as the Pulse Leaks copy; frames checked). Not a new event, so no new card; status stays Disputed. The account's 360p copy (18.5 MB) is under the 20 MB limit and is published, so the card now plays the footage. Wayback for the post returned 523; local capture, JSON, MP4 and poster kept. Its hand-count/LindellPlan.com promotional lines are quoted only in part. Nothing redacted. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from the legacy duplicate heading 'Ballot Harvesting' to 'Ballot Harvesting'. Moved on Oct. 20, 2026, with Mark's approval, from 'Ballot Harvesting' to the new leaf 'Ballot Harvesting > Paid collectors gather completed absentee ballots from voters and return them in bulk.'.", "images": [{"full": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video-thumb-orig.jpg", "thumb": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video-thumb.webp", "alt": "Video thumbnail from the Pulse Leaks repost: James O'Keefe on a Minneapolis rooftop with the caption 'James O'Keefe here in downtown Minneapolis' and a Veritas logo, plus an inset image (provenance unverified) of Ilhan Omar beside a car trunk overflowing with envelopes and a @MrJohnJnr watermark"}], "videos": [{"original_url": "https://x.com/MLindellOffense/status/2114876229379912047", "archived_mp4": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-video.mp4", "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-video-poster.jpg", "duration_s": 625.197, "bytes": 18489105, "sha256": "3078807a0533b7fc83327896ea055df270d8ebb3a4c8d088e30c4c25dce8422a", "local_only": false, "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video--lof__x-video.json"}, {"original_url": "https://x.com/Pulse_Leaks/status/2110828290281742691", "archived_mp4": null, "poster": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video-thumb-orig.jpg", "duration_s": 625.151, "bytes": 46923762, "sha256": "50f00856739353dfd428467972a53c780beb62b034674ae4154892b2f1a5168f", "local_only": true, "archived_offline_path": "local-archives-offline/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video.mp4", "manifest": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/archives/2026/10/mn-hennepin-2020-veritas-liban-mohamed-car-full-absentee-ballots-video__x-video.json"}]}
{"id": "tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error", "permanent_id": "C20261020-160717-20", "uid": "C20261020-160717-20", "link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?card=C20261020-160717-20", "old_ids": ["tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error"], "seq": "C01013", "category": "9. Technology, Software & Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities", "tactic_path": ["Electronic Voting Machines", "Touchscreen Voting Machines (DRE and BMD)", "Program straight-ticket (straight-party) selections so the wrong candidates are automatically selected, or the voter's candidates are deselected, when a straight ticket is chosen."], "leaf_id": "L20261020-160717-01", "leaf_link": "https://cabal-tactics.handcountroadshow.org/?leaf=L20261020-160717-01", "status": "Disputed", "date": "2016-10", "state": "TX", "description": "In late October 2016 a viral Facebook post (nearly 200,000 shares) said an Arlington (Tarrant County, Texas) woman voting a straight Republican ticket found Hillary Clinton selected on the review screen; copies of the same story circulated naming San Antonio, Odessa, Amarillo and Houston, and Tarrant Democrats said they had reports of Clinton selections jumping to Trump. Tarrant County elections officials investigated, found the Hart eSlate working properly, and the voter (Foster) told FOX 4 the problem was her own error; officials said voters must take care scrolling after a straight-ticket choice and check the summary page. Randall County (Canyon) reported one straight-ticket voter whose party appeared to flip and found nothing wrong with the machine. Snopes rated the statewide claim Mostly False. Status Disputed: the documented case was investigated and the voter admitted error. Contrast: in Chambers County the same month, an ES&S straight-party programming error was confirmed (see tx-chambers-2016-ess-straight-party-omitted-race-programming-error). Catalog point: when a straight-party choice can land on the wrong party or drop a race, the outcome depends on programming and screen design that voters cannot inspect, and the official answer (\"voter error\") is the same whether the cause is honest or not. Nothing here shows intent; only voters who check every race catch it.", "sources": [{"title": "FOX 4 Dallas-Fort Worth — Tarrant County woman admits early voting problem was her fault (Oct. 28, 2016)", "url": "https://www.fox4news.com/news/tarrant-county-woman-admits-early-voting-problem-was-her-fault", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error__fox4_2016.html"}, {"title": "CBS Texas — Voter Error Blamed For Problems With Machines (Oct. 25, 2016)", "url": "https://www.cbsnews.com/texas/news/rumors-of-rigged-voting-machines-in-tarrant-county/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error__cbstx2016.html"}, {"title": "NBC DFW — Electronic voting equipment operating properly, officials say (Oct. 2016)", "url": "https://www.nbcdfw.com/news/local/electronic-voting-equipment-operating/2031183/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error__nbcdfw2016.html"}, {"title": "Snopes — Texas Vote Switching (Oct. 25, 2016; Mostly False)", "url": "https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/texas-vote-switching/", "local": "/archives/2026/10/tx-tarrant-2016-straight-ticket-clinton-reports-voter-admits-error__snopestx2016.html"}], "notes": "Evidence sweep 2026-10-20 (touch-screen vote-flipping, state by state, 2002-2026; straight-ticket leaf). Archived source copies: 4 (fox4_2016, cbstx2016, nbcdfw2016, snopestx2016). Linked only (blocked to curl/403/429 or not fetched): none. Status per catalog rules; nothing here claims intent. Nothing redacted.", "vendor": ["Hart InterCivic"], "vendor_models": ["eSlate"]}
